Perez vs Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
1. Petitioners are employed by respondent as:
a. Felix Perez – shipping clerk b. Amante Doria – supervisor 2. Acting on an alleged complaint regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, the respondent conducted special audits and discovered that petitioners jacked up the value of freight costs and the duplicates of shipping documents showing traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition. 3. Petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days. It was extended twice. 4. Subsequently, petitioners were dismissed from the service. 5. Labor Arbiter – the 30-day extension of their suspension and subsequent dismissal were both illegal; ordered to pay their salaries and reinstate them with back wages and 13th month pay. 6. NLRC – reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days. 7. CA – affirmed the decision of the NLRC insofar as illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. But it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process. a. There was sufficient basis for respondents to lose confidence in petitioners for allegedly tampering with the shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to a cargo forwarder. 8. Supreme Court: a. Ruled in favour of petitioners. b. The evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted. c. Respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. d. It was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these documents. e. Impartial tribunals should merely rely on the statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in its employee. f. Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. i. However, lost of confidence should not be simulated. Should not be used as a subterfuge for cause which are improper, illegal or unjustified. g. The burden of proof lies on the employer in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code. h. Must be proven by substantial evidence. i. Dues process for the dismissal of an employee: i. A written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side ii. Another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee. j. Petitioners were never apprised of the charges against them nor give a chance to defend themselves. k. Dues process was also not observed in the absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the evidence against them. l. There is a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed the Labor Code and its implementing rules: i. Labor Code – an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative. ii. IRR – requires a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. m. LC must prevail. n. Ample opportunity to be heard – ample means considerably more than adequate or sufficient. As such this could be interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or conference. Hence IRR is in conformity with the LC. o. IRR does not mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance of the due process requirement in termination of an employment. p. The test for fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. q. Ample opportunity to be heard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. Such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. r. The standard for hearing requirement, is couched in general terms to give effect to the legislative intent to give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a situation. An actual, formal trial-type hearing, although is preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the hearing requirement. s. Section 2(d) of the IRR must be observed substantially, not strictly. While a formal conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory, or exclusive avenue of due process. t. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence is support thereof. u. Guiding principles: i. Ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. ii. A formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, ow hen similar circumstances justify it. iii. Ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or conference requirement in the implementing rules and regulation. v. Petitioners were illegally suspended for 30 days: i. Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of LC mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of rights and other privileges and full backwages. w. Petition is granted. But reinstatement is no longer practical since 14 years have already passed. Payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement.