G.R. No.

L-46903 July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma.
She died intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed
administratrix and in due time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not
been included.1

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no
dispute regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are
subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of
the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious.

The two articles provide as follows:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.

Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance,
unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.
Moreover, the donation did not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could
be accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of Candelaria's estate.3

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the
deed of donation contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062.
Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including
the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.4

The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:

IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking

anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San
Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at
inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa
 pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na
sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring
tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga
lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;

IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking
ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng mga tao na dapat
magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay Libre
Disposicion. 5

We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase
"sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a
donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation required
under Article 1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it
was prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the
donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that
he would have included therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor's
intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article
1062. The suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were
1awphil

imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the
question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or
not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding the decision of
the appealed case by the respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article X,
Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was
merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of
jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section
15, of the 1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater
urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have been clogging their dockets
these many years. Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.

[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000]

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
 DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The victory of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal
[1]

Circuit Trial Court in an ejectment suit filed against them by private respondent
[2] [3]

Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal by the Regional Trial Court on appeal.
[4] [5]

They elevated their cause to respondent Court of Appeals which, however,

[6] [7]

promulgated a Decision on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional
[8]

Trial Court.

The following facts are undisputed:

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,
Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of
residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has
been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial
partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they,
however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his
other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta,
both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria;
Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by
his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and
Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was
allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father,
Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of
his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the
buyer.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went
through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of
amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.

On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner
spouses.

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo,
Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of
Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as
[9]

co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.

On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of
Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto
Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney
was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective
children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the office of
the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It
made the following findings:

"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the

court finds that the evidence adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his
ownership over x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x while defendants has
[sic] successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said
property is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the
late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that
Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of
[sic] the above-described residential property x x x as their share of the
inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how
come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano
Pada was not transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria
Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the
 present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily
transferred in the name of his heirs x x x.

"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and
the genuineness and due execution of said document was assailed as
doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of
attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in
the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial
statement.

"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-

described property long before the sale of said property on November
17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-
described property since the year 1960 with the consent of some of the
heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-
described property to them, virtually converting defendants' standing as
co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners
became the undivided owners of the whole estate x x x. As co-owners of
x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x their possession in the northern
portion is being [sic] lawful."[10]

From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
On November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:

"x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada
Pavo were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than
40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two vendors
were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. x x x
At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada
Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and
Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by
prescription, if not laches or estoppel.

"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule,
but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the
heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period sufficient to
acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs
claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of
the community property, the question then involved is no longer one for
 partition but of ownership. x x x Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a
period of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs
may have, was long extinguished by laches, estoppel or
prescription.

"x x x

"x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a

brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of the
case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is
illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others, were absolutely bereft
of any right in donating the very property in question." [11]

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment

earlier promulgated by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:

"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;

"2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent provisions of
the New Civil Code has to be applied;

"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their

occupancy and use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of
P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until
the termination of the present case;

"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00
as moral damages and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;

"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." [12]

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision
of the Regional Trial Court.

On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said
petition. It explained:
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is
possession de facto or physical or material possession and not de jure.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the
court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter . It
cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue being
inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of
possession x x x.

"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the
land possessed by petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor
by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada
who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee
Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial
partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which
was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject
land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias
Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial
partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action
was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such
partition.

"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent

facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property originally
owned by Jacinto Pada x x x and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of
Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria
Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share x x
x. Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent
court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of
Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the share of
Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria
Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary
shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they have been
occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff x x x. Petitioners cannot now
impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in
1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and
her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary
division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is
 conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the
respective portions assigned to them x x x.

"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute

made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest
nor right to transfer. x x x This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought
to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the
respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of
laches and estoppel come into play due to the donors' failure to assert
their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty (40) years x x x.
Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the
vendor over Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
petitioners." 
[13]

Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.

On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said
motion.

Hence this petition raising the following issues:

"I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED
FROM THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF
JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.

"II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING

THAT WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED
SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.

"III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN

GOOD FAITH." [14]
There is no merit to the instant petition.

First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his
heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No
law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be
valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
[15]

partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration
[16]

is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no
creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent
[17]

for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner
and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first
place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a
[18]

public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated

therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for
[19]

their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights

over immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience,
non-compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of
the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
[20]

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally
deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a transfer of
property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right
of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate
[21]

being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly
transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and
private respondent, respectively.  [22]

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed
voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they
[23]

discussed and agreed on the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that
they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is
conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the
estate which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid
[24]

charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of
never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said
partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was
a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a
parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and
one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made
by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the
owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches
have equally set in.

Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by
the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been
occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as they only
relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are
[25]

evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of
the subject property is concerned.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer

tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance
or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot be
[26]

considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article
448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of
[27] [28]

useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply
only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance
[29]

of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia,
Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to
petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements
were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as
[30]

that promise was fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito
Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be
said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986

ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mang-oy; LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted
by her husband, Miguel Olila; HELENA TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA TUMPAO, married to Salming Pirazo,
and ABITO TUMPAO, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the Mountain Province, setting of many
legends of adventure and romance among the highlanders of the North. Our story is not as fanciful,
involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a
piece of land. Even so, as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor of the just and
deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the heart but of the law.

The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at the time it all began he was still a
young and vigorous man. He had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the private
respondents in this case. 1Upon her death, he took to himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had two children
she had "adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots then. 2 It is their children who, with some others, are the petitioners in this case.

The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.

On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a "last will and testament" the
dispositive portion of which declared:

Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after departing from
this life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have
the power to see and dispose all what I have stated, he shall not change what I have
already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will affix my right
thumbmark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to read and
write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Win this 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon this 4th day of September 1937, before those who are present and
have heard what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet, 4th September, 1937. 3

The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were
already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this document,
they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as follows:

We who are named children and who will inherit from our father TUMPAO: BANDO
TUMPAO, LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also whose lands are
included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT and ANTHONY MENECIO all of
legal age and residing in the town of La Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in
truth after swearing under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our father
TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also acknowledge or
recognize the lands as included in the area of said land as appearing in Title No. 416
in the name of our father TUMPAO here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and
understood the Will as told by him concerning our right to the land which we will
inherit and also to those whose lands which were included in the said Title No. 416
because we were all called be present and hear his wilt We heard and agreed to his
 will as appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit. We also
recognized and agree to the appointment of our brother BANDO to whom the parcels
of land is to be delivered and he will also be the one, to deliver to us our shares as
soon as we will demand the partition in accordance with the will of our father
TUMPAO as soon in the Testament which we saw and have heard by all.

It is also agreed upon among us in this confirmation that when our brother BANDO
who is appointed to distribute to us our shares we affirm in this instrument that will
answer for all the expenses when it shag be surveyed so the share of each will be
segregated so also with the approval of the title, which shall appear the name of
each of us and that we do not dispute the land which we are actually working shall
pertain to us as embodied in the said win of our father TUMPAO.

We execute this deed of confirmation in the presence of the Notary Public here in
Baguio so that this Will, be used as our agreement so also with the wig of our father
so that they be one to be followed as regard upon by all and we affix our right
thumbmark at the end of our written name because we do not know how to read and
write this 7th day of September, 1937 in the City of Baguio. 4

Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.

The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them, apparently in obedience to the wish
of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the other abovequoted instrument.
But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty three years later, that brought this matter to the
courts.

On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Man Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons
mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another
6
one was issued in favor of the three respondents.

It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance. They
had been sustained by the trial court, 7 which, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. They are before this Court to
challenge that reversal.

In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will" executed by Old Man Tumpao was
null and void because it had not been probated The agreement of partition among the supposed
beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition inter vivos and had not been
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the land in
dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first marriage although it was registered during his
second marriage and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them, as well
as attorney's fees. 8

After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals-that the will, not having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as such. The
settled principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court. 9

We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
of 1899, which was in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in
1937. The said article reads as follows:
 Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter
vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heirs.

On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable decision is Albela vs. Albela, 10 also decided by
the Court of Appeals, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as the ponente.

In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed of partition dividing two parcels of
land between hisdaughters, Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their conformity by signing the
instrument. The took possession of their respective shares upon his death, but fourteen years later,
Restituta ejected Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party and denying the
existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis
of the deed of partition.

Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, take over at this
point:

In their argument, appellants do not question the authenticity of the above document,
but argue against its validity, on the grounds summarized in their brief (p. 7), as
follows:

Therefore the allegations of the plaintiff-appellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on a

document which defies classification. If it is a deed of partition, it is null and void
because it is not embodied in a public document; if it is a simple donation of realty, it
is also null and void, because it is not in a public document and there is no
acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis Causa, certainly it is null and void because it
does not follow the rules governing testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be
classified as a will, more so, it is still null and void because it does not conform to the
requirements of Section 618, Act 190 as amended by Act 2645.

None of these objections is valid in law. The appellants evidently fail to realize that
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his
property, and distribute them among his heirs, and that this partition is not
necessarily either a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his
lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its
binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the
property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced
heirs. 'El testador es libre y sus herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en cuanto
no perjudique la legitime de los forsozos. Inutil es sonar en otras limitaciones que no
existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th Ed., p. 639.

That such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donations inter vivos is a
consequence of its special nature. Says the learned Manresa on this point:

Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley en el Articulo 1056, como en el 1057,
que despues examinaremos, alude a las formalidades con que puede practicarse la
particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando que para ella no es preciso que
intervengan las formas solemnes que todo testamento o acto de ultima voluntad en
general requiere. Ni aun sera preciso guardar las formalidades especiales de las
donaciones, porque no se trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de divider aquellos
 bienes de que ya anteriormente sedispuso en forma legal (Emphasis supplied. Op.
Cit., p. 635)

It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition Exhibit A, should be in writing. It does not
have to be in a public document except to affect third persons (Art. 1280), being valid
between the parties who signed it in its present form.

If any invalidity could be alleged against the partition, it would lie in the absence of a
previous testament preceding it (Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766). And even this
may not be indispensable in the present case, for the testator's partition did not
depart from the shares allotted to his heirs by the law of intestacy. Nor is a prior win
necessary under Article 1080 of the new Civil Code, which replaced the word
'testator' in Article 1056 of the Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'

Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition Exhibit A would not alter the result. There
being only two daughters surviving the deceased Agustin, each one of them would
necessarily be entitled to one-half of each of the two parcels he owned at his death,
and Agustin's former ownership is no longer disputed by the appellants in this
instance. In addition, since both daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its terms
would bind both, and estop them from asserting a different interest. Appellants' act; in
appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits can find no support in law or justice.

There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's deed of partition and Old Man
Tumpao's "last will and testament." Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which
was in force at the time they were executed Even as Agustin Albela's partition was signed by the two
daughters themselves, so was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their
agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and recognized the terms of such "will." While not
valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless
binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in
his "last will and testament."

As the trial court put it:

The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for the simple reason that it was not
probated, However, when the persons who were named therein as heirs and
beneficiaries voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably to save the
expenses of probate. and furthermore, carried out its terms after the death of the
testator until now, then it must be held to be binding between them.

Said agreement was not a disposal of inheritance by a prospective heir before the
death of the testator, but an agreement to carry out the will. It was not contested by
the defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their right, if any, to assail it has
prescribed under Art. 1144 of the Civil Code.

Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:

1) upon a written contract;

2) Upon an obligation created by law;

3) Upon a judgment.

Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was cured by the lapse of time.

What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate area of less than 1/3 of the land of Old
Tumpao. It covers about 11,000 square meters while the total area was more than
35,000 square meters, Under the old Civil Code, it was within the free disposable
portion of ones' estate despite the existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil Code,
Art. 808)

In view of the foregoing considerations, the defendants are ordered to execute a

deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas respectively owned and
occupied by them and to pay the costs.

Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants P160.00 more as a reasonable

amount of his additional share in the expenses of segregating his lot but the
(defendants) are ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor of the said lot
owned by him.

The expenses of Survey and segregation must be borne by the plaintiffs.

We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao's
"will" did not have to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the
document was not a conveyance of properties or property right. 12

It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is
that it was acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the respondents as the
conjugal property of their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the
entire land as their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in ordering the reconveyance to the
petitioners of their respective shares. We affirm his decision in toto.

How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during the early days, when right and
wrong were weighed according to the primal code of the ancient hills. Even so, though that past is
gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the deserving.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the trial court
reinstated, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. DE

CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), ANTONIO CHAVEZ,
ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.

Jose L. Lapak for respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela Buenavista
of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the
subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the
earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid
partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the
decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch 1.

The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil
Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children, named
Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the
plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.

On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista,
executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.

Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also sold her
1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of P450. On May
19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the
same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion,
Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the
land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.

In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:

Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina, ang

nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim (6) na mga
magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang paghihiwatig o partition;
ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na
bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana
namin ay samantalang nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at
makikinabang sa nasabing pag-aari. (p. 14, Rollo.)

meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal
pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte,
Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No.
9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the
land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime.

Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier,
Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire
property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October
7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother Manuela
and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February
4, 1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil
Case No. 1934.

After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court
did not award damages.

The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
64708-R).

On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and render another
one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez
(Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as null and
void ab initio, and declaring further that the documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime,
without pronouncement as to damages and costs. (p. 17, Rollo.)

On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others:

3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the defendants-
appellees, was found lately to have executed during her lifetime a LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT ... and there is now a pending petition for probate of said last will and
testament before the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;

xxx xxx xxx

6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's execution of
the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D are valid, nevertheless its
validity ceases from the time that she executed the Last Will and Testament . . .
because the execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela
Buenavista;

7. That the Last will and Testament . . . which his now pending probate in the
Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally affect the property —
hence, there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the
decision-pending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Manuela Buenavista. (pp. 88-89, Rollo.)

Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter
vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and Testament
could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and Testament was
executed on December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the complaint for annulment
on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile and not of disposing mind;
that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds of Sale, the
supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no
more property to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, when she supposedly executed her Last
Will and Testament.

On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allege:

(l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in declaring
valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a partition by an
act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a
testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista;

(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article 1347 of the
New Civil Code. (p. 126, Rollo.)

We find those contentions not well-taken.

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347,
par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly
gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL.
When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the
form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained
on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as
to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was
taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will
recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising
acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of
Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales.
The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to feature
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.

.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from
denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. It is a general
 principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own
acts, or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)

Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that
the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioner's
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to
bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition... They cannot attack the partition collaterally ...
(Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)

As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and
inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized
as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had
received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person should be
allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. CV-
64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.]

191 SCRA 814
LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS, BERNARDINO
BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and JUANA BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the decision* of the respondent
appellate court dated March 3, 1987 CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno) Albovias
et al., v. Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower court, the decretal
portion of which reads: : nad

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest over the property in
question, hence, has no authority to dispose of the same in favor of her co-defendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and subsequent transactions involving
the same property null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of the subject parcel of land;
 4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject premises and to surrender possession
thereof unto the plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay unto the plaintiff the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject of this case is a parcel of
land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters, more particularly described
as follows:: nad

"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Nagcarlan, province of

Laguna. Bounded on the North, by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio
Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the South, by that of Dalmacio
Monterola (formerly Domingo Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing
an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square meters, more or less. Assessed
at P3,320.00 under tax declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein private respondent, on the
one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and
Jovita Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in question is a portion of a
bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio
Artiaga, grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA, her
brother Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo,
both surnamed Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows:
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman at ang bahagi naman ay
may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong Nagcarlan,
at humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay Enrique Jovellano; sa
Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at sa Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido."
(Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street was created by the
Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, one on
the west of C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by the
heirs in the following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern portion of
which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion was given to
JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and
Domingo Bueno, the former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras,
and the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not owned by
Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later sold by him to Dalmacio
Monterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.). : nad

Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with the two parcels of land
owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida
Coronado (now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos
in turn sold the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino
Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof, sometime in 1974
(Ibid., pp. 16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners (CORONADO, for brevity) claim
that the property in question was bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by
Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before the outbreak of
World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283, entitled "Testate Estate
of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together
with her husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will was
allowed by the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On
appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 40353, entitled
"Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-
appellants" (Ibid.). It is not apparent, however, from the record whether or not said decision
has already become final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question, JUANA filed an action for
quieting of title, declaratory relief and damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial Court
of the Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.
7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered judgment in favor of JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition.
:-cralaw

CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:

I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN NOT
APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT. (Ibid., p. 108)
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION CLAIMED BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO UNDER THE
WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA; NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT
SAID WILL HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
III
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PETITIONER OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE SAME IN THE
ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND
FACTS ADMITTED ON RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR.
(Ibid., p. 121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p.
105); while that of JUANA was filed on October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the respondent appellate court's finding
that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive
prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right or legal
title she had over the property in question, the reason being that Monterola's continued
possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute
ownership (Ibid., p. 112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze
or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law
that might have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the findings complained
of are totally devoid of support in the record, so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not
expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties (Andres v. Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670, September
15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the instant case to depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never claimed ownership over the
property in question. As a matter of fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola
in favor of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on the property
conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the reason why during the lifetime of the late
Dalmacio Monterola, JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or
produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said Monterola in 1970 that
Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from entering it (Ibid., p. 18). :- nad

Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued possession of the said
property for over ten years since 1934, said possession is insufficient to constitute the
fundamental basis of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de
dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly
not en concepto de dueno, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do
not start the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate court and the lower court, never
categorically claimed ownership over the property in question, much less his possession
thereof en concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said property by
acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado could tack her possession to that
of Monterola, so that claim of legal title or ownership over the subject property, even against
the petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in good faith, is a foregone
or settled issue, the respondent appellate court aptly answered the same in this wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived ownership of the land in question
from her predecessor-in-interest Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription or by some
other title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own name. It was only in 1970
after the death of Dalmacio Monterola that she asserted her claim of ownership adverse to
that of plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no title over the land in question,
she must be deemed to have claimed it in bad faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code,
ownership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or good faith. And even granting that
she had no notice or defect in her title and was, therefore, in good faith, a period of ten years
of possession is necessary for her to acquire the land by ordinary prescription. (Article 1134,
Civil Code). But she can claim to have possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola
lots were donated to her. The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7 years after,
when the complaint below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 18-19)
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will under which JUANA inherited
the property in question from her grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated; hence,
said transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule 75, Sec. 1 of the Rules
of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190, no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit. chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be
sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the
time said document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos,
or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida Coronado is entitled to legitime
from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that
Leonida Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is estopped from questioning
the ownership of Leonida Coronado over the land in question having failed to raise the same
in the estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p. 119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The authentication of a
will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
the wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of
the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning the ownership of
the property in question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will
executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property. :-cralaw

Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that JUANA's petition is weak for
want of factual and legal support; the weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that she
did not only fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the discrepancy in the
boundary of the property she is claiming to be hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and to explain the discrepancy
in the boundary of said property, assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings
of the lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover, the lower court
found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the property in question is the same
property adjudicated to JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO has no
right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are conclusive upon this Court
(Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000]

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO, respondents. LEX

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996 decision of the Court of
Appeals, basically affirming that rendered on 30 April 1991 by the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property
subject matter of the litigation to respondents. The case and the factual setting
found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that
made by the trial court.

During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned
several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog
Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three
years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo
Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to
Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on
22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents
--- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides
Viado.

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the

Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado after the
former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two
families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith,
claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that
petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01 February 1988,
petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case
for partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jj sc

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject

property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian
Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and
petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both
instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07 January
1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled
and new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of
Nilo Viado.

Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner
Rebecca Viado, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado,
in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should
warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated at the assailed
instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five
years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely,
Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died. Sc jj

Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for respondents and
adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the
disputed property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification by ordering the remand of the records of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the
amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been
preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.

Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled correctly.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal
property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs
--- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah
Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of
death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the
[1] [2]

heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
[3]

heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport

to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial
settlement.[4]

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties

hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail
the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed. Sj cj

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial
court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a
quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting,
consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo
Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial
settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those
supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian
Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his
rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of
petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial
settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the
administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult
to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have
misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of
their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents
was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents
[5]

against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained
[6]

completely valid and binding. Supreme

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the

deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646.
The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests
on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the
appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for
further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and
ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated May
29, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
special pronouncement on costs.Court

SO ORDERED.