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GILLES PINSON
Do the logics of public government still have a role in the processes of urban governance?
What are the logics of leadership, of the institutionalization of a social and political
territory, and of the legitimation of actors? What are the logics involved in organizing
networks that can be developed by the institutions of urban government, in a context of
governance characterized by new relations between state and cities, by the increasingly
horizontal nature of relations between actors and institutions in public policy, by change
in traditional modes of public intervention, by urban competition and by the increasingly
strong and legitimate presence of economic actors in urban policy-making?
The case of Turin’s Strategic Plan demonstrates that political forms of regulation do
not dissolve in governance, but are modified by entering into various combinations with
other forms of regulation. New accommodations between forms of regulation by political
institutions and other modes of regulation — market, network, community — can give the
activities of local public institutions an importance that they did not previously have.
This article will first attempt to reintroduce the issue of government into the debate
on governance. This means recognizing one specific feature of political regulation, in a
context where other modes of regulation are finding growing legitimacy in the
governance strategies of cities. Political regulation is changing in its modalities and
making explicit accommodations to other modes of regulation, which in turn makes it
necessary to redefine the role of the public institutions of urban government. The case of
Turin’s Strategic Plan will then be presented as an example of these modifications to
political regulation. Within the context of this plan, the municipal institution is playing an
active role in the process of diversification of modes of regulation and, in doing so, is
regaining a more central role in the processes of governance, helping to construct the city
as a fully-integrated political space and society.
ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
478 Gilles Pinson
development and of placing new territorial props firmly around stabilized modes of
governance (Le Galès, 1995). This new situation could be described as multi-level
governance (Marks et al, 1996), but it is also worth stressing the institutional battles that
punctuate this process of redistribution of authority between territorial levels. Formal and
functional sovereignty cannot be divided ad infinitum; therefore, the view can be taken
that some centres — cities, regions — will assert themselves more than others, depending
on their national contexts. The second type of consequence relates to the fact that changes
in scale of government are not taking place in the presence of constant modalities of
relations between state and society, modes of coordination of social activities, or ways of
imparting direction to a political community.
‘Work on governance’ thus includes analysis of the new forms of coordination that
these changes of scale entail. In fact, the very concept of ‘governance’ refers to a new
way of understanding public policy as collective action, as the combination of
cooperative and competitive games between actors and organizations, and as a set of
constraints on inventing modalities for collectively constructing problems, objectives and
ways of going about things. In parallel, work on governance also relates to the reshaping
of a capacity to integrate networks for the development and implementation of public
policies and to give meaning to the plurality of cooperative and competitive mechanisms
that constitute public policy in a territory. What is sought is not so much an institutional
centrality reconstructed at the local level (reproducing line for line the centrality of the
state at national level), but more, some new ways in which a political authority can
reconstruct a nodal position (Hood, 1983). ‘Nodality’ refers less to the capacity to initiate
and control processes for producing public policies than to the capacity to bring together a
plurality of actors as partners in governing the dynamics, to get them to work together, to
identify the relevant actors and to mobilize them (Duran and Thoenig, 1996).
Governance hypothesizes the reconstruction of a given order at another territorial
scale, and so it should not be seen as opposed to government. We still need to examine the
participation of political institutions in this reconstruction. Thus, asking the government
question in a governance context means examining the way in which urban governments
situate their own activity within this increasingly complex context of combinations of
modes of regulation. The meaning of governance used here recognizes the specific nature
of political forms of regulation, but takes as its starting point an acknowledgement of the
position in which the actors redefining these regulations in a changing context find
themselves.
linkages between these modes of regulation in a different way from the national state.
Initiatives to promote urban and territorial identities — like strategic planning or city
marketing, for example — should not be seen solely as simple propaganda or territorial
‘merchandizing’ tools or as signs that market logics are replacing state logics in territorial
policies. These policies may bring about a ‘recombination’ of modes of local regulation.
This ‘recombination’ may leave more room for self-organizational dynamics, for civil
societies and for community forms of regulation, but it may also strengthen the nodality
of public institutions, which might then become catalysts for non-institutional forms of
coordination of social activities. A logic of government may thus survive, but expressed
less in terms of control and of centrality in processes than in terms of nodality.
The Strategic Plan has emerged in a specific context marked by the crisis of Italian
political parties at the local and national level, following the Tangentopoli enquiries into
corruption scandals, by the crisis of the Italian state, which has fuelled — among other
things — secessionist movements like the Northern Leagues, and by a strong legitimation
of civil societies at the local level. Valentino Castellani, Mayor of Turin since 1993,
himself has a background in civil society.2 When the 1993 municipal elections were
approaching, corruption scandals threw the parties into total disarray, and civil society
stepped into the vacuum that remained. A movement was created around the Chamber of
Commerce, the University and the Catholic voluntary sector, in the aim of putting
forward a candidate for the municipal elections. This was Valentino Castellani, who was
elected on 20 June 1993.
Castellani and his team have tried to institute a new style of government for the city.
Turin had been ‘ruled’ by confrontation between FIAT and the representatives of the
working class: the omnipresence of Fordist major industry and its hierarchical forms of
organization had tended to make industrial conflict the basic mode of regulation for social
relations in the city (Bagnasco, 1986). The result of this was a weakening of the power of
the municipality, partly because it intervened little in the regulation of industrial conflicts
and partly because it had little influence over FIAT’s decision-making. Turin’s political
municipal authorities had never been able to frame and manage the town-planning and
social impacts of FIAT’s expansion. Diego Novelli, Communist Mayor from 1975 to
1985, had been able to establish an ambitious welfare policy that was successful precisely
because it occupied an area shunned by FIAT. For a long time, left-wing municipal
majorities situated their action alongside or in opposition to economic power, without
ever really being able to exert any pressure on its choices. A tradition of strong industrial
conflicts prevented the municipal authority from bringing together the parties in a truly
political space to construct a project.
Town planning provides a good illustration of this ‘blocked’ situation. The Italian
Left has always seen town planning as the most legitimate way to constrain capitalist
logics, since it should enable them to impose a political rationality on strong special
interests — and with the backing of the scientific rationality of the town planners. From
1976, Novelli’s council threw itself into revising the Piano Regolatore Generale (General
Regulatory Plan);3 but the representation of strong economic interests inside the
municipal council blocked all its initiatives, and the futility of trying to constrain planning
subsequently gave way to a more pragmatic, opportunistic approach. After 1985, the
Communist council was succeeded by a series of five-party coalitions dominated by
socialists, and any vague impulses towards controlling urban change were abandoned.
More pragmatic action on specific projects being carried out by private-sector actors was
preferred. A ‘project-by-project’ approach to town planning, favoured by numerous
closures of industrial sites, was established, and very little attention was paid to building
an overall territorial vision.4
The pragmatic approach did not solve Turin’s problem — the absence of
transparency in the strategies of the city’s strong economic interests and the difficulty
of bringing these interests in as partners in building a collective project. The era of the
five-party councils (1985–93) saw a proliferation of projects, but they were not integrated
2 Valentino Castellani was, at the time he was elected, Professor of Physics at Turin Polytechnic, the city’s
prestigious engineering college. Although he is an active member of associative circles on the Christian
and Social Left in Turin, Castellani has neither real institutional experience nor political visibility, since he
had been a member of the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) for only two years in the early 1970s and had not
held any political office before his election.
3 This, the main document governing urban planning in Italy, lays down constraints on land use and
building at the scale of the municipality.
4 In the mid-1980s, the territory of the Municipality of Turin included no less than two million square
metres of derelict industrial sites, of which more than half belonged to the FIAT group.
into an overall strategy for positioning and planning the city. The way in which FIAT
managed the conversion of its historic Lingotto factory, entirely at its own discretion,
provides an illustration of this (Bobbio, 1990).
Through the Strategic Plan, Castellani and his supporters are attempting to go beyond
the strategy of confrontation with strong special interests, the constraints placed on town
planning by the Communist councils, and the integral pragmatism of the five-party
councils. By using the theme of internationalization, they are aiming to bring urban actors
out of a somewhat secretive, conflict-ridden culture, to create a space for dialogue on the
future of Turin, and to transform relations between civil society and the public
administration, which have been marked by mistrust. This means reinventing a role for
the administration — that of reducing the costs of cooperation and introducing trust. The
municipality must become the instigator of diversification in modes of regulation. The
council intends to replace overarching unilateral and hierarchical relations — where
authority was embodied by FIAT or by the political institution — with a plurality of
relations of cooperation, where there are dynamics of trust and a common identity.
implementation of the 84 actions will be entrusted to different signatory bodies, under the
coordination of the Torino Internazionale Association, a political body constituted on 9
May 2000 to act as trustee of the moral contract established between the parties, and the
Torino Internazionale Agency, a technical body responsible for following-up projects and
cooperation issues.
The 84 actions relate to the project’s operational aspects — they are operational
micro-projects. This is the real meaning of ‘project-making’ — building a working
consensus capable of speeding up the sequence of decision-making, and of linking the
definition of strategic objectives to a systematic effort at identifying financial resources
and those who will carry out the projects. The need to speed up urban policy-making
processes has become stronger since Turin was awarded the 2006 Winter Olympics. This
event is seen as a chance to make up for the city’s backwardness as far as infrastructures
are concerned.
However, the striking thing about Torino Internazionale is that it is not a traditional
planning process, in which experts and/or politicians bring peripheral actors under their
control and insert them into a predetermined, material strategy. It is notable that the whole
process is relatively vague. The project approach focuses attention on ‘the realms of the
concrete’ (Duran, 1999). In order to face up to urban competition and to the challenge of
2006, it is necessary to mobilize the community of urban actors as operators who will
implement the plan. In fact, the nature of the strategies produced hardly matters: the
process of building them has offered the chance to produce a working consensus and to
consolidate the collective city-actor. The objective is clear — to make Turin into an
active community — but this objective may be made concrete in varying ways. One
illustration of this was the way the work involved went beyond the tourist issue and was
extended into a debate on the post- or neo-industrial future of Turin. From an orthodox
point of view, a plan is conceived as a tool for public forecasting and regulation, and
consequently might be expected to work towards ‘closure’, through the production of a
stable, relatively precise image of the desirable city. In this case, however, the definition
of ‘desirable’ is up for negotiation, and a plan can be an open framework that is subject to
frequent updating. Torino Internazionale is not a closed plan: on the contrary, it is subject
to frequent updating. The primary objective of urban planning no longer seems to be the
legal allocation of land: the first Castellani council took up the five-party councils’ plan
for the Piano Regolatore Generale, and, after some amendments, this was adopted. The
main issue for municipal government now lies elsewhere, in the shared general vision that
enables consensus-building and the perpetuation of a capacity for collective action. The
To promote – To enhance and develop – To rethink the city's system of museums and
Turin as a the city's cultural heritage relocate the Egyptian Museum
city of culture, – To coordinate cultural – To promote Turin as a `Cinema City' centred
tourism, activities and to schedule around the National Cinema Museum in the
commerce events of international Mole Antonelliana (under way)
and sport standing – To improve and develop hotel facilities for the
– To develop the tourist 2006 Winter Olympic Games
industry – To develop conference activities related to the
– To positionTurin/Piedmont automotive industry and to food and drink
in the national and – To develop tourist activities linked to sport
international tourist markets – To build an Olympic village to contribute to
– To support growth and urban regeneration
innovation of the region's – To build new sports infrastructures
commercial network
– To promote sport
– To use the 2006 Winter
Olympic Games as a driver
for development and
international promotion
Strategic Plan does not represent a very precise material vision: the concrete modalities
through which the major orientations are put into operation are to be negotiated with the
operators. Moreover, the Strategic Plan has not been published in graphic form, and it is
not legally enforceable on third parties.
Torino Internazionale operates as a meta-project, a cognitive frame for the concrete
practices of the actors involved in carrying out concrete projects. But it can operate as
such only if the vision that it carries is owned by the urban actors. This ownership is
guaranteed by the participation of these actors in the collective process of building the
meta-project. On the other hand, the meta-project can act as a cognitive frame only if it is
flexible and open enough to absorb changes in economic circumstances. The shared,
consensual nature of the strategies matters more than their ‘scientific’ nature. Faced with
overall constraints and with firms’ strategies that are difficult to forecast, territorial
strategies cannot be the product of deductive cogitations: they must, of necessity,
‘emerge’ incrementally. The plan’s instigators have taken the view that political
authorities in cities can no longer impose strategic substance. Instead, they must create
the conditions for wider participation in the construction of relatively vague strategies.
The sharing of the project is more important than its content — and that represents the
exchangist-aggregative aspect of governance.
hierarchically. The territory of Turin is, on the contrary, revealing itself as rich in
relations of cooperation and trust. Torino Internazionale intends to promote the territory
as a mode of regulation that is both alternative and complementary to the market and to
hierarchical organization. The exchangist, interactive approach of the project aims to
stabilize relations of trust between actors. The collective construction of issues and the
confrontation of the local and the global are helping to develop awareness of various
forms of interdependence. Highlighting the territory’s competitive advantages promotes a
shared view of the territory as social capital: the bonds created and the consensus built
enable the strengthening of cooperative ties.
someone operating in this territorial context’ (Dematteis, 1998: 8). The political effect of
the project is to ‘exhume’ the territory as a historically constituted community and to
attempt to eradicate the view that this territory is a neutral container for practices that
have their meaning at another — national or global — scale. The project approach
situates the activity of government both as the exhumation of historically constituted
characteristics of a territory/social formation and as instituting activity to organize the
updating of such endowments by activating exchanges between the social actors.
This structuring of the territory-institution is leading to the reconstruction of
government. However, in the context of the Strategic Plan, all the aspects relating to
formal political institutions have been subject to a lot less attention. The functioning of
the Working Group on Intermunicipal Cooperation was not ideal, and it was finally
decided to set up an association to bring municipalities together on a voluntary basis. In
reality, the political institutions are seen as places where the capacity of urban actors to
‘system-build’ is diluted and where the consensus built in the community is destroyed.
The more or less explicit isolation of Turin City Council from Torino Internazionale is an
illustration of this. Community forms of regulation are commensurate with consensus,
with a sharing that helps to highlight the things that bring actors and interests together.
The political institution, by contrast, functions on dissension. The cohesion of a system of
urban actors and the operational imperatives require interactions, renegotiations of
objectives, an iterative project process made up of trial-and-error — all of which are not
really compatible with sanction by voting and the division of the community of actors
into a majority and a minority.
Should we see this process of ‘institutional evasion’ as a sign of the death of the
political under the pressure of the disciplinary logics of globalization? Have government
and the political capacity to integrate disappeared in favour of the logic of exchanges and
vagueness? Are we seeing things pass beyond government defined by authority and by the
institutional monopoly of forms of mediation and regulation? From this point of view, the
Castellani strategy is explicit: to situate the municipality’s actions within an extended
system of governance, no longer to concentrate public policy in a few sectors where the
municipality can behave as the exclusive actor, but to become one actor instigating
development across a broader palette of sectors. It is no longer a matter of being central in
a few sectors but of being nodal in all sectors, of developing a capacity to organize
‘project-making’ by the city’s different actors. Municipal government activity is being
redefined, in a context of governance, as the promotion and strategic framing of the city’s
capacity for self-organization.
The desire to ‘empower’ Turin’s civil society is explicit. The Deputy Mayor in
charge of the Strategic Plan has indicated that ‘Torino Internazionale is not the municipal
administration’s programme but the city’s project’. The municipality’s desire to give way
to civil society reveals a specific mode of conceiving the process of institutionalizing a
territory and the role of the political actors in this process. In this mode, the construction
of a political territory does not come about mainly through interactions between political
operators engaged in relations of competition, but more through a process of increasing
density in the social weft of the territory. The territory, as institution, must pre-exist its
political institutionalization. This does not nullify the role of political institutions: they
can stimulate multilateral exchanges, which will produce norms of behaviour and
reciprocity. Government consists of providing the scale and the setting for this process of
social institutionalization. Paradoxically, in Turin, this concept of government, which
might be seen as reductive, seems to have restored a role to the municipal institution.
The question remains as to which social elements might have found expression in the
development of Torino Internazionale. Some observers have seen it as an operation to
harness the citizenship debate, mounted by a limited coterie of economic, political and
university elites. It is clear that the economic actors were the section most mobilized by
the initiative. More worryingly, some people have seen Torino Internazionale as a
process that has institutionalized a division between two collective action networks within
the city: on the one hand, a network of elites mobilized around economic development
issues and very involved in drawing up the plan — a network that brings together
employers’ associations, trade unions, some councillors and university academics; and,
on the other hand, a very large social action network, bringing together numerous
associations and institutions from the non-profit sector and the voluntary sector, which
has remained largely at the margins of the process. Whatever the case, it is clear that
Torino Internazionale is an elitist mobilization. In the opinions of all our interviewees, its
merit lay in introducing pluralism into the representation of these elites: the Strategic Plan
has helped to structure a pluralist network of representations of economic interests, and
this has brought Turin out of a system of regulation based on confrontation between FIAT
and the trade unions. Through Torino Internazionale, Castellani’s actions have broadly
helped to institute this pluralism in forms of representation of the economic world.
Politics in Turin has provided an institutional outlet for a process of pluralization of
local society. It has not designated legitimate interests, but has set up a mechanism to
support interacquaintance and inter-recognition between these different interests. This
mechanism has enabled the actors’ identity to be fashioned through the institution of a
framework of territorialized interactions. Thus, relationships have crystallized which
strengthen the nodality of public institutions without giving them a monopoly over
mediations. To paraphrase one observer of Turin society, a party to the Strategic Plan, we
might say that, although Torino Internazionale is the opposite of political in the absolute
sense, it signals the return of politics to Turin. Society is no longer constructed solely
from a political base; instead, the institutions initiate a process of self-institutionalization
of local society.
Conclusion
The case of Turin shows that, in a governance context, truly political forms of regulation
retain their specific features but alter in nature. Government is no longer defined by the
public institutions’ monopoly of mediations or by the coordination of social activities
through the exercise of authority. Government in governance is the set of processes
instigated by the public institutions of urban government to regulate the behaviour of
actors in a context in which various modes of regulation contribute to coordinating social
activities and producing the social order.
This new type of political regulation is making the best of the pluralism that seems
increasingly characteristic of the production of urban policies. Moreover, public
institutions are aiming to stimulate relations of exchange and social interaction in urban
collective action. These approaches enable the structuring of interactions and their
territorialization. Through Torino Internazionale, it can be seen that the project-based
approach enables the actors to be guided towards the rediscovery of ties that bind them to
the territory — with territory understood both as social formation and as space for
relations. Government in governance takes the form of a specific institutionalization
process — the ‘ascent of the territory’, that is, the updating of pre-political ties between
actors and the validation of relations of reciprocity, trust and informal cooperation as a
mode of regulation.
Community-type forms of regulation seem to be established. They structure a
territory-institution which regulates behaviour and provides both a common identity and a
place for the emergence of consensus and a shared vision. They organize the exhumation
of the territory’s pre-political social characteristics. In the case of Turin, urban
government is aiming to promote and structure local society’s capacity for self-
organization and so it is regaining a greater capacity for overall influence on the
governance of the city. A new political capacity is being constructed, on the initiative of
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