VALINO v ADRIANO than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his

Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making
Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6 children. frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend
Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually the service and view the remains of the deceased.
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they
decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued
to provide financial support to Rosario and their children.

Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in the US. PUNSALAN v DE LACSAMANA

None of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of
her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment
for a few days but her request was not heeded. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for
actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty.
Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for
more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the
time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife.
RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner, who has taken care of and
lived with the deceased at the time of illness and subsequent death, has better
right over the body?
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to
his failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction
to which PNB was the highest bidder.
On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit
for the construction of a warehouse.
A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to
include the warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments,
respondent Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was
that the bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said
deed.
Petitioner’s complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the
action being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real
property.
W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue.

The legal spouse W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where
the property lies.
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the Civil Code provides
who has rights over funeral arrangements. The SC stated that the law simply confines the Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property.
right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a
contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in
It it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements no wise changed its character as immovable property.
to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any
other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children
when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often
 PRUDENTIAL BANK v PANIS
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they
executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also
the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the
spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses
secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another real estate
mortgage was executed over the same properties.
The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land
which was later on mortgaged to the bank.
The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed
and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court
held that the REM was null and void.
W/N a real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
land belonging to another.
Yes. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code
can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property.
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by
itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered
as a REM for the building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt
with separately and apart from the land.
The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed
before the issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested
of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is evident that the mortgage executed
by private respondent on his own building was a valid mortgage.
As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus
prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.
DAVAO SAWMILL v CASTILLO
Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land, which it
doesn’t own. Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease
agreement, all buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor,
which would not include machineries and accessories. In connection to this,
petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment wherein some were
bolted in foundations of cement.
Whether or not the trial judge erred in finding that the subject properties are
personal in nature.
The machinery must be classified as personal property.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another,
with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which
would pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also
treated the machinery as personalproperty in executing chattel mortgages in favor
of third persons. The machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as personalty pursuant
to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered.
Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
person having temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
MINDANAO BUS v CITY ASSESSOR
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks. It owns a land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor
trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with machineries placed
therein, its TPU trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a condition
to be serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates.
The machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to produce
finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered to the
general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes.
Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner’s above-
mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of
Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the
City sustained the city assessor, so petitioner herein filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a
petition for the review of the assessment.
The CTA held the petitioner liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance
and repair equipment mentioned above. Hence, this petition.
Should the tools and equipment in the petitioner company’s repair shop be
considered immovable taxable real properties?
NO. Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be
“essential and principal elements” of an industry or works without which such industry or
works would be “unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
established.” The tools and equipment are not essential and principle municipal
elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for
expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. The transportation business could be
carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.
 CAPITOL WIRELESS INC. v PROV TREASURER OF BATANGAS
Petitioner, Capitol Wireless, Inc. (CapWire), is a Philippine corporation in the business of
providing international telecommunication services. It has signed agreements with other
local and foreign telecommunications companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as: the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN), the
Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System (BMPCNS), the Philippines-Italy (SEA-
ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The agreements provide for
co-ownership and other rights among the parties over the network. Petitioner claims
that it is co-owner only of the so called “Wet Segment” of the APCN, while the landing
stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu, Batangas are allegedly
owned by PLDT. Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and
not Philippine waters. For loan restructuring purposes, petitioner engaged an appraiser
to assess the market value of the international submarine cable system and the cost to
CapWire. It then submitted a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties at the
Provincial Treasurer’s Office in Batangas City, for the Wet Segment of the system.
Respondent Provincial Assessor of Batangas had determined that the submarine cable
systems described in CapWire’s Sworn Statement are taxable real property. Petitioner
contested this by reasoning that the cable system lies outside of Philippine territory i.e.
international waters. Petitioner received a Warrant of Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale
from respondent. Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of
Warrant of Levy, Notice of Auction Sale and/or Auction Sale with the RTC of Batangas
City. RTC issued an order dismissing the petition: (1) for failure to follow the requisite of
payment under protest; as well as (2) failure to appeal to the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals (LBAA), as provided for in Sections 206 and 226 of R.A. 7160 or the Local
Government Code. The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC – for petitioner
failed to avail of remedies before administrative bodies like the LBAA and the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). Petitioner claims that its petition raises purely legal
questions, but the C.A. noted that the case raises questions of fact, such as the extent to
which parts of the submarine cable system lie within the territorial jurisdiction of the
taxing authorities, the public respondents.
Whether the submarine communications cable be classified as taxable real
property by the local governments?
Yes. Submarine or undersea communication cables are akin to electric transmission lines
which this Court has recently declared in MERALCO vs City Assessor and City Treasurer of
Lucena City, as no longer exempted from real property tax and may qualify as
“machinery” subject to real property tax under the Local Government Code. The Court
sees no reason to distinguish between submarine cables used for communication and
aerial or underground wires or lines used for electric transmission, so that both pieces of
property do not merit a different treatment in the aspect of real property taxation. Both
electric lines and communication cables are not directly adhered to the soil but pass
through posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be classified as “machinery”
under Article 415 (5), NCC for the simple reason that such pieces of equipment serve the
owner’s business or tend to meet the needs of his industry or works that are on real
estate. Petitioner also failed to prove that it is exempted from payment of real property
tax.
MAKATI LEASING v WEAREVER
Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on machinery attached to the ground the
machinery, the same should be considered as personal property. Therefore, the chattel
mortgage constituted thereon is not null and void regardless of who owns the land.
Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the private respondent Wearever Textile Mills,
Inc., discounted and assigned several receivables with the former under a Receivable
Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned, private
respondent executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as
a machinery described as an ArtosAeroDryerStenteringRange. Upon private respondent’s
default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgage
to it. However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned to implement the foreclosure failed to gain
entry into private respondent’s premises and was not able to effect the seizure of the
aforedescribed machinery.
Acting on Makati Leasing’s application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of
seizure, the enforcement of which was however subsequently restrained upon
Wearever’s filing of a motion for reconsideration. After several incidents, the lower court
finally issued an order lifting the restraining order for the enforcement of the writ of
seizure and an order to break open the premises of Wearever’s to enforce said writ.
Wearever Textile Mills contends that estoppel cannot apply against it because it had
never represented nor agreed that the machinery in suit be considered as personal
property but was merely required and dictated on by herein petitioner to sign a printed
form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at the time of signing. This
contention lacks persuasiveness
Whether or not the subject machinery is a real property or a personal property
to subject it to chattel mortgage.
Where a chattel mortgage is constituted on machinery attached to the ground the
machinery is to be considered as a personal property and the chattel mortgage
constituted thereon is not null and void regardless of who owns the land.
However, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a
ground for rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the
new Civil Code, by a proper action in court.
It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as chattel by
the private respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the
character determined by the parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v.
Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as long as no
interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby. This is really because one who has
so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
As aptly pointed out by petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the status of the
subject machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue before the lower
court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the
petition filed in the appellate court. Moreover, even granting that the charge is true, such
fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for
rendering said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article 1390 of the new Civil
Code, by a proper action in court. There is nothing on record to show that the mortgage
has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. On
the other hand, as pointed out by petitioner and again not refuted by respondent, the
latter has indubitably benefited from said contract. Equity dictates that one should not
benefit at the expense of another. Private respondent could not now therefore, be
allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom,
costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to
adapt it for new or further purposes.
m) Machinery — shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances,
instruments, appliances and apparatus attached to the real estate. It includes
the physical facilities available for production, as well as the installations and
appurtenant service facilities, together with all other equipment designed for or
essential to its manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes (See sec. 3[f],
Assessment Law).

CALTEX v BAA
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under a lease
agreement, which stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment. The lessor of the land does not become the owner of the
machines and equipment. Caltex retains their ownership.
The machines and equipment are necessary to the operation of the gas station,
for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been
attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein,
are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment
Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Therefore, the machines and equipment are real property subject to realty tax.

The City Assessor characterized the said machines and equipment as taxable realty.
However, the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. The Assessor
appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

The Board held that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Sec. 3(k)
& (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of
real and personal property in Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.

Whether or not the said machines and equipment are real property subject to
realty tax?

The said machines and equipment are considered real property.

Section 2 of the Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property,
including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements" not specifically exempted
in section 3 thereof.

This provision is reproduced with some modification in the Real Property Tax Code which
provides:

SEC. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax.— There shall be levied, assessed and
collected in all provinces, cities and municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on
real property, such as land, buildings, machinery and other improvements
affixed or attached to real property not hereinafter specifically exempted.

The Code contains the following definitions in its section 3:

k) Improvements — is a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration

in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste,
 MERALCO v CBAA
Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, RA No. 387,
Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of
cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the
surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The portion passing through Laguna is
about thirty kilometers long.
In points where the pipeline traversed rivers or creeks, the pipes were laid beneath the
bed thereof. Hence, the pipes are permanently attached to the land.
However, Meralco Securities notes that segments of the pipeline can be moved from one
place to another (if for example, req'd by the Gov't, should they be affected by any road
repair or improvement.)
The pipeline system in question is indubitably a construction adhering to the soil. It is
attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form the pipeline.
Insofar as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of oil,
it is in a sense machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.
It should be borne in mind that what are being characterized as real property are not the
steel pipes but the pipeline system as a whole.
DISPOSITIVE: The questioned decision and resolution are affirmed. The petition is
dismissed. No costs.

Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of
Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations, containing the
assessed values of portions of the pipeline.

Meralco Securities appealed the assessments to the Board of Assessment Appeals of

Laguna, which, however, upheld the assessments. Meralco Securities then brought the
case to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals but ended w/ the same result.

Meralco Securities filed its MR. It was denied, hence this petition.

CBAA: Meralco Securities' pipeline is subject to realty tax as the pipes are machinery or
improvements, as contemplated in the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
They do not fall within the category of property exempt from realty tax under those laws.

Articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code, defining real and personal property, have no
application to this case and that even under A415, the steel pipes can be regarded as
realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil and things attached to the land
in a fixed manner and that Meralco Securities is not exempt from realty tax under the
Petroleum Law.

Meralco: Its pipeline is not subject to realty tax because it is not real property within the
meaning of A415.

WON Meralco's pipeline is a real property subject to realty tax.

Yes.

(1) It is incontestable that the pipeline of Meralco Securities does not fall within any of
the classes of exempt real property enumerated in S3 of the Assessment Law and S40 of
the Real Property Tax Code.

(2) Article 415[l] and [3] provides that real property may consist of constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil and everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in
such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object.
 FELS ENERGY v BATANGAS
NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges
moored at Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement,
was for a period of five years wherein, NPC shall be responsible for the payment of:
maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into
electricity.
It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by
invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160,

(a) all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the …the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the
National Government government owned or controlled corporation;

(b) all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of The agreement POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, it will operate
the Power Barges the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity. Therefore, FELS shall be liable for
the realty taxes and not the NPC who is not actually, directly and exclusively using the
Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. same. It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of law
Thereafter, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges. The between the parties
assessed tax, which likewise covered those due for 1994, amounted to P56,184,088.40
per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the
Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to
represent it in any conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial
Assessor.

NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property
taxes on the power barges. However, the motion was denied. The Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA) ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be
classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for
taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of
permanency.

FELS appealed the LBAA’s ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The
CBAA rendered a Decision finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.

It was later reversed by the cbaa upon reconsideration and affirmed by the CA

Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties
and therefore, not subject to real property tax.

No. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which,
though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a
river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and
other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said
industry or work.

The findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner
FELS is the entity being taxed by the local government. As stipulated under the
Agreement:

OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures,
fittings, machinery and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges
which have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate, manage and
 US v CARLOS
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished by the Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company for a building containing the residence of the accused and 3
other residences. Believing that more light is consumed than what is shown in the meter
installed, the company installed an additional meter on the pole outside Carlos’s house
to compare the actual consumption. They found out that Carlos used a jumper. Further, a
jumper was found in a drawer of a small cabinet in the room of the defendant’s house
where the meter was installed. In the absence of any explanation for hispossession of
said device, the presumption raised was that Carlos was the owner of the device whose
only use was to deflect the flow of electricity,causing loss to the Meralco of over 2000
kilowatts of current.
Accused of theft, Carlos’s defense was that electricity was an unknown force, not a fluid,
and being intangible, could not be the object of theft.
Whether the court erred in declaring that electricity can be the object of theft.
While electric current is not a fluid, still, its manifestations and effects like those of gas
may be seen and felt. The true test of what may be stolen is not whether it is corporeal
or incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner
may appropriate the same. Electricity, like gas, is a valuable merchandise and may thus
be stolen. (See also U.S. v. Tambunting, 41 Phil. 364).
The court further ruled that electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of
merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of
appropriation by another. It is also susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger
quantity and of being transported from place to place. Hence, no error was committed
by the trial court in holding that electricity is a subject of larceny.
LAUREL v ABROGAR
Laurel was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
PLDT alleges that the “international phone calls” which are “electric currents or sets of
electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the
human voice to a receiver,” are ersonal properties which may be the subject of theft. Art.
416(3) deems “forces of nature” (which includes electricity” which are brought under the
control by science, are personal property.
Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication
carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric currents or impulses.
Hence, it may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation.
Laurel claims that the analogy between generated electricity and telephone calls is
misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only rovides the
facilities or services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that
“business” is not personal property. It is not the “business” that is protected but the
“right to carry a business.” This right is what is considered as property. Since the services
of PLDT cannot be considered as “property,” the same may not be the subject of theft.
Is Laurel guilty of theft of personal property?
YES. The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or
apparatus to PLDT’s telephone system, through which Laurel is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities constitutes acts of subtraction.
The business of roviding telecommunication is likewise ersonal property which cann be
the object of theft.
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil
Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was
declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in
the enumeration of real roperties. Art. 414 provides that all things which are or may be
the object of appropriation are considered either real property or personal property.
Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like
interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Business should also be classified
as ersonal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real
properties under Art. 415. It is therefore personal roperty.
In making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted into electrical
impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the arty called. A telephone call,
therefore, is electrical energy. Intagnible property such as electrical energy is capable of
appropriation because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property
under art. 416(3) which enumerates “forces of natur which are brought under control by
science.”
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that
constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and
business.
Therfore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service is
personal property.