G.R. No.

L-68159 March 18, 1985

HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent

ESCOLIN, J.

The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under
the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost.
Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25,
1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to
exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law,
and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an
elected member of Parliament.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .”

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding
of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs
afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.

JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place
sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the
production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and
stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to
Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.

Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of
such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious
event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation
or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the
stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event.
Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052
appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government”. The fact
that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.
On religious freedom

The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as
elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to
establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that religious freedom as a constitutional
mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945

ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.

FERIA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the
ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director
of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of
illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an
indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three
years, nine months and three days ofprison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on
September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.

Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the
sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by
Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the
majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of
said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944,
which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5
(p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called
Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines
during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the
judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court held
that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same
Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order
No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of
the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no
substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent
occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the
court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and
valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that
such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the
abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the
authorities therein cited.

Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged
with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by
the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.

A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not
defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate
government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against
belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory
and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private
reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the
welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national
security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc.,
were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code,
which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977,
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No
annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the
certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and
very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said
roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of
the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the
Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said
indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April
17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in
his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the
6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the
payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land,
moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the
suit.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of
the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was
premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right
of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed;
(3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be
sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved
in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the
trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its
decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government
cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money
claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have
jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly,
the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.

The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the
case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of
a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale,
the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there said: .

... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were
to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the
right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in
the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad
plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that
there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is
not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned
upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title
and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the
appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only
relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking. 2

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the
price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In
addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a
quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled
as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR,respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election
of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of
Tayabas.

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion
of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion
to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only
constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of
the legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any
of the other two departments of the government.

(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each
house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members.

(h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to
the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would
be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones
Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns
and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house
to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members,
the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix
the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of
whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no
protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission
of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against the election of any member of
the National Assembly should be filed.

G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA,
JR., FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.

The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22,
1972), "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and
state power in the country and to take over the Government by force ..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law.

1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of
Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify
the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question
political or justiciable in character?

Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of not
much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly exercised by
Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political clime, or by theories of foreign
authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and
fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.
In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in an
ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation
No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the
courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and events recited in
detail in the different "Whereases" of the proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of
rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several
provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that
therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature
and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between
organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most
subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting.
Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers;
recruitment of armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material,
fifth-column activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion which by
their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively
unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their opinions,
is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision
of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and
shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution ..." To be
sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new
Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our decision
in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31, 1973), and of course by the existing
political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other countries.

On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping
statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations,
decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she
concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but not of a
constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are subject to judicial review when proper under the
Constitution.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the present
cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law — has
become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The
question propounded to the voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires,
can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish
the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots,
including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was
thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat
of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President in the
beginning — whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court is precluded from
applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.

2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their
petitions because they are still subject to certain restrictions, 5 the ruling of the Court is that the
petitions should be dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the
situation which justifies the proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of rebellion,
necessarily implies the power (subject, in the opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to
the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees conditions or
restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation. Justice
Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of petitioner Rodrigo" and others
similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the majority; while Justice Teehankee
believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of
the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus.

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said
privilege with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the
proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On
this particular point, that is, that the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of
the writ as to the persons referred to, the Court is practically unanimous. Justice Fernando, however,
says that to him that is still an open question; and Justice Muñoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the
majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she discusses therein votes for the dismissal of the
petitions.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN
THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT
THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE
APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

G.R. No. L-37364 May 9, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, and SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, *respondents.

Tañada, Salonga, Ordoñez, Gonzales, Rodrigo, Jr., Roxas, Arroyo, Castro and Felipe for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor-General Vicente V. Mendoza,
Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and
Attorney Blesila Quintillan for respondents.
Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, petitioner was arrested on September 23,
1972, pursuant to General Order No. 2-A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political
and state power in the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at Fort Bonifacio in
Rizal province. On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus 1 in which he questioned the
legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention. This Court issued a writ of
habeas corpus, returnable to it, and required respondents to file their respective answers, after which
the case was heard. Thereafter, the parties submitted their memoranda. Petitioner's last Reply
memorandum was dated November 30, 1972. On September 17, 1974, this Court dismissed the petition
and upheld the validity of martial law and the arrest and detention of petitioner. 2

In the present case, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of military commissions to try him, alone or
together with others, for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. The charges are contained in six (6) amended charge sheets 3 filed
on August 14, 1973 with Military Commission No. 2.

The original petition in this case was filed on August 23, 1973. It sought to restrain the respondent
Military Commission from the proceeding with the hearing and trial of petitioner on August 27, 1973.
Because of the urgency of the petition, this Court called a hearing on Sunday, August 26, on the question
of whether with its membership of only nine (9) Justices, it had a quorum to take cognizance of the
petition in view of the constitutional questions involved. At that hearing, this Court asked the parties to
agree to seek from the Military Commission a postponement of petitioner's trial the following day. The
purpose was to relieve the Court of the pressure of having to decide the question of quorum without
adequate time to do so.

When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened the following day, however, petitioner
questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings
even as he discharged both his defense counsel of choice and his military defense counsel.

The proceedings were thereupon adjourned to another day. In the meantime, for the petitioner's
assurance, a Special Committee, composed of a retired. Justice of the Supreme Court, to be designated
by the Chief Justice, as Chairman, and four (4) members to be designated respectively by petitioner, the
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice and the Secretary of National
Defense, was created to reinvestigate the charges against petitioner. The Secretaries of Justice and
National Defense designated their representatives but the petitioner refused to name his. The Chief
Justice asked former Justice J.B.L. Reyes but the latter declined, as he also declined in his capacity as
President of the IBP to designate a representative to the Committee. As a result, with only two of its
members designed, the Special Committee has not been able to function.

On September 4, 1973, a supplemental petition alleging the creation of the Special Committee and
questioning the legality of its creation was filed. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Secretary of Justice were included as respondents. Subsequently, the Court resolved to require the
respondents to file their answer and on August 21, 1974, within the extended period granted by the
Court, respondents, with the exception of the Chief Justice, filed their answer to the supplemental
petition.

Thereafter, petitioner was required to file a reply and was granted additional time after the lapse of the
original period, but instead of doing so, petitioner asked for the admission of a second supplemental
petition challenging the continued enforcement of martial law in the Philippines, in the light of
Presidential statements to the effect that with the coming into force of the new Constitution on January
17, 1973, martial law was "technically and legally" lifted. To this petition respondents answered.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument as per Resolution
of this Court on January 14, 1975. 4

On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission be prohibited from proceeding with
the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975, the same being illegal, until
further orders from the Supreme Court..

On March 31, 1975, respondents filed their Comment to petitioner's aforementioned urgent motion,
which motion and other related incidents were set for hearing on April 14, 1975 at 10:00 a.m., as per
Resolution of this Court on April 8, 1975.

Meanwhile, or on April 1, 1975, this Court issued a Resolution, stating that "for lack of a necessary
quorum", it could not act on petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of temporary Restraining Order
Against Military Commission No. 2, inasmuch as this case involved a constitutional question..

On April 7, 1975, petitioner filed a "Manifestation" stating, among others, that the "Urgent Motion did
not and does not involve a constitutional question", for reasons stated therein.

On April 12, 1975, respondents filed their "Reply to Petitioner's Manifestation", followed by
Respondents' Manifestation filed on April 14, 1975, attaching thereto fourteen (14) sworn statements of
witnesses whose testimonies are sought to be perpetuated..

On April 14, 1975, this Court also issued a restraining order against respondent Military Commission No.
2, restraining it from further proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated
March 10, 1975 until the matter is heard and further orders are issued.

When this case was called for hearing, petitioner's counsel presented to this Court a motion to withdraw
the petition, as well as all other pending matters and/or incidents in connection therewith.
Respondents' counsel interposed objection to the granting of the aforesaid motion to withdraw.

After the hearing, this Court Resolved: "(a) to require the Solicitor General to furnish the Court as well as
the petitioner and the latter's counsel, with copies of the transcript of all the stenographic notes taken
at the hearing before the Military Commission No. 2 for the perpetuation of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution in various criminal cases filed against herein petitioner, within five (5) days
from today; (b) to request the Solicitor General and the AFP Judge Advocate General to make the
necessary arrangements for the petitioner to confer with his counsel on matters connected with the
aforementioned motion to withdraw; (c) to allow counsel for the petitioner, if they so desire, to file a
manifestation in amplication of the aforesaid motion to withdraw, within ten (10) days from the date
they confer with the petitioner, and thereafter to allow the Solicitor General to file a counter-
manifestation within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof; and (d) to consider the case
submitted for decision after submission by both parties of their respective pleadings on the motion to
withdraw."

Subsequently, the parties manifested their compliance.

Acting on petitioner's motion to withdraw the petitions and motions in this case, and there being only
three (3) Justices (Justices Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma) who voted in favor of granting such
withdrawal, whereas seven (7) Justices (Justices Castro, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion
and Martin) voted for its denial, the said motion to withdraw is deemed denied (Section 11, Rule 56 of
the Revised Rules of Court). The Chief Justice has inhibited himself, having been made respondent by
petitioner in his Supplemental Petitions.5

The Justice who voted to deny the withdrawal are of the opinion that since all matters in issue in this
case have already been submitted for resolution, and they are of paramount public interest, it is
imperative that the questions raised by petitioner on the constitutionality and legality of proceedings
against civilians in the military commissions, pursuant to pertinent General Orders, Presidential Decrees
and Letters of Instruction, should be definitely resolved.

In regard to the merits, We Resolve by a vote of eight (8) Justices to dismiss the main as well as the
supplemental petitions. 5*

II

MILITARY COMMISSIONS

We have that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and validly
vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner.

1. The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law (Proclamation No. 1081) on
September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines is valid and constitutional and that its
continuance is justified by the danger posed to the public safety. 6

2. To preserve the safety of the nation in times of national peril, the President of the Philippines
necessarily possesses broad authority compatible with the imperative requirements of the emergency.
On the basis of this, he has authorized in General Order No. 8 (September 27, 1972) the Court of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to create military tribunals to try and decide cases "of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order No. 12 (September 30,
1972), the military tribunals were vested with jurisdiction "exclusive of the civil courts", among others,
over crimes against public order, violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, violations of the laws on
firearms, and other crimes which, in the face of the emergency, are directly related to the quelling of the
rebellion and preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In order to ensure a more orderly
administration of justice in the cases triable by the said military tribunals, Presidential Decree No. 39
was promulgated on November 7,1972, providing for the "Rules Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure and Other Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals." These measures he has the
authority to promulgate, since this Court recognized that the incumbent President, under paragraphs 1
and 2 of Section 3 of Article XVII of the new Constitution, had the authority to "promulgate
proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people and to the
institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of the rebellion or insurrection or secession or the
threat thereof....." 7 Pursuant to the aforesaid Section 3 [1] and [2] of Article XVII of the Constitution,
General Orders No. 8, dated September 27, 1972 (authorizing the creation of military tribunals), No. 12,
dated September 30, 1972 (defining the jurisdiction of military criminals and providing for the transfer
from the civil courts to military tribunals of cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or
rebellion, etc.), and No. 39, dated November 7, 1972, as amended (prescribing the procedures before
military tribunals), are now "part of the law of the land." 8

3. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being a civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives him
of his right to due process, since in his view the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to persons
accused of "ordinary" crimes means judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the rebellion
and the existence of martial law. It is, of course, essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law
administrator must have ample and sufficient means to quell the rebellion and restore civil order.
Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders have been considered as necessary in a state of
martial law, as a mere power of detention may be wholly inadequate for the exigency. 9 "It need hardly
be remarked that martial law lawfully declared," observed Winthrop, "creates an exception to the
general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war,
as well as those of a civil character, triable, at the discretion of the commander, (as governed by a
consideration for the public interests and the due administration of justice) by military tribunals." 10

Indeed, it has been said that in time of overpowering necessity, "public danger warrants the substitution
of executive process for judicial process." 11 According to Schwartz, "The immunity of civilians from
military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely
imperative for public safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to
exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in court." 12

In any case, We cannot close Our eyes to the fact that the continued existence of these military tribunals
and the exercise by them of jurisdiction over civilians during the period of martial law are within the
contemplation and intendment of Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. These are
tribunals of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national
security. This is the only logical way to construe said Section 3, paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, in relation to General Order Nos. 8, 12 and 39, in the context of contemporary history and
the circumstances attendant to the framing of the new charter.
4. When it has been established that martial law is in force, the responsibility for all acts done
thereunder must be taken by the authorities administering it. 13 It is a serious responsibility which merits
the cooperation of all in the collective desire for the restoration of civil order. In the case at bar,
petitioner is charged with having conspired with certain military leaders of the communist rebellion to
overthrow the government, furnishing them arms and other instruments to further the uprising. There is
no question that the continuing communist rebellion was one of the grave threats to the Republic that
brought about the martial law situation. Under General Order No. 12, jurisdiction over this offense has
been vested exclusively upon military tribunals. It cannot be said that petitioner has been singled out for
trial for this offense before the military commission. Pursuant to General Order No. 12, all "criminal
cases involving subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion or those committed in furtherance of, on
the occasion of incident to or in connection with the commission of said crimes" which were pending in
the civil courts were ordered transferred to the military tribunals. This jurisdiction of the tribunal,
therefore, operates equally on all persons in like circumstances..

5. Neither are We impressed with petitioner's argument that only thru a judicial proceeding before the
regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due process is not a
guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent
jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily means
a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. 14 The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural
aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of the
proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and "the problem of the propriety of the deprivations,
under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential
fairness." 15 It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation
of defense. 16

Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39,
assures observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially
fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense. 17

6. It is, however, asserted that petitioner's trial before the military commission will not be fair and
impartial, as the President had already prejudged petitioner's cases and the military tribunal is a mere
creation of the President, and "subject to his control and direction." We cannot, however, indulge in
unjustified assumptions. Prejudice cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the great
confidence and trust reposed by the people upon the President and the latter's legal obligation under
his oath to "do justice to every man". Nor is it justifiable to conceive, much less presume, that the
members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Board
of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with their corresponding staff judge advocates, as
reviewing authorities, through whom petitioner's hypothetical conviction would be reviewed before
reaching the President, would all be insensitive to the great principles of justice and violate their
respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises.
This assumption must be made because innocence, not wrongdoing, is to be presumed. The
presumption of innocence includes that of good faith, fair dealing and honesty. This presumption is
accorded to every official of the land in the performance of his public duty. There is no reason why such
presumption cannot be accorded to the President of the Philippines upon whom the people during this
period has confided powers and responsibilities which are of a very high and dedicate nature. The
preservation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution rests at bottom exactly where the defense of
the nation rests: in the good sense and good will of the officials upon whom the Constitution has placed
the responsibility of ensuring the safety of the nation in times of national peril.

III

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 355

We also find that petitioner's claim that Administrative Order No. 355 actually "strips him of his right to
due process" is negated by the basic purpose and the clear provisions of said Administrative Order. It
was precisely because of petitioner's complaint that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in the
preliminary investigation of his charges that the President created a Special Committee to reinvestigate
the charges filed against him in the military commission. The Committee is to be composed of a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court, to be designated by the Chief Justice, as Chairman, and four (4) members
to be designated respectively by the accused, the President of the Integrated Bar, the Secretary of
Justice and the Secretary of National Defense, all of whom, according to Administrative Order No. 355
"must be learned in the law, reputed for probity, integrity, impartiality, incorruptibility and fairness...." It
is intended that the Committee should conduct the investigation with "utmost fairness, 'impartiality and
objectivity' ensuring to the accused his constitutional right to due process, to determine whether "there
is reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged were in fact committed and the accused is
probably guilty thereof."

Petitioner, however, objected by challenging in his supplemental petition before this Court the validity
of Administrative Order No, 355, on the pretense that by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Special
Committee he would be waiving his right to cross-examination because Presidential Decree No. 77,
which applies to the proceedings of the Special Committee, has done away with cross-examination in
preliminary investigation.

The infirmity of this contention is apparent from the fact that the committee "shall have all the powers
vested by law in officials authorized to conduct preliminary investigations." We have held as implicit in
the power of the investigating Fiscal or Judge in the discharge of his grave responsibility of ascertaining
the existence of probable cause, is his right to cross-examine the witnesses since "cross-examination
whether by the judge or by the prosecution supplies the gap by permitting an instant contrast of
falsehoods and opposing half-truths, mixed with elements of truth, from which the examining judge or
officer is better able to form a correct synthesis of the real facts." 18

In the case at bar, petitioner's representative in the Committee having been conferred with "all the
powers" of officials authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, is, therefore, expressly authorized
by Section 1[c] of Presidential Decree No. 77 to subpoena the complainant and his witnesses and
"profound clarificatory questions". Viewed in the context of Our ruling in Abrera v.. Muñoz, 19 this
implies the authority of his representative in the Committee to cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution, in order to reach an intelligent and correct conclusion on the existence of probable cause.

IV

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Equally untenable is petitioner's contention that his constitutional right to due process has been
impaired when the anti-subversion charges filed against him with the military commission were not
investigated preliminarily in accordance with Section 5 of the Anti-Subversion Act, but in the manner
prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77. It is asserted that
under the aforesaid Presidential Decrees, he is precluded from cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses and from being assisted by counsel. Contrary to petitioner's contention, Section 1[b] of
Presidential Decree No. 77 specifically grants him the right to counsel, and Presidential Decree No. 328
amended Presidential Decree No. 39, precisely to secure the substantial rights of the accused by
granting him the right to counsel during preliminary investigation. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
1700, the accused shall have the right "to cross-examine witnesses against him" and in case the offense
is penalized by prision mayor to death, the preliminary investigation shall be conducted by the proper
Court of First Instance. As to whether or not the denial to an accused of an opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against him in the preliminary investigation constitutes an infringement of his right to due
process, We have to advert to certain basic principles. The Constitution "does not require the holding of
preliminary investigations. The right exists only, if and when created by statute." 20 It is "not an essential
part of due process of law." 21 The absence thereof does not impair the validity of a criminal information
or affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case. 22 As a creation of the statute it can, therefore, be
modified or amended by law.

It is also evident that there is no curtailment of the constitutional right of an accused person when he is
not given the opportunity to "cross-examine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary
investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or
investigating officer concerned."23

Speaking for the Court, Justice Tuason, in Bustos v. Lucero, 24 discussed the matter extensively,
thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes
the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C.J.S., 49.) Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is 'the mode and
manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in
dispute in judicial proceedings' — is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished.
Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La.,
462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules.

In Beazeil vs. Ohio, 269 U.S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

'Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation
may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder Bull, 3 Dall 386,
390. 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring Missouri, 107
U.S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. And there may be procedural changes
which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of the
commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall
within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U.S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 US 343; 42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled that
statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a
defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the
trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs.
Utah, 110 U.S., 575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202. 4 Am. Crime Rep 417. Nor is a statute which
changes the rules of evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused
evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson Missouri, 171 U.S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
922; or which changes the place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes
a court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U.S.,
377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570.'

Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an accused in a
preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witness who had given evidence for his arrest is of such
importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the beginning,
preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely,
and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be held
to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

In rejecting the contention of the political offenders accused in the People's Court that their
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was impaired because they were denied preliminary
examination and investigation, whereas the others who may be accused of the same crimes in the Court
of First Instance shall be entitled thereto, this Court said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

(2) Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is
justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of
prisoners then under detention and the length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if
so many prisoners were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the
necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the interest of the public and of the
accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such investigation in such
cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution. For the rest, the constitutional prohibition against discrimination among defendants
placed in the same situation and condition is not infringed. 25

It was realized that the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 5180 granting the complainant and
respondent in a preliminary investigation the right to cross-examine each other and their witnesses was
"time consuming and not conducive to the expeditious administration of justice". Hence, it was found
necessary in Presidential Decree No. 77 to simplify the procedure of preliminary investigation to
conform to its summary character, by eliminating the cross-examination by the contending parties of
their respective witnesses which in the past had made the proceeding the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of parties' evidence. The procedure prescribed in the aforecited decrees appears
justified by the necessity of disposing cases during martial law, especially those affecting national
security, at the earliest date. On the basis of the aforestated settled principles, the curtailment of the
right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him in the preliminary investigation does not
impair any constitutional right. It may be relevant to note that recently in Litton, et al. v. Castillo, et
al., 26 this Court denied for lack of merit a petition challenging the validity of Presidential Decree No. 77
issued on December 6, 1972, on the ground that aforesaid decree now "forms part of the law of the
land."

PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY

Petitioner claims that the order of the Military Commission for the perpetuation of the testimony of
prosecution witnesses is void because no copy of the petition was previously served on him. He asserts
that, as a consequence, he was not given the opportunity to contest the propriety of the taking of the
deposition of the witnesses. It must be noted that petitioner does not dispute respondents' claim that
on March 14, 1975, he knew of the order allowing the taking of the deposition of prosecution witnesses
on March 31, to continue through April 1 to 4, 1975.

The provisions of Presidential Decree No. 328, dated October 31, 1973, for the conditional examination
of prosecution witnesses before trial, is similar to the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Presidential Decree No. 328 provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Where, upon proper application, it shall satisfactorily appear to the military tribunal before which a case
is pending, that a witness for the prosecution or the defense is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning thereto, or where delay in the taking of its
testimony may result in the failure of justice or adversely affect national security, the witness may
forthwith be examined and his deposition immediately taken, such examination to be by question and
answer, in the presence of the other party, or even in the latter's absence provided thatreasonable
notice to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition has been served upon him, and will be
conducted in the same manner as an examination, at the trial, in which latter event the failure or refusal
to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Deposition of witness for the prosecution. — Where, however, it shall satisfactorily appear that the
witness cannot procure bail, or is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial, as directed by the order of the
court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning thereto, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined or his deposition immediately taken. Such examination or deposition must be by
question and answer, in the presence of the defendant or after reasonable notice to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition has been served on him, and will be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a
waiver. The statement or deposition of the witness thus taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the defendant. His testimony taken, the witness must thereupon be discharged, if he has been detained.

The foregoing was taken substantially from Section 7 of Rule 115 of the old Rules of Court, with the
difference, among others, that the phrase "or after one hour notice" in the old Rules of Court has been
changed to "or after reasonable notice" in the Revised Rules of Court.

In Elago v. People, 27 this Court, in rejecting the contention that no written motion was filed by the
prosecuting attorney for the taking of the depositions and that less than one hour notice has been given
the defendant, held that "the one-hour notice mentioned in Section 7, Rule 115, of the Rules of Court,
was intended by law mainly to give the defendant time to attend the taking of a deposition and not to
prepare for the taking thereof because in reality there is no need for preparation. It is not a trial where
the defendant has to introduce his evidence. It is only taking down the statements of the witnesses for
the prosecution with opportunity on the part of the defendant to cross-examine them."

The thrust of Elago is that the order of the court authorizing the taking of the deposition of the
witnesses of the prosecution and fixing the date and time thereof is the one that must be served on the
accused within a reasonable time prior to that fixed for the examination of the witnesses so that the
accused may be present and cross-examine the witness. On this point of the time given the defendant to
attend the taking of the deposition, Professor Wigmore has the following to say: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The opportunity of cross-examination involves two elements:

(1) Notice to the opponent that the deposition is to be taken at the time and place specified, and

(2) A sufficient interval of time to prepare for examination and to reach the place.

xxx xxx xxx

(2) The requirements as to the interval of time are now everywhere regulated by statute .... ; the rulings
in regard to the sufficiency of time are thus so dependent on the interpretation of the detailed
prescriptions of the local statutes that it would be impracticable to examine them here. But whether or
not the time allowed was supposedly insufficient or was precisely the time required by statute,
theactual attendance of the party obviate any objection upon the ground of insufficiency, because then
the party has actually had that opportunity of cross-examination ... for the sole sake of which the notice
was required. 28

We, therefore, hold that the taking of the testimony or deposition was proper and valid.

VI

WAIVER OF PETITIONER'S PRESENCE

There is conflict among the authorities as to whether an accused can waive his right to be present at his
trial. Some courts have regarded the presence of the accused at his trial for felony as a jurisdictional
requirement, which cannot be waived. 29 Many others do not accept this view. 30 In defense of the first
view, it has been stated that the public has an interest in the life and liberty of an accused and that
which the law considers essential in a trial cannot be waived by the accused. 31 In support of the latter
view, it has been argued that the right is essentially for the benefit of the accused, 32 and that "since the
accused, by pleading guilty, can waive any trial at all, he should be able to waive any mere privilege on
the trial that is designated only to aid him in shielding himself from such result." 33

In this jurisdiction, this Court, in People v. Avanceña, 34 traced the history of the constitutional right of
the accused to be present at his trial from U.S. v. Karelsen 35 and U.S. v. Bello 36 Diaz v. United
States 37 and People v. Francisco. 38 In the first two cases, it was ruled that one whose life or liberty is
involved in the prosecution for felony must be personally present at every stage of the trial when his
substantive rights may be affected by the proceedings and that it is not within his power to waive the
right to be personally present. In Diaz v. United States and People v. Francisco, this rule was modified.
Upon the authority of the Diaz and Francisco cases, the Court laid down as the law in this jurisdiction
that: (1) in cases of felony, the accused has the right to be present at every stage of the trial, inclusive of
the arraignment and pronouncement of the judgment; (2) where the offense is capital the right of the
accused to be present at every stage of the trial is indispensable and cannot be waived; (3) even in
felonies not capital, if the accused is in custody, his right to be present at every stage of the trial is
likewise indispensable and cannot be waived; (4) where the offense is not capital and the accused is not
in custody his presence is indispensable only: (a) at the arraignment; (b) at the time the plea is taken, if
it be one of guilt; and (c) at the pronouncement of judgment. The Court looted the rationale of Diaz v.
United States as basis of its ruling, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... the court was called upon to pass on the question whether the provision in section 5 of the Philippine
Civil Government Act, securing to the accused in all criminal prosecutions 'the right to be heard by
himself and counsel,' makes his presence indispensable at every stage of the trial, or invests him with a
right which he is always free to assert, but which he also may waive by his voluntary act. After observing
that an identical or similar provision is found in the constitutions of the several states of the American
Union, and that its substantial equivalent is embodied in the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States; that it is the right which these constitutional provisions secure to persons accused of
crime in that country that was carried here by the congressional enactment; and that, therefore,
according to a familiar rule, the prevailing course of decision there may and should be accepted as
determinative of the nature and measure of the right here, Justice Van Devanter speaking for the court,
said: 'As the offense in this instance was a felony, we may put out of view the decisions dealing with this
right in cases of misdemeanor. In cases of felony our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded it as
extending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the jury and the reception of the
verdict, and as being scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself. And with like
accord they have regarded an accused who is in custody and one who is charged with a capital offense
as incapable of waiving the right; the one, because his presence or absence is not within his own
control; and the other because, in addition to being usually in custody, he is deemed to suffer the
constraint naturally incident to an apprehension of the lawful penalty that would follow conviction. But,
where the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody, the prevailing rule has been, that if,
after the trial has begun in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has
been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right
to be present, and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as if
he were present.'39

In Avanceña, the issue was whether the defendant charged with an offense which is not capital had
impliedly waived his right to be present at his trial, because of his failure to appear in court at the trial of
his case.

Under the present Constitution, however, trial even of a capital offense may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified." 40

On the basis of the aforecited provision of the Constitution which allows trial of an accused in absentia,
the issue has been raised whether or not petitioner could waive his right to be present at the
perpetuation of testimony proceedings before respondent Commission..

As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if
such waiver is not against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the
end of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the
proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in
a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the
same as in a civil case." 41

There are, for instance, certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which may
be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in person and by attorney, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet the
witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due
process to ensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise
of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be waived. 42 Considering
the aforecited provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his
presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore, no logical reason why petitioner, although he
is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the
proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was
conferred upon him for his protection and benefit.

It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of
witness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a
waiver" (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly provides that " ... the
failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver."
(Emphasis supplied).

It is for the foregoing reasons that the writer of this opinion voted with the six (6) Justices who ruled on
the full right of petitioner to waive his presence at said proceedings..

Since only six (6) Justices (Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino) are of the
view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings while five (5)
Justices (Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra, Concepcion Jr. and Martin) are in agreement that he may so waive
such right, except when he is to be identified, the result is that the respondent Commission's Order
requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified, in the sense that
petitioner's presence shall be required only in the instance just indicated. The ruling in People v.
Avanceña 43 is thus pro tanto modified.

Finally, it is insisted that even if said orders and decrees were valid as martial law measures, they have
ceased to be so upon the termination of the emergency. In Aquino, et al. v. Enrile, et al., supra, We
adverted to the fact that the communist rebellion which impelled the proclamation of martial law has
not abated. In the absence of any official proclamation by the President of the cessation of the public
emergency, We have no basis to conclude that the rebellion and communist subversion which
compelled the declaration of martial law, no longer pose a danger to public safety.

It is important to note here that an accused being tried before a military tribunal enjoys the specific
constitutional safeguards pertaining to criminal trials. Thus, he is entitled to be heard by himself and
counsel, 44 to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 45 to meet the witnesses face to
face, to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf, 46 and to be exempt from being a witness against himself. As in trial before civil courts, the
presumption of innocence can only be overcome by evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused. 47 These tribunals, in general, are "bound to observe the fundamental rules of law and
principles of justice observed and expounded by the civil judicature." 48 Section 11 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial specifically provides that the "rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courts-martial." 49 This is applicable to
trials in the military commission . 50 There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner's contention that
such military tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused and that proceedings
therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of petitioner's constitutional rights. This is not,
however, to preclude the President from considering the advisability of the transfer of these cases to
the civil courts, as he has previously announced.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petitions for prohibition
with preliminary injunction and setting aside the temporary restraining order issued on April 8, 1975,
with costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and
Solicitor Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F.
Flores presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention and confinement
of Jean L. Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November
8, 1952, is illegal, for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion
in considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of
P440,000 was made in the sale of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the
question directed by the Senate committee to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault,
by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.

Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected on
October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate
of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine
"whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal
was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in
the premises." In the investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution,
petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15,
1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and
imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate or to the
Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to answer questions
pertinent thereto. In G.R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of the
confinement so ordered, by a petition forcertiorari filed in this Court. He contended that the Senate of
the Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he delivered P440,000., that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond
the term of the legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an
incriminating question which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the abovementioned contentions
were adversely passed upon by the decision of this Court, so his petition for release was denied.

In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an
affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met
one by the name of Jess D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special
Committee, the latter subjected petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D. Santos, and
after said investigation and questioning the Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8,
1952. This Resolution reads as follows:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA
AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING
JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON
AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF
THE SENATE.

WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines, transcending divisions of party and
faction in the national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering the detention and confinement of Jean L.
Arnault at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of contempt
of the Senate by revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal, and by answering other pertinent questions in connection
therewith;

WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said Jean L. Arnault, and the report
thereon rendered by the Senate Special Committee on the said deal, the Senate holds and finds that,
despite numerous and generous opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the
said Jean L. Arnault has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to
whom he gave the said amount of P440,000, and to answer other pertinent questions in connection
with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal;

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially
changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should
have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the
occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its
dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of
the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied
by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to whom the said Jean L. Arnault
gave the amount of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and the
further information which the Senate requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and
contumaciously withholds, is required for the discharge of its legislative functions, particularly so that
adequate measures can be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon the Government and
the People of the Philippines and to recover said amount; and

WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy, the Senate holds and finds
that the said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of
the Senate, is trifling with its proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of
the Supreme Court, is his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at any time by
revealing the truth; now therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find, as it hereby holds and finds,
that Juan L. Arnault has not purged himself of contempt of the Senate, and has in no way altered his
situation since he has committed to coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th
day of May, 1950; and that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of Prisons to hold the said
Jean L. Arnault, in his custody, and in confinement and detention at the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment, until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid
contempt to the satisfaction, and until order to that effect, of the Senate of the Philippines or of its
Special Committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.

Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)

In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitioner-appellee alleges: (1)
That the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact
beneficial to the Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the
Senate did not imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period longer than arresto
mayor, as this is the maximum penalty that can be imposed under the provisions of Article 150 of the
Revised Penal Code; (3) that petitioner-appellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he
disclosed the fact that the one to whom he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted
evidence in corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate is not justified in finding that the petitioner-
appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the legislative purpose or
intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be considered as having been
accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.

The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to the government
and is neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our minds, two questions are decisive of this
case. The first is: Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that
the person to whom he gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the
court review said finding? And the second is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the
continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of
November 8, 1952, valid?

On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and continues to
fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the situation of
petitioner "has not materially charged since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the
Senate Special Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the
persons to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent questions related to said
amount." It is clear and evident that the Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that
the person to whom he delivered the abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos.
The court a quo, however, arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the
"petitioner has satisfactorily shown that the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in
the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion of the Senate Committee is not borne to out by the
evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate abused its discretion in making its conclusion
and that under these circumstances the only thing that could in justice be done to petitioner is to order
his release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the judicial department for
investigation and prosecution as the circumstances warrant.

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed
that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of
legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative
process.

The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental discretion in the
means used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in
reference to the means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what
means are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate,
the courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only
means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course would best the
exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial department. It has been said that the methods,
regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain results consistent with the public welfare are purely
of legislative cognizance, and the determination of the legislature is final, except when so arbitrary as to
be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the absence of a clear violation of
a constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion has been properly
exercised. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902).

These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the
same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of
truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process,
because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers
established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are
when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary
exercise of the legislative discretion.

Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these
departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest
expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et al 65 Phil., 56; See
also Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139)

All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his
incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded him
before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the
land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar
such right has fully been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard
personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his
continued confinement.

The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine Senate have the
power and authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued confinement of the petitioner? In the
supposition that such power and authority exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the
petitioner had given the name Jess D. Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that
the Senate found that the petitioner-appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D.
Santos, the identity of the person to whom the sum of P440, 000 was delivered, and, in addition thereto
that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's
authority and dignity. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a
punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that
the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This may be inferred from the
confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way, therefore, the petitioner's
assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the language of the resolution, wherefore
the issue now before Us in whether the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed
against it under the circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.

In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201, Arnault vs.
Nazareno, et al. (46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the
authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to
compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is
now contended by petitioner that if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the
legislative body, because he refused to reveal the identity of the person in accordance with the
demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish him, for the punishment for his
refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the institution of a criminal
action in a court of justice.

American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if
the contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or
preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed.
814). While the power of the United States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in
its earlier decision (See Marshal vs. Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two
decades ago held that such power and authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs. MacCraken (294 U. S.
123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was whether or not the Senate could order the confinement
of a private citizen because of the destruction and removal by him of certain papers required to be
produced. The court said:

First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to punish for contempt may never
be exerted, in the case of a private citizen, solely qua punishment. The argument is that the power may
be used by the legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the
performance of its duties; that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been
removed, or its removal has become impossible; and hence that there is no power to punish a witness
who, having been requested to produce papers, destroys them after service of the subpoena. The
contention rests upon a misconception of the limitations upon the power of the Houses of Congress to
punish for contempt. It is true that the scope of the power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is
of a nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of the legislature. This may be lack of power,
because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there was no legislative duty to be
performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A.
1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to obstruct
the legislative process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process,
the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal has become impossible is
without legal significance.

The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was exerted by Congress as early as
1795; and since then it has been exercised on several occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution,
by the colonial assemblies, in intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the
Continental Congress and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242,
decided in 1821, it was held that the House had power to punish a private citizen for an attempt to bribe
a member. No case has been found in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been
successfully challenged on the ground that, before punishment, the offending act had been
consummated or that the obstruction suffered was irremediable. The statement in the opinion in
Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F. 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B,
371, supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the light of the particular facts. It was there
recognized that the only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the character of the offense; and
that the continuance of the obstruction, or the likelihood of its repetition, are considerations for the
discretion of the legislators in meting out the punishment.
Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with vindication of the
established and essential privilege of requiring the production of evidence. For this purpose, the power
to punish for a past contempt is an appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col.
Cas. 296, Fed. Cas No. 10375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed from
time to time in congressional debates, in opposition to particular exercise of the contempt power
concerned, not the power to punish, as such, but the broad, undefined privileges which it was believed
might find sanction in that power. The ground for such fears has since been effectively removed by the
decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of congressional privilege are subject to judicial
review. Melbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, supra; and that the power to punish for
contempt may not be extended to slanderous attacks which presents no immediate obstruction to
legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann.
Cas. 1918B, 731 supra.

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of
legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making
each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority and power. And
how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance,
every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by
the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished
from the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the
punishment which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the
legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary
concommitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and
application of the criminal law.

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is
committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of
discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations,
the exercise of the authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra).

The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he
says he has already answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer. In
order that the petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary
that he should have testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry.
No person guilty of contempt may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of
the offense. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the
sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name
of the person whose identity is being the subject of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act
of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further
interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult to the intelligence of the honorable
members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance and contempt could not
have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the petitioner in
contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power.

One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the period of
imprisonment has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law punishment for contempt, i.
e., 6 months of arresto mayor, the petitioner is now entitled to be released. This claim is not justified by
the record. Petitioner was originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13,
1951, he executed his affidavit and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate
Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No. 114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the
petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e., five months after the last resolution when
the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It is not true, therefore, that the
petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period prescribed in the criminal law.

Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the sense that the
Senate Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which the petitioner had
obstinately refused to divulge. While the Philippine Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner
may ultimately disclose the record, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued
confinement is an abuse of the legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative
discretion.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the
writ ofhabeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null
and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With
cost against the petitioner-appellee.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B.

ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J.
CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO,
CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER
ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO,
JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).

Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]

G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution
scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and
cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are
less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657
for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted
from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.

G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)

Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the
ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the
specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that
this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just
compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.

Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds
and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of
money and not in bonds.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:

1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the
agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small
landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.

2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However,
there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation.
In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government –
even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just
compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed.
What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative
body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:

Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of
eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The
program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if
everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.

G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his
capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila,
CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO,
JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO
QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE
VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the Municipal
Board,respondents.

Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.

Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.

Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor
Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and
Commissioner of Civil Service.

Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic
Act 4065, “An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred
Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.”

in 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an
order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).

Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas
et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the
SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and
Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been
enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it
was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was
referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made
significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back
to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong
version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended
by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the
President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.

Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.

HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by
both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive,
when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is
supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.