Retroactivity of Laws: Francisco v.

CA
Petitioner: Teresita Francisco (2nd Wife)
Respondents: Court of Appeals (review/certiorari) Conchita Evangelista (alleged administrator,
child of Eusebio in the 1st marriage)
Facts:

Petitioner, Teresita Francisco, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio)
by his second marriage filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney
authorizing Conchita Evangelista (Eusebio’s daughter in his first marriage) to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during
their conjugal partnership.

Properties included are:

 Sari-sari store
 A house and lot (Barangay Balite)
 An apartment house
 House and lot (San Isidro)

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents due to petitioner’s failure to
establish proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner.

The CA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.

Prompting a decision that it was exclusively owned by Eusebio pursuant to NCC 158 and 160
(which was repealed by NCC 254 and NCC256 [making the NCC retroactive provided it does not
impair vested or acquired rights with the Civil Code and other laws)

Issue: Whether or Not NCC 158 and 160 is applicable or not.

Ruling: Yes, it is applicable.

Ratio:

Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the
Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior
vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said
provisions were in force.
Retroactivity of Laws: DAVID v. AGBAY

Petitioner: Renato David

Respondents: Editha Agbay ; People of the Philippines

Facts:

In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon

their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines.
Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong,
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application

(MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application,
petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the

ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA

was pending,petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of
R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07
issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his

application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property
was titled land and they have the right and authorityto convey the
same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal
suits between him and private respondent’s family

On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding
probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending
the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in
a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the
CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had

been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under
R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost
on account of said naturalization

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225

Ruling:

Yes

Ratio:

David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his

MLA. He made an untruthful statement in his MLA that he was a Filipino
citizen at the time he filed the document but he was in fact at that time a
Canadian Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, that has no retroactive effect in as so far as
his false misrepresentation. Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became
foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.
Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws: Nerwin v. PNOC
Petitioner: Nerwin
Respondents: PNOC

R. A. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, EXCEPT SC, from issuing any TRO, preliminary
injunction, etc. against the 
 Government, or any official, any persons or entity acting under
the Government direction. xxxxx from: xxxxx (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project
of the National Government 
 xxxxxx 


In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) made an invitation to pre-qualify and bid
for a contract, otherwise 
 known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about 60k pieces
of wood poles and 20k pieces of cross arms 
 needed in the country’s Rural Electrification
Project. 


Nerwin was one of the 4 bidders who qualified and bid in the contract and he was the lowest.
Even though he was the 
 lowest, NEA’s administrator, Conrado Estrella, recommended the
board of directors of NEA to award the contract to Nerwin for he is the lowest bidder and there
was a big difference between the 2nd lowest bidder. 


However, NEA’s board of directors made Resolution No. 32 decreasing the IPB No. 80 material
requirements by 50%. Nerwin contends that it was only a ploy to accommodate the losing bidder.



And then, the other losing bidders such as Tri State and Pacific Synnergy led a complaint alleging
that Nerwin falsified 
 documents in the pre-qualification in the IPB No. 80. But it was then
validated by the Gov’t Corporate Counsel. 


On the other hand, respondent PNOC claiming to be under the Dep’t of Energy, issued an
invitation to pre-qualify and 
 bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification
Project or “O-ILAW Project). 


When petitioner learned about this, they led this complaint alleging that it was an attempt to
subject the materials in 
 the IPB No. 80 to the O-ILAW Project and prayed that a TRO be issued.



Respondent as defense states that petitioner has no cause of action for: 


RTC ruled in favor of Nerwin granting the TROs and declaring PNOC in default. However, CA
reversed the decision stating that RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TROs. 


Nerwin now appeals to SC. 


Issue:

Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO?

Ruling:

Yes, RTC gravely abused its discretion.

Ratio:

SC states that the CA is correct in ruling that RTC gravely abused its discretion in entertaining an
application for TRO/preliminary injunction which is in violation of

R. A. 8975 which prohibits any court, except the supreme court, from issuing a TRO.

The TRO in this case is void because according to Article 5 of the Civil Code: Acts executed
against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity.