CANON 7 March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why

his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163,
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975 p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
Court, respondent. against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164,
Examinee, respondent.
p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR.,
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on
Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed
his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
MAKASIAR, J.: He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang,
omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations. alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court
deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited
discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also
the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another,
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name
before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further
resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office
therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty
examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the
dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to
grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal
testify in the investigation.
motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer,
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959,
reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university.
I, rec.). Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-
21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been
charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60,
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the
rec.).
1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law
and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and
Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not
some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar
candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to
with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively.
submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their
He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75%
as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence
in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
summoned to testify.
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit
their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E.
submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking,
examination.
stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon
examination notebooks in question.
the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing. In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant 2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high
passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back
 the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such
re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7%
each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April
11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and
myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions
as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no
alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to
get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the
chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be
identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return
for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the
one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in
Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972
that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's
code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on
February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook
bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested
me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57,
whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if
I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that
I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control
and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name
was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been
identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had
given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations
to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the
grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read
the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had
used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that
the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he
had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had
not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the
total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from
item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the
other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that
I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to
the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of
my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or
his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact
with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his
representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an
error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
 especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
candidates.
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar
Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request
was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read
and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall
that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same
grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I
had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the
total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark
of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had

absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor
had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even
up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated
April 12, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing
the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may
well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that —

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one
(1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his
paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%then he
would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving
a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised
mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the
general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted
the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the
identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and
without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated
April 17, 1972:
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he
was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant,
that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee deserved a
higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he
did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal,
to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee
after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me
in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to
to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously
re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he
used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested
me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low
grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of
short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
71%;
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly
 That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes
in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of
his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that
I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led
me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to
the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should
then be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the
release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with
requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of
them would copy their answers and have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result of the examinations when
released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that
in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer,
stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned
into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question
were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing
in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly
that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not
re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early
part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I
think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the
first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of
the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance
(evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street
towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino
street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of
the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a
portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as
Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta.
Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six
digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever
possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took
charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I
either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as
Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of
these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27,
1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was
still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the
 casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the
ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954".
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-
Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to
them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have
reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of
the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to
refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code
No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code
No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general
average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to
66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This
notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the
same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-
evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political
and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to
review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I
told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the
increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial,
may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only
10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was
"led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going
over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number
954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as
required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary
for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should
it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of
former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the
Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as
having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions
arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers
by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and
not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates
who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done
as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of
passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that
only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly,
is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having
caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's
behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that
would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the
result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make
this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the
existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners
were in the performance of their duties and that they should be
regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision
without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply
the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971,
just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets,
and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a
candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on
the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian
took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code
Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-
evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven
subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six
subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial
Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent
Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has
reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said
examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark
and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent
Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to
the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the
matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent
Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to
make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded
to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his
affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make
the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent
Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be
corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66,
rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and
the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to
the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency.
After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase
of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code
Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V,
pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was
still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law,
with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of
papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished
correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law —
that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade
by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised
a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting
the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did
not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz
raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and
also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had
almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of
policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the
failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential
Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p.
61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average
to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including
Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by
securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in
Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-
Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo
was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within
hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next
day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would
not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change
the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the
notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions.
According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the
said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority
to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the
examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said
notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee
Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp.
12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON
E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the
five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average
from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted
points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a
resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took
his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the
Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent
Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of
passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4,
rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains
that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners'
decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in
the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even
suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and
Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as
corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners
(Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted
during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo
adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that
respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well
as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with
the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately
enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the
five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was
only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this
was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%.
The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-
evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's
original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted
points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations
and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law
for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in
the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make
the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners,
his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare
a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis
of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than
the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A
Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without
any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as
Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he
singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than
ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim
of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for
re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of
Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to
do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-
evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes,
as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International
Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping
that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not
give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one
notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in
one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to
Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his
suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47.
rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers
of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more
than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57%
was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in
three (3) subjects, as follows:
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S Labor Laws 3%
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
Taxation 69%
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Mercantile Law 68%

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his
aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty
grade in Political Law are as follows:
dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

BA
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty
dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the weighted points
latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty Civil Law 75% 75% = "
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that Taxation 69% 69% = "
the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were ————————————————
not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the
release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject,
one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to
him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is
owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the Political Law 70%
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as Taxation 72%
appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing as follows:
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. BA
Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence. Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case Civil Law 89% 89% = "
of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all Taxation 72% 72% = "
subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15- weighted points
16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.). —————————————————

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number
1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the
Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the
meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up,
respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it.
This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile
Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case
brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was
no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political
Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of
the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed
should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo,
allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No.
2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.).
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty
dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of
respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after
the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still
failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in
Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was
so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed
the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the
integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court.
He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or
their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be
required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of
the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil
Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile
Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1)
previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these
facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight
(8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one
subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and
the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on
the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to
the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with
the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated
by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of
the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar
Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission
of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or
not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is
whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the
Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of
good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or
under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127).
Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the
Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence,
the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record —
whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending
against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is
his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that
the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court
will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not
be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending
or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing
upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the
applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that
the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court
for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether
involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is
required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense
before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there
a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal
case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in
his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for
physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966,
1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he
had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he
had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was
allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations
of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a
ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR
1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent,
in withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of
this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so
serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon
the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge
to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N —
W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken
from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion,
the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to
show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the
state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one
of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations
as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case
despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances
of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify
thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the
Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his
omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any
explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner
in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him
to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American
cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in
this present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on
several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to
the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations
of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name
of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In
re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re:
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez
(Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro
were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public
documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty.
Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation
and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that
they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same
without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and
without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more
inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-
examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent
Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned
was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the
Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so
declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the
re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades
of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of
Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought
to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact
average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol.
V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject
and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at
least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked
him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done
before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily
acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate'
and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as
lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what
I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"
(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-
41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated
the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of
said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him,
but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
 correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo
to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one
among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or
free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased
grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with
the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or
deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one
impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and
vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14,
1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded
cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with
vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his
(examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass
said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of
the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and
therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did
not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his
defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread
or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this
case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because
he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating
or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did
see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection
with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned
in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even
though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a
member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine
the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI. The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.
A. There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately
after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may
be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the
BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters,
more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was
dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the
same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80,
Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription
— April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down
payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was
his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece
before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol.
VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a
bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement,
his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00,
which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his
1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from
his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place,
said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister
at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address of
his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the
records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a
family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a
lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00
(Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23,
1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry
No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent
Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In
his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972),
the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car
sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be
inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his
statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972
(as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the
house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971
Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal
machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to
respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money
 used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed
respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed
of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March
16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the
amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part
thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48,
rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section
3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a
public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act
1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned
Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B. There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights
educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution
(now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent
Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16,
1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to
1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V,
pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he
was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational
Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly
addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of
the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he
does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether
beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the
Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86,
rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring
buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know
the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st
Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before
the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working
with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in
Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other
parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar
only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while
he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the
Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result
and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and
inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first
lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US
Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and
with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December
22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected
notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court
expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO
D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM
THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to
the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later
he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the
roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for
examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up
law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never
obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically
admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school
in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the
General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the
educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began
his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to
the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take
it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in
the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
VILLASANTA April 30, 1957
In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality,
vs.
HILARION M. PERALTA, respondent.
Ramon J. Diaz for respondent.
PARAS, C. J.:
G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case
originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found
guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed.
The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was
dismissed for lack of merit.
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar
candidate, from being admitted to the bar. The basic facts are the same as
those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit: On April 16, 1939, the
respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, Nueva Ecija. On or
before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love with
him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the
preparation of a fake marriage contract which was then a blank document.
He made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A week after, the document was
brought back by the respondent to the complainant, signed by the Justice
of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel, Tarlac, and by two
witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived together
as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a
religious ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the
corresponding ceremony was performed in Aparri by the parish priest of
said municipality. The priest no longer required the production of a
marriage license because of the civil marriage contract shown to him. After
the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband and wife
and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the
respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed
the criminal action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for
immorality in this court..
Upon consideration of the records of G.R. No. L-9513 and the complaint,
this Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves moral turpitude. The
act of respondent in contracting the second marriage (even his act in
making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their
marriage still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency,
and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
So ordered.
[BAR MATTER No. 810. January 27, 1998] IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE
THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations.[1] His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Courts
resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he)
shall not be allowed to take the lawyers oath pending approval of the Court
x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in the
initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN
BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted
upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On
May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered
closed and terminated.
In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner
prays that he be allowed to take his lawyers oath at the Courts most
convenient time[2] attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his
probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law
abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic,
Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the
Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and
officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and
Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the
President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic,
Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioners
application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the
deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In
compliance with the Courts directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his
comment which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in
allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to
take the lawyers oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such
gesture.
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental
or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the outset of
the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-
defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but
murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes helpless and
defenseless condition when they were beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog, suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking
advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil.
524).
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to
the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide,
including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of
the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally
kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas
day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they reported
that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of
his sons involvement in the case.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in
the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a
son in whom he has a high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed
him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then
has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He
politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Hon. Court. [3]
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son.
Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in
a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit x x x
and submits petitioners plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law
to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons
for disallowing petitioners admission to the noble profession of law. His
deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte
which resulted to the latters untimely demise indicates absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a
privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of
intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the
entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been
admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court,
nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that
it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-accused below, to
take the lawyers oath.[4]
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without
any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character
prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in
moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan.
The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.[5] Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyers oath
is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing
cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted
to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according
to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase
Mr. Justice Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino
To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, [t]he Court
sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will continue with the assistance he
has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better
position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur
M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on
a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Let this resolution be attached to petitioners personal records in the Office
of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7022 June 18, 2008 MARJORIE F. SAMANIEGO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. ANDREW V. FERRER, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against
respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment and willful
refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential
client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her cases1 and soon their lawyer-
client relationship became intimate. Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer
courted her and she fell in love with him.2 He said she flirted with him and
he succumbed to her temptations.3 Thereafter, they lived together as
"husband and wife" from 1996 to 1997,4 and on March 12, 1997, their
daughter was born.5 The affair ended in 20006 and since then he failed to
give support to their daughter.7
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented
their daughter's birth and baptismal certificates, and the photographs
taken during the baptism. She testified that she knew that Atty. Ferrer was
in a relationship but did not think he was already married. She also
testified that she was willing to compromise, but he failed to pay for their
daughter's education as agreed upon.8 Atty. Ferrer refused to appear
during the hearing since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego.9
In his position paper,10 Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to support
their daughter. He also admitted his indiscretion; however, he prayed that
the IBP consider Ms. Samaniego's complicity as she was acquainted with
his wife and children. He further reasoned that he found it unconscionable
to abandon his wife and 10 children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-13811 dated November 12, 2005, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the penalty of
six (6) months suspension from the practice of law for his refusal to
support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP also admonished him
to be a more responsible member of the bar and to keep in mind his duties
as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 with
prayer for us to reduce the penalty, to wit:
Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness
of the disposition of the Honorable Commission on Bar
Discipline, herein respondent most humbly and respectfully
begs the compassion of the Honorable Court and states that
the gravity of the penalty imposed and meted out, depriving
herein respondent to earn a modest living for a period of six (6)
months, will further cause extreme hardship to his family of ten
(10) children.13
We referred the motion to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation.
Upon finding that Atty. Ferrer lacked the degree of morality required of a
member of the bar for his illicit affair with Ms. Samaniego, with whom he
sired a child while he was lawfully married and with 10 children, the Office
of the Bar Confidant recommended that we affirm Resolution No. XVII-
2005-138 and deny the prayer for reduced penalty.14
We agree with the IBP on Atty. Ferrer's failure to give support to his
daughter with Ms. Samaniego. We also agree with the Office of the Bar
Confidant that Atty. Ferrer's affair with Ms. Samaniego showed his lack of
good moral character as a member of the bar. We dismiss, however, Ms.
Samaniego's charge of abandonment since Atty. Ferrer did not abandon
them. He returned to his family.
Atty. Ferrer admitted his extra-marital affair; in his words, his indiscretion
which ended in 2000. We have considered such illicit relation as a
disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action.15 The
penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment,16 or indefinite17 or
definite18 suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr.,19 we ruled that suspension from
the practice of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the
lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In said case, we
considered the absence of aggravating circumstances such as an
adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or
maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women during the
subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting
with other women.20
In this case, we find no similar aggravating circumstances. Thus we find
the penalty recommended by the IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant as
adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.
On another point, we may agree with respondent's contention that
complainant was not entirely blameless. She knew about his wife but
blindly believed him to be unmarried. However, that one complicit in the
affair complained of immorality against her co-principal does not make this
case less serious since it is immaterial whether Ms. Samaniego is in pari
delicto.21 We must emphasize that this Court's investigation is not about
Ms. Samaniego's acts but Atty. Ferrer's conduct as one of its officers and
his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.22
Finally, it is opportune to remind Atty. Ferrer and all members of the bar of
the following norms under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
xxxx
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
xxxx
Needless to state, respondent ought always to keep in mind the
responsibilities of a father to all his children. If there be a resultant
hardship on them because of this case, let it be impressed on all
concerned that the direct cause thereof was his own misconduct.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of
gross immorality and, as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective upon notice hereof,
with WARNING that the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the
respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision
to this Court.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the courts all over the country.
Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of
the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, A.C. No. 1481
Complainant, ATTY. PONCIANO P. ARNOBIT, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
Respondent. BRION, JJ. October 17, 2008
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint[1] dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court
exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on
the grounds of Immorality and Abandonment.
In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on August 20,
1942. Twelve children were born out of this union.Rebecca further alleged seeing
respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar
examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years after, however,
or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one Benita
Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondents infidelity, according
to Rebecca, impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal
case for adultery against Benita and respondent later followed.
In his Answer[2] dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife
and the mother of their 12 children. He denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And
he pointed to his complaining wife as the cause of their separation, stating the observation
that she was always traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes, without
his knowledge and consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. [3]
Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office of the Solicitor
General and, subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission
on Bar Discipline (Commission). At the hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and
documentary evidence to support her allegations of abandonment and immorality.
Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M.
Barrientos, her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent
to her, addressing her as Vending (Exhibit B-1), therein asking for forgiveness for the
unhappiness he caused his family; and Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, who testified
about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful
marriage.
Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C.
Velasco and Jose C. Vicente (Exhibits H-1 and H-2) to show the existence of a prima
facie case for adultery. The pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma.
Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were submitted to prove the fact
that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with Benita.[4]
According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly
absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence, adding that scheduled hearings
had to be postponed just to afford respondent ample opportunity to present his side of the
controversy. The investigating commissioner also stated that, in most cases, respondent
would seek postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. And according
to the Commission, its several directives for respondent to send by mail his affidavits and
documentary exhibits in lieu of personal appearance so that the commission could finish
with the investigation proved futile.
In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found respondent liable
for abandonment and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three (3)
months. The recommendation portion of the report reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of
Governors that the respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months as a lesson for him to
change his ways. An indefinite suspension is not recommended
because it has been gathered from complainant herself that
respondent supports himself through the practice of law which
would be cruel for us to curtail at this time when he is already
advanced in age the penalty of three (3) months suspension and
recording of such penalty in his record being sufficient to berate
him as to his lack of responsibility as evidenced by his
abandonment of the children. [Report and Recommendation
rendered by Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas]
On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-96-43
adopting and approving the Commission report aforementioned.
While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on the charge of
abandonment, it cannot bring itself to agree that respondent is liable only for that offense.
As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct has sufficiently been proven. Following
established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be disbarred.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct:
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to
the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust
and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all. [5]
Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. [6]
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community.[7] A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards.
A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the hearings
mainly caused by respondents failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this
administrative case against her husband. She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear,
convincing, and preponderant evidence his commission of marital infidelity and
abandonment of his family.
Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children and
offered an explanation as to the cause of his and his wifes separation, he opted not to take
the witness stand and be cross- examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to
call and present his alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had disproved an existing
adulterous relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation about the
paternity of her four children. Significantly, Benitas husband, no less, risked personal
ridicule by testifying on the illicit liaison between his wife and respondent.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred
for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would
show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and
the law invest him.[8] To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, [t]he grounds expressed in Section
27, Rule 138,[9] of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any
misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.[10] To reiterate,
possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to prove the same,
respondent owes himself and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a
member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing would not suffice in the face of clear
evidence demonstrating unfitness.
When ones moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges
squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [11] Respondent has not
discharged the burden in this regard. Although duly notified, he never attended the hearings
to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges
are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have
children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to
injury, there seems to be little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his
liaison with the other woman.
As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his
lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a
child.[12] In the instant case, respondents grossly immoral conduct compels the Court to
wield its power to disbar. The penalty is most appropriate under the premises.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this
Decision be entered into the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be
furnished the IBP and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and
STAFF, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6010 August 28, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for child
abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU for his alleged
unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money supposedly for the teachers;
and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera
Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May
1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. He
thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary Jane Pascua, before the
Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said second marriage was
subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed
and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to 1997, despite
expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December 1987. A
Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not applied for commission as Notary
Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to 1997. Respondent performed
acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by
Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
2. Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria
Cortez Atos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
3. Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed
by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
4. Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
5. Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed
by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by
Rolando DelaCruz;
6. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March
1994, executed by Evelyn
C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn
to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7. Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed
by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before
Rolando Dela Cruz;
8. Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by
Woodrow Apurado in favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
9. Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June
1994, executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10. Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996,
executed by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized
by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12. Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April
1996, executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13. Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997,
executed by Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma.
A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14. Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996,
executed by JARCO represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and
AZTEC Construction represented by Mr. George Cham,
notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal
deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis University (SLU),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors Office. He did not
discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in contracting a second marriage and
malpractice in notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a reiteration of
their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the existence of
his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He also admitted having
notarized certain documents during the period when his notarial commission had already
expired. However, he offered some extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice
and noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his report and
recommended that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for
the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage
without taking the appropriate legal
steps to have the first marriage
annulled first, he be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year,
and
b. For notarizing certain legal
documents despite full knowledge of
the expiration of
his notarial commission, he be
suspended from the practice of law
for another one (1) year or for a total
of two (2) years.[17]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking appropriate legal
steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando
C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year and for notarizing legal documents despite full
knowledge of the expiration of his notarial commission Atty.
Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years
Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as
to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during
good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public and those
charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. Elaborating on
this, we said on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should maintain a high standard
of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of
these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.

Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another.[20] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as
the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and
the courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. [21]
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such moral character as requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous. Otherwise, membership in
the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct. [22]
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted
marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they
parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without seeking judicial recourse. The
union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact, respondent never knew the
whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of communication with
her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who
was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989,
respondent married Mary Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action having
been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of
respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the
bigamous second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he
cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage may be
validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled by the
appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October 1994 before the
RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent contracted his second
marriage. The annulment of respondents second marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the
respondents second bigamous marriage.Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather
an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer
in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an
affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of
evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then liability
attaches.[23]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as
a ground for disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes
immoral conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community and what is grossly immoral, that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[24]
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant
his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage
while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.[25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider
respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation
and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any
intention to flaunt the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession, to wit:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage
or for a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been
romantically involved with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and
total love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent
person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife
and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry
(sic) with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted
ways when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[26]
In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral character
was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he convinced the
complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio and that she
was legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had
contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by
complainant, with some assistance from respondents parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely
to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his grossly
immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children; second, he
lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third, he mispresented himself as a
bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign land; and fourth, he availed himself of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to
marry the latters daughter. He did this without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he
even had the temerity to assure complainant that everything is legal.
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent
himself acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble
enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to his wife
and child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him to be
unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that
a penalty of two years suspension is more appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year
suspension recommended by the IBP is too light and not commensurate to the act
committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during
the years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent humbly
admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that he no longer had
authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no payment in notarizing said
documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must
observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined.[30]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated
as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.[31]
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do
so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one, performing a notarial act
without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By
acting as a notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise
violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer was suspended for one
year when he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired,
to wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and a
contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a suspension of
two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent notarized a total of
fourteen (14) documents[33] without the requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before the
Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed by the Teachers,
Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU; and the pending
labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region,
on alleged illegal deduction of salary by respondent, need not be discussed, as they are
still pending before the proper forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still
prevails in favor of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in
disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another two (2) years for notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of
suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the
Court Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in
the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 9
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs.THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.: Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am—
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have
on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of
all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for
legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term
medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject
of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that
it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this
practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for
doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered
by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law
student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between
a man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning
a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications
for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime
is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper
reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the
public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the
legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon
the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason
of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate
the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of
the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the
information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice
of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such
term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and
effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form
may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and
By-laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty.
Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and
then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its
legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent
uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law.
It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law
of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice
of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take
and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures
to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to
do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services
are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey
to those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal
Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve.
The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals
and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used
by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the
path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the
law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's
primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building
the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether
or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
 the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative.
Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative'
one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully
do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services
(See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge,
may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as
that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par.
6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for
the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
 . . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction
of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration
to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and
you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to
transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to
deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives
will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other
things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows
a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and
DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J: In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction,
petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12,
1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of
execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on
October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private
respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint
for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An
Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of
the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference
on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default
and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A
decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private
respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by
petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the
case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the
decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano
Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the
lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the
following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose
Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being
contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly
award of moral damages is contrary to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate
of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty.
Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision
became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower
Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the
lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida
Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately
protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or
levied upon without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition
and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said
Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for
defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon
". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals
... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting
upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three
motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a
dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack
of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the
initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial
proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did not amount to
a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the
subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment
by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members of the
Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In
other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently
assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order
of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged
counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason.
To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a
proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado &
Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby
ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why
Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-
V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners, vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.: May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal
services rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review of
an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8
December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-
ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's
fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After
trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March
1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October
1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning
complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total
backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a
similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas
on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to
an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same
day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"
equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings
were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the
case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on
the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January
1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as
respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-
23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division of
attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share
in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and
is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees
is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by
legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant
in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of
the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively
entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. —
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to
the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the
client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is
not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore,
recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those
possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules
and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive.
There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar
from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal
services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the
services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ...
and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated;7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law
will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done
in violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact
that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when
the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
"agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be
awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that
appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations
should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special
jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons
and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an
award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some of
its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone,
that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they
were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently
filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their
inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award
of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its members
because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute an action
in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic
well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the
union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6,
Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person
aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear
the financial burden of litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual
practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them
like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a
serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since
this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be
taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action
against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as
they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent
Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against respondent Muning.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994 - FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S.
ARMAMENTO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action
for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto
Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and
10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as
taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist
only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact.
It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems
that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the
petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour
shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car
washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he
already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he
was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a
taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger
who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the
same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was
made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on
several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the
previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00.
Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left
of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs
of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to
recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted
on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part,
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for
the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration
Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal
dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding
that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay
was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly
treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private
respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by
"Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that
Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their
jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of
the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It,
however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is
now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not
supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious
and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray
any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the
Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing
that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry.
Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded
therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his
worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment
supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such
trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a
recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary
of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or
damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same
does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may
incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped
working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private
respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his
deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to
petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was
mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with
the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had
not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash
deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision:
"Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in
the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he
has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the
respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents
herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid
directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice,
much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the
context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private
respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00.
Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice
in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor
arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or
the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of
the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to
attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence
of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and
such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution
up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 6290 - ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Complainant,
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, Respondent. July 14, 2004
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former
employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law
office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has
been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage
contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the
National Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage
exists between them. The false date and place of marriage between the
two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel
Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5]But in the birth certificates of their
two other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another
date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that
the respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous
affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The
respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor
Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
complainant alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal
practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine
Bar; (2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which
led to the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the
statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents
illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations
against her. As to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally
married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February
1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108
of the Civil Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent
denied that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory
affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondents good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
was likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped
pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[10] The respondent likewise denied
that she threatened the complainant with the words Isang bala ka
lang on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment
complaint was filed by the complainant to get even with her. She
terminated complainants employment after receiving numerous
complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people
with the promise of processing their passports and marriages to
foreigners, but she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment
complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which
they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted
the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for civic
works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the
dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed
that the complainant would submit a Reply to respondents Answer,
while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties
also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits
would constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and
the affiants.[11]
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the
respondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by
submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the
name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2)
a Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card[13] signed by
the respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents husband even
appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed
a law partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear
in court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to
show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon cross-
examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan,
who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they
have investments in her law office.[14]
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo
R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later
discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied
for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a
certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous
entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place and date
of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of
Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this
disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and
misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September
2003, IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found
that the complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of
the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by
respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729
20734, whereinFelicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as
counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for
failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to
prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan
recommended that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification
the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The
modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a warning that
a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner
San Juan as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of
Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting
on the Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant
Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment
may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence
on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance
of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this
disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings,
the complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs.
Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the
same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal
case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-
member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice
law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a
source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding ones self
out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a
client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he
holds himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and
aided him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo
A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted
that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is
another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist
in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy.Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained.Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not
to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or
to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana
Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent
Cristal-Tenorios record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the
IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
[B.M. No. 139. October 11, 1984.]
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY.
PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc., Complainant, v. ELMO S.
ABAD, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; A SUCCESSFUL
BAR EXAMINEE FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND
PENALIZED FOR UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; CASE
AT BAR. — In a comprehensive and well-documented Report the
Clerk of Court concluded that the documentary and testimonial
evidence, as well as the report of the National Bureau of
Investigation, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still
practicing law despite the decision of the Supreme Court of March
28, 1983 which held the respondent in contempt of court for
unauthorized practice of law. The Report has found as a fact, over
the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits
B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila
courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
Elmo S. Abad is ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00 within ten (10)
days from notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty
(20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized
practice of law he shall be dealt with more severely. The Court
Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that
the respondent has not been authorized to practice law, a copy of
which to be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk
of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an
appropriate complaint for false testimony against the Respondent.
2. ID.; ATTORNEYS; LAWYER HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR
COLLABORATING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW WITH ONE WHO
IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BAR; CASE AT BAR. — The Report
of the Clerk of Court reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe
collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S.
Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085
and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Exhibit D).
Atty. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice
why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating
in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member
of the bar.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
On March 28, 1983, this Court held respondent ELMO S. ABAD in
contempt of court for unauthorized practice of law and he was
fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to
pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217.) He paid the fine.
On May 5, 1983, Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant,
filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA
COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT
AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW.chanrobles law library
Asked to comment on the Motion, Mr. Abad opposed it. He denied
the allegation in the Motion that he had been practicing law even
after our Decision of March 28, 1983.
Because the Motion and the Opposition raised a question of fact,
in Our resolution of April 10, 1984, We directed "the Clerk of Court
to conduct an investigation in the premises and submit a report
thereon with appropriate recommendation."cralaw virtua1aw library
In a comprehensive and well-documented Report which is hereby
made a part of this Resolution, the Clerk of Court
concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as
the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent
Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of
March 28, 1983."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Clerk of Court makes the following
recommendations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from
receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty (20) days in
case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary
action of imprisonment in case of any further practice of law after
receipt of this resolution; and
b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time
that the Court find him fit to become such a member.
"It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in
the Philippines through the Office of the Court Administrator that
respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine
Bar and is therefore not authorized to practice law."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We find the Report to be in order and its recommendations to be
well-taken. However, the latter are not sufficiently adequate in
dealing with the improper activities of the Respondent.
The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent
under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made
appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the
respondent to a charge for perjury.
The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated
with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe
should be called to account for his association with
the Respondent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice, failing which he shall
be imprisoned for twenty (2) days. he is also warned that if he
persists in the unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with
more severely.
The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the
country that the respondent has not been authorized to practice
law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila
an appropriate complaint for false testimony against
the Respondent.
Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10)
days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating
and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who
is not a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L.
RANA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess
the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege
bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit
cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine
Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of
law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member
of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the
Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court
ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending
the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of
law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent,
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the
May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.Complainant further
alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19
May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel
for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and
signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that
respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter
engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation
of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing
the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him.
In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment
on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his
specific assistance to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent
claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
but as a person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the
19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes
in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001
which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a
copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated
28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering
that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that
the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents
Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance
before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
(Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-
Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before
the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds:
(1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents
Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case
is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the
MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes
of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated
in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent
appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers
oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents
misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that
respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to
cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as
counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001.
However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers
oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same pleading
respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and
in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the bar
had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
before the MBEC and similar bodies. Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even
before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized
also retained respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has
been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers
oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that
being a member of the Philippine Bar. the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private
client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
elucidated that:
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, Bayan.
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by no authority to practice law.
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law
SO ORDERED.
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when
he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a
member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right
but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust[4] since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice
of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.[5]
A.C. No. 7036 JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, Complainant, Present: -
versus - VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA,
and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA,
Respondent. June 29, 2009
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.: This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty.
Quintana) stemmed from a letter[1] addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge
Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for
performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for
allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC, executive judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries
public within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries
public shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence,
she wrote a letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which is
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial
commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since certain
documents[3] notarized by him had been reaching her office.
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed
notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of
ATM Card[4] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers
License[5] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.
Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty.
Quintana could not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato Cityand
the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part
of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of
the Province of Cotabato. The City within
the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was
discovered that it was Atty. Quintanas wife who performed notarial acts whenever he
was out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit[7] executed by Kristine C.
Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,[8] we required Atty. Quintana
to comment on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.
In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for
notarial commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap,
Cotabato. However, the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three
weeks. He alleged that the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction was that she
questioned his affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City
Chapter, and required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to
obtain a Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted
to withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge
Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition, but he did
not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary
Public[10] issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City.
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum,
because the latter immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without
asking for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge
Laquindanum even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients;
and disseminated information through letters, pronouncements, and directives to
court clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow lawyers.
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at
Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato.He contended
that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because
he was equipped with a notarial commission.He maintained that he did not act outside
the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He
claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession
in the entire Philippines.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority
to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued
his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
the Province of Cotabato.
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,[11] we referred this case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing[12] before the OBC presided by Atty.
Ma. Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of
Donation,[13] which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004.[14] Honorata Rosil
appears as one of the signatories of the document as the donors wife. However,
Honorata Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of
Death[15] issued by the Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize
documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary
public for and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already
expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same.[16] To support her
claim, Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of]
Title[17] executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006
at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy[18] of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with
subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Drivers License[19] executed
by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss[20] executed by Santos V. Magbanua with
subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in
the documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card[21] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2)
Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License[22]executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3)
Affidavit of Loss[23] executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those
documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation
of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife,
when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his
wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to stop
doing it as it would ruin his profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his
petition, because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his
membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only
performing her responsibility and had nothing against Atty. Quintana.The reason why
she did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, [24] which is a
requirement before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure
a certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his
Response the certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues. However,
when the same was examined, there were no documents attached thereto. Due to
oversight, Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send them later which was
granted by the Hearing Officer.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and
promised not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and
not be divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his
family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the
documents[25] issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his
IBP dues.
In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum
submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP dues
for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No.
610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and
1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence,
when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet completely
paid his IBP dues.
In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC recommended that Atty.
Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years;
and that if his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2)
years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be
without merit, viz:
Apparently, respondent has extended his
notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan, Cotabato, which is
already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as
Notary Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice provides, thus:
Jurisdiction and
Term A person commissioned
as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of
 January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made,
unless earlier revoked [or] the
notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules
of Court.
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his
notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in
Cotabato City and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But
definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public
in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of
the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat
to do such act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of
either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of Maguindanao but part
of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of
respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in
Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of
the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of merit.
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Further, evidence on record also shows that
there are several documents which the respondents wife
has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot
be blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the
latter to notarize documents in his absence. According to
him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not to do it anymore
as it would affect his profession.
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm.
Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the Court held, thus:
A notary public is
personally accountable for all
entries in his notarial register;
He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the
buck to their (sic) secretaries
A person who is commissioned as a notary
public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial
register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was
his wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize
documents. He is personally accountable for the activities in
his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his
wife, who acts as his secretary.
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent
notarized in 2004 a Deed of Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein,
(sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the affiants
therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as
shown in a Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80) issued by the
Civil Registrar General of Libungan, Cotabato.
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
A person shall not perform a notarial act if
the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally
at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation
without even determining the presence or qualifications of
affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross
negligence and ignorance of the provisions of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
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Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being
a lawyer in good standing, has the right to practice his
profession including notarial acts in the
entire Philippines. This statement is barren of merit.
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are
allowed to engage in the practice of law in
the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in
good standing can perform notarial functions without having
been commissioned as notary public as specifically
provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He
must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by
filing his petition for issuance of his notarial (sic) Notarial
Practice. The commissioning court may or may not grant the
said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not
meet the required qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since
respondent herein did not submit himself to the procedural
rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no
reason at all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in
the entire country for lack of authority to do so.
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent,
complainant being the commissioning court in Midsayap,
Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and
responsibilities including liabilities, if any, of a notary public
commissioned or those performing notarial acts without
authority in her territorial jurisdiction.[29]
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We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty.
Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the
gravity and number of his offenses.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that
Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized
documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed
notarial acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his
absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was
already dead at that time.
The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not
to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification.[30] Notarizing
documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the
laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is
deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes. [31] Notarizing
documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of
Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,[32] Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires
lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally
accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot
relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of
violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income
for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On
the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should
not be treated as a money-making venture.It is a privilege granted only to those who
are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on
several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily
requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing
upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of the authenticity thereof.[33]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q.
Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING
that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is
DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of
respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.