Notes On Robert Stalnakers Mere Possibil

Stalnaker notes Phil 5301 Page 1
Notes on Stalnaker’s Mere Possibilities

This is one of the three most important and valuable books in the past century on modal
metaphysics. Everyone interested in modality or metaphysics will be assumed to understand this
book well over the next several decades, in the way that everyone now must understand Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity and Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds. That’s why we read those three
books, and invested most of the semester on them. Stalnaker’s book is pretty hard going in
places. Parts of Mere Possibilities are technically more demanding, and parts of it are
dialectically more intricate than anything in either of those earlier books. Happily, a pretty good
acquaintance with Kripke and Lewis helps to understand S (= Stalnaker from here on). Only a
small coterie of experts could actually follow S’s argument without a great deal of work. I’m not
one of those experts, but I did a fair amount of work. Every serious philosopher should have a
grasp of this book. These notes are intended to help an intelligent but non-expert reader with
some of those difficult parts.1 Some of the exposition is just to keep the thread between hard
spots.
Let me say very roughly what I take to be the main project of this book. Remember
Kripke’s attempt to get people not to take possible worlds seriously as places to visit. He
regarded issues about how we know that it is Humphrey that won in another possible world as
bogus. Worlds where Humphrey wins are stipulated. What does “stipulated” mean? Following S,
we can say that what Kripke wanted to say was that “could have won” is a modal feature
attributed to the actual Humphrey. But, given Kripke’s work on the semantics of quantified
modal logic, where one quantifies over possible worlds and their domains of possible objects,
how can this simple way of dismissing “the ontology of possible worlds” be seriously sustained?
Taking a cue from S, Kripke should agree that “It is not reduction but regimentation that
the possible-worlds framework provides—a procedure for representing modal discourse, using
primitive modal notions, in a way that helps reveal its structure.’ (Mere Possibilities, p. 11)
Kripke never explained how you could use his semantics, but not actually talk about
metaphysical exotica like merely possible inhabitants of other possible worlds.
Part of S’s project is actually doing the semantical-metaphysical work that Kripke left
undone in 1970. Roughly, S treats possible worlds semantics as a device for articulating the
modal truths about the actual world. The features of the device, that it represents worlds as points
such that each point has a domain of entities some of which may not be actual, will be treated as
just features of the device, a notion that S discusses in detail. The result is a much better way of
doing semantics than is typical in formal semantics.
1
Being a physicalist and Davidsonian, I find Stalnaker’s down-to-earth anti-metaphysical-
exotica intuitions very compelling and compatible with my prejudices. In fact, I think that my
differences with his view of modality and possible worlds-theory are quite small, and are
centered around what semantics as opposed to theory is. I also have doubt about possible worlds
theories as a theoretical panacea for all the modalities, even of English.
The issue of merely possible objects, and how we can discuss them is the central topic by
which this project is carried out. If we don’t countenance such objects (which we should not) we
have to say that there are in fact no propositions that are about any particular one of them. So, we
need to be able to say that Mother Theresa could have had grand-children, rather than being
celibate, and that one of those grandchildren might have become a Bahai. Since those
grandchildren do not exist, there are no propositions about them. But there could have been. So,
propositions exist contingently.
A way of grasping this notion is to observe that, on a normal conception of time
according to which the future is contingent, there were no propositions about you in 1900. There
were propositions about there being a graduate student at the University of Connecticut who had
all of your purely qualitative features,2 but those propositions do not discriminate between you
and someone else who might have had your features. A conception of propositions and
properties as contingent accepts that propositions (and properties) can come into existence and
might not exist at all..
As we discussed in talking about Lewis on sets, this view of abstract objects as, as it
were, located, differs from other views out there. One way to think about this: Propositions have
their early home in mathematics (Euclid). With Plato and Frege, propositions and properties are
modelled on mathematics. But if propositions and properties are applied to the real physical
world, some of the features of mathematical relationships will no longer apply.
A useful preliminary read to get a handle on the issue of merely possible entities is S’s
essay in Saul Kripke (ed. Alan Berger), Cambridge UP 2011, “Possible Worlds Semantics:
Philosophical Foundations.”
I Chapter 1:
Section 1: This section defends S’s project of devising a framework for modal discussions. That
is, just as Quine’s “On What There Is” which we read in week 2 doesn’t propose an account of
ontological commitment which says what there actually is, so S wants a framework for
discussing modal issues which is neutral among various modal views. Three sections of Chapter
4 and the end of section 6 of Chapter 2 argue against deriving metaphysical conclusions from
semantic premises and against deriving semantic accounts from metaphysical premises. Chapter
3, the most difficult, explores metaphysical issues using the framework.
Section 2: What are possible worlds? S’s conceives of possible worlds as properties, “ways a
world might be.” There are several consequences of understanding “ways” as properties. First,
this is not a reduction of modality to something else, since properties are understood as what it
would be to instantiate them. Just as propositions are truth-conditions, so properties are
satisfaction-conditions. Second, possible worlds are not representations, as Lewis insisted that
2
“Purely qualitative” is discussed in Chapter 3. There weren’t even any propositions about me,
or about your parents in 1900.
anything other than his realism about worlds would have to posit. Third, depending on the kind
of completeness enforced by the demand that possible worlds decide every property, there can be
various domains of possible worlds for various purposes. S is a realist about possible worlds,
since these properties exist. However, he is not committed to the idea that every application of
the possible worlds idea requires a metaphysically complete determination of properties. S wants
his conception of possible worlds to be neutral among various metaphysicalized views about
possible worlds. In particular, S takes the requirement that a possible world determine every
proposition to be possibly relative to a context of inquiry which determines what propositions
there are.3
However liberal S wants to be about properties, worlds, etc., possibilities about non-
actual entities are a puzzle for an actualist who wants to say that GWB might have had a son, but
deny that there is anything that might have been GWB’s son.
Section 3: Containment properties
What kind of properties are possible worlds, these world-completely-characterizing
properties? They are containment properties an entire universe might have. S’s analogy in this
section is about as illuminating and clear as philosophical analogical explications get.
Only one such world-completely-characterizing property is instantiated. One important
point that emerges is that some of the containment properties have to be “generic.” Generic
containment properties have existentially quantified components which lack a “witness.” So, the
possibility that GWB had a son describes worlds which contain “There is an entity which is
GWB’s son” but contain no singular proposition which entails “There is an entity which is
GWB’s son.” There is no singular proposition such as “GWB Jr is GWB’s son.
This is a further way in which S’s identification of possible worlds with properties rather
than as sets of propositions is helpful. If you thought of a world as a set of propositions, then a
set which contained “There is an entity which is GWB’s son” and also contained the negation of
every proposition that some particular object in the domain was GWB’s son, the set would be ω-
inconsistent, as Ben pointed out. Properties, on the other hand, have no such problem. The
property of being red exists. Of course it is true that if something instantiates that property, it
must instantiate a particular shade of red, but that is irrelevant to whether the property exists.
Something very like this will be true of characterizations of worlds with merely possible
individuals. If a possible world w in which GWB had a son were the actual world, that is, if that
property were a component of the world-appropriate property which is instantiated, there would
be a “witness” to the truth of the existential proposition. That witness might be expressed by the
words “GWB Jr. is a son of GWB.” That is, there would be a singular proposition about a merely
possible individual.
Although worlds as sets of propositions and world as properties are different, they are
also related. Possible worlds are supposed to be maximally specific. The intuitive idea is that a
possible world is “as specific as what would exemplify it. “Red,” for instance is not as specific as
3
See his “Possible Worlds and Situations,” which he footnotes.
a thing that would exemplify it, since a particular shade would exemplify it. If all possible world-
properties existed, an exemplified world-property would have a witness corresponding to every
existential, and so would “be as specific as what would exemplify it.” But any possible worlds
with merely possible objects in them don’t exist. The possible worlds that exist typically have
some generic features that lack witnesses. Most of the possible worlds that exist are not specific
possible worlds, since, if they were instantiated, the “witness” for that possible world would be a
world that is only possibly possible. The specific world-property does not actually exist.
So, S proposes that possible worlds are properties that determine every proposition. This
will get things right, since generic propositions go with generic properties. But propositions are
treated in the semantics as sets of worlds, so this doesn’t tell us much. In any case, since
“determine” means “entail,” S’s account can be construed as thinking of possible worlds as sets
of propositions, albeit not as theories, given that the sets are ω-incomplete. Among the topics S
wants his framework to be neutral about is whether there is such a thing as the absolute totality
of propositions. He wants to allow that context and topic determine which propositions are
relevant for constructing maximal possible worlds.
Section 4: Kripke’s dice
This example illustrates what S is trying to accommodate. Since the dice are just possible
dice, there is not really a distinction between A =6, B=5 and A=5, B=6. The case is “one comes
up 5 and the other 6.” But if that case were realized, there would be one specific case that was
realized and another specific case that could have happened. Generic properties are such that, if
they are instantiated, a specific property is instantiated. But no such specific property may
actually exist.
Section 5: McMichael’s Problem of Iterated Modality
It is simple enough for an actualist to treat “Saul might have had a seventh son” by
invoking generic properties. So, the sentence can be true without there being anything that could
have been Saul’s seventh son, i.e. without there being a witness to the existential proposition.
But in a possible world in which he does have a seventh son, there would be a number of
singular propositions (at least about these sons) which do not actually exist.
McMichael’s problem for actualism can be developed from this example: There might
have been a seventh son of Saul who became a Rabbi, but could have converted to Mormonism.
◊Ǝx( Sx /\Rx /\ ◊Mx). This is “Ǝw Ǝx(Sxw and Ǝw’Mxw’).” But think about the domain of
“Ǝw’Mxw’” The worlds in which this entity could have converted to Mormonism are all worlds
which do not actually exist—there are no containment properties containing the relevant entities
and singular propositions about them, namely the seven individual sons of Saul.
McMichael observes that the domains of the outer existential quantifier and the inner
quantifier are different. This means that the reference of a predicate like “is a son” and “is a
Mormon convert” differ on the outside and the inside. So, substitution of the same predicate’s
extension (in actuality) in the inner clause need not preserve truth. McMichael observes that a (if
not the) virtue of the possible worlds analysis of modality is that it preserves extensionality. You
do not need a Fregean reference-shift inside a modal context. For an actualist, this virtue must
disappear. McMichael: “But if we have to give up the extensionality of the possible worlds
approach, we might as well do without it.” (McMichael p.55 in the essay cited by S.)
S’s project in this book is, at bottom, to show that S’s kind of actualism, combined with
S’s way of doing semantics, answers this objection while allowing us to use Kripkean models.
II Chapter 2 Much of this Chapter is technicality-free. These remarks address a few points that
may not be obvious, and some of their consequences.
Section 1: The theory of propositions S is working with is minimal, in the sense that everyone
who believes in propositions will admit that there are the objects S has defined. Lewis’
propositions fit the theory. Frege and others have a more “fine-grained” account of propositions,
but acknowledge have sets of propositions corresponding to each of these minimally-defined
propositions. For S, propositions ARE the truth-conditions that sentences express. The question
of “grain” is the question of when truth-conditions are should be treated as identical.
Section 2: Modal properties of propositions:
The first of these modal properties is very important, and may puzzle: p.29: “(P7) There
exists a proposition that necessarily entails all propositions.”
(P7) means that there is a proposition that in every possible world, entails all other propositions.
This proposition, the4 contradictory proposition, expressed in many ways, will, in a given
possible world, entail all the propositions that would exist if that possible world were
instantiated. This means that even though there would exist different propositions if a different
possible world were actual, “logical space” is the same no matter what. Why? Because in every
possible world, all the propositions that exist in that world are entailed by this proposition. So,
logical space includes all the propositions, properties, and individuals that exist in any world. So,
“logical space” includes all possible propositions.5
(P8) implies that, even though propositions exist contingently, they have all their logical
relations essentially. S here applies his definition of essential property, which he will introduce
officially in Chapter 4, in the discussion of Fine.
4
On S’s minimal theory of propositions, there is only one contradictory proposition. You might
wonder how P7 would fit more fine-grained notions. All you need is one proposition that exists
in all possible worlds. “Two is prime and two is not prime” would do. “There is a proposition…”
is still true when there are lots of them.
5
On p. 29, 3/5 of the way down, there is a typo that may baffle you: Instead of “Our minimal
theory already implied that there exists a (unique) proposition that is entailed by all propositions”
read “Our minimal theory already implied that there exists a (unique) proposition that entails all
propositions.”
Section 3: This section is an intuitive sketch of the equivalence relations that, as it were, collapse
merely possible possible worlds into actual possible worlds. S gives details in Appendix A,
discussed below.
Section 4: The Kripkean semantics everyone, including S, uses represents possible worlds as
points. Such points, in general, have domains that consist partly of merely possible individuals.
Therefore, the properties that would represent those points do not actually exist. So, for S,
because of the non-existence of singular propositions about merely possible objects, the actual
possible worlds (which, remember, are properties) are equivalence-classes of such points. So are
the possible worlds points or equivalence-classes? How does he get around quantifying over
merely possible objects? This section is a discussion of the role of models and their relation to
the reality they model.
Very briefly, while S is an actualist, and holds that everything there is to say can be made
sense of without attempting to refer to anything merely possible, he needs the Kripkean models
to give him a way to talk in detail about relations among properties, including world-appropriate
properties, and individuals. You can talk about what would have been the case if Kripke had had
seven sons each of which was a grandfather. S wants to do this without quantifying over merely
possible objects. His plan is to use the Kripke models, but interpret them so that there is no
reference to anything other than actual things.
S will present in the last parts of the book a way of doing semantics in which the points
will be an artifact of the formalism that is “factored out” when the semantics is actually applied.
He notes that McMichael suggests this strategy, by analogy with models for spatial relations.
This analogy is worth dwelling upon for a moment, since it is very close to what S does:
Suppose you hold a relational theory of space, that space is nothing but relations among
entities and that there are actually no spatial locations. You could still use a formalism which
treated spatial locations as points in a mathematical volume, represented as triples of real
numbers, and represented relations among locations as vectors. You would just treat all models
in a 3-space that “said the same thing” according to you by identifying the models which had the
same distance-ratios and relative orientation-relations as the same. You would get reality
according to your theory out of the mathematical models by defining an equivalence relation
which collapsed models which have the same appropriate relations among their elements. More
or less, you would treat all models which are relation-preserving rotations or contractions or
expansions of one another as the reality of space, making which particular triple of numbers you
used to represent a location irrelevant. This would make the mathematical points and the
absolute “space” they inhabit “artifacts of the model.” The model is still useful, of course, but
there is this intermediate step. Using this strategy is roughly how S treats possible worlds as
points for some purposes (using the Kripke models) and as equivalence-classes of points for
other purposes (being committed to nothing but actual entities).
Other points: p.37-40 S’s notion of “property:” “Property” is a basic concept for S, just
as “truth” is for Davidson. That is, there are a lot of connections between the concept and other
concepts, but there is no reduction of the concept to any others. (See Davidson’s “The Folly of
Defining Truth” for a parallel.) Properties are real and actual, but the representation of the
structure of their relations may use abstract spaces parts of which have no actual correlates.
S’s possible worlds are not representations. S rejects Lewis’ characterization of
alternatives to modal realism as “representations.”6 For S, possible worlds are properties, and
properties are real, so he is a realist. But only one of the world-appropriate properties is
instantiated. On the other hand, when one is doing Kripkean semantics, the points in the
modelling space, as well as the equivalence-classes of points are representations.
S discusses the distinction between features of the model and features of the reality the
model models. Hoffman’s criticism (p.38) is that, since the equivalence classes are sets of points,
and the existence of the sets entails the existence of the points, S is committed to the existence of
merely possible worlds. S points out that the features of the model are not features of what the
model models. If you represent baseball players by numbers, and Babe Ruth is assigned the
number 3, that does not mean that Babe Ruth is a necessary existent (nor that he is prime.)
Section 5: More on models: Nonrealistic semantics
S outlines his conception of the relation between models and the phenomena they model,
in the case of modellings which use a fictional domain, apply an equivalence-relation to it, and
use the collapsed fictional domain to directly model reality. In the present case, the fictional
domain is the domain of possible worlds in the Kripke semantics, the points. The collapsed
domain is the reduction of possible worlds with merely possible objects to equivalence classes.
In these equivalence classes, expressions like “GWB’s son” denote “roles”7 that various possible
individuals fill. The reality is actual objects, properties and propositions. S has two models,
analogously to the spatial relationalist’s models. At the first level, there is the Kripkean
semantics, with points representing possible worlds. At the next level, there is the result of
collapsing equivalent points, discussed below in more detail. Finally, the reality is the actual
properties and entities.
Section 6: “Objections and Replies’ (p. 42 ff.)
In this section, and in the first three sections of Chapter 4, we see S’s theory at work,
refuting or presenting alternatives to arguments from semantics to metaphysics and from
metaphysics to semantics.
Plantinga’s target is “existentialism,” the thesis that “a singular proposition is
ontologically dependent on the objects it is directly about.” Note that S rejects Plantinga’s
argument against this view in this section, but also rejects Hofweber’s argument for this view in
the first section of Ch. 4. He holds that the proper Kripkean semantics of modal discourse is
neutral on many metaphysical issues.
6
Remember, Lewis identifies propositions with sets of worlds, and identifies properties with sets
of elements from all the worlds.
7
This useful metaphor is from S’s 2011.
Plantinga’s position: Take the definite description “Kripke’s seventh sophisticated son.”
Plantinga takes this to be a reference-fixing description of a set of individual essences. That is, in
a situation/possible world in which Kripke had seven or more sophisticated sons, there would be
exactly one individual who was Kripke’s seventh sophisticated son. So, the description “Kripke’s
seventh sophisticated son” would pick out an individual by an accident,8 in the way that “first
postmaster general” picks out Ben Franklin. Plantinga posits individual essences for non-actual
but possible individuals, thus preserving singular propositions without allowing contingently
existing propositions. Individual essences of every possible object exist in worlds in the way
numbers do, as necessarily existing objects. Individual essences are “what it would be to be this
guy” which determine which particular possible individual is in fact satisfying the “is Kripke’s
seventh sophisticated son” role in a possible world.9
Stalnaker’s view is that propositions and properties exist contingently. Example:
Consider the propositions “Socrates does not exist” and “It is possible that Socrates does not
exist.” The first is false; the second true. The truth of the second proposition must say something
about possible worlds. Given Stalnaker’s view, it cannot be that the proposition “Socrates does
not exist” is true in a possible world. If Socrates does not exist in a world, there are no existing
singular propositions about Socrates in that world. Put otherwise, if Socrates did not exist, there
would be no propositions about him.10
For this to be the case, he needs the distinction between being true OF a world and being
true IN a world. “Socrates does not exist” is true of a world without Socrates, but not true in such
a world, since it does not exist in that world to have either the property of being true or to lack
that property.
Here is Plantinga’s argument to the opposite conclusion as S presents it (page 44-45):
“P1. Possibly, Socrates does not exist.
P2. If P1, then the proposition Socrates does not exist is possible.
P3. If the proposition Socrates does not exist is possible, then the proposition Socrates does not
exist is possibly true.
P4. Necessarily, if Socrates does not exist had been true, then Socrates does not exist would have
existed.
P5. Necessarily, if Socrates does not exist had been true, then Socrates would not have existed.
C[onclusion]. It is possible both that Socrates does not exist and the proposition that Socrates
does not exist exists. “
8 That’s what “sophisticated” guarantees, in case being the seventh son strikes you as essential.
9
This is a role only one element of a given possible world could fill.
10
This is not just about singular terms. There are propositions expressed by sentences using
“Socrates” that are true in a world without Socrates. For instance, the proposition expressed by
our “Either Socrates was a philosopher or Socrates was not a philosopher” is true in every world,
since it is a tautology.)
S challenges this argument by distinguishing two possibility predicates applying to

propositions. S’s analysis invokes the distinction between “true of a world” and “true in a
world.” He argues that the clause “the proposition Socrates does not exist is possible”, the
consequent of P2 and the antecedent of P3, is ambiguous between these two readings of
“possible.”.
S introduces some notation: “T” is the truth predicate applied to propositions. “I” is an
entailment relation holding between propositions.
The absolutely central piece of notation is “^.” “^” is a variable-binding operator that
takes, for instance, n-place open sentences and yields complex n-1-place predicates. When every
variable is bound, one has a monadic predicate which can be applied to an actual object and thus
yield a truth or a falsehood. This operator, as we will see, allows him to replace the traditional
quantifiers, which combine complex predicate formation and operations on those complex
predicates, with a notation which separates those roles. “^” is the only variable-binding operator
in S’s semantics. This conception of logical form yields a conception of logical form which
accords with linguistic theory11 and, as we will see, allows an actualist appropriation of Kripkean
models as regimentation of the relations among properties.
“π” is a term-forming operator that takes a sentence, a linguistic object, and yields a term
for the proposition expressed by the sentence. So “π `Socrates does not exist’” denotes the
proposition that Socrates does not exist. The point of this notation is to distinguish our use of our
language to express propositions and the propositions themselves.
So, [](φ↔Tπφ) is not true because in some possible worlds, those in which the
proposition expressed by φ does not exist, φ will not be true. To be true or not true, a proposition
has to exist. Also, (Ixy ↔[](Tx →Ty) fails. The example S gives is that the proposition that no
one is immortal entails the proposition that Obama is not mortal, but that proposition is not true
in worlds in which Obama does not exist.12
S defines two distinct “possible” predicates:
Possible1 = df ^x◊Tx. This predicate applies to a proposition if and only if there is a world in
which it is true. So, ^x◊Tx(the proposition that Socrates does not exist) is true only if that
11
The idea is very close to, if not identical with, generalized quantifiers. Both Generalized
quantifiers and S’s views accord with my view of the quantifiers as predicates of aggregates, in
“Attributive and their Modifiers” (Nous 1972) and ”Quantification in English” (Philosophia,
1978) which likewise has a single abstraction-operator yielding something that predicates or
operators can apply to or operate on.
12
This distinction has other kinds of applications. There is a puzzle about the truth of sentences
about the past. When the tyrannosaurs ruled, it was not true that there were tyrannosaurs, since
language did not exist, so there were no sentences to be true or false. Some claim that this shows
that truth-bearers must be propositions, timeless truth-conditions. But “There are tyrannosaurs”
is true of that time, even though it is not true in that time. We speak our language with our
references. This is akin to Kripke’s pointing out that Aristotle might not have been called
“Aristotle.”
proposition has the property truth in that world. On Stalnaker’s view, that will not be the case. A
proposition has to exist to have either the truth-predicate or its negation apply. So, the
proposition that Socrates does not exist is not true in any world, and so not possible1. So, the
consequent of P2 is false if “possible”= possible1.
But:
Possible2= df ^x(Ǝw)Iwx. Possible2 applies to a proposition if and only if that proposition is
entailed by the maximal proposition w. Since w is a maximal proposition, I will hold between a
world and the proposition that p just in case p is entailed by w. So, suppose p is the proposition
(existing, of course) that Socrates does not exist. The world w is maximal. For every one of the
existing propositions, either it or its negation is entailed by w. So, the entailment holds between a
world in which Socrates does not exist and the proposition that Socrates does not exist.
A proposition may be true IN a world by having the predicate ^x◊T x true of it: There is a world
in which x is true. A proposition may be true OF a world by having the predicate ^xƎwIwx true
of it: There is a world which entails it.
You might ask, “How can a world where Socrates does not exist, and so where there are
no propositions about Socrates, entail that Socrates does not exist?” Given contingent
propositions, there are actual possible worlds (properties) and merely possible possible worlds.
Actual possible worlds are maximal actual propositions, so since “Socrates does not exist” is an
actual proposition, either it or its negation is entailed by every actual possible world. If he did not
exist, a different set of possible worlds, than the one ones that exist would be actual.
So, “Socrates does not exist” will be true OF, entailed by, only worlds in which he does
not exist. IN such worlds, the proposition will not exist, and so the truth-predicate will not apply
it. So, paradoxically, perhaps (p.46, bottom), if propositions exist contingently, then: “The
singular proposition Socrates does not exist is a proposition that will be true of or entailed by
only possible worlds in which that proposition does not exist….the truth-predicate will not apply
to any proposition in a possible world in which that proposition does not exist.”
Notice that if propositions exist necessarily, as numbers do, possible1 and possible2 have the
same extension, since every proposition exists in every world. S’s dissolution of the Plantinga
argument is an application of the idea that propositions and properties may be contingent
existents.
Bear in mind that on the minimal theory of propositions, what it is for a propositions to
exist in a world is not always a matter of whether singular terms refer. “Either Socrates is a
philosopher or someone other than Socrates is” expresses the proposition that there are
philosophers. That proposition may be true in worlds in which Socrates does not exist, so that
neither disjunct is true in that world
III Chapter 3 Haecceitism
This is dialectically the most intricate chapter of the book. The chapter, and Appendix D
which is one of its supplements, ends up inconclusively, with questions about what metaphysical
differences amount to. S’s interest is partly to work out the connections between anti-haecceitism
and other metaphysical commitments. He hopes his propositional framework will provide a
neutral framework for such investigation.
The anti-haecceitist appears to be able to talk about merely possible objects without
appealing to metaphysical exotica while retaining the idea that propositions exist necessarily
rather than contingently. Subjects of distinct singular propositions are necessarily qualitatively
distinct, since there is no other way to distinguish entities, that is, there are no haecceities. So,
given that we can express all the qualitative properties of entities, we can express all
propositions. And of course, there would exist propositions about all of them.13
Haecceitists supply an answer to questions about what it takes for an entity to be the same
as an actual entity in another possible world. How do we know that it is Humphrey winning the
election in that other possible world? The issue is whether direct reference is reducible to a
qualitative definite description. According to the discussion in Chapter 1, where there could be
multiple entities filling a maximally specific role, S’s answer is “no.” The anti-haecceitist says
“yes.”
The question is not whether there is a property unique to each individual, since “is
identical to Fred” for instance, is a property recognized by everyone and necessarily satisfied
only by Fred. Such property-terms, though, are not described in purely qualitative terms, since
their specified satisfaction conditions make reference to an individual. However, those references
to an individual and so satisfaction-conditions are reducible to purely qualitative conditions,
according to the anti-haecceitist.
Anti-haecceitism, intuitively, is the view that all individual identity is reducible to
qualitative features. So, if there is such a reduction of merely possible objects to purely
qualitative descriptions, world-properties are never generic. A full description of every possible
world is accessible to us. That is, a complete qualitative containment-property with existentially-
quantified claims about individuals specifies a single world. “Witnesses” are given by
description, according to anti-haecceitism.
But there are different ways of trying to express anti-haecceitism, which do not sort
views in the same way into the haecceitist and anti-haecceitist.
Section 1: David Kaplan’s version
13
Haecceitists have focused on essences for merely possible individuals as a way of avoiding
contingently existing propositions, but, as S points out, there is equally a question about
contingently existing properties, even purely qualitative ones. Propositions attributing such
properties would likewise be contingent for another reason, according to S’s view. For purposes
of discussion S supposes that there is a realm of primary qualitative properties all of which exist
necessarily.
Kaplan re-introduced this Medieval Latin term into philosophy in “How to Russell a
Frege-Church,” (1975). The haecceitist allows irreducible identity of individuals across possible
worlds, while the anti-haecceitist denies this. For the anti-haecceitist, singular propositions are
reducible to purely qualitative propositions. S takes Kaplan’s “puzzling remark,” “Although the
Anti-Haecceitist may seem to assert that no possible individual exists in more than one possible
world, that view is properly reserved for the Haecceitist who holds to an unusually rigid brand of
metaphysical determinism,” as an opportunity to disentangle metaphysics and semantics.
Lewis, remember, held, from an Aristotelian perspective, exactly the view that Kaplan
reserves for this Haecceitist. If we think of essence as “what it would be to be” a particular thing,
then in those terms Lewis’s individuals have all their features essentially. Ryo and Jared brought
this up when we were reading Lewis. Of course, by Lewis’ analysis of “essential property” as a
property that all of an entity’s counterparts have, the claim is false.
But a philosopher could reject Lewis’ analysis of modality as remarks about counterparts
while granting that there are closely resembling individuals in other worlds. If she agreed with
Lewis that there could be distinct absolutely indiscernible worlds, she would be a haecceitist
without even supposing that there is any property other than identity-with-this-world-bound-
individual.14 Metaphysically, it is difficult to see any difference between the views. The question
is whether analysis of possibility and necessity in terms of counterparts really captures our modal
intuitions. That is sort of what this chapter is about.
Section 2: Robert Merrihew Adams’ version
Adams starts with the trivial property “^x(x= Fred).” Adams’ anti-haecceitist holds that
being Fred is reducible to purely qualitative properties. Adams is explicit that his notion of
haecceity presupposes that there is a principled distinction between properties that are qualitative
and others.
Section 3: David Lewis’ version
David Lewis interprets haecceitism as a denial of supervenience. One would expect that
this denial of supervenience would be the denial that singular propositions supervene on purely
qualitative propositions. This sort of anti-haecceitist, however, would hold that the identity of an
14
In class, we may not have sufficiently emphasized that Lewis’ counterpart relations are his
way of treating de re necessities and possibilities. When you wish to say that it is Humphrey that
could have won, Lewis’ substitute is that there is a world in which a counterpart of Humphrey
won. So you don’t need individuals being the same in different worlds. The counterpart relation
is not part of the metaphysical reality, but rather part of our interpretation of that reality. There
are lots of candidate relations that would be counterpart relations. So, a de re possibility will be
relative to a choice of counterpart relations. The counterpart relations allow us to represent the
intuitive fact that Humphrey could have won. It will be an objective fact, relative to a counterpart
relation, that Humphrey could have won. But the metaphysical facts are just the worlds that there
are.
individual is completely determined by its intrinsic and relational properties. This would mean
that there could not be two indiscernible worlds. Lewis thinks this would be an unmotivated
assumption.15 So, for Lewis, there could well be distinct entities which shared all relational and
intrinsic properties, i.e. which inhabited distinct possible worlds.
Metaphysically speaking, if there are duplicate worlds, Lewis would malgre lui be a
haecceitist. What, after all, makes an entity in one duplicate world distinct from any of the two
hundred thirty entities in the other two hundred thirty duplicate worlds? Nothing except its
distinctness, its being it. This distinctness is not a matter of any qualitative difference. Lewis,
though, interprets haecceitism to be directed at how we talk about entities when representing de
re necessities and possibilities about them, not what they are. So, his question is whether our
representing Humphrey de re is reducible to qualitative differences or not.
From S’s perspective, where possible worlds are ways a world might be, absolutely
indiscernible distinct worlds would make no sense. A property is a truth-condition, and
indiscernible worlds have indiscernible truth-conditions. So, S will treat Lewis as if he were an
anti-haecceitist who held that there were no indiscernible worlds. Generally, he calls such
theories “Lewisian,” not attributing them to Lewis himself.
Section 4: Suchness and Thisness: What does “qualitative” mean?
15
Given that there is one world with a certain distribution of features, etc., why could there not
be any number whatsoever of duplicate worlds? You would think the Lewis could argue as
follows, from his Humean Principle that there are no necessary connections between distinct
existences: If there could not be distinct duplicate worlds, then it would be necessary of every
world that it differed in some way from every other. Worlds, though, are distinct existences. So,
there must be pluralities of indiscernible worlds. But Lewis’ account of necessity would treat the
necessity as just a fact that there are no duplicate worlds. Lewis generally has such a way out.
You might think there is an argument for indiscernible worlds. It seems there could be
such—why not? Remember our discussion of the Principle of Plenitude. That Principle removes
the possibility that the possible worlds there are is just a brute fact, so that there might not be
possible worlds in which Humphrey won, just because there happen not to be any. The principle
of plenitude required validation by the principle of recombination, motivated only by his
acceptance of the Humean Principle that there are no necessary connections among distinct
beings. Since there are no such necessary connections, there must be the possibilities that the
principle of recombination generates. So, there must be such possible worlds.
Is there an application of recombination that would generate duplicate worlds?
Peter van Inwagen’s “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds” was a tu quoque argument that
Lewis’ commitment to sets was as mysterious as “magical ersatzism.” Another consequence of
the Inwagen essay is that the relation between entities and their unit sets appears to violate the
Humean Principle. Could you have had a different unit set? In Parts of Classes Lewis of course
rephrases this in terms of whether counterparts have unit sets that are also counterparts. He
thinks perhaps not. Since the relation cannot be internal, it must be external. But what external
feature could link a unit set to an individual or to set? To me, the relation between an entity and
its unit set, given that one is a realist about sets, puts real pressure on Hume’s Principle, in the
sense that Lewis has to take it on faith to resist the intuition that there is a necessary connection.
What do Lewis and Adams have in mind by “qualitative”? S suggests 1) primary and
secondary properties, basic physical properties (charge and charm), and 2) natural and artificial
kind terms: Being a lion, being a 2007 Chevrolet Impala, and the like.
With kind-terms the distinction becomes problematic. Being a 2007 Chevy Impala may
make essential reference to General Motors. Perhaps Chevys cannot be Toyota products. Maybe
tigers have to have a causal connection with Earthly tigers. 3) Dispositional properties are also
problematic as purely qualitative, since, prima facie, they are modal properties. The serious
problems with “qualitative” are about modal properties, of which dispositonal properties would
be a subset. 4) Spatial and temporal properties and relations. Is “being four feet away from
something” a purely qualitative property? What do you mean “qualitative”? The likely candidate
criterion is “does not require proper names for its expression.” The “mighty language” section
explores this possibility.
S is suspicious of this kind of account of entities by describing the language used to
specify them. One is reminded of “the smallest positive integer not describable in fewer than
twelve words.” Both Lewis and Adams propose such criteria. Lewis proposes his “mighty
language,” about which more below. Adams proposes excluding “proper” predicates such as
“pegasizes.” The trouble with Adams’ criterion is that it presupposes an understanding of
“proper” which could only be explicated by “refers to an individual rather than being purely
qualitative.” Circular, as S observes.
Section 5: The mighty language
In order to model the difference between the haecceitist and the anti-haecceitist, S adds a
Lewisian mighty language to the minimal account of propositions. All of the primitive predicates
of the mighty language are purely qualitative. Its predicates represent every qualitative
distinction. It is a modal language with a Kripkean semantics. S wants this language to be
compatible with both haecceitism and anti-haecceitism, so that the issue can be addressed in a
common framework.16 Some of its models will be metaphysically exactly like Lewis’ conception
of possible worlds—each world will have its exclusive domain. The language also can represent
counterpart-relations, and so represent Lewis’ account of possible worlds.17 Other models will
have the same domain for every world, as in Linsky and Zalta (see Chapter 4) thus treating all
entities as existing necessarily.
S wants a framework which keeps the semantics separated from the metaphysics. Every
individual has a rigidly designating proper name, and there are no other kinds of singular terms.
S simplifies by supposing that all the purely qualitative properties and propositions exist
necessarily. So, a purely qualitative description can be defined as one with no proper names. The
anti-haecceitist, according to Adams’ account, holds that every thisness, every property like ^x(
x=Fred), is reducible to a purely qualitative description.
16
See Appendix C for the demonstration that it is so.
17
See Appendix D.
That individuals have rigidly designating names assumes that we can identify individuals
across possible worlds.18 So the mighty language does not fit Kaplan’s characterization of the
anti-haecceitist. There will be a fact of the matter whether an object in one possible world is the
same as an object in another. Bear in mind that while the framework allows identification across
worlds, in Lewis-appropriate models no such identifications are true.
The difficulty in using the mighty language to characterize the anti-haecceitist view
comes from predicates that are not tied to individuals, but express modal properties. Consider the
predicate “has no sons but might have had seven sons, the seventh of whom is a lawyer who
might have been a plumber instead.” (p.64) Is this a purely qualitative predicate and does its
existential quantification express a purely qualitative proposition?
There is a problem both if such modal properties are counted as qualitative and a
problem if they are not counted as qualitative. Suppose that the anti-haecceitist’s notion of
“purely qualitative” does include some modal predicates. Then, given two worlds that are
duplicates as far as their non-modal features go, and given that we can identify objects across
possible worlds, the worlds might differ qualitatively. A pair of non-modally duplicate objects
might, in other worlds be distinguished because one can do something the other cannot. So
what? Then these modal properties are not grounded in non-modal properties. So what? S
observes that having primitive modal properties floating free of non-modal properties “seems
incompatible with the spirit of anti-haecceitism” and it is surely true that Lewis would not allow
modal properties to be ungrounded in non-modal properties.19
If the modal predicates do not express purely qualitative properties, then the non-modal
predicates determine all of the modal properties of an object, according to the anti-haecceitist.
So, the anti-haecceitist must hold that the only differences in worlds and in individuals are non-
modal differences. Since there are no (Lewisian, not strictly Lewis’) indiscernible worlds,20 there
is exactly one object that has all the qualitative properties and relations that a given object has,
and that object is in its world. (While the framework takes for granted that objects could exist in
more than one world, the anti-haecceitist models rule that out. Given that any modal differences
supervene on non-modal differences (and so may be qualitative, but not both qualitative and
primitive) no entity could have been any different from what it is. This is the metaphysical view
we ascribed to Lewis at the end of the discussion of Section 1, supporting Jared and Ryo.
The anti-haecceitist, then, in order to accommodate the obvious truth that these dice, for
instance, could have landed differently, would have to use Lewis’ counterpart theory, so that the
truth would be analyzed as another entity in another world landing differently. But, as Kaplan
18
Note that we can, but in fact in Lewis-imitating models, no such identifications will be correct.
19
But couldn’t an anti-haecceitist also be an actualist and modal primitivist? This would mean
treating “might have been a frog” as a primitive modal predicate. In principle, an anti-haecceitist
could say that it is within God’s power to create an entity with this possibility and create a
distinct entity exactly like it in all non-modal features without this possibility. Whether an
actualist anti-haecceitist could then accept the identity of indiscernibles while accommodating
the intuition that it is false is a topic below.
20
By S’s adjustment to Lewis’ actual view.
and Lewis agree, counterpart relations are not strictly part of the metaphysics, but something we
posit by choosing a counterpart relation. De re modalities are relative to a choice of counterpart
relation.
So, we haven’t got a framework in which to formulate the metaphysical thesis of anti-
haecceitism. The idea of defining “qualitative” as “has no occurrences of singular terms” will
not keep out modal predicates as qualitative, and so will not be acceptable to anti-haecceitists
like Lewis. The notion of “purely qualitative” has not really been clarified by the “mighty
language” metaphor. So try something else.
Section 6 Property-spaces
Given the difficulties in specifying “purely qualitative” in linguistic terms via the mighty
language, S tries to construct the idea directly in terms of properties, supposing that the notion of
“qualitative property” is clear. The device he uses is a property space. Property-spaces are
generalizations of descriptions of physical space by Cartesian coordinates. That is, supposing a
Newtonian absolute space, one can specify a location by giving a triple of numbers, one for each
dimension. The “property-space” generalization adds dimensions, one for each qualitative
category.21 So, for instance, you could represent temperature in addition to location by adding
another “dimension.” The dimensions really amount to nothing much more than another n-tuple
of numbers encoding a qualitative feature that may allow of degrees.22
So, take this picture and extend it to every kind of quality. This will represent every entity
as an n-tuple of m-tuples of numbers specifying all of its qualitative features, that is, all the
qualitative features there are that it has. Such a “space,” by the way, will treat physical spatial
location itself as a qualitative feature of an object, and so as a dimension in the abstract space.
Relations would be represented as pairs of points on a dimension, so “warmer than” will
be a set of pairs of points on the “hot” dimension. S wants to avoid commitment to the
reducibility of relations to intrinsic features. His strategy is the one he has used before—define
an equivalence relation which will just preserve relationships, rather than the particular numbers.
So, “are not in the same plane” will be defined, not in terms of a set of quadruples of numbers,
but rather as a set of sets of quadruples of numbers which keep the same things in the same
relative positions.
A very intuitive diagram of a “rotation” which yields different numbers but the same
relationships is in S’s “Anti-Essentialism,” reprinted in Ways a World Might Be, on page 83.
That same essay says what S means by “real relations” and “real intrinsic properties.” The
contrast is with conventional properties. So, assuming a relational account of space, being to the
right of is not a real property, since it is not invariant under the equivalence relation. In other
21
I am of course suspicious of the picture, since so many features of things seem to be off or on
rather than places on a dimension. We had the same problem in evaluating Lewis’ claim that
being six feet tall was an intrinsic property rather than a relation between an entity and a time.
22
There could be other qualitative dimensions that are, as it were, binary, so that every entity had
either a 1 or a 0. “Cute” might be such, imaginably.
terms, for this case: Some allowable rotations preserve the real relations among points, but do
not preserve “to the right of” relations. Those depend on which rotation you have in mind.
The conventional-real distinction is akin to what is the case with Lewis’ counterpart
relations, and therefore with Lewis’ entire account of modality. The choice of counterpart
relation is basically up to us. Given a counterpart relation, there will be objective facts about
what, for instance Humphrey could have done, but there is no metaphysical fact, just as being to
the right of is an objective feature, given an element of the equivalence-class representing a
spatial relationship. So counterpart-theory makes modal properties not really part of
metaphysical reality.
A possible world will then be represented by the quality-space model as a function which
maps individuals in a domain to points in the quality-space. The point assigned to Fred will be a
complete census of Fred’s qualitative features. (Remember that the points are points in an n-
dimensional space, where n is the total number of qualitative dimension there are. Bear in mind
that physical spatial location is a particular one of those dimensions.) A first approximation of
the anti-haecceitist idea is that no two individuals are assigned to the same point in the quality-
space.
S finds two ways this falls short of capturing the haecceitist idea:
1) S uses his earlier example of the two indiscernible dice. If they both land on six, they, by the
conditions of the example, which restricts what qualities there are to how the dice land, these are
two dice with exactly the same position in the quality space (appropriately restricted). This “toy”
example might not convince. Realistically, distinct dice will have distinct locations, one would
expect. So, to rule out coinciding dice, you would have to add something like “no two physical
entities occupy the same space at the same time.” This would be a controversial metaphysical
claim.23
2) If there were modal features irreducible to qualitative properties, two entities could differ even
though they were at the same point in the quality-space. Modal properties raise a problem again.
If modal properties were determined by qualitative properties, modal properties would be
reducible to non-modal properties. S denies that there is any such reducibility. Lewis takes a
theory’s appeal to “primitive modality” to be a crushing objection to various alternatives to his
view. As we will see below, this is the fundamental issue between Lewis and S. Lewis wants to
keep the intrinsic features of a world separate from the modal “features.” The modal “features”
are objective, but only relative to a pragmatic choice of counterpart relation. S holds that you
cannot separate features of a world from features of that world’s relation to other worlds, that is,
an entity’s modal features.
Both of these ways that the property-space model fails could be corrected by removing
the subjects which might have other properties independently of purely qualitative ones. S
23
A person and a collection of person-stages are different objects, but might fill exactly the same
space and time. Non-physical objects would be another problem. Peter van Inwagen, among
many others, would want to allow that three distinct persons are identical as one substance, for
instance.
suggests treating points as either occupied or not, but not occupied by anything. “Occupied”
would express the property “physically exists.”24
Since Lewis takes “is a being” to be a count-noun, an entity-constituting feature, the
“bundle theory,” the idea that entities are nothing over and above coalitions of properties, is not
really available to him. As S puts it, given Lewis’s nominalism, according to which properties
are sets of entities in the possible worlds and propositions are sets of possible worlds, Lewis’
metaphysics would “swallow itself,” (p. 71). Properties are sets of entities; entities are
collocations of properties. S’s Ouroboros metaphor is the only one I can remember in
philosophical writing.
Lewis’ anti-haecceitism is S’s focus, but the issue is more general. An actualist might be
an anti-haecceitist. Lewis says that causal relations might not be reducible to purely qualitative
features. S is pretty sure that Lewis is committed to reducing causal relations and dispositions to
purely qualitative features. Otherwise, Lewis’ Humean Principle, that there are no necessary
connections between independent existences, which implies his Humean supervenience, would
be violated. Lewis’ anti-haecceitism would, prima facie, be unmotivated if he thought modal
properties were irreducible to intrinsic qualities. In fact, it would be hard to maintain that
irreducible modal properties make sense unless an entity could exist in other possible worlds.
S does not see a knock-down argument that you cannot be a Humean superveniencist
without being committed to anti-haecceitism. Commitment or not, S characterizes the basic idea
of Lewis’ view as the thesis that intrinsic properties of worlds (maximal sets of world-mates)
must be kept separate from relations of worlds to one another. Since “relations of worlds to one
another” are modal properties, this is the thesis that modal properties supervene (but
conventionally, relative to a choice of counterpart relation) on intrinsic properties.
S, of course, taking modal properties to be irreducible, as well as thinking that the notion
of “qualitative intrinsic property” is not so clear, thinks this separation is a mistake. He accepts
primitive modality, as we remember from Chapter 1.
Section 7: Identity of Indiscernibles
What is S’s view on the general thesis of identity of indiscernibles? Given that “ways a
world could be” are possible worlds, S’s conception of possible worlds as properties commits
him to the identity of indiscernible worlds. What about indiscernible individuals? The
indiscernible individuals we have encountered before are in Chapter 1, in the discussion of
Kripke’s imaginary dice. The possibility that one die comes up 6 and the other 5 is one actual
24
I cannot see any clear argument that “physically exists” could not itself be a purely qualitative
property. It does have only two degrees, 0 and 1, but having a finite number of values is common
to fundamental physical properties, like color charge, as well. So, different possible worlds
would just be different quality-spaces, I guess. But “Pegasizes” and “Socratizes” would also get
in, contrary to Adams’ view, being binary, as it were. I share S’s suspicions about the notion of
“purely qualitative.” I suspect its home is sensible qualities of the medium-sized object world,
which may have little to do with a modern realist’s fundamental reality.
possibility, even though there would be two possibilities corresponding to it if it were actual. The
dice, as merely possible objects, are not actually indiscernible, but would be discernible and
distinct if actual. For an actualist, indiscernibles are possibly distinct, but actually identical. This
would reflect the equivalence-classes by which points in the Kripke semantics are collapsed.
Is actual indiscernibility identity? Remember S’s contextualism about the “grain” that
treating possible worlds as maximal containment properties. S is skeptical about there being a
fundamental single articulation. Different “grains” would yield different notions of
“indiscernible.” We have already seen that “purely qualitative,” which is crucial to the
haecceitism debate, is obscure. So, this section is an investigation of the connections between
counterfactuals and haecceitism that discussion of the identity of indiscernibles illuminates.
Lewis is explicitly not committed to the identity of indiscernibles worlds, but the
modified Lewis (“the Lewisian” that S has been discussing, which disregards indiscernible
worlds) is. If worlds are properties, and properties are understood as satisfaction-conditions, the
idea that distinct worlds could have the same satisfaction conditions is unintelligible.
However, Adams, who treats “qualitative” as clear, has an argument against the identity
of indiscernibles, a doctrine which he takes to be essential to anti-haecceitism. Remember that
anti-haecceitism is a way out of S’s view that properties and propositions exist contingently. If it
can be made sense of and plausible, anti-haecceitism would allow that we could talk about mere
possibilities by description.
The image with which the identity of indiscernibles is debated goes back more than sixty
years, to an article by Max Black in 1952. Adams adapts the Black argument. We are supposed
to imagine two qualitatively similar iron spheres in a space separated by some distance. They are
indiscernible, but distinct, since each is at a distance from the other. S notes that it is only on a
moderate relational view of space, where one situation is a rotation of the other, and so
equivalent, that the argument works. On the moderate relational view, there is a real shape to
space. If we suppose absolute space, the spheres have different locations, and so are discernible.
If we suppose that space is completely ideal, so that there is no objective difference between a
space which folds in upon itself and a space which is Euclidean, the argument does not work
because the “two” objects are only distinct relative to an arbitrary choice of how to think of
space.
So, the counter-argument to identity of indiscernibles depends on a metaphysics of
individuals which can stand in symmetric relations, share all “intrinsic properties and qualitative
relational properties,” yet be distinct.
Adams enhances the intuition that there are distinct spheres by populating them with
duplicate people who observe each other. He takes there to be an obvious difference between that
scenario and one where there is a single world with a mirror-phenomenon. The differences
would be different counterfactuals being true and different causal relations obtaining. Such
differences will not move a Lewisian, since all such counterfactuals and relations supervene on
purely qualitative properties.
Adams claims that anti-haecceitism and the identity of indiscernibles go together. If you
hold one, you have to hold the other. Lewis is an apparent counterexample, since he allows
indiscernible worlds. Such indiscernible worlds would have metaphysically distinct individuals.
Also, Lewis positively endorses indiscernible individuals.25 So, Lewis would allow there to be a
metaphysical fact about distinctness, not fitting Kaplan’s definition of anti-haecceitism, since
there is a metaphysical fact about whether an object in one world is the same as an object in
another, while fitting Adams’ definition of anti-haecceitism, since the distinctness of his distinct
individuals does not rest on qualitative differences.
Reminder: Adams’s version of haecceitism is that “thisness” is not reducible to
“suchness.” Lewis agrees that thisness is not reducible to suchness. Kaplan’s version is that there
is no identification of individuals across possible worlds. Lewis agrees that there is no
identification of individuals across possible worlds. So S asks, “Could we accept primitive
identity while rejecting cross-world identities that are not defined relative to a counterpart-
relation that is itself grounded in the qualitative similarities and differences of individuals?”
(p.78)
Adams has an argument to show that you cannot. He develops the intuition that there
could be absolutely indiscernible but distinct individuals. He in effect takes Lewis’ appeal to
partiality (in response to the challenge that Lewis’ possible worlds realism makes ethical action
nonsense) and applies it to the case of the duplicate worlds. Individuals on the distinct world will
have different responses to the disappearance of their counterparts. This response uses Lewis’
idea that we have concern only for our world to distinguish the situations where one rather than
the other duplicate individual vanishes.26 Each will regard herself as Lucky versus Unlucky,
depending on which happens. But there then has to be a difference between one happening and
the other happening. For future reference: W1 is a world with indiscernible entities, C and P,
where nothing bad happens. W2 is just like W1 up to a time t, but C ceases to exist at t while P
continues. So, in this world P is Lucky and C is Killed. W3 is just like W2, except that it is P
who ceases to exist. C is Lucky and P is Killed. Surely, C and P have preferences about which
happens. (Note that “C” and “P” are like the first die and the second die in S’s Kripke
examples—they are just our labels.)27
This argument, as is usual in philosophy, not entirely conclusive. Lewis can apply the
strategy that he uses to accommodate haecceitist intuitions (next section). Lewis can say that
25
Remember Lewis’ Nietzschean possible worlds with eternal recurrence with the structure of
the negative and positive integers, that is, with no endpoint and no beginning. Then an infinity of
less-than-world-sized entities, including people, galaxies, and nations, would be absolutely
indiscernible, but distinct.
26
This is a topic on which I think Lewis was very insightful. For a Kantian, partiality is a
problem. For Lewis, it is a datum, as it is for Carol Gilligan. I feel somewhat bad about the
destruction of the Athenian army at Syracuse, but less bad than I feel when the New England
Patriots lose.
27
In mythology, Castor and Pollux are not actually identical twins, since they have different
fathers. A widespread folk belief is that twins come from different fathers.
there is just one possible world being described, but, within that world, call it W2,3, multiple
possibilities for entities in that world.28
Lewis, in the section “Against Haecceity” of OTPOW directly addressed the lucky and
unlucky twins. The key idea is that possibilities for an individual need not be whole worlds. An
entity can have counterparts in its own world which counterparts can represent possibilities for
him. So, in the case of the twins on the spheres: There are two possible worlds, one with
indiscernible inhabitants C and P and one with inhabitants K and L (for “killed” and “lucky”).
<C, P>, the pair W1, have both the pair <K, L> and the pair <L,K> as counterpart in the other.
The pair itself, since it preserves the relation between C and P,29 has counterparts, as well as the
individuals having counterparts. So, C prefer that the second possibility, W2, obtain. But the two
possibilities are a single world, the world where one of a pair of twins is destroyed.
Section 8: Cheap haecceitism
This is a difficult section.
Lewis’ way out of the identity of indiscernibles is also his way of accommodating
haecceitistic intuitions. You can represent counterfactual possibilities by means of counterparts
within a single world. Why is this topic of interest to S? S is a haecceitist who holds that there
are propositions which are irreducibly singular. That’s why there’s a problem with mere
possibilities in the first place. If one could get the effect of haecceitism while being an anti-
haecceitist, that might be the way to go, given that contingently-existing propositions are a
theoretical cost.30
Let’s review what an actualist anti-haecceitist theorist would hold: She would agree with
S that worlds are ways the world could be. She would hold that all possibilities are about existing
properties, relations and individuals. Her disagreement would be about whether it is possible to
have two entities with all the same qualitative features and relations. So, GWB’s son, precisely
enough specified, is not a role several individuals could play, but a possible individual we can
28
Here it is especially useful to re-read Lewis’ section 4 of Chapter 4, “Against Haecceitism”
especially pages 232-233. Lewis takes a remark like “If I were Fred, I would be in Florida now”
to be not about another possible world, but about this world. Fred and I are counterparts in this
world, being both humans. Since any property a counterpart has is one I might have had,
including, in this case, being identical with Fred, there is a possibility for me, represented by
Fred, a world-mate, that I could have been Fred. But the counterpart representing that possibility
is in this world.
29
Why this matters: From Appendix C: Suppose Hilary and Chelsea each have two counterparts
H1, H2 and C1,C2. H1 is the mother of C1; H2 is the mother of C2. Then even though each of
the pair <H1, C2> are counterparts of Hilary and Chelsea, that pair is not a counterpart of the
mother-daughter pair.
30
Leaving aside the question of properties which don’t exist in some worlds, which S has put
aside at the beginning of the chapter.
refer to using equipment from the actual world. Could she use Lewis’ Cheap Haecceities to
accommodate the intuition that there could be two indiscernible individuals?
Delia Fara attacks the coherence of Lewis’ Cheap Haecceities. Her example of a case
where you would have very plausible multiple counterparts in the same world is Lewis’ example
of a recurring universe with the structure of the integers, infinite in both directions. She
combines that idea with the idea that each recurring world-episode would itself have multiple
simultaneous duplicate regions. In such a world, she would have multiple counterparts in the
same world.
Suppose some of those duplicate regions have a catastrophe happen while others in the
same world do not. Is there a problem with a survivor representing counterfactual possibilities by
appeal to counterparts in the same world?
Fara’s argument that there is a problem invokes a modal logic with an actuality operator.
What is an actuality operator, and what does it do? The actuality operator is an add-on to modal
logic which makes a sentence true at a world w if and only if it is true in the actual world.31 “In
any possible world w, ACTϕ [@ϕ] is true there if and only if the embedded sentence ϕ is true in
the actual world.”32 What difference does “@” make? Well, “[](Wh ->Wh)” is true, since in
every possible world, in which Humphrey won, he won. But “[](Wh ->@Wh)” is false, since it is
possible that Humphrey won, so true in some worlds, but false in the actual world.
So, the survivor and non-survivor: C survived but might not have, in the world in
question, W2,3. (Sc /\ ◊¬Sc) Since “◊¬Sc” is in virtue of that possibility being represented by an
actual-world counterpart of C being destroyed, we can insert “@” and get (@Sc /\ ◊@¬Sc). But
◊@¬Sc) entails @-Sc. If there is a possible world in which @¬Sc is true, then since @¬Sc is
only true in a world if ¬Sc is true in the actual world, ¬Sc. So, “Sc /\¬Sc” is true. Not good.
Apart from the fact that Lewis rejects modal logic, and so perforce rejects modal logic
plus “@,” what is the bearing of this on the possibility of an actualist borrowing the counterpart
idea and using Lewis’ Cheap Haecceitism to avoid having contingently existing propositions?
Can she avoid Fara’s argument?
The issue gets a bit intricate, and S leaves a lot here as an exercise for the reader.
First, an advocate of Cheap Haecceitism would say there is something fishy about using the “@”
operator, which makes what is the case in actuality true at other possible worlds, to talk about
31
It is not clear to me whether S would have any use for this operator. Being true “at” a world is,
for S, ambiguous between being true IN a world and being true OF a world. The actuality
operator is defined by “true in,” or by rejecting the distinction. Either way, every proposition that
is actual according to S will be in any other possible world. “@” is at home in theories where all
propositions exist in every world, such as the Linsky-Zalta theory described below.
S also has other ways of handling the kinds of sentences that “@” is said to be required
for: We will see in Chapter 4 below that S deals with “There could be something that does not
exist” by using his distinction between “true of” and “true in” and contingently-existing
propositions.
32
“Counterpart Theory and the Actuality Operator,” Ulrich Meyer, Mind, forthcoming.
this brand of Lewisian possibility which is about possibilities represented in this world. What
should an actuality operator do when possibilities are represented in the same world?
The theorist wanting to use counterparts while denying the identity of indiscernibles
needs to interpret “possibly actual” as “actual.” How can she do this in the context of a general
account of possibilities and necessities as explicated by counterpart relations? You need an @-
operator which makes ◊@φ equivalent to @φ. But this has to be a special case. Otherwise, you
will not be able to use counterparts to talk about possibilities that are not actual.
The direct way is to interpret “@” as selecting a counterpart relation which maps
individuals to themselves. This means that you explicitly treat counterpart relations as functions
from a possible entity to a possible entity, rather than as rough characterizations of features that
make, for instance, Merkel a counterpart of Obama. Within one’s own world, you are a
counterpart of yourself, but you may have others, as Fara does in the recurring worlds. Different
counterpart relations will yield different values for different functions, and so will generate
different pairs.
So, to talk about possibilities as the existence of counterparts, you need to take into
account not only the world you’re looking for a counterpart in, but also the particular counterpart
relation, relative to which a is a counterpart of b. So, the objects such a theory posits are pairs of
worlds and counterpart relations, not just worlds. So, the counterpart relation which, within a
world, maps individuals to themselves (defined as “normal” in Appendix D33) would treat
“possibly a frog” as “is a frog.” When you are taken to be your own counterpart to explain
possibilities, the possibilities will be restricted to ones that are actualities. By that interpretation
of the @-operator for smaller-than-world possibilities, you seem to escape the Fara problem.
This will not help, though, when there are two normal (i.e. ones which take an entity to
the same entity) counterparts of each of the destroyed and lucky persons. This would be the case
from the point of view of w1 in which C and P are counterparts of themselves, but also each have
two counterparts in the actual (w2,3) world, namely Lucky and Unlucky.
So, in w2,3, Lucky survives and Unlucky is destroyed. Their possibilities of surviving
and being destroyed, respectively, are represented by themselves. @ is being interpreted as the
special counterpart relation that takes individuals to themselves and also as an operator that
makes whatever is true in the actual world (w2,3) true in another world (w1).
So, it is true of C in w1 that it is destroyed since its Unlucky counterpart is destroyed in
w2,3 and thus by @ true in w1, and true of C in w1 that it is not destroyed, since its Lucky
counterpart is not destroyed in w2,3, and thus by the @ relation true in w1. The “actuality” part
of the @-operator, combined with the interpretation of it as the counterpart relation that maps
individuals to themselves, allows that in w1 C is both destroyed and not destroyed. So, the fix of
interpreting the @-operator as restricting the counterpart relation does not fix.
33
Appendix D is a detailed description of the semantics for Cheap Haecceitism. Here I’ve tried
to give the core ideas and how they work. Since adopted Cheap Haecceitism still doesn’t work
and so is not really central to any results, I’m not going to discuss Appendix D in detail.
The remainder of this section gets back to issues from earlier in the book. This whole
business about C and P is akin to the discussion of Kripke’s dice. In reality, C and P are
identical, since we as actualists have no resources to discriminate them. So, S will regard the
world with indiscernible Castor and Pollux as a single world, as Lewis does. (C and P are just
like the dice, which might land die 1=5, die 2 = 6 or die 1=6, die 2 =5.) At this point, since the
haecceitist and the actualist anti-haecceitist are so much in accord, the metaphysical significance
of the difference is obscure.
An analogous thing happens in Appendix C. which gives a semantics for the “Mighty
Language.” Logically or syntactically, there is nothing to prevent adding a qualitative predicate,
a suchness, whenever you need a thisness. Absent some criterion of “qualitative” there is no
logical difference between Plantinga’s essences and qualitative properties.
My take on this chapter is that S is of course a haecceitist of sorts, based primarily on
doubts about the whole foundation of the haecceitist/ anti-haecceitist discussion—the difference
between the qualitative properties of an object and other properties. So “Are properties such as
^x(x=Fred) reducible to purely qualitative properties?,” the question at issue, has no clear
answer. But S’s generalized account of propositions in a Kripkean semantics can make the issue
clear(er).
IV Chapter 4:
While Chapter 3 was about how S’s framework could illuminate metaphysical debates,
Chapter 4 is primarily examples of how metaphysical inferences from semantics that are
unsound and semantic theories proposed to accommodate metaphysical conclusions are not
needed.
The basic idea of the book is that you can be an actualist and hold that there might have
been things that don’t in fact exist without:
a) believing in primitive haecceities for merely possible objects
b) accepting individual essences
c) making all entities necessary existents
d) reducing propositions about individuals to purely qualitative propositions. (Anti-haecceitism)
While: “doing compositional semantics in the orthodox Kripkean way.” (Appendices A and B,
below)
S gives three examples where either metaphysical conclusions are unwarranted by a semantic
argument or semantic conclusions are unwarranted by a metaphysical view.
1) Hofweber argues from the semantic claim that there is direct reference to the metaphysical
claim that propositions depend for their existence on what they are about (the view Plantinga
calls “existentialism”).
Hofweber’s argument is that given direct (un-mediated by a Fregean sense or description)
reference of a name, the only contribution the name makes to the proposition is its reference. So,
if the object did not exist, neither would the proposition.
S agrees with Hofweber’s conclusion but thinks his argument is invalid. The “contribution” of a
directly referential term might mean “the referent is a constituent of the proposition,” as in
Russell, where the proposition expressed by “Fred is a frog” is the ordered pair <Fred, the
property of being a frog>.
A more inclusive account of “contribution” would use the notion of a propositional function, a
function from objects to propositions. “Is a frog” expresses a function mapping Fred onto the
proposition that Fred is a frog. (More on propositional functions and propositions below.)
So, by this more general account, the determination of the proposition by reference to the object
only succeeds if the object exists, but the proposition need not depend on the object existing. The
proposition that Socrates is mad and not mad exists in every world (the one contradictory
proposition) but can only be determined by a function from Socrates to that proposition in worlds
in which Socrates exists. The proposition does not depend for its existence on Socrates, but the
determination of the proposition via that propositional function does.
S’s analogy is that the determination of Barbara Bush by “the mother of” function being applied
to George W. Bush does not make her existence dependent on his.
2) Adams holds that there are no de re possibilities or necessities about non-actual individuals.
There are haecceities about actual individuals only. So, although “It is possible that Socrates
does not exist” is true, and “Socrates does not exist” is true at a world without Socrates, neither
“It is possible that Socrates does not exist” nor “It is not possible that Socrates does not exist” is
true at that world. Why? In virtue of the fact that Socrates does not exist at a Socrates-free world,
propositions about Socrates do not exist. Adams thinks that his metaphysics requires these
strange conclusions and a very “inconvenient” semantics. It is “inconvenient” because it has to
include clauses for special cases, Adams thinks.
S’s solution appeals to his distinction between being true OF a world and true IN a world. To
make this clear, he reviews Quine’s “Three Grades of Modal Involvement.” There is a difference
between “is false” and “is possible” (“F” and “P”) as predicates of propositions and negation and
◊ as operators on propositions—that is, mappings from propositions to other propositions.
So, if φ expresses a contingently existing proposition, neither [](◊φ ↔ Pπφ) nor [](¬φ↔Fπφ )
will be true. That is, a possibility proposition may be true of a world, but since it does not exist in
that world, the possibility-predicate does not apply to the proposition determined by that
sentence. The π-operator produces a term for the proposition that φ expresses.
So, [](¬Ea →¬◊Ea) is true, but [](¬Ea →¬PπEa) is false. Why? In the first expression, ¬◊Ea, Ea
is not a constituent of the proposition determined by the negation of the possibility operator.
“The proposition expressed by a complex sentence, such as ◊φ might exist in a world in which a
constituent of the sentence did not exist.” (p. 100) So, in every world in which Adams does not
exist, there is no possibility that he exist. If Adams did not exist, there would be no de re
possibility that he exists. Because there are no singular propositions about him.
In the second expression, the claim is that in every possible world, if Adams does not exist, then
the negation of the possibility-predicate applied to the proposition determined by “Adams exists”
would be true. But in worlds in which Adams does not exist, there is no proposition determined
by the π-operator applied to “Adams exists” and so there is nothing for the Possibility-predicate
or its negation to apply to. So, “Adams does not exist” is true of worlds in which he does not
exist, but not true in worlds in which he does not.
What S has supplied is an account according to which it is possible that Adams does not exist,
while there is no world in which Adams has the property of non-existence. The semantics he
supplies is compositional and needs no special clauses for special cases.
3) Fine’s puzzle is how to express the claim that Socrates is necessarily a man without saying
that Socrates is a necessary existent—that is, how to distinguish essential truths about entities
from necessarily existing entities. Various ideas use grades of necessity, etc.
S’s approach has a simpler way to distinguish necessary truths about objects, given that
they exist, from necessarily existing objects. It requires re-thinking quantification. For S, the
only variable-binder is predicate-abstraction, which takes complex sentences with free variables
and yields complex predicates. Then “All” and “some” apply to these complex predicates. So,
Ǝx(Fx/\Gx) is better written as Ǝ^x(Fx /\Gx). “Ǝ” is an operator/predicate that applies to a
complex predicate and yields a truth if the predicate is true of something.
I emphasize that S’s idea is along the same lines as Generalized Quantifiers and my
34
idea that quantifiers should be treated as predicates of classes. It is a substantial improvement
over the standard “logical” quantifiers, not least in terms of lending itself to a general account of
quantifiers and modals. If the variable-binding which generates the collection is distinct from the
operator (or predicate) that characterizes the collection, then all quantifiers get a uniform
treatment. “Five,” “almost all,” “most,” and complex quantifiers like “Just about as many as
there are first-graders” get a uniform treatment, in terms of form. S remains focused on “all” and
“some” and “exists” because those are the quantifiers that connect with “possibly” and
“necessarily.” His idea, however, could be applied to all the other quantifiers.35 If I had to single
out one thesis that is the most important and significant in this book, it is this much better way of
doing semantics.
S has only one kind of necessity, with one semantics. The barrier to using the same
necessity operator, prima facie, is that (where “E” is “exists” and “M” is “is a man” is that both
(Es v ¬Es) and []Ms being necessary, would mean that in every possible world, Socrates is a
man, which is not true in Socrates-free worlds. Both predicates applying to Socrates imply the
existence of Socrates: ^x(Ex v ¬Ex)s →Ǝx x=s and ^x([]Mx)s→Ǝx x=s.
34
Wheeler, 1972, 1978
35
Heim and Kratzer (Semantics in Generative Grammar, p.191) point out that it is only special
features of “all” and “some” that allow “All frogs are green” and “Some frogs are green” to be
represented as operators binding variables in truth-functionally compound predicates. “All” and
“some” are extreme cases of quantifiers. Likewise, “Necessarily” and “possibly” are extreme
cases of modals.
All S need do is to define the property of being essentially a man, using the existence predicate.
The expression ^x[](Ex →Mx) does the job: So Socrates has the property that necessarily, if he
exists, he is a man, so ^x[](Ex →Mx)s is true. But [](^xMx)s is false. It is not the case that in
every possible world, Socrates has the property of being a man.
So Fine’s distinction between necessity and transcendental necessity is gratuitous metaphysics
resolved by a correct semantics.
4) Proxy actualism
“Proxy actualism” is Bennett’s term for accounts of merely possible objects that supply
some kind of actual entity to sort of be the merely possible objects. Plantinga’s individual
essences and Linsky and Zalta’s non-concrete entities (appropriated by Williamson) are such
surrogates. S’s idea is different. As we will explain below, his way of doing semantics can be
translated into standard Tarskian semantics, but there are differences. Standard Tarskian
semantics treats all sentences as propositional functions from an infinite sequence to a
proposition. Open and closed sentences are treated in the same ways. S’s official semantics is
quite different, but is still compositional (i.e. a semantics that pairs semantic rules with syntactic
rules.) The key idea is the difference is how S treats complex predicates. We have had hints that
something will be different. Those hints will be turned into a theory in Appendix B. In the
section where he explains how his semantics does not have to “quantify over” merely possible
entities, he says that in order “to preserve the comfort of familiarity” (147) he will use Tarskian
semantics in Chapter 4.
On page 115 there is the formula : vs w (^xφ) ={d ε ___: Vs(d/x)w (φ) =1}
What is this? The issue S raises is: Should the “___” be the domain of a particular world Dw or
the union of the domains of all the worlds? First, what does the formula say?
It says that the semantic value (v) relative to a sequence s, relative to a world, of a predicate
formed by abstracting a complex predicate with one variable is the set of entities in either the
domain of all possible entities (U) or the domain of entities in w (Dw) such that, if they are
assigned as value for x in “φx”, yield a truth.
What is this about? Having every propositional function be a function from an infinite
sequence allows for φ to have any number of variables. In a Tarski derivation, the variables are
assigned values once and for all, by assigning them numbers. The “s” is in an ordered infinituple,
and the nth variable, relative to a given s, is assigned the nth item in the infinituple. are bound
one-by-one. You keep track of what the satisfaction-conditions are after some variables have
been bound by numbering the variables to correspond to places in the sequence. So, the
sequence, Bush, Bush, Trump, Obama, my Chevy Impala, 1, √2…..satisfies “x4 is president in
2015” because the fourth element in the sequence is president in 2015.
On the surface, though, since the sequences are the arguments of every predicate (i.e. “x1
is a frog” is true of a sequence just in case the first element of the sequence is a frog) you are
quantifying over merely possible objects. That is, all the variables have their interpretation given
at the beginning, for any sequence. So, “possibly had a son y who in turn had a son z” would
seem to require, if applied to GWB, a quantification over merely possible sons and grandsons.
The values for the imbedded variables could only be possible objects, since GWB had no sons.
At the end of the chapter, S says “It is technically feasible to do the compositional semantics in a
way that mixes reference to real things with artifacts of the model and then use the equivalence
relation to filter out the artifacts at the end…” There are two tasks for S: First, his idea that the
real possible worlds are equivalence classes of merely possible possible worlds must be spelled
out. The merely possible objects and merely possible propositions directly referring to them are
to be collapsed into actual possible worlds in a way that preserves the possibility of doing
Kripkean semantics. This is the project of Appendix A, discussed below. Second, S must show
how to do semantics in a way that does not require quantifying over merely possible objects.
Appendix B does the semantics.
V Appendix A:
What are these “permutation relations” and what are they supposed to do? Remember
Chapter 1, where S contemplates the possibility that GW Bush might have had a son, and
remember his discussion of the dice, and the distinction between die A being 5 while die B is 6
and the opposite possibility. There are two cases, but our description does not distinguish them.
If one had been realized, the other would be a possibility. As it is, the two possibilities collapse.
A similar collapse takes place with GW Bush’s son. Suppose there are singular propositions,
propositions about individuals. If we hold, as S and Kripke do, that such propositions are basic,
then, even when every possible qualitative difference has been taken into account, there will still
be a distinction between one possible individual filling that slot and another. If you imagine two
individuals, one of them GW Bush’s first son (completely qualitatively described) and the other
someone distinct from that individual (as the two dice are distinct from one another) having all
those features, from our point of view, there is no real difference—neither of these guys is real,
so there are no “alternatives” to one supposition. But if GWB had in fact had a son, there would
have been alternatives. Some other being could have filled this role in that possible world.
Now, suppose you have a possible world, specified as well as we can do, by absolutely
complete descriptions. Remember that the possible worlds are maximal propositions, using all
the propositions that in fact exist. So, for instance, the number of atoms in GW Bush’s son’s
fingernail will be specified in every one of the possible worlds in the equivalence class. The
permutation function is supposed to get all and only such worlds.
There will be an indefinitely large number of possible individuals filling each of the “roles” in
that possible world. That is, if one of those worlds were real, there would be possibilities about
other objects filling each of the roles. Which and how many possible possible worlds are there in
one particular (completely detailed) possible world in which GW Bush has a son? You want to
say, “Anything could have been anything,” perhaps restricted by essential properties.
S defines a permutation-function, which in effect preserves everything about the possible
world we can specify (using all the propositions that in fact exist), but makes every possible
switch of possible object for possible object. The equivalence classes that are the actual possible
worlds, given how things are, is the set of permutations of possible objects. This is a very big set,
but the criterion for membership is clear—each permutation is isomorphic to every other.
VI Stalnaker’s semantics: Appendix B
“Using the methods sketched in appendix B, we could do the compositional semantics directly,
where all intermediate values in the composition are actual things. But this could not be done if
our quantifier ranged over merely possible things.”(p.125)
How does he do this? S uses his idea that the variable-binding operator is complex
predicate formation, combined with the idea that propositional functions can be functions from
functions to other functions, to other functions, and so on. So, in a complex quantified sentence
with possibility-operators, the possibility-operators will be absorbed into complex predicates,
and the quantifiers will not be variable-binders. In effect, complex quantified sentences with
many variables get re-interpreted as complex functions. A complex function will not be satisfied
by an n-tuple of objects corresponding to the variables that are bound, but rather applied, for
instance, to a single (actual) object.
Roughly: Rather than represent “It is possible for GW Bush to have had a son” as ◊Ǝx(S(x,gwb)
and interpret that via Tarskian semantics, S constructs a complex predicate by predicate
abstraction, “Possibly had a son who might himself had had a son” and attributes it to GWB.
^z(◊Ǝ ^xS(x,z) )gwb. Since predicate-abstraction is the only variable-binder, there is no place
where one “quantifies over” merely possible objects.
To see how this works in detail we have to actually work through appendix B a bit more.
1) Propositional functions versus properties:
First off, functions are a special case of relations, those which, given one argument, have at most
one second argument. A one-place propositional function is a function from an individual to a
proposition. In modal logic, such a propositional function takes an individual in a world and
yields a proposition that exists in that world. Propositions themselves are functions from possible
worlds to truth-values. (This is more or less like Carnap.)
Propositional functions are different kinds of object from properties and relations, which are
expressed by one-place predicates. They are interchangeable in extensional languages but which
the semantic uses makes a difference in modal logic.
Illustration: ^xƎ^y(x=y) is the existence predicate. What the propositional function semantics
does is first form the open complex predicate “being the same as” which has a free variable. This
is a function from individuals to a propositional function. It takes Fred to the propositional
function “is identical to Fred. It then forms the open predicate “something is the same as.” It then
forms the closed one-place predicate “is such that something is the same as x.” This is a function
from an individual to a function from individuals to propositions. The non-existence predicate
^x\/^y(x≠y) is similar.
The first expresses a property that takes any world to its entire domain; the second takes any
world to the null set. Necessarily, everything satisfied the first predicate and nothing satisfies the
second.
But now we can construct the predicate “possibly does not exist”: ^x◊\/^y(x≠y). So, it is not
possible for an entity to have the property of non-existence, but most of us have the property of
possible non-existence.
The key to S’s semantics is that when there are possibility and necessity operators, there can be a
difference between a function taking a pair of individuals to a proposition and taking one
individual to a function from an individuals to a proposition. On S’s semantics, ¬(Fx /\ Gy) is a
one-place function taking an individual to a function from an individual to a proposition. Thus it
might be closed in two ways: ^x^y¬(Fx /\Gy) or ^y^x¬(Fx /\ Gy). The first expression takes a,
for instance, to the function ^y¬(Fa /\ Gy), which would take b to the proposition ¬(Fa/\Gb). The
second expression would take a to the function ^x¬(Fx/\Ga), which would take b to ¬(Fb/\Ga)
Another example: Salmon has a puzzle: Another sperm might have won the race to the egg that
gave rise to him. Then he wouldn’t exist. On the other hand, that guy can’t exist. How do we say
that two possible individuals are not compossible?
We want to say that there might have been an individual x such that there might have been an
individual y such that necessarily not both x and y exist (143)
If ◊Ǝ^x◊Ǝ^y [] ¬(Ex /\ Ey) is treated as a function from a pair of objects to a proposition, it is
necessarily false. In no world is there a pair of objects which don’t both exist.
To get the right meaning, treat [] ¬(Ex /\ Ey) as expressing a function from an individual to a
function from an individual to a proposition. It is a function from an entity a to one of the
propositional functions [] ¬(Ea /\ Ey) or [] ¬(Ex /\ Ea). Then predicate abstraction binds the y,
and the Ǝ-operator takes that function to a function from individuals to functions such that the
function takes an individual in the domain of w to a true proposition in a world w if some
individual in the domain of that world does. ◊ yields a function that takes an individual to a
proposition that some world is such that the inner function takes something to a true proposition.
^x binds the variable in that function, Ǝ yields the claim that some individual in w is mapped
onto 1, and ◊ says that there could be an individual like that. ◊Ǝ^x◊Ǝ^y [] ¬(Ex /\ Ey
It is important to see that this step procedure differs from the Tarski approach. The Tarski
approach assigns values to all the variables en masse, treating all predicates as having an infinite
number of argument-places, as it were. That is artificial, but it gets things right for extensional
languages. You could, as S points out, get the effect of the contrast between, for instance, “John
is immortal” and “It is not the case that John is mortal,” which only shows up in modal contexts,
by the “kludge” of Ǝx(¬Mx /\ x=j). From S’s perspective, this version first quantifies and then
removes the generality by the identity.
To understand what S is doing here, a number of points:
1) The main innovation is making variable-binding a matter of complex predicate-formation. So,

“GWB might have had a son who could have gone to law school but instead became a plumber”
attributes the property expressed by the predicate “might have had a son who could have gone to
law school but instead became a plumber” to GWB. That predicate is a complex function of
functions, of…etc.
2) All truth-functionally simple sentences, no matter how many quantified variables there are in
them, become one-place predications. All of the variable-binders create predicates via functions
on (possibly) functions of functions of functions, etc., of individuals. Those functions are just
abstract objects. That is, the quantifiers in them are building a predicate, not ranging over
objects. So, only the quantifier of the last-bound variable is really something about which you
need to worry about ontological commitment. You don’t need “merely possible objects” on the
outside. So, the only objects you need to talk about are actual objects.
3) For S’s step-by-step procedure, you need a different sort of compositional semantics. What S
does is characterize how to interpret these complex predications. His method is more or less what
you find in standard logic texts.
Suppose you have a complex quantified sentence, with quantifiers embedded in the scope
of other quantifiers, embedded within the scope of quantifiers, etc. You start from the inside, the
most deeply imbedded quantifier, and work your way out. If you have a quantified expression
with \/s and Ǝs, some bound variables, and perhaps a lot of ◊s and []s, you have a high-level
function—a function taking an individual to a function of functions of functions…of an
individual.
So, there is a rule how to interpret 0-level functions (propositions). Then there is a rule
that tells you how to take a k+1-level-function (and variable) and yield a k-level function with a
name instead of a variable. Eventually, by repeating the process, you have an interpretation for a
function of any complexity.
So, you take the most deeply-imbedded variable, and assign a new name (not in the
language) to be the value of the variable. You have converted a k+1-level function to a k-level
function. You keep doing that until you have a sentence about named objects, a 0-level
propositional function, that is, a proposition. The name is interpreted as something in Dw. Thus
the objects you assign to be the values of variables for the purposes of interpretation are all
objects that exist, being from Dw.
A note on notation: “vw” is a valuation-function. A valuation function, relative to a world,
assigns semantic values to expressions of the language. When the language is expanded by
adding a new name “a,” the valuation-function has to be different, in that now it assigns a value
to this new singular term. S represents the new valuation function as “vw (d/a) “. A compositional
semantics has a computable “v” function, given assignments by the “v”-function to primitive
elements. S’s inductive definition meets these conditions. An interesting question (for me) is
whether this semantics
This is an inductive procedure. You define a 0-case, and show how a k+1 case yields a k-case.
Since any expression has only a finite degree of embeddedness, you have shown how to interpret
any expression in the language. As S notes, you have to do it this way, because you need to take
into account the order in which variables are bound. Doing things S’s way allows you to pick
individuals from Dw since you don’t have to assign values to all the variables at once, as in
Tarskian semantics. That is, the sentence, . ◊Ǝx◊Ǝy [] ¬(Ex /\ Ey) would assign values to x and y
at the beginning, and yield an interpretation which could not be true.
VII Conclusion
Mere Possibilities is a great book. Maybe this will help you figure it out

Notes On Robert Stalnakers Mere Possibil

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Stalnaker notes Phil 5301 Page 1

Notes on Stalnaker’s Mere Possibilities

S challenges this argument by distinguishing two possibility predicates applying to

1) The main innovation is making variable-binding a matter of complex predicate-formation. So,

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