Pacific Banking Corporation vs.

CA & Oriental Assurance

[GR. No. L-41014 28 November 1988]
Post under case digests, Commercial Law at Sunday, March 11, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: An open Fire Policy issued to Paramount Shirt

Manufacturing for Php61,000 on the following: stocks,
materils, supplies, furniture, fixture, machinery, equipment
contained on the 1st to 3rd floors. Insurance is for a year
starting 21 OCTOBER 1964.

Paramount Shirt is debtor of Pacific Banking amounting to

Php800,000. Goods in policy were held in trust by
Paramount for Pacific under thrust receipts. Fire broke out
on 4 January 1964.

Pacific sent letter of demand to Oriental.

Insurance Adjuster of Oriental notified Pacific to submit
proof of loss pursuant to Policy Condition 11. Pacific did not
accede but asked Insurance Adjuster to verify records
form Bureau of Customs.

Pacific filed for sum of money against Oriental. Oriental

alleged that Pacific prematurely filed a suit, for neither filing
a formal claim over loss pursuant to policy nor submitting
any proof of loss.

Trial court decided in favor of Pacific. Decision based on

technicality. The defense of lack of proof of loss and defects
were raised for the 1st time. (On presentation of evidences
by Pacific, it was revealed there was violation of Condition
No.3, there were undeclared co-insurances under same
property –Wellington, Empire, Asian. The only declared co-
insurances were Malayan, South Sea, and Victory)

CA reversed decision. Concealment of other co-insurances

is a misrepresentation and can easily be fraud.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not unrevealed con-insurances is a violation
of Policy Condition No.3

(2) Whether or not there was premature filing of action

Held:
(1) Yes. Policy Condition 3 provides that the insured must
give notice of any insurance already in effect or
subsequently be in effect covering same property being
insured. Failure to do so, the policy shall be forfeited.

Failure to reveal before the loss of the 3 other insurances is

a clear misrepresentation or a false declaration. The
material fact was asked for but was not revealed.
Representations of facts are the foundations of
the contract. Pacific itself provided for the evidences in trial
court that proved existence of misrepresentation.

(2) Yes. Policy Condition 11 is a sine qua non requirement

for maintaining action. It requires that documents necessary
to prove and estimate the loss should be included with
notice of loss. Pacific failed to submit formal claim of loss
with supporting documents but shifted the burden to the
insurance company. Failing to submit claim is failure for
insurance company to reject claim. Thus, a lack of cause of
action to file suit.

Furthermore, the mortgage clause in the policy specifically

provides that the policy is invalidated by reasons of FRAUD,
MISREPRESENTATION and FRAUD. Concealment can
easily be fraud or misrepresentation.

The insured – PARAMOUNT is not entitled to proceeds.

Moreso, Pacific as indorsee of policy is not entitled.
Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 (2001)

Facts:
Graciano del Rosario (decedent) had two marriages. When his first wife, Graciana, died, her estate was
extrajudicially settled. Graciano received his fair share, the questioned lot included. Graciano thereafter
entered into a second marriage with Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, he sold the same lot to the
Natcher. This sale is being questioned by Graciano’s heirs (children by the first marriage) upon his death.

Graciano’s heirs then filed an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages to question the
validity of Natcher’s title. The RTC ruled that although the sale was invalid, Natcher’s title to the property
was valid because the RTC considered it as an advance of her legitime, being a compulsory heir of Graciano.

Issue:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment
of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Held:
No. There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.

Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135 (2001)

Facts:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death on February
14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including
a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.

Respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

Oppositors (Petitioners) filed their opposition, but the Judge resolved in favor of the Respondents.

Petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them,
are indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO
MANALO, had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased
father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned,
without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased
TROADIO MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners
and their co-heirs xxx.
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit
and were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than,
P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and
attorney's fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx.

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground
that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners
therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article
222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February
14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The petition is SP.PROC
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.

CUENCO VS CA
FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
 Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.

The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed
a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI
Quezon.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to
CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings

HELD:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last
will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.
Reynoso v. Santiago, 85 Phil 268
Short summary: husband and eldest son wanted to reopen the probate proceedings of the
deceased wife/mom and wanted the reappointment of the surviving husband as the executor
Facts:
Decedent: Salvadora Obispo
S.Spouse: Victorio Reynoso
Eldest son: Juan Reynoso
-Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of decedent Salvadora Obispo presented an application in CFI for
administration of Salvadora's property (No. 2914)
-Father and son opposed application and filed a document, allegedly the last will and testament
of Salvadora, w/ a counter petition for probate
TC: alleged last will and testament is a forgery
CA: reversed

-Father and son filed 2 petitions, one special proceedign (No. 2914) an another under a separate
and new docket number (3107) and with different title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora
Obispo)
1st petition: (1) special administrator, Meliton Palabrica (2914), be ordered to turn over the
properties of the deceased and proceeds of copra, nuts and other agricultural products to
Victorio Reynoso, and render accounting within reasonable time;
(2) render an accounting w/n a reasonable time
(3) closing of intestate proceeding
2nd petition: estate be administered and settled in special proceeding, Victorio Reynoso be
appointed as executor
-prayer for accounting
-delivery by him to the new executor of the properties

-2 petitions decided separately by Judge Santiago

1st petition: substitution unnecessary, inconvenient and expensive + intestate proceeding
should not be converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente w/o the
necessity of changing its number, name or title
-withheld: because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which special administrator is plaintiff
and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant (re: parcel of coconut land)

WON the intestate proceeding should be discontinued and a new proceeding should be
instituted instead?
-this is in the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights
of any heirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing is at stake on this phase of the
controversy.

WON a regular executor should be appointed?

-appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator: If one other than the
surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If
Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the
suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim
against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the
court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the
same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the
settlement of the claims." The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with reference to the
land within the spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.
-Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance
with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is
justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The
Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there
is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator. The appointment of a
regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate.
There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator
can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be
accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.

Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754

FACTS:

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Peteand Linda), and by his two children by a first
marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his
second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills
and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine
admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978
and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine
and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On

March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding
on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a
copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine
withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in
the record.The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated
in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to
account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine
alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise
agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate
so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack
of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

HELD:

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil
Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

BUSH CASE (CHECK FB AD)

URIARTE V. CFI
Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for settlement of
INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was
even appointed as special administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by
nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND
that petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not
yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate of the will of Don
Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed, contending that Negros courts already had
exclusive jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special proceeding, and
the Manila court proceeded to probate the will. Petitioner contested it. Court held that
since the decedent was a non-resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper
venues for the proceedings. But since probate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue was improper, petitioner
considered to have waived the defect by laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever
recognized as the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate
proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.

Facts:
-Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros
-The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition for settlement
of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the Negros Occidental court. Note that
during that time, the proceedings for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of
Don Juan was still pending
-PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB failed to qualify
-OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan):
Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated - submitted before Negros
court
ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable
-JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced SPECPRO for
PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts
Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros Courts
Vicente had no legal personality to sue
>>>OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the same
NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it
-VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal
of petition for probate + annulment of proceedings - DENIED
-Manila court admitted to probate the last will

WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO.
Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the
courts in the province s where he left property may take cognizance of settlement of his
estate
-here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros
Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court
special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will,
is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy
VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID
-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have
filed a MTD in Manila court earlier: Manila court already
*appointed an administrator
*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier
-court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was
not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction
As to interest of Vicente in the case
-two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the
estate of the deceased parent:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose
Cano, was appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the
estate be leased to him at P4,000 which was approved by the court. The court later on approved
the reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion of some of the agricultural lands to a
subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was approved by court designating Florante as the
sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that the area
designated for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement
of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and his tenants will lose their
landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florante’s petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though
it would prejudice the lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters
of administration of the party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of
administration, hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment
of lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs the delivery
of the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the court’s approval hence if the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of
the subject of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction
of the land leased because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the
debts of the estate under administration.

Sandejas v Lina
Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate.

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration
be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration
were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records
of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina
alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the
death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in
Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of
a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator
in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an
administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were
reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex
Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A.
Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted
Alex's motion.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely
a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the
intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

Issue

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell
their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does
not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may
be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission.

Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's
jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the
settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the
appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a
speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and
the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly
falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether
petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the
settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

* Re: Intervenor's Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval
of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting
respondent's Motion for Approval.

There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of
deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor or
administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by
the parties and approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator,
the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "

This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically requiring only the
executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for
the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies (Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate
beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to
pay debts, legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).
Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased
entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file the application, it stands to reason that
the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the
avails of the suit.

Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja

July 25, 1955| Bautista Angelo

Facts:
Petitioner is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared incompetent
by the CFI of Rizal. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is being
settled in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja and administrator of
the estate of Josefa Tangco.

After Francisco was declared incompetent, petitioner took possession of two parcels of land and
commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the estate proceedings
of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of the lands has
been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.

the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in the
disputed lands.

Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana
Ongsingco and Jose de Borja?

Held: No.

Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting
upon the question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in
an action pending in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did
was look into the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of
ownership and being interwoven one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from
the other.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

BAYBAYAN VS AQUINO
FACT

petitioners, claiming to be the registered owners of the lots involved, filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against the Deputy Sheriff and the herein private
respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain said defendants from
enforcing the writ of execution issued. Meanwhile, the question of the Identity of the lands was
brought up but the lands are registered in the names of petitioners By reason thereof, the
probate court, dismissed the contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelists.
However, the same court ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint

The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with his
order and dismissed the case.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD

The findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of the land after the hearing
conducted do not justify the order to amend the complaint since the determination of the
ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising probate
jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested
party to raise the question of ownership in a proper action. 15

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long fine of decisions,
that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate,
such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of
First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
as a court of first instance." 16

Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what the
amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the petitioners should
not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by does not contain the allegations
that the respondent Judge would want to appear therein.

UY VS CA
FACTS:
a certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late
Ambrocio C. Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of
the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco and was appointed as special administratrix.
Counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion stating that two (2) parcels of land
belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and has been sold to petitioner who registered the sale
with the Register of Deeds of Manila and counsel requested the court to direct the Register of
Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos.
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of respondent Judge, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from
implementing the Order. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
of complainants and set aside the Order of respondent Judge. Special Administratrix Herminia R.
Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent Judge had jurisdiction to entertain further proceedings concerning the
ownership of the properties.
HELD:
NO. Respondent judge had no jurisdiction to entertain such matter.
The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 9 The failure of
respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal
rules.

VDA. DE RODRIQUEZ V. CA
FACTS:
Spouses Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero did not beget any child during their marriage.
Bautista adopted Carmen. Jose wanted to also adopt her but because, by his first marriage, he
had two children named Flora Valero Vda. de Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez he was
disqualified to adopt Carmen.
On September 18, 1964, Jose donated to Carmen (who was already married to Doctor Sergio
Rustia) his one-half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate share) in two conjugal lots, located
at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Rizal with the improvements thereon, with an area of 1,500
square meters. His wife, Beatriz, consented to the donation. However, the deed of donation was
not registered. On January 13, 1966, Jose executed his last will and testament and did not
mention the donation. He devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and
bequeathed the remainder to his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez.Valero
spouses, by means of a deed of absolute sale, conveyed the lots and the improvements thereon
to Carmen B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one hundred twenty thousand pesos. The sale was
registered on the following day. Beatriz died intestate and more than a month later, Jose also
died testate. Jose survived by his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez. His will was
duly probated in Special Proceeding, of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Lawyer Celso F.
Unson, the executor, submitted an inventory wherein, following the list of conjugal assets in the
testator's will, the two San Lorenzo Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.That
inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs. Valero, and Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
Gutierrez, the legitimate children of the testator, Jose, to file (through Mrs. Rustia's lawyer) in
the testate proceeding a motion for the exclusion of the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the
testator's inventoried estate. The probate court in its order excluded the two lots from the
inventory of the testator's estate but with the understanding "that the same are subject to
collation". The CA held that the order of exclusion was interlocutory and that it could be changed
or Modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether the probate court has jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the
properties.

RULING:
NO. The probate court has no jurisdiction. The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by
the parties.

JIMENEZ VS IAC

Nature of the case:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated May 29, 1986 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus
in AC-G.R. No. 06578 entitled "Tomas Jimenez, et. al. vs. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."

FACTS:
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four (4) children,
namely:
Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino Jimenez
acquired five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the
seven petitioners herein:
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be appointed as
administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva.

In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr.,
filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles
from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion
Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received
their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels of lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.3

On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy.4 On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory of the
estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy wherein she included the five (5) parcels
of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.

On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land
from the inventory on the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. which
consisted among others of:
(1) Tax Declaration showing that the subject properties were acquired during the conjugal
partnership of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson; and,
(2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12, 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject
properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his children by a previous marriage, namely:
Alberto, Leonardo, Alejandra and Angeles.5 The motion for reconsideration of said order was
denied on January 26, 1982.6

Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the annulment of the order;

On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint dated December 10, 1984 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 16111, to
recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino
Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render an accounting of the
produce therefrom.

RTC- resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. 8

ISSUE: whether in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction
to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar petitioners' present
action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.
Petitioners' present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because
as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Since the
probate, court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, 10 a separate proceeding is
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. 11

The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. 12

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so. 13

The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a contested property was again
reiterated in the following cases: Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 14
Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15 Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la Rosa. 17 It has also been
held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement
no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar

DE LEON VS CA
FACTS:

Teresita de leon, one of the children of the deceased was appointed as the administratix of
the intestate estate of his father, Rafael Nicolas.
On September 19, 1994, private respondent, his brother, Ramon G. Nicolas, an oppositor
applicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a Motion for Collation, claiming that his deceased
father during his lifetime, had given certain real properties to his children by gratuitous title and
that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of
the decedent.
RTC issued an Order directing Ramon to submit pertinent documents relative to the transfer
of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper determination of the
court if such properties should be collated, and set it for hearing with notice to the present
registered owners to show cause why their properties may not be included in the collation of
properties
Ramon filed an Amended Motion for Collation specifying the properties to be collated
 A comparison with the original motion for collation reveals that the amended motion refers
to the same real properties enumerated in the original except Nos. 6 and 7 above which are not
found in the original motion.
The court noted that only those lots described under paragraphs 3.1.2, 3.2 and 4 of the
Amended Motion for Collation were ordered included for collation.
Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration
RTC removed petitioner from her position as administratrix on ground of conflict of interest
considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject properties acquired by
her from their deceased father and therefore the same should not be included in the collation
Teresita N. de Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as
administratrix be maintained; and that the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-36989, T-33658, T-
36987, T-40333, T-10907 and a portion of TCT No. T-13206 described as Lot 4-A with 4,009 square
meters be declared and decreed as the exclusive properties of the registered owners mentioned
therein and not subject to collation
The RTC denied said motion in its Order dated December 23, 1996.
TERESITA FILED AN APPEAL TO THE CA BUT was no avail hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Probate court’s decision regarding title of property is already final and binding
and cannot be assailed through a separate action.
HELD:
No. The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties,
and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires
the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also
inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties
of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations,
with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties
referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding can only pass upon questions of
title provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are
expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeal
The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions
of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action
 All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so.]

Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error
in considering the assailed Order dated November 11, 1994 as final or binding upon the heirs or
third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third
person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims. And said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent
Private respondents reliance on Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or

alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir.

Hence, the petition is partly GRANTED and said Order which involve the properties
enumerated therein are considered merely provisional or interlocutory.