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Psychological Warfare
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
COPYRIGHT 2008 Thomson Gale
Psychological Warfare
History
Modern doctrine and methods
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Psychological warfare is a term that came into vogue in the United States during
World War n to identify an activity as old as the history of con ict. Although the
term gained wide currency in popular and scienti c discussions in the United
States and Europe within a decade after the end of World War Ii, meanings
ascribed to it were not always clear, and there were several views concerning
its nature and scope. Some have limited its meaning to that range of activity
which clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the armed forces and which is
centered on the dissemination of propaganda to speci ed target audiences for
the purpose of supporting the attainment of a given military mission. This view
of psychological warfare, however, is too limited in scope for most journalists,
politicians, and scholars who discuss the subject.
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8/1/2018 Psychological warfare facts, information, pictures | Encyclopedia.com articles about Psychological warfare
As used in popular and scienti c journals, a much wider variety of meanings has
been attached to the term. First, there is the view that psychological warfare is
the sum total of a nation’s efforts to in uence the opinions and behavior of
foreign peoples and governments in desired directions through means other
than the employment of a nation’s political, economic, and military resources.
Those who subscribe to this view generally agree that propaganda is the
principal, but not the sole, ingredient of psychological warfare.
Second, there is the view that psychological warfare involves an even wider
range of activity, including symbolic acts of violence and terror designed to
intimidate or to persuade an adversary to adjust his behavior. Those who hold to
this view of psychological warfare would include within its scope various
undercover activities such as espionage and subversion, assassinations and
other forms of terrorism, and censorship, when they are designed to mold the
opinion or behavior of speci c groups.
A third view holds that the term includes such activities as the premeditated
twisting of personality through techniques popularly described as
“brainwashing,“hypnosis, and the employment of psychopharmaceutical agents
allegedly used by some communist states [seeBrainwashing (/social-sciences-
and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts-
127#1G23045000131).]
There is still a fourth view, which holds that psychological warfare includes the
molding of public attitudes of one’s own people and extends across the
spectrum of political-military action to hit-and-run guerrilla raids and other acts
of a paramilitary character conducted in enemy rear areas. Thus, at times the
term has been used as though it were synonymous with political indoctrination
or orientation, political persuasion, indirect aggression, “protracted con ict,“or

a “strategy of subversion.“In the twenty years that followed the end of World
War n, doctrine concerning psychological warfare in the United States and
western Europe —its nature, its uses, and its role in modern international
relations—tended to coalesce to form a consensus. Thus, increasingly, those
who discuss it accept the basic conclusion that unless a technique involves the
premeditated manipulation of opinion through the use of one or more of the
media of communications it does not involve psychological warfare.
History
The British military analyst and historian J. F. C. Fuller is believed to have been
the rst to employ the term “psychological warfare“—in 1920—although the
activities it describes go back to ancient times. In discussing implications to be
drawn from World War i advances in military technology, he suggested that
traditional means of warfare may in time be “replaced by a purely psychological
warfare, wherein weapons are not even used or battle elds sought …but
[rather] …the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human
intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by
the in uence of the will of another is accomplished“(1920, p. 320). Fuller’s use
of the term at the time attracted no unusual attention in either British or
American military and scholarly circles. Twenty years later, as the British were
“tooling up“for a propaganda effort similar to the one that General Fuller had
forecast, they adopted the expression “political warfare.“Only in January 1940
did the term come into American use, when an article was published entitled
“Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It.“Over a year later the Committee
for National Morale used the term in the title of a book (Farago & Gittler 1942)
but ascribed to it a meaning far different from that in postwar usage.
During World War n “psychological warfare“was widely used to denote the

organization and, more especially, the activity of propagandists who served with
or supported the U.S. armed forces. But the term was not generally applied to
broader, longer-range propaganda efforts. “Information,““strategic
services,“and “political warfare“were preferred and were used in titles and
names of agencies, e.g., Coordinator of Information (COI), Ministry of
Information, Of ce of Strategic Services (OSS), etc. The major British agency
for the overseas effort that was later described as psychological warfare was
the Political Warfare Executive (PWE). In the United States the civilian-directed
effort was entrusted to the Of ce of War Information (OWI).
The psychological warfare support provided U.S. and allied combat forces
during World War n, while signi cant, was largely the result of ad hoc
improvisations. Neither the Americans nor the British had made plans before
the war to employ combat propaganda. Civilian propagandists from the OWI
and PWE were casually included among Eisenhower’s forces and organized into
propaganda units and staff sections. Later on, experience gained in Africa
induced General Eisenhower to create a special staff section for psychological
warfare at his headquarters in Europe. The British and American personnel
from both civilian and military agencies were selected, trained, and assigned to
army group, eld army, and army corps headquarters. Psychological warfare
operations in the action against Japan were even more improvised: the OWI
sent small civilian staffs to major reararea headquarters—Hawaii, Australia,
China, and India. In every instance they rst had to convince the theater
commander that psychological warfare could make a contribution to victory;
next they had to induce military commands to assign quali ed personnel to ad
hoc units; and then it was necessary to win the cooperation of combat
commanders to enable these units to praciice their skills. Psychological warfare
units were generally attached to intelligence sections. Propaganda operations
were therefore seldom adequately integrated into operational plans and were
generally employed in addition to, not as a part of, regular military operations.
The War Department in Washington assigned headquarters personnel to
monitor overseas operations only intermittently, and even then no operational
or planning function was performed for the overseas commands. The impetus
and planning for the use of psychological warfare in overseas areas came from
those within each command; the pattern of organization, therefore, varied from
one theater of operations to another.
After the war all psychological warfare units and special staff sections were
disbanded. The Of ce of War Information was dissolved, and a greatly curtailed
foreign information service was established in September 1945 by executive
order as an interim operation under State Department auspices. In 1948
Congress rst authorized its continuance. Thus the civilian-sponsored program
remained under direct State Department jurisdiction until 1953, when the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) was established as a quasi-autonomous
organization.
During the years that the foreign information program remained under State
Department jurisdiction, it increasingly became the practice for the general
public to describe its operations as psychological warfare. With the increased
tensions growing out of the “cold war,“the outbreak of con ict in Korea, and the
launching of a “great new campaign of truth,“by President Truman in 1950,
there was recognition of a need for a new instrument to coordinate the
overseas propaganda effort of the several departments and agencies involved.
It was natural, in view of the growing acceptance of the term psychological
warfare, for a term like psychological strategy to be adopted to label the agency
given responsibility for the coordination of the over-all foreign information
program. In August 1950 President Truman established a national
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to coordinate “foreign information and
psychological strategy“where more than one agency was involved. In 1953 the
PSB was replaced by an Operations Coordinating Board, which in turn was
abolished by President Kennedy in 1961.
Modern doctrine and methods
Relatively early in the Korean War the U.S. Army created, as a special staff
section, the Of ce of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) and a center
and school in North Carolina for the codi cation of doctrine and the training of
military personnel in what came to be called, in short, “psywar.“With the
establishment of OCPW and a psywar center and school, interest in
psychological warfare spread throughout the U.S. armed forces. With increased
interest came new concepts, de nitions, and a crystallization of doctrine.
Psychological warfare, as previously de ned, gave way to new terms—
psychological operations (psyops) and psychological activities. Psyops were
de ned as political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and
conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups

emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the accomplishment of national
objectives.
The American approach to psychological warfare that grew out of World War n
and the cold war experience has had a signi cant impact on the thought and
behavior of allied nations. The American term psychological warfare has largely
displaced terms these nations previously used. More important than this,
however, is the widespread recognition now given to the need for specially
trained and equipped units to conduct psychological warfare operations in time
of crisis. In preparing for this responsibility, many nations have sent of cer
personnel to the United States for specialized training in American military
schools.
Modern psychological warfare on both the national level and within the armed
services differs markedly from propaganda operations conducted in the past
during times of national crisis in several ways. First, there is of cial recognition
that the psychological warfare element, taken in its broadest sense, is one of
four major forces employed during both peace and war to give maximum
support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable
consequences of victory and lessen chances of defeat. Thus, in the highest
councils of government the psychological factor in international relations is
considered along with political, economic, and military factors in making major
foreign policy decisions.
Second, technological advances in the science of communications have made

available to the modern propagandist a variety of means for reaching audiences
that previously could only have been reached after great effort and much
uncertainty. Short-wave radio transmitters and receivers, lms, the growing

distribution of television outlets, and the availability of high-speed printing
presses combine to increase the likelihood that any given audience a
propagandist desires to reach can be exposed to the message he wants it to
receive.
Third, modern developments in public opinion polling, audience sampling, panel

interviewing, intelligence analysis, and the new techniques for assessing
cultural traits of foreign groups enable one to make more accurate predictions
of group and mass behavior. Thus it is possible for modern psychological
warfare operations to be more nearly manageable and predictable than were
the hit-or-miss operations of the past.
Communications media
The choice of communications media for psychological warfare operations

depends on the target audience to be addressed and the time one has to
prepare and deliver the message. In combat situations, printed lea ets and
newssheets disseminated by airdrops and voice broadcasts ampli ed by
electronic loudspeakers are the most commonly employed media. Operations
conducted from areas farther to the rear or to audiences far removed from
combat zones utilize mobile and xed long-wave and medium-wave radio
transmitters.
Media employed in strategic or national-level operations are commonly

classi ed as either slow or fast. Slow media include news magazines, books,
pamphlets, motion picture lms, and lectures. They are so described because
there is a considerable time lag between the sending and the receiving of the
message. Fast media are those that rely largely on electronic communications.
In addition to short-wave radio broadcasts, fast media include carefully timed
statements by statesmen deemed to be of suf cient interest to be picked up
and transmitted as news and a daily news le transmitted by wireless to
overseas outlets for local dissemina-ation.
Intelligence requirements
Intelligence requirements for effective psychological warfare operations are

both enormous and varied. There are three major types of intelligence required.
The rst is background data, in great detail, concerning the predispositions and
vulnerabilities of the target or targets to be addressed. This type of intelligence
is described as target analysis. A second type of intelligence needed is that
employed in propaganda output. The writings, press releases, and speeches of
leading adversaries are thus combed for material that can be usefully employed
against the target. Finally, it is necessary to provide a means for checking the
results of one’s work. Is the message getting through? Is it clearly understood?
In what ways can a more favorable response be elicited? Answers to these and
other questions are sought by such means as are appropriate to the situation. In
time of con ict, and with respect to closed societies, it is sometimes necessary
to employ clandestine means for gathering data to assess effectiveness. With
respect to societies more or less open to direct approach, variations of
techniques employed in domestic public opinion polling and market surveys may
be employed.
In both World War n and the Korean War, carefully selected panels of prisoners
of war were found to be useful in pretesting and post-testing messages and in
making critiques of the format of presentation or the media of communications.
Where such panels were used, extreme care had to be taken to insure that they
were as nearly representative as possible of target groups yet to be addressed.
Furthermore, the fact that prisoners had either defected or had been captured
set them apart from those still within enemy ranks, and great care had to be
taken in extrapolating ndings based on such groups [seeIntelligence, political
and military (/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-
magazines/intelligence-political-and-military).]
Research
Recognition of the need for psychological warfare target intelligence in both

depth and breadth has had a great impact on American social science
scholarship in the period since the outbreak of the Korean War. Social scientists
in the United States, since 1950, have devoted considerably more attention to
studies of elites, would-be elites, and communications and other behavioral
patterns in foreign societies than in any previous period. Great attention has
been given to the identi cation of research criteria of signi cance in the study
of alien cultures. Likewise, great effort has been devoted to the systematic
development of more sophisticated tools for the effective identi cation and
assessment of such material as is useful to psychological warfare practitioners.
[SeeCommunication, mass (/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-
reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/mass-0#1G23045000222).]
Since 1950 the national government, through the facilities of the State
Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), and its
predecessors, the USIA and the three service branches of the Defense
Department, has subsidized university groups, individuals, and nonpro t
organizations to undertake speci c research projects that might not otherwise

have been undertaken, or tailored them to meet the needs of the so-called
“psychological warfare community.”
From the ndings of this government-sponsored and other research there has
emerged a clearer understanding of the requirements for an effective
psychological warfare effort in times of peace and of crisis. Whatever media of
communications are employed, psychological warfare can contribute to the
attainment of a nation’s objectives only if the messages transmitted are
credible, clearly understood, and seek to elicit a response within the capability
of the target audience.
What is credible is not to be equated necessarily with truth. What is credible to

any given audience is what it believes to be true, not what is in fact true.
Credibility is a complex goal and not easily achieved. What is credible is
determined by the audience, not the content of a message. The development of
credibility thus must be constantly and persistently pursued in every
psychological warfare campaign. Without this important element much of a
propagandist’s effort will go for nought.
William E. Daugherty
[See alsoCommunication, political (/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-

magazines/communication-political); Propaganda (/social-sciences-and-
law/political-science-and-government/political-science-terms-and-concepts-
62#1G23045000996); War (/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-
magazines/westermarck-edward).]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barghoorn, Frederick C. 1964 Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton Univ. Press.
Barrett, Edward W. 1953 Truth Is Our Weapon. New York: Funk & Wagnalls.
Bureau Of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C. 1956 International

Communication and Political Opinion: A Guide to the Literature, by Bruce L. Smith
and Chitra M. Smith. Princeton Univ. Press.
Clews, John C. 1964 Communist Propaganda Techniques. New York: Praeger.
Daugherty, William E. (compiler) 1958 A Psychological Warfare Casebook.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. -” A compilation of articles and case studies
covering various problems, techniques, and requirements of psychological
warfare. Contains an extensive list of references.
Davidson, Philip 1941 Propaganda and the American Revolution: 1763-1783.

Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press.
Dyer, Murray 1959 The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Farago, Ladislas; and Gittler, Lewis F. (editors) 1942 German Psychological

Warfare. New York: Putnam. -“Contains an extensive list of references to
German language material published before 1939.
Fuller, J. F. C. 1920 Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918. London: Murray.
Holt, Robert T.; and Van De Velde, Robert W. 1960 Strategic Psychological
Operations and American Foreign Policy. Univ. of Chicago Press.
Hunter, Edward 1956 Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who De ed It. New York:
Farrar.
Lasswell, Harold D. (1927) 1938 Propaganda Technique in the World War. New
York: Smith.
Lerner, Daniel 1949 Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to

VE-Day. New York: Stewart.
Lerner, Daniel (editor) 1951 Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American
Policy. New York: Stewart.
Lineearger, Paul M. A. (1948) 1954 Psychological Warfare. 2d ed. Washington:

Combat Forces Press.
Mock, James R.; and Larson, Cedric 1939 Words That Won the War: The Story of
the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919. Princeton Univ. Press.
Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It. 1940 Current History and Forum 51,
no. 5:52-53.
Smith, Bruce L.; Lasswell, Harold D.; and Casey, Ralph D. 1946 Propaganda,
Communication and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide. Princeton
Univ. Press.
Thomson, Charles A. H. 1948 Overseas Information Service of the United States

Government. Washington: Brookings Institution.
Yu, Te-chi 1964 Mass Persuasion in Communist China. New York: Praeger.
Zeman, Z. A. B. 1964 Nazi Propaganda. Oxford Univ. Press.
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8/1/2018 Psychological warfare facts, information, pictures | Encyclopedia.

com articles about Psychological warfare

Select Source: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences ▾

Modern doctrine and methods

or orientation, political persuasion, indirect aggression, “protracted con ict,“or

During World War n “psychological warfare“was widely used to denote the

Modern doctrine and methods

conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups

Second, technological advances in the science of communications have made

uncertainty. Short-wave radio transmitters and receivers, lms, the growing

Third, modern developments in public opinion polling, audience sampling, panel

The choice of communications media for psychological warfare operations

Media employed in strategic or national-level operations are commonly

Intelligence requirements for effective psychological warfare operations are

Recognition of the need for psychological warfare target intelligence in both

organizations to undertake speci c research projects that might not otherwise

What is credible is not to be equated necessarily with truth. What is credible to

[See alsoCommunication, political (/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-

Barghoorn, Frederick C. 1964 Soviet Foreign Propaganda. Princeton Univ. Press.

Bureau Of Social Science Research, Washington, D.C. 1956 International

Clews, John C. 1964 Communist Propaganda Techniques. New York: Praeger.

Daugherty, William E. (compiler) 1958 A Psychological Warfare Casebook.

Davidson, Philip 1941 Propaganda and the American Revolution: 1763-1783.

Farago, Ladislas; and Gittler, Lewis F. (editors) 1942 German Psychological

Fuller, J. F. C. 1920 Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918. London: Murray.

Lerner, Daniel 1949 Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to

Lineearger, Paul M. A. (1948) 1954 Psychological Warfare. 2d ed. Washington:

Thomson, Charles A. H. 1948 Overseas Information Service of the United States

Zeman, Z. A. B. 1964 Nazi Propaganda. Oxford Univ. Press.

Learn more about citation styles

© 2016 Encyclopedia.com | All rights reserved.

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