Sage Publications, Inc., American Sociological Association Sociology of Education

Zengakuren: A Japanese Case Study of A Student Political Movement
Author(s): Michiya Shimbori

Source: Sociology of Education, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Spring, 1964), pp. 229-253
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111956
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Zengakuren 229
ZENGAKUREN: A JAPANESE CASE STUDY OF

A STUDENT POLITICAL MOVEMENT
Michiya Shimbori *
The student movement of Japan, Zengakuren i8 analyzed in its social context. The peculi-
arities of Japanese higher institutions are described first. They are characterized by their
internal uniformity of struoture accompanied by a steep prestige hierarchy; by their rapid
expansion; by their geographical ooncentration; by a paternalistic campus culture; and
by a lack of strong commitment to academic disciplines. Postwar changes in the political
struoture of Japan in students' status within it are analyzed in terms of the relation-
ships among the political elite, the counter-elite and the mass, with the academic elite
and the students as floating elements in between. The greater power of the counter-elite
and mass, and the shortened distance between students and the mas8 are accompanied by
more powerful student movements. Thi.s fact is testified to by the history of Zengakuren.
Based upon this analysis, some generalizations are formulated concerning 1) the psychology
and behavior patterns peculiar to students due to their status in society, and 2) some social
conditions favorable to student movements.
HIGHER EDUCATION HAS become a big enterprise in which almost every

nation is involved. In advanced nations enrollment has greatly expanded,
while in less developed ones governments have made every effort to train
the elite through higher education. Yet higher education may have conse-
quences different from the initial intention. Higher institutions founded
and supported by the elite to train their successors have produced in not
a few cases a counter-elite who criticize and even revolt against the
status quo. Several examples will suffice to illustrate this fact. European
universities which were founded by the ecclesiastical elite in order to pre-
serve established religious tradition and to train prospective theologians
have produced free thinkers who showed the greatest antagonism to the
clerical order. Japanese universities which were built by the government
in order to train leaders faithful to it have produced the most influential
critics of national policy. Russian higher institutions controlled by the
Party are said to be producing "westernized" intellectuals. The elite may
resent and be perplexed by a situation of this kind, but in the long run
the progress of the society depends in part upon the counter-elite pro-
duced by higher education in so far as they criticize the elite construc-
tively.
The fact that college students, under certain circumstances, can act
as a powerful social force and even supplant the elite has been shown by
recent events in such countries as Turkey, Korea, and Japan. The in-
fluence of college students as a social group cannot now be ignored. Our
aim here is to offer the Zengakuren as an illustrative case study.
As Zengakuren is an abridged form of the word designating All
*In collaboration with Hideo Ikeda, Tsuyoshi Ishida, and Yasumasa Tomoda.
230 Sociology of Education
Japan Federation of Students, we shall first look at the main character-

istics of Japanese higher institutions and then at the status of the stu-
dents in the power structure, which influences their political movements.
Japanese Colleges. When we look at Japanese colleges, it is readily
seen that they have a few outstanding characteristics. These are: 1) their
external uniformity and internal variety; 2) their rapid expansion of
enrollment; and 3) their geographical concentration.
In the pre-war period, Japan had various kinds of higher institu-
tions, e.g., daigaku (university), semmon-gakko (technical school), and
koto-gakko (high school). Post-war Japan witnessed a thorough reform
of the educational system, and all the higher institutions were consoli-
dated and entitled daigaku. Thus it is that several institutions in the same
locality were integrated into one daigaku, each of which became faculties
of the latter. Formerly each institution had a distinct aim and reputation
in a specialty of its own. A few universities produced the very top leaders
of the nation, while professional schools had the function of training the
technical leaders in specialized practical fields.
On the contrary, the post-war institutions followed the pattern of the
former university. Tokyo University was taken as the very model of
daigaku. Naturally, the limited marketplace for top leaders cannot pro-
vide all the rank and file with top positions. The equipment, tradition,
faculties, and reputation which the newly consolidated daigaku inherited
varied greatly. Nevertheless, the new daigaku all try to be a miniature of
Tokyo University-a goal which can never be attained. Given the name of
daigaku, all the institutions came to identify themselves as ranking on a
single scale of evaluation. The former semmon-gakko, whose function was
only education, for example, identify themselves now as having a research
function as well, in spite of poor equipment and staff for the purpose.
Today in every daigaku, one can find a one-and-a-half or two year general
education course (for freshmen and early sophomores) and a two-and-a-
half or two year professional course. Every daigaku declares at least for-
mally the same objectives.
In this manner Japanese higher institutions have gained an external
uniformity, which David Riesman calls "institutional homogenization. " 1
They are trying to resemble each other, prolong the period of schooling
from two to four years in the case of the junior colleges (tanki-daigaku)
and to add graduate schools in the case of the four-year institutions. They
are becoming similar in terms of their title and form, while they are even
more dissimilar than before in terms of their quality and prestige. Before
the war one daigaku had the highest prestige for producing the leading
scholars, another daigaku for the leading business men, one semmon-gakko
for the leading secondary teachers, and another semmon-gakko for the
1 David Riesman, Constraint andl Variety in American Education, Anchor Edition

(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1958), p. 21.
Zengakuren 231
leading electrical technicians and so on. Now each of them is evaluated as

a faculty within the integrated new daigaku. A formerly strong institu-
tion may now be a weak division of a weak university.
Japanese higher education was initiated and supported by the cen-
tral government which intended through it to train the national leaders,
especially the bureaucrats of high rank. "The Imperial University shall
have as its aim to instruct in the sciences and arts which are essential for
the State, and also to carry on profound research in them," declared the
First Article of the University Act, promulgated in 1886 and effective
until 1945. Thus it had a national objective from the beginning.
Tokyo Imperial University (now Tokyo University) had been the
only higher institution until 1897, when Kyoto Imperial University was
founded. Around the period of the First World War which stimulated
the rapid development of industrialization and capitalism in Japan,
higher education developed and functioned as a training center of white
collar workers in business as well but it continued to enjoy high prestige.
"Sponsored mobility" ruled in higher education.2 That is, those students
who gained entry to the prestigeful institutions were more or less guaran-
teed a future elite status.
To a lesser degree the situation is the same even now. Students can be
freer than ordinary adults to do anything they like, and they are likely
to be leaders in extra-campus movements owing to the esteem they receive.
Above all, the students in the leading universities enjoy the greatest
esteem and privileges.
A very conspicuous and rigid hierarchy of prestige exists among in-
stitutions of higher education in Japan. As a rule, the older ones enjoy
a higher status than the younger; the national ones than the private; the
big and many-faculty ones than the small and one-faculty ones; the
metropolitan ones than the local; the academic or professional ones (hav-
ing graduate schools) than the general or vocational (e.g., junior col-
leges); the men's or coeducational ones than the women's institutions.
Tokyo University has enjoyed the very top status, a fact which the
Japanese people, whether academic or not, consider as unalterable. Then
comes Kyoto University, and so on down.3
This prestige hierarchy becomes rigid and fixed owing to two proc-
esses. One is that the brighter students gather in the major league and
the other is a kind of nepotism in all fields. If a university of high reputa-
tion attracts bright students, the status of the university becomes higher,
which in turn attracts the brighter students all the more. The result is
2 Ralph Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through Education: Sponsored Mo-

bility and Contest Mobility, " in Halsey, Floud, and Anderson (eds.), Education,
Economy, and Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1961), pp. 121-39.
3 See T. Shigematsu et al., "Social Conditions of Struggle for Entrance into
College," in Kyoto Daigaklu Kyoiku-gakubu Kiyo, Vol. IV (Kyoto University, School
of Education, 1958), pp. 201-255.
that there is a justification for recruiting the elite from this stratum of
students only. Thus there are- specially among students in the leading
universities-more privileges and freedoms which come from recognized
prospective higher status for them and which lead to a sense of superior-
ity, elite consciousness, and feeling of leadership on their part.
In student movements, too, leadership is taken by the students of
the leading universities, and most of the participants belong to them. At
the same time students in the minor league may feel that they must follow
the example set by those in the major league in order to assure them-
selves that they are university students too. Thus the same type of
movement spreads easily all over the country and federation is readily
accomplished under the leadership of the students in leading universities.
Table 1
NUMBER OF COLLEGES, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS, 1920-60
Proportion of
Number of Number of Number of College Age Youth
Year Students Teaching Personnel Colleges in College 0
1920 82,218 6,517 141 1.6%

1925 135,007 11,201 217 2.5%
1930 184,234 15,140 264 3.0%
1935 189,511 16,226 263 3.0%
1940 247,563 19,000 285 3.7%
1945 409,650 26,200 532 5.8%
1950 405,310 52,120 884 6.2%
1955 601,240 63,969 492 8.8%
1960 709,878 74,677 525 10.2%
aThe age span used is 17-21 for 1920-1940 and 18-21 for 1945-60; adapted
from Mombwsho Nempo and census data.
A second major feature of the post-war Japanese colleges is the rapid

expansion of their enrollment.4 This expansion has been accompanied by
important social changes. College education has been democratized and
the door is wide open to the general population. Formerly, women
scarcely had access to the universities, and only a small proportion of
the youth could attend them.5 Today there are more university students
4 Adapted from Mombusho Nempo, Yearbooks of Ministry of Education. Rapid

increase of number of schools in 1950 shows that around this year the reform of the
education system was in progress; therefore, institutions of the old system as well
as the new system existed side by side.
5 According to my computation, 8.7% of the graduates from the elementary schools
(then of 6 years) finished secondary education (of 5 years), and 2.5% went to higher
institutions, in 1935. See Yoshihiro Shimizu, Shiken, Entrance Examination (Tokyo:
Iwanami, 1957), p. 17. In contrast, in 1957, 51.4% of those who finished the com-
pulsory education of 9 years went to secondary schools, and 16.1% of those who left
the latter received higher education. See Mombu-tokei Yoran, Concise Statistics of the
Ministry of Education, 1959, pp. 66-67.
Zengakuren 233
who come from poor families and who are sensitive to class problems.
According to a pre-war nationwide survey by the Ministry of Education,
students were classified in terms of the ease with which their families
could provide for their school expenses. It classified 43.2% as finding
it " easy," 49.4% as finding it "possible," and 7.4% as finding it
"hard." 6 In contrast to this, according to annual surveys of the life of
the students in Tokyo University since 1949, 65-70% did so-called Arbeit
(side-jobs) to earn money for their own school expenses, and about 30%
reported that they depended wholly or almost wholly upon their Arbeit.7
Arbeit naturally leads to closer contact with social realities which may
awaken the students' social consciousness; and it leads also to their
economic independence which may secure their autonomy of thinking.
This situation contributes to student political movements.
As a result of this rapid expansion in higher institutions, students
became closer to the mass in terms of their quality as well as quantity.
Their prospective careers became less promising; their social origins,
their intellectual level, their cultural background, and the standards for
teaching personnel were lowered. The relationship between professors
and students was impersonalized. Less prestige and esteem were afforded;
students lost their elite consciousness and they gained a feeling of affinity
and identity with the mass. Greater power on the part of students was
felt to result from their numbers. They became more sensitive to mass
culture and less sensitive to academic culture.
The last key feature of Japanese colleges is their geographical con-
centration. A report of the Ministry of Education says that 33% of the
four-year universities and 27.5% of the two-year junior colleges are
located in Tokyo, while 44.9% of the university students and 30.6%o of
the junior college students attend institutions in Tokyo.8 Thus, Tokyo,
which has a tenth of the total population, has about a third of the higher
institutions, and about half of the college students of Japan. About
230,000 college students are enrolled in Tokyo.
Geographical concentration is favorable to student movements and
helps to determine their character. Leadership in student movements is
taken by students in the leading universities as in all other fields. This is
shown by the composition of members of the central committee of Zenga-
kuren and the other main student organizations.
6 Adapted from Mombusho, Gakusei-seito Seikatsu Chosa, Vol. II, Survey of

Student Life, surveyed in November 1938, p. 40. Similarly, a survey at the Tokyo
University in 1934 revealed that 76.2% of the students there lived wholly on money
given by their own family, the rest depending in addition upon scholarship and/or
their own work. See Mombusho, Shiso Chosa Shiryo, Data of Survey of Ideology,
No. 28 (1935) pp. 85-76.
7 Tokyo University, Committee on Students' Arbeit, Gakusei Arbeit Junen-shi,
Ten Years of Students' Arbeit (1959), pp. 237-8.
8 Mombusho, Daigaku to Koto-gakko no Kanren, Relation Between College and
High School (1954), p. 21.
Table S
INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN OF MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEES
OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS
National Private
Uniiversity University Tokyo Elsewhere Total Year
Zengakuren 21 9 15( 5)a 15 30 1948

21 9 17( 7) 13 30 1958
33 12 28(10) 17 45 1959
Shagakudo (Union of 40 21 29 32 61 1950

Socialist Students) 33 5 23(13) 15 38 1958
53 17 37 32 70 1959
Japan Federation of 9 3 6( 1) 6 12 1950

Student Newspapers 7 5 11( 1) 1 12 1958
Igakuren (Japan Union 12 3 6( 2) 9 15 1958

of Medical Students)
Shigakuren (Union of 13 7 6 13 1958

Students of Private
Universities)
Kyosando (Union of 12 2 12( 7) 2 14 1958
Communist Students) 27 7 26 8 34 1959
Chiho Gakuren (Students 53 20 73 73 1959

in non-Tokyo Districts)
Zenjiren (Federation of 20 8 10( 1) 18 28 1960
Student Governments)
a The figures in parentheses are the number of students from Tokyo University
itself. Adapted from Nikkan Rodo Tsushin-sha, ed., Zengakuren no Jittai, The Present
Status of Zengakuren, 1959, and Sayoku Dantai Jiten, Directory of Leftist Organiza-
tions., 1961.
When we consider the fact that 120 out of 226 universities and 184
out of 228 junior colleges are private, that 256,226 out of 446,927 students
in universities and 52,934 out of 64,197 in junior colleges are in private
institutions (1953 statistics), and that Tokyo University had an enroll-
ment of 12,380 in 1956, it is clear that students in national universities,
in the Tokyo district, and especially in Tokyo University, take a lead out
of proportion to their numbers.
Tokyo, where the central government is located, which is the center
of journalism and full of social problems, is readily subject to political
and social controversies. Unlike the capitals of other advanced nations,
perhaps excepting Paris, political, economic, industrial, and journalistic
as well as academic leaders are almost exclusively concentrated in Tokyo,
which is at the same time the residence of the humblest and poorest
people. Tokyo is a fertile soil for student movements.
When we examine the geographical origins of college students, we
find that 34% of students in colleges located in Tokyo come from Tokyo,
and 42.1%o of students in the five next largest cities (Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya,
Zengakuren 235
Yokohama and Kobe) have the same geographical origin as their institu-
tional locality, while 65.5% of those in other areas attend a college in
their own locality.9 This shows that the metropolitan areas, especially
Tokyo, have the largest proportion of students who are far from home and
live either in a dormitory or in a lodging. They are freer as well as
lonelier than students who live at home. Their marginality is greater, and
they are less controlled-a favorable condition again for student move-
ments.
But this is not the whole story. If one examines the culture of
Japanese colleges, one can understand more fully why the students are
apt to be oriented to political matters and flock into the movements.
College Culture. Only three items which seem to be relevant to student
movements in Japan will be discussed: 1) paternalism, 2) the lack of an
object of commitment, and 3) the tradition of political concern.
A kind of paternalism or nepotism prevails in Japanese higher edu-
cation. Nepotism here means that a graduate from a leading university
can expect a secure place and promising career much more easily than
one from a minor university, to say nothing of a common man without
university education, whatever his ability and achievement may be, be-
cause an alumnus of the university will recruit him.
Moreover, the same paternalism applies within university education.
Once admitted, a student can graduate from the institution quite easily
and automatically, and usually with good marks. Although there is a very
severe, strict, and cruel assessment before admittance, namely, before a
professor or an institution has a personal relationship with him, a profes-
sor or an institution makes every effort to protect him, who is the profes-
sor's or the institution 's own student, once he is accepted as a member
of the group. It is a disgrace for a professor or a university to produce
a student who gets poor marks, drops out, or is dismissed, because it
proves the failure or incompetence of his or its teaching. It is a disgrace
for the student, too. Once the in-group relationship is established, it will
injure the moral sense to dismiss or disgrace any member of the group.
A sense of pity, sympathy, or a fear of arousing resentment may operate
here. Thus, a professor usually tries to give a good mark to a -student who
does not necessarily appear in his class regularly. A lazy-in-study or busy-
in-money-making student can often finish the university formally if he
takes the final semester examinations. Therefore, a student can escape
from classes and engage in many activities outside the campus.
The freedom resulting from paternalism is further increased by
physical conditions. Japanese higher institutions are often overcrowded,
especially the general colleges, the social science courses where a professor
gives a lecture only to a large audience, and the private universities which
9 For boys in four-year universities only, surveyed by the Ministry of Education

in 1952. Mombusho, Daigalcu to Koto-galkco no Kanren, p. 19.
are financed mainly by the tuition of students.10 It is not unusual to see

a professor giving his lecture through a microphone to several hundred
students in a large hall. It cannot be said that a personal relationship
exists among them, either between the professor and his audience or
among the students themselves.
And yet, paternalism remains, when a professor evaluates their
examination papers or recommends them to a corporation where they
wish to be hired. Students in this situation see no control coming from
their professors or their university. It does not matter whether they
attend classes or not. Thus, students in an over-crowded university or
department are even freer than the rest. Students in physical sciences,
students in small colleges, and students in specialized courses are less
likely to be involved in non-academic activities, because they are more
controlled by requirements of the discipline itself and by administrative
authorities. Needless to say, the facts that the overcrowded universities
are often the leading universities, and that the students in general courses
or social sciences are the most concerned with non-academic matters, are
partly responsible for the tendency mentioned above.
Another psychological aspect of the situation must be mentioned.
Professors in the leading universities are oriented solely to research and
are often proud that they are poor in teaching. Professors in weak insti-
tutions are often poor in research and are not admired by the students.
Students sit in a large hall writing down what a professor says, without
knowing who the students beside them are. They are lonely, anonymous,
passive. Lectures do not usually stimulate the interests of students. They
are often repeated year after and are available in textbooks already pub-
lished. The examination which is taken at the end of a semester consists
of an assessment of learning by rote memory and may be evaluated
blindly. There are rumors that some professors do not even look at the
papers.
Students, especially those who come from a rural community, faced
with this situation, often suffer from psychoneurosis and look around to
find any anchoring group. They feel lonely, deserted, and isolated, vainly
in search of a sense of belongingness and community, all the more because
they have not been accustomed to an individualistic culture. The bureau-
cratic large institutions do not usually provide them with guidance facili-
ties. In addition, there are few opportunities for them to discharge their
surplus energy; no extracurricular activities, such as fraternities, are
provided. Student movements can supply them with a chance to recover
their sense of belongingness and community and to devote their energy
to something thrilling and unifying like sports in other college cultures.
10 For instance, the number of students per professor is 8.0 in national universities
and 27.8 in private universities in 1957. In the Hiroshima University, the number of
students per professor is 12.7 for humanities and social sciences, and 6.1 for natural
sciences in 1953.
Zengakuren 237
Student movements, mass demonstrations, or strikes fit into the Japanese

social climate, because through them people can reassure themselves and
show their power without being recognized or punished as individuals.11
A second feature of Japanese college culture is the existence of so-
called "ronin." The term originally means lordless samurai, wandering
in search of a new master. Now it is used to designate the high school
graduate who fails in. the entrance examination for higher school and is
enrolled nowhere, preparing solely for the coming year 's examination. It is
estimated that there are at present about 200,000 ronin. Since there are so
many higher institutions with so many varieties of standard and prestige,
and since there is in action a nepotism which promises the graduates of
leading institutions a brilliant career, there are too many applicants for
these institutions. Hence the severe competition in the entrance examina-
tion, which consists almost exclusively of achievement tests in a few aca-
demic subjects and is given once a year, in March. It is not an exaggeration
to say that the whole three years of senior high school are devoted to prepa-
ration for the entrance examination and the main concern of high school
students, their teachers, and their parents is with it. Many parents are
even anxious to have their child enter into a strong elementary school
which can send more pupils to a strong junior high school which has a
reputation for competent preparation for a strong senior high school.
Extracurricular activities are said to be harmful to performance in the
examination on academic subjects. As there is hardly any chance to
transfer from one college to another, or from a junior college to a four-
year university, and since "gakubatsu" (nepotism through alumni-ship)
is so strong after finishing higher education, the entrance examination
plays a decisive role in the high school student's life.
Thus, after success in this keen, individualistic, scholastic competi-
tion, there is a sharp contrast between high school life and college life.
The one is full of anxiety and narrow, individualistic concern, while the
other is characterized by a sense of superiority, emancipation, freedom,
and broadened interests. In order to recover a free and enjoyable youth,
the college students are oriented to cultural and social matters. Distaste
for scholarly work may also emerge because they are tired of it; their
interest may have been stifled in monotonous preparation.
Thus, the sense of freedom and emancipation, the absence of institu-
tional control, and the absence of extracurricular activities-all these
combined lead to lack of commitment on the part of students. They search
11 A recent survey by the Institute of Student Issues reports that among fresh-
men 17.8% say they have personal contract with teachers and 82.2% say they have
no personal contact; the percentage of those who have contact with teachers rises
with the grades (for sophomore and junior about 50% and for senior 69.2% have
contact.) See Kyoikur Gakujutsu Shimbun, No. 291. 53.4 per cent of the students in
the Nagoya University report they have no extra-curricular activities. Nagoya Uni-
versity, The Second Survey of Student Life, 1958, p. 88.
for any chance to discharge their now emancipated energy and to regain
a sense of devotion and belongingness. If their broadened concern is di-
rected to political issues, they have every reason to flock to political move-
ments.
One of the features of Japanese higher institutions, common to some
other, especially less industrialized, nations, is the numerical superiority
of students in the social sciences and humanities over those in the natural
sciences and mathematics. This tendency is due to such facts as: 1) that
new nations require first, political leaders and efficient administrators of
government; 2) that they do not have much industry which needs en-
gineers or technicians; 3) that ambitious youth are oriented mainly to
governmental office; 4) that nations which have "spiritual" culture but
not "material" culture value the former more highly; and above all, that
education in physical science is more expensive.
Although Japan is an industrialized society, the residue of the above
tendency still exists. Following the practice in Japan to classify disci-
plines into two main groups, rika-kei (science) and bunka-kei (arts), the
former covering such divisions as the physical sciences, technologies,
agriculture, medicine, pharmacy, nursing, home economics, and the latter,
such disciplines as the humanities, law, commerce, economics, art, and
education: 67.7% of the students are in bunka-kei and 32.3% in rika-
kei.'2 As said before, 60% of college students are in private institutions,
which are supported mainly by fees and therefore cannot but seek more
students and less expensive facilities. Thus, the private college puts its
emphasis on bunka-kei.
An over-supply of students in bunka-kei makes their careers rela-
tively insecure and less advantageous than those of the students in the
natural sciences. They cannot easily expect to become members of the
political or academic elite, or to put their special knowledge to profes-
sional use in the future as they could in earlier times or as the students in
rika-kei can expect to do. Students who have majored in philosophy may
12 The Ministry of Education compares the main nations in terms of proportion

of college students classified into three categories,
1. physical sciences and technology,

2. education and home economics and
3. social sciences and humanities, getting the following table: Mombusho,
Waga-kuni no Kyoiku Suijun, Level of Education of Japan, 1959, p. 150.
Nation Category 1 Category 2 Category S
Japan 21.9% 23.7% 54.4%

USA 29.5 25.0 45.5
UTTSSR 43.4 49.2 7.4
UK 44.5 32.1 23.4
West Germany 41.6 11.7 46.7
France 44.3 0.0 55.7
Zengakuren 239
work as salesmen.'3 Salaries are lower for bunka-kei graduates than for
rika-kei, because of the shortage of the latter.14
Under these relatively unfavorable conditions, students in bunka-kei
are likely to feel alienated from their own specialty. They lose interest in
it because their future career will be foreign to it. Since no experimental
studies and the like are required for them, and paternalism exists, they
are freer than rika-kei students, thus, they tend not to commit themselves
to their major subject and not to submit to institutional control. They are
more marginal than rika-kei in terms of their future, their major, and
their campus life. And yet they are more powerful because of their num-
ber, freer because of their easy-going schooling, and more socially-minded
because of their major and because of consciousness of their relatively in-
definite and unpromising future. Numerical data showing what propor-
tion of students in bunka- and rika-kei take an active role in the student
movements are not available, but it is widely held that bunka-kei students
are the more active.15
A third feature of Japanese college culture is a tradition of political
concern which values leftist ideology. There are the traditions that gov-
ernmental universities have taken a lead in producing the nation's lead-
ers; that competent and ambitious youth were anxious to be mobile
through higher education into the political hierarchy and at the same
time to make the nation catch up with advanced nations; and that self-
denial and social devotion were emphasized more than individualism.
13 A statistical survey was done by the Ministry of Education to find the relation-
ship between one 's major and his job, or the proportion of university graduates who
are in a job unconnected with their major. The ratio ranges from 40% (for "home-
economics and nursing") to 1% (for "medicine"). Generally bunka-kei and the
pure sciences in rika-kei (e.g. biology, mathematics) are unfavorable subjects for
offering a job closely relevant to them, while rika-kei such as technology and engineer-
ing are closely related with the job. Mombusho, Shokuba ni okeru Gakureki-kosei,
Educational Composition in the Job-market, 1954, pp. 62-65; Shokushu to Gakureki,
Kinds of Job and Education, 1955, pp. 66-73.
14 According to a survey of the Ministry of Education, the supply of majors in
social sciences, humanities and education is above the demand, while majors in physical
sciences, engineering, medicine are in short supply. About 20,000 students in the
social sciences, 8,000 in home-economics, 8,000 in education, 900 in agriculture will be
surplus while 3,500 in engineering, 2,500 in medicine and 250 in physical sciences will
be needed but not available around 1960. Estimated by the Mombusho, Daigaku to
Shushoklu College and Job, 1957, pp. 76-94.
15 The Departmental origin of members of the Central Committee of Zengakuren,
who are supposed to be the most active and militant leaders, may show this tendency.
Of 45 members, 41 belong to bunka-kei, 3 to rika-kei, one unknown. For the members
of the Central Committees of the Regional Divisions of Zengakuren, 58 are in bunka-
kei, 12 in rika-kei and 3 unknown. (Both for 1959, adapted from Zengakuren no
Jittai, op. cit., pp. 223-227.) Statistics of the pre-war time when legal suppression
was the severest show that out of 3,626 students in higher institutions who were
arrested by the police on a charge of participation in subversive movements during
1925-1933, 2,859 (78.85%) were in bunka-kei and 767 (21.15%) in rika-kei. Mom-
busho, Shisokyoku Yoko, Beport of the Bureau of Ideology, 1934, pp. 355-356.
The academic elite, as a rational and critical group, is inclined to

take a sympathetic attitude toward counter-elites, since the power exer-
cised by a political elite is often accompanied by elements of irrationality.
The status quo, or traditional reality, must necessarily have some irra-
tional aspects, and the political elite, as a conservative group, shares them,
whereas the counter-elite has not yet attained full power and can claim a
thoroughly rational ideology which attracts the academic elite. Professors
and college students, as objective and rational researchers, share this
tendency.
The philosophy and policy of the political elite in Japan cannot be
said to have been rational or democratic. Every effort was made to make
Japan rich and strong enough to cope with the advanced nations. The
very aim of politics was to develop the nation as a whole, not necessarily
the happiness of individuals. The most effective way to achieve this aim
was thought to consist in the concentrated utilization of individual capa-
cities under the strong control of the central government. Former elites
were urged to contribute to this enterprise. F,or example, the samurai, as
the former political elite, became governmental officials, soldiers, police-
men; rich merchants, as the economic elite, offered their capital; priests,
as the intellectual elite, were employed as teachers; and daimyo (feudal
lords) and kuge (court nobles) acted as statesmen or symbolic leaders.
Common people who had neither money nor skill could, and had to, offer
their labor at the cheapest price. The government also tried to train their
successors through higher education and more efficient laborers through
common education. The feudalistic ethics, with emphasis upon "vertical'"
morality, e.g., loyalty, sacrifice, obedience, silence, and the like, were also
used to the fullest extent. Unconditional obedience to the superior, to the
family, to the public, to the State, to the Emperor was required as the
central morality of people. The people, accustomed to authoritarian
ethics, were forced to assimilate them on the one hand, while any criti-
cism was forcefully prohibited and suppressed on the other.
In general, this situation continued until 1945. The policy was suc-
cessful in making Japan fairly industrialized and powerful in a little
more than half a century and in avoiding the status of colonized country.
The general population were not dissatisfied with the policy, but even the
contrary. The rise of living standards, the spread of education, and the
tangible progress of the nation itself gave them great satisfaction and
pride.
Nevertheless, there were inner contradictions in modern Japan, and
there had to be counter-elite ideologies and movements, however success-
ful and powerful the political elite might be. In order to cope with west-
ern nations, Japan had to adopt western technology; in order to be
accepted as a modern nation by the world, she had to introduce western
institutions. But technology and institutions cannot be separated from
ideology, despite the so-called cultural lag. To take an example, parlia-
Zengakuren 241
mentarianism, even if promulgated by the government and limiting

suffrage to the chosen few, could not help but expand the ideology of
civil liberties among the general population. The development of capital-
ism was followed by an individualistic ideology and various social prob-
lems such as class antagonism, joblessness, and the business cycle. A con-
sciousness of individual and class was thus awakened, which was against
authoritarianism and exploitation. The irrational and mystical political
philosophy which the political elite imposed-such as the doctrine of the
Emperor as the incarnation of religious holiness, moral supremacy and
political sovereignty, the doctrine of so-called Kokutai, the national polity
based upon the eternal lineage of the Imperial family-irritated the in-
tellectuals who were baptized by western thinking.
Of course, there was a strong counterpoise. Of special importance
was the assimilation of the counter-elite into the elite, chiefly through
higher education open to those with superior ability though of inferior
social origin. There were also the subtle tactics of the government to con-
vert the anti-elite ideologues into pro-elite ones. That part of the aca-
demic elite in higher institutions which was sponsored by the political
elite produced sophisticated doctrines in favor of the political elite under
the guise of objective science. College students, even if sympathetic to
anti-elite ideology, were easily assimilated into the political or business
elite immediately after graduation. Officially sponsored organizations
were skillfully formed to absorb and integrate the energy of youth
through an appealing ideology similar to that of national socialism.
Although, due to these and other factors, the counter-elite never suc-
ceeded in upsetting the political elite, there was always a potential tend-
ency toward a counter-elite ideology and movement, especially among the
intellectuals and the working classes. This counter-elite tendency had
some roots in the traditional culture, too. While the mores of the Toku-
gawa shogunate period, which had lasted about three hundred years be-
fore Meiji modern Japan, with its feudalism and caste-like system,
trained the people in morals like unconditional obedience, self-sacrifice,
and no ambition for mobility, still it had favorable elements, latent or
manifest to some extent, for the counter-elite. The Tokugawa culture had
several lines of descent, namely, Confucianism, Bushido, Buddhism,
Shintoism, and Chonin-Bunka (Culture of Commoners in Towns). And
one of the elements common to all of these is what can be termed spiritu-
ality, by which we mean the alleged supremacy of the spirit of the culture
concerned. Mere erudition or skill is not appreciated so much. Not superi-
ority in a professional specialty, but in moral and spiritual personality,
is the point. Zen-Buddhism is probably the best example of this culture.
When a person dismisses his own narrow self-interest, e.g., his ambition
to be a great scholar or saint, and he is in the world of nothingness, he can
suddenly get insight into the core of the universe. This is the state of
satori. The spirit of the world can be apprehended only by the spirit of
24.2 Sociology of Education
the person. Consistent loyalty to the spirit or the idea in a Platonic sense,
and constancy of spirit of the person at the cost of his physical and im-
mediate welfare are what spirituality means. In this way a kind of con-
tempt for changing phenomenal realities and an appreciation of the un-
changing ultimate principle prevailed in Japanese sentiment. Of course
this ultimate principle differed in different groups of people and in
different streams of culture. But a persistent clinging to justice or michi
(way, moral) against worldly power and personal interests, which be-
longed to the world of phenomenal realities, was the main virtue in
Bushido, Confucianism, and Kokugaku. In Buddhism which stressed the
evanescence of the actual life, an other-worldly mind as well as resigna-
tion was cultivated. In Chonin-Bunka, wvhich was strongly oriented to
secularism and was based upon the developing economic power of the
urban common people, there was a latent revolt against, and eontempt
for, the power elite of the time, a feeling that political power was evil in
itself, and it was thought a virtue to side with the weak against the strong.
Therefore, it can be assumed that there had been a tradition of valu-
ing the anti-elite way of thinking and behaving. It must be pointed out,
above all, that the modern Japan of the Meiji era was itself the result
of an anti-elite movement, and the people knew that the present power
elite had been the counter-elite before Meiji. "Successful crime is called
virtue." A sentiment that power is wrong appealed to the moral subcon-
sciousness of the people. Technological westernization was followed by
western ideology, and its core or principle was searched for after the
fashion of spirituality. Some found it in democracy, others in individual-
ism and in rationalism, and still others in socialism. The spiritualist or
asceticist tradition favored radicalism against compromise. The more
thorough-going and radical an ideology, the closer to the truth or the
ideal it seemed. Hence, a fashion of leftist ideology, especially among the
intellectuals. Marxism was seemingly the only consistent political theory,
at least in the social sciences, so that it attracted those who looked for the
core of an opposition to the ideology of the political elite.
Change of Political Structure in Japanese Society. There are two
dimensions which determine the status of college students, namely, power
and ideology. The political elite, counter-elite and mass are three poles,
and the academic elite and students float in between in the status deter-
mined by interrelationships among the poles. Distances in terms of power
and ideology are the two main variables which deserve fuller analysis in
order to see the dynamics of social movements, including student move-
ments.
There was a drastic change in power and ideology in post-war Japan.
In terms of power, what is most conspicuous is the lowered status of the
political elite and the rising status of the counter-elite and the mass, both
of which affected the status of college students to some extent.
At the first stage after the war, there was no substantial political
Zengakuren 243
elite except the occupying forces. The previous political elite had been
dismissed. The former counter-elite came back as a new elite, but without
much power; the only political elite, the occupying forces, made every
effort to weaken the old elite and to strengthen the counter-elite and the
mass. Economically, too, the thorough defeat and destruction brought an
equalization of living standards of all the people.
It was not until about 1947, with a change of occupational policy as
a result of the emerging Cold War, that a new status hierarchy began to
be established. The pre-war political elite began to recover its power in
politics as well as in the economy. The so-called "reactionary course"
(gyaku-course) proceeded, though the political elite could not oppose the
ideology of democracy openly. The political elite has been relatively weak
in comparison to the pre-war period. This is due to the newly established
rights of laborers, to the rapid expansion of the new middle class with
higher education, to the growth in the number of workers in secondary
and tertiary industries who can easily form labor unions, to the effects
of mass media through which counter-elite ideology can freely criticize
the status quo, to rising economic standards, and to the growing power
of the counter-elite. Having lost the support of the military, and re-
stricted by the new Constitution, the political elite cannot completely re-
store its former position.
Students, who had served in the army and navy, giving up their col-
lege life half-way through, felt that they had been deluded by the former
elite. No wonder that communism, which had been the most radical op-
ponent of the former elite and which seemed to explain the conflict
between the classes, became so attractive for them. As students were ideal-
istic and fond of clearcut theory, they moved from extreme to extreme.
This was also the case for the academic elite. The majority of journalists,
writers, and professors had cooperated with the elite during the war, as
they had no other way of living. Reluctantly or willingly, they justified
the ideology and policy of the power elite through papers, books, and in
classrooms. In fact, they had been incorporated into the political elite.
Leading professors in a few national universities sponsored by the politi-
cal elite traditionally, held some of the highest positions in the govern-
ment. Journalists and writers could not publish articles unless approved
by the official censorship during the war, so that they were, in effect, war
leaders.
At the end of the war, private universities expanded greatly and a
great many professors became independent of the government. National
universities, too, expanded so much that the authority and prestige of
professors were lowered, and most of them had no affiliation with the
political elite. Most of the academic elite, therefore, felt no responsibility
for the political elite but, on the contrary, with a claim for academic
freedom and a distrust for the political elite, they felt a closer intimacy
with the counter-elite. Supported by the allied forces of the academic
elite, the students, and the mass, the status of the counter-elite was much
improved.
As for the status of college students, although they still enjoy more
freedom and privileges, especially in a few leading universities, than
ordinary working citizens, their privileges and prestige have been lowered
in comparison with pre-war times. The main reason for this is the numeri-
cal expansion of students, which has a profound impact upon their status,
objectively as well as subjectively. Quantitative growth was accompanied
by lowered quality. While formerly, the universities selected a handful
of competent students, now the door is much more wide open, so that even
though it is now harder to be enrolled in a leading institution, it cannot
be denied that the average college student is lower in quality or ability.
The entering age and period of schooling are shortened if one takes
education in the pre-war " high school " (koto-gakko) plus " university "
(daigaku) -three- and three-year schooling, respectively, after six-years
of elementary and five-years of lower secondary education-and com-
pares it with the higher education of the present "university '-four-
years of schooling after six-years of elementary, three-years of lower
secondary, and three-years of upper secondary education. Far more girls,
who see in higher education only a preparation for a better marriage, not
for a professional or academic career, are in higher institutions. All these
factors contribute to a lowered status of college students.
On the other hand, the students' quantitative growth increases their
power. When united into a federation, they can demonstrate and feel
their power. Besides, young people with technological skill are required
on a large scale by the post-war economy. In addition, distrust of the
adult generation owing to the defeat in the War has prevailed among the
young, while adults themselves can believe in their leadership no more.
While the pre-war students depended economically upon their families,
contemporary students can manage to support themselves by Arbeit and/
or by scholarships. Thus they feel themselves independent and autono-
mous.
Various data are available to show the high percentage of students
who are in favor of progressive ideology. Let us cite only one source. A
poll in 1957 at the Tokyo University showed 50% of all students for the
Socialist Party, 4% for the Communist Party, while only 11% were for
the Liberal Democrat Party (conservative), and 33% did not favor any
party.16 Students, losing their former status as a prospective elite, and
becoming conscious of their power as well as the increased power of the
mass, begin to feel themselves as an avant-garde of the general population.
Zengakuren. Let us look finally at the actual events of the post-war
student movements under the conditions in Japan as described above.
16 M. Ozaki, Daisan no Sedai, The Third Generation, 1960, Tokyo: H6ritsu-

bunka-sha, p. 43.
Zengakuren 245
The number of "events" is extremely hard to estimate, owing to the

difficulties in defining operationally a single "event." However, we shall
present a table giving the frequency of events in order to show a rough
tendency, using the following procedures:
a) Our sources of data are more than ten books on Zengakuren, and
a newspaper, Asahi, which has the greatest circulation in Japan and is
recognized as most reliable. In other words, we take as a criterion for
counting a happening as an "event" the fact that it has been recorded
owing to its social significance. We may, however, be underestimating
happenings outside the Tokyo area because a majority of the books and
the Asahi were written by persons in Tokyo.
b) We count an in-campus movement (confined to a single campus)
however long it may last (it may consist of several strikes and assemblies),
as one. A co-campus movement (involving cooperation of many campuses),
or an extra-campus movement (cooperating with non-student organiza-
tions), may have happenings in several places at the same time. If they
occur on the same day by prearrangement, they are counted as one; but
if they happen on three days they are counted as three.
c) Categorization depends upon the relative importance of the vari-
ous concerns of the students in a movement. When the concerns are in-
campus ones, and a majority of participants consist of students of a
particular school, it is defined as an in-campus movement.
d) There are two classifications: "events" and "organizations."
"Events" are chiefly assemblies, strikes, and demonstrations, while by or-
ganizations we mean formation or building of a new organization for
student movements. Each of these two is categorized into in-, co-, and
extra-campus.
In this manner we can make the following chronological table show-
ing the frequency of happenings in the student movement after the War.
When we look at this table we find that in 1948 co-campus movements
began to increase, and since 1950 extra-campus ones have grown in num-
ber. This is not a mere coincidence. 1948 is the year when Zengakuren
was organized, and 1951 is the year when the Peace Treaty was con-
cluded at San Francisco. Before 1948, students fought against the sur-
vivals of war-time militaristic education within their own campuses sepa-
rately. Democratization of the campus and defense of college life were
their main concerns. Then came the governmental plan to raise the fee,
the proposed act concerning university administration, and the "Red
Purge," all of which united the students in opposition. Around 1951, the
whole nation was involved in the dispute on the coming peace treaty, i.e.,
whether Japan should have peace with the free world at once or should
have overall peace with the whole world later; whether Japan should
have the U.S.-Japan Security Pact or should cling to the new Constitution
prohibiting armament. If we classify the three stages in this way and re-
arrange the table according to them, we get the following table:
Table S
NUMBER OF EVENTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES IN THE POST-WAR STUDENT MOVEMENT
Events Organizations
In- Co- Extra- In- Co- Extra-

Year campus campus campus campus campus campus
1945 97 0 0 6 6 2
1946 10 3 2 3 10 1
1947 7 6 2 2 10 0
1948 150 40 2 1 7 0
1949 10 27 9 0 1 1
1950 57 52 16 1 5 1
1951 55 27 4 0 2 0
1952 15 46 12 0 2 0
1953 17 28 14 0 3 0
1954 7 16 1 0 0 0
1955 1 10 4 0 0 0
1956 6 68 19 0 0 0
1957 0 60 18 0 0 0
1958 29 47 25 0 4 0
1959 7 33 11 1 3 0
1960 1 44 11 0 5 0
It can be readily seen that co-campus and extra-campus movements in-

creased relatively as well as absolutely as the stages proceeded.
A high frequency of happenings in a given period, however, does not
necessarily indicate that there is more enthusiasm, more intensity in the
student movements. Happenings may be modest. The attractiveness of a
movement for students can partly be seen by the number of students
mobilized by it. Roughly speaking, about a fifth of all higher institutions
and about a third of all college students in Japan are, at least formally,
under Zengakuren, and about half of all students may participate in a
specific Zengakuren movement under certain circumstances, as was the
case in the struggles against the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Pact.
Table 4
IN-CAMPUS, CO-CAMPUS, AND EXTRA-CAMPUS EVENTS IN
THREE PHASES OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD
First Stage Second Stage Third Stage

(1945-47) (1948-50) (1951-60)
In-campus
events 114 (90%) 217 (60%) 138 (22%)
Co-campus
events 9 ( 7%) 119 (33%) 379 (59%)
Extra-campus
events 4 ( 3%) 27 ( 7%) 119 (19%)
Total 127 100% 363 100% 636 100%
Zengakuren 247
Still another way of seeing the intensity of student movements may

be analysis of their tactics. Various techniques were invented to unify the
will of the majority of members, make a common front, consolidate the
organization, propagate the ideology, and weaken the resistance of the
authorities. The following list gives some examples:
1945. Strike (refusal of students to at- Agitation speech at the street

tend classes); corner;
United attendance (In some pri- Student funeral, in which stu-
vate universities, where more students gather to mourn a student
dents are admitted than there was martyr.
capacity for, in order to get more 1954. Enclosing the administrators in
fees-on the assumption that not their offices, which is named "can-
all enrolled students attend class ning."
-school authorities are embar- 1956. Physical violence to the authori-
rassed if all students attend.) ties.
1946. Demonstration parade. 1957. Open letter, e.g., to the Minister
1947. Refusal to pay fees; of Education;
Petition, e.g., to the Ministry of Protesting telegram from all
Education. members.
1948. General strike (nationwide or 1958. Stopping a train by occupying
regionwide); the station or by sitting on the
Polling, e.g., survey of the stand- rail.
ard of life of students, to obtain 1959. Surrounding a residence, e.g., of
objective data as a basis for their Premier Kishi, and making noise
demands; all night.
Message, e.g., from progressive 1960. Demonstration. Many forms of
writers to encourage the morale demonstration were invented dur-
of students; ing the struggle against the revi-
Accusation, e.g., of a school prin- sion of the U.S.-Japan Security
cipal or a policeman who sup- Pact. They were named as fol-
pressed students, to the court. lows: early rain demonstration
1949. Sitting-in; (long-lasting series of demon-
Hunger strike, e.g., at the top of strations), zig-zag demonstration
a chimney. (snake-like parade), French style
1950. Picket lines; demonstration (hand-in-hand pa-
Disturbance of a lecture by suc- rade), centripetal demonstration
cessive questioning, hooting and (parades starting from many
leaving. points and finally centralizing at
1951. Annoying a school official by suc- the center), swirling demonstra-
cessive visiting to disrupt his tion, incense-burning demonstra-
daily routine. tion (for the martyr), silent dem-
1952. Flame bottles, which are hand- onstration, demonstration with
made weapons for startling; crepes (expecting the death of
Survey of a rural community, the authorities), wave-like dem-
which can help students to under- onstration (which lasts for many
stand social problems and to com- days).
municate their demands to the
mass;
Needless to say, some of these tactics are illegal, and the offenders
were arrested by the police or dismissed from the institution. Looking at
them chronologically, it is clear that the tactics have grown progressively
more violent. This shows that the demands of the students have only with
more difficulty been heard through the use of moderate means, and that
the power of the political elite who were presented with demands from
the students has grown stronger, and their countertactics also have
grown more violent.
Thus, a circular process is operative. When the distance of power and
ideology between the political elite and the students is great, and at the
same time channels of communication between them are limited, force and
violence become final resorts for both parties. In this sense, the violent
actions of Zengakuren show an immature democracy, not only on the
part of the students, but on the part of the whole society, including the
political elite.
Conclusion
Conditions of Student Life Conducive to Student Movements
The general attributes of the status of students can be classified into four
categories:
1. Marginality. The student has not yet been incorporated into the
occupational system. He has a fairly wide range of possibility in terms of
his future career. He has no immediate superiors; he has no family to
support; he may go anywhere at any time. From this marginality of
status comes his attitude of detachment toward society. He is marginal
to his family, too. He is already old enough to be independent of his
family and to be accepted as an adult, but he is still economically de-
pendent. He lives, as a rule, outside the family in a dormitory far from
his home town. Thus, in terms of age and location, he is half-dependent
and half-independent. He thinks he is emancipated from family ties and
his home community, but still with some consciousness of not being
wholly so.'7 Hence, he feels some sense of guilt and insecurity, especially
when he compares himself with youths of the same age who are already
independent and have taken a definite role in society. Sometimes he may
have a superiority complex toward workers of the same age because of his
cultural background and his promising future, but at the same time, he
may feel guilty toward them because of his luck. In both cases he can
have a sense of obligation to devote himself to social matters for the sake
of the general population.
These are the most general characteristics of the student on a psycho-
logical level which come from his status as student. There are many varia-
tions, of course, which may be attributed to personality, to the culture of
17 David Riesman, op. cit., pp. 116-17.
Zengakuren 249
the individual institution he attends, or to the structure of the larger

society.
First, the prospective career of a student may be more or less clear
and predictable. For humanities students it is less predictable than for
engineering students; in societies with free occupational choice, it is less
predictable than in those without; in times of economic depression it is
less predictable than in times of prosperity.
Second, the mode of schooling and the nature of school discipline
may or may not be favorable to marginality. Where strict discipline is
exercised and all students are compelled to live in a dormitory, they are
incorporated into their own college community and do not feel marginal.
Again, where class attendance is enforced, much home study is imposed,
and energy must be devoted to study, as in some professional schools,
students are so busily involved in their own special field that they do not
feel marginal and free.
Third, the number of students per class or per professor may be too
large to develop personal and intimate relations between students and
professors or among students and at the same time to give them a sense
of belongingness and security. Colleges in rural "college towns" give
their clientele a sense of community. Students may live in their own
homes and attend college, and not suffer from loneliness and isolation.
Or they may live in a dormitory with their friends, enjoying a sense of
community. Still other students may rent their rooms and cook their own
food without a friend. In some countries, students, especially graduate
or "veteran" students have founded their own families. Some institu-
tions offer opportunities for extracurricular activities, which drain
off otherwise free energies. Depending upon conditions like these, the
marginality of college students varies.
2. Intellectuality. The student is, by definition, interested in study
and science, which is dependent upon intelligence and reasoning. Worldly
wisdom, immediate utility, pecuniary concerns, and personal interests are
ideally rejected.'8 Students are trained to think rationally, intellectually,
theoretically, disinterestedly, idealistically. Being critical, being ideal-
istic, seeing in general and broad perspective, they tend to be acutely
conscious of the irrational, dark, unjust, conflictful side of life. This leads
to overabundant ideology, radicalism, and unworldliness.
However, intellectuality as a general attribute of college students
varies greatly in intensity.19 Where higher education is well "democra-
18 See Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in Ainerica, American Century

Series (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957), Chapter 1. The Mertonian concept of
cosmopolitan influentials may be suggestive here. Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press,
1957), pp. 393-8.
19 Nevitt Sanford, "Higher Education as a Social Problem," in N. Sanford
(ed.), The American College (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 10-30.
tized" and everybody is not necessarily academically minded or does not

always have high intelligence, or where higher education, on the con-
trary, is monopolized by an "aristocracy," and the sons of the upper
class are admitted regardless of their ability and motivation, intellectu-
ality is not necessarily high. Where higher education is solely for train-
ing in particular bureaucratic or technological skills, and students are
only concerned with existing knowledge, broad, objective, and critical
perspectives are hardly gained. Ideas and degrees of academic freedom
also differ. When academic freedom is restricted, objective and critical
attitudes can hardly develop.
Extreme preoccupation with personal and immediate concerns makes
student movements and organizations impossible, while mission-minded-
ness, social and political concerns, and esteem for self-sacrifice among
students may promote these movements.
3. Circulation. Rapid circulation of leaders and members means

rapid change and transformation. College education may last two or four
years, and one's status as a student in a college community is limited to
this period. The student may leave, drop out, or graduate, but in any
case, he cannot enjoy his status as a student beyond a certain limited
number of years. This means little continuity of membership and fre-
quently changing quality within the organizations, even if they keep the
same name. From another point of view, student organizations can be
free from the traditions of the immediate past. A student organization
includes among its members both those youth who seek for independence
and adventure, and those students who are intellectual and critical; there-
fore, these organizations are the more autonomous because of their rapid
circulation.
4. Geographical concentration. College students are concentrated

within a certain age-stratum of the population. In addition, they maybe
are concentrated in terms of geographical location. This means that it is
easy for them to organize themselves and to federate with each other. It
is also important to note that students are freer to give up their proper
job, namely, study and learning, than are ordinary workers, and that
urban areas have many social problems, and a wide variety of social
activities which affect the consciousness of students.
In most cases college students have more personal and intimate
contacts with each other than they would in ordinary, occupational, or
social associations. Although they compete with each other for high
status, e.g., in scholastic achievement, in athletics, in dating, status
among them is vaguely defined compared to the status of personnel in
business, industry or government. The criteria for judging relative status
among students are more varied than they are in business and industry.
There are not so many conflicts of interest, and they see each other as
friends, peers, comrades, colleagues, rather than as threatening oppo-
nents. They are oriented almost exclusively to their peers. Values, climate,
Zengakuren 251
and the fashions of the campus all have more effect upon the constituents
than those of an office upon its workers.
Conditions of General Social Life Conducive to Student Movements

We have seen why college students are inclined to originate a political
movement. Now it is necessary to investigate the larger social conditions
under which student movements are likely to occur.
Higher institutions have two interrelated but distinct functions,
namely: developing science and training scholars, on the one hand; and
selecting and training social leaders on the other. Of course, different
countries and different types of higher education have different degrees
of emphasis upon the two functions. Because of the two main functions
of higher education, it is proper here to distinguish between the academic
elite and the political elite in order to analyze the status of students in a
general frame of reference. Here the political elite not only refers to
political leaders in the narrow sense, but includes all social elites except
the academic elite.
Not only does elite, by definition, presuppose the mass as its counter-
part, but its existence always gives rise to a counter-elite. The leaders
of the opposition party, the ideologists of a revolutionary party, the
critics of the existing social order, and the like are a few examples.
The academic elite is placed somewhere between the political elite
and the counter-elite. Although sometimes affiliating with the political
elite and usually living in institutions created and supported by it, it
is by nature likely to sympathize or even merge with the counter-elite.
The academic elite, is accustomed to analyzing the world critically.
Therefore, this group, especially those who are scholars in the political
or social sciences, are easily dissatisfied with the status quo, which causes
them to evolve a progressive or critical ideology. They are potentially
ready to join the camp of the counter-elite, and often become its ideo-
logical leaders.
The status of students in the political structure is even more in flux
than that of the academic elite, under whose immediate influence they
live. The following conditions affect their status:
1) Students may be an actual political elite in a society, for example,
in an underdeveloped country where there is almost no political elite
powerful as well as intelligent enough to lead other than the students.
History shows that there have been a great many nations in which the
army and the students are the two main actual powers for the advance-
ment and enlightenment of the nation. Students in such a case can
exercise a great influence over the whole society. If the traditional elite,
or the modern elite of army men competing with students does not
satisfy them, students can initiate revolutionary movements and become
the core of the counter-elite. If they win, they themselves are recognized
as an actual elite. Remember the case of the Korean students.
2) On the contrary, in various other cases students may have no

power in actual politics except their ballot. In a society where college
students are too small in number to become a social force, or too numerous
to be accepted as an elite, or where it is a cultural tradition to depre-
ciate education, or where higher education is too specialized or too much
emphasis is placed upon the physical and technical sciences for students
to develop social and political interests, there is little possibility for them
to act or to be recognized as a political elite. This is also the case for a
society which is very individualized and in which students are not con-
cerned with social or political matters but merely with their own per-
sonal careers.
3) Students may be predetermined as the future personnel of the

political elite while still finishing higher education. This is the situation
which Ralph Turner has ingeniously called "sponsored mobility." 20 In
this case students already have great privileges and prestige, and have
already assimilated during college life the values of the political elite,
so that they scarcely hold a counter-elite ideology, although a few sensi-
tive members among them tend to feel guilty or responsible for those of
the mass unable to acquire higher education. On the other hand, when
college education is greatly democratized with increasing enrollments,
students do not feel themselves to be a potential elite, but identify rather
with the mass. Just like the masses, these students are likely to be polit-
ically indifferent but they may be dissatisfied with the political elite and
sympathize with the counter-elite under critical circumstances.
From the preceding analysis, we can generalize the conditions favor-
able for student movements. We have found that there are at least six:
1) A balance of power between political elite and counter-elite. If
the political elite is overwhelmingly powerful, as in a totalitarian state,
prohibiting all kinds of counter-elite movements, student movements
cannot exist except in an underground form. In this case, as soon as the
power of the political elite is weakened, counter-elite movements, includ-
ing student movements, are ready to burst out.
2) Ideological distance between the political elite and counter-elite.

If the distance is small, student movements are unlikely to appear. If it
is great, students are easily divided into two opposing camps, affiliating
with the political elite and with the counter-elite.
3) Status of students. If students are fore-ordained members of the

political elite, they assimilate the ideology of the political elite except
for a few sensitive ones. If they are the actual political elite, as in under-
developed countries, and the status quo dissatisfies them, they are likely
to upset the existing order by radical and forceful movements. If students
are members of the mass, they are likely to participate in anti-elite move-
20 Ralph Turner, op. cit., pp. 121-2.
Zengakuren 253
ments insofar as the discontented mass can demonstrate power, but

usually students as mass do not have much interest in politics, as they
have no consciousness of superiority and power.
4) Quantity of students. The mere number of students makes organ-

ization possible or impossible. If students are too small in number, then
they cannot organize themselves to initiate movements.
5) Geographical location of students. If students are concentrated
in a few urban areas, political movements are more likely.
6) Mores of the academic elite. If the academic elite is interested

exclusively in pure science, if professionalism prevails among them, and
if the tradition of academic freedom is well established, students are
unlikely to develop social and political movements under the influence
of the academic elite. If higher education is established to train a political
or national elite, students are oriented to social matters and are more
likely to develop political movements. Students oriented to academic
disciplinary specialties, are not involved in social movements as easily
as practically- or socially-minded students.2'
21 A kind of impressionistic typology of student movements in various countries

is presented in "Characteristics of Student Movements Seen in Some Countries,"
Asahi Journal, Vol. III, No. 14 (April 2, 1961), pp. 6-15.

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Zengakuren: A Japanese Case Study of A Student Political Movement

Author(s): Michiya Shimbori

ZENGAKUREN: A JAPANESE CASE STUDY OF

HIGHER EDUCATION HAS become a big enterprise in which almost every

Japan Federation of Students, we shall first look at the main character-

1 David Riesman, Constraint andl Variety in American Education, Anchor Edition

leading electrical technicians and so on. Now each of them is evaluated as

2 Ralph Turner, "Modes of Social Ascent Through Education: Sponsored Mo-

1920 82,218 6,517 141 1.6%

A second major feature of the post-war Japanese colleges is the rapid

4 Adapted from Mombusho Nempo, Yearbooks of Ministry of Education. Rapid

6 Adapted from Mombusho, Gakusei-seito Seikatsu Chosa, Vol. II, Survey of

Zengakuren 21 9 15( 5)a 15 30 1948

Shagakudo (Union of 40 21 29 32 61 1950

Japan Federation of 9 3 6( 1) 6 12 1950

Igakuren (Japan Union 12 3 6( 2) 9 15 1958

Shigakuren (Union of 13 7 6 13 1958

Chiho Gakuren (Students 53 20 73 73 1959

9 For boys in four-year universities only, surveyed by the Ministry of Education

are financed mainly by the tuition of students.10 It is not unusual to see

Student movements, mass demonstrations, or strikes fit into the Japanese

12 The Ministry of Education compares the main nations in terms of proportion

1. physical sciences and technology,

Nation Category 1 Category 2 Category S

Japan 21.9% 23.7% 54.4%

The academic elite, as a rational and critical group, is inclined to

mentarianism, even if promulgated by the government and limiting

16 M. Ozaki, Daisan no Sedai, The Third Generation, 1960, Tokyo: H6ritsu-

The number of "events" is extremely hard to estimate, owing to the

In- Co- Extra- In- Co- Extra-

It can be readily seen that co-campus and extra-campus movements in-

First Stage Second Stage Third Stage

Total 127 100% 363 100% 636 100%

Still another way of seeing the intensity of student movements may

1945. Strike (refusal of students to at- Agitation speech at the street

17 David Riesman, op. cit., pp. 116-17.

the individual institution he attends, or to the structure of the larger

18 See Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in Ainerica, American Century

tized" and everybody is not necessarily academically minded or does not

3. Circulation. Rapid circulation of leaders and members means

4. Geographical concentration. College students are concentrated

Conditions of General Social Life Conducive to Student Movements

2) On the contrary, in various other cases students may have no

3) Students may be predetermined as the future personnel of the

2) Ideological distance between the political elite and counter-elite.

3) Status of students. If students are fore-ordained members of the

20 Ralph Turner, op. cit., pp. 121-2.

ments insofar as the discontented mass can demonstrate power, but

4) Quantity of students. The mere number of students makes organ-

6) Mores of the academic elite. If the academic elite is interested

21 A kind of impressionistic typology of student movements in various countries

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