Ganzon v CA

Facts:

 The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof The
petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against
him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

A prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the
respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty
(60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
 Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the
respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he
succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an
action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.
 On May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for
another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of
Appeals, a petition for prohibition.
 Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise
promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued
a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent
Secretary, to this Court.
 On June 26,1990, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

Arguments:

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid,
in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary
Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746). Petitioners believe the 1987 Constitution 20 no longer allows the President, as
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials.
According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The
provision in question reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces
with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions. 22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since:
(1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.
The Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. — Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local
Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his
verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall
be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed
with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local
Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is
an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay
official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of
culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in
the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted
in computing the time of suspension. 25

Issues:

(1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the
power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials?

(2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?

Held:

Notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its
right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against
local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government
affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

1. "Local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local
government code, 27 a local tax law, 28 income distribution legislation, 29 and a national representation
law, 30 and measures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for
removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing
Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
 election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the
objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as
observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. 33 The Constitution did nothing more,
however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local
Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
2.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government
Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand
with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have
indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 52
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as we observed,
does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of
Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between
the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case, 54 decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power
to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor
of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency. 55

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, 58 and so also, because it
is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 59 is
simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority
over possible witnesses" 60 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence. 61It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days, 62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient,
and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his
presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until
found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than
sixty days. As we held, 63 a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility. Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes,
his suspension permanent.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which
local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative
control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is
consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set
forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the
President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended
for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not
be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes
and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local
Government Code.