Section 8

Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015
Facts:
Issue: Does the ostracism and segregation of Cadet 1CL Cudia violate his freedom of association?
RULING:
On ostracism:
While not something new in a military academy, ostracism’s continued existence in the modern times
should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting
in the loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the
possibility of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC. In the court's mind,
ostracism practically denies the accused cadet’s protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or
her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.

On segregation:

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the
HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG
Holding Center. In Birdwell v. Schlesinger, the “administrative segregation” was held to be a reasonable
exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech
and freedom of association.

DCWD vs. Aranquez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015

Facts:
Issue: Was the concerted mass action of the DCWD employees well-within their rights?
RULING:
YES. It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA
incentives was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they
followed the advice of GM Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt
the fun run. They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government
employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Quezon City PTCA vs. DepEd, GR. No. 188720, Feb. 23, 2016
Facts:

Issue: Does the right to organize equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence?
RULING:

NO. The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as a collective,
but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be formally recognized by the state, but also
bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. In pursuit of public
interest, the state can set reasonable regulations—procedural, formal, and substantive—with which
organizations seeking state imprimatur must comply.
 Section 9
NPC vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 196140, Jan. 27, 2016
Facts:
Issue: Should the inflation factor be included in the computation of just compensation?
RULING:
NO. Valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation should not include the inflation
rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently
recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of the land as of the time of taking from the
landowner.

Republic vs. Regulto, G.R. No. 202051, April 18, 2016

Facts:
Issue: Is the Republic liable to pay just compensation to the land of the Regultos which was originally a
public land to be traversed by a public road?
RULING:
NO. Lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public
enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be
affected.

Garcia vs. Grecia, G.R. No. 185638, Aug. 10, 2016

Facts:
In 1989, the subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-way and road widening projects.
Despite the taking of the subject land and the completion of the road widening projects, the Sanggunian
failed to tender just compensation. Petitioners argue that the subject land is a subdivision road which is
beyond the commerce of man.

Issue: Is the City of Cabanatuan liable to pay just compensation to a subdivision lot utilized by the city for
road widening?
RULING:
YES. The subject land is within the commerce of man and is therefore a proper subject of an expropriation
proceeding. Without a doubt, the respondents are entitled to the payment of just compensation. The right
to recover just compensation is enshrined in the Bill of Rights; Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution states that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Mosqueda vs. Filipino Banana Exporters, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Issue: Is the imposition by Davao City of a 30 meter buffer zone on the plantations a compensable taking?
RULING:
NO. The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees
within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory
requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking
amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they
can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

SP of Bataan vs. Cong. Garcia, G.R. No. 174964, Oct. 5, 2016

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan
which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just compensation?
RULING:
NO. Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the State.

The State's ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are beyond dispute.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.