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Conflict in Africa
Robert B. Lloyd
To cite this article: Robert B. Lloyd (2010) Conflict in Africa, Journal of the Middle East and Africa,
1:2, 171-186, DOI: 10.1080/21520844.2010.502566
Conflict in Africa
ROBERT B. LLOYD
INTRODUCTION
1
I. William Zartman defines conflict as a real or perceived incompatibility between two or
more actors.
171
172 R. B. Lloyd
2
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001).
3
See Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and
Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
4
Naomi Chazan, Peter Lewis, Robert A. Mortimer, Donald Rothchild, Stephen J. Stedman,
Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, 46–65).
Conflict in Africa 173
tend to lump the fifty-three states into one undifferentiated bin. This
approach has the unfortunate side effect of creating an international level
in which Africa interacts as a unitary Africa. It is important to note that while
Africa possesses coherence as a region it is nevertheless just as much an
‘‘international’’ undertaking for Botswana to interact with Egypt as with India.
A second modification to the model is the inclusion of the processes of glo-
balization into the structural analysis of conflict. The increasing political and
economic integration of Africa within the broader international system, while
affording new opportunities for growth and development, has also been a
source of conflict.
Independence Era
During the colonial era, African states did not have an independent existence
but were classified as territories of a European state. The European metro-
pole managed the internal affairs of its colony and defended it against dom-
estic and foreign threats. Upon independence, sovereignty was transferred to
5
See Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (New York: Avon Books, 1992).
6
The international impact of the breakup of empires is discussed in Mark Katz, ‘‘Collapsed
Empires,’’ in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds.
Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 1996), 25–36.
Conflict in Africa 175
local rule and security now depended upon the ability of new governments
to manage competing and often conflicting demands within an ethno linguis-
tically diverse state, among a new community of independent African states,
and within the broader international system. As states are the primary actors
in the international system, the success of these African governments in man-
aging conflict is central to providing security. These new states were for the
most part woefully unprepared for independence, lacking many ingredients
necessary for democratic self-rule. As a result, nearly all African states soon
fell under the rule of an authoritarian leader who imposed some degree of sta-
bility and security but at a price of economic prosperity and political liberty.
The future success of these newly independent African states was
further complicated by the fact that they were born into the contentious,
polarized, and militarized international environment of the Cold War. As
African states became independent, they tended to gravitate toward one side
or the other of the Cold War. This at times created a situation in which neigh-
boring states often had strained relations with one another, undermining
mutually advantageous economic and political cooperation. In East Africa,
for example, a pro-West Kenya was bordered by a socialist Tanzania on
the south and a Marxist Ethiopia to its north. Finally, states with significant
numbers of European immigrants—so-called settler states—experienced
significant amounts of conflict as local European populations resisted African
nationalist movements pressing for independence. Such resistance radicali-
zed African leaders and movements, especially in the more temperate south-
ern and northern portions of Africa, including Algeria, Rhodesia, Mozambique,
and South Africa.
The ending of the Cold War in 1990 and apartheid in South Africa in
1994, removed two major and long-standing international sources of conflict
in Africa. Soviet funding of client states wound down, South African destabili-
zation of southern Africa ended, the international environment became less
polarized, and Western and African impatience with authoritarian African
governments grew. Apparently intractable conflicts in Namibia, Mozambique,
Angola, and South Africa yielded to negotiation. The international system on
the continent had fundamentally changed from one based on empire and
European control over the affairs of Africa and Africans to one where fifty-
three independent states now existed. There were important elements of
continuity, nevertheless, of European influence through trade, political
cooperation, and security ties.
states out of the former territories of empires changed both the structure and
dynamic of the international system that comprises Africa. During the
colonial era, independent states were a rarity. At the time of World War I,
for example, there were but three independent states in Africa. These new
African states were the building blocks upon which security would have
to be established in Africa. One attribute of these fundamental building
blocks of African security is that the states themselves were weak. Their
frailty related in part to the colonial heritage discussed earlier, but they
also often lacked the capacity to manage the functional demands placed
upon them, due in part to internal divisions among the various groups in
the state.
Geographical Incoherence
An important component undermining the African state is their lack of
geographical cohesiveness. The colonial borders reflected the needs and
negotiations of the European empires.7 These borders have not always been
advantageous to the new African states that emerged from these colonial
territories. Some of these new states like the Central African Republic and
Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), which had respectively been incorporated into
the larger French and British empires, found themselves landlocked. Some,
such as Equatorial Guinea and Gambia, were not really viable due to their
small size and general remoteness. On the other end of the scale, Sudan and
Congo-Kinshasa were so large that effective administration was essentially
impossible. Finally, the sheer number of states on the continent made
intra-African trade more difficult.
It is therefore surprising how relatively few disputes over borders have
emerged since independence given the arbitrariness of the European-drawn
colonial boundaries and the failure to always clearly demarcate these bound-
aries. Nevertheless, in some cases unclear borders have led to conflicts. The
armed secession of Igboland from Nigeria in the Biafran War, for example,
clearly demonstrated early on in the postcolonial era the human and financial
cost of such territorial readjustment.8
Identity
A second factor undermining the African state is the lack of identification of
citizens with the state. The newly independent African states inherited
from colonial era governments authoritarian political systems and habits.
7
See Robert Lloyd, ‘‘The Caprivi Strip of Namibia: Shifting Sovereignty and the Negoti-
ation of Boundaries,’’ in Border Lines: History and Politics of Odd International Borders,
ed. Alex Diener (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2009).
8
See John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
Conflict in Africa 177
European colonial powers did not rule their colonies based on democratic
precepts, but through authoritarian colonial government institutions based
on European, not African, identity. As African nationalist movements gained
power they had to borrow a European ideology of nationalism and then
apply it to a variety of African contexts that differed greatly from one another
and from Europe. Given these major challenges, it is not surprising that few
African nationalist groups were united and integrated across ethnic and geo-
graphical cleavages. Support for independence movements was often based
in part on promises of patronage once the colonialists departed.
Africans from a wide variety of different ethnicities, languages, tradi-
tions, religions, and regions found themselves in a new state. The lack of
social cohesiveness further complicated efforts to construct a new national
identity. This was particularly true if the new national leaders were predomi-
nantly from an ethno linguistic group that had been a traditional competitor
or even enemy. Africa’s linguistic diversity also posed a challenge to social
cohesiveness. Africa is linguistically an incredibly diverse continent. There
are 2,110 living languages in Africa.9 Very few states outside the Arabic-
speaking areas of North Africa are linguistically homogeneous. In sub-
Saharan Africa only small states such as Swaziland and Lesotho are
linguistically uniform. At the other end of the linguistic continuum are states
like Nigeria in West Africa, which has 514 living languages, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in central Africa, which has 215.10
Given the continent’s linguistic diversity, it is not surprising that many
Africans are remarkably multilingual, and in some regions the colonial era
existence of lingua fracas such as Lingala, Hausa-Fulani, and Swahili provide
means of broader communication. Yet conflict may also be sparked through
attempts to impose an official language. In Sudan, for example, the Arabiza-
tion policies of the northern-based government provoked strife with black
African and non-Muslim groups in the south of the country. To avoid linguis-
tic conflict, most African states have chosen to retain the language of their
former colonizer. This also has had the advantage of aiding in education
and linking the state to the broader world. In terms of pan-African communi-
cation, one effect of this policy has been to deepen the linguistic division of
the continent, for the most part along former colonial lines.
Ethno Nationalism
A lack of identification with the state and social cohesion, by themselves,
makes it more difficult, but do not preclude domestic tranquility and inter-
national cooperation. One factor, however, that is sufficient to impede
9
M. Paul Lewis (ed.), Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th ed. (Dallas, TX: SIL
International, 2009).
10
Ibid.
178 R. B. Lloyd
Nigeria, for example, is the most populous country in Africa. In 1950 its
population was 34 million people. By 2000 the population had nearly quad-
rupled to 125 million. By 2025 the United Nations estimates Nigeria’s popu-
lation may be around 210 million. DRC, a failed state today, is expected
to have a population of 108 million by 2025. In North Africa, Egypt’s popu-
lation may reach just shy of 100 million. While the state population increases
are rapid, even more impressive is the rate of urban growth. By 2025,
Kinshasa in the DRC may be the largest urban area on the continent with
nearly 17 million inhabitants. Lagos and Cairo may each have around 16
million people.13
This rapid population growth has been a source of conflict for three
reasons. First, Africa’s population increases and urbanization have occurred
largely without growing economic opportunities. Second, the poor employ-
ment prospects combined with a relatively large cohort of unemployed
young males can be a powerful spring of conflict. As an example, in Algeria
unemployed men, with poor economic prospects, helped fuel the growth of
militant Islamic groups. Finally, the migration of people from rural to urban
areas can disrupt traditional social practices of a country, undermining social
cohesion and sparking conflict. In 2008, migrants from Mozambique and
Zimbabwe to South Africa’s large cities were attacked by a few South Africans
due to a widespread view that the migrants were taking scarce jobs and
driving down wages for South Africans.
Economic Malaise
A major source of conflict in Africa relates to a long-standing and deep
economic malaise. Africa is the only region of the world that did not grow
economically in the past quarter of a century. At independence in the early
1960s, per capita incomes were higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in the
South Asia and the East Asia=Pacific regions. Yet economic stagnation, com-
bined with the rapid population growth, has meant a declining per capita
income and these two other regions of the world have pulled ahead. Even
oil-producing sub-Saharan Africa states have not shown significant economic
growth.14
The reasons for this decline have been well studied.15 The legacy of
colonialism is one factor in explaining the economic decline of Africa. Upon
independence, African leaders inherited economies that were developing
but distorted. European investment into African colonies had been quite
13
United Nations Population Division, ‘‘World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision
Population Database,’’ available at http://esa.un.org/ (accessed May 10, 2010).
14
World Bank. World Bank Development Indicators, 2008 (Washington, DC, 2008).
15
See William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and
Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
180 R. B. Lloyd
Land Disputes
Another source of conflict is a resource constraint related both to rapid popu-
lation growth and economic stagnation. Land is a finite resource and the
rapid growth of Africa’s population has increased the value of scarce land.
This increase in value has sparked conflicts throughout the continent. In
Zimbabwe, for example, conflicts over commercial farms caused the govern-
ment simply to expropriate farms owned by white Zimbabweans. While the
government claimed this was a just act based on rectifying past wrongs, one
underlying economic motive was clearly due to the scarcity of land in a lar-
gely rural and agricultural country that had experienced rapid population
growth. A similar dynamic is also seen in neighboring South Africa where
the government has also pressed for a reallocation of farms among citizens.
Again, rapid population growth made land more scarce and valuable.
Environmental Degradation
Another source of conflict in Africa relates to the loss in value of scarce land
due to environmental degradation. Rapid population growth has placed
increased demands on the natural resources of states in Africa. One obvious
16
See Robert Lloyd, ‘‘Zimbabwe: The Making of an Autocratic ‘Democracy,’ ’’ Current
History (2002): 219–224.
Conflict in Africa 181
State Failure
A final factor relates to state failure and collapse. Given the large political and
economic demands on these new states, it is not surprising that a number of
them have disintegrated. State failure is an outcome of conflict within the
African state, reflects the government’s inability to manage this conflict, and is
itself a cause of insecurity for neighboring states. The functional disintegration
of the state is marked by a reduction in capacity, authority, and (perhaps)
territory.17 This void or vacuum is filled by local authorities, outside inter-
vention, or both. The average citizen has virtually no relationship to the state
except in the form of local exactions by security forces of different categories,
including bandits. The DRC has aspects of a failed state. Collapsed states, such
as Somalia, no longer effectively exist. Power has devolved to people with
weapons who may or may not be organized and whose sway is limited to
narrow geographic areas. Conflict in Somalia negatively affects Kenya and
Ethiopia and even threatens shipping in Somalia’s territorial waters due to
the haven the insecurity provides for piracy.18
AFRICAN LEADERSHIP
Up to this point the analysis of sources of conflict has examined the inter-
national and state levels. Attention now turns to the individual leader as a
source of conflict. In Africa this is particularly salient, given the often enor-
mous influence of the individual leader on the state. This phenomenon of
African authoritarian leaders was referred to earlier in the article as the Big
Man. This authoritarian type of regime has been remarkably popular, wide-
spread, and stable. In Libya, for example, Muammar al-Gaddafi is the dean of
African leaders, having been in office since 1969. At the other end of the con-
tinent, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has maintained power since 1980.
17
See I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legit-
imate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
18
An excellent analysis of state collapse is in Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes
and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
182 R. B. Lloyd
The creation of the modern African state did not eliminate traditional
and local cultural practices of governance, but rather often incorporated
them into the new state governments. Thus, governing emphases are often
on the individual and not the institution, the tribe and not the citizens, and
collective assets to be distributed by the president rather than individual pro-
perty to be protected by the government. By the 1990s, growing popular dis-
satisfaction with authoritarian rule provoked violent civil conflicts throughout
the continent. Within African states, governing regimes changed as the
norm of democratization deepened its roots in Africa, as single-party states
permitted oppositions to contest for power, as political repression was
relaxed, and as long-serving presidents were voted out of office peacefully.
In Kenya and Zambia, for example, presidents were voted out of office by
newly established opposition political parties. Thus, one source of violent
conflict in Africa has been the difficulty both in replacing authoritarian
regimes and in establishing new democratic regimes that satisfactorily
manage conflicts among the various groups that comprise the state, provide
the basis for economic growth, and allow for peaceful change through
constitutional means.
Corruption
A second and closely related reason for conflict in Africa at the individual
level of analysis, is the role of corruption. The extent of corruption in Africa,
in comparison to other regions of the world is tracked by Transparency
International. The organization’s ‘‘corruption index’’ placed Africa first among
all the regions of the world.19
There are historical and cultural factors for such corruption. Postinde-
pendence African governments were politically and economically weak
and insecure. They were subject to internal political splits and infighting once
the common objective of kicking out foreigners had been achieved. To
secure their position, new rulers quickly dismantled last-minute colonial
democratic institutions and imposed single-party, autocratic rule. These
new leaders used two methods to maintain power. These methods were
widespread on the continent and provided internal security in the state.
The first is clientilism, which is the use of patronage to secure position by
making these resources available to supporters. The second is patrimonial-
ism, which is the personalization of power by the country’s ruler. In essence,
a ruler sees all the assets of the state as belonging to him, and then uses con-
trol over these resources to dole out assets to supporters, solidifying their
support.
19
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (accessed May 10, 2010).
Conflict in Africa 183
GLOBALIZATION
the democratic demands placed on the state by various groups, thus under-
mining trust in the government, weakening identification with the state, and
encouraging subnational secession movements. Thus, democratization itself
may be one source of conflict that undermines security in the postcolonial
state.
Religion
Another idea that globalization spread a source of conflict in Africa relates to
religion. Centuries of evangelization efforts by Arab Muslims and European
and American Christians have gradually transformed the traditional animist
foundations of the continent. As a result, the religious tapestry of the conti-
nent is quite complex. By one estimation, 49 percent of the continent is
Christian and 40 percent is Muslim.23 The African continent is divided
roughly into a Muslim north and Christian south with the religious fault line
running along the Sahel at approximately nine degrees north latitude.24
Along this fault line there is a consistent pattern of conflict, which has desta-
bilized a number of states in the region. In Sudan, the Arab and Muslim north
engaged in a long-standing and violent conflict with Christian and animist
black Africans in the south of the country. In Nigeria, tensions between Chris-
tian and Muslim Nigerians occasionally surface through fighting in northern
Nigerian cities of Kaduna and Kano. Fighting between the predominantly
Christian south and predominantly Muslim north led to a de facto partition
of Ivory Coast between 2002 and 2008.
Within Muslim North Africa, religion has also been a factor in conflict,
even among co-religionists. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front waged a
bitter civil war against the government in the 1990s. In Egypt, individuals
loosely tied to members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981 due to their view that Sadat
had made peace with Israel, oppressed Muslims, and abused his power.
Some of their associates would later become linked to al-Qaeda. Islamic
groups, who patterned themselves after the Taliban of Afghanistan, suc-
ceeded in taking over Somalia. They were removed from power in the capital
of Mogadishu only after the military intervention of neighboring Ethiopia in
2006 and early 2007. There has been, nonetheless, some conflict between
Muslims and the Christian minorities. Coptic Christians in Egypt, for example,
face persecution by some in the larger Muslim majority. These conflicts have
not, however, threatened the stability of the Egyptian state.
23
Exact figures are difficult to obtain and these figures should be considered best esti-
mates. Other sources present slightly lower percentage figures for Africa’s Christian popu-
lation and slightly higher for the Muslim population.
24
The topic of cultural fault lines is covered in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996).
Conflict in Africa 185
Within largely Christian areas of the southern part of Africa, there is much
religious diversity between various Protestant, Pentecostal=Charismatic, and
Catholic churches. In addition, religious syncretism—a fusion of traditional
African religions and Christianity—is fairly common. In one case, this
dynamic has provoked a violent and destabilizing conflict. The Lord’s Res-
istance Army in northern Uganda, for example, has waged a relatively long
and violent war with the government.25
Commodities
While Africa has historically been relatively isolated from the international
system, in recent decades globalization has increased economic interaction
both within Africa and between Africa and the rest of the world. Economic
globalization, while providing large sums of money to Africa, has also been
a source of conflict. This is seen particularly in extractive commodities,
oil and minerals. The increasing globalization of the international system,
and in recent decades the growth of China and India, have spurred the
demand for commodities such as oil in Africa. The monetary sums in oil
are phenomenal. Africa is a major oil producer for the world market. Within
Africa proper, the two major areas of production are North Africa
(Algeria and Libya) and the Gulf of Guinea in West and Central Africa
(Nigeria and Angola).26 In Nigeria, oil profits have triggered conflicts in
the Delta Region where armed groups have attacked pipelines and offshore
platforms and taken hostages. While some of these groups appear to
have a political agenda seeking a greater share of profits for the people of
the Delta, other groups seem to be more financially opportunistic. In the
Horn of Africa there is a similar conflict over the division of oil profits
between Sudan and southern Sudan over reserves in the southern part of
the country.
A second area where economic integration has sparked conflict is
through the production and sale of gems, minerals, and timber. The most
well-known conflict is the so-called blood diamonds of Sierra Leone and
Liberia in West Africa.27 Conflicts in these two countries were fueled by
the export of diamonds to world markets. Less well known was the role
played by diamonds in supporting the rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi in
Angola. His control over the parts of the country with diamond mines pro-
vided a valuable source of income to sustain him and his followers in their
25
BBC News, ‘‘Q&A: Uganda’s Northern War,’’ August 29, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/3514473.stm (accessed May 10, 2010).
26
Figures are estimates for the years presented and may not be accurate. https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2176rank.html?countryName=
Nigeria&countryCode=ni1ionCode=af&rank=7#ni
27
See Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra
Leone (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).
186 R. B. Lloyd
fight against the government. Finally, tropical timber has been another
source of revenue and conflict. The illegal harvesting of such valuable wood
has been seen in Liberia, during and after its civil war.
CONCLUSION
This article has demonstrated that the sources of conflict are complex,
varied, and linked among different levels of international, state, and
individual. By examining Africa systematically, it is nonetheless possible to
identify contributing factors. While all factors help explain the causes and
characteristics of conflict in Africa, not all contribute equally. The degree
of impact will obviously vary by place and time, but these factors are never-
theless present in much of Africa. Analyzing conflict by level and process
helps to isolate the relative importance of these factors. Certainly on a sys-
temic level, the challenging international environment has clearly been a
source of conflict. This does not completely explain the nature of conflict
in Africa. Other newly independent states such as Thailand and Vietnam
faced similarly challenging international environments during the Cold War
but were able to demonstrate some political resiliency and economic
strength. At a state level, the relative weakness of the African state remains
an important factor in understanding sources of conflict. The solution is
not automatically to argue for a strong African state to overcome conflict.
A relatively strong state such as South Africa during the apartheid era
wreaked considerable damage within the state and in the region. The nature
of the regime within the state—weak or strong—makes a difference in out-
come. Both the weakness and strength of the state (in the case of South
Africa) point out the very strong influence of ethno nationalism on conflict.
On an individual level, corrupt, venal, and rapacious leaders are cer-
tainly not unique to Africa, but are found throughout the world. Precisely
because the states are so weak, the institutional restraints on the exercise
of arbitrary power that may exist in other states are not as robust. Further-
more, when this often capricious rule is matched with an inability or unwill-
ingness to respond to ethnic-based demands, the conditions are particularly
ripe for conflict and not resolution. Globalization can fuel states’ growth, but
the money that flows into the state is also a primary source of wealth and
power to rulers supporting their rule through patronage. The relatively
recent erosion of Africa’s historical economic autarky through globalization
has been a further source of conflict through the economic, social, and polit-
ical disruptions. This process has been especially pronounced in, but is not
unique to, Africa.