DAY FIVE
1.3.6. NEGLIGENCE OF PROFESSIONALS
 Medical Malpractice
BATIQUIN VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private
patient sometime before September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21,
1988 Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarean
operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving
the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being
feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the
latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines. However, the pains still
kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr. Kho
suggested that Mrs.Villegas submit to another surgery. When Dr. Kho opened the
abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst
on each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the
uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus, embedded on
the ovarian cyst. The piece of rubberappeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This
was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the
discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found was not
presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu
City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the evidence which
mentioned the piece of rubber are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an
Anaesthesia Record, a Nurse's Record,and a Physician's Discharge Summary. The
trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there
being no showing that the person or persons who prepared them
are deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated- There was also doubts
as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s
testimony: 1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in Court by
Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by her to Defendant. The failure of
the Plaintiffs to reconcile these two different versions served only to weaken their
claim against Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.
The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable.
HELD:
YES. It is here worth nothing that the trial court paid heed to the following portions
of Dr. Batiquin's testimony: that no rubber drain was used in the operation, and
that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor
blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Moreover, the trial court
pointed out that the absence of a rubber drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr.
Batiquin's assistant during the operation on private respondent Villegas. But the
trial court failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were
denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is
stronger than negative testimony. Of course, as the petitioners advocate, such
positive testimony must come from a credible source, which leads us to the second
assigned error.
While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho's
testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes
Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness
stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr.
Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. The trial court's following declaration
shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho handled the
piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only
supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's trustworthiness:
This is not to say that she was less than honest when she testified about her
findings, but it can also be said that she did not take the most appropriate
precaution to preserve that "piece of rubber" as an eloquent evidence of what she
would reveal should there be a "legal problem" which she claim[s] to have
anticipated.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive
testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. This Court has had occasion to
delve into the nature and operation of this doctrine:
This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
DAY FIVE
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." Or
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference
that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality
causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinary does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule
of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the
mere fact that theaccident happened provided the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of
negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown
to have been under [the] management and control of the alleged
wrongdoer . . . . Under this doctrine . . . the happening of an injury permits an
inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the
injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of
negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere
procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and
regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked
when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First,
the entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of
Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as
to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into
private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless
through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could
have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession plays in the lives of the people, and State's compelling interest to enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma." Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of
his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and
skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde
Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of
the legal standards set forth for professionals, in the general, and members of the
medical profession, in particular.
GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO
FACTS:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical
operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was
attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda
Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however,
Florencio died of complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the
UST Hospital.
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the NBI to
conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that
Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in
administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr.
Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. During the
preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events which
we shall try to disentangle.
The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit
himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. The case was
re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on
motionof the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence
regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor
DAY FIVE
Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be
held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina
Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties,"
recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma
was partial to the petitioner.
Thus, the case was transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where avolte
face occurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be
dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor
Dimagiba. Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong" continued
when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who
recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto
was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A.
Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution
which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City
Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for
manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the
Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and
to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for,
allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable
cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the
respondent.
HELD:
In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training
and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will
employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore
has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It
is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that
expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of
any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other
physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's
expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Flores to Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of
the NBI only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to
illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should
have exercised.
The better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to
appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to
the Secretary of Justice under the Department of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise
known as the "1993 Revised Rules on Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary
Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by Department Order No. 359,
Section 1 of which provides:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No.
223states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution." On the other hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the
appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds."
DAY FIVE
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within
his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and
this Court will not interfere with the same.
Petition is dismissed.
DR. RUBI LI vs SPOUSES REYNALDO AND LINA SOLIMAN
FACTS:
 Respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the
mass located in her lower extremity at the SLMC and results showed that
Angelica was suffering a highly malignant cancer of the bone which usually
afflicts teenage children.
 Following the diagnosis,Angelica’s right leg was amputated. But to prevent
recurrence and the spreading of the disease, chemotherapy was suggested and
Angelica was refered to petitioner Dr. Rubi Li.
 On August 18, 1993, Angelica was again readmitted to SLMC for the
administration of the first cycle of chemotherapy. However, she died eleven
(11) days after.
 LMC refused to release a death certificate without payment of the hospital bill.
Hence, the spouses brought their daughter’s cadaver to the PNP
CrimeLaboratory for post-mortem examination and the Medico-Legal Report
indicated the cause of death as “Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.
 On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr.
Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma, a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents
charged them with negligence.
 Petitioner denied having been negligent and asserted that she had fully
explained to respondents how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer
cells but also the patient’s normal body parts, including the lowering of white
and red blood cells and platelets. She claimed that what happened to Angelica
can be attributed to malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery.
 TC – dismissed the complaint. The court held that petitioner was not liable for
damages as she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest
skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs on Angelica
but despite all efforts said patient died.
 CA – Petitioner is negligent. While the concurred with the TC decision that no
negligence in the administration of chemotherapy procedure, the CA found that
the petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the
respondents all the known side effects of chemotherapy. Had petitioner made
known to respondents those other side effects which gravely affected their
child, the respondents could have decided differently. On this point therefore,
plaintiffs-appellants entitled to claim for damages.
 Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side
effects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing
chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in
administering the said treatment.
HELD:
No.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action
based upon the doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to
disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those
risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient
consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed
consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant undisclosed information
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that there was adequate disclosure of
material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the
consent of Angelicas parents.Respondents could not have been unaware in the
course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee.
When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of
chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells,
decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening,
there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents
understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for
all patients undergoing the procedure.In other words, by the nature of the disease
itself, each patients reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment
laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician.That
deathcanpossibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying
cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy
drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures,butsuch conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side
effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.
DAY FIVE
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have
considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted
with a life-threatening illness.On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to
respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their
daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave
conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapys
success rate.Besides, informed consent laws in other countries generally require
only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific disclosures such as
statistical data, may not be legally necessary.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical
treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all
instances.Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed
consent, "the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty
through expert testimony.Such expert testimony must show the customary
standard of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant
doctor.
CONTRA: DOCTORS ARE NOT GUARANTORS OF CARE
DR. PEDRO DENNIS CERENO and DR. SANTOS ZAFE vs CA
FACTS:
Raymond S. Olavere (Raymond), a victim of a stabbing incident, was rushed to the
Bicol Regional Medical Center (BRMC). Dr. Realuyo, the emergency room resident
physician, recommended that Raymond should undergo blood transfusion.
Raymond was brought inside the operating room. During that time, the hospital
surgeons, Drs. Zafe and Cereno, were busy operating on gunshot victim Charles
Maluluy-on. Assisting them in the said operation was Dr. Rosalina Tatad (Dr. Tatad),
who was the only senior anesthesiologist on duty at BRMC that night. Just before
the operation on Maluluy-on was finished, another emergency case involving Lilia
Aguila, a woman who was giving birth to triplets, was brought to the operating
room. Drs. Zafe and Cereno, in the meantime, proceeded to examine Raymond and
they found that the latters blood pressure was normal and "nothing in him was
significant." There being no other available anesthesiologist to assist them, Drs.
Zafe and Cereno decided to defer the operation on Raymond. The relatives of
Raymond brought the bag of blood to be used for blood transfusion. Drs. Cereno
and Zafe immediately started their operation on Raymond. Upon opening of
Raymonds thoracic cavity, they found that 3,200 cc of blood was stocked therein.
Dr. Cereno did not immediately transfuse the blood since the bleeders had to be
controlled first. Blood was finally transfused on Raymond. However, during the
operation, Raymond died due to massive loss of blood.
The parents of Raymond (herein respondents) filed a complaint for damages against
Drs. Zafe and Cereno. RTC found Drs. Zafe and Cereno negligent for not immediately
conducting surgery on Raymond. CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Won Drs. Zafe and Cereno are guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their
duties?
HELD:
No. Causation was not Proven. In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the
complainant has the burden of establishing breach of duty on the part of the
doctors or surgeons. It must be proven that such breach of duty has a causal
connection to the resulting death of the patient. 22 A verdict in malpractice action
cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a
reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
The parents of Raymond failed in this respect. They also failed to prove that it was
petitioners’ fault that caused the injury. Their cause stands on the mere assumption
that Raymond’s life would have been saved had petitioner surgeons immediately
operated on him; had the blood been cross-matched immediately and had the
blood been transfused immediately. There was, however, no proof presented that
Raymond’s life would have been saved had those things been done. Those are mere
assumptions and cannot guarantee their desired result. Such cannot be made basis
of a decision in this case, especially considering that the name, reputation and
career of petitioners are at stake.
The Court understands the parents’ grief over their son’s death. That
notwithstanding, it cannot hold petitioners liable. It was noted that Raymond, who
was a victim of a stabbing incident, had multiple wounds when brought to the
hospital. Upon opening of his thoracic cavity, it was discovered that there was gross
bleeding inside the body. Thus, the need for petitioners to control first what was
causing the bleeding. Despite the situation that evening i.e. numerous patients
being brought to the hospital for emergency treatment considering that it was the
height of the Peñafrancia Fiesta, it was evident that petitioners exerted earnest
efforts to save the life of Raymond. It was just unfortunate that the loss of his life
was not prevented.
DAY FIVE
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ VS CA
FACTS:
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical
malpractice suit, which in simplest terms is the type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm.The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the
attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged
with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide for the
untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following her surgical operation.
Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother, Lydia, to the Perpetual
Help Clinic and General Hospital. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
"myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March
23, 1991. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her mother
was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation
could be postponed. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that
she must be operated on as scheduled. Rowena and her other relatives waited
outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were
waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy
tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had
passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia.
After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was
finished. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in
a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy
additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank,
gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's
husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District
Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it
arrived. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to
the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was
wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on
her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. While the
petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Lydia Umali was
pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of
death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty
to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision finding the accused Dra. Lina
Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-
accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali
on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals affirmed the MTCC in toto and further directed
petitioner to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.
ISSUE:
Won petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?
HELD:
No. This Court finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness
of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the
patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the
DAY FIVE
reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert
testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as
a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused
petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless
imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the
reckless imprudence.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at
the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. The prosecution's
expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. FlorestoArizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of
death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of
care that petitioner should have exercised. Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive
of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good
standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when
the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and
employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the
contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as
well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy conducted by Dr.
Arizala on the body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel
nor was there any indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel had become
loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. This Court has no recourse but to rely on
the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that thecause of Lydia's
death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to
the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused
by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but this Court finds the petitioner civilly
liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to
establish civil liability.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
 Captain of the Ship doctrine
RAMOS vs CA
FACTS:
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on
an operation to the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she
was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation performed by Dr. OrlinoHozaka. Dr. Hosaka
charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and
which was to be paid after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband
that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's
hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the
College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went
down with her to the operating room. Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at
DAY FIVE
about 12:15 P.M.Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw
the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for
another anesthesiologist Dr. Calderon. She went out of the operating room to tell
Rogelio that something is wrong. When she went back she saw Erlinda in
a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care
Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25
and she was since then comatosed. She suffered brain damage as a result of the
absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. She was also diagnosed to
be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage" Monthly
expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000. Spouses Ramos and their minors filed
against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling
to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral
damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus
interest
ISSUE:
W/N the Ramos' are entitled to damages
HELD:
YES. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents
the following: 1) P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner
Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000 moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages
and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.The application of res
ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a
judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a
matter of law, permit a given inference. doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by
the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this case doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. As borne by the
records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient according
to witness Herminda. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied
with her testimony Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only
an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Generally, to qualify as an
expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter
about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on
the subject or by practical experience. Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated
that oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic encephalopathy was due to an
unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was not accepted as
expert opinion. Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different
hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three
hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with hisanesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that
he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient private hospitals, hire,
fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff.
While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages.
 Art. 2199. — Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
 temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no
incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
 They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything
less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it
would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic
changes which her body would normally undergo through the years.
 Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has
been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now
DAY FIVE
 Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.
The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one.
Award of P2,000,000 in moral damages would be appropriate.
 Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000 are likewise proper.
 Doctrine of apparent authority
ROGELIO NOGRALES VS CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
FACTS:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), who was
then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr.
Estrada") beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December
1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an
increase in her blood pressure and development of leg edemaindicating
preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of
25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor painsprompting Corazon
and Rogelio Nogales ("Spouses Nogales") to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After
examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol
Medical Center ("CMC"). On 26 May 1976, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at
the CMC after the staff nurse noted the written admission request8 of Dr. Estrada.
Upon Corazon's admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales ("Rogelio") executed and
signed the "Consent on AdmissionAgreement”and“AdmissionAgreement.”
Corazon was then bought to the labor room of the CMC. Dr. Rosa Uy ("Dr.
Uy"), who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal examination
of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of her findings. Based on
the Doctor's Order Sheet, around 3:00 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered for 10 mg.of valium
to be administered immediately by intramuscular injection. Dr. Estrada later
ordered the start of intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed with
dextrose,5%, in lactated Ringers' solution, at the rate of eight to ten micro-drops
per minute. According to the Nurse's Observation Notes, Dr. Joel Enriquez ("Dr.
Enriquez"), an anaesthesiologist at CMC, was notified at 4:15 a.m. of Corazon's
admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services of an
anaesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada's refusal, Dr. Enriquez
stayed to observeCorazon’scondition. At 6:00 a.m., Corazon was transferred to
Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. At 6:10a.m., Corazon's bag of water ruptured
spontaneously. At 6:12 a.m., Corazon's cervix was fully dilated. At 6:13 a.m.,
Corazon started to experience convulsions. At 6:15 a.m., Dr. Estrada ordered the
injection of ten grams of magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely Villaflor ("Dr.
Villaflor"), who was assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of
magnesium sulphate. At 6:22 a.m. Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low
forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical
tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak and
injured condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated by
Dr. Enriquez and Dr. Payumo. At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate
vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon's blood pressure dropped
from 130/80 to 60/40 within five minutes. There was continuous profuse vaginal
bleeding. The assisting nurse administered hemacel through a gauge 19 needle as a
side drip to the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose. At 7:45 a.m., Dr. Estrada
ordered blood typing and cross matching with bottled blood. Ittook approximately
30 minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson("Dr. Lacson"), to
comply with Dr. Estrada's order and deliver the blood. At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe
Espinola ("Dr. Espinola"), head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of the
CMC, was apprised of Corazon's condition by telephone. Upon being informed that
Corazon was bleeding profusely, Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy.
Rogelio was made to sign a "Consent to Operation." Due to the inclement weather
then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his residence by an ambulance, arrived at
the CMC about an hour later or at 9:00 a.m. He examined the patient and ordered
some resuscitative measures to be administered. Despite Dr.Espinola's efforts,
Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, postpartum."On
14 May 1980, petitioners filed a complaint for damages,with the Regional TrialCourt
of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr.Lacson, Dr.
Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao for the death of Corazon. Petitioners mainly
contended that defendant physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the
treatment and management of Corazon's condition. Petitioners charged CMC with
negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and hospital
staff.
ISSUES:
1) whether an employee-employer relationship existedbetween CMC and Dr.
Estrada
2) whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada
HELD:
In Ramos vs. CA, weheld:
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically
employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants
DAY FIVE
all fulfil the important hallmarks of an employer-employeerelationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship infact
exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we
rule that forthe purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employeerelationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians.
Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor. Applying the control test, SC did not find
evidence pointingto CMC's exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and
management of Corazon's condition.The patient was under the exclusive prenatal
care of Dr. Estrada. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilitieswhen
Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an emergency.But while SC
held that Dr. Estrada is not CMC’s employee, CMC is vicariously liable under
thedoctrine of apparent authority.
General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician.
Except: When physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital (doctrine of
apparent authority)
Requisites for the doctrine to apply:
(1) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude
that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of
the hospital;
(2) where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff
must also prove that
the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and
(3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent,
consistent with
ordinary care and prudence.
Two Factors to consider:
1) An inquiry onwhether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person toconclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent
was an employee or agent of thehospital. The hospital need not make express
representations to the patient that the treatingphysician is an employee of the
hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
2) An inquiry on whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or itsagent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
Application of these factors to this case:
1) CMC impliedly held out Estrada as a member of its medical staff.
a) CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical staff and
facilities toDr. Estrada.
b) CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. These forms
did notindicate that he was an independent contractor-physician. No one from CMC
informed theSpouses
c) Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who
was thenthe Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the
impression thatDr. Estrada as a member of CMC's medical staff was collaborating
with other CMCemployedspecialists in treating Corazon.
2) Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle
Corazon's deliverynot only because of their friend's recommendation, but more
importantly because of Dr.Estrada's "connection with a reputable hospital, the
CMC." In other words, Dr. Estrada’srelationship with CMC played a significant role in
the Spouses Nogales' decision in accepting Dr.Estrada's services
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC. VS AGANA
FACTS:
Dr.Ampilperformed an anterior resection surgery and hysterectomyon
NatividadAgana. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the
corresponding Record of Operation, the attending nurses entered these remarks:
"sponge count lacking” and "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no
avail continue for closure." After a couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes told her that the pain
was the natural consequence of the surgery.
Natividadwent to the United States to seek further treatment. Natividad was told
she was free of cancer. Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from
pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from
her vagina. Dr.Ampil managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze. He then assured
her that the pains would soon vanish.
The pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze which badly infected
her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs
which forced stool to excrete through the vagina.Natividad underwent another
surgery.
DAY FIVE
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against the
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr.Ampil, and
Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two
pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of
negligence. Pending the outcome of the case, Natividad died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr.Ampil
RULING:
In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court articulated that for purposes of
apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its
liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency
by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained
acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health
professionals.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory,
or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law
of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual
relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in
somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority
exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this
manner: "The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent
authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he holds the
agent out to the public as possessing.”
In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a
particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted
treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in
behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names
and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those
of Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it
"is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it
proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched
for their skill and competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out to
the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers
quality health care services. By accrediting Dr.Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were
its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As
expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services on
the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its
employees, agents, or servants.
PETRON CORPORATION VS SPS CAESAR JOVERO
FACTS:
Robin Uy leased a property from Cesar for a period of five years to operate a
gasoline station in Estancia, Iloilo. He then entered into Retail Dealer Contract with
Petron Corporation for the period May 1, 1984 to April 30, 1989, where he
obligated himself to sell Petron products in quantities as ordered by him. One of the
provisions of the contract is that the dealer hold Petron harmless against all losses
and claims for death, personal injury or property damage arising out of any use or
condition of the dealer’s premises, regardless of any defects therein. To comply
with the obligation to deliver its products to the dealer, Petron entered into a
hauling contract with Jose Villaruz, doing business under the name Gale Freight
Services, for the period of three years from March 1988. Under the hauling
contract, Jose specifically assigned three trucks (tanks trucks with plate numbers
FVG-605, FVG-581, and FVG-583). The parties also agreed that Jose shall hold
Petron free from any liability on claims by third persons arising out of but not
limited to the terms of the hauling contract. Delivery was defined as “not only
transportation but also proper loading and unloading and delivery”. On October 27,
1988, Robin executed a Special Power of Attorney for the management of the
gasoline station in favor of Chiong and his wife, Dortina. Howver, Chiong left for
Honkong on November 27, 1990, so Dortina was left with the management of the
station. On January 27, 1991, Ronnie, an employee of the station, ordered products
from Petron, who then instructed Jose to deliver the products. The latter however
used a truck not stipulated in the contract, but was allowed by Petron. During the
unloading of the petroleum from the truck to the fill pipe into the underground
tank, a fire started in the fill pipe and spread to the rubber hose connected to the
tank truck. When the driver (PepitoIgdanis), who was out of the premises saw the
fire, he immediately drove the truck in reverse without detaching the rubber hose
from the fill pipe, starting a conflagration that damaged the property of spouses
Cesar and Erma (Jovero), Leonilo and Luzvilla (Samson), and Rogelio and Lucia
(Simpoco). The aggrieved parties then filed cases for damages against Petron, Jose,
Rubin and Dortina, which was consolidated and tried by the RTC Iloilo. In its answer,
DAY FIVE
Petron alleged that liability rests with Rubin and Dortina and Jose, as it alleged that
the products were already paid for and delivered to Rubin and Dortina, while Jose
transported the petroleum. It also asserted cross-claims against the other
defendants, for contribution, indemnity and subrogation if in case it is held liable.
ISSUE:
WhetherPetron is liable for continuing to do business with Robin despite the
absence of a valid dealership contract.
HELD:
Petitioner, as an importer and a distributer of gasoline and other petroleum
product, executed with a dealer of these products an exclusive dealership
agreement for mutual benefit and gain. On one hand, petitioner benefits from the
sale of its products, as well as the advertisement it gains when it broadens its
geographical coverage in contracting with independent dealers in different areas.
The products sold and the services rendered by the dealer also contribute to its
goodwill. Thus, despite the transfer of ownership upon the sale and delivery of its
products, petitioner still imposes the obligation on the dealer to exclusively carry its
products.
The dealer also benefits from the dealership agreement, not only from the resale of
the products of petitioner, but also from the latter’s goodwill.
The expiration or nonexistence of a dealership contract did not ipso facto transform
the relationship of the dealer and petitioner into one of agency. As far as the parties
to the dealership contract were concerned, the rights and obligations as to them
still subsisted, since they continued to mutually benefit from the agreement. Thus,
neither party can claim that it is no longer bound by the terms of the contract and
the expiration thereof.
 Negligence of Attorneys
BURBE VS MAGULTA
FACTS:
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta agreed to legally represent Burbe in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta informed Burbe that the complaint had already been filed in court. Later,
Burbe decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty.
Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told
that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta.
Burbe complained Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and
oppressive conduct. Pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline,respondent filed his Answer vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant for being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After their
meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on
withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement
was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract.
Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time,
told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees
amounted toP187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million,
complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents
secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When
informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees
before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had
paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived
complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it
was he.
IBP recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
ISSUE:
Won alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf
of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing
fee were proper.
HELD:
No. SC found Alberto C. Magulta guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year.
DAY FIVE
Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense
of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only
protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor
to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.
Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the
formers fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law
partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant
as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.They owe
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities
to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by
his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report
correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to
be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for
something else. Moreover, upon discovering the mistake -- if indeed it was one --
respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should
have lost no time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should have
issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced
by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the
rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
them in their professional capacity.Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents
and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may
retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they
may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However,
these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In
any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the
bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus
failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount
does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.
DEL MAR vs CA and NORMA DEL MAR
FACTS:
Private respondent and her sister, Florence, inherited three (3) parcels of land
situated in Mabini, Santiago City.
Florence executed a general power of attorney naming and constituting private
respondent as her attorney-in-fact with regard to the subject properties.
Private respondent, acting for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Florence, executed
Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner covering the aforementioned parcels
of land, which was confirmed and ratified by Florence. Consequently, petitioner
DAY FIVE

obtained certificates of title in his name. resulting from his former lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite
prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
A complaint for reconveyance was filed by private respondent against petitioner
alleging that petitioner obtained the aforementioned certificates of title through In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from
fraud. what he considers as the serious and costly mistake of his former LAWYERS, in
demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of
During the pre-trial conference, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared, by which deprived him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of
reason of which the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner as in default and documentary evidence that would have completely belied the accusation against
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. him.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the CA, but the counsel for private
respondent moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to file
the required brief within the reglementary period. The CA granted the motion to
dismiss and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s counsel negligence was excusable
HELD:
No.SC held that the negligence of petitioner's counsel in this case was his
inexcusable failure to file the required appellant's brief, thus causing the dismissal
of the appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of his
counsel's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, a failure that had placed him
in default. Because petitioner was in default, private respondent's evidence was
received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the trial court decided against him.
Finally, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, petitioner allowed the
reglementary period for filing an appeal to lapse, opting instead to file this petition
for certiorari. Well-settled is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Even if for this reason alone, the petition should not be given due course.
Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of expenses and
RECEIPTS in support of the liquidation voucher (Exhibit E) showing due
disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training programs actually conducted
- the original records of which are all along kept in the Records Section of the
Bureau of Plant Industry as per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P. GIANT
ON and which are readily available.
Petitioner now appeals to the SC sense ofjustice and equity that these documents
be summoned and appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after
remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the final chance to prove his
innocence.
The osg aversion that Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers,
assuming that the latter indeed committed one.
Petitioner aversion that Even granting he is not bound by his former lawyers
mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner now attempts to present would
nonetheless not cast at all a reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to warrant a reversal of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan.

DE GUZMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioners guilt was duly
established by 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine ANGELES testimony that no
such training programs were held at the designated places, and 2) petitioners
failure to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00,
ISSUE:
Whether de guzman is bound by the mistakes of his former counsel?
HELD:
NO.Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and
centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it
simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural
strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as
aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the
DAY FIVE
while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the
circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not
penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same
principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial,
excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general
rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to
petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his
previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his
evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be
appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that
we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation,
petitioners documentary evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with
the lone prosecution witness Angeles testimony, indicating that official training
programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance
he received were spent entirely for those programs. In this connection, the Court
in US v. Dungca, had occasion to state that:
xxx, the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this would be
done only under very exceptional circumstances, and in cases where a review of the
whole record taken together with the evidence improvidently omitted would clearly
justify the conclusion that the omission had resulted in the conviction of one
innocent of the crime charged.(Italics supplied)
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this
liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive
and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not
without additional basis. For in Ronquillo v. Marasigan, the Court held that:
The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a modification
or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its
execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified
or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
 Other professionals
CUILON ICE, FISH VS PHIL MOTORS
Nov. 3, 1930
Street, J.
FACTS:
H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of Manila. At the
same time the plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner
Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands. In
January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the
Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting
thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the boat. He therefore made
known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors, and was told by Mc
Kellar, of said company, that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors
Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street, in the City of Manila. Cranston
accordingly repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a
conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the
understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. Upon
preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the
principal thing necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new
carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one most adapted to the
purpose. In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its
connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the
gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to
the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly
of the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the
flooding would disappear. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the
carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the
members of the crew were unable to subdue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Quest is liable.
HELD:
YES. In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself
out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held
liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had
ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not
appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the
flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of
DAY FIVE
the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we
think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him to take
greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not
use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing
gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from
accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not
have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not
whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame. We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is
chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the changes which Quest
undertook to accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to the exact
manner in which the accident occurred might appear to be in some respects
incorrect, yet the origin of the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it
was casus fortuitus.
It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the plaintiff in the
amount of P9,850, with interest, must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs
against the appellant.
SARMIENTO VS CABRIDO
 Petitioner Sarmiento requested by her friend to find somebody to reset a pair
of diamond earrings into two gold rings.
 Petitioner sent a certain Payag ti Dinding’s Jewelry store owned and managed
by respondent Cabrido which accepted the job order.
 Payag delivered to the jewelry shop the diamond earrings which was earlier
appraised as worth .33 carat and almost perfect in cut and clarity.
 Respondent Sun went on to dismount the diamond from its original setting.
Unsuccessful she asked their goldsmith (Santos) to do it. Santos removed the
diamond by twisting the setting with a pair of pliers, breaking the gem in the
process.
 Petitioner required the respondent to replace the diamond with the same size
and quality but was refused. The petitioner was forced to buy a replacement .
 Respondent Cabrido who was the manager of the Jewelry shop denied having
entered into any transaction with Payag whom she only met only after the latter
came to the shop to seek compensation from Santos for the broken piece of
jewelry.
 Respondent Sun however admitted knowing Payag who came to the Jewelry
shop to avail of their service.
 Santos denied being an employee of the Jewelry shop.
 Attempt to settle the controversy before the barangay lupon proved futile. Thus
petitioner filed a complaint for damages with the MTCC. MTCC rendered a
decision in favored of the Petitioner
 RTC reverse the MTCC’s decision which was eventually affirmed by the CA
ISSUE:
W/N the Respondents should be held to answer for any liability in the process of
dismounting the diamond from the earrings?
HELD:
 In the case at bar it is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in
dismounting the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the
practice of the trade to use miniature wire saw in dismounting precious
gems such as diamonds from their original setting. Santos employed a
pair of pliers in clipping the original setting, thus resulting in the breakage
of the diamond.
 The Jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the ordinary
diligence required by the circumstances. Respondent Sun examined the
diamond before dismounting it from the original setting and found the
same to be in order. The breakage in the hands of Santos could only have
been caused by his negligence in using the wrong equipment.
 Respondent seek to avoid liability by passing the buck to Santos who
claimed to be an independent worker but the fact shows that Santos had
been working in the Jewelry shop as goldsmith for about 6 months
accepting job orders through referrals from private respondents and that
Payag had transacted with the jewelry shop atleast on the 10 occasions
and always through Respondent Sun. The preponderance of evidence
support the view that Respondent Sun and Santos were employed by
Dingding’s Jewelry shop in order to perform activities which were usually
necessary or desirable in its business.
 The court hold that an obligation to pay actual damages arose in favor of
the petitioner against the respondent spouses who admittedly owned
and managed the jewelry shop. An award for Moral damages has also
been justified since Santos was guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith for being a gold smith for 40 years given his long experience in
the trade, he should have known that using a pair of pliers instead of a
miniature wire saw in dismounting a precious stone like a diamond would
have entailed an unnecessary risk of breakage.
DAY FIVE
PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL VS CA & CONSUNJI INC.
FACTS:
Citibank commissioned DM Consunji to lift its new generator set to the top of its
building. For this work, Consunji used its crane operator to do the lifting. Along the
way, the generator set fell to the ground, causing irreparable damage. Citibank filed
a case to recover the cost of damaged generator against DM Consunji. Citibank
was later subrogated by Philam Insurance which paid the cost of the generator set.
At the RTC, Philam did not invoke res ipsa loquitor. RTC found DM Consunji liable for
damages, but the decision was reversed by CA. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DMCI was liable for damages.
HELD:
Petition dismissed. The cause of the fall was accident. Philam cannot invoke res ipsa
loquitor on appeal.
RATIO:
The test of negligence is as follows:
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of
the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
Applying the test, the circumstances would show that the acts of the crane
operator were rational and justified. DM Consunji exercised care and precaution in
the lifting of the generator set. The whole team was present during the crane
operation. The operator exercised reasonable care and caution when it tested the
crane four times right before the actual operation.
In their final effort to reverse the appellate court, petitioners invoked res ipsa
loquitur, even if they never had raised this doctrine before the trial court.
According to petitioners, the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in this case.
Had the principle been applied, the burden of proof in establishing due diligence in
operating the crane would have shifted to DMCI.
In this case, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, since there is direct evidence on the
issue of diligence or lack thereof pertaining to the lifting of the genset. The doctrine
is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience.
In any event, res ipsa loquitur merely provides a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. On this, we have already pointed out that the evidence does not prove
negligence on the part of DMCI, and that due diligence on its part has been
established.
Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome when the plaintiff has knowledge and testifies
or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence that caused the injury
complained of; or when there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident, and with all the attendant facts clearly present. Finally, neither the
presumption nor the doctrine would apply when the circumstances have been so
completely elucidated that no inference of the defendant's liability can reasonably
be made, whatever the source of the evidence.
 Negligence of Hotels/Innkeepers
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA RESORTS AND HOTELS VS ELLEN
JOHANNE HARPER
FACTS:
Sometime on November 1999, Christian Harper came to the Philipines on a
business trip for ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm. He checked in t
the Shangri-La Hotel and was billeted at Room 1428. However, he was murdered
inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors. The accused, a Caucasian
man obtained Harper’s Credit Cards, he then proceeded to Alexis Jewelry Store in
Glorietta, expressing his interest in buying a Cartier lady’s watch valued
at P320,000.00 with the use of Harper’s credit cards. But the customer’s difficulty in
answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently
aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the
customer’s passport, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit
cards and the passport behind.
Harper’s family in Norway was then informed that a caucasian male tried to use his
credit cards. They then phoned Harper in Makati Shangri-la however since the latter
failed to answer his phone hence his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty
DAY FIVE
Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper’s room. The security
personnel found Harper’s dead body on his bed. The CCTV showed that 3 minutes
after Harper entered his room, a woman knocked on his door and entered the
room. A few minutes later, the same Caucasian man who tried to use his credit
cards entered the room. They then left the room a few hour later after killing and
robbing the victim.
Harper’s heirs then filed a civil case against Makati Shangri-la Resorts and Hotel on
the ground that the Hotel was negligent because their security measures were
inadequate, and the latter’s negligence was the proximate cause of Harpers death
more particularly on the failure to deploy sufficient security personnel or roving
guards at the time the ghastly incident happened. The hotel on the other hand
alleged that it was Harper’s own negligence that caused his own death because he
allowed the woman and the man to enter his hotel room. Both the RTC and the CA
ruled against the Hotel.
ISSUE:
WON the Makati Shangri-la Hotel is liable for negligence which was allegedly the
proximate cause of death of Christian Harper.
HELD:
YES. Col. Rodrigo De Guzman who was then the Chief Security Officer of defendant
hotel testified during trial that when he took on the job, he made as assessment on
the overall security measures of the Hotel. He noticed that some of the floors of the
hotel were being guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard
only on a roving manner. He then made a recommendation that the ideal-set up for
an effective security should be one guard for every floor, considering that the hotel
is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen. However, his
recommendations were unheeded because the business was then not doing well
and that the hotel was not fully booked hence the number of guards were allegedly
enough.
The hotel was negligent in providing adequate security measures to its guests. The
record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper, it was
exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger by providing
sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in the country.
In so concluding, WE are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the
hotel business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes
the essence of the business. There were also similar minor infractions that took
place prior to the murder of Harper such as loss of valuable items however, the
management has failed to tighten its security. The Caucasian man entered the hotel
unnoticed and it was even evidenced by the CCTV that before he walked to the
room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked at the monitoring
camera. Such act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to
the hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on the
part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any.
Also, it was more probable that the Harper opened the door when the woman
knocked because he thought she was a hotel personnel and that it might have been
the woman who allowed the Caucasian man to enter the hotel room. Hence, the
hotel was negligent and liable for damages for the death of Christian Harper.
YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA
PAYAM vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAURICE
McLOUGHLIN
FACTS:
Maurice Peaches McLoughlin is an Australian businessman-philanthropist who used
to stay at the Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984. He
met Brunhilda Mata-Tan who befriended him and showed him around. Tan
convinced Mcloughlin to transfer to the Tropicana from the Sheraton where
afterwards he stayed during his trips from Dec 1984 to Sept 1987.
On 30 Oct 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana.
He rented a safety deposit box as his usual practice. The box required two keys, the
guest had one and one from the management. He placed US $10,000 in one
envelope and US$5,000 in another , AU$10,000 in another envelope and other
envelopes with his passport and credit cards. On 12 Dec 1987, he took from the box
the envelope with US$5,000 and the one with AU$10,000 to go to Hong Kong for a
short visit, because he was not checking out. When he arrived in HK, the envelope
with US$5,000 only contained US$3,000, but because he had no idea if the safety
deposit box has been tampered, he thought it was just bad accounting.
After returning to Manila, he checked out of the Tropicana on 18 Dec 1987 and left
for Australia. When he arrived he discovered that the envelope with US$10,000 was
short of US$5,000. He also noticed that the jewelry he bought in Hong Kong which
he stored in the safety deposit box upon his return to Tropicana was likewise
missing, except for a diamond bracelet.
DAY FIVE
He went back to the PH on 4 Apr 1988 and asked Lainez (who had custody of the
management key) if some money was missing or returned to her, to which the
latter answered there was not. He again registered at the Tropicana and rented a
safety deposit box. He placed an envelope containing US$15,000, another of
AU$10,000. On 16 Apr, he opened his safety deposit box and noticed that US$2,000
and AU$4,500 was missing from the envelopes.
He immediately confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan opened the
safety deposit box with the key assigned to McLoughlin. McLoughlin went up to
his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had
stolen McLoughlin’s key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the
assistance of Lopez, Payam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole
the key assigned to McLoughlin while the latter was asleep.
McLoughlin requested the management for an investigation of the incident. Lopez
got in touch with Tan and arranged for a meeting with the police and
McLoughlin. When the police did not arrive, Lopez and Tan went to the room of
McLoughlin at Tropicana and thereat, Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a
promissory note.
He made Lopez and Tan sign a promissory note for him for the loss. However, Lopez
refused liability on behalf of the hotel, reasoning that McLoughlin signed an
"Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" which disclaims any liability of
the hotel for things put inside the box.
On 17 May 1988 McLoughlin went back to AU and consulted his lawyers. They
wrote a letter addressed to Pres. Cory Aquino which was pushed back to the DOJ
and the Western Police District. He went back from the PH to AU several times
more to attend business and follow up but the matter was only filed on 3 Dec 1990
since he was not there to personally follow up.
McLoughlin filed an action against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez, Lainez, Payam
and Tan.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin. The CA modified only the
amount of damages awarded.
Tan and Lopez, however, were not served with summons, and trial proceeded with
only Lainez, Payam and YHT Realty Corporation as defendants.
Issue whether the loss of money and jewelry is supported by the evidence. YES.
Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great
respect is accorded to the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial
court. The trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.
Issue 2: whether there was gross negligence on the part of the innkeepers
Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the master
key of the management when the loss took place. They even admitted that they
assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlin’s safety deposit
box.
The management contends that McLoughlin made its employees believe that Tan
was his spouse for she was always with him most of the time. The evidence on
record is bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan to the management
as his wife. Mere close companionship and intimacy are not enough to warrant
such conclusion. They should have confronted him as to his relationship with Tan
considering that the latter had been observed opening McLoughlin’s safety deposit
box a number of times at the early hours of the morning.
Art 2180, par (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. Given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin’s money
was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana’s employees both the
employees and YHT, as owner of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable
pursuant to Art 2193.
Issue 3: WON the "Undertaking for the Use of the Safety Deposit Box" is null and
void.
Yes, it is null and void. Art. 2003 is controlling. This is an expression of public policy
that the hotel business like common carriers are imbued with public interest. This
responsibility cannot be waived away by any contrary stipulation in so-called
"undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature.
The CA (former case) even ruled before that hotelkeepers are liable even though
the effects are not delivered to them or their employees, but it is enough that the
effects are within the hotel or inn.
DAY FIVE

Pars. 2 and 4 of the undertaking manifestly contravene Art. 2003 of the NCC.
Meanwhile, the defense that Art. 2002 exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if
the loss is due to the acts of the guest, family or visitors falls because the hotel is
guilty of negligence as well. This provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not
guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed in any degree to the
occurrence of the loss.