1. G.R. No.
L-3756 June 30, 1952 Republic of the Philippines, intervenor) to annul the sale of property of
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO
DE FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico C. Alikpala and Assistant
Attorney Augusto Kalaw for appellant.
Ramirez and Ortigas for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property
(land and warehouses) situated in Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for
its occupation and use. The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name
the title was registered before the war. On January 4, 1943, during the
Japanese military occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese
corporation by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho for the sum of P140,00,
and thereupon title thereto issued in its name (transfer certificate of title
No. 64330, Register of Deeds, Manila). After liberation, more specifically
on April 4, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of
America took possession, control, and custody thereof under section 12
of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat., 411, for the reason that it
belonged to an enemy national. During the year 1946 the property was
occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a
custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian
(Exhibit G), and when it vacated the property it was occupied by the
defendant herein. The Philippine Government made representations with
the Office Alien Property Custodian for the use of property by the
Government (see Exhibits 2, 2-A, 2-B, and 1). On March 31, 1947, the
defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land, and
actually spent thereon the repairs the sum of P26,898.27. In 1948,
defendant leased one-third of the warehouse to one Dioscoro Sarile at a
monthly rental of P500, which was later raised to P1,000 a month. Sarile
did not pay the rents, so action was brought against him. It is not shown,
however, if the judgment was ever executed.
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian
of the United States, but as this was denied, it brought an action in court
(Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 5007, entitled "La
Sagrada Orden Predicadores de la Provinicia del Santisimo Rosario de
Filipinas," vs. Philippine Alien Property Administrator, defendant,
Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The Republic of the
Philippines was allowed to intervene in the action. The case did not come
for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is
claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null
and void because it was executed under threats, duress, and
intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the name of the
Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued;
that the claims, rights, title, and interest of the Alien Property Custodian
be cancelled and held for naught; that the occupant National Coconut
Corporation has until February 28, 1949, to recover its equipment from
the property and vacate the premises; that plaintiff, upon entry of
judgment, pay to the Philippine Alien Property Administration the sum of
P140,000; and that the Philippine Alien Property Administration be free
from responsibility or liability for any act of the National Coconut
Corporation, etc. Pursuant to the agreement the court rendered judgment
releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability, but reversing to
the plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation
reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises. (Exhibit
A-1.)
The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August,
1946, the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises, to the
date it vacated it. The defendant does not contest its liability for the
rentals at the rate of P3,000 per month from February 28, 1949 (the date
specified in the judgment in civil case No. 5007), but resists the claim
therefor prior to this date. It interposes the defense that it occupied the
property in good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for
the use and occupation of the warehouse. Judgment was rendered for
the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P3,000 a month, as
reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant vacates
the premises. The judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the
owner, as the sale of Japanese purchaser was void ab initio; that the
Alien Property Administration never acquired any right to the property,
but that it held the same in trust until the determination as to whether or
not the owner is an enemy citizen. The trial court further declares that
defendant can not claim any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien
Property Administration, and that as defendant has used the property and
had subleased portion thereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its
occupation.
Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed, the following
assignment of error having been made on defendant-appellant's behalf:
 The trial court erred in holding the defendant liable for rentals or
compensation for the use and occupation of the property from the
middle of August, 1946, to December 14, 1948.
1. Want to "ownership rights" of the Philippine Alien Property
Administration did not render illegal or invalidate its grant to the
defendant of the free use of property.
2. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
the sale by the plaintiff to the Japanese purchaser null and void
ab initio and that the plaintiff was and has remained as the legal
owner of the property, without legal interruption, is not conclusive.
3. Reservation to the plaintiff of the right to recover from the
defendant corporation not binding on the later;
4. Use of the property for commercial purposes in itself alone
does not justify payment of rentals.
5. Defendant's possession was in good faith.
6. Defendant's possession in the nature of usufruct.
In reply, plaintiff-appellee's counsel contends that the Philippine Allien
Property Administration (PAPA) was a mere administrator of the owner
(who ultimately was decided to be plaintiff), and that as defendant has
used it for commercial purposes and has leased portion of it, it should be
responsible therefore to the owner, who had been deprived of the
possession for so many years. (Appellee's brief, pp. 20, 23.)
We can not understand how the trial court, from the mere fact that
plaintiff-appellee was the owner of the property and the defendant-
appellant the occupant, which used for its own benefit but by the express
permission of the Alien Property Custodian of the United States, so easily
jumped to the conclusion that the occupant is liable for the value of such
use and occupation. If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations,
must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namley, law,
contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish
Civil Code.) Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all,
because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of
the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the
Allien Property Administration. Neither was there any negligence on its
part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the
Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured
the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of
duress, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee
(defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality
of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The
Allien Property Administration had the control and administration of the
property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title,
the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law (Trading with the
Enemy Act of the United States, 40 Stat., 411; 50 U.S.C.A., 189). Neither
is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a
trustee of then Government of the United States (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 249;
50 U.S.C.A. 283), in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against the
claim or title of, the enemy owner. (Youghioheny & Ohio Coal Co. vs.
Lasevich [1920], 179 N.W., 355; 171 Wis., 347; U.S.C.A., 282-283.) From
August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of
judgment on February 28, 1948, Allien Property Administration had the
absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the
United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though
it were the absolute owner. (U.S vs. Chemical Foundation [C.C.A. Del.
1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-
appellant were liable to the Allien Property Administration for rentals,
these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-appellee, the owner,
but to the United States Government.
But there is another ground why the claim or rentals can not be made
against defendant-appellant. There was no agreement between the Alien
Property Custodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay
rentals on the property. The existence of an implied agreement to that
effect is contrary to the circumstances. The copra Export Management
Company, which preceded the defendant-appellant, in the possession
and use of the property, does not appear to have paid rentals therefor, as
it occupied it by what the parties denominated a "custodianship
agreement," and there is no provision therein for the payment of rentals
or of any compensation for its custody and or occupation and the use.
The Trading with the Enemy Act, as originally enacted, was purely a
measure of conversation, hence, it is very unlikely that rentals were
demanded for the use of the property. When the National coconut
Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management Company in the
possession and use of the property, it must have been also free from
payment of rentals, especially as it was Government corporation, and
steps where then being taken by the Philippine Government to secure the
property for the National Coconut Corporation. So that the circumstances
do not justify the finding that there was an implied agreement that the
defendant-appellant was to pay for the use and occupation of the
premises at all.
The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals
before it obtained the judgment annulling the sale of the Taiwan
Tekkosho may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of the
defendant-appellant, or any contract, express or implied, because the
Allien Property Administration was neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee,
nor a privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho, its title being based
by legal provision of the seizure of enemy property. We have also tried in
vain to find a law or provision thereof, or any principle in quasi contracts
or equity, upon which the claim can be supported. On the contrary, as
defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of
liability for such use and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not
be held liable therefor. And as to the rents it collected from its lessee, the
same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith, as this Court has
already expressly held. (Resolution, National Coconut Corporation vs.
Geronimo, 83 Phil. 467.)
Lastly, the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a
new right; if no right to claim for rentals existed at the time of the
reservation, no rights can arise or accrue from such reservation alone.
Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences
defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August, 1946, to February 28,
1949, is hereby reversed. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista
Angelo, JJ, concur.
2. G.R. No. 116123 March 13, 1997
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION),
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its members,
LEONARDO T. GALANG, et al., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who
were separated from service due the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled to
separation pay and, if so, in what amount? Are officers of
corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies
they represent for the payment of separation pay?
These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third
Division) 1 promulgated on February 28, 1994,2 and May 31, 1994.3 The
February 28, 1994 Resolution affirmed with modifications the decision4of
Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-12-2477-91. The
second Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners.
The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting
separation pay to herein individual respondents in the increased amount
of US$120.00 for every year of service or its peso equivalent, and holding
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc. ("CFTI").
The Facts
The following facts are derived from the records of the case:
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force
Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within
Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T.
Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned
corporation.
Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab
drivers. During their employment, they were required to pay a daily
"boundary fee" in the amount of US$26.50 for those working from 1:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon to
12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the
vehicles they were driving were accounted against them, including
gasoline expenses.
The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the
availability of taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily.
In excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash
deposits to the company, which they could later withdraw every fifteen
days.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from
which Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the
services of individual respondents were officially terminated on November
26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local
president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards
separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They
arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00
for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted
said amount in December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual
respondents herein refused to accept theirs.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual
respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen
("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a
complaint5against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and
style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange
Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific
Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as
President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out.
Said complaint was later amended6 to include additional taxi drivers who
were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat
as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.
In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were
regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual
applications for employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to
have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised
their employment. They averred further that they were entitled to
separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of US$15.00 for
working sixteen (16) days a month.
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners
claimed that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991,
was due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" resulting
from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement. They
admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union, through its
President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had blanket authority to
negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driver-
employees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every year of
service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular
workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year
of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier
agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every
year of service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it
was forced to close business due to "great financial losses and lost
business opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was
profitably earning and the cessation of its business was due to the
untimely closure of Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in
accordance with the Labor Code, the labor arbiter explained:
To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation
to pay separation pay would be inhuman to complainants
but to impose a monetary obligation to an employer
whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) down
by force majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the
least.7
and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian
consideration."
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its
Resolution, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
granting separation pay to the private respondents. The concluding
paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution read:
The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-half
month salary should be US$120.00 but this amount can
not be paid to the complainant in U.S. Dollar which is not
the legal tender in the Philippines. Paras, in commenting
on Art. 1249 of the New Civil Code, defines legal tender
as "that which a debtor may compel a creditor to accept in
payment of the debt. The complainants who are the
creditors in this instance can be compelled to accept the
Philippine peso which is the legal tender, in which case,
the table of conversion (exchange rate) at the time of
payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used.
However, since the choice is left to the debtor,
(respondents) they may choose to pay in US dollar."
(Phoenix Assurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-
25048, May 13, 1975)
In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and
Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same time the
President and Vice-President and General Manager,
respectively, should be joined as indispensable party
whose liability is joint and several. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules
of Court)8
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
was denied by the NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order. Upon posting by the petitioners of a surety
bond, a temporary restraining order9 was issued by this Court enjoining
execution of the assailed Resolutions.
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues before this Court for resolution:
I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.)
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;
II. Whether or not Messrs. Teofilo Rafols and Romeo N.
Lopez could validly represent herein private respondents;
and,
III. Whether or not the resolution issued by public
respondent is contrary to law. 10
Petitioners also submit two additional issues by way of a supplement 11 to
their petition, to wit: that Petitioners Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin
Naguiat were denied due process; and that petitioners were not furnished
copies of private respondents' appeal to the NLRC. As to the procedural
lapse of insufficient copies of the appeal, the proper forum before which
petitioners should have raised it is the NLRC. They, however, failed to
question this in their motion for reconsideration. As a consequence, they
are deemed to have waived the same and voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the appellate body.
Anent the first issue raised in their original petition, petitioners contend
that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally increasing the amount of severance
pay granted by the labor arbiter. They claim that this was not supported
by substantial evidence since it was based simply on the self-serving
allegation of respondents that their monthly take-home pay was not lower
than $240.00.
On the second issue, petitioners aver that NOWM cannot make legal
representations in behalf of individual respondents who should, instead,
be bound by the decision of the union (AAFES Taxi Drivers Association)
of which they were members.
As to the third issue, petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc. is a separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be
held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of CFTI. And similarly,
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely officers and
stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally accountable
for corporate debts.
Lastly, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat assail the Resolution of NLRC holding
them solidarily liable despite not having been impleaded as parties to the
complaint.
Individual respondents filed a comment separate from that of NOWM. In
sum, both aver that petitioners had the opportunity but failed to refute, the
taxi drivers' claim of having an average monthly earning of $240.00; that
individual respondents became members of NOWM after disaffiliating
themselves from the AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, through the
manipulations of its President Eduardo Castillo, unconscionably
compromised their separation pay; and that Naguiat Enterprises, being
their indirect employer, is solidarily liable under the law for violation of the
Labor Code, in this case, for nonpayment of their separation pay.
The Solicitor General unqualifiedly supports the allegations of private
respondents. In addition, he submits that the separate personalities of
respondent corporations and their officers should be disregarded and
considered one and the same as these were used to perpetrate injustice
to their employees.
The Court's Ruling
As will be discussed below, the petition is partially meritorious.
First Issue: Amount of Separation Pay
Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the only way a labor case may
reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must clearly show that the
NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 12
Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial
dictum that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is
a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that
they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. 13
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case
if only to determine whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of
private respondents that their separation pay should be based on the
amount of $240.00, allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi
drivers of petitioners.
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San
Fernando, Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth in detail the
work schedule and financial arrangement they had with their employer.
Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to
not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer
any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the
labor arbiter adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even
appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any error in his
findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel for not having
questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private
respondents, like petitioners, are bound by the factual findings of
Respondent Commission.
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to
great financial losses brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which
made the roads practically impassable to their taxicabs. Likewise well-
settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order to
sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant
exemption from payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear
and satisfactory evidence. 14 The records, however, are devoid of such
evidence.
The labor arbiter, as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners
stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-
out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was not due to any great financial
loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at the time
of its closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted,
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:
. . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2)
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered
one (1) whole year.
Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that individual respondents were entitled to separation
pay 15 in the amount $120.00 (one-half of $240.00 monthly pay) or its
peso equivalent for every year of service.
 Second Issue: NOWM's Personality to
Represent Individual Respondents-Employees
On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents,
we hold petitioners in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this
issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC. NOWM was already a party-
litigant as the organization representing the taxi driver-complainants
before the labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in
said complaint did not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the
validity of its representations in behalf of the complaining taxi drivers
before the quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from
raising such question before this Court. In any event, petitioners
acknowledged before this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly
represented by NOWM, are themselves parties in this case. 16
Third Issue: Liability of Petitioner-
Corporations and Their Respective Officers
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat
Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled employment
terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer. As adverted to
earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court
in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for
holding Naguiat Enterprises and its officers jointly and severally liable in
discharging CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again
remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must
distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are
based. 17 This rule applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
Naguiat Enterprise Not Liable
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of
CFTI, respondents rely on Articles 106, 18107 19 and 109 20 of the Labor
Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however,
found that individual respondents were regular employees of CFTI who
received wages on a boundary or commission basis.
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting
exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to an employer does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of the employer. 21 Independent
contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise independent
employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own
methods without being subject to control of their employer except as to
the result of their Work. 22
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis
to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor. On the contrary,
petitioners submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for
employment with CFTI, 23 and social security remittances 24 and
payroll 25 of Naguiat Enterprises showing that none of the individual
respondents were its employees. Moreover, in the contract 26 between
CFTI and AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase
from AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of
vehicles to be "ke(pt) on the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their
concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became the owner of
the taxicabs which became the principal investment and asset of the
company.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It
appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F.
Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate
business. They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same
time a stockholder and director 27 of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.,
was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A
closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of
the matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the taxi drivers and
determining their employment terms, was rather carrying out his
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a
separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi
business.
To illustrate further, we refer to the testimony of a driver-claimant on
cross examination.
Atty. Suarez
Is it not true that you applied not with Witness
Sergio F. Naguiat but with Clark Field
Taxi? What I know is that he is a
concessionaire.
Witness
xxx xxx xxx
I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat.
Atty. Suarez
Atty. Suarez
But do you also know that Sergio F.
Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the Naguiat is the President of Clark Field
corporation? Taxi, Incorporated?

Witness Witness

Sergio F. Naguiat na tao. Yes, sir.

Atty. Suarez Atty. Suarez

Who is Sergio F. Naguiat? How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his
role in the taxi services, the operation of
Witness the Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?

He is the one managing the Sergio F. Witness

Naguiat Enterprises and he is the one
whom we believe as our employer He is the vice president. 28

Atty. Suarez And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his
employer, he could not deny that he received his salary from the office of
What is exactly the position of Sergio F. CFTI inside the base. 29
Naguiat with the Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises? Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the
corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
Witness CFTI was in taxi services. 30

He is the owner, sir. In addition, the Constitution 31 of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
which, admittedly, was the union of individual respondents while still
Atty. Suarez working at Clark Air Base, states that members thereof are the
employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining purposes, the definite
employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc."
How about with Clark Field Taxi
Incorporated what is the position of Mr.
Naguiat?
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual
and direct employer of individual respondents, and that Naguiat
Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor labor-only contractor.
It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president
solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability
of their officers. To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due process since they
were not parties to the complaint below. 32 In the broader interest of
justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as
president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in
the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC 33 is the case in point. A.C.
Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of which
were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973, it filed an application for
clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of
employees to seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22
employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were
subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the
union filed about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation,
but none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable
assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the union
asked that officers and agents of the company be held personally liable
for payment of the backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In
the corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is
the judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed employees
with backwages, enforceable against its officer and agents, in their
individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the
case where the judgment was rendered!" The NLRC answered in the
negative, on the ground that officers of a corporation are not liable
personally for official acts unless they exceeded the scope of their
authority.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter.
In imposing joint and several liability upon the company president, the
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera,
ratiocinated this wise:
(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the
Labor Code) provisions be implemented when the
employer is a corporation? The answer is found in Article
212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
(c) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not
include any labor organization or any of its officers or
agents except when acting as employer.
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the
Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial
person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to
be the employer, being the "person acting in the interest
of (the) employer" RANSOM. The corporation, only in the
technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be
held personally, not to say even criminally, liable for
nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of the law. .
..
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation
employer can have devious ways for evading payment of
back wages. . . .
(d) The record does not clearly identify "the officer or
officers" of RANSOM directly responsible for failure to pay
the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence of
definite Proof in that regard, we believe it should be
presumed that the responsible officer is the President of
the corporation who can be deemed the chief operation
officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is
with the "Manager or in his default, the person acting as
such." In RANSOM. the President appears to be the
Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively
managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls
within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code,
who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the
corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat
Enterprises were "close family corporations" 34owned by the Naguiat
family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close Corporations)
of the Corporation Code, states:
(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively
engage(d) in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation, the
stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each
other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall
be personally liable for corporate tortsunless the
corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability
insurance. (emphasis supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably
adequate liability insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine
whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort."
Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission
of a duty imposed by law. 35 Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal
duty. 36 Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant
separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI
failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently,
its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or
operation of the business should be held personally liable.
Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 37 the Court
recognized that a director or officer may still be held solidarily liable with a
corporation by specific provision of law. Thus:
. . . A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only
through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations
incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents, are
not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation
they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be
incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant
such as, generally, in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific
provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action.
(footnotes omitted)
As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the
Corporation Code specifically imposes personal liability upon the
stockholder actively managing or operating the business and affairs of
the close corporation.
In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed
NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F. Naguiat, in his individual and personal
capacity, principally bound himself to comply with the obligation
thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private respondents of any
damages which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary
restraining order sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said
principals were not entitled thereto. 38
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer
cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in the absence of
evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice. 39 In the present
case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he
had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close
corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he
carried the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been shown that
he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of
his participation in the management or operation of the business was
preferred. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the
obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.
Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the
NLRC Resolution holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly
and severally liable with petitioner-corporations in the payment of
separation pay, averring denial of due process since the individual
Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of the
corporation were not parties to the case when the judgment in favor of
the employees was rendered. The corporate officers raised this issue
when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the employees to enforce
the judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the corporation
president solidarily liable with the corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they, in their
individual capacities, filed a position paper 40 together with CFTI, before
the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been denied due process
since they availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the
NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat,
president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and
severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at
US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T.
Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of separation pay to
individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
3. G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October
1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether
or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand,
is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the
latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of
that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in
the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with
him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards
her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such
other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the
rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts
are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with
the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of
her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and
finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay
captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged
into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental
anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had
agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single,
Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second
year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay
Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since
July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when
the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny
Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August
3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff
the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's
fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent
is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily
submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit
and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held
at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill
his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court
gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,
she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her
claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing
decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at
the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they
first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's
family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers
and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they
agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter,
and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and
sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of
October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and
feet while he went to school, and he even gave her
medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep
the whole day and night until the following day. As a result
of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married
to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay
captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay
captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the
pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his
Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the
case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay
moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met
defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had
boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern
urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no
persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her."
In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the
pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him
 except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54,
tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him
to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would
defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved
in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's
insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated
not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was
working and where defendant first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal
of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a
man of good moral character and must think so low and
have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that
he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology
before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he
had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words,
he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did
not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is
not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry
plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these
acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even
gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has
been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed
be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and
injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article
21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he
had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom
or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the
private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture,
and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant
with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even
if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the
same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he
then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court
erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover,
his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to
his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims
that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting
to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was
to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment
to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could
alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these
exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro,
93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453
[1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and
appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co.,
103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of
the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the
Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach
of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history
of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
 But the Code Commission had gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law.
Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing
norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X".
A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can
not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted
to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of
moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first
instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him,
she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was
eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were
made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence
on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
— out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
To constitute seduction there must in all
cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil.
123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the
woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and
a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient
to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity
for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which
a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
 intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21
of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L.
Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of
promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248,
Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the
promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as
the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v.
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still
subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished
without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of
authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the
woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years
of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a
resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there
should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of
the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . .
(Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man
who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire
need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not.
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It higher values of morality and dignity.
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
SO ORDERED.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
and traditions.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt
or in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in
delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about
by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom
the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where
his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault,

there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
4. G.R. No. L-29041 March 24, 1981
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FIRST FARMERS MILLING CO., INC., ETC.; RAMON NOLAN in his
capacity as Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration, ET
AL., defendants; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, defendants-
appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. from the
Order dated November 28, 1967 issued by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VI (Pasig), in Civil Case No. 9185, as well as the Order
dated March 5, 1968 denying the Motion for its reconsideration. The
Order had dismissed, after a preliminary hearing, on the ground of lack of
cause of action, the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the
defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC).
Plaintiff-appellant had commenced, on March 18, 1966, an action for
Injunction and Prohibition with Damages against defendants First
Farmers Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC), various named planters including those
similarly situated, and Ramon Nolan in his capacity as Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Administration. It was alleged,
9. That in the year 1964 the defendant First Farmers
Milling Co., Inc., established and operated a sugar central
known as the First Farmers Sugar Central and for the
crop years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the defendants
transferred their quota "A" allotments to their co-
defendant First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. and are actually
milling their sugar with the said First Farmers Milling Co.,
Inc., which illegal transfer has been made over the
vigorous protest and objections of the plaintiff, but with
the unwarranted, unjustified and likewise illegal approval
of their co-defendant the Sugar Quota Administration;" 1
After the defendants FFMC, the adhering planters, and the Sugar Quota
Administrator had filed their respective Answers, plaintiff-appellant filed,
on May 2, 1967, a Motion to admit Amended and Supplemental
Complaint. As amended, PNB and NIDC were included as new
defendants in view of the FFMC allegation in its Answer that the non-
inclusion of PNB and NIDC as party defendants, "who became creditors
of defendant FFMC central prior to the institution of the instant case, and
who therefore are necessary parties, is fatal to the complaint. " It was
alleged this time,
20. That defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans
to defendant sugar mill in the amount of P12,210,000.00
on June 18, 1965, and P4,000,000.00 on Dec. 14, 1966,
respectively, to assist in the illegal creation and operation
of said mill, hence, a joint tortfeasor in the trespass of
plaintiff's rights, aggravated by the fact that defendant mill
has only a paid up capital stock of P500,000.00, hence,
said loans are far beyond the limits fixed by law; 2
It was then prayed that defendants be ordered
... jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual and
exemplary damages of not less than Fl million pesos and
attorney's fees in the amount of 101-C of said damages,
plus legal interest from the filing of the original complaint,
plus costs.
The defendants. except the Sugar Quota Administrator, filed their
respective Answer to the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. For
their part, PNB and NIDC followed this with a Motion to Set for
Preliminary Bearing their special and affirmative defenses, which were
also grounds for dismissal. Opposition, reply memoranda, rejoinder, and
supplementary reply memoranda on the Motion were submitted by the
contending parties.
In their Answer, the PNB and NIDC had contended:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That both the defendants PNB and NIDC have no
participation whatsoever either directly or indirectly on the
alleged illegal (transaction) transfers of the defendant
planters from the plaintiff to the defendant mill, and
therefore, the defendants PNB and NIDC could not be
 held liable for any damage that the plaintiffs alleged to
have suffered from the said particular act complained of;
6. That the granting of loans by the defendants PNB and
NIDC in favor of the defendant mill to finance the
construction of a sugar central did not violate any rights of
the plaintiff in view of the fact that the said loans were
extended in the ordinary and usual course of business, as
specifically authorized-under the respective Charter of the
defendants PNB and NIDC, hence, the latter defendants
did not commit any tortious action against the plaintiffs
and, consequently, the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against the defendants PNB and NIDC. 3
As stated at the outset, the trial Court dismissed the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint against the PNB and the NIDC after a
preliminary hearing on the ground of lack of cause of action.
The only issue then is whether or not the allegations of the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of action against
the PNB and NIDC.
A negative finding is called for.
It is basic that the Complaint must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "Ultimate facts"
are the important and substantial facts which either directly form and
basis of the plaintiff's primary right and duty, or directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions by the defendant. 4
When the ground for dismissal is that the Complaint states no cause of
action, the rule is that its sufficiency can only be determined by
considering the facts alleged in the Complaint and no other. 5 The court
may not consider other matters outside of the Complaint. 6 Defenses
averred by the defendant are not to be taken into consideration in ruling
on the motion. 7 The allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as
true and it is not permissible to go beyond and outside of them for date or
facts. 8 And the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged is whether or not
the Court could render a valid judgment as prayed for accepting as true
the exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint. 9
The subject Amended and Supplemental Complaint fails to meet the test.
It should be noted that it charges PNB and NIDC with having assisted in
the illegal creation and operation of defendant sugar mill. Granting, for
the sake of argument, that, indeed, assistance in the "illegal" act was
rendered, the same, however, is not supported by well-pleaded
averments of facts. Nowhere is it alleged that defendants-appellees had
notice, information or knowledge of any flaw, much less any illegality, in
their co-defendants' actuations, assuming that there was such a flaw or
illegality. This absence is fatal and buoy-up instead the PNB-NIDC's
position of lack of cause of action.
Although it is averred that the defendants' acts were done in bad
faith, 10 the Complaint does not contain any averment of facts showing
that the acts were done in the manner alleged. Such a bare statement
neither establishes any right or cause of action on the part of the plaintiff-
appellant. It is a mere conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of
facts, much less admitted by defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore,
aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a cause of
action. 11 Defendants-appellees are not fairly apprised of the act or acts
complained of.
Besides, bad faith is never presumed (Civil Code, Art. 527). And, it has
been held that "to support a judgment for damages, facts which justify the
inference of a lack or absence of good faith must be alleged and
proven." 12
While it is a settled rule that a defective complaint may be cured by the
introduction of sufficient evidence so as to constitute the cause of action
which the plaintiff intended to set forth in the complaint, the same merits
the Court's blessings only and unless there is no objection or opposition
from the side of the defendant. It is obvious that the defendants-
appellees, in the case at bar, were vigilant of their right and were on their
guard from the very initiation of the complaint against them.
Plaintiff-appellant's allegation "that defendants NIDC and PNB have
extended loans to defendant sugar mill ..., to assist in the illegal creation
and operation of said mill, hence, a joint tortfeasor in the trespass of
plaintiff's rights. ..." is, therefore, a mere conclusion not warranted by
sufficient facts. What appears from the record is that PNB and NIDC
came into the picture in the ordinary and usual course of its business
after the borrowing entity had established itself as capable of being
treated as a new milling district (FFMC is officially designated as Mill
District No. 49) because it could already operate and had its array of
adhering planters. "The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful
win not render one liable as for a tort, simply because the unintended
effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or
accomplish a wrong," 13 assuming, of course, that there was such a
wrong.
WHEREFORE, without resolving the issue in the main case regarding the
alleged illegal creation and operation of First Farmers Milling, Co., Inc.,
there having been no presentation of evidence as yet in the lower Court,
the challenged Order dismissing the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint against defendants-appellees as well as the Order denying
reconsideration thereof, is hereby affirmed, and the appeal dismissed.
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
5. G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City
Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA
PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City
Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted,
and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970,
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970,
alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for
certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and,
therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and
Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave
due course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO
CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF
THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT
OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN
ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY
MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE
THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not
there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue
City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action
was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or
negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney
owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile
and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of
the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the
damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others,
that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection
and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence
and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible from the
foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes
not only reckless but also simple imprudence. if we were
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according
to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence — even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil hability
arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We
will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin
and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise,
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make
defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious
and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there
is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate
remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that professional
drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do
not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to
go through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right
and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and
direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society.
Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the
masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial
safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence."
And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the such employee because of
his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p.
622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus,
Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747)
that before third persons the employer and employee
vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion
de la del dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza
(become as one personality by the merging of the person
of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there
is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility
arising from crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless
and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harm done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420,
424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided
for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists
cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of
an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the
City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on
section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just
cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the
criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action
referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it
provides:
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent
source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when
it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other
errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set
aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro,
JJ., concur.

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-

delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons
but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage
to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other.
Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in
the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2)
of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or
property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that

respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
6. G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now
final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by
marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,
1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of
the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40,
Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
 THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES
2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE
OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY
MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically,
none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living
with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have
been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was
the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
(pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an
entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in
this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been
fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate
to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to
be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana?
We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be
shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harms done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor,
an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts
of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the
said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the
same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the
Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also
the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor
is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his Separate Opinions
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the AQUINO, J, concurring:
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
unusual. blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely,
killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of
a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the
child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done Separate Opinions
by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational
son. conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in
against appellees. the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812
cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

7. G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006 Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch
273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to
PAJARILLO, petitioners, observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
vs. committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and
VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent. In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the
complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter
acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim
for moral damages and attorney's fees.
DECISION
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants
Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the following:
Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20,
2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462. 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco damages
(Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to
renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would 2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death
sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with indemnity;
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, 3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for damages;
safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun
hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case 5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as
No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their attorney's fees; and
right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of
Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision 6. costs of suit.
dated January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was
affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby
2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001. DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected
Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence
to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the
area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such
report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled
that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have
exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for
him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo
had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-
73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the
instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed
that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not
only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the
protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and
employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the
CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to
costs.9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from
felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been
found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to
be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable
under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the
civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged
and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished
with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact
from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil
liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father
of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto;
that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an
employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not
joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in
a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner
Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and
other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner
Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find
that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
hence, should be excused from any liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence
in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable
for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case,
its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in
filing a separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery
of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact
filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and
serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal
Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the
party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and
posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan Branch, Quezon City,
who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship
between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein
plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline
Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without
exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the
use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M.
Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly
and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are
invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting
and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
 contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not
only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal
liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be
enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was
whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or
on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a
crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the
criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the
court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of
May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept
the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this
Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While
that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to
file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil
action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling
in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court
is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a
party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily
liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis
supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of
Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance
or importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely different if
respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary
liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause
of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The
liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in
shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot
pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent
reason for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and
affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in
shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to
the bank was to renew her time deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo
claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at
him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a
distance of about one meter or one arm's length26he stepped backward,
loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable
that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun
was already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted
Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline
on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery.
However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified
that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over
which was about 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to
a man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the
street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare testimony
of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the
shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the
attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his
concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose
outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted
outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards
inside the bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible
that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-
over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all
by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure
entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but it must be credible in itself — such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony,
except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside
judicial cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank
and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when
petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions
raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when
Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside
her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and
perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out
of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act,
regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against
petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind of
petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her
purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure
self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent,
Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such
claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other
than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that
Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is
therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment
of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful
aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence.
Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business
bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react
instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she
could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct
herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she
should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely
due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that
Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had
adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the
selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required
the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite
qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been
complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the
diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel,
wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the
security guards which include among others, whether or not they are in
their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular
evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo
loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is not
sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent
in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly
implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of
law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of
employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for
the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as
may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the
diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo
underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted
by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were
noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for
security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence
required in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this
case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for
Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and
regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To
Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship
Training Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also
been established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was
not aware of such rules and regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's
clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules and
regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors
during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of
the same,42 the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended such
classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had
only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by
Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard,
which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the
concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be
guarded and protection of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota,
Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was
later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business
with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank
is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive
area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing
her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms
that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients
and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were
inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily
performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record
ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such
inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have
been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred
by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were
supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are
awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation
whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by
Evangeline's death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a
wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her
death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as
moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was
murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we
likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to
the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their
youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left
a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled
to the amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the
lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love
and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be
recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are
awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount
of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated
July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Working Chairperson), Callejo Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Panganiban, C.J., Retired as of December 7, 2006.
8. G. R. No. 166876 March 24, 2006
ARTEMIO INIEGO,1Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, in his official
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42,
City of Manila, and FOKKER C. SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For this Court to grant this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, petitioner has to persuade us on two engaging
questions of law. First, he has to convince us that actions for damages
based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore would fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal
courts if the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount
of P400,000.00 in Metro Manila. Second, he has to convince us that the
moral and exemplary damages claimed by the private respondent should
be excluded from the computation of the above-mentioned jurisdictional
amount because they arose from a cause of action other than the
negligent act of the defendant.
Petitioner urges us to reverse the 28 October 2004 Decision and 26
January 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 76206 denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner under Rule 65, elevating the 21 October 2002 Omnibus
Order and the 21 January 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 42, City of Manila. The dispositive portion of the 28 October 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED
for lack of merit.2
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for
quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck
involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as
owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed
from a vehicular accident that happened on 11 December 1999, when a
freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s
jitney which private respondent was driving at the time of the accident.
On 24 August 2002, private respondent filed a Motion to Declare
defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the latter to file his answer
within the final extended period. On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a
Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground,
among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of
action of the case.
On 21 October 2002, public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan,
acting as presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 42, Manila, issued the
assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner
and the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the private respondent.
Pertinent portions of the Omnibus Order and the dispositive portion
thereof read:
In his opposition to the motion to declare him in default and his Motion to
Admit defendant IÑEGO alleged that he never received the Order dated
12 August 2002. But believing in good faith, without being presumptuous,
that his 3rd Motion for additional Time to file or any appropriate [pleading]
would be granted, he filed the aforesaid Motion received by the Court on
23 August 2002.
The explanation of defendant IÑEGO has merit. The order dated 12
August 2002 was sent to a wrong address, thus defendant IÑEGO did
not receive it. Since it was not received, he was not aware that the court
would grant no further extension. The Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss
has to be granted and the Motion to declare Defendant IÑEGO [in
default] has to be DENIED.
xxxx
The plaintiff opines that this court has exclusive jurisdiction because the
cause of action is the claim for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00.
The complaint prays for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages
in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in the amount
of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed
is P490,000.00.
Proceeding on the assumption that the cause of action is the claim of
(sic) for damages in the total amount of P490,000.00, this court has
jurisdiction. But is the main cause of action the claim for damages?
This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim for
damages but quasi-delict. Damages are being claimed only as a result of
the alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code in the case of defendant Pinion and under Article 2180
also of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Iniego. But since fault or
negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary
estimation, this court has exclusive jurisdiction.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion to declare
defendant Iniego in default and the said defendant’s motion to dismiss
are denied.3
On 7 November 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Omnibus Order of 21 October 2002. On 21 January 2003, public
respondent issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Pertinent portions of the 21 January 2003 Order are
reproduced hereunder:
What this court referred to in its Order sought to be reconsidered as not
capable of pecuniary estimation is the CAUSE OF ACTION, which is
quasi-delict and NOT the amount of damage prayed for.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.4
Petitioner elevated the 21 October 2002 and 21 January 2003 Orders of
the RTC to the Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On 28 October 2004, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and dismissed for
lack of merit.5
On 22 November 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals on 26 January 2005. Hence, this present
petition.
Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are
actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in
such cases falls upon either the municipal courts (the Municipal Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts In Cities, And
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial Courts, depending on
the value of the damages claimed.
Petitioner argues further that should this Court find actions for damages
capable of pecuniary estimation, then the total amount of damages
claimed by the private respondent must exceed P400,000.00 in order that
it may fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner asserts, however,
that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private respondent be
excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for
jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and exemplary damages
arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioner’s refusal to pay
the actual damages.
I basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively
actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore
capable of pecuniary estimation.
In a recent case,6 we did affirm the jurisdiction of a Municipal Circuit Trial
Court in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, although the ground
used to challenge said jurisdiction was an alleged forum shopping, and
not the applicability of Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
According to respondent Judge, what he referred to in his assailed Order
as not capable of pecuniary estimation is the cause of action, which is a
quasi-delict, and not the amount of damage prayed for.7 From this,
respondent Judge concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-
delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this
respect.8
Respondent Judge’s observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be
determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the
cause of action, but the subject matter of the action.9 A cause of action is
"the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff."10 On the other hand, the
"subject matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or
personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the
suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the
defendant."11
The case of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al.,12 has guided this Court time
and again in determining whether the subject matter of the action is
capable of pecuniary estimation. In Lapitan, the Court spoke through the
eminent Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial
Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of
the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. x x x.13 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively
actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered
because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed
in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to
the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not
merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out
that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually
bears the caption "for DAMAGES."
Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or
negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third
person. The relief available to the offended party in such cases is for the
reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without which any
alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or
negligence of the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the
claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict
without a claim for damages.
We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based
on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary estimation.
II
The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of
determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages
arise from the same or from different causes of action.
Despite our concurrence in petitioner’s claim that actions for damages
based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary
estimation, we find that the total amount of damages claimed by the
private respondent nevertheless still exceeds the jurisdictional limit
of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict,
claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other
than the fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in
the computation of the jurisdictional amount. According to petitioner, the
moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at
bar are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent
act. Petitioner points out that the complaint itself stated that such moral
and exemplary damages arose from the alleged refusal of defendants to
honor the demand for damages, and therefore there is no reasonable
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the claim for moral and exemplary damages.14 If the claims for moral and
exemplary damages are not included in the computation for purposes of
determining jurisdiction, only the claim for actual damages in the amount
of P40,000.00 will be considered, and the MeTC will have jurisdiction.
We cannot give credence to petitioner’s arguments. The distinction he
made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and
those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more
apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from
the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the
employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer
in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed,
without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and
exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-
delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional
purposes is still proper. All claims for damages should be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose
from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section
5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action
as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said
section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action
are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
be the test of jurisdiction.15
Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a
single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount
thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with
the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral
and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.
In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction
of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of
damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages
that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the
claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
28 October 2004 and 26 January 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED
insofar as they held that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
9. G.R. No. 160283 October 14, 2005
JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65976, dated 25 September
2003. Said Decision denied the petitioner’s appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), La Union, Branch 31, in Civil Case No. A-
1646.
THE FACTS
The antecedents of the instant case are quite simple.
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is
located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south
by a chapel of the respondent.
The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic
tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely"
Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction
contractor in the locality.
Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) on
28 February 1995 which is reproduced hereunder:
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, executed this 28th day of
February, 1995, by and between:
JOHN Y. CHAN, of legal age, single, and a resident of Aringay, La Union,
now and hereinafter called the FIRST PARTY;
GEN. ELY E. YORO, Jr., of legal age, married, and a resident of
Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND
PARTY:
WITNESSETH that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is the owner of a parcel of land located at
Sta. Rita, Aringay, La Union.
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY, desires to dig a septic tank for its perusal
in the property bordering Iglesia ni Cristo.
WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY is willing to contract the intended
digging of septic tank for the first party.
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY and SECOND PARTY has (sic) agreed
verbally as to the compensation of the said digging of septic tank.
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the terms and covenants
hereinbelow set forth, the FIRST PARTY hereby AGREES and ALLOWS
the SECOND PARTY to undertake the digging of the parcel of land for
the exclusive purpose of having a septic tank.
TERMS AND COVENANTS
1. The SECOND PARTY shall contract the said digging;
2. The FIRST PARTY shall have complete control over the number of
personnel who will be entering the property for said contract;
3. The digging shall be allowed for a period of three (3) weeks only,
commencing on March 28, 1995, unless extended by agreement of the
parties;
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY;
5. In the event that valuable objects are found on the property, the same
shall be divided among the parties as follows:
FIRST PARTY - 60%
 SECOND PARTY - 40%
6. In the event that valuable objects are found outside the property line
during the said digging, the same shall be divided among the parties as
follows:
FIRST PARTY - 35%
SECOND PARTY - 65%
7. In case government or military interference or outside intervention is
imminent, the FIRST PARTY hereby reserves the option to stop the
digging at any stage thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto set our hands on the day
and year first above-written at Aringay, La Union.4
Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was
informed by the members of the respondent that the digging traversed
and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The
foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under
it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.
On 18 April 1995, a Complaint5 against petitioner and a certain Teofilo
Oller, petitioner’s engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC,
La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as Civil Case No. A-1646.
Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party
Complaint6 impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
Yoro filed an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint7 dated 13 July 1995.
An Amended and Supplemental Complaint8dated 30 August 1995 was
later filed by the respondent already naming Yoro as a party-defendant,
to which the petitioner and Oller filed an Answer.9 Yoro filed his own
Answer.10
After four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated its
Decision11 holding that the diggings were not intended for the
construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct
tunnels to find hidden treasure.12 The trial court adjudged the petitioner
and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the
petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any liability, viz:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment in favor of plaintiff IGLESIA
NI CRISTO and against defendants JOHN KAMBIAK CHAN and
DIOSCORO "ELY" YORO, JR. who are respectively solidarily liable to
PLAINTIFF on a 35%-65% basis, with JOHN CHAN taking the 35% tab,
Ordering the two (2) aforesaid DEFENDANTS to pay PLAINTIFF the
following amounts:
1. SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
NINETY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P633,595.50);
representing ACTUAL DAMAGES;
2. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) representing
MORAL DAMAGES;
3. TEN MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
4. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as plaintiff’s attorney’s fees;
and
5. TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as litigation expenses.
Defendant TEOFILO OLLER is absolved of any civil liability.
Any counterclaim filed against PLAINTIFF IGLESIA NI CRISTO
is dismissed.13
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal14 dated 18 August 1999. Yoro filed his
own Notice of Appeal15 dated 20 August 1999.
In a Resolution16 dated 19 November 1999, the trial court disallowed
Yoro’s appeal for failure to pay the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period for taking an appeal.17 In view
of Yoro’s failure to appropriately file an appeal, an order was issued for
the issuance of a Writ of Execution as against him only, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court GRANTS the motion of
plaintiff Iglesia ni Cristo for the issuance of a Writ of Execution as against
Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro, Jr. only.18
The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, was
given due course.19 On 25 September 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered its Decision denying the appeal. It affirmed the trial court but
with modifications. The decretal portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision in
Civil Case No. A-1646 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows:
(a) The award of moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00 is hereby
deleted.
(b) The award of exemplary damages is hereby reduced to ₱50,000.00.
(c) The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses is hereby
reduced to ₱30,000.00.20
Undeterred, petitioner instituted the instant case before this Court. On 15
December 2004, the instant petition was given due course.21
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner assigns as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 31, AGOO, LA UNION)
PARTICULARLY IN SAYING THAT THE BASIS OF THE SOLIDARY
OBLIGATION OF PETITIONER AND YORO VIS-À-VIS PLAINTIFF IS
BASED NOT ON THE MOA BUT ON TORT
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING EFFECT TO THE
MOA WHICH SHOULD EXONERATE THE PETITIONER FROM ALL
LIABILITIES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AS CROSS-CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER
AGAINST YORO.22
ISSUE
Drawn from the above assignment of errors, the solitary issue that needs
to be resolved is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT
OF MAKING THE LATTER SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES
TO THE RESPONDENT.
THE RULINGS OF THE COURT
Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame
solely on Yoro. He argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro
is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts. Since
nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and
public policy, it must govern to absolve him from any liability.23 Petitioner
relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA, which is again reproduced
hereunder:
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY
incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY.
In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the MOA should not
absolve petitioner from any liability. This written contract, according to the
respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein was to
search for hidden treasure. The alleged digging for a septic tank was just
a cover-up of their real intention.24 The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to
intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondent’s
premises should make both parties liable.25
At this juncture, it is vital to underscore the findings of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals as to what was the real intention of the petitioner
and Yoro in undertaking the excavations. The findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals on this point are in complete unison. Petitioner
and Yoro were in quest for hidden treasure26 and, undoubtedly, they were
partners in this endeavor.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, held in part:
The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the
fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only
when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of
the obligation requires solidarity.27
We find no compelling reason to disturb this particular conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore, must be ruled in
the negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the
following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was
the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was
done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the
foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondent’s premises was
caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on
the other.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly
liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.28
The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier
cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.29
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They
even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the
treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s property line. Thus,
the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose
that insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation
traversed the respondent’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his
employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard and his
engineer Teofilo Oller.30
Coming now to the matter on damages, the respondent questions the
drastic reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to it. It may be
recalled that the trial court awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
₱10,000,000.00 but same was reduced by the Court of Appeals to
₱50,000.00.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good.31 In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may
be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.32 By gross
negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise a presumption
that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of
carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to
person or property of others.33
Surreptitiously digging under the respondent’s chapel which may weaken
the foundation thereof, thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the
people in worship, unquestionably amounts to gross negligence. Not to
mention the damage that may be caused to the structure itself. The
respondent may indeed be awarded exemplary damages.
For such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels that the
amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is inadequate. The exemplary
damages must correspondingly be increased to ₱100,000.00.
The modification made by this Court to the judgment of the Court of
Appeals must operate as against Yoro, for as fittingly held by the court a
quo:
While it is settled that a party who did not appeal from the decision 10. G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998
cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment
appealed from, nevertheless, when the rights and liability of the FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
defendants are so interwoven and dependent as to be inseparable, in vs.
which case, the modification of the appealed judgment in favor of COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE
appellant operates as a modification to Gen. Yoro who did not appeal. In INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
this case, the liabilities of Gen. Yoro and appellant being solidary, the
above exception applies.34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 September

BELLOSILLO, J.:
2003 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of exemplary
damages, which is hereby increased to ₱100,000.00. Costs against
petitioner. For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-
delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its
insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented
SO ORDERED.
vehicle?

This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987,

two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic
accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano
was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone,
while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent
FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as
lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon
approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR
swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time
Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's
license. 1

As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its

insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of
subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as
respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of
FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was

no longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner,
he was dropped from the complaint.

On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner
to substantiate its claim of subrogation.3
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR.4 In other words, petitioner failed to establish its
cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the
strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de
Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages
suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art.
2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . "
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.6
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the
existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant
FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the
damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that
he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was
solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by
the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have
any participation therein.
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasi-
delict provides:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article
2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible
thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance
over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage.7 Yet,
as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable
because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the
case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-
a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and 11. G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the
negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner,
latter. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code DATUIN, Respondents.
which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the DECISION
use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not
in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." NACHURA, J.:
Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the
absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and
This is a petition1 for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against
assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31,
respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim
2007 and its Resolution3 dated September 12, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
63602, entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo SG.
Villanueva, et al."
Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a
misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint4 for violation of
reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by
injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to
respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the
exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at
Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of petitioner
the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was
Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio
leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee but of the
(Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing,
lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature
allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for
of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected
the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of
an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint
and several liability of the corporation with its driver. As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was
unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent
Criminal Case Nos. 236544, 236545, and 236546, before the
Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1995 sustaining the dismissal of
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
petitioner's complaint by the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
The MeTC issued a warrant5 for her arrest, and it was served upon her by
the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against
SO ORDERED.
Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City
while she was visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters at their
city residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where
she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained.
She was released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband
posted a bond for her temporary liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion6 for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could
not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, as
certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank,
Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was patently and
radically different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In
the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of
Desistance7 dated August 18, 1998, stating, among others, that Gregorio
was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of
prosecution.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss8 dated November 12, 1998 with respect to Criminal Case Nos.
236544-46. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the B.P. Blg. 22
cases dismissed.9
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint10 for damages against
Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Ligao, Albay. The complaint, in part, reads —
4. That on or about December 15, 1995, defendant Emma J.
Datuin filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an
"Affidavit of Complaint" wherein, among others, she alleged under
oath that as an Officer In-charge of the Accounts Receivables
Department of SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she was duly
authorized and empowered by said company to file cases against
debtors, customers and dealers of the company;
xxxx
5. That while acting under authority of her employer namely the
defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., defendant EMMA J.
DATUIN falsely stated in the "Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex "A"),
among others, that plaintiff Zenaida R. Gregorio issued and
delivered to their office the following checks, to wit:
a. PNB Check No. C-347108 dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱9,564.00;
b. PNB Check No. C-347109 dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱19,194.48; and
c. PNB Check No. C-347104 dated December 2, 1992 in
the amount of ₱10,000.00
and that the above-mentioned PNB Checks bounced when
deposited upon maturity;
6. That as a result of the filing of the "Affidavit of Complaint"
(Annex "A") wherein defendant Emma J. Datuin falsely charged
the plaintiff with offenses of Estafa and/or violation of B.P. Blg. 22
on three (3) counts, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
issued a Resolution dated April 1, 1996 finding the existence of a
probable cause against the plaintiff for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 on three counts;
xxxx
7. That in the "MEMO OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION"
attached hereto as Annex "C," signed by defendant Emma J.
Datuin she falsely indicated the address of plaintiff to be at No. 76
Peñaranda Street, Legaspi City when the truth of the matter is
that the latter’s correct address is at Barangay Rizal, Oas, Albay;
8. That as a consequence of the aforegoing false and misleading
indication of address, plaintiff was therefore not duly notified of
the charges filed against her by defendant Emma J. Datuin; and
more, she was not able to controvert them before the
investigating prosecutor, finally resulting in the filing in court of
three (3) informations accusing her of violating B.P. 22;
xxxx
9. That as pernicious result of the unwarranted and baseless
accusation by the defendants which culminated in the filing of
three (3) informations in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3 indicting the plaintiff on three counts of the offense of
violating B.P. 22, the said court issued a Warrant of Arrest on July
22, 1996 ordering the arrest of the plaintiff;
xxxx
10. That taking extra effort to expedite the apprehension of
plaintiff, defendants’ retained private prosecutor managed to
obtain the Warrant for the Arrest of said plaintiff from the Court as
evidenced by the copy of the letter of lawyer Alquin B. Manguerra
of Chua and Associates Law Office (Annex "H") so much so that
in the morning of October 17, 1997, while plaintiff was visiting her
husband Jose Gregorio and their two daughters at their city
residence at 78 K-2 Street, Kamuning, Quezon City, and without
the slightest premonition that she was wanted by the law, armed
operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) of DILG suddenly swooped down on their residence,
arrested the plaintiff and brought her to the PARAC DILG Office
in Quezon City where she was fingerprinted and detained like an
ordinary criminal;
xxxx
11. That feeling distraught, helpless and hungry (not having eaten
for a whole day) the plaintiff languished in her place of
confinement until the late afternoon of October 17, 1997 when her
husband was able to post a bond for her temporary liberty and
secure an order of release (Annex "J") from the court. It was
providential that a city judge was available in the late afternoon of
October 17, 1997 which was a Friday, otherwise plaintiff would
have remained in confinement for the entire weekend;
12. That because of her desire to prove and establish her
innocence of the unjustified charges lodged against her by the
defendants, the plaintiff was thus compelled to retain the services
of counsel resulting in the filing of a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation (Annex "K") which was granted
by the court; the filing of a Request for Reinvestigation with the
prosecutor’s office (Annex "L"); and the submission of a Counter-
Affidavit to the investigating prosecutor. All of these culminated in
the filing by the investigating prosecutor of a Motion to Dismiss
(Annex "M") the three criminal cases as a consequence of which
the Court issued an Order dated June 1, 1999 (Annex "N")
dismissing Criminal Cases No. 236544, No. 236545 and No.
236546, copy of which was received by plaintiff only on July 7,
2000;
13. That previous to the filing of the above-mentioned Motion to
Dismiss by the prosecutor and having been faced with the truth
and righteousness of plaintiff’s avowal of innocence which was
irrefutable, defendants had no recourse but to concede and
recognize the verity that they had wrongly accused an innocent
person, in itself a brazen travesty of justice, so much so that
defendant Emma J. Datuin had to execute an Affidavit of
Desistance (Annex "O") admitting that plaintiff is not a signatory
to the three bouncing checks in question, rationalizing, albeit
lamely, that the filing of the cases against the plaintiff was by
virtue of an honest mistake or inadvertence on her (Datuin’s) part;
14. Be that as it may, incalculable damage has been inflicted on
the plaintiff on account of the defendants’ wanton, callous and
reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that "every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" (Art. 26, Civil Code of
the Philippines);
15. That the plaintiff, being completely innocent of the charges
against her as adverted to in the preceding paragraphs, was
socially humiliated, embarrassed, suffered physical discomfort,
mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety as a proximate result
of her unjustified indictment, arrest and detention at the PARAC
headquarters – all of these ordeals having been exacerbated by
the fact that plaintiff is a woman who comes from a respected
family in Oas, Albay, being the wife of an executive of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation, the mother of two
college students studying in Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a
businesswoman by occupation, and an incumbent Municipal
Councilor (Kagawad) of Oas, Albay, at the time of her arrest and
detention; and that she previously held the following positions:
(a). President, Philippine Pharmaceutical Association
(Albay Chapter);
(b). Chairman of the Board, Albay Pharmaceutical
Marketing Cooperative (ALPHAMAC);
(c). Charter Secretary, Kiwanis Club of Oas;
(d). Chairman, Polangui Ladies Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Polangui, Albay;
(e). Vicarial Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate
International, District IX;
 (f). Chapter President and Municipal Coordinator, Albay
Women Volunteers Association, Inc., Legaspi City;
(g). Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate International
Virgo Clemens Circle, Oas, Albay;
(h). Secretary, Girl Scout of the Philippines District
Association; and
(i). Director, Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO),
not to mention the undue aspersion cast upon her social,
professional and business reputation because of defendants’
tortious act of accusing her of Estafa and/or issuing bouncing
checks – even without a scintilla of evidence;
16. That to compound the aforegoing travails and sufferings of
the plaintiff she had to devote and spend much of her time,
money and efforts trying to clear her tarnished name and
reputation, including traveling to and from Manila to confer with
her lawyer, attend the hearings at the prosecutor’s office and at
the Metropolitan Trial Court;
17. By and large, defendants’ fault or, at the very least, their
reckless imprudence or negligence, in filing the three (3) criminal
cases against the plaintiff unequivocally caused damage to the
latter and because of defendants’ baseless and unjustified
accusations, plaintiff was constrained to retain the services of a
lawyer to represent her at the Metropolitan Trial Court and at the
Office of the City Prosecutor at Manila in order to establish her
innocence and cause the dismissal of the three (3) criminal cases
filed against her, reason for which she spent ₱20,000.00; and in
order to institute this instant action for the redress of her
grievances, plaintiff have to pay the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and incur litigation expenses in the amount of
₱35,000.00;
18. That by reason of all the aforegoing and pursuant to the
provision of law that "whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done," (Article 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines),
the plaintiff is entitled to and hereby claims the following items of
damages:
a. ₱3,000,000.00 as moral damages
b. ₱50,000.00 as actual damages
c. ₱50,000.00 as nominal damages
d. ₱70,000.00 as attorney’s fees
e. ₱35,000.00 as litigation expenses
19. That defendants herein are jointly and solidarily liable for the
payment of the above items of damages being co-tortfeasors.
Moreover, defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC. is vicariously
liable as the employer of defendant Emma J. Datuin who patently
acted within the scope of her assigned tasks (Vide: Art. 2180,
Civil Code of the Philippines).11
Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss12 on the ground that the
complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution,
failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the
elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint. Gregorio
opposed13 the Motion. Sansio and Datuin filed their Reply14 to the
Opposition. Gregorio, in turn, filed her Rejoinder.15
On October 10, 2000, the RTC issued an Order16 denying the Motion to
Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the
October 10, 2000 Order, but the RTC denied the same in its
Order18 dated January 5, 2001.
Sansio and Datuin went to the CA via a petition19 for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the civil
case for damages instituted by Gregorio, directing Sansio and Datuin,
jointly and solidarily, to pay Gregorio ₱200,000.00 as moral damages;
₱10,000.00 as nominal damages; ₱35,000.00 as litigation expenses;
₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of the suit. The RTC expressly
stated in its Decision that the complaint was one for damages based on
quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution.
Aggrieved by the March 20, 2003 Decision, Sansio and Datuin appealed
to the CA, and the same is now pending resolution.
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision on the certiorari case
granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the damage suit of
Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said Decision but the same
was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12,
2007.
Hence, this petition.
The core issue to be resolved, as culled from the factual circumstances of
this case, is whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based
on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the complaint for damages
filed by Gregorio before the RTC was for malicious prosecution, but it
failed to allege the elements thereof, such that it was aptly dismissed on
appeal by the CA on the ground of lack of cause of action. In their
comment, citing Albenson Enterprise Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,20 they posit that Article 26 of the Civil Code, cited by Gregorio
as one of the bases for her complaint, and Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
same Code, mentioned by the RTC as bases for sustaining the
complaint, are the very same provisions upon which malicious
prosecution is grounded. And in order to further buttress their position
that Gregorio’s complaint was indeed one for malicious prosecution, they
even pointed out the fact that Gregorio prayed for moral damages, which
may be awarded only in case of malicious prosecution or, if the case is
for quasi-delict, only if physical injury results therefrom.
We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages readily
shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing
against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that
respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity
of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as
payment for the various appliances purchased; and that respondents
never gave her the opportunity to controvert the charges against her,
because they stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint.
Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and humiliation she
suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon
City while visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a
respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint
on Articles 26,21 2176,22 and 218023 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite
alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by
the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.24 Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a
complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article
26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person
to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that
there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.25
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action
for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not
necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right
to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family
relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to
peace of mind.26
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments
thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to
Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when
they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving
her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St.,
Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal
complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of
the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon
City, while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and
humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend
time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation,
considering that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no
contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for
its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its
employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a
cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct
when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.
Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint
is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and
Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.27 As previously
mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the
fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken
notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she
suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted
against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper, given
the factual antecedents of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
31, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987
VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code)
was filed by private respondent against petitioner. The action arose from
a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to
petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private
respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and
assessed at P53,024.22.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his
driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and)
careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort
and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes,
the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private
respondent) and that the said accident was an act of God for which he
cannot be held liable." 1
Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation,
alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was
insured by the third party defendant insurance company. Petitioner asked that the latter be ordered to
pay him whatever amount he may be ordered by the court to pay to the private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and
severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, to the private,
respondent the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. On the
third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to
the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its
comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him

guilty of fault or negligence is not tenable. It was established by
competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the
case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and the damages.

It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of

an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act or
omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed
upon by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the
respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show that
the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently
established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat.
And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding
circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck
was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it
crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then
bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck
rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."2

According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the
latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the
petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration
as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome

the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and
supervision of his driver.

Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was
negligence on the part of the petitioner, the petitioner's contention that
the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is
untenable.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 138550 October 14, 2005
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NOEL CORDERO, Defendant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated April 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671, entitled, "Noel
Cordero, Plaintiff-Appellee versus American Express International, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant."
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its
customers, which the latter then use to purchase goods and services at
accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero, wife
of respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an American
Express charge card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The issuance of the
charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember Agreement. As
cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card, manifested
her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement.
An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was likewise
issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed.2
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda,
daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a three-day holiday trip
to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at about 7:00
o’clock, the group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop located at 277C
Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some chocolate
candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension
charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by
making a telephone call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong.
Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind
the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card.
Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a
pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him
embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was done in front of
his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter.
Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American
Express charge card.3
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioner’s
Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk to Senior Authorizer Johnny
Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong
Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number as
respondent’s card. The Hong Kong American Express Office called up
respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in Hong
Kong, placed his card in the "Inspect Airwarn Support System." This is
the system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the company and
the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a
card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person
to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the
true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the
charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.4
When the Watson’s sales clerk called up petitioner’s Hong Kong Office,
its representative said he wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the
latter’s identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the "Inspect
Airwarn Support System." However, respondent refused. Consequently,
petitioner’s representative was unable to establish the identity of the
cardholder.5 This led to the confiscation of respondent’s card.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages against petitioner, docketed
as Civil Case No. 92-60807. He prayed for the award of moral damages
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the
humiliation he suffered.
The trial court found that "the inexcusable failure of defendant (petitioner
herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent herein) of the November 1, 1991
incident despite sufficient time was the proximate cause of the
confiscation and cutting of plaintiff’s extension card which exposed the
latter to public humiliation for which defendant should be held liable."6 On
February 20, 1995, the trial court promulgated its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the following
amounts, namely:
a) The sum of ₱300,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
b) The sum of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) The sum of ₱100,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney’s fees; and
d) The costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED."7
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision
affirming the trial court’s Decision with modification in the sense that the
amounts of damages awarded were reduced, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated
February 20, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. 92-60807 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to modifications
with respect to the amount of damages awarded, which are reduced as
follows:
(a) Moral damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱150,000.00; and
(b) Exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to ₱100,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
"A. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the ‘public
humiliation’ allegedly suffered by Cordero to Amex.
B. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to
Cordero for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees."8
Respondent filed his comment contending in the main that the petition
raises questions of fact beyond this Court’s domain.
While it is true that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, this Court may review only errors of law, however, this rule
admits of well-known recognized exceptions, thus:
". . . (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record."9
In this case, the inference made by the courts below is manifestly
mistaken. Therefore, we are justified in reviewing the records of this case
and rendering judgment based on our own findings.
In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered embarrassment
and humiliation because his card was unceremoniously confiscated and
cut in half by Susan Chong of Watson’s Chemist Shop.
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the
Civil Code:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter."10
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. But there are
exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict notwithstanding that
there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.11
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be
the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.12
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent
that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a
charge card bearing similar number to that of respondent’s card; and that
petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the
"confiscation and cutting of [respondent’s] extension card which exposed
the latter to public humiliation for which [petitioner] should be held
liable."13
We cannot sustain the trial court’s conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon
verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized
cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to
petitioner’s representative, enabling the latter to determine that
respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence
which breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the
cause of respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to
talk to petitioner’s representative.
That respondent refused to talk to petitioner’s representative can be
gleaned from the testimony of Mr. Chen Heng Kun a.k.a. Johnny Chen
during the deposition in Hong Kong,14 thus:
"Question No 9 : Was AEII required under its existing policies and/or
membership agreement with its cardholders to advise said cardholders of
their card have been put under the support INSPECT – Strictly Question
(for identification) cardmembers before approving any charge?
Mr. Johnny Chen : Under the existing policies of AEII, we don’t have to
inform the cardholders if they have to pass the INSPECT –Strictly
Questions (for identification).
Question No 10 : If the answer to Q9 is in the negative, please explain
why not?
Mr. Johnny Chen : The reason why we don’t have to are because, first,
we are not terminating the service to the cardholder. Second, it doesn’t
mean that we are going to limit the service to the cardholder. Third, as
long as the cardholder can present an identification card of his
membership, we allow him to use the card. He can show this by
telephoning the company or by presenting us his passport or travel
document. When Watson Company called AEII for authorization, AEII
representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused
to talk to any representative of AEII. AEII could not prove then that
he is really the real card holder."
Mr. Chen Heng Kun was briefly cross-examined by respondent’s counsel,
thus:
"Question No 10 : Question 9 is objected to since the best evidence
would be the membership agreement between plaintiffs and AEII."
Significantly, paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed by
respondent provides:
"16. THE CARD REMAINS OUR PROPERTY
"The Card remains our property and we can revoke your right and the
right of ay Additional Cardmember to use it at any time, we can do this
with or without giving you notice. If we have revoked the Card without
cause, we will refund a proportion of your annual Card Account fee. We
may list revoked Cards in our "Cancellation Bulletin", or otherwise inform
Establishments that the Card issued to you and, if you are the basic
Cardmember, any Additional Cards have been revoked or cancelled.
"If we revoke the card or it expires, you must return it to us if we request.
Also, if any Establishment asks you to surrender an expired or revoked
Card, you must do so. You may not use the Card after it has expired or
after it has been revoked.
"The revocation, repossession or request for the return of the Card is not,
and shall not constitute any reflection of your character or credit-
worthiness and we shall not be liable in any way for any statement made
by any person requesting the return or surrender of the Card."15
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke
respondent’s card without notice, as was done here. It bears reiterating
that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had
respondent talked to petitioner’s representative and identified himself as
the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no
negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held
liable to respondent for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671 is REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-
President and General Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City,
and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review
on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising from a
vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents -
the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the
petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the
accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On
account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998,
dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed
a complaint3 for damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint
was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as
defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son,
claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased
driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal
prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten
days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the
defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that
the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer" under the provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment
of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them
liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs.
They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to
institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed,
the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal
action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
subsequent order7 of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic
complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the
petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged
issuance:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that
the responsibility charged was the petitioner's subsidiary liability
under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial
court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not
even allege the basic elements for such a liability, like the
conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly
enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and
distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for
fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the
liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.
(Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was
denied by the CA in its resolution9 of July 10, 2003. Hence, the
petitioners' present recourse on their submission that the appellate court
committed reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their
motion to dismiss.
We DENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses
Vallejeras' cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners,
or derived from Article 218010 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts
below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for
damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia,
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner
of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer
sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at
Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs [now
respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped
by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of
defendant's employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly,
negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition
and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and
negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food
Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered multiple
body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's
employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as
Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III,
entitled "People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide," but the same was dismissed because pending
litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant
death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to the
negligence and imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for
the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if
exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the
herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by
the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the
criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras
were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict.
Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-
delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on
the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to
the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of
action as the "act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may
come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil
liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the intentional
torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action.16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against
the offender.17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil
Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may
hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior
conviction of its employee.18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision
of Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the
plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in
his initiatory pleading or complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can
not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or lack of it
based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted
to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.22
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's
minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and
that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of
their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented
said accident."
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the
guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such
accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the
defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.23 Since there was no conviction in the criminal
case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was,
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based
on quasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with
Compulsory Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that "they
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed
the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as
one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under
Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the
petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged
in any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-
10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses
to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages
when the criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced.
There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the
employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee
driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case
No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy
can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the
criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment
for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the
petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine
qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners. 15. G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

SO ORDERED. EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner

vs.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, J.J., concur. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO
SALAZAR, respondents.

David G. Nitafan for petitioner.

Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.

Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders

of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint
for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino Timbol
and Rodolfo Salazar.

The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as

follows:

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan,
involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie
Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations
for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal
Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion
thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which
happened to be petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for
causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of
P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner-
driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left
going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound
for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had
jumped from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was
bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version
of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck
driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left
towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a
policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop position,
his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing
him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit
petitioner's car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta.
Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the
accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify
Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of P972.50 as actual
damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the
offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with costs
de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability,
civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having
been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was
petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-
driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol,
the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by
Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a
result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar
and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the
alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was
uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one
of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil
Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior
judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of action.
An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore-
mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970, petitioner sought
before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave
due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.
Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an independent
civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action for the offense from
which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1,
1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the
criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section
2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was
denied in the order dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge
suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive
interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before
us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required
jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12,
1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge
sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint
judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where
the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages
against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a
cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner
prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for
the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a
final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and
second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity
of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present.
However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of
action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803.
Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not
prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep.
Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial
Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any
damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a
complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-
228. 4 And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action
was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence
under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803
is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the
separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that
there is a distinction between civil liability arising from
criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act
may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited
render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this
case the defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly
liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based
on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that
while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao,
Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of
Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of
Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and
sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a
consequence of the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage
amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral
damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the
two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's
primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2)
defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's
primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner
Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing
Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in
the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-
delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed
the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-
driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the
institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111,
Rules of Court, which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
 Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may
be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shau proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from
crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence,
having always had its own foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with
Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the
latter. Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for
these articles were drafted ... and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what
is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized
amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo
further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no
reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2
of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and is not
within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were
not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency
with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules
of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned,
Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to
reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent civil action
based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists
with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has
the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminalunder Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is
deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended
party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion
that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced
by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the
criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be
involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case,
there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly
instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of
the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case,
expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during
the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held able for
having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven
by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear
 of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this
Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be
held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo
Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the
case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages
sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of
action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to
have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all
cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed:
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,
therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971
dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil
Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside,
and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with
the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803
against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro,
JJ., concur.

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver

Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being
clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's acquittal was
not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for
damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in
Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is

acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence ...

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based

upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
16. G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment
meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the
finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the
guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary
civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and
executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and the March 27,
20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390.
Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in
the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang]
was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6)
years, and to pay damages as follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income
for one year at ₱2,500.00 a month, ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of ₱300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income
for three years at ₱45,000.00 per annum, and the further
sum of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages and
₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
₱22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of ₱20,544.94
as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years
at ₱1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of
₱100,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of ₱170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to cover
future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral
damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical
expenses, ₱2,000.00 as loss of income, and ₱25,000.00
as moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47
as medical expenses, ₱800.00 for loss of income, and
₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as
medical expenses, ₱4,600.00 as actual damages and her
loss earnings of ₱1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of ₱10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, ₱14,530.00 as doctor’s fees,
 ₱1,000.00 for medicines and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for
medical expenses, ₱87.00 for medicines, ₱1,710.00 as
actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for
hospital bills, ₱500.00 for medicine, ₱2,100.00 as actual
damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income and ₱5,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner
of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of ₱250,000.00 as
actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle;
to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of ₱22,698.38 as
actual damages;’
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the
insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become
final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is
worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial
court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf
of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the
trial court gave due course to [petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On
December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9,
1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be
excused from filing [respondents’] brief on the ground that the
OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases
on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of
May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor
filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in
the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the
accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of
civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the
accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply
to the instant case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its
appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had
jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of
that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal
case, but the government may do so only if the accused would not
thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution
cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a
more severe penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the
accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as
is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency
if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his
arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless
remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with
the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we
quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be
modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused
to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows:
 "In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging
therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within
the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers,
according to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x xxx x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment
of conviction meted out to the employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623of the Civil Code shall remain "separate,
distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same
act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are
not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
more than once for the same act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability
arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not
those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In
fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in
the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject
to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,
which states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the
criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to
its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party
to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman,
its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none
can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s
employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an
appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the
extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee
absolved of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a
whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with
the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that the trial
court’s finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused
decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower
court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the
accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty
higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may
be meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right
against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused
effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though,
that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.35 Having
been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to
have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and
executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived
even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of
them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused.
He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be
deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment
rendered against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the
court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but
hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate
court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who
refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and
executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.
Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply
to the present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein
petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in
these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary
liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down --
that an employer’s liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-
employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of
the latter’s insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the
offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case
would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered
by a competent court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must
be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the
employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in
some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil
action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a
hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as
part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its
accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase
its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-
employee’s conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of
the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself;
and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of
the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then
the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was
incident to and dependent upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In in the discharge of his duties.
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.52
SO ORDERED.
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process.53 It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory Davide, Jr., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by
the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.55

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal

as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be
discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In
these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations,
such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to
facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.58

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said
that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right
to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said
that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived
petitioner of the right to appeal.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has
been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular
trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being
then operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an
17. G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
1
CV No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086,
finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353
with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number
PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent
Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila
from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit
Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side
of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the
latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with
water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left
and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was
first brought for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in
Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus,
and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as
Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No.
D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan,
Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the
following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be
sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles
involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly
licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto
Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private
jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and
straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the
jeep fell into.3
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as
these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan,
left for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since
then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando
Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that
her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She
narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique,
Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her
husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not
go there.1awphil.net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos,
Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring
the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo
Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other
documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of
Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared
before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.8 Counsel for
respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said
criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were
not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that
said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan
testified. The TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of
the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to
be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal
evidence, the TSNs10 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan
and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for
the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while
the latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash
up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2)
vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was
cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of
the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo
Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine
Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said,
the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff
was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast.
The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he
heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right
on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and
they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic),
meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified
that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by
the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left
lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it
was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony
before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in
the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between
the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and
solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as
well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including
appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to
pay costs.12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals.13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no
reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all
respects.14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF
THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY
OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN
PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of
this appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of
Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and
children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan,
Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court
of a Decision16 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of
the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando
Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to
comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or
deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the
present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness in the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the
requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or
proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had
no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The
criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner
PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to
the criminal cases instituted against their employees.23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible
on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a
privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the
provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these
documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient
to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be
insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made
thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the
importance it deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26 Moreover,
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI
argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the
criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it
too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of
the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the
same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the
accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of
Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied
due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in
the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due
process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a
ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object
at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a
witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion that he
would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that
the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the
TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right
to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not
have been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule
130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find such contention to
be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and
deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they
being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the
testimony may be entitled.29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of
petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than
respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the fact that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal
in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages
was one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was
sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision,
while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of
a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff
was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a
moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading
South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who
was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon
Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly
bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.
353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one
Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was
then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently
lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-
described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express
Way towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a
ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor
vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS
 (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be
presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily
injuries which compounded plaintiff’s frail physical condition and
required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July
22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of
the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic)
sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence
of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard
or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the
selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an
absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of
Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant
was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from
behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven
the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in
front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be
held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.32
From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the
ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based
on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising
from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused,
even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on
his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on
the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there
being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted
on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same
will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case37 based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision
occurred and to disregard that of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that
while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondent’s jeep,
the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in
order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for
review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme
Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof
unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the
exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We
fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the
PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the
version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took
place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two
drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio
Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the driver of
the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The
allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan
was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently,
it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so
that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the
incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when
it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision
took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and testimony,
his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the
jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of
plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision
between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the
fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day
after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention.
The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would
be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having
received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the
statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March
10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh.
13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in
said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another
jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine
Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic,
and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the
point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side
thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen
on the road itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless,
likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as
testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the
smash up, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability
of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employee.43
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it
exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it
showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before
he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the
supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready
investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised
the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.
In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence,
that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was
explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand,
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance
of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to
emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on
hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has
the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere
allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that
"the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing
that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner
from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver
the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its
employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in
the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as
good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of
evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its
driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to
oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles SO ORDERED.
without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an employer and it should be made
responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the driver involved
in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of

the accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability
arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply
with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence
of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular
supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been
shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of
supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of
manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of
PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be
continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is
being lent to all the drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner
PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded

the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount
paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the
awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the
circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered
to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral
damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of
exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against
petitioners.
18. G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18
June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard
one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang,
Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While
the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway
in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.
"Under Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is provided
that ‘Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation, xxx.’
"In the instant case, plaintiff did not present any single evidence
that would prove that defendant is a common carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not
warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence on the part
of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of
goods during transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not
availing.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the
cargo to whom the plaintiff was subrogated and the owner of the
vehicle which transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and
contract of the Civil Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.

FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum
of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and
interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the
amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company
failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach
of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer,
respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the
cause of damage was purely accidental.
1âwphi 1.nêt
"Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is
not presumed. The law on quasi delict provides for some
presumption of negligence but only upon the attendance of some
circumstances. Thus, Article 2185 provides:
‘Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.’
"Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was
violating any traffic regulation. Hence, the presumption of

negligence is not obtaining.

The issues having thus been joined, FGU presented its evidence,
establishing the extent of damage to the cargoes and the amount it had
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that
paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with
defendant is a common carrier and defendant’s driver was the
leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to
one negligent, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages
evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
of the subject cargoes."2
common carrier.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,3 plaintiff
The trial court, in its order of 30 April 1996,1 granted the motion to
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
dismiss, explaining thusly:
court had erred (a) in holding that the appellee corporation was not a
common carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence; and (b)
in dismissing the complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
The Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor
of GPS. The appellate court, in its decision of 10 June 1999,4 discoursed,
among other things, that -
"x x x in order for the presumption of negligence provided for
under the law governing common carrier (Article 1735, Civil
Code) to arise, the appellant must first prove that the appellee is
a common carrier. Should the appellant fail to prove that the
appellee is a common carrier, the presumption would not arise;
consequently, the appellant would have to prove that the carrier
was negligent.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Because it is the appellant who insists that the appellees can still
be considered as a common carrier, despite its `limited clientele,’
(assuming it was really a common carrier), it follows that it
(appellant) has the burden of proving the same. It (plaintiff-
appellant) `must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole adduced by
one side is superior to that of the other.’ (Summa Insurance
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 175). This,
unfortunately, the appellant failed to do -- hence, the dismissal of
the plaintiff’s complaint by the trial court is justified.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Based on the foregoing disquisitions and considering the
circumstances that the appellee trucking corporation has been `its
exclusive contractor, hauler since 1970, defendant has no choice
but to comply with the directive of its principal,’ the inevitable
conclusion is that the appellee is a private carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"x x x the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the
law on common carriers is not warranted and the presumption of
fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of
loss, damage or deterioration of good[s] during transport under
[article] 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.' x x x.
"Finally, We advert to the long established rule that conclusions
and findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid
reasons."5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;6 hence, the
instant petition,7 raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A
COMMON CARRIER AS DEFINED UNDER THE LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
II
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON
CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO
HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT
UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
III
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive
contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering
its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a
common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or
compensation, offering their services to the public,8 whether to the public
in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive
basis.9 The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or
goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its
transportation service for a fee.10Given accepted standards, GPS
scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from
liability.
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being
the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief.11 The law, recognizing the obligatory
force of contracts,12 will not permit a party to be set free from liability for
any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof.13 A breach upon the contract confers
upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promisee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest
in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as
he would have been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance
interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest,"
which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.14 Indeed, agreements can accomplish little,
either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for
action.15 The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to
make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of
another to observe his contractual obligation16 unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence
(normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or,
exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common
carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous
event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract
of carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the
cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its
custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with,
the obligation – in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the
place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and
corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The
driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s
principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A
contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their
successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical
position.17 Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque
nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third
person. Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based
on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the
claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the
defendant.18
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by
petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and
the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.19 It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create
an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of
proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute
for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. The maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of
going forward with the proof.20 Resort to the doctrine, however, may be
allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes,
including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently
eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.21 Thus, it is not applicable
when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several
causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.22
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the
inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the
occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the
parties.23 Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other
than those due to defendant’s conduct must first be eliminated, for the
doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases
of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of
negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out,
immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. In the case
of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa
acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been in control and
management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally
shown, however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work
against him.
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.24 Thus, respondent corporation may no longer offer
proof to establish that it has exercised due care in transporting the
cargoes of the assured so as to still warrant a remand of the case to the
trial court.
1âw phi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 66, of Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999,
of the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent
Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said assailed order of the trial court
and decision of the appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P.
Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay
FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in
the amount of P204,450.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.
19. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
SALVA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff
in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical
Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned
and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction
of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done
under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for
the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed
to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered
ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make
the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages
to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is
liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a
case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of
carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to
the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption
of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove
that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's
contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive
his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or
impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of
the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating
any motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more
freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a
peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also,
the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of
risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable.3 This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of
the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in
causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner
is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken. was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: accident.

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-
year college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the
Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the
second semester of that school year. She testified that
she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to
pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because
of my leg which has a defect already."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., are on leave.

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she

was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her
injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of
the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further
pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because
"my left leg . . . has a defect already."

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the

inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which
is fair, just and reasonable.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for

damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such
damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3)
of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of
fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in
bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's
contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the
jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of
20. G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA,
CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC., respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C.
Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony Syquia, were the parents and
siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5,
1979, they filed a complaint1 in the then Court of First Instance against
herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for
recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict.
The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as
follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony
all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a
complaint for damages against defendant-appellee,
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a
Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27, 1969
and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978
executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and
defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased
Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of
July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with
defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that on
September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said
remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault
encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its
niche underground with the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the
concrete vault was being raised to the surface, plaintiffs-
appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole
approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the
bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the
vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one
hour, more or less), water drained out of the hole; that
because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants
became agitated and upset with concern that the water
which had collected inside the vault might have risen as it
in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the
same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill
effects thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by
the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on
September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the
assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of
defendant-appellant (sic) caused the opening of the
concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening
the vault, the following became apparent to the plaintiffs-
appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was
entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the
wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the
viewing glass panel located directly above the head and
torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin,
the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of
the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the
action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the
defendant-appellee of its obligation to deliver a defect-
free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the
deceased and the coffin against the elements which
resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave and in the
alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-
appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual
damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary
 damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of
defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and
expenses of litigation and costs of suit.2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between
the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof;
that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty
of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing
contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father himself,
Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to
be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water
would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the
explanation given by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the
vault: "The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it
has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with
water and the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would
caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial
court erred in holding that the contract allowed the flooding of the vault;
that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable;
and in not awarding damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7, 1990 however,
affirmed the judgment of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the
instant petition. They allege herein that the Court of Appeals committed
the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of
private respondent allowed the flooding of the vault and
the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and
corollarily, when it held that no act of desecration was
committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant,
undisputed facts, such as those which have been
stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private
respondent's witnesses, and admitted in the answer,
which could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing
contract and the absence of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which
was agreed upon by the parties, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by
private respondent on the vault of the deceased kin of the bereaved
petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private
respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the
alternative, a negligent act which constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless,
petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent has
committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners'
dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or,
alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them.
Unfortunately, however, We are more inclined to answer the foregoing
questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in
law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to
uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has
committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act
on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against
it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does
not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to
disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
 In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract
entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care"6 on
August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the
parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence,
had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for
a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as
provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the
concrete box to be send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and
Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in
a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or
concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by
the employees of the Association.7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on
July 27, 1978, the day before the interment, and was, on the same day,
installed by private respondent's employees in the grave which was dug
earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract
with them as the latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the . . .
lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground
in sealed concrete vault."8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by
private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently,
water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything
inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and
Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof.
Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the
term "sealed" meant "closed."9 On the other hand, the word "seal" is
defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that cannot be
opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been given by private
respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition.
Moreover, it is also quite clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with
"waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract
are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should
be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be
interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the
respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his
signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A") and the
attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be
assumed that he has accepted defendant-appellee's
undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can
not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition,
also be waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are
bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law
between them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739). Where there is
nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of
the contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance
Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with
this ruling, a contracting party cannot incur a liability more
than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of
the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence,
where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing,
the document itself, being constituted by the parties as
the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of
evidence in respect of that agreement which the law will
recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of
evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs.
Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No.
83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs.
Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero
vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its
obligation to the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent
be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be
denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than
was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In the
absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the
diligence to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that
which is expected of a good father of a family.
respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with
earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private
respondent, We find no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the
applicable laws and jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in
toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7,
1990. No costs.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act — SO ORDERED.

boring of the hole — negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for
the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
that:

Q It has been established in this particular

case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia
was interred on July 25, 1978 at the
Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you
please tell the Hon. Court what or whether
you have participation in connection with
said internment (sic)?

A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was

buried our personnel dug a grave. After
digging the next morning a vault was
taken and placed in the grave and when
the vault was placed on the grave a hole
was placed on the vault so that water
could come into the vault because it was
raining heavily then because the vault has
no hole the vault will float and the grave
would be filled with water and the digging
would caved (sic) in and the earth, the
earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the
grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)

Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should
there be a heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private
21. G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner,
vs.
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his
capacity as President of FEU, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assails the June 29, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the November 10, 2004
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case
No. 98-89483 and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner; as well as
its August 23, 2007 Resolution4 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.5
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent
Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete
(Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on
August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes
Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the wound he
sustained.6Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he
explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released
considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents
on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students with
a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to
learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint7 against
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency
contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy's President, to
indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if
any; and to pay attorney's fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand,
Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General
Insurance.8
On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering:
1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as
president of FEU to pay jointly and severally Joseph
Saludaga the amount of P35,298.25 for actual damages
with 12% interest per annum from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; moral damages of P300,000.00,
exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its
president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and
severally 3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus
in his capacity as President of FEU) for the above-
mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of
cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which provides, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint filed by Joseph Saludaga against appellant
Far Eastern University and its President in Civil Case No. 98-
89483 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied; hence,
the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING
THAT:
5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;
 5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR
THE INJURY RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND
SUFFERED BY THE PETITIONER FROM THE HANDS OF NO
LESS THAN THEIR OWN SECURITY GUARD IN VIOLATION
OF THEIR BUILT-IN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO
PETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW STUDENT AT THAT TIME,
TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A SAFE AND SECURE
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. SECURITY GAURD, ALEJANDRO ROSETE, WHO SHOT
PETITIONER WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY TO THE
LAW LIBRARY OF RESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR
EMPLOYEE BY VIRTUE OF THE CONTRACT FOR SECURITY
SERVICES BETWEEN GALAXY AND FEU
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT PETITIONER, NOT
BEING A PARTY TO IT, IS NOT BOUND BY THE SAME UNDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS; and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN
SELECTING GALAXY AS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD
PROVIDE SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE PREMISES OF
RESPONDENT FEU.11
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach
of student-school contract for a safe learning environment. The pertinent
portions of petitioner's Complaint read:
6.0. At the time of plaintiff's confinement, the defendants or any of
their representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his
condition. This abject indifference on the part of the defendants
continued even after plaintiff was discharged from the hospital
when not even a word of consolation was heard from them.
Plaintiff waited for more than one (1) year for the defendants to
perform their moral obligation but the wait was fruitless. This
indifference and total lack of concern of defendants served to
exacerbate plaintiff's miserable condition.
xxxx
11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its
students while the latter are within the University premises. And
that should anything untoward happens to any of its students
while they are within the University's premises shall be the
responsibility of the defendants. In this case, defendants, despite
being legally and morally bound, miserably failed to protect
plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to mitigate and compensate
plaintiff for said injury;
12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was
entered into between them. Under this contract, defendants are
supposed to ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an
atmosphere conducive to study and ensure the safety of the
plaintiff while inside defendant FEU's premises. In the instant
case, the latter breached this contract when defendant allowed
harm to befall upon the plaintiff when he was shot at by, of all
people, their security guard who was tasked to maintain peace
inside the campus.12
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals,13 we
held that:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its
part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by
the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm
of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades
exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.14
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law student
in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual obligation
between the two parties. On petitioner's part, he was obliged to comply
with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand,
respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart
knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure
and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.15 In the instant case, we find that, when
petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who
was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima
facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the shooting
incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably
foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he was not their
employee;16and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe
learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence
in selecting the security services of Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in
providing a safe learning environment for their students. They failed to
prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met the
requirements stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed,
certain documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no
evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the
university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain
and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess
the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not
proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201
files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy.
Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to
check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on
the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to
completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its
inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Consequently, respondents' defense of force majeure must fail. In order
for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show that no
negligence or misconduct was committed that may have occasioned the
loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a
loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in
producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a person's participation - whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act - the whole occurrence is humanized
and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.17
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the
performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for
breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning
environment, respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is
essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have
satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of
the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts.18
In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25 for
his hospitalization and other medical expenses.19 While the trial court
correctly imposed interest on said amount, however, the case at bar
involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or
forbearance of money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six
percent (6%) per annum of the amount demanded. Such interest shall
continue to run from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this
Decision.20 After this Decision becomes final and executory, the
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction.
The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as transportation
expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal assistant while
recuperating were however not duly supported by receipts.21 In the
absence thereof, no actual damages may be awarded. Nonetheless,
temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered
where it has been shown that the claimant suffered some pecuniary loss
but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, the
amount of P20,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to petitioner.
As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in
the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.22 The
testimony of petitioner about his physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, and moral shock resulting from the shooting
incident23 justify the award of moral damages. However, moral damages
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The
award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.24 We deem it just and
reasonable under the circumstances to award petitioner moral damages
in the amount of P100,000.00.
Likewise, attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00 as part of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.25 However, the award of exemplary damages is deleted
considering the absence of proof that respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with
respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,26 we held
that:
[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save
for certain exceptions, corporate officers who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally
liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal liability of a corporate
director, trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with
the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1)
he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when
he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs,
or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to
the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his
written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally
and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a
specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action.27
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the
breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative, also
holds respondents vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents' Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by
a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the
element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.28
As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao:29
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,30 we held that where the security
agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or
security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or
watchmen is such agency, and not the client, since the latter has
no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to
 observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client:
… [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security
agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of
its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal
or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients or
customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or
customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting
who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty
to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of
events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security guards.
xxxx
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render
the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.31
We now come to respondents' Third Party Claim against Galaxy.
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Tempengko,32 we held that:
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device
whereby a 'third party' who is neither a party nor privy to the act
or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the
case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party
plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect
of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party complaint is actually
independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. Were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it
would have to be filed independently and separately from the
original complaint by the defendant against the third-party. But
the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or
so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in respect of
plaintiff's claim against a third-party in the original and principal
case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and
unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing
expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject matter arising
from one particular set of facts.33
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and
defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner's complaint. Evidence duly
supports the findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in
the selection of its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no
administrative sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting
incident; moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence
which led eventually to his disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed to monitor
petitioner's condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the
P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make
good their pledge to reimburse petitioner's medical expenses.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU
with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latter's breach of
obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent
FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts
awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with
Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security
agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that his medical expenses
will be shouldered by Galaxy but said representations were not fulfilled
because they presumed that petitioner and his family were no longer
interested in filing a formal complaint against them.35
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050 nullifying the Decision of
the trial court and dismissing the complaint as well as the August 23,
2007 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 finding respondent FEU liable for
damages for breach of its obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure learning atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to pay
petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6% interest
per annum from the filing of the complaint until the finality of this
Decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the applicable 22. G.R. No. 164601 September 27, 2006
rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction;
SPOUSES ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL, petitioners,
b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate vs.
damages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in the amount of SPOUSES LUZ SAN PEDRO AND KENICHIRO
P100,000.00; and attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of TOMINAGA, respondents.
P50,000.00;
DECISION
c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is DISMISSED.
The counterclaims of respondents are likewise DISMISSED. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court questioning the Decision1dated September 29, 2003
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and its promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71758,
president, Mariano D. Imperial are ORDEREDto jointly and severally pay which affirmed the Decision dated May 31, 2004 of the Regional Trial
respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts Court, Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC); and the CA Resolution2 dated
awarded to petitioner. July 19, 2004.

SO ORDERED. This case originated from an action for damages filed with the RTC by
Spouses Luz San Pedro and Kenichiro Tominaga (respondents) against
Spouses Erlinda Batal and Frank Batal (petitioners) for failure to exercise
due care and diligence by the latter in the preparation of a survey which
formed the basis for the construction of a perimeter fence that was later
discovered to have encroached on a right of way.

The facts of the case, as found by the RTC and summarized by the CA,
are as follows:

The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga

(Kenichiro) are the owners of a parcel of land, on which their
house was erected, described as Lot 1509-C-3 with an area of
700 square meters situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto,
Bulacan. Said property was acquired by them from one Guillermo
Narciso as evidenced by a "Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa" dated
March 18, 1992.

The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the services of

Frank Batal (Frank) who represented himself as a surveyor to
conduct a survey of their lot for the sum of P6,500.00. As Luz and
Kenichiro wanted to enclose their property, they again procured
the services of Frank for an additional fee of P1,500.00 in order to
determine the exact boundaries of the same by which they will
base the construction of their perimeter fence.
 Consequently, Frank placed concrete monuments marked P.S.
on all corners of the lot which were used as guides by Luz and
Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence measuring about eight (8)
feet in height and cost them P250,000.00 to build.
Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz and
Kenichiro before the barangay on the ground that the northern
portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated
right-of-way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification with another
surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found that their wall indeed
overlapped the adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not
Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed
geodetic engineer.
During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank admitted
that he made a mistake and offered to share in the expenses for
the demolition and reconstruction of the questioned portion of Luz
and Kenichiro's fence. He however failed to deliver on his word,
thus the filing of the instant suit.
In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and Erlinda Batal
submitted that Frank never represented himself to be a licensed
geodetic engineer. It was Erlinda who supervised her husband's
work [and t]hat the house and lot of plaintiffs, Luz and Kenichiro,
were already fenced even before they were contracted to do a
resurvey of the same and the laying out of the concrete
monuments. The spouses Frank and Erlinda also refuted the
spouses Luz's and Kenichiro's allegation of negligence and
averred that the subject complaint was instituted to harass them.3
On May 31, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants [petitioners] to pay to plaintiffs
[respondents] the sum of P6,500.00 as refund for their
professional fees by reason of the erroneous relocation survey of
the property in question;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs the sum of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) as actual damages;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs the sum
of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs the costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Regarding the issue whether the petitioners failed to exercise due care
and diligence in the conduct of the resurvey which eventually caused
damage to the respondents, the RTC held:
As against the bare and self-serving denials of the [petitioners],
the testimony of [respondent] Luz San Pedro that she constructed
the encroaching perimeter fence in question using as guide the
cyclone concrete monuments marked P.S. that were installed by
[petitioner] Frank Batal and his survey team, is more credible. As
testified to by [respondent] Luz San Pedro, she proceeded with
the construction of the perimeter fence in question upon
assurance given by [petitioner] Frank Batal that she could already
do so as there were already concrete monuments placed on the
boundaries of her property x x x.
xxxx
It does not matter that the location plan dated May 3, 1992
(Exhibit "B") was later approved by the DENR, as it is quite
apparent that the mistake committed by [petitioner] Frank Batal
pertains to the wrong locations of the concrete monuments that
he placed on the subject property and which were used or relied
upon by the [respondents] in putting up the fence in question.
Such mistake or negligence happened because quite obviously
the installation of said concrete monuments was without the
needed supervision of [respondent] Erlinda Batal, the one truly
qualified to supervise the same. x x x x
x x x x5
The RTC found that indeed the perimeter fence constructed by the
respondents encroached on the right-of-way in question; that the
preponderance of evidence supports the finding that the encroachment
was caused by the negligence of the petitioners; that, in particular,
respondents constructed the fence based on the concrete cyclone
monuments that were installed by petitioner Frank Batal and after he
gave his assurance that they can proceed accordingly; that the
negligence in the installation of the monuments was due to the fact that
petitioner Erlinda Batal, the one truly qualified, did not provide the needed
supervision over the work; and, lastly, that the testimonies of the
petitioners on the whole were not credible.
The petitioners appealed to the CA. On September 29, 2003, the CA
rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision in its entirety.6
In concurring with the findings of the RTC, the CA in addition held that
the petitioners cannot claim that the error of the construction of the fence
was due to the unilateral act of respondents in building the same without
their consent, since the former gave their word that the arrangement of
the monuments of title accurately reflected the boundaries of the lot; and
that, as a result, the northern portion of the fence had to be demolished
and rebuilt in order to correct the error.
Hence, the instant Petition assigning the following errors:
I.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling for the Respondents and
basing its decision [o]n the following jurisprudence:
(a) "[A] party, having performed affirmative acts upon which
another person based his subsequent actions, cannot thereafter
refute his acts or renege on the effects of the same, to the
prejudice of the latter. (Pureza vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA
110)"; and
(b) "Findings of fact made by the trial court [are] entitled to great
weight and respect. (Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686).
II.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling in favor of Respondents by
premising its Decision on [a] misapprehension of facts amounting
to grave abuse of discretion . . . which is also a ground for a
Petition for Review.7
The petition must fail.
The petitioners insist that there had been no error in their resurvey, but
rather, the error occurred in respondents' fencing; that the proximate
cause of the damage had been respondents' own negligence such that
the fencing was done unilaterally and solely by them without the prior
approval and supervision of the petitioners. And to justify their case, the
petitioners argue that the courts a quo misapprehended the facts.
Accordingly, they ask this Court to review findings of fact.
A review of the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are matters not
ordinarily reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari.8 Well-
established is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and the CA
are entitled to great weight and respect9 and will not be disturbed on
appeal save in exceptional circumstances,10 none of which obtains in the
present case. This Court must stress that the findings of fact of the CA
are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when these
coincide with the factual findings of the trial court,11 as in this case.
The Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support
or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.12 The petitioners failed to demonstrate this point. On the
contrary, the finding of the courts a quo that the damage caused to the
respondents was due to petitioners' negligence is sufficiently supported
by the evidence on record. For these reasons, the petitioner's contentions
bear no import.
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either
as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission
which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between
two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa
contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance
of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability
from such already existing obligation.13 Culpa aquiliana is governed by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles;
while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same
Code.14
Articles 1170 and 1173 provide:
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
 ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2202, paragraph 2,
shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their
contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the
placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later
constructed. The placement of the markings had been done solely by
petitioner Frank Batal who is not a geodetic engineer. It was later
discovered that it was not he but his wife, petitioner Erlinda Batal, who is
the licensed geodetic engineer and who is, therefore, the one qualified to
do the work. Petitioner Frank Batal's installation of the concrete cyclone
monuments had been done without the adequate supervision of his wife,
Erlinda. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately
reflect the dimensions of the lot. The respondents, upon assurance given
by petitioner Frank Batal that they could proceed with the construction of
the perimeter fence by relying on the purported accuracy of the
placement of the monuments, erected their fence which turned out to
encroach on an adjacent easement. Because of the encroachment, the
respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus,
suffered damages.
The Court affirms and adopts the findings of the CA, to wit:
Records show that the services of the [petitioners] Frank and
Erlinda were initially contracted to segregate Luz and Kenichiro's
property from its adjoining lots. When the [respondent] spouses
Luz and Kenichiro planned to fence the segregated lot, they again
commissioned [petitioners] Frank and Erlinda to conduct a
resurvey in order to determine the precise boundaries of their
property upon which they will base the construction of their fence.
It was also shown that in the course of the resurvey, Frank
caused the installation of monuments of title on the four (4)
corners of Luz and Kenichiro's property and that he instructed
them to just follow the same in building their fence.
[Petitioners] Frank and Erlinda cannot thus validly claim that the
error in the construction of the northern portion of the fence was
due to the spouses Luz and Kenichiro's act of building the same
without their consent. This is considering that the former led the
latter to believe the purported accuracy of the resurvey and
exactness of the lot's boundaries based on the monuments of title
which they installed.
It has been ruled that "[A] party, having performed affirmative acts
upon which another person based his subsequent actions, cannot
thereafter refute his acts or renege on the effects of the same, to
the prejudice of the latter." (Pureza v. Court of Appeals, 290
SCRA 110)
The foregoing clearly supports the findings of the RTC that the
spouses Batal committed a mistake in the conduct of their
business that led to the encroachment of plaintiffs-appellees'
fence on the adjoining alley-lot. As a result, the northern portion
ha[d] to be torn down and rebuilt in order to correct the error in its
original construction. The defendants-appellants cannot be
excused from the effects of their actions in the survey of plaintiffs-
appellees' lot.
We therefore concur with the findings of the RTC holding
defendants-appellants liable for damages in the case at bar.
"Findings of fact made by the trial court is entitled to great weight
and respect." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 686)15
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for
damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170
and 2201 of the Civil Code,16 which state:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
 In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor On the other hand, there is no legal or factual bases for the claim
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably of the plaintiffs for moral or exemplary damages as there was no
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. showing at all that defendants acted with malice or in bad faith.

Thus, the Court agrees with the CA's affirmance of the findings of the In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in
RTC on the matter of damages, to wit: the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or
bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. (R & B
Going now to the claims for damages, Engr. Arnold Martin Surety Insurance Co. v. Intermediate Court of
testified on his computation and estimate (Exhibits "G" and "G-1) Appeals, 129 SCRA 736; Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139
that the total cost for the demolition and reconstruction of the SCRA 576).17
perimeter fence in question would be in the total amount
of P428,163.90, and this was not at all disputed by the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
defendants, whose counsel waived cross-examination. This and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
estimate is practically double the amount of the cost of
constructing said fence as testified to by plaintiff Luz San Pedro Costs against petitioners.
as she was told that it is much costlier to demolish and
reconstruct a fence than to simply erect one because of the SO ORDERED.
added expense involved in tearing it down and hauling its debris.
On the other hand, said plaintiff stated that the iron decorative
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-
grills of the fence, which is re-usable, cost her P50,000.00, and it
Nazario, J.J., concur.
is only proper to deduct said amount from the total cost of
reconstructing the fence in question. At the same time, some
figures in the said estimate appear to be quite excessive, such as
the estimated cost for demolition which was quoted at P25,000.00
in addition to the amount of excavation priced at P30,000.00 and
the cost of hauling of scrap materials at P10,000.00. The court
believes that the sum of P300,000.00 for the demolition and
reconstruction of the fence in question would be reasonable
considering that the original cost for its construction was only
about P200,000.00, and considering further that its iron grills are
re-usable.

The plaintiffs are likewise entitled to recover attorney's fees

considering that they were compelled by the defendants to resort
to court action in order to protect their rights and interest, as
defendants, particularly defendant Frank Batal, failed and refused
repeatedly to even attend the confrontation of conciliation
meetings arranged between him and the plaintiffs by
the barangay authorities concerned, and to honor his promise to
help in shouldering the cost of reconstructing the fence in
question.
23. G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS, INC., DUSIT THANI PUBLIC CO., LTD. And
FIRST LEPANTO TAISHO INSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For this Court’s resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007, affirming the
Decision2 of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in
Civil Case No. 96-1367 dated 21 February 2006, dismissing for lack of
merit herein petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang’s Complaint for Damages.
Assailed as well is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution3 dated 5 November
2007 denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed on 28 August
1996 by petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang4against herein respondents
Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI)5 and Dusit Thani Public Co., Ltd.
(DTPCI),6 as owners of Dusit Thani Hotel Manila (Dusit Hotel);7 and co-
respondent First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation (First
Lepanto),8 as insurer of the aforesaid hotel. The said Complaint was
premised on the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
staff, in the untimely putting off all the lights within the hotel’s swimming
pool area, as well as the locking of the main entrance door of the area,
prompting petitioner to grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding
wooden counter top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury. The
negligence was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
failure to render prompt and adequate medical assistance.
Petitioner’s version of the antecedents of this case is as follows:
On 11 June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit
Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at
the hotel’s swimming pool facility. They started bathing at around 5:00
p.m. At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool attendant informed
them that the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The two
subsequently proceeded to the shower room adjacent to the swimming
pool to take a shower and dress up. However, when they came out of the
bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and
there was no longer any person around but the two of them. They
carefully walked towards the main door leading to the hotel but, to their
surprise, the door was locked.9
Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping
someone would come to their rescue but they waited in vain. Delia
became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around
to look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time,
petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguard’s counter. While slowly
walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned
out to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioner’s head that
knocked her down almost unconscious.10
Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and notified the hotel
telephone operator of the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at
the main entrance door of the swimming pool area but it took them at
least 20 to 30 minutes to get inside. When the door was finally opened,
three hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an ice pack and
applying some ointment on her head. After petitioner had slightly
recovered, she requested to be assisted to the hotel’s coffee shop to
have some rest. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel
physician.11
Dr. Violeta Dalumpines (Dr. Dalumpines) arrived. She approached
petitioner and introduced herself as the hotel physician. However, instead
of immediately providing the needed medical assistance, Dr. Dalumpines
presented a "Waiver" and demanded that it be signed by petitioner,
otherwise, the hotel management will not render her any assistance.
Petitioner refused to do so.12
After eating her dinner and having rested for a while, petitioner left the
hotel’s coffee shop and went home. Thereupon, petitioner started to feel
extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in her
stomach, which lasted until the following day. Petitioner was constrained
to stay at home, thus, missing all her important appointments with her
patients. She also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches
that caused her three (3) sleepless nights.13
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a certain Dr. Perry Noble (Dr. Noble),
a neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her to have an X-
ray and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) tests.14 The MRI
Report15 dated 23 August 1995 revealed the following findings:
CONSULTATION REPORT:
MRI examination of the brain shows scattered areas of intraparenchymal
contusions and involving mainly the left middle and posterior temporal
and slightly the right anterior temporal lobe.
Other small areas of contusions with suggestive pertechiae are seen in
the left fronto-parietal, left parieto-occipital and with deep frontal
periventricular subcortical and cortical regions. There is no mass effect
nor signs of localized hemorrhagic extravasation.
The ventricles are not enlarged, quite symmetrical without shifts or
deformities; the peripheral sulci are within normal limits.
The C-P angles, petromastoids, sella, extrasellar and retro orbital areas
appear normal.
The brainstem is unremarkable.
IMPRESSION: Scattered small intraparenchymal contusions mainly
involving the left middle-posterior temporal lobe and also right medial
anterior temporal, both deep frontal subcortical, left parieto-occipital
subcortical and cortical regions. Ischemic etiology not ruled out. No
localized intra - or extracerebral hemorrhage.16
Petitioner claimed that the aforesaid MRI result clearly showed that her
head was bruised. Based also on the same MRI result, Dr. Noble told her
that she has a very serious brain injury. In view thereof, Dr. Noble
prescribed the necessary medicine for her condition.17
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Ofelia Adapon, also a
neurologist from Makati Medical Center, who required her to undergo an
Electroencephalogram examination (EEG) to measure the electrostatic in
her brain.18Based on its result,19 Dr. Ofelia Adapon informed her that she
has a serious condition—a permanent one. Dr. Ofelia Adapon similarly
prescribed medicines for her brain injury.20
Petitioner’s condition did not get better. Hence, sometime in September
1995, she consulted another neuro-surgeon by the name of Dr. Renato
Sibayan (Dr. Sibayan), who required her to have an X-ray
test.21 According to petitioner, Dr. Sibayan’s finding was the same as
those of the previous doctors that she had consulted—she has a serious
brain injury.22
By reason of the unfortunate 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area, petitioner also started to feel losing her memory,
which greatly affected and disrupted the practice of her chosen
profession.23 Thus, on 25 October 1995, petitioner, through counsel, sent
a demand letter24 to respondents PHI and DTPCI seeking payment of an
amount not less than P100,000,000.00 representing loss of earnings on
her remaining life span. But, petitioner’s demand was unheeded.
In November 1995, petitioner went to the United States of America (USA)
for further medical treatment. She consulted a certain Dr. Gerald
Steinberg and a certain Dr. Joel Dokson25 from Mount Sinai Hospital who
both found that she has "post traumatic-post concussion/contusion
cephalgias-vascular and neuralgia."26 She was then prescribed to take
some medications for severe pain and to undergo physical therapy. Her
condition did not improve so she returned to the Philippines.27
Petitioner, once again, consulted Dr. Sibayan, who simply told her to just
relax and to continue taking her medicines. Petitioner also consulted
other neurologists, who all advised her to just continue her medications
and to undergo physical therapy for her neck pain.28
Sometime in 1996, petitioner consulted as well a certain Dr. Victor Lopez
(Dr. Lopez), an ophthalmologist from the Makati Medical Center, because
of her poor vision, which she has experienced for several
months.29 Petitioner’s Eye Report dated 5 March 199630 issued by Dr.
Lopez stated: "IMPRESSION: Posterior vitreous detachment, right eye of
floaters." Dr. Lopez told petitioner that her detached eye is permanent
and very serious. Dr. Lopez then prescribed an eye drop to petitioner.31
For petitioner’s frustration to dissipate and to regain her former strength
and physical well-being, she consulted another neuro-surgeon from
Makati Medical Center by the name of Dr. Leopoldo P. Pardo, Jr. (Dr.
Pardo, Jr.).32 She disclosed to Dr. Pardo, Jr. that at the age of 18 she
suffered a stroke due to mitral valve disease and that she was given
treatments, which also resulted in thrombocytopenia. In Dr. Pardo, Jr.’s
medical evaluation of petitioner dated 15 May 1996,33 he made the
following diagnosis and opinion:
DIAGNOSIS AND OPINION:
This patient sustained a severe head injury in (sic) 11 June 1995 and as
a result of which she developed the following injuries:
1. Cerebral Concussion and Contusion
2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy
3. Post-concussional Syndrome
4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction
5. Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent
It is my opinion that the symptoms she complained of in the foregoing
history are all related to and a result of the injury sustained on 11 June
1995.
It is further my opinion that the above diagnosis and complaints do
materially affect her duties and functions as a practicing physician and
dermatologist, and that she will require treatment for an undetermined
period of time.
The percentage of disability is not calculated at this time and will require
further evaluation and observation.34
Dr. Pardo, Jr. then advised petitioner to continue her medications.35
Petitioner likewise consulted a certain Dr. Tenchavez36 for her follow-up
EEG.37 He similarly prescribed medicine for petitioner’s deep brain injury.
He also gave her pain killer for her headache and advised her to undergo
physical therapy. Her symptoms, however, persisted all the more.38
In 1999, petitioner consulted another neurologist at the Makati Medical
Center by the name of Dr. Martesio Perez (Dr. Perez) because of severe
fleeting pains in her head, arms and legs; difficulty in concentration; and
warm sensation of the legs, which symptoms also occurred after the 11
June 1995 incident. Upon examination, Dr. Perez observed that petitioner
has been experiencing severe pains and she has a slight difficulty in
concentration. He likewise noted that there was a slight spasm of
petitioner’s neck muscle but, otherwise, there was no objective
neurologic finding. The rest of petitioner’s neurologic examination was
essentially normal.39
Dr. Perez’s neurologic evaluation40 of petitioner reflected, among others:
(1) petitioner’s past medical history, which includes, among others, mitral
valve stenosis; (2) an interpretation of petitioner’s EEG results in October
1995 and in January 1999, i.e., the first EEG showed sharp waves seen
bilaterally more on the left while the second one was normal; and (3)
interpretation of petitioner’s second MRI result, i.e., petitioner has a
permanent damage in the brain, which can happen either after a head
injury or after a stroke. Dr. Perez concluded that petitioner has post-
traumatic or post concussion syndrome.41
Respondents, on the other hand, denied all the material allegations of
petitioner and, in turn, countered the latter’s statement of facts, thus:
According to respondents PHI and DTPCI, a sufficient notice had been
posted on the glass door of the hotel leading to the swimming pool area
to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that the swimming pool
area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.42 Though the hotel’s
swimming pool area is open only between the aforestated time, the lights
thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2)
housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmer’s
World Gym adjacent to the swimming pool area, which was then open
until 10:00 p.m., to have a good view of the hotel’s swimming pool. Even
granting that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were turned off,
it would not render the area completely dark as the Slimmer’s World Gym
near it was well-illuminated.43
Further, on 11 June 1995, at round 7:00 p.m., the hotel’s swimming pool
attendant advised petitioner and Delia to take their showers as it was
already closing time. Afterwards, at around 7:40 p.m., Pearlie Benedicto-
Lipana (Ms. Pearlie), the hotel staff nurse, who was at the hotel clinic
located at the mezzanine floor, received a call from the hotel telephone
operator informing her that there was a guest requiring medical
assistance at the hotel’s swimming pool area located one floor above the
clinic.44
Immediately, Ms. Pearlie got hold of her medical kit and hurriedly went to
the hotel’s swimming pool area. There she saw Delia and petitioner, who
told her that she was hit on the head by a folding wooden counter top.
Although petitioner looked normal as there was no indication of any blood
or bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any
medical attention to which petitioner replied that she is a doctor, she was
fine and she did not need any medical attention. Petitioner, instead,
requested for a hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.45
At about 8:00 p.m., after attending to petitioner, Ms. Pearlie went back to
the hotel clinic to inform Dr. Dalumpines of the incident at the hotel’s
swimming pool area. But before she could do that, Dr. Dalumpines had
already chanced upon Delia and petitioner at the hotel’s coffee shop and
the latter reported to Dr. Dalumpines that her head was hit by a folding
wooden counter top while she was inside the hotel’s swimming pool area.
When asked by Dr. Dalumpines how she was, petitioner responded she
is a doctor, she was fine and she was already attended to by the hotel
nurse, who went at the hotel’s swimming pool area right after the
accident. Dr. Dalumpines then called Ms. Pearlie to verify the same,
which the latter confirmed.46
Afterwards, Dr. Dalumpines went back to petitioner and checked the
latter’s condition. Petitioner insisted that she was fine and that the
hirudoid cream was enough. Having been assured that everything was
fine, Dr. Dalumpines requested petitioner to execute a handwritten
certification47 regarding the incident that occurred that night. Dr.
Dalumpines then suggested to petitioner to have an X-ray test. Petitioner
replied that it was not necessary. Petitioner also refused further medical
attention.48
On 13 June 1995, petitioner called up Dr. Dalumpines. The call, however,
had nothing to do with the 11 June 1995 incident. Instead, petitioner
merely engaged in small talk with Dr. Dalumpines while having her daily
massage. The two talked about petitioner’s personal matters, i.e., past
medical history, differences with siblings and family over inheritance and
difficulty in practice. Petitioner even disclosed to Dr. Dalumpines that she
once fell from a horse; that she had a stroke; had hysterectomy and is
incapable of having children for her uterus had already been removed;
that she had blood disorder, particularly lack of platelets, that can cause
bleeding; and she had an "on" and "off" headaches. Petitioner oftentimes
called Dr. Dalumpines at the hotel clinic to discuss topics similar to those
discussed during their 13 June 1995 conversation.49
Also, during one of their telephone conversations, petitioner requested for
a certification regarding the 11 June 1995 incident inside the hotel’s
swimming pool area. Dr. Dalumpines accordingly issued Certification
dated 7 September 1995, which states that:50
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called
to attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the
folding countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the
lifeguard’s counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpines at the Coffee Shop.
After narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer
of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was enough and
that petitioner being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all
right.
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever
purpose it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.51 (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner personally picked up the afore-quoted Certification at the hotel
clinic without any objection as to its contents.52
From 11 June 1995 until 7 September 1995, the hotel clinic never
received any complaint from petitioner regarding the latter’s condition.
The hotel itself neither received any written complaint from petitioner.53
After trial, the court a quo in its Decision dated 21 February 2006
dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for lack of merit.
The trial court found petitioner’s testimony self-serving, thus, devoid of
credibility. Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate her
allegation that the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were shut off
at the time of the incident. She did not even present her friend, Delia, to
corroborate her testimony. More so, petitioner’s testimony was
contradicted by one of the witnesses presented by the respondents who
positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel
management not to put off the lights until 10:00 p.m. to allow the
housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool surroundings,
including the toilets and counters. Also, the lights were kept on for
security reasons and for the people in the nearby gym to have a good
view of the swimming pool while doing their exercise routine. Besides,
there was a remote possibility that the hotel’s swimming pool area was in
complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10:00 p.m.,
and the lights radiate to the hotel’s swimming pool area. As such,
petitioner would not have met the accident had she only acted with care
and caution.54
The trial court further struck down petitioner’s contention that the hotel
management did not extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of
the accident. Records showed that the hotel management immediately
responded after being notified of the accident. The hotel nurse and the
two chambermaids placed an ice pack on petitioner’s head. They were
willing to extend further emergency assistance but petitioner refused and
merely asked for a hirudoid cream. Petitioner even told them she is a
doctor and she was fine. Even the medical services offered by the hotel
physician were turned down by petitioner. Emphatically, petitioner cannot
fault the hotel for the injury she sustained as she herself did not heed the
warning that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00
p.m. As such, since petitioner’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages.55
The trial court similarly observed that the records revealed no indication
that the head injury complained of by petitioner was the result of the
alleged 11 June 1995 accident. Firstly, petitioner had a past medical
history which might have been the cause of her recurring brain injury.
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation
between the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by
petitioner. Even Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being
experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other than the
head trauma she allegedly suffered. It bears stressing that petitioner had
been suffering from different kinds of brain problems since she was 18
years old, which may have been the cause of the recurring symptoms of
head injury she is experiencing at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof
establishing the causal relation between the injury she allegedly suffered
on 11 June 1995 and the head pains she now suffers, her claim must fail.
Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchez’s (Dr. Sanchez) testimony cannot be relied
upon since she testified on the findings and conclusions of persons who
were never presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay.
Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads
of doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were
neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being
deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. Even
assuming that petitioner suffered head injury as a consequence of the 11
June 1995 accident, she cannot blame anyone but herself for staying at
the hotel’s swimming pool area beyond its closing hours and for lifting the
folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head.56
For petitioner’s failure to prove that her serious and permanent injury was
the result of the 11 June 1995 accident, thus, her claim for actual or
compensatory damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees, must all fail.57
With regard to respondent First Lepanto’s liability, the trial court ruled that
under the contract of insurance, suffice it to state that absent any cause
for any liability against respondents PHI and DTPCI, respondent First
Lepanto cannot be made liable thereon.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals with
the following assignment of errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding that
the testimony of petitioner is self-serving and thus void of credibility; (2)
the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of proximate cause in cases
of breach of contract and even assuming arguendo that the doctrine is
applicable, petitioner was able to prove by sufficient evidence the causal
connection between her injuries and respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
negligent act; and (3) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner is not
entitled to damages.58
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming
the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise:
At the outset, it is necessary for our purpose to determine whether to
decide this case on the theory that herein respondents PHI and DTPCI
are liable for breach of contract or on the theory of quasi-delict.
xxxx
It cannot be gainsaid that herein petitioner’s use of the hotel’s pool was
only upon the invitation of Delia, the hotel’s registered guest. As such,
she cannot claim contractual relationship between her and the hotel.
Since the circumstances of the present case do not evince a contractual
relation between petitioner and respondents, the rules on quasi-delict ,
thus, govern.
The pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict."
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delict
or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
Thus, to sustain a claim liability under quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI
and DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing
time is 7:00 p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that
she was well aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the
pool area. Hence, upon knowing, at the outset, of the pool’s
closing time, she took the risk of overstaying when she decided to
take shower and leave the area beyond the closing hour. In fact,
it was only upon the advise of the pool attendants that she
thereafter took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification that she lifted the
wooden bar countertop, which then fell onto her head. The
admission in her certificate proves the circumstances surrounding
the occurrence that transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This
is contrary to her assertion in the complaint and testimony that,
while she was passing through the counter door, she was
suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object. In view of the
fact that she admitted having lifted the counter top, it was her own
doing, therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that
the pool area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she
saw a telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be
noted that petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area
with ease since they were able to proceed to the glass entrance
door from shower room, and back to the counter area where the
telephone was located without encountering any untoward
incident. Otherwise, she could have easily stumbled over, or slid,
or bumped into something while searching for the telephone. This
negates her assertion that the pool area was completely dark,
thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than
that the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was
due to her own negligence.
Moreover, petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate that the medical
symptoms she is currently experiencing are the direct result of the head
injury she sustained on 11 June 1995 as was aptly discussed in the lower
court’s findings.
xxxx
It bears stressing that in civil cases, the law requires that the party who
alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proving it. Hence, for petitioner to be entitled to damages,
she must show that she had suffered an actionable injury. Regrettably,
petitioner failed in this regard.59 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated 5 November 2007.
Hence, this Petition raising the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the findings of fact of the trial court and of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive in this case.
(2) Whether or not herein respondents PHI and DTPCI are
responsible by implied contract to exercise due care for the safety
and welfare of the petitioner.
(3) Whether or not the cause of action of the petitioner can be
based on both breach of contract and tort.
(4) Whether or not it is respondents PHI and DTPCI and its
employees who are liable to the petitioner for negligence,
applying the well-established doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
respondeat superior.
(5) Whether the petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries
were a result of the accident she suffered at the hotel on 11 June
1995.
 (6) Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of they negligently locked the main entrance door of the hotel’s swimming
damages, attorney’s fees, interest, and the costs of suit. pool area. Following the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondents PHI
and DTPCI’s negligence is presumed and it is incumbent upon them to
(7) Whether or not the respondent insurance company is liable, prove otherwise but they failed to do so. Further, respondents PHI and
even directly, to the petitioner. DTPCI failed to observe all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees, hence, following the
(8) Whether or not petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the doctrine of respondeat superior, they were liable for the negligent acts of
decision of the Court of Appeals is pro forma.60 their staff in not verifying if there were still people inside the swimming
pool area before turning off the lights and locking the door. Had
respondents PHI and DTPCI’s employees done so, petitioner would not
Petitioner argues that the rule that "findings of fact of the lower courts are
have been injured. Since respondents PHI and DTPCI’s negligence need
conclusive and must be respected on appeal" finds no application herein
not be proved, the lower courts erred in shifting the burden to petitioner
because this case falls under the jurisprudentially established exceptions.
and, thereafter, holding the hotel and its employees not negligent for
Moreover, since the rationale behind the afore-mentioned rule is that "the
petitioner’s failure to prove their negligence. Moreover, petitioner alleges
trial judge is in a vantage point to appreciate the conduct and behavior of
that there was no contributory negligence on her part for she did not do
the witnesses and has the unexcelled opportunity to evaluate their
anything that could have contributed to her injury. And, even if there was,
testimony," one logical exception to the rule that can be deduced
the same does not bar recovery.
therefrom is when the judge who decided the case is not the same judge
who heard and tried the case.
Petitioner equally declares that the evidence on record, including the
objective medical findings, had firmly established that her permanent
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals in ruling that no contractual
debilitating injuries were the direct result of the 11 June 1995 accident
relationship existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI since
inside the hotel’s swimming pool area. This fact has not been totally
her use of the hotel’s swimming pool facility was only upon the invitation
disputed by the respondents. Further, the medical experts who had been
of the hotel’s registered guest. On the contrary, petitioner maintains that
consulted by petitioner were in unison in their diagnoses of her condition.
an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel
Petitioner was also able to prove that the falling of the folding wooden
guest status extends to all those who avail of its services—its patrons
counter top on her head while she was at the hotel’s swimming pool area
and invitees. It follows then that all those who patronize the hotel and its
was the cause of her head, eye and neck injuries.
facilities, including those who are invited to partake of those facilities, like
petitioner, are generally regarded as guests of the hotel. As such,
respondents PHI and DTPCI are responsible by implied contract for the Petitioner reiterates her claim for an award of damages, to wit: actual,
safety and welfare of petitioner while the latter was inside their premises including loss of income; moral, exemplary; as well as attorney’s fees,
by exercising due care, which they failed to do. interest and costs of suit. She states that respondents PHI and DTPCI
are liable for quasi-delict under Articles 19, 2176 and 2180 of the New
Civil Code. At the same time, they are liable under an implied contract for
Petitioner even asserts that the existence of a contract between the
they have a public duty to give due courtesy, to exercise reasonable care
parties does not bar any liability for tort since the act that breaks a
and to provide safety to hotel guests, patrons and invitees. Respondent
contract may also be a tort. Hence, the concept of change of theory of
First Lepanto, on the other hand, is directly liable under the express
cause of action pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.
contract of insurance.
Petitioner similarly avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and
Lastly, petitioner contends that her Motion for Reconsideration before the
respondeat superior are applicable in this case. She argues that a person
Court of Appeals was not pro forma for it specifically pointed out the
who goes in a hotel without a "bukol" or hematoma and comes out of it
alleged errors in the Court of Appeals Decision.
with a "bukol" or hematoma is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. It was an
accident caused by the fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift the
heavy counter top for petitioner as is normally expected of them because The instant Petition is devoid of merit.
Primarily, only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court
in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.61 This Court is not a trier of facts and it is beyond its function to re-
examine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the
parties.62 Besides, this Court adheres to the long standing doctrine that
the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the parties and this
Court.63 Nonetheless, this Court has, at times, allowed exceptions thereto,
to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the Court of Appeals’ findings are contrary to those by
the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
or
(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.64
Upon meticulous perusal of the records, however, this Court finds that
none of these exceptions is obtaining in this case. No such justifiable or
compelling reasons exist for this Court to depart from the general rule.
This Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals and adequately supported by the evidence on
record.
Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply
because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge
who penned the decision. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity
and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court.65 Indeed, "the
efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial,
unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual
findings reached by him."66 In this case, there was none.
It bears stressing that in this jurisdiction there is a disputable presumption
that the trial court’s decision is rendered by the judge in the regular
performance of his official duties. While the said presumption is only
disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other
evidence. Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the
presumption that the trial court judge, in resolving the case and drafting
the decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on
record. That the said trial court judge is not the same judge who heard
the case and received the evidence is of little consequence when the
records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and
available for consideration by the former,67 just like in the present case.
Irrefragably, the fact that the judge who penned the trial court’s decision
was not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence
therein does not render the findings in the said decision erroneous and
unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of witnesses may sway a
trial court judge in deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only
consideration. Even more vital for the trial court judge’s decision are the
contents and substance of the witnesses’ testimonies, as borne out by
the TSNs, as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted
and made part of the records of the case.68
This Court examined the records, including the TSNs, and found no
reason to disturb the factual findings of both lower courts. This Court,
thus, upholds their conclusiveness.
In resolving the second and third issues, a determination of the cause of
action on which petitioner’s Complaint for Damages was anchored upon
is called for.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on
account of their negligence but not on any breach of contract.
Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart and later claimed that an
implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI
and that the latter were liable for breach of their obligation to keep her
safe and out of harm. This allegation was never an issue before the trial
court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the petitioner not until
the case was before the Court of Appeals. Presently, petitioner claims
that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of
contract.
A perusal of petitioner’s Complaint evidently shows that her cause of
action was based solely on quasi-delict. Telling are the following
allegations in petitioner’s Complaint:
6. THAT, in the evening of 11 June 1995, between the hours from
7:00 to 8:00 o’clock, after herein petitioner and her friend from
New York, Delia, the latter being then a Hotel guest, were taking
their shower after having a dip in the hotel’s swimming pool,
without any notice or warning, the Hotel’s staff put off all the lights
within the pool area including the lights on the hallway and also
locked the main entrance door of the pool area, x x x;
7. THAT, Hotel guest Delia started to panic while petitioner
pacified her by telling her not to worry as they would both find
their way out. Petitioner knowing that within the area there is a
house phone, started to look around while Delia was following
her, eventually petitioner saw a phone behind the counter x x x,
that while slowly moving on towards the phone on a stooping
manner due to the darkness CAUSED BY UNTIMELY AND
NEGLIGENTLY PUTTING OFF WITH THE LIGHTS BY THE
HEREIN RESPONDENTS PHI AND DTPCI’S EMPLOYEE while
passing through the open counter door with its Folding Counter
Top also opened, x x x, a hard and heavy object fell onto the
head of the petitioner that knocked her down almost unconscious
which hard and heavy object turned out to be the Folding Counter
Top;
8. THAT, Delia immediately got hold of the house phone and
notified the Hotel Telephone Operator about the incident,
immediately the hotel staffs (sic) arrived but they were stranded
behind the main door of the pool entrance and it too (sic) them
more than twenty (20) minutes to locate the hotel maintenance
employee who holds the key of the said main entrance door;
9. THAT, when the door was opened, two Hotel Chamber Maids
assisted the petitioner to get out of the counter door. Petitioner
being a Physician tried to control her feelings although groggy
and requested for a HURIDOID, a medicine for HEMATOMA, as
a huge lump developed on her head while the two Chamber
Maids assisted petitioner by holding the bag of ice on her head
and applying the medicine on the huge lump;
10. THAT, petitioner after having recovered slightly from her
nightmare, though still feeling weak, asked to be assisted to the
Hotel Coffee Shop to take a rest but requested for the hotel’s
Physician. Despite her insistent requests, the Dusit Hotel refused
to lift a finger to assists petitioner who was then in distress until a
lady approached and introduced herself as the Hotel’s house
Doctor. Instead however of assisting petitioner by asking her what
kind of assistance the Hotel could render, in a DISCOURTEOUS
MANNER presented instead a paper and demanding petitioner to
affix her signature telling her that the Hotel Management would
only assists and answer for all expenses incurred if petitioner
signs the paper presented, but she refused and petitioner instead
wrote a marginal note on the said paper stating her reason
therefore, said paper later on turned out to be a WAIVER OF
RIGHT or QUIT CLAIM;
xxxx
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents
PHI and DTPCI’s gross negligence despite medical assistance,
petitioner started to feel losing her memory that greatly affected
and disrupted the practice of her chosen profession x x x.
xxxx
 19. THAT, due to respondents PHI and DTPCI’s gross negligence
as being narrated which caused petitioner to suffer sleepless
nights, depression, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, and embarrassment with her Diplomate friends in the
profession and industry, her social standing in the community was
greatly affected and hence, respondents PHI and DTPCI must be
imposed the hereunder damages, prayed for x x x and Artile (sic)
2176 and 2199 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines x x x.
xxxx
22. THAT, as to Moral, Exemplary and Actual Damages, as well
as petitioner’s Loss of Income, the amounts are stated in its
prayer hereunder.69
It is clear from petitioner’s allegations that her Complaint for Damages
was predicated on the alleged negligence of respondents PHI and
DTPCI’s staff in the untimely putting off of all the lights within the hotel’s
swimming pool area, as well as the locking of its main door, prompting
her to look for a way out leading to the fall of the folding wooden counter
top on her head causing her serious brain injury. The said negligence
was allegedly compounded by respondents PHI and DTPCI’s failure to
render prompt and adequate medical assistance. These allegations in
petitioner’s Complaint constitute a cause of action for quasi-delict, which
under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.70
It is evident from petitioner’s Complaint and from her open court
testimony that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed
against her by respondents PHI and DTPCI, through their management
and staff. It is now too late in the day to raise the said argument for the
first time before this Court.71
Petitioner’s belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action
cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-settled is the rule that a party is
not allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on
appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial
court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal or
certiorari.72 When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he
will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal for to permit him to
do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.73 Hence,
a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he
stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate
his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate
the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal.74
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following
differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of contract
(culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and
independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental
to the performance of the contractual obligation; there is a pre-existing
contract or obligation.75 In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a
family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians
and employers are concerned, while in breach of contract, such is not a
complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of
employees.76 In quasi- delict , there is no presumption of negligence and it
is incumbent upon the injured party to prove the negligence of the
defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed, while in
breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved
that there was breach of the contract and the burden is on the defendant
to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of
the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.77
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner’s change of theory or cause of
action from quasi-delict to breach of contract only on appeal would
necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the
latter will have no more opportunity to present evidence to contradict
petitioner’s new argument. Second, the burden of proof will be shifted
from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI. Petitioner’s change of
theory from quasi-delict to breach ofcontract must be repudiated.
As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent
upon her to prove the presence of the following requisites before
respondents PHI and DTPCI can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff.78 Further, since petitioner’s case is
for quasi-delict , the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it
is the basis of her action.79 The burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section
1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the
defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his
complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The
quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.80
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence of
respondents PHI and DTPCI. Other than petitioner’s self-serving
testimony that all the lights in the hotel’s swimming pool area were shut
off and the door was locked, which allegedly prompted her to find a way
out and in doing so a folding wooden counter top fell on her head causing
her injury, no other evidence was presented to substantiate the same.
Even her own companion during the night of the accident inside the
hotel’s swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her
allegations. Moreover, petitioner’s aforesaid allegations were successfully
rebutted by respondents PHI and DTPCI. Here, we quote with conformity
the observation of the trial court, thus:
x x x Besides not being backed up by other supporting evidence, said
statement is being contradicted by the testimony of Engineer Dante L.
Costas,81 who positively declared that it has been a normal practice of the
Hotel management not to put off the lights until 10:00P.M. in order to
allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the pool’s surrounding, the
toilets and the counters. It was also confirmed that the lights were kept on
for security reasons and so that the people exercising in the nearby gym
may be able to have a good view of the swimming pool. This Court also
takes note that the nearby gymnasium was normally open until 10:00
P.M. so that there was a remote possibility the pool area was in complete
darkness as was alleged by herein petitioner, considering that the
illumination which reflected from the gym. Ergo, considering that the area
were sufficient (sic) illuminated when the alleged incident occurred, there
could have been no reason for the petitioner to have met said accident,
much less to have been injured as a consequence thereof, if she only
acted with care and caution, which every ordinary person is expected to
do.82
More telling is the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Viewed from the foregoing, the question now is whether respondents PHI
and DTPCI and its employees were negligent? We do not think so.
Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.
One. Petitioner recognized the fact that the pool area’s closing time is
7:00 p.m.. She, herself, admitted during her testimony that she was well
aware of the sign when she and Delia entered the pool area. Hence,
upon knowing, at the outset, of the pool’s closing time, she took the risk
of overstaying when she decided to take shower and leave the area
beyond the closing hour. In fact, it was only upon the advise of the pool
attendants that she thereafter took her shower.
Two. She admitted, through her certification, that she lifted the wooden
bar countertop, which then fell on to her head. The admission in her
certificate proves the circumstances surrounding the occurrence that
transpired on the night of 11 June 1995. This is contrary to her assertion
in the complaint and testimony that, while she was passing through the
counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object.
In view of the fact that she admitted having lifted the countertop, it was
her own doing, therefore, that made the counter top fell on to her head.
Three. We cannot likewise subscribe to petitioner’s assertion that the
pool area was totally dark in that she herself admitted that she saw a
telephone at the counter after searching for one. It must be noted that
petitioner and Delia had walked around the pool area with ease since
they were able to proceed to the glass entrance door from the shower
room, and back to the counter area where the telephone was located
without encountering any untoward incident. Otherwise, she could have
easily stumbled over, or slid, or bumped into something while searching
for the telephone. This negates her assertion that the pool area was
completely dark, thereby, totally impairing her vision.
xxxx
The aforementioned circumstances lead us to no other conclusion than
that the proximate and immediate cause of the injury of petitioner was
due to her own negligence.83 (Emphasis supplied).
Even petitioner’s assertion of negligence on the part of respondents PHI
and DTPCI in not rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous.
Her own Complaint affirmed that respondents PHI and DTPCI afforded
medical assistance to her after she met the unfortunate accident inside
the hotel’s swimming pool facility. Below is the portion of petitioner’s
Complaint that would contradict her very own statement, thus:
14. THAT, due to the unfortunate incident caused by respondents PHI
and DTPCI’s gross negligence despite medical assistance, petitioner
started to feel losing her memory that greatly affected and disrupted the
practice of her chosen profession. x x x.84 (Emphasis supplied).
Also, as observed by the trial court, respondents PHI and DTPCI, indeed,
extended medical assistance to petitioner but it was petitioner who
refused the same. The trial court stated, thus:
Further, herein petitioner’s asseverations that the Hotel Management did
not extend medical assistance to her in the aftermath of the alleged
accident is not true. Again, this statement was not supported by any
evidence other that the sole and self-serving testimony of petitioner.
Thus, this Court cannot take petitioner’s statement as a gospel truth. It
bears stressing that the Hotel Management immediately responded after
it received notice of the incident. As a matter of fact, Ms. Pearlie, the
Hotel nurse, with two chambermaids holding an ice bag placed on
petitioner’s head came to the petitioner to extend emergency assistance
when she was notified of the incident, but petitioner merely asked for
Hirudoid, saying she was fine, and that she was a doctor and know how
to take care of herself. Also, the Hotel, through its in-house physician, Dr.
Dalumpines offered its medical services to petitioner when they met at
the Hotel’s coffee shop, but again petitioner declined the offer. Moreover,
the Hotel as a show of concern for the petitioner’s welfare, shouldered
the expenses for the MRI services performed on petitioner at the Makati
Medical Center. Emphatically, petitioner herself cannot fault the Hotel for
the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed the
warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00
P.M. Thus, when the petitioner’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, shecannot recover damages x x x.85
With the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1)
petitioner stayed in the hotel’s swimming pool facility beyond its closing
hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head; and (3) respondents PHI and DTPCI extended medical assistance
to her. As such, no negligence can be attributed either to respondents
PHI and DTPCI or to their staff and/or management. Since the question
of negligence is one of fact, this Court is bound by the said factual
findings made by the lower courts. It has been repeatedly held that the
trial court's factual findings, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance
and influence. Petitioner has not presented sufficient ground to warrant a
deviation from this rule.86
With regard to petitioner’s contention that the principles of res ipsa
loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable in this case, this Court
holds otherwise.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out
an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie
case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts
of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking.87 Simply stated, this doctrine finds no application if there is direct
proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is sufficient proof
showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury
occurred, then the creative reason for the said doctrine disappears.88
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where, (1) the accident
was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must
have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.89
In the case at bench, even granting that respondents PHI and DTPCI’s
staff negligently turned off the lights and locked the door, the folding
wooden counter top would still not fall on petitioner’s head had she not
lifted the same. Although the folding wooden counter top is within the
exclusive management or control of respondents PHI and DTPCI, the
falling of the same and hitting the head of petitioner was not due to the
negligence of the former. As found by both lower courts, the folding
wooden counter top did not fall on petitioner’s head without any human
intervention. Records showed that petitioner lifted the said folding
wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head. The same was
evidenced by the, (1) 11 June 1995 handwritten certification of petitioner
herself; (2) her Letter dated 30 August 1995 addressed to Mr. Yoshikazu
Masuda (Mr. Masuda), General Manager of Dusit Hotel; and, (3)
Certification dated 7 September 1995 issued to her by Dr. Dalumpines
upon her request, which contents she never questioned.
Here, we, respectively, quote the 11 June 1995 handwritten certification
of petitioner; her letter to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995; and Dr.
Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995, to wit:
Petitioner’s 11 June 1995 Handwritten Certification:
I was requested by Dr. Dalumpines to write that I was assured of
assistance should it be necessary with regard an accident at the pool. x x
x The phone was in an enclosed area on a chair – I lifted the wooden bar
counter top which then fell on my head producing a large hematoma x x
x.90
Petitioner’s Letter addressed to Mr. Masuda dated 30 August 1995:
Dear Mr. Masuda,
xxxx
x x x We searched and saw a phone on a chair behind a towel counter.
However, in order to get behind the counter I had to lift a hinged massive
wooden section of the counter which subsequently fell and knocked me
on my head x x x.91
Dr. Dalumpines’ Certification dated 7 September 1995:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that as per Clinic records, duty nurse Pearlie was called
to attend to an accident at the poolside at 7:45PM on 11 June 1995.
Same records show that there, she saw petitioner who claimed the
folding countertop fell on her head when she lifted it to enter the
lifeguard’s counter to use the phone. She asked for Hirudoid.
The same evening petitioner met Dr. Dalumpnes at the Coffee Shop.
After narrating the poolside incident and declining Dr. Dalumpines’ offer
of assistance, she reiterated that the Hirudoid cream was enough and
that petitioner]being a doctor herself, knew her condition and she was all
right.
This certification is given upon the request of petitioner for whatever
purpose it may serve, 7 September 1995 at Makati City.92 (Emphasis
supplied).
This Court is not unaware that in petitioner’s Complaint and in her open
court testimony, her assertion was, "while she was passing through the
counter door, she was suddenly knocked out by a hard and heavy object,
which turned out to be the folding wooden counter top." However, in her
open court testimony, particularly during cross-examination, petitioner
confirmed that she made such statement that "she lifted the hinge
massive wooden section of the counter near the swimming pool."93 In view
thereof, this Court cannot acquiesce petitioner’s theory that her case is
one of res ipsa loquitur as it was sufficiently established how petitioner
obtained that "bukol" or "hematoma."
The doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence
of any showing that the employees of respondents PHI and DTPCI were
negligent. Since in this case, the trial court and the appellate court found
no negligence on the part of the employees of respondents PHI and
DTPCI, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence and be
made to pay the millions of pesos damages prayed for by petitioner.
The issue on whether petitioner’s debilitating and permanent injuries
were the result of the accident she suffered at the hotel’s swimming pool
area on 11 June 1995 is another question of fact, which is beyond the
function of this Court to resolve. More so, this issue has already been
properly passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. To
repeat, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the lower courts and
there is no cogent reason to depart from the said rule.
The following observations of the trial court are controlling on this matter:
Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which might have been the
cause of her recurring brain injury.
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation
between the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by
petitioner. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being
experienced by petitioner might have been due to factors other than the
head trauma she allegedly suffered. Emphasis must be given to the fact
that petitioner had been suffering from different kinds of brain problems
since she was 18 years old, which may have been the cause of the
recurring symptoms of head injury she is experiencing at present.
Thirdly, Dr. Sanchez’s testimony cannot be relied upon since she testified
on the findings and conclusions of persons who were never presented in
court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was hearsay. A witness can testify
only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge.
Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based, not on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence --
whether objected to or not -- has no probative value.94
Fourthly, the medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
of doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment were Associate Justice
neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them. Being
deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative value. 1âw phi 1

The aforesaid medical reports/evaluations/certifications of different

doctors in favor of petitioner cannot be given probative value and their
contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
It must be stressed that a document or writing which is admitted not as
independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness
does not constitute proof of the facts related therein.95 In the same vein,
the medical certificate which was identified and interpreted in court by
another doctor was not accorded probative value because the doctor who
prepared it was not presented for its identification. Similarly, in this case,
since the doctors who examined petitioner were not presented to testify
on their findings, the medical certificates issued on their behalf and
identified by another doctor cannot be admitted as evidence. Since a
medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it cannot be given weight or credit
unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications.96 Thus, an unverified and unidentified private document
cannot be accorded probative value. It is precluded because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to
cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are
attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to
provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its
contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of
the letter renders its contents suspect and of no probative value.97

All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and
DTPCI, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made
Iiable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the petitioner.
Since respondents PHI and DTPCI arc not liable, it necessarily follows
that respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the
contract or Insurance.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution or the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87065 dated 9 August 2007 and 5
November 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
24. G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI),Petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO
INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO
CATIBOG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at
the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her
daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the
Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St.,
GSIS Village, Quezon City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy
hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.502 for which she was
issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida
no response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this
time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any
financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her
husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On
her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother
Editha left for Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to
the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined
from January 30, 1991 to March 21, 1991.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on
February 15, 1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver
it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the
delivery thereof as it was another messenger who previously was
assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located,
hence, the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second
messenger finally found the address on February 15, 1991.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5,
1991,5 demanded an explanation from the manager of the Service Quality
Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by
letter of March 13, 1991,6 as follows:
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly
processed in accordance with our standard operating procedure.
However, delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of
circumstances which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI.
Among others, during the transmission process, the radio link connecting
the points of communication involved encountered radio noise and
interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in
the receiving teleprinter machine.
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus,
a repeat transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected.
(Underscoring supplied)
Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of
July 23, 1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time,
but no representative of RCPI showed up at said date and time.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and
Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the
telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha to their
damage and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages9 and attorney’s fees.10
After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was
denied12 by Branch 5 of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer,
alleging that except with respect to Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no
privity of contract with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was
due to force majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception
of the telegraphic message";14 the clause in the Telegram Transmission
Form signed by Grace absolved it from liability for any damage arising
from the transmission other than the refund of telegram tolls;15 it observed 1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; and at all as moral damages;
events, any cause of action had been barred by laches.16
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the attorney’s fees; and
questioned telegram was not apparently the proximate cause of the
death of Editha," ruled out the presence of force majeure. Respecting the 3. To pay the costs.
clause in the telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it
partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion. SO ORDERED.18

Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27,
telegram to the addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not 2004,19 affirmed the trial court’s decision.
in view of the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter
and the concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial
Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the
court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
following questions: (1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if
the trial court found that there was no direct connection between the
Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, injury and the alleged negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the stipulations in
there being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. the ‘Telegram Transmission Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion"
Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation (sic)?21
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection
between its delay in transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the
"omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa
and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, or the
contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with
place."
regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
to the addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery
of the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its
employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
making it liable for damages under Article 2176. negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. (Underscoring supplied)
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract
rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed: and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right
of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not
permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
to preserve the interests of the promissee that may include
his "expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of
his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his
interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the
other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their
makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The
effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to
observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence x x x or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the
shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception
of the telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could
not locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt
that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct
that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have
concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s
participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible
for a fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human
intervention from the cause of injury or loss.24 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from
delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at
least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so
that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not.
There lies the fault or negligence.
In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual
obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to
ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given
address and should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered
messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent
by cable or wireless means are usually more
important and urgent than those which can wait for the mail.25
xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep
emotional stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages
about the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a
family, important business transactions, and notices of conferences or
meetings as in this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar
corporations, it is incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of
care and concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to
inform senders of the non-delivery of messages should be undertaken.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of
the telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the
existence of urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was
of the essence’ imports. A check drawn against a Manila Bank and
transmitted to Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be deposited in a bank in
Sorsogon and pass thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days before it
may be encashed or withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check
to Sorsogon took 1 day – private respondents could therefore still wait for
6 days before the same may be withdrawn. Requesting a check that
would take 6 days before it could be withdrawn therefore contradicts
plaintiff’s claim of urgency or need.28
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace
Verchez was able to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to
the same addressee in Manila thru JRS.29
xxxx
As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned,
the same has no basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso
Verchez did not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila
by bus. He stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he
proceeded to Manila. 30
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso
Verchez could not give any plausible reason as to the reason why he did
not accompany his ailing wife to Manila.31
xxxx
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for
moral damages that private respondent Grace Verchez did not
accompany her ailing mother to Manila.32
xxxx
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as
much as possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez
stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates
that he himself knew that his wife was not in critical condition.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its
liability is, it bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its
contract, the presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however,
failed to rebut this presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following
Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could
prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. Article 2180 of the Civil Code so provides:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the
presence of the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable
act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained
by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein
respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of
appellees on time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members
blamed each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that
involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites
are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform
Grace of the non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to
deliver it again, knowing – as it should know – that time is of the essence
in the delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to
deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days
before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent
obligation indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth
requisite is thus also present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral
damages in cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty
of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation.36
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-
respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial
tranquillity" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained
of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article
26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict when
courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages
is in order, as is the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been
compelled to litigate to protect their rights.
Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the
"Telegram Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it
argues:
Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of
adhesion as held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were
all written in bold letters right in front of the Telegram Transmission Form.
As a matter of fact they were beside the space where the telegram
senders write their telegraphic messages. It would have been different if
the stipulations were written at the back for surely there is no way the
sender will easily notice them. The fact that the stipulations were located 25. G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
in a particular space where they can easily be seen, is sufficient notice to
any sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante) where she could manifest her AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of the services of the other vs.
telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied) RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the
readability of the stipulations nor their physical location in the contract Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
determines whether it is one of adhesion. Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties

imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may
accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares
the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely affixes his
SANCHEZ, J.:
signature or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation and
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable,
in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip
since it is construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to
Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate,
any ambiguity therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or
from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
subversive of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the
alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity
to bargain on equal footing.39 On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund
on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to
affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’
petitioner.
contract is one of adhesion which is void is, given the facts and
circumstances of the case, thus well-taken.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the
evidence of record", are:
Costs against petitioner.
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino
pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
SO ORDERED.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its
authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a
"first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in
 the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out
that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white
man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the
findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that
respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to
petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be
rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in
the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to
direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the
"essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A
court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece
of evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues
raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a
part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential
ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court
of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts
with respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well
observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure
to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the
mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the
appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony",
would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision
the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by,
the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such
testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions
are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the
matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe
defined as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the
court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand,
has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by
certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is
conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this
Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and
received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said
ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of
the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was
no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would
depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and
discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its third
assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on
the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that from Saigon to
Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance
of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to
whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the
first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the
necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such
a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give
out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the
corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is
more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the
company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to
be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of
petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket,
there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits
"A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness,
Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know,
what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga
and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a
"first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said
witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of
said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid
for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael
Altonaga testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation
for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the
"first class" ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference
of a few pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the
decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of
affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding
in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might
have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the
appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free
from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in
the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its
findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was
said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds
different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the
trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a
first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific
flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It
will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to
strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a
verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule
to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If
only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case
here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to
defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that
there are facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding
that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a
first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg
of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of
Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that
respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke
an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to
see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and
because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then,
was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he
had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages.
Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon
breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the
Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal
allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the
Philippine Air Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting
as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which
said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to
furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane during
the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as
starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to
Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the
plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations,
arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with
defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage,
but instead furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations
from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First
Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already
seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the
inconvenience and embarrassments brought by defendant's
breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World
Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class
accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences,
embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the
like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a
contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others,
the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached
when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and
circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish
the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial,
respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso
intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white
man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was
presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in
the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the
complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad
faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
 That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class
compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France
while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only
without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of
the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who
was a co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by
the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of
defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its
manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to
secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation
was made by the white man. Hence, if the employees of the
defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the
seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have
been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be
subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from
his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's
employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting
the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what
happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael
Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is
confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another
witness for defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation
Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know
what reservation the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation."
(t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge
has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, "white man" have a "better right" to the seat
occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right
on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that
the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was
issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the
defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the defendant could
have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the
said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so;
the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is
constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of
the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he
did not give up his "first class" seat because the said
Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted
portion first transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it
be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to
a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established.
Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For,
"bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or
for ulterior purpose." 39
 And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express
finding of bad faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance,
thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its
contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with
the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager
in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in
the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out
of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was
occupying to, again using the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's
Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant
has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right"
to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was
occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding
"first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees
need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent
act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article
21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we
held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation
which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with
the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right
to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's
check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its
agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check
was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this,
because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a
railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him
the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and
told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the
cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct
of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language
to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger. 1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty.
The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony,
thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and
purser?
A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could
not help it. So one of the flight attendants approached me and
requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said,
"We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said,
"Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my
transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything
there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
 A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable
and you don't have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the
pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me,
"I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and
translated it to me — because it was recorded in French — "First
class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his
will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness
because the best evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser
made an entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced
to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res
gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and
physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an
employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner
to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up
the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is
admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court
ample power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The
manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat
fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary
damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that
can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable
that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the
tradition that discretion well exercised — as it was here — should not be
disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys'
fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial
court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The
dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto.
Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not
suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.