Dibenzoyl Peroxide

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Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Energy East Project
Consolidated Application Volume 12: Risk Assessment
Appendix 12-4
Facilities Risk Assessment
May 2016
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Risk Assessment
Energy East Pipeline Ltd.
Tank Terminal Facilities
Prepared By: Darrell Rose, P.Eng, CRM

Marsh Risk Consulting
Calgary, Alberta
Date of Report: November 27, 2015
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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Tank Terminal Facilities Energy East Pipeline Project
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................ 1
1. Scope and Purpose ........................................................................ 3
2. Description of Tank Terminals........................................................ 4
3. Methodology ................................................................................... 9
4. Consequence Analysis ................................................................. 18
5. Conclusion ................................................................................... 30
Appendices ....................................................................................... 31
Appendix I References
MARSH RISK CONSULTING

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Executive Summary
Marsh Risk Consulting (MRC) was contracted by Energy East Pipelines Ltd. (Energy
East) to identify major hazards and complete a risk assessment for the proposed tank
terminal facilities on the Energy East Project (the Project). The risk assessment details
the determination of credible worst case accident or malfunction events that could occur
at the tank terminals. The results of the risk assessment were provided to Energy East to
support the estimation of response, remediation, and third-party costs that could be
associated with such events, in the unlikely event that they were to occur. This
assessment details the hazard identification and risk assessment process and
specifically provides frequency and consequence results derived from the risk
assessment.
This risk assessment covers the following tank terminal facilities associated with the
Project:
• Hardisty D Tank Terminal
• Moosomin Tank Terminal
• Saint John Tank Terminal including Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary
Equipment Area
Methodologies used in conducting the risk assessment are based on established
techniques. A Major Hazards Identification (HAZID) workshop was conducted to
establish the major hazards which could occur at the tank terminals and lead to, in the
unlikely event that they were to arise, potential credible accident and malfunction events.
Credible events were defined as events which could occur within a return period of 1 in
10,000 years (annual probability of greater than 1x10-4 events per year), which is
accepted by financial institutions. The magnitude and extent of the potential impacts
associated with those events, focusing on offsite consequences, were assessed for the
purpose of determining potential credible worst case accident and malfunction events.
Overall, it was determined that the credible accident and malfunction events for the tank
terminal facilities included:
 Tank fires at the Hardisty D, Moosomin and Saint John Tank Terminals;
 Piping and tank ruptures at the Hardisty D and Saint John Tank Terminals; and
 Pool fires at the Saint John Tank Terminal.
Of these, it was further determined that the following potential events at Saint John Tank
Terminal would result in the greatest financial liabilities:
 Piping rupture outside of tank containment, and
 Pool fire associated with a loss of containment.
MARSH RISK CONSULTING 1

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The worst credible release from piping and tanks that could potentially result from a loss
of containment within the tank areas in these events was calculated to be approximately
4800 m3 of oil. It was calculated that radiant heat and sulphur dioxide levels from a pool
fire at the Saint John Terminal could potentially affect adjacent properties. It was found
that credible accidents and malfunctions that could potentially be associated with the
Energy East tank terminals would not result in damage to industrial operations adjacent
to any of the Project facility sites.

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1. Scope and Purpose

The purpose of this risk assessment is to determine the potential credible major accident
and malfunction events which could occur at the tank terminal and marine terminal
auxiliary equipment area for the Energy East Project. From there, the magnitude and
extent of the potential impacts associated with those events, focusing on offsite
consequences, were assessed with a view to determining potential credible worst case
events. The outputs of the risk assessment have been selected to allow for the
determination of financial liabilities associated with these events.
This risk assessment covers the following tank terminal facilities associated with the
Project:
• Hardisty D Tank Terminal
• Moosomin Tank Terminal
• Saint John Tank Terminal including Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary
Equipment Area
The risk assessment process follows the standard philosophies, concepts, and
methodologies common to risk assessment processes, including established models
and techniques. The full methodology is presented in this assessment under Section 3.

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2. Description of Tank Terminals

The Energy East Project includes the following facilities of note for this study which are
described in further detail below:
 Hardisty D Tank Terminal

 Moosomin Tank Terminal
 Saint John Tank Terminal including Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary
Equipment Area
Hardisty D Tank Terminal
The Hardisty D Tank Terminal is the starting point for the Energy East Project in Alberta
where oil is received from shippers and stored for delivery into the pipeline. The Hardisty
D Tank Terminal consists of 14 external floating roof tanks. Each tank measures 65.5
metres (m) in diameter and is 16.34 m from the floor of the tank to the design liquid level
(DLL), with a storage capacity of approximately 350,000 barrels (55,600 m3). Bottom
nozzles on the tanks are NPS 24 in size, connected to an NPS 48 bi-directional tank line
that connects tanks to the process area. The terminal contains a north and south tank
area which are bermed for secondary containment. Six tanks are located in the north
tank area while eight tanks are included in the south tank area. The tank areas are each
sized to contain 100% of the volume of the largest tank, plus 10% of the volume of the
remaining tanks. The tank piping has motor operated, remotely actuated valves which
can isolate the flow to and from the tank. The north and south tank areas are separated
by the process area. Within the process area, there are five booster pumps (four
operational plus a common spare) that either deliver oil to the Hardisty D Pump Station,
for delivery to the pipeline associated with the Project or move oil between tanks as
necessary. The site also includes custody transfer metering to measure oil flows and a
valve manifold to distribute flows as necessary, as well as other support equipment.
The Hardisty D Tank Terminal plot plan is shown in Figure 2.1.

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Figure 2.1 - Hardisty D Tank Terminal Plot Plan
Moosomin Tank Terminal
The Moosomin Tank Terminal in Saskatchewan receives oil from the Cromer lateral for
delivery onto the pipeline associated with the Energy East Project. The Moosomin Tank
Terminal consists of three external floating roof tanks. Each tank measures 65.5 m in
diameter and is 16.34 m from the floor of the tank to the DLL, with a storage capacity of
approximately 350,000 barrels (55,600m3). Bottom nozzles on the tanks are NPS 24 in
size, connected to an NPS 48 bi-directional tank line that connects tanks to the process
area. The tanks are in a single tank area which is bermed for secondary containment,
and sized to contain 100% of the volume of the largest tank, plus 10% of the volume of
the remaining tanks. The tank piping has motor operated, remotely actuated valves
which can isolate the flow to and from the tank. The process area is located north of the
tank area. Within the process area, there are five booster pumps (four operational plus
a common spare) that either deliver crude oil to the Moosomin Pump Station for delivery
to the pipeline associated with the Energy East Project or move product between tanks
as necessary. The site includes a valve manifold to distribute flows as necessary, as
well as other support equipment.
The plot plan for the Moosomin Tank Terminal is shown in Figure 2.2

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Figure 2.2 - Moosomin Tank Terminal Plot Plan
Saint John Tank Terminal
The Saint John Tank Terminal in New Brunswick will receives oil from the pipeline
associated with the Energy East Project. The oil will then be transported to either the
Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal or the Irving Canaport Tank Terminal. The Saint
John Tank Terminal consists of 22 external floating roof tanks. Each tank measures 78.6
m in diameter and is 19.56 m from the floor of the tank to the DLL, with a storage
capacity of approximately 600,000 barrels (95,400 m3).
Bottom nozzles on the tanks are NPS 24 in size, connected to an NPS 48 bi-directional
tank line that connects tanks to the process area. The terminal contains four tank areas,
each of which are bermed for secondary containment. Three of the tank areas consist of
six tanks in each, and one tank area consists of four tanks. The tank areas are sized to
contain 100% of the volume of the largest tank, plus 10% of the volume of the remaining
tanks. The tank piping has motor operated, remotely actuated valves which can isolate
the flow to and from the tank. The process areas are located to the east and west of the
tanks. Within the west process area, there are twelve marine loading pumps (11
operational with a common spare) that can either deliver oil through the east process
area used for metering, to the two berths for tanker loading or move product between
tanks as desired. The main valve manifold for the terminal is located in the west process
area. The east process area has three custody transfer metering systems to measure

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oil to each berth at the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal as well as to the Irving
Canaport Tank Terminal.
Figure 2.3 shows the plot plan of the terminal.
Figure 2.3 - Saint John Tank Terminal Plot Plan
Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary Equipment Area
The Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal receives oil from the marine loading pumps
located at the Saint John Tank Terminal through two aboveground NPS 42 lines, each to
a separate marine berth. Approximately 400 m south of the Saint John Tank Terminal is
an Auxiliary Equipment Area associated with the Canaport Energy East Marine
Terminal, which includes the marine vapour management system. The marine vapor
management system consists of five thermal oxidizers, as well as four 30 m3 (8000
gallon) propane tanks.
The scope of this risk assessment is limited to the marine foreshore area before the lines
enter the trestle and the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary Equipment
Area.


Figure 2.7 is a plot plan of the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal and Figure 2.8 is
a plot plan of the Auxiliary Equipment Area.
Figure 2.7 - Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Plot Plan
Figure 2.8 – Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary Equipment Area Plot Plan


3. Methodology
Overview
The following steps were undertaken to complete the risk assessment:
1) Documents were reviewed regarding the Project including documents pertaining to

pipeline layout, design parameters, and tank terminals involved. Documents
reviewed included the Energy East Application to the National Energy Board,
including supplemental reports and the Amendment Application.
2) A Hazard Identification (HAZID) study was undertaken to identify the major hazard
events that could potentially affect persons and properties outside of the property
lines of the tank terminals.
3) A frequency analysis was undertaken to determine the probability of the identified
hazard events within the tank terminals. These were determined using recognized
techniques within the oil and gas industry.
4) A consequence analysis was undertaken for credible worst case events to determine
the impacts which could result from the identified hazards within the tank terminals.
This was performed using established techniques and software tools based on the
design parameters of the tank terminals.
5) A determination based on the above analyses of the credible worst case events that,
in the unlikely event that they were to occur, could cause damage to persons and
property outside of the tank terminals, and require cleanup within facility boundaries.
The determination of whether an event was credible was guided through the use of a
threshold probability of the event occurring.
The methodology used in this risk assessment follows the procedures and general
philosophies of the following publications:
 Canadian Society for Chemical Engineering Risk Assessment Recommended
Practices for Municipalities and Industry (CSChE, 2004),
 Canadian Standards Association Z662-15 Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems (CSA,
2015), and the
 ISO 31000 series, specifically ISO/IEC 31010, Risk management – Risk
assessment techniques (ISO, 2009)
HAZID / Hazard Event Determination

A Major Hazards Identification (HAZID) study was undertaken which focused primarily
on hazard events which could potentially affect property and persons outside of the
property line of each tank terminal. Additionally potential loss of containment hazard


events contained within the tank terminals were considered to enable estimation of the
cost of cleanup and remediation.
Systems within the tank terminals with flammable and/or potentially toxic products
including oil (or whose products of combustion were potentially toxic) were identified.
These included the storage tanks, vessels, pumps, and piping, and other equipment that
could contribute to hazardous events. The products were quantified as to composition,
process or storage conditions, volumes, and flow rates.
Based upon the above analysis, the following categories of potential events were
developed for the Energy East tank terminals:
 Loss of containment events

 Tank fires
 Pool fires
 Toxic smoke evolved from fire events
 Tank boilover events
 Vapour cloud explosions
 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVE’s)
 Jet fires
Frequency Analysis
In order to assess the risk of an event, it is necessary to assess its probability, being its
frequency of occurrence over time. The probability of the loss of containment (i.e spill) of
hazardous contents from the tank terminals to the surrounding environment was
considered as a first step in defining a particular event. A propane release from the
vapour recovery system at the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary
Equipment Area was also considered as a loss of containment event. If a spill of oil
encounters an ignition source, then the consequence of the spill can escalate into a fire
or explosion event. The probability of such an ignition was thus considered.
Probabilities were taken from several information sources. One source of such data is
the Besluit Externe Veiligheid Inrichtingen (BEVI) risk assessment methodology (RIVM,
2009), which is published by the Dutch government and following it is required for risk
assessment work in the Netherlands. It is used throughout the world as a
comprehensive source for risk assessment techniques and data within the oil, gas and
petrochemical process industries, including product storage facilities. The level of
protection and risk mitigation considered in the event frequency data is commensurate
with the design criteria of this Project. These risk mitigation features include mature
management systems, instrumentation and isolation systems typical of standard tank
terminal design. They also include tank spacing, secondary containment, and fire
protection systems that meet applicable regulatory standards. Modern design features


that are included in the tank terminals associated with the Project would introduce
conservatism into the event frequency analysis.
Event frequencies taken from the BEVI methodology include probabilities for pipe
ruptures, vessel ruptures, tank ruptures, pump failures, and BLEVE events. Tank fire
probabilities were taken from the LASTFIRE project (LASTFIRE, 1998), as this study
provides widely used probabilities in this field. The probability of a tank boilover event
was calculated from data from the Brandforsk Project (Persson & Lonnermark,
2004).Probabilities for the ignition of flammable materials were taken from the
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Risk Assessment Data
Directory (RADD) Ignition Probability document (RADD, 2010), as this group has studied
a wide range of events in the oil and gas industry and provides ignition probabilities for a
wide range of configurations. Table 3.1 details the unit probabilities that were utilized for
the frequency analysis.
Event Annual Probability Source

of Event
Pipe Break/Rupture (>75mm, <150mm) 3x10-7 /metre BEVI
Pipe Break/Rupture (>150mm) 1x10-7 /metre BEVI
Catastrophic Pump Failure 1x10-4 /pump BEVI
Rim Seal Fire 1x10-3 /tank LASTFIRE
Full Surface Fire 3x10-5 /tank LASTFIRE
Boilover 9x10-7 /tank BRANDFORSK
Catastrophic Tank Failure (Atmospheric) 5x10-6 /tank BEVI
Catastrophic Tank Failure (LPG) 5x10-7 /tank BEVI
BLEVE of LPG Tank 3.5x10-8 /tank BEVI
Ignition of Crude Oil Vapour Release 0.12 OGP RADD
Event
Ignition of Propane Release Event 0.15 OGP RADD
Table 3.1 - Unit Probabilities
The probabilities provided in Table 3.1 are based on the annual probability of occurrence
of the event per unit of exposure, thus they must be multiplied by the number of units
exposed at a particular site (i.e number of tanks, pumps, or length of pipe) that may
potentially be involved in the postulated event.
This risk assessment is restricted to assessing the maximum effect that could be
induced by a potential credible worst case event which will be used to determine
potential cleanup, remediation, and third-party costs, and does not assess potential
smaller impact events. The probability of knock-on or cascading events was determined
to be of sufficiently low frequency such that they were not considered credible worst
case events for the purposes of financial assurance.


For the purposes of this assessment, a representational crude oil was determined to
have a flash fraction of under 5%, based on boiling points as given by Crude Quality Inc.
(Crude Quality Inc, 2015) The probability of ignition of oil was taken as being 12%, since
the oil does not have a “significant flash fraction” (defined as 10% or less) according to
the RADD document. The probability of ignition of a propane release as defined by
RADD was 15% for release rates of 60 kg/s, which was determined to be the
approximate flowrate through an NPS 4 piping system.
Consequence Analysis
Consequence modelling was carried out using the concepts presented by the CSChE
recommended practices (CSChE, 2004). This involves three distinct steps: source term
modelling, hazard modelling, and vulnerability modelling. The nature of the loss of
containment (LOC) events involving products at the tank terminals were identified during
the HAZID portion of this assessment. If an LOC event did not meet the criteria for being
credible worst case scenario based on its calculated probability, no further analysis was
completed.
Source Term Modelling
For each identified LOC event, parameters including volumes, piping sizes, flow rates,
product temperature and pressure were considered. Storage tank release events were
considered to be fed by the head pressure of the tank at maximum design liquid level,
releasing the entire volume of the tank if block valves were downstream of the breach. If
block valves are included upstream of the breach, the release was considered to be fed
by the same mechanisms for a defined time period until the system is isolated. The
release was determined based on the full diameter of the tank piping, and included the
volume resulting from gravity drainage between block valves. The time period used for
the identification of the event and isolation of the system was determined to be two and
three minutes respectively for a total 5 minutes. This was considered appropriate as the
tank terminals are provided with adequate instrumentation and operator interfaces to
detect and isolate releases within the tank terminals.
Crude oil properties used in the consequence analysis were based on mixtures for
heavy and light crude oil as provided within the Phast software program. Both light and
heavy products were tested when events were considered and the product with the
larger effect distance was chosen for that event.
Oil releases of less than 10,000 m3 (62,000 bbls) outside of the tank areas were
assumed to be substantially contained within the tank terminals due to the size of the
facilities, location of equipment and site grading.


Propane releases from the tanks at the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal would be
modelled by Phast if an LOC event was considered credible, using tank conditions and
pipe sizes, and the parameters of the pool or jet release used in the Hazard Modelling.
Releases which are directional in nature, such as a jet fires, are modeled as the jet
release being in the same direction as the wind, to maximize the effect. Such releases
were considered to be horizontal and 1 m above the grade level, leading to the
maximum effect distances. If a longer effects distance is obtained with another release
event, such as the release impinging on the ground, then that event is used.
Hazard Modelling
Hazard modelling was performed utilizing the commercially available consequence

modelling software package, Phast (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool, Version
6.7) from DNV-GL. Phast was used to calculate source term parameters, based on initial
flow and storage conditions, to develop discharge parameters. It was then used to
develop heat radiation levels, used in assessing the fire and explosion consequence
effects (heat radiation and overpressure) based on these discharges. Phast examines
the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion,
including modeling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects.
The modelling within Phast is based on guidance given by the National Institute of Public
Health (NIOSH) and the Environment Centre for External Safety, of the Netherlands
(RIVM), as set out in their External Safety (Establishments) Decree (BEVI, (RIVM,
2009)). This methodology is based on the former guidelines presented by TNO in their
“Colored Books”, with the “Methods for the calculation of Physical Effects Due to
releases of hazardous materials (liquids and gases)”, CPR14E, or more widely known as
the “Yellow Book” (CPD, 2005).
The details from the HAZID were entered into the analysis software to enable the
calculation of consequences. The consequences from each of the above source term
modelling release events were determined through the use of Phast, and those which
affected areas outside the tank terminals were identified. The source term modelling
defined the sizes of pools within the tank and process areas (usually covering 100% of
the surface area). Tanks were assumed to either have a rim seal fire event, or a full
surface fire event which was modelled as a pool fire confined to the tank.
Hydrocarbon liquid fires, which include oil, have a wide range of heat radiation values in
literature, particularly in the choice of Maximum Emissive Power (MEP) of the fire. Many
papers indicate that large hydrocarbon liquid pool fires are considered to be sufficiently
smoky such that a maximum heat radiation of 20 kW/m2 is allowed to affect nearby
receptors. The SFPE (SFPE, 1988) suggests that 80% of a heavy hydrocarbon (such as
oil) fire is smoky while 20% is luminous, so overall it is calculated to produce heat
radiation of approximately 50 kW/m2. The National Institute of Standards and Testing,
NIST, (McGrattan, Baum, & Hamins, 2000) acknowledges the 50 kW/m2 value, however


indicates that a more conservative value of 100 kW/m2 should be used. In this
assessment, we have opted to use this latter value for crude oil fire radiation calculations
with no consideration as to the use of mitigation systems such as fire suppression.
The following events are considered in each release model calculated by Phast, if the
event was calculated to be credible:
Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs): Phast modelling shows that vapour generation from
pools of oil considered is less than what is required to form a substantial cloud within the
flammable limits. Further, the RADD probability of ignition (RADD, 2010) indicates that
such ignition would occur if the product temperature is “significantly above their normal
boiling point”. Given that the lowest boiling points for light oil is above 33ºC and that the
oil temperature will not be “significantly above” this value, RADD indicates that the
ignition probability of a cloud formed is lower than what would be considered credible for
risk assessment purposes, and thus was not considered in this assessment.
Jet Fires: Phast calculates heat radiation from jet releases of oil from piping, based on
the temperature and pressure conditions of the system. This is generally limited to the
maximum flow possible within the system considered. Flow greater than the maximum
system flow are not considered since the upstream pumps would not be able to maintain
flow due to a loss of backpressure. Jet fires in the tank lines were not deemed to cause
significant damage if the release was driven by tank head pressure, since the maximum
pressure would be less than 200 kPag. Thus, jet fires were only considered if the
pressure was increased due to pipeline or booster pumps. In these latter events, the
probability of failure is driven by the length of pipe that would be transferring oil at the
time, rather than all piping on the site as would be the case for other events.
Pool Fires: Phast calculates the heat radiation from flammable liquid pools based on the
maximum pool size calculated by the source term modelling. Berms, curbing or
drainage systems were considered in determining the pool area.
Tank fires: Phast calculates the heat radiation from tank fires as pool fires elevated to
the maximum design height of liquid in the tanks. Two types of tank fires were
considered: rim seal fires and a full surface fire. From a heat radiation point of view for
receptors perpendicular to the wall of the tank, the majority of the heat transferred
comes from the luminous portions of the flame facing the receptor. Thus, it was
conservatively assumed that the heat radiation to lateral receptors from a fully involved
rim seal fire is equivalent to the radiation from the full surface fire.
Tank boilover: Boilover events can be calculated as a flame five times longer than the
flame length calculated in a full surface tank fire.
Smoke and toxic gas release effects: The Dow Chemical Exposure Index (Dow, 1994)
was used to calculate the toxic gas concentrations based on the largest fire sizes in
tanks and tank areas, with effects calculated for sulphur dioxide dispersion. It was


assumed that 100% of the sulphur contained in the crude oil was converted to SO2. Lees
(Lees, 1996) indicates that this conversion can be from 70 to 90%, thus the use of a
100% conversion rate is considered conservative. Smoke cloud particle densities were
not considered, as several larger events have not seen smoke as damaging to the
surrounding environment such that cleanup was not possible. The Buncefield oil depot
explosions and fire did not exceed the “Low” air pollution category (AEA, 2006), and
similar results were seen at the Caribbean Petroleum Tank Terminal explosion and fire
(CSB, 2015)
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVE’s): Phast calculates the

overpressure effects from a BLEVE. A BLEVE is assumed to occur at a pressure of
121% of the relief valve setting of the vessel, or at 110% of the design pressure of the
vessel for the purposes of calculating damaging overpressures in the surrounding
environment. This is based on the methods suggested by the Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS, 2010).
Weather and Environmental Conditions
Weather and environmental conditions affect the dispersion of hazardous substances,

which influences the probability of the release potentially affecting populated areas as
well as the magnitude of the consequences. The worst case weather conditions for the
areas around each of the tank terminals were determined by sampling numerous
combinations of wind speed, atmospheric stability, atmospheric temperatures, and
relative humidity within the modelling. Maximum and minimum temperatures and wind
speeds for the areas in which the tank terminals are to be located were based on the
National Building Code of Canada (NBC, 2010) Design Temperature data (January 1%
and July 2.5%) and 1/50 Hourly Wind Pressures. Minimum wind speed was investigated
at the Phast minimum recommended wind speed of 1 m/s. Approximately 25
combinations of weather conditions were calculated for each event, with the worst of
these cases used to predict worst case effect distances.
Wind direction plays a role in determining whether a particular receptor is affected in the
event. However, as a conservative approach, the effects distances were plotted without
regard for wind direction, with the largest effects distance plotted in all directions.
Vulnerability Modelling
The hazard levels used in this study are given in Table 3.2. The heat radiation levels
modelled were 4 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2, and 25 kW/m2. The impact of toxic gas releases,
including Sulphur dioxide (SO2) was evaluated based on Emergency Response Planning
Guideline Levels 2 and 3 (ERPG-2, and ERPG-3) (AIHA, 2013), and the Immediately
Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) (NIOSH, 1994).
For fire radiation effects, the worst case was calculated at a height of 9 m for 12.5 kW/m2
and 25 kW/m2 levels. For these types of fires, the radiation increases as the height of


the point of the receptor increases, as the receptor point is closer to the flame.
Therefore, using a height of 9 m considers the heat radiation effect to the roof of a 2
story house. The 4 kW/m2 heat radiation level considers the effect on persons at the
ground level, and therefore was calculated at a height of 2 m.
EXPOSURE LIMIT DESCRIPTION

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to
reach cover within 20 s; however blistering of the
Heat Radiation 4 kW/m2
skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0: lethality
(World Bank, 1988)
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of
12.5 kW/m2 wood, melting of plastic tubing (World Bank,
1988)
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at

25 kW/m2 indefinitely long exposures (non-piloted) (World
Bank, 1988)
The maximum airborne concentration below
which it is believed that nearly all individuals
could be exposed for up to 1 hr without
ERPG-2 experiencing or developing irreversible or other
serious health effects or symptoms which could
impair an individual's ability to take protective
action. (3 ppm for SO2) (AIHA, 2013)
The maximum airborne concentration below
which it is believed that nearly all individuals
Toxic Release ERPG-3 could be exposed for up to 1 hour without
experiencing or developing life-threatening health
effect. (25 ppm for SO2) (AIHA, 2013)
Exposure at this concentration is likely to cause
death or immediate or delayed permanent
IDLH adverse health effects or prevent escape from
such an environment. (100 ppm for SO2)
(NIOSH, 1994)
Table 3.2 – Exposure Endpoints


Determination of Credible Worst Case Events

Considered in the analysis was the concept of a credible accident or malfunction event.
A credible worst case event has been considered as being one whose probability of
occurrence is remote, but not out of the realm of possibility. In this context, a worst case
event with a return period of less than 10,000 years was considered to be credible. This
equates to a frequency of 1 x 10-4 events per annum.
The above rationale is supported by the approach taken by the insurance industry which
has an established precedence in defining credible events, where an Estimated
Maximum Loss (EML) event at a hydrocarbon processing facility has long been
considered to be a vapour cloud explosion after a large release of flammable material.
The probability of this event is 4.3 x 10-4 (or a return period of approximately 2326
years). This is based on a credible large release of material causing a relatively large
amount of damage to the facility it occurs in.
In order to add additional conservatism to the above noted probability applied by the
insurance industry, the threshold frequency of credible worst case events for the
purposes of this assessment was set at 1 x 10-4 events per annum, (or a return period of
10,000 years), which we deemed logical given that this assessment is designed to feed
into financial assurance decisions. Once an event was considered credible based on
the threshold probability, its potential effects were calculated using the consequence
analysis techniques described earlier. The effects which were deemed credible and
which most adversely affected the local environment and offsite properties were
presented.


4. Consequence Analysis
HARDISTY D TANK TERMINAL
Loss of Containment
In the event of a loss of containment (LOC) in the tank areas, oil could cover the surface
of the tank areas minus the surface areas of the tanks. The worst case spill volume
would result from a breach of a 350,000 BBL (55,600 m3) tank or the piping between the
tank and the remotely operated tank isolation valves and assume a spill of the entire
tank volume without a means to stop the spill. On the basis of these assumptions, this
volume is conservative as the tanks would not generally operate above the normal
working level. It is calculated that the length of piping between the tank wall and the
isolation valves is approximately 10 m. It is recognized that the inventory levels within
the Hardisty D Tank Terminal will fluctuate and that the tank terminal will generally not
be maintained at full inventories in order to allow for incoming shipments of oil.
Therefore, an average inventory of 75% was assumed for the analysis. The length of
piping within the tank areas and process area of the Hardisty D Tank Terminal was
calculated, and the number of tanks at the site was considered. The annual probability
of a tank spilling unabated into the tank area was calculated to be:
[(Length of piping x Probability of pipe break) + Probability of tank failure] x Number of

tanks x Average Inventory Level = 6.3x10-5 LOC events per year
A spill at a design flow rate of up to 8280 m3/hr was also considered within the tank
areas or process area based on inlet flows into the facility. In such a case, the spill size
would amount to full design flow for 5 minutes, plus line pack of approximately 500 m of
1219 mm (NPS 48) piping, for a total of 1274 m3 of oil spilled. This spill was also
assumed to remain within the site and thus only on-site cleanup and remediation costs
would be incurred. The annual probability of this occurring is based only on the length of
pipe with this level of flow at any one time. The annual probability of this occurring is
thus:
Length of piping x Probability of pipe break = 5x10-5 LOC events per year
If a line was to break downstream of the tank isolation valves, the spill is postulated to
occur at design rates for 5 minutes, plus the loss of the line pack in the broken line. The
worst case loss of containment is from a 1219 mm (NPS 48) line fed by one of the tanks.
The design rate was based on the maximum head pressure in the tank at design liquid
level. It is assumed that this can occur on any line and that the tank isolation valves are
kept open with operational isolation occurring at the manifold. Calculations indicate that
flows decrease significantly as the line length increases (due to friction loss) such that


the combination of flow and line pack loss is maximized at approximately 50 m of line
length. It is thus calculated that 4028 m3 would be released in this event. This would be
contained in either the tank areas or in the process area, depending on the location of
the break. It was estimated that 50% of the line length would be outside the tank area
secondary containment where a leak would have greater impact than if it were to occur
inside the tank areas. Lesser outflow would be experienced if the tank was not
completely full at the time of the break. Since lower tank height will have a lesser effect
on the volume of product released and the surface area of the spill would be similar, the
conservative assumption of full tanks was maintained to simplify and provide a worst
case analysis. The probability of a portion of the lines flowing at full design flow is
subtracted. The annual probability of this occurring is thus:
Length of piping x Probability of pipe break – Probability of break at design line flow =
7.1x10-4 LOC events per year
In the event that one of the pumps could failed catastrophically and released product into
the contained process area at full flow rates for 5 minutes, the spill is calculated to be
approximately 173 m3. The probability of this occurring is:
Number of pumps x probability catastrophic pump failure = 4x10-4 LOC events per year
Through the sum of these events the annual probability of a spill in the Hardisty D Tank
Terminal is calculated to be 1.22x10-3 events per year and therefore a LOC event is
considered credible for the purpose of this assessment. Financial impacts of this event
would include the need to provide cleanup and remediation for the spill.
Tank Fires
The annual probability of tank fires at this site is calculated to be:
Number of Tanks x Probability of rim seal fire = 1.4x10-2 rim seal fires per year, and
Number of Tanks x Probability of full surface fire = 4.2x10-4 full surface fires per year
Thus, both rim seal fires and tank fires are within the credible probability limits for the
purpose of this assessment. It was determined that the radiation heat levels did not
reach offsite receptors, and therefore emergency response costs, residual cleanup
costs, and necessary tank repair costs would be incurred, however, few third party
cleanup costs would be expected.
The tank fires have also been calculated to produce ground level concentrations of SO2
for the distances shown in Table 4.1, assuming that the conversion efficiency of the
sulphur in the crude oil is 100%.
The annual probability of a boilover event at this site is calculated as:


Number of tanks x Probability of a boilover = 1.26x10-5 events per year
This is not within the credible probability range of this study.
Jet Fires
The probability of a jet fire at the Hardisty D Tank Terminal is the probability of a line
leak with a hole size such that the upstream pumps would not shut down on loss of
discharge pressure. The annual probability of a jet fire is calculated as:
Length of piping involved x Probability of pipe break x Probability of ignition = 9.6x10-6 jet
fires per year.
Pool Fires
Pool fires can occur in the tank areas or within the process area. The probability of a
pool fire is based on the probability of a loss of containment event multiplied by the
probability of the pool igniting. The largest pool fire would occur in the south tank area,
covering an area of approximately 100,000 m2. The annual probability is calculated as:
Probability of a spill x Probability of ignition = 1.47x10-4 pool fires per year
This is within the credible probability range for the purpose of this assessment. It was
determined that there are no developed properties in the areas affected by the calculated
heat radiation beyond the property line of the tank terminal.
A full surface containment fire has been calculated to produce ground level
concentrations of SO2 for the distances shown in Table 4.1, assuming that the
conversion efficiency of the sulphur in the crude oil is 100%.
Summary
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the findings for the Hardisty D Tank Terminal.


Table 4.1 - Hardisty D Tank Terminal Summary
MOOSOMIN TANK TERMINAL
Loss of Containment
A loss of containment (LOC) in the tanks areas could cover the surface of the tank area
minus the surface areas of the tanks. The worst case spill volume would be the breach
of a 55,600 m3 (350,000 BBL) tank or the piping between the tank and the remotely
operated tank isolation valves, spilling the entire tank volume without a means to stop
the spill. This volume is considered conservative as the tanks would rarely operate
above the normal working level. It is calculated that the length of piping between the tank
wall and the isolation valves is approximately 10 m. It is recognized that the inventory
levels within the Moosomin Tank Terminal will fluctuate and that the tank terminal will
generally not be maintained at full inventories to allow for incoming shipments of oil.
Therefore an average inventory of 75% was assumed for the analysis. The length of
piping within the tank areas and process area of the Moosomin Tank Terminal was
calculated, and the number of tanks at the site was considered. The annual probability
of a tank spilling unabated into the tank area is thus:



A spill at a design flow rate of up to 8280 m3/hr could also occur within the tank area or
process area based on Energy East inlet and outlet flows into the facility. In this case,
the spill size would be full design flow for 5 minutes, plus line pack of 1219 mm (NPS48)
piping, for a total of 1040 m3 of oil spilled. The annual probability of this occurring is
calculated to be:
Length of piping x Probability of a pipe break = 5x10-5 LOC events per year
worst case loss of containment is from a 1219 mm (NPS 48) line fed by one of the tanks.
the combination of flow and line pack loss is maximized at approximately 50 m of line
completely full at the time of the break. Since lower tank height will have a lesser effect
on the volume of product released and the surface area of the spill would be similar, the
conservative assumption of full tanks was maintained to simplify and provide a worst
case analysis. The probability of a portion of the lines flowing at full design flow is
subtracted. The annual probability of this occurring is thus:
One of the pumps could fail catastrophically and release product into the contained
process area at full flow rates for 5 minutes. The spill is calculated to be approximately
173 m3. The probability of this occurring is:
Number of pumps x probability catastrophic pump failure = 4x10-4 LOC events per year
Through the sum of these events the annual probability of a spill in the facility is
calculated to be 5.74x10-4 events per year and is considered credible in this study. T
Financial impacts of this event would include the need to provide cleanup and
remediation for the spill.
Tank Fires
The annual probability of tank fires at the Moosomin tank terminal is calculated to be:


Number of tanks x Probability of rim seal fire = 3x10-3 rim seal fires per year, and
Number of tanks x Probability of full surface fire = 9x10-5 full surface fires per year
Thus, the rim seal fires are within the credible probability limits of this study, while full
surface fires are outside of the probability limits. It was determined that the radiation
heat levels did not reach offsite receptors, and therefore emergency response costs,
residual cleanup costs, and necessary tank repair costs would be incurred, however,
little third party cleanup costs would be expected.
for the distances shown in Table 4.2, assuming that the conversion efficiency of the
sulphur in the crude oil is 100%.
Therefore, this is not within the credible probability range of this study.
Jet Fires
The probability of a jet fire at the Moosomin Tank Terminal is the probability of a line leak
with a hole size such that the upstream pumps would not shut down on loss of discharge
pressure. The annual probability of a jet fire is calculated as:
Length of piping x Probability of pipe break x Ignition probability = 6x10-6
Pool Fires
Pool fires can occur in the tank area or within the process areas. The probability of a
pool fire is based on the probability of a loss of containment event multiplied by the
probability of the pool igniting. The annual probability of this event is calculated as:
Probability of a spill x Ignition probability = 6.9x10-5 pool fires per year
Summary
Table 4.2 shows a summary of the findings for the Moosomin Tank Terminal.


Table 4.2 - Moosomin Tank Terminal Summary
SAINT JOHN TANK TERMINAL INCLUDING CANAPORT ENERGY EAST MARINE

TERMINAL AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT AREA
Loss of Containment
A loss of containment (LOC) in the tanks areas could cover the surface of a tank area
minus the surface areas of the tanks. The worst case spill volume would be the breach
of a 95,400 m3 (600,000 BBL) tank or the piping between the tank and the remotely
operated tank isolation valves, spilling the entire tank volume without a means to stop
the spill. This volume is considered conservative as the tanks would rarely operate
above the normal working level. It is calculated that the length of piping between the tank
wall and the isolation valves is approximately 10 m. It is recognized that the inventory
levels within the Saint John tank terminal will fluctuate and that the tank terminal will not
generally be maintained at full inventories to allow for incoming shipments of oil.
Therefore an average inventory of 75% was assumed for the analysis. The length of
piping within the tank areas and process area of the Saint John Tank Terminal was
calculated, and the number of tanks at the site was considered. The annual probability of
a tank spilling unabated into the tank area is thus:



A spill at a design flow rate of up to 8280 m3/hr could also occur within the tank areas or
process area based on the pipeline flow into the facility. In this case, the spill size would
be full design flow for 5 minutes, plus line pack of 1219mm (NPS 48) piping, for a total of
4554 m3. The probability of this occurring is based on the length of pipe that could be
flowing at that time, thus:
worst case loss of containment is from a 1219mm (NPS48) line fed by one of the tanks.
the combination of flow and line pack loss is maximized at approximately 50m of line
completely full at the time of the break. A lower tank height will reduce the amount of
hydraulic head present within the tank in which to drive a potential release but such a
release will likely have a similar surface area in the resulting spill, the conservative
assumption of full tanks was maintained to simplify and provide a worst case analysis
The probability of a portion of the lines flowing at full design flow is subtracted. The
annual probability of this occurring is thus:
A spill on the marine loading line would have a design flow rate of up to 15,000 m3/hr
and could occur at any point in the west and east process areas. Such a spill is
assumed to remain within the tank terminal process areas. In the case of the breach
being downstream of the shipping pumps, the spill size would be a full design flow for 5
minutes, plus line pack of 1219mm (NPS48) piping, for a total of 4763m3 of oil spilled.
Alternatively, a catastrophic failure of a shipping pump could also occur. The probability
of a failure, be it with a smaller spill size, was considered in the overall probability of this
event with respect to the second loading line flowing 12,000 m3/hr. The annual
probability of one of these events occurring is thus:
[(Length of piping x Probability of pipe break) + (Number of pumps x Probability of pump

failure)] x Number of lines = 1.53x10-3


Through the sum of these events the annual probability of a spill in the facility is
calculated to be 3.03x10-3 and is considered credible in this study. Financial impacts of
this event would include the need to provide cleanup and remediation for the spill.
Tank Fires
The annual probability of tank fires at the Saint John tank terminal is calculated to be:
Number of tanks x Probability of rim seal fire = 2.2x10-2 rim seal fires per year, and
Number of tanks x Probability of full surface fire = 6.6x10-4 full surface fires per year
Thus, both the rim seal and full surface fires are within the credible probability limits of
this study. The heat radiation levels of interest calculated do not reach outside of the
property lines and would not impact off site receptors.
for the distances shown in the summary chart at Table 4.3, assuming that the conversion
efficiency of the sulphur in the crude oil is 100%.
Therefore, this is not within the credible probability range of this study.
Jet Fires
The probability of a jet fire on the Saint John Tank Terminal site is the probability of a
line leak with a hole size such that the upstream pumps would not shut down on loss of
downstream discharge head. The annual probability of this jet fire, then, is calculated as
Length of piping x Probability of pipe break x Ignition probability = 1.2x10-5
Pool Fires
The probability of a pool fire is based on the probability of a loss of containment event
multiplied by the probability of the pool igniting. The largest pool fire would occur in one
of the three larger tank areas, each covering an area of approximately 100,000 m2.
The annual probability of this event is calculated as:
Probability of a spill x Ignition probability = 3.63x10-4 pool fires per year


Thus, the annual probability of a pool fire at the site is within the credible probability
range of this risk assessment. Table 4.3 indicates the heat radiation distances
extending outside of the property line calculated from pool fires in the north tank areas.
The 4 and 12.5 kW/m2 heat radiation levels were calculated to reach developed
properties outside of the property line. This is considered a conservative finding as the
tank terminal is higher than the developed properties and the calculated heat radiation
levels would be expected to be less than that calculated.
A full surface containment fire has been calculated to produce ground level
concentrations of SO2 for the distances shown in Table 4.3, assuming that the
conversion efficiency of the sulphur in the crude oil is 100%.
Summary
Table 4.3 shows a summary of the findings for the Saint John Tank Terminal.
Table 4.3 – Saint John Tank Terminal Summary


Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary Equipment Area
Loss of Containment
The propane tanks in the Auxiliary Equipment Area could also see a loss of containment
(LOC). Although still subject to detailed design, a conservative length of 100 mm (NPS
4) piping was assumed to be associated with these tanks. The annual probability of a
break in these lines occurring is thus:
The annual probability of the entire contents of the tank being released catastrophically
or within a 10 minute period is calculated to be:
Number of propane tanks x Probability of catastrophic failure = 2.0x10-6 LOC events per
year
Thus, the annual probability of a propane release is calculated to be 3.2x10-5 events per
year. This is not within the credible probability range of this study.
Vapour Cloud Explosions
A release of propane could occur and form a vapour cloud that could be ignited. The
annual probability of such an event occurring is calculated to be:
Probability of propane LOC x Probability of ignition = 4.8x10-6 propane vapour cloud

explosions annually
Propane BLEVE
The annual probability of a BLEVE of one of the propane tanks is calculated to be:
Probability of propane LOC x Probability of BLEVE = 2.24x10-5 propane BLEVEs per

year
Jet Fires
The probability of a propane jet fire is calculated to be:
LOC event x Probability of ignition = 4.5x10-6 propane jet fires per year


These are not within the credible probability range of this study.
Pool Fires
The annual probability of a propane pool fire in the Auxiliary’s Area is calculated as:
[(Length of piping x Probability of pipe break) + (Number of propane tanks x Probability

of propane tank failure)] x Probability of ignition = 4.8x10-6 propane pool fires per year
Thus, the probability of a pool fire at the Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary
site is not within the credible probability range of this study.
Summary
There were no credible hazard events calculated for this facility.


5. Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to calculate the effects of credible worst case events on the tank
terminal facilities and the property surrounding those sites for the purpose of calculating
remediation costs after an event. For the purpose of this assessment, a credible worst case
event was defined as an event which is calculated to occur at a rate of greater than 1x10-4
events per year, based on the frequency of events deemed credible by financial institutions and
risk assessment work.
Oil spills outside of the tank areas and rim seal tank fires were found to be credible at all three
tank terminals. Full surface tank fires and pool fires within the tank areas or process areas were
found to be credible at the Hardisty and Saint John tank terminals.
Heat radiation from tank and pool fires at the Hardisty and Moosomin tank terminals was found
to not impact developed properties outside of the property line of the tank terminals. Smoke
effects from these fires in the form of ground level SO2 concentrations were calculated to extend
12 km and 2 km for ERPG-2 and IDLH levels respectively for the Hardisty D tank terminal and
approximately 8 km and 1.4 km for ERPG-2 and IDLH levels respectively for the Moosomin
Tank Terminal.
From the perspective of credible worst case events it was determined that the following
events associated with the Saint John Tank Terminal would result in the most severe
impacts for the purpose of determining financial liabilities:
 Piping rupture outside of tank area, and

 Pool fire resulting from a tank loss of containment.
The worst credible spill size calculated was based on a piping rupture outside of the tank areas
at the Saint John tank terminal, with a spill of approximately 4800 m3.
The greatest third party off site effects for events deemed credible were calculated with respect
to pool fires at the Saint John tank terminal within the tank areas, where heat radiation effects
beyond the tank terminal’s property line were possible where properties were present. These
properties were calculated to be affected by radiant heat levels of 4 kW/m2 and 12.5 kW/m2 at
distances of 86 m and 352 m outside of the property line, respectively. Thus, these properties
could see damage after an extended exposure to the fire under worst case weather conditions.
This was considered a conservative finding, as the tank terminal is elevated above the
developed properties and the developed properties would see less heat radiation than
calculated. It was determined that these events would not physically affect adjacent industrial
operations near this site. The SO2 levels resulting from these pool fires were calculated at
ground level to extend approximately 12 km at ERPG-2 levels, and out to approximately 2 km at
IDLH levels.


Appendices
Appendix I References


APPENDIX I
Bibliography
MARSH RISK CONSULTING

BIBLIOGRAPHY
AEA. (2006). Initial Review of Air Quality aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion.
England: AEA Technology Environment.
AIHA. (2013). Current ERPG Values (2013). Retrieved Nov 3, 2015, from American
Industrial Hygiene Association: https://www.aiha.org/get-
involved/AIHAGuidelineFoundation/EmergencyResponsePlanningGuidelines/Do
cuments/2013ERPGValues.pdf
API. (1995). Recommended Practice 752. Washington: American Petroleum Institute.
CCPS. (2010). Guidelines for Vapor Cloud Explosion, Pressure Vessel Burst, BLEVE and
Flash Fire Hazards. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc.
CPD. (2005). Methods for the calculation of phusical effects, CPR 14E, "Yellow Book".
the Netherlands: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters.
Crude Quality Inc. (2015). CrudeMonitor.ca. Retrieved October 2015, from
CrudeMonitor.ca: http://www.crudemonitor.ca/home.php
CSA. (2015). Z662-15 Oil and gas pipeline systems. Toronto: Canadian Standards
Association.
CSB. (2015). Final Investigation Report - Carribean Petroleum Tank Terminal Explosion
and Multiple Tank Fires. Washington: U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board.
CSChE. (2004). Risk Assessment - Recommended Practices for Municipalities and
Industry. Ottawa: Canadian Society of Chemical Engineering.
Dow. (1994). Chemical Exposure Index. New York: American Institute of Chemical
Engineers.
ISO. (2009). ISO/IEC 31010. Geneva: International Organization for Standardization.
LASTFIRE. (1998). A study of the fire related risks associated with large diameter open
top floating roof tanks. Article for Publication, 1-7.
Lees, F. P. (1996). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries - Hazard Identification,
Assessment and Control. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
McGrattan, K. B., Baum, H. R., & Hamins, A. (2000). NISTIR 6546 Thermal Radiation
from Large Pool Fires. National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NBC. (2010). National Building Code of Canada. Ottawa: National Research Council of
Canada.
NIOSH. (1994, May). Sulfur dioxide. Retrieved Nov 3, 2015, from CDC Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/7446095.html
Persson, H., & Lonnermark, A. (2004). Tank Fires - Review of fire incidents 1951-2003.
BORAS: SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute.
RADD, O. (2010). Risk Assessment Data Directory - Ignition Probabilities. England:
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers.
RIVM. (2009). RIVM Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessments. the Netherlands:
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM).
SFPE. (1988). Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. Boston: National Fire
Protection Association.
World Bank. (1988). Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards. London: Technica
Ltd.
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CA PDF Page 1 of 37

Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Facilities Risk Assessment

Prepared By: Darrell Rose, P.Eng, CRM

Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

1. Scope and Purpose ........................................................................ 3

2. Description of Tank Terminals........................................................ 4

4. Consequence Analysis ................................................................. 18

MARSH RISK CONSULTING

Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

MARSH RISK CONSULTING 1

Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

MARSH RISK CONSULTING 2

Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

1. Scope and Purpose

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

2. Description of Tank Terminals

 Hardisty D Tank Terminal

Hardisty D Tank Terminal

The Hardisty D Tank Terminal plot plan is shown in Figure 2.1.

MARSH RISK CONSULTING 4

Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Figure 2.1 - Hardisty D Tank Terminal Plot Plan

Moosomin Tank Terminal

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Figure 2.2 - Moosomin Tank Terminal Plot Plan

Saint John Tank Terminal

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Figure 2.3 shows the plot plan of the terminal.

Figure 2.3 - Saint John Tank Terminal Plot Plan

Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Auxiliary Equipment Area

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Figure 2.7 - Canaport Energy East Marine Terminal Plot Plan

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

1) Documents were reviewed regarding the Project including documents pertaining to

HAZID / Hazard Event Determination

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

 Loss of containment events

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Event Annual Probability Source

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Source Term Modelling

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Hazard modelling was performed utilizing the commercially available consequence

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVE’s): Phast calculates the

Weather and Environmental Conditions

Weather and environmental conditions affect the dispersion of hazardous substances,

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Risk Assessment Energy East Pipeline Ltd.

EXPOSURE LIMIT DESCRIPTION