Você está na página 1de 11

February 10, 2016.G.R. No. 199537.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Civil Law; Property; Acquisitive Prescription; Only private property can be acquired by
vs. ANDREA TAN, Respondent prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man.—Only
private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside
FACTS: Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D the commerce of man. It cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does
situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu. She alleged that she is the absolute owner in fee not run against the State in its sovereign capacity. However, when property of public
simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a dominion is no longer intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of
certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Land registration court granted Tan’s the patrimonial property of the State. When this happens, the property is withdrawn
application. The court confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still owned by
registration. The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove the State. The property is now brought within the commerce of man and becomes
that she is a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.
possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June Same; Same; Same; While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application. and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PRD), it does not suffice for the
must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.—While a prior declaration that the
the certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial
(CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose
September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded of prescription under the Civil Code. Before prescription can even begin to run against
that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription. the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial
property: 1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance
ISSUE: Whether or not the CENRO certification and tax declarations presented were with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution; 2. The land must have been
insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no longer intended for public use. classified as alienable and disposable; 3. There must be a declaration from a
competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby
HELD: In Malabanan case, we already held en banc that a declaration that property of converting it to patrimonial property. Only when these conditions are met can applicants
the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into begin their public and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
patrimonial property. While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable
and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the
Civil Code. Before prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Property; Regalian Doctrine; View that the Regalian
conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property: Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution; Thus, there is no basis for the
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with presumption that all lands belong to the state.—Respectfully, I disagree with
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution; the ponencia’s statement that “the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable ownership.” This statement is an offshoot of the idea that our Constitution embraces the
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no Regalian Doctrine as the most basic principle in our policies involving lands. The
longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property. Regalian Doctrine has not been incorporated in our Constitution. Pertinent portion of the
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful Constitution provides: SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner. petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State[.]
alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public Thus, there is no basis for the presumption that all lands belong to the state. The
service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet Constitution limits state ownership of lands to “lands of the public domain[.]” Lands that
been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce are in private possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial are
of man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not considered never to have been public. They were never owned by the state.
produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired Civil Law; Land Registration; View that the state cannot, on the sole basis of the land’s
legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how “unclear” private character, always successfully oppose applications for registration of
long, can never ripen into ownership. titles, especially when the land involved has long been privately held and historically
regarded by private persons as their own.—The state cannot, on the sole basis of the
Constitutional Law; Agricultural Lands; Regalian Doctrine; All lands of the public domain land’s “unclear” private character, always successfully oppose applications for
belong to the State; Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are not registration of titles, especially when the land involved has long been privately held and
alienable except for agricultural lands.—All lands of the public domain belong to the historically regarded by private persons as their own. This case can be resolved without
State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted right of ownership over land. resort to the fiction of the Regalian Doctrine. Respondent Andrea Tan’s application for
Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership. This registration was granted by the land registration court. The Court of Appeals affirmed
is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and the land registration court’s Decision based on the certification issued by the
repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence. Under the present Constitution, lands of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that the land was
public domain are not alienable except for agricultural lands. already classified as alienable and disposable. By submitting the CENRO’s certification,
therefore, respondent applicant admitted that prior to her possession, the land was part The Supreme Court further provides, with regards to the issue of the petitioners
of the public domain. However, she failed to clearly show that the land was classified as certificate of title's authenticity.
alienable and disposable public land. "It is premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because her certificate of
title, supposedly her best proof of ownership over the property described therein, is
questionable. Besides, inasmuch as the authenticity of her certificate of title is also
being questioned in the LRC cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove the
Dolfo, petitioner vs. The Register of Deed For the Province of Cavite, contrary would be the same evidence she will present in the case for annulment of title.
Trece Martires, et al., G.R No. 133465, Spetember 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58 At this point, where there is already a decree of registration issued in favor of private
Facts : respondents, it is moot and academic to allow petitioner to participate in the LRC cases
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of for the purpose of preventing possible double titling of property. As the trial court
Appeals in "Amelita Dolfo v. Hon. Novato T. Cajigal, et al." in which the court had correctly stated, petitioner is not left without remedy even if she was not allowed to
denied petitioner's motion for leave to intervene and/or admit complaint in intervention intervene. If it is shown that her certificate of title is genuine and that she is the true
as well as her motion for reconsideration. owner of the litigated property, the proceedings in the land registration cases would
On March 5, 1996, petitioner Dolfo and Yangtze Properties, Inc. filed a motion then be null and void because the trial court has no jurisdiction on the matter.
for leave to file and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases pending before the The Petition is denied and the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court and of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner alleged that she is the the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
registered owner of the real property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-320601 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds Land Titles; Land Registration; Provisions of §§14 and 25 of Presidential Decree No.
of Trece Martires City. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are the
The trial court denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds that: 1) it is a only parties in cases of original applications for land registration; A motion to intervene
procedural error to file a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application in a land registration case cannot be allowed.—The provisions of §§14 and 25 of P.D.
for land registration, the proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are
been an order of general default entered by the court against those who failed to the only parties in cases of original applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary
oppose the applications. The trial court noted petitioner's failure to exercise any act of civil actions where parties may include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party
dominion over the subject property consistent with her allegation of ownership. The trial complainants, cross-claimants, and intervenors. It is now settled that a motion to
court opined that petitioner's title over the subject property was of doubtful nature and intervene in a land registration case cannot be allowed. A party wishing to be heard
that allowing her to intervene in the LRC cases would unduly delay the proceedings. should ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and then if lifted, file an
And so the Regional Trial Court rendered a joint decision recognizing and confirming opposition to the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in land
the rights of private respondents over the litigated property and ordered the issuance of registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration
a Decree of Registration in their favor. applied for, not the determination of any right connected with the registration.
Later, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus Same; Same; Rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and,
to annul and set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court. However, the Court of hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the
Appeals rendered its decision denying the petition. certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.—The rule that a title issued under the
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. The petitioner now contends that the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece
respondent court of appeals gravely erred in holding that the proper remedy in the land of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
registration cases is an opposition to the application of the applicants, and not a motion Same; Same; While it may be true that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over
to intervene in the proceedings before the trial court. parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule
Issue: applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the
Whether or not the proper remedy in the land registration cases is a motion to intervene certificate.—Petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears
in the proceedings before the trial court. emphasis that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and
records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner
Ruling: argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already
The Supreme Court states that, “the provisions of Sec. 14 and 25 of P.D. No. covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there
1529 (Property Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are the exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
only parties in cases of original applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil
actions where parties may include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party complainants, Buenaventura v. Republic, G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007 – DIGEST
cross-claimants, and intervenors.”
(VIP!) “It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land registration case Facts:
cannot be allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the
general default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property, more particularly described as
This is so because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, located in San Dionisio, Parañaque
sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination of any right City, Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the
connected with the registration. said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same
since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law. The court a quo binding on the Court. However, the rule is not without exceptions. There are several
issued an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject property. recognized exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court and two of
However, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the Republic, these exceptions find application in this present case, to wit: (1) when the findings of the
petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court; and (2) when the findings of fact
by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves. The Republic further argues that of the appellate court are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but
petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and contradicted by the evidence on record.
disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); There are three
the Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first
alienated. On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the category provided for in Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, to wit: (1) that the property
Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo and the parcel of land subject in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the
matter of the application is declared public land. Petitioners filed a Motion for applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3)
this Petition for Certiorari. that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier.—Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply
Issue 1: for registration of land. The said provision of law refers to an original registration
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial court through ordinary registration proceedings. It specifically provides: SEC.14.Who may
confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not being allegedly supported by apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
substantial evidence as required by law. Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: (1)Those who by themselves or through
YES. The Court found out that petitioners offered in evidence a certification20from the their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Region dated 29 possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
October 2001, to prove that the subject property was alienable and disposable land of under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2)Those who
the public domain. Said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
of the subject property. The certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the existing laws. From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we
absence of contradictory evidence. can deduce that there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under the first category, to wit: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
Issue2: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through
property as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year possession in their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any adverse claim. possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The second classification relates to the
YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only acquisition of private lands by prescription.
after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by Same; Same; Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription. commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said
Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been Decree which speaks of prescription.—In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,
characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have 448 SCRA 442 (2005), this Court closely examined the land registration laws governing
the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land registration proceedings in the Philippines. In the aforesaid case, the Court made
land commenced only after 12 June 1945.In the present case, while the following pronouncements: When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in
petitioners possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title
1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of period was amended by R.A. [Republic Act] No. 1942, which provided that the bona
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. WHEREFORE, the court granted fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977,
petitioners application for registration of the subject property and directing the issuance Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
of a decree of registration in petitioners favor. which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is
concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Indeed, there are no
Appeals; As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case to “agricultural lands of the public domain,” while the Property Registration Decree uses
considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and the term “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.” It must be noted though
binding on the Court.—As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of that the Constitution declares that “alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re- to agricultural lands.” Clearly the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type. Did
case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public On June 24, 1974, the private respondents filed an application for the
domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, registration of the three lots adjacent to their fishpond property.
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of “those who have acquired ownership ofprivate On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Armando C. Vicente, in
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.” (Emphasis supplied.) representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the registration.
possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June
1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section The Lower Court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription. that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondent’s fishponds.
Same; Same; Because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who
are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has CA affirmed Lower Court’s decision.
been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may
have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their Republic contended that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.—It is well-settled that the new Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents
properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of Meycauayan river, and thus,
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. if there is any accretion to speak of, it is the man-made and artificial and not the result
Such property now falls within the contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable Issue:
land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive
for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the Whether or not the accretion can be a valid subject of registration.
fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
Same; Tax Declarations; While, as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments Held:
of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind That the testimony of the private respondents’ lone witness to the effect that as early as
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should
possession—they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey of their adjacent
the property.—Petitioners presented as evidence their tax declarations covering the property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire
years from 1948 until the third quarter of 2001. They also offered in evidence a Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged
certification from the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Parañaque to prove that accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had
realty taxes over the subject property had been duly paid by petitioners. As a rule, tax supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan River in 1951.
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of
or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of the Meycauayan River by reclamation.
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the The lower court cannot validly order the registration of lots 1 and 2 in the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such Meycauayan River and are therefore classified as property of the public domain. They
an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. are not open to registration under the Land registration Act. The adjudication of the
lands in question as property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO


GR No. L-61647 October 12, 1984 132 SCRA 514 Appeals; Exceptions to binding effect of lower court factual findings.—The rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this
Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock
Facts: Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and
rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
Respondents, Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT # T- manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of
89709 situated in Barrio Ubinan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
and Bocaue rivers. the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
Property; Land Registration; Requisites for land accretion to take place for Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the
benefit of riparian owner.—The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private
taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be respondents is null and void.
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Same; Same; For accretion or alluvion to form part of registered land of riparian HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs.
owner, the gradual alluvial deposits must be due to the effects of the river’s
current. Deposits made by human intervention are excluded.—The requirement REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is
no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who (PD No. 1529)
happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed
the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents FACTS:
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness
was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering
years before 1939. a parcel of land identified as Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang
Same; Same; Evidence; In the case at bar there is evidence that alleged alluvial Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters.
deposits were man-made.—However, the witness testified that in that year,
she observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in
question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse
exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the
rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and property was originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather,
gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather.
water. The private respondents’ own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is
two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
on the side of the pilapil facing the river. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
Same; Same; A riparian owner cannot register accretions to his land arising from properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
special works or man-made dikes constructed for reclamation purposes.—The and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper application.
that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated
by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by
owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly the CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the
intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under
transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.”
purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the
river. On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan
Same; Same; Same; Public Lands; Beds of rivers are non-registerable portions of
the public domain.—The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
in the names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession
of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. DISCUSSION:

CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) governed the classification and disposition
Malabanan. of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.
CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to
any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d)
the period of possession. reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.

Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
(Interpretation of CA of Section 14(1) was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. purposes may be disposed of
Herbieto)
CA noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was “by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles” through “judicial legalization.”
declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the Velazcos’ possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details
of possession. and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Malabanan died while the case was pending with the CA; it was his heirs who appealed Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
the decision of the appellate court domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
Petitioners rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit (handed down just 4 months prior to where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
Herbieto) - with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration xxx
Decree.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
is the correct interpretation of the provision. disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
The OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. shall

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
“agricultural lands” was changed to “alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.”
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of o The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
the application, the property had already been “converted” into private property through registered.
prescription.
o Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, “agricultural lands” are a mere subset
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of of “lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition.” Evidently, alienable and
properties of the State refers to disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only “agricultural lands.”

“patrimonial property,” while Section 14(2) speaks of “private lands.” Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for “thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application” to possession “since June
The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run 12, 1945 or earlier.”
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply
also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through to the period fixed by the President.
their duly authorized representatives:
The substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been December 2020.
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June The OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of
12, 1945, or earlier. an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.

Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended.
12, 1945, or earlier.”

Discussed in Naguit. – “adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible
Registration Decree warrant comparison: to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims not yet even considered an independent state. “
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
“[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
xxx property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed.”
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first
place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.

It is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).
the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945.
The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not
granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to
original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in
title. exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but
not before 12 June 1945.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the
Public Land Act (amended by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002) limits the period within which The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2)
one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, the State.”
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
Registration Decree. property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads: duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? - We rule in the negative.
character shall not be the object of prescription.
As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act
or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for Decree and the Civil Code.
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty- Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No.
(30) years. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while
the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: “[p]roperty of the extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.” The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
Articles 420 and 421 possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot
be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and Once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system.
character; It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. SYNTHESIS OF DOCTRINES APPLIED:

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the (1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
preceding article, is patrimonial property of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
to the State, cannot be the object of prescription a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are possession.
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the passage of the
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
[51] Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or
their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open, continuous, exclusive
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.”—Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who “have been in open,
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer 12, 1945, or earlier.” That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature
of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.—It is clear that Section 48
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the
possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino
(10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a citizen who has been “in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” to perfect or complete his
title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.—It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain
APPLICATION OF DOCTRINES: are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the
other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
Evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
no substantive evidence to establish that Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the authorized by law.—There must be an express declaration by the State that the public
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
subject property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public land is declared
and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. patrimonial by law or proclamation, can the period of possession prior to such
conversion be reckoned in counting the period of prescription? No.—The re-file their respective applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the
limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of publication-of-notice requirement.
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Requisites for Judicial Confirmation of
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property an Imperfect Title.—Judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are we being domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or
inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no earlier; and (2) the land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration Same; Same; When an individual acquires an imperfect title, he acquires a right to
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration a grant by operation of law.—Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant
available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code. consequences arising from a finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: could ripen into an imperfect title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by
Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Prescription; Lands belonging to the occupation and possession of the land by a person and his predecessors-in-
public domain may not be acquired by prescription.—Section 14(2) of the Property interest for the period required and considered by law sufficient as to have
Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers to “private lands,” without mention at all segregated the land from the mass of public land. When a person is said to have
of public lands. There is no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14(2) acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a right to a grant, a
of the Property Registration Decree except that the land was already private when the government grant to the land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and goes
therein was not the means by which the public land was converted to private land; beyond the authority of the State to dispose of. An application for confirmation of
rather, it was the way the applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from title, therefore, is but a mere formality.
another person previously holding title to the same. The provision in question is very BRION, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and Constitutional Law; Land Registration Act; Public Land Act; Any consideration of
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for lands of the public domain must begin with the Constitution and its Regalian
application. doctrine and the special laws thereon.—In light of our established hierarchy of laws,
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to particularly the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of
what already are private lands, which can be acquired by prescription.—With the the public domain should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands
understanding that Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies only to belong to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden of proving his
what are already private lands, then, there is no question that the same can be acquired claim. Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the grant, alienation
by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the PRD for the registration of
Code which governs rights to private lands. lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme in their respective spheres,
Supreme Court; Judgments; The acquisition of an imperfect title to a disposable subject only to the Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on
land of the public domain was raised as an issue in the Herbieto case and passed property and prescription and should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete
upon.—It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and terms, where alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA
disposable land of the public domain under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as is the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on property and
amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto and discussed prescription must yield in case of conflict.
extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1073 should have provided January
Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of the 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date.—PD 1073 should have thus
notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the provided January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date
other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the is the express legal reality. The reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is
application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack that where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in light of the absence of amended by RA 1942, prior to the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to
proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the perfect his or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date back to June
application given that the applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as been fully made to highlight that it is a date whose significance and import
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by
completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute and judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must be respected.
issues between the parties. Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the Same; Same; Same; Congress extended the period for filing applications for
second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to December 31, 2020.—RA 6940 extended
the period for filing applications for free patent and judicial confirmation of imperfect title classification since this ruling, by the ponencia’s own admission, is not necessary for
to December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the issuance of free patents for lands the resolution of the present case.
not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the
owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of
the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject
to disposition. Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December
31, 2020.
Same; Same; Same; The Court acted ultra vires in its interpretation of Sec. 48(b),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073.—This Court acts beyond the limits of
the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving Section 48(b), as amended
by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into
the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If
we feel that a law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an interpretation that is
not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of
policy—a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason,
we should avoid expanding—through Naguit and the present ponencia—the plain
meaning of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; A public land, even if alienable is State property
and prescription does not run against the State.—The purpose is to determine
whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
has been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is based on its
Section 48(b) and, until the requirements of this Section are satisfied, the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain remains a State property that can be disposed
only under the terms of Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the
question of whether—for purposes of prescription—an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription does not run against the
State. In other words, there is no room for any hair-splitting that would allow the
inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil Code to be directly applied to
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain before this land satisfies
the terms of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Public land may become private by the government’s
declaration in which case prescription under the Civil Code can run.—I agree with
this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has become private by the
government’s own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can run. Note in
this regard that there is no inconsistency between this conclusion and the hierarchy of
laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA applies
as a special and primary law when a public land is classified as alienable and
disposable, and remains fully and exclusively applicable until the State itself
expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that
point, the application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered.
The application of Section 14(2) of the PRD follows.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Stare Decisis; The ruling in Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit (442 SCRA 445) must be abandoned.—
Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed premises
and for being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least, the
present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective pos-session prior to

Você também pode gostar