EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, RESPONDENT TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY.
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, RESPONDENT (2008)
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness.
Cojuangco (complainant) hired Atty. Palma (respondent) as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s relationship with
complainant’s family became intimate. He frequented their house and even tutored complainant’s 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa
Cojuangco (Lisa). Without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next day that
respondent informed complainant and assured him that “everything is legal.”
Complainant came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his (complainant’s) office an
airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented himself as “bachelor” before the
Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three
children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
Complainant filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa.
The CFI declared the marriage null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment. The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether
or not respondent committed the following acts which warrant his disbarment:
a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant;
b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage;
c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath
as a lawyer.
Professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable
requirement.
Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
We have somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., “that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.”
Measured against this definition, respondent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children.
Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land. Respondent’s culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-year old college student
of Assumption Convent and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. Naturally, she was an easy prey.
Anent respondent’s argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the
same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that a subsequent judgment of annulment
of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. So long as the quantum of proof --- clear
preponderance of evidence ---in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they “shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which
states:
“CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.”
Respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is hereby DISBARRED
from the practice of law.
Overgaard, a Dutch national, through his business partner John Bradley, entered into a Retainer Agreement with the respondent, Atty.
Valdez. Upon the execution of the agreement, the complainant paid the respondent USD16,854.00 through telegraphic bank transfer,
as full payment for the services to be rendered. Four months after the execution of the Retainer Agreement, the complainant, through
his business partner John Bradley, demanded from the respondent a report of the action he had taken with respect to the cases
entrusted to him. However, despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent to inquire on the status of the cases, he was unable
to reach him; his phone calls were not answered and his electronic mails were ignored. The complainant alleges that the respondent
did not do a single thing with respect to the cases covered under the Retainer Agreement. Due to the above lapses, complainant
demanded the return of the documents which were turned over to respondent and the money paid to him. However, complainant
was unable to get any word from the respondent. Hence, Overgaard was constrained to file an administrative complaint seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful
conduct.
We find the respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following
grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
The respondent has indubitably fallen below the exacting standards demanded of members of the bar. He did not merely neglect his
client's cause, he abandoned his client and left him without any recourse but to hire another lawyer. He not only failed to properly
handle the cases which were entrusted to his care, he refused to do a single thing in connection with these cases.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals.
It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a
lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client." Necessity and public interest enjoin
lawyers to be honest and truthful when dealing with his client. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. However, instead of devoting himself to the client's cause, the respondent avoided the
complainant, forgot about the cases he was handling for him and ostensibly abandoned him.
Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that "a lawyer shall account for all money and property
collected or received for and from the client." Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the duty of fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used must immediately be
returned to the client on demand.
The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton
disregard for his duties as a lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent, betray not only the trust of their
client, but also public trust. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the bar. We could not find any mitigating circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. For violating elementary principles
of professional ethics and failing to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good faith, the respondent has proven himself
unworthy of membership in this noble profession. Respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED.
A.M. No. P-06-2177 RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK
OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR. (2006)
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an administrative case against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an
RTC, after an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho stated that these amounts were stored in the court’s safety vaults, as his usual practice. The audit team
advised him that he should deposit such amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho complied with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending
out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving profit from the interest earned. The OCA found
Atty Kho liable of violating an OCA Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. The OCA then
recommended that its report be docketed as an A.C. and Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE/S: W/N Atty. Kho is administratively liable.
HELD: YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
RATIO: Public office is a public trust. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the court's funds, revenues, property and premises, is also entrusted with the
primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds. Clerks of court have always been
reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they
are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty
and gross misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to
immediately deposit the collections for the judiciary funds.
Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for his failure to make timely remittance of judiciary funds in his
custody. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, RESPONDENT (2011)
Atty Gumba asked to be lent P350,000. She offered by way of security a parcel of land. Tan consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was
assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to respondent. Complainant
was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be
registered. Respondent defaulted and failed to pay despite repeated demands. Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register
of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell
the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.
Tan filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Gumba for gross unethical conduct.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or
private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondent's actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and
false representations and taking advantage of her education and complainant's ignorance in legal matters. As manifested by
complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondent's misrepresentation that she was
authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the "open" deed of sale if she fails
to pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant's perception of the legal profession but the public's
perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 which
provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed
as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX
(6) MONTHS.
MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO AND JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, RESPONDENT (2006)
Ronquillo and Atty. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment. For the price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the
complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot. Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon
execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00
each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was
able to encash the first check. Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full
the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent failed to return the amount paid to him,
hence, this administrative complaint that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer's professional duties.
This Court has made clear in a long line of cases that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was unlawful for respondent
to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to
Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters
worse for him.
Respondent's adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as
an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict
standard of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member
of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
We cannot grant complainants' prayer that respondent be directed to return the money he received from them in the amount of
P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into
the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to the complainants.
Atty Cezar was suspended for 3 years from the practice of law.
PETER T. DONTON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, RESPONDENT (2006)
Donton filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document against Stier, Maggay and respondent, as the notary
public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury
against complainant. Complainant averred that respondent's act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation
of the Code.
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,] respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant's name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier's recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant's name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing
the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.
We find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS
ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON VS. ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO (2006)
A UP graduating student was killed during a rumble and two UP students were taken as suspects in the killing of a UP student. They
were taken into the custody of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of the UP Security Force. Atty. Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations
Group, requested that Taparan and Narag be taken into his custody. Atty. Lambino, Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, opposed Atty. Dizon’s
move, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest. After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the
UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their dormitories. Atty. Villamor committed to accompany them to the NBI the
following morning.
A complaint was filed by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1,
Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8, Rule
8.01.
(1) Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon constitutes violation
of Code of Professional Responsibility. (2) Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Professional Ethics in "refusing to turn over the suspected
students to the group of Atty. Dizon.” Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon,
there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizon's administrative complaint against her must then be dismissed.
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
(Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Dizon was Reprimanded and Warned that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
ROBERTO SORIANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON, RESPONDENT (2006)
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of frustrated homicedm
which involved moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code. Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found
to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor; b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident; c. Shot at
Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery) which lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of
his neck causing spinal cord injury, which paralyzed the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.; d. Denied his
acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty); e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim f. Despite neing
granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim
Issues: (1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude (2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant
disbarment?
Held: (1) Yes. Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals…” Dizon was obviously the
aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt
to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes. His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds
him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in question have been sitting for 4 years,
unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation. Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and was disbarred.
EDUARDO A. ABELLA, COMPLAINANT, VS. RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., RESPONDENT (2013)
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of
five (5) months, complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second Motion for Execution. However, still, there
was no action until the complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award thereof after the latter asked from
the former how much would be his share. Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the complainant
moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the
effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA. The NLRC annulled respondent’s Order, stating that respondent had no authority to
modify the CA Decision which was already final and executory.
Complainant now filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a favorable resolution; and
(b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
YES. Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for any corrupt motive or
interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public position
to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to
note that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar
and to retain membership in the legal profession.
In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to re-compute the monetary awards due to the complainant who sought
to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and executory. When complainant moved for execution – twice at that –
respondent slept on the same for more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit that the latter
speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after. The sudden dispatch in respondent’s action soon after the aforesaid visit casts
serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort money from the complainant.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision, propounding that the CA’s award of
separation pay denied complainant’s entitlement to any backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. Fundamental in the
realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded
conjunctively to an employee who has been illegally dismissed. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could
overlook the fact that complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal dismissal.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct constitutes "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment."
As respondent’s violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his disbarment should come as a matter of
course. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case,
entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,[39] which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same.
Barrios was FINED in the amount of P40,000 in order to penalize respondent’s transgressions and to equally deter the commission of
the same or similar acts in the future.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. (2005)
FACTS
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent. Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is
claimed that 'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official information
in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in
informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No.
0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there
were no sides.

After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with
the Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by Mendoza. PCGG filed motions
to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents, alleging that Mendoza,as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central
Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became
Allied Banking Corporation.
"revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it
for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service." These
concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts' and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the
matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand,
"congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.

The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza?

NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and
bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." "Matter" is any discrete, isolatable act as well
as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

There are two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation in a
proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only
includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils
sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such
as "x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law."
The intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. The lawyer must have participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee.
In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included
within the concept of 'matter’ under Rule 6.03. The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. The 'matter’
where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts
and in filing the necessary petition. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is
different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.
LEA P. PAYOD, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. ROMEO P. METILA, RESPONDENT (2007)
Atty. Metila failed to submit important documents to the Court of Appeals (CA) and the serious consequences brought by such act
became prejudicial to the case of Lea Payod. Payod said they made sufficient follow ups with Atty. Metila but the latter failed to show
up in appointed meetings at the Court. Pagod thereafter charged Atty. Romeo P. Metila for willful neglect and gross misconduct
Atty. Metila denied the charges and insisted that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and Payod for there was no
Special Power of Attorney authorizing Payod’s mother to hire him as a lawyer.
In failing to comply with the requirements in initiating complainant's appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 102764 even after his
attention to it was called by this Court, respondent fell short of the standards required in the Canon of Professional Responsibility for
a lawyer to "keep abreast of legal developments"[6] and "serve his client with competence and diligence."
That Lea's mother did not have a Special Power of Attorney to hire respondent on Lea's behalf is immaterial, given that he actually
initiated the appeal, albeit unsuccessfully.

The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the It need not be underlined that a lawyer who accepts a case must give it his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,[8] and his
Code cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an negligence in connection therewith renders him liable.
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
The circumstances attendant to respondent's initial handle of Lea's case do not warrant a finding of gross negligence, or sheer absence
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not significant and substantial. We note that the petition of real effort on his part to defend her cause. Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that respondent was motivated by ill-
filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings will. In the absence of proof to the contrary, a lawyer enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.
is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. Also, the disqualification of respondent Mendoza
has long been a dead issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after Atty. Romeo Metila, is SERIOUSLY ADMONISHED with WARNING that similar charges will be severely dealt with.
the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the
Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's
motive as highly suspect.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, RESPONDENT (2009) ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, RESPONDENT (2012)

A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has
Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa: (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he
Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for P30,000;
claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan.
Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”: Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
Front conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.” Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions
LAW OFFFICE can only be described as desperate.
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
Fe Marie L. Labiano complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
Paralegal arm of the Court.

Back We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office
DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. Second, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card. a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Third,the crime of direct
bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of
Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional suspension. Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under
Responsibility. Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime.

With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading
the profession in the public’s estimation).

With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In
relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes “ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure
to protect community from barratry and champertry.

With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer's client
nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04. The rule is that a
lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
(such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client. The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.

As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited.
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed
to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only
contain the following details: (a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number
and (e) special branch of law practiced.

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from
their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism
degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.

Atty. Tolentino was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
EDGAR Y. TEVES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERMINIO G. TEVES, RESPONDENTS (2009)
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental. Respondent Herminio G.
Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit. Respondent alleged that
petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which carries
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of Representatives and ordered
the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Hence, the instant petition. (The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race did
not effectively moot the issue of whether he was disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime he was
convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring
that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner's defeat.)
RODRIGO E. TAPAY AND ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO AND ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER,
RESPONDENTS (2013)
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of
Atty. Bancolo. Complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were
also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane
Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
The Supreme Court found Atty Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by
a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted of involved moral turpitude. The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to
within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.[11] Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia
were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads: allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for disciplinary action.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
xxxx wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect Atty Bancolo was SUSPENDED for one year.
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited,
as in the instant case. “Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves
moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact
that it is punishable by law or not…the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.”
We examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner's conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC's finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his
interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him
by the people. Petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial
interest in the cockpit. Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit
is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral
turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary
interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to
public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent
even during the Spanish occupation. While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable
issue.
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, RESPONDENT. (2012)
Respondent undertook to give comlainant 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the late
Benjamin Yap. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting
to 17% of the total estate or about P40 million.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his profession for having
abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has
four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business without the required authorization from the
Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas.
Respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he
begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has
been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[13] Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath[14]
and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently established.
Respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, PETITIONER. (2013)
Medado passed the bar and took the Attorney’s Oath but failed to sign in the Roll of Attorney’s on his scheduled date, allegedly because
he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys in May 1980. Several years later, while rummaging through his old college
files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent,
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;[8] and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten.”
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number
in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.[10] Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the
imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate
penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado
himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. For another, petitioner has not been
subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. This fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict
requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.
However, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll
of Attorneys.[21] He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
and an honest error of judgment.”
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts[23] as it negates malice or
evil motive,[24] a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.[25] Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that
what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification.
At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.[26] When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to
merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon
him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000.