IN RE SOTTO
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be
Facts: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with
the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality.
The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be
charged with contempt of court.
Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends
that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon
this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional
penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose
fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by
Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in
his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the
utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of
the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended
to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set
forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes
Ratio: Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as
for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such under the
law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior
statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the
courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this
jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after
those of that country.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in
good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the
court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not
well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the
court in reversing or modifying its decision.
Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress,
of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members
of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to
2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted
by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local
daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow
mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of so many
mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years,
I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of
the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by
this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto,
like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as
such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct.
Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause
why he should not be disbarred.
In Re: Vicente Almacen
31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case.
They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
He notified the opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the
time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He
then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with
the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to
surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are men
who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was
made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became
“one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated
“that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court
is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the
Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues
that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be permitted “to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
. . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering
that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.”
Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are
needed because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full
opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be
unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the
Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular
facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of
the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer,
he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify
the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper
and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and
he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.
Enrique Zaldivar vs Raul Gonzalez 166 SCRA 316 – Legal Ethics –
Contemptuous Language – Duty of a Lawyer
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme
Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez
directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations
against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims
that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the
TRO is a manifestation theta the “rich and influential persons get favorable actions
from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition
to be given due course”.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then
ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is
entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may
have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six
justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on
Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed
their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the
Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be
bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged
that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar
case.
The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.
KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, v s. HON.
PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134,
respondent.
This is a petition for certiorari , assailing the orders of respondent Judge Paul T.
Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt
and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a
fine of P100.00.
Facts: Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia
Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by
which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had
purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS
Enterprises and later sold by the latter to co-defendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided
over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul
T. Arcangel.
On November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion
seeking the inhibition of the respondent judge from the consideration of the case.
The motion alleged in pertinent part:
1. …
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case
was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding
Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing,
counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that
His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was
personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his
wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and
Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative
Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless,
plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos'
relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His
Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case,
since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property,
plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set this case for re-
raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that
in the first instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of
the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.
Considering the allegations to be "malicious, derogatory and contemptuous,"
respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear before him on
November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
of court." 2
In a pleading entitled "Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct
Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty. Rayos
claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views
because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words,
just lawyering," for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to him that a "young man
possibly employed by the Court" had advised him to have the case re-raffled, when
the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come
for a hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who
"the judge may be and when he would appear".
Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated
December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to
suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding petitioners liable for direct contempt.
Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos argue that "when a person, impelled by
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit
himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt."
In his comment, respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not because, as
petitioners alleged, he was "personally recruited from the South" by Atty. Santos
and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos…that Atty. Rayos' claim that he was
just "lawyering" and acting as "the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client" is untenable
because his (Atty. Rayos') duties to the court are more important than those which
he owes to his client; and that by tendering their "profuse apologies" in their motion
for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the
falsity of their accusations against him…
SC Ruling: What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it
involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending. It
is equivalent to "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of Rule
71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.
In case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only
"[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to
be heard by himself or counsel," whereas in case of direct contempt, the
respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. The judgment in cases of
indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.
The Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
A reading of the allegations in petitioners' motion for inhibition leads to no other
conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the
case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer
to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated "easing out" the former judge to make
room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and
constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in this country.
They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can manipulate the
assignment of judges to their advantage
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As
a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. Based on Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and [t o] insist on similar conduct by
others "and" not [t o] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have materiality to the case."
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners' "profuse
apologies" and indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail
sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition
which prayed in part that "Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to
his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex
cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City." If nothing else, this personal attack on
the judge only serves to confirm the "contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant
belligerence" first evident in petitioners' motion for inhibition belying their
protestations of good faith.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to
cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle
we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while
vindicating the dignity of the court.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the
sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P100.00
to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against
Atty. J.Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda
Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
SARMIENTO, J.: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt
against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and
Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things,
Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using
intemperate and accusatory language." [1] On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration,
reproduced as follows:
. . . This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for
Ayala ... [2]
...
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence but
also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary. . . [3]
. . . The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in
issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts
exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted
conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court . . . [4]
...
. . . [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the
exclusive benefit of the residents of BelAir Village, or rule that respondent Court's
admission of said fact is "inaccurate", as Ayala's Counsel himself would like to do
but did not even contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to
Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. [5]
...
... [i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's
competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is
a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted factual
findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true significance of
those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not bother to read
and consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with
respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. [6]
...
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in
BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new
development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its commercial
lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason
therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance . . . [7]
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the
current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be
enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? [8]
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalledfor. His suggestions that the Court might
have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and
integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to
the records alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of
the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better
that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of
bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he
has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the
stability of the administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the
findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with
the findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily
because, precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior
court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the
Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that
event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity . . . and to
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession." [9]
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests
of his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate;
and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics." [10] And while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest
and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to
arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to . . .
challenge the thinking in the Decision,” [11] comes as an eleventhhour effort to
cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the
prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we held in
Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer
multiplication of words'." [12] As we indicated (see Decision denying the motions for
reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding
G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new
arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with
inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept
with grace criticisms of my decisions." [13] Apparently, he does not practice what he
preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its
decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended
the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke.
In our "showcause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the
Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 ...
Rule 11.02 ...
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 ...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional
misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE: Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine
of P500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PARAGAS VS. CRUZ
In Paragas vs. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809, a lawyer was suspended because of
derogatory statements in his Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts: In asking for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of his petition for
certiorari in the present case, counsel for the petitioner, Atty. Jeremias Sebastian,
used derogatory expressions against the dignity of the Court in the language of his
motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sebastian is administratively liable for his
actions/language.
Held: The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration penned by the
counsel of the petitioner are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful and he is
hereby guilty of direct contempt of court.
As remarked in People vs. Carillo: “Counsel should conduct himself towards the
judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer
of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require.”
In the matter of the proceedings against MARCELINO AGUAS for contempt of
the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA
NATURE: Criminal case where a witness for the defendant was seized by the judge
and the attorney was held in contempt
FACTS:
• August 29, 1900, during the progress of a trial then being held before CFI
at Bacolor, Pampanga, the court had occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a
witness in the case, not to look at the attorney for the defendant but to fix
his attention on the judge who was at the time examining him.
o Instead of looking at the judge (based from how I understand it), he
was looking at the attorney who’s questioning him.
• Judge, thereupon, arose from his seat and approaching the witness, seized
him by the shoulders, and using the expression, “Lingon ang mucha” (“Look
at me”). According to:
o Attorney of the defendant: shook him
o Judge: only turned him about.
• The said “seizing” was placed on record as insisted by the attorney of the
defendant.
• Two days after, Atty. Marcelino Aguas, was held in contempt and was
suspended for 20 days for wanting in respect to the court by making use of
“improper phrases,” and by interrupting opposing counsel in their
examination of witnesses.
• Atty. Aguas appealed but was denied by the lower court. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not Atty. Aguas should be held in contempt of court.
• Whether or not the Judge of CFI Bacolor’s action wrong.
HELD:
• NO. There was no evidence to support it.
• YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
On Issue No. 1
• The witnesses say and the judge finds that “his attitude was menacing”
(bastante amenazadora) in the moment of making his protest, but beyond
that there is nothing in the record which even tends to show that he was
disrespectful to the court or unmindful of its dignity.
• In our opinion both testimony and finding state a mere conclusion which, in
the absence of the facts from which it was deduced, is wholly valueless to
support a judgment of contempt. The statement that the attorney’s attitude
was “menacing” tended no more to competently establish the alleged
offense of contempt than if the witnesses had testified and the court had
found that his conduct was “contemptuous or lacking in respect.”
• The specific act from which it was inferred that his attitude was menacing
should have been testified to by the witnesses and found by the court, and
failing that, the record does not show concrete facts sufficient to justify the
conclusion that he was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.
On Issue No. 2
• In our opinion the action of the judge in seizing the witness, Alberto Angel,
by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an interference
with that freedom from unlawful personal violence to which every witness is
entitled while giving testimony in a court of justice.
• Against such conduct the appellant had the right to protest and to demand
were respectfully made and with due regard for the dignity of the court.
RULING: Ruling of the CFI is REVERSED, costs de oficio.
NOTE: I guess the part to which our topic in this case applies is to the first issue, that
a judge should work without prejudicing others.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial
Court, Antique, petitioner, vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A.
ABIERA, respondents.
FACTS:
• Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged
that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying "that
all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and
ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
• Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July
and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
• Petitioner contends that that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
said case since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUE:
• Whether the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.
RULE:
• Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
APPLICATION:
• A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to
the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
• In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
• In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
CONCLUSION:
• WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public
respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court
for appropriate action.
FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON
FACTS
This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty.
Villalon. It started from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez
to nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of
the case against Fernandez.
In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez
to help him in a case against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with
the help of Fernandez.
In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest
in buying Palacios’ Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez
who allegedly had a Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This
Deed of Donation was registered.
Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed
against Fernandez. However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name
was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was
actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in taxes.
In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon
for violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has
suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no
mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation.
Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case.
Sustaining Atty. Villalon’s argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no
duty to include the fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only the client’s
operative facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the complaint.
The Deed of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely
point out during the trial.
Fernandez appealed the case.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
HELD
None. Case against Villalon is dismissed.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to be truthful in all his
dealings. However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of
defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. She (Villalon) is not duty bound to
build the case for her client’s opponent, Fernandez.
The cause of action chosen by Palacios was for the annulment of the
Deed of Donation. Client Palacios informed her that the Deed of Sale was void for
lack of consideration. Also, it was not registered and was not the basis of the transfer
of title of Palacios’ property to Fernandez. Therefore, it is not a necessary
evidence/fact to their case.
49 - Rivera v. Corral (2002) (tampering with court records; February 29)
Doctrine: Altering material dates on court records is an act of dishonesty.
Facts: Jose Rivera, a Baptist pastor, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
Napoleon Corral. The complaint charges Atty. Corral with Malpractice and Conduct
Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. According to Rivera, Atty. Corral
tampered with court records by manually changing the entries of a Decision without
the Court”s knowledge and permission.
Justice Ybanez wrote the Decision (civil case — ejectment) on February 12, 1990.
Atty. Corral”s secretary received the Decision on February 23, 1990. On March 13,
1990, Atty. Corral filed a Notice of Appeal. The succeeding day, Atty. Corral went to
the Office of the Clerk of Court, Branch 7, Bacolod City and changed the date from
February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. However, Atty. Corral soon realized that
there was no February 29, 1990. As a result, he filed a Reply to Plaintiff”s
Manifestation claiming that he actually received the Decision on February 28, 1990.
Atty. Corral claimed that he corrected the papers in the presence and with the
approval of the Clerk of Court. He attributed the correction to a typographical error.
The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. They found Atty. Corral guilty and recommended his suspension
for 6 months. Atty. Corral filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP”s decision but
this was denied. Atty. Corral filed a motion for reconsideration before the SC. He
claimed that there was no due process or hearing.
Issues: 1. W/N the penalty of suspension for 6 months is sufficient.
Held/Ratio: 1. NO. The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is
to punish and discipline erring lawyers and to safeguard the administration of justice
by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers. If it is
evident that a lawyer lacks moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or
is unworthy to continues as an officer of the court, he may be suspended or
disbarred.
A lawyer must constantly “uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He
can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to his clients.” Every lawyer should act and comport himself in such manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the profession.
Atty. Corral violated his solemn oath as a lawyer by engaging in unlawful,
dishonest or deceitful conduct. He committed an act of dishonesty by altering
the material dates on the Notice of Appeal. He made it seem that it was timely filed
within the period prescribed. He deceived his client into thinking that it was filed on
time. This constitutes as grave misconduct upon the court. Further, his act is a
“disgraceful indictment on his moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a
lawyer.” It is an embarrassment to the members of the Bar. Atty. Corral is
suspended for one year and sternly warned that a repetition will warrant a more
severe penalty
JOHNNY NG V. ALAR
FACTS
The case stemmed from a labor case filed by the employees of the Ng
Company against its employers. The employees alleged that they did not receive
their service incentive leave pay from their employers due to the latter’s claim that the
employees conducted a strike at the Company’s premises which hampered its
ingress and egress. The case was referred to the labor arbiter and the latter found
that the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees
appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision.
In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit
(MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to
support his complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his
findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice
thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring
commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim
involved in the case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the
latter violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is
prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language
against an opposing counsel and before the courts.
In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the
canons found in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to
in the rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in
labor cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondent’s
counter-complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the
lawyers of the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action
and when they deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case.
The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude
that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the
complainant did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent
be reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a
similar conduct will be committed again.
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD
YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the public’s perception of the legal
profession. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both
its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality,
impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language
in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The
use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the
courts and trust in judicial administration.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the
IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondent’s violation of the Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine
in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against the lawyers of complainant,
the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position paper to
substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
FUDOT V. CATTLEYA LAND
FACTS
De La Serna a requested for the inhibition of Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the
ponente of the decision, received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in
exchange for a favorable decision. De la serna alleges JOHNNY
CHAN curtly told him that Chan already given out 10M to JUSTICE
DANTE O. TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in the case
between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr. Chan is a representative of
Cattleya land). Atty. De La Serna said that Justice Tinga abandoned the
doctrine in the case Lim v, Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also
said that the case was prioritized for resolution and that Mr. Chan had
prior knowledge of the outcome of the case before the decision was
promulgated.
However, Mr. Chan related that he approached De La Serna
for the purpose of amicably settling their case with Cattleya, and offered
him to be their retainer in Bohol. However, he denied having said to De
La Serna that he had already spent so much money for the Supreme
Court
ISSUE
W/N Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD
Atty. De La Serna is guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by setting
up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only
a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders but such conduct
that tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of
law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. Indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the
presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or
embarrass the court and justice. Any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice
has also been considered to constitute indirect contempt.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court.
Corollary to his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice”
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a
lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable
practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are
perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the
matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission
or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the
public's trust in, the judicial system.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court, he
cannot criticize the court. It is a long recognized and respected right of
a lawyer, or any person, for that matter, to be critical of courts and
magistrates as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels. But it is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. De La Serna's statements bear the badges
of falsehood while the common version of the witnesses who disputed
his statements is imbued with the hallmarks of truth. De La Serna's
declarations were maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded
the boundaries of decency and propriety. The libelous attack on the
integrity and credibility of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of
the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it.
BONDOC V. JUDGE SIMBULAN
FACTS
There was a case for corruption in the judges sala. the private
prosecutors representing the government were repeatedly absent or
unprepared.
This led to the case being dismissed. the lawyer/private
prosecutor was unhappy with the dismissal and accused the judge of
favoritism and gross ignorance of the law.
The lawyer went to the congressman in their district and
through him filed a case against the judge. this subsequent reached the
supreme court.
HELD
The supreme court found the judge innocent and the lawyer
was found to be the one behind the case (against the judge) not the
congressman.
The lawyer was found guilty of indirect contempt and given a
stern warning as well as fined for 2500php by the court.
Lesson: if you file a case against a judge file it within the
justice system (ie office of the court administrator / IBP) not with your
congressman or other non-judicial people.
Facts
Former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) of Pampanga,
charged Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan (Simbulan), of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando City, Pampanga, with
partiality, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in the
handling of Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Salvador
Totaan and Flordeliz Totaan (for: Violation of R.A. 3019 and
Falsification of Public Documents).
Bondoc alleged that during the pre-trial, Simbulan strongly suggested
the settlement of the case so as to prevent the accused (Sps Totaan)
from being administratively suspended. It was also further alleged by
Bondoc that Simbulan was taking the cudgels for the accused (she
argued strongly in favor of the Sps Totaan); that she subjected the
lawyers to pressure and indignities in order to fast-track the case, even
humiliating Atty Lanee David, counsel for the complainant, in open
court. She also showed partiality, bias, concern, sympathy and
inclination in favor of the accused in several incidents, one of which is
the dismissal of the case despite the fact that the prosecution was able
to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence the irregularities
committed by the accused.
In her comment, Simbulan pointed out that an examination of the
complaint would readily show that it was prepared by the private
prosecutors, Attys. Stephen David and Lanee David, who wove a tale
of lies and distortions regarding the proceedings to cover up their own
shortcomings as lawyers; had they performed their duty as officers of
the court and members of the bar, they would have informed the
complainant that they lost because of their blunders in the prosecution
of the cases. While she admitted having asked both private prosecutor
Stephen David and defense counsel Juanito Velasco to approach the
bench at the pre-trial of the cases, she claimed that the conference with
both counsels was to save Atty. Stephen David from embarrassment,
as he could not answer the courts queries on the civil aspects of the
case. She denied brokering a settlement of the cases; had she done so,
she would not have issued the suspension order. She also denied fast-
tracking the hearing of the cases in favor of the accused; her only
objective was to have a weekly hearing and for this purpose, she
instructed Atty. Lanee David to be prepared; it was her habit to act fast
on all cases before her sala.
The respondent likewise denied the charge of partiality for her failure to
act on the suspension of the accused, contending that it was the duty of
the private prosecutors to file a motion to cite the responsible heads of
the government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to
implement lawful orders of the court. She claimed that in the absence
of such motion, she assumed that the accused had already been
preventively suspended.
In Atty. Militantes case, the respondent explained that there was a
misunderstanding between the private prosecutors and the
Ombudsman Investigator; she therefore sought Atty. Militantes
appearance to find out the truth. She desisted from issuing another
subpoena to Atty. Militante in view of the plea of Atty. Lanee David that
Atty. Militante would no longer be called as a witness; she also wanted
to avoid an open confrontation between the two lawyers. Lastly, and in
reply to the charge of unfair treatment, the respondent maintained that
if ever she called the attention of and might have slighted Atty. Lanee
David, the reason for her action was the latters appearance in court
without preparation, to the prejudice of the accused and the
government.
In the manifestation and motion, Simbulan prayed for the
permanent dismissal of the present administratie matter and requested
that her complaint against Attys. Stephen and Lanee David be acted
upon and given due course. The court resolved to dismiss the
administrative complaint against Simbulan and requred Attys. Stephen
and Lanee David to show cause as to why they should not be disciplined
or be held in indirect contempt for violation of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC
(Filing of a losing litigant of unfounded or malicious charges against the
judge who rendered the Decision.)
Issue WON Attys. Stephen and Lanee David are guilty of indirect
contempt.
a clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between
liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since
they are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice.As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with
the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in
the administration of justice.
In Alfonso L. Dela Victoria v. Maria Fe Orig-Maloloy-on, we had
occasion to state: Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard
of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of their litigation and
their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsel
and the courts.
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David miserably failed to come up to the
standards of these rulings. Accordingly, they are liable under A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC and should be held in indirect contempt under Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Considering that they have no previous
derogatory record, we deem a fine of P2,500.00 each to be the
appropriate penalty for their infraction.
Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby declare
Attys. Stephen L. David and Lanee S. Cui-David GUILTY of Indirect
Contempt for violation of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, and accordingly
impose on each of them the FINE of Two Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P2,500.00) with the STERN WARNING that a commission of a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Ruling Yes, they are guilty of indirect contempt.

Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and
protected conduct as members of the bar and as officers of the court in
the filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent. As the
OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former
Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc, he never really appeared in
court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the
complaint which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The
complainant thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by
his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the
two lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the
allegations in their clients complaint.

Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys.

Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. They
were his lawyers and therefore had the duty to report to him on the
proceedings in court and the progress of the cases they were
handling. Nonetheless, as officers of the court, counsels are expected
to be as truthful and as objective as possible in providing information to
their client regarding developments in the courtroom. Needless to say,
they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In these regards,
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting.

x x x x.

As we already stated above, given that the complainant never appeared

in court, it is reasonable to conclude that the two lawyers crafted the
complaint and incorporated therein all the unfounded accusations
against the respondent in order to conceal their inadequacies in the
handling of their clients cases. To say the least, the complaint was most
unfair to the respondent who, as the record shows, was simply keeping
faith with her avowed objective of expediting the proceedings in her
court by, among other measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared at all
times and to be fair and candid in their dealings with the court.

The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did is
just a consequence of their commitment to their client x x x can hardly
exculpate them. As the Court held in Racines v. Judge Morallos, et al.,
CANON 12
PEOPLE v. JARDIN
(G.R. No. L-33037-42, August 17, 1983)
FACTS:
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of
the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the
necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of
public documents on six counts. The cases were assigned to Assistant
Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation. The
accused moved to postpone the investigation four times but the accused
and his counsel failed to appear every time. Inspire of their absence, the
preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, the six
information’s were filed against the accused before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967. On the
records it was show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for
June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August 16, the same was re-set
for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement filed at the
instance of the accused. When the arraignment of the accused was called
on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for
reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity
to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was
granted by the court and the first reinvestigation was set on November 24,
1967. Accused moved to postpone many times, failed still to appear. When
he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for 15 days to file
memorandum. The memorandum was never filed, so the investigating fiscal
filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases be
returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set. The court transferred
the case to new branch of CFI Quezon without acting on manifestation.
Arraignment date was set but more postponements was filed at the instance
of accused; moved for reinvestigation again. Arraignment finally happened
on Sept 8, 1970. Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked for trial to be
postponed. On postponed date, accused asked for another postponement.
ISSUE:
Whether the acts of the accused and his counsel obstruct the
administration of justice.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the dilatory tactics of the defense
counsel and the failure of both judge and the fiscal to take effective counter
measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice. An
attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance
its cause. For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs
perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him.
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take
many forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in
a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case
against the client, the accused, would be dismissed. asking a client to plead
guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, advising
a client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison prosecuting clearly
frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other party and
compel him to submit out of exhaustion and filing multiple petitions or
complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false
expectation of getting favorable action.
CAPT. CABAGUI v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION
(G.R. No. L-38377, October 15, 1975)
FACTS:
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on
a third petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming petitioner’s
conviction of the crime of malversation of public funds, as filed on November
13, 1974 by his attorney, Eugenio M. Millado, with address at Koronadal,
South Cotabato, ordered that said petition be expunged from the records
and required “Atty. Eugenio Millado to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice hereof why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
trifling with the Court by filing this third petition despite previous resolutions
of this Court.” In its previous Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first
two petitions filed by respondent Millado on behalf of the same petitioner,
the Court had dismissed the secondpetition (filed on March 18, 1974) by
respondent Millado in the guise of a new petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction but which merely raised again the same questions in
his first petition (filed on January 9, 1974) seeking to set aside petitioner’s
conviction for malversation of public funds, by decision of the court of first
instance of Misamis Oriental dated June 20, 1963 as affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals’ decision dated June 8, 1973, for
alleged lack of jurisdiction and praying for reversal of the conviction or for a
reduction of his criminal liability by finding appellant-petitioner guilty of
technical malversation only for the amount of P1,161.65. Said first petition
had been denied on January 15, 1974 by virtue of the petition having been
filed late by 4 months and 25 days beyond the last date for filing which fell
due since August 15, 1973.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Millado is guilty of violating Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty
of gross negligence in not having complied with a “show cause” resolution
and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court by filing multiple petitions
for the same cause in the false expectation of getting favorable action from
one division as against the adverse action of the other division. The Court
deems his suspension from the practice of law since February, 1975 as
sufficient penalty and now lifts his suspension with the warning that the
commission in the future by respondent of the same or other infractions shall
be dealt with severely.
5. Casals v. Cusi
Liberato V. Casals, and Jose T. Sumcad vs. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.
Rebecca T. Palanca And Grecan Co., Inc.
FACTS:
December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante as counsel for respondents
states that while he received notice of the Court's resolution "no
accompanying copy of the petition has been attached hence the
counsel would not be able to prepare the comments filed
his first motion for a ten-day extension of time to submit respondents'
comment. The Court granted first motion for extension.
December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O. Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan &
Associates as counsel for respondents filed a second motion for extension
of ten days to submit respondents' comment on the ground that Atty. L.C.
Delante, counsel of record, got sick and that Atty. Delante has just
recovered from his ailment.
December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third motion for "a last
extension of fifteen days to submit the comment, stating the undersigned
counsel already prepared the final draft but due to pressure of work in his
office and matters occasioned by the Christmas season, the same has
not been finalized and typed out in a clean copy for filing.
The Court granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five days.
Having noted respondents' failure to file their comment notwithstanding the
numerous extensions, the Court resolved to require Atty. Delante to
explain and show cause why they failed to file the required comment.
Atty. Delante in his explanation claimed that in view of his pressing
professional commitments, he requested his clients to have the answer
prepared by another lawyer Atty. Antonio Fernandez. It was only upon
receipt of the Court's resolution requiring his explanation that he learned
that Atty. Fernandez underwent a surgical operation.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Delante’s explanation deserves credence?
HELD: NO.
In his previous motions for extension, he never mentioned his belated
allegation now that another lawyer had been retained.
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office cited as
reason the fact that he had gotten sick.
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the Court
that he has already prepared the final draft and cited pressure of work in his
office and the Christmas Season for not having finalized and typed out the
comments in a clean copy.
His present explanation is not even borne out by Atty. Fernandez' medical
certificate which shows that he was confined in the hospital for
sinusitis only from December 23-26. Hence he had sufficient time and
opportunity to submit the comments by the extended deadline.
He submits no explanation for his gross neglect in not seeing to it,
assuming that Atty. Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that
the required comment was filed within the last extension secured by him
from the Court on his assurance that the final draft was ready. His inaction
unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt
disposition of the petition.
His unsatisfactory explanation evinces a willful disregard of his
solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case "such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead" the courts.
Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the practice of law
for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite repeated
extensions of time obtained by them, with the reminder that "the trust
imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal
ethics but with the soundest traditions of the profession would require
fidelity on their part.”
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his
oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the
administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions
and representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case.
The Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante from the practice
of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective from his receipt of
notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
PNB V UY TENG PIAO
NATURE
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
FACTS
- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of
obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor
of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of
seven percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the
defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court
within three months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the
mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law and
the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.
- The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties
were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the
buyer.
- On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latter’s
right to redeem one of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and
thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos for P8,600.
- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds
was credited to the account of Uy. The total amount generated with the
resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.
- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of
the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven
percent per annum.
- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to
redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from
him the balance of the judgment.
- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank
through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.
- Hence this appeal
ISSUES
1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment
2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case
HELD
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of
the defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if
the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not
evidence presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank through its
board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank
to the agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel
and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it
would be preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the
other. In other words, if they are to testify as required by the case, they
should withdraw from the active management of the case. This is embodied
in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.
Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is
ordered to pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate
of seven percent per annum to be reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for
the defendant.
 BERBANO V. BARCELONA
FACTS
Felicitas Berbano, heir of Rufino Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as
their atty-in-fact for their pending casevwith the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (regarding their Ayala lot being claimed by
Filinvest Dev. Corp.). Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by Muntinlupa
police. The heirs of Hilapo looked for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty.
Daen. Berbano was recommended to Atty. Barcelona (by a certain Naty
Sibuya). After the first visit of Atty. Barcelona in Muntinlupa City Jail, they
learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty.
Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona told Berbano that if they could produce P50K,
he will cause the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Since it was already
late in the evening, Berbano could only produce P15,700 by asking from
relatives who were with her.
There were several subsequent meetings between Berbano and
Atty. Barcelona regarding the “grease money” to be used to allegedly bribe
an SC justice. Berbano made another payment via a “pay-to-cash” check
for P24,000; and, in another occasion, went to the house of Atty. Barcelona
to give him P10,000. Another P15,000 was handed to Atty. Barcelona by
Atty. Daen’s nephew while Berbano gave him P1000 for gasoline expenses
when Atty. Barcelona informed them that he could not secure Atty. Daen’s
because the check had not been encashed. By this time, the total amount
given to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000.
For failure to deliver on his promise and due to his sudden
disappearance, Berbano filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Barcelona with the IBP. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. Barcelona guilty
of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional
Responsibility recommending him to be disbarred and ordering him to return
the P64,000 (For failure to file an answer and to appear before the
Commissioner, the decision was rendered ex parte.). Board of Governors
adopted the Commissioner’s findings but reduced the penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for 6 years.
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred
HELD
Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are meant to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and remove from the profession of law
persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
Berbano’s Affidavit-Complaint and testimony was sufficient to
support the finding that respondent committed the acts complained of. The
act of Atty. Barcelona in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings,
despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Hence,
the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the Investigating
Commissioner’s judgment.
Atty. Barcelona is guilty for violations of Canon 1, 7, 11, and 16
(Rule 16.01). Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes,
respondent callously demeaned the legal profession by taking money from
a client under the pretext of having connections with a Member of the Court
(to secure the release of Atty. Daen). Also, this was not the first time Atty.
Barcelona has been charged and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a
lawyer (The previous case also involved misrepresentation and Atty.
Barcelona also did not appear before the IBP despite due notice.).
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients
that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and
thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections
(related to Canon 12).
SEBASTIAN V. BAJAR
FACTS
Bajar was a lawyer or the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance
of the DAR who represented Fernando Tanlioco in numerous cases which
raised the same issues. Tanlioco was an agricultural lessee of a land owned
by Sebastian’s spouse and sister-in-law (landowners). The landowners filed
an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of
the land use from agricultural to residential. The RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation. This was affirmed by the CA and SC. Bajar, as counsel, filed
another case for Specific Performance to produce the conversion order.
RTC dismissed this due to res judicata and lack of cause of action. Bajar
again filed another case for Maintenance of Possession with the DAR
Adjudication Board which raised the same issues of conversion and
disturbance compensation.
Manuel S. Sebastian filed a disbarment complaint against Atty.
Emily A. Bajar (respondent) for “obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling,
and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals
and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for submitting those final
decisions for the review and reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body,
and for contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics.”
The Court issued a resolution requiring Bajar to comment on the
complaint lodged against her. After a 2nd Motion for Extension, Bajar finally
submitted her Comment which was alleged to not confront the issues raised
against her. The Court required Bajar to submit a Rejoinder but failed, and
was later ordered to show cause why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action for such failure. The Court referred the case to the IBP
for hearing and decision. The IBP ruled that Bajar be “SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law for Unethical Practices and attitude
showing her propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets
and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering her
unfit to continue in the practice of law.” However, Bajar continued to practice
law despite the decision claiming that she did not receive a copy of the
order.
ISSUE Whether Bajar violated the Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD YES. Respondent’s act of filing cases with identical issues in other
venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of the law. Respondent
abused her right of recourse to the courts. Respondent, acting
as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed cases for Specific Performance and
Maintenance of Possession despite the finality of the decision in
the Ejectment case which involves the same issues. The Court held that “an
important factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar
cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.[72] Indeed, “while a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of
truth and administration of justice.” It is evident from the records that
respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the final judgment
in theEjectment case. In this case, respondent has shown her great
propensity to disregard court orders. Respondent’s acts of wantonly
disobeying her duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for
the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will not disbar a
lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.
Bajar was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
 HEGNA V. PADERANGA
FACTS
Hegna was the lessee of a portion of land owned by the
Baclayon spouses for 10 years but during this period the Panaguinip
spouses by means of force, threat, intimidation, stealth and strategy
(FISTS) entered upon the vacant portion of the lot and constructed a shop
for which he filed a forcible entry case.
Hegna won and the Panaguinip spouses were sentenced to
vacate the leased premises and to pay complainant compensatory
damages for illegal occupation. When the MTCC of Cebu issued a writ of
execution and the Sheriff levied certain properties of the spouses they sent
a letter dated Dec 2001 to Hegna for a possible amicable settlement which
he denied. Then Atty. Paderanga filed a Third Party Complaint alleging that
he bought the lot and the vehicle during November and December of 2001
which caused the failure to levy the properties by the Sheriff.
Hegna then filed a letter complaint to the Office of the bar
confidant for “deliberately falsifying documents, causing delay and a
possible denial of justice.” He also filed criminal charges against Atty.
Paderanga & Atty. Madarang (notary public) for falsification of public
documents and the Panaguinip spouses for false testimony and perjury. His
grounds were (1) the lot had no record of transfer with the Register of
Deeds, (2) the registration of the vehicle didn’t reflect any change of
ownership & (3) the Notarial Register Book showed tampering and
erasures.
The City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint for lack
of prima facie evidence of guilt but referred the administrative complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Atty.
Paderanga’s defense alleged that for ESTATE PLANNING purposes, he
intentionally left these properties in the name of the previous owner and that
he alleged discrepancies in the notarization were made to correct mistakes
so that entries will speak the truth.
The Investigating Commissioner found that the dismissal was
improper in light of the letter handwritten by Respondent’s clients, written in
Cebuano, asking for mercy and forgiveness in relation to the forcible entry
case. Such letter was no longer necessary if indeed there was a GENUINE
transfer of ownership of properties. In addition, there were several instances
where Atty. Paderanga will meet with Hegna offering settlement and it was
only when he denied them that he received the Third Party Complaint.
ISSUE
W/n there was indeed a genuine transfer of the lot and vehicle
to Atty. Paderanga?
HELD
Commissioner is convinced that there was indeed an anomaly
which constitutes a violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility
so given 1 year suspension. His non-registration of the sale transaction so
it would not appear in the records of the BIR, the City Assessor or the
Register of Deeds, on the Land Registration Office so that he would not pay
for the expenses of the sale and transfer twice, once he decided to sell;
or place them in his children’s name, and avoid paying estate and
inheritance taxes upon his death.
Art. 1491 A lawyer ought to have known that he cannot acquire
the property of his client which is in litigation.
• violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
• violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates that he should
support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no
falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court.
Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law
that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system. The act of non-registration of the deeds of
sale to avoid paying tax may not be illegal per se; but, as a
servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an exemplar
for others to emulate.
PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA
FACTS
In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C.
GARCIA vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No.
7056, February 11, 2009, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, finding
respondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional
falsehood before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the
illegal practice of law.
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the
Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus
Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.,
who were the clients of respondent Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The
PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful
possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way
up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining complainant’s rights
over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondent was
found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court
processes with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through
the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders, and
the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision.
Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the
law firm.
Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts
complained of. The courses of action he took were not meant to unduly
delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated November 19, 1999, but
were based on his serious study, research and experience as a litigation
lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in
the DARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid
and proper legal theory designed to protect the rights and interests of
Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. He stresses that he was not the original lawyer
in this case. The lawyer-client relationship with the former lawyer was
terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former
counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to
them and, in fact, even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent
candidly relied on what the tenants/farmers told him in the course of his
interview. They maintained that they had been in open, adverse, continuous
and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more
than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to in
order to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property.
He avers that he merely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to
which his clients were entitled under the law, considering that his clients
were subjected to harassment and threats of physical harm and summary
eviction by the complainant. He posited that he was only being protective of
the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his own
family, and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro
bono.
HELD
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected
to give his full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles
him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly
due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s
cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this
regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complained
of were committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to
protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are
not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less
fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather
commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost
responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their
clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the
expense of truth and justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind
in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by
impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.

FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ
FACT
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his
case in the CA for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando
Hernandez, who received the denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and
was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for
Extension the day before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,,
alleging that he was counsel for a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial
candidate, and he was also needed in the canvassing of votes, so the
urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the limited time to file
the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2nd Motion for Extension,
this time, because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file
the appeal on time, thus asking for 20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the
grand excuse that because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up,
thus requiring him more time to conclude on the work load he missed when
he was ill, plus the appeal, hence the request for 10 days extension, to
which 10 days later, he did actually file the appeal. (Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions
for Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy
of the resolution denying the appeal all together. However, instead of
informing his client, Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial
of the appeal some 7 months later, which greatly angered his client, pushing
him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE
Is Hernandez liable for malpractice, gross misconduct,
tantamount to violation of his oath as a lawyer, which warrant his
disbarment?
HELD
Yes, to gross negligence, but no to disbarment.
The filing of 3 motions for extension on the careless assumption
that each motion will be granted by the Court, and without taking care of
informing himself of the Court's action thereon, constitutes inexcusable
negligence. Moreover, respondent knowingly referred to Rule 65 in the
petition he belatedly filed as an afterthought in his desperate attempt to
salvage the appeal.
Rule 12.04 enjoins a lawyer not to "unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of judgment or misuse court proceedings." While pressure of
work or some other unavoidable reasons may constrain a lawyer to file a
motion for extension of time to file pleadings, he should not presume that
his motion for extension of time will be granted. Motions for extension of
time to file a pleading are not granted as a matter of course but lie in the
sound discretion of the court. It is thus incumbent on any movant for
extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of
the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry from the Clerk of Court.
Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time running out on him, for
which he will have nobody but himself to blame.
A lawyer who finds it impracticable to continue as counsel should
inform the client and ask that he be allowed to withdraw from the case to
enable the client to engage the services of another counsel who can study
the situation and work out a solution.
To make matters worse, it took respondent 7 months from the
time he received a copy of the Court's resolution to inform complainant of
the same.
He was merely suspended for 6 months, considering that
respondent humbly admitted his fault in not immediately informing
complainant of the status of the case.
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,vs.
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.
FACTS:
Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the Court
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo for "having employed fraud, trickery and
dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio
Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00" against Atty Pepito
C. Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the respondent entered into an
agreement for a purchase of land by the latter from the former. The price of
the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by
installments. Respondent issues post dated checks as payment.
Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with
Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and
its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his
own use. The land was
eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided
into 35 to 36 lots.
The 8 post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored. Mr.
Espino made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latter
refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then
tried to collect from respondent the value of the eight checks. When
complainant’s numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint
in June 1997.
Respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he
had employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino
were totally false and baseless.
Respondents claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not
encash the checks until the right of way problem has been resolved. In
addition, respondent claims that the balance would be offset with the cost
he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent failed to act with candor and fairness towards
the complainant.
HELD:
Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1)
there was an agreement between respondent and complainant’s late
husband for the sale of the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight
checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these checks were
dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing road-
rightof- way.
The responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment,
or that he was entitled to legal compensation. Respondent’s failure to
present evidence is a breach of Rule
12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8 dishonored checks,
respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties for payment was
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court.
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by his
unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and her late
husband, first by allowing the 8 checks he issued to bounce, then by
ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to
file this complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this
case with dilatory tactics.
Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto
AC 6273 March 15, 2010
FACT:
June 21 2001, An information for estafa was filed against Atty.
Illuminada Vaflor-Fabroa (Petitioner) amongst others. Atty. Oscar
Pagunto prepared and notarized the joint affidavit-complained.
The affidavit-complaint didn't include Vaflor-Fabroa's involvement. She
filed a motion to quash the information. Trial Court granted the motion.
Atty. Paguinto's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Atty. Paguinto filed six other criminal complaints against Vaflor-Fabroa
against violations of Art 21 of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines). He filed a motion to withdraw those.
October 21 2001 Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa, as chair of the General Mariano
Alvarez Service Cooperative (GEMASCO) received a notice of a special
general assembly on Oct 14, 2001. Agenda was to consider the removal
of 4 members of the Board of Directors including her and the General
Manager.
October 14, 2001, PNP Sr Supt Angelito Gerango, complainant's
predecessor, presided over Special GA that included people who were
not members of current Board. Gerangco declared himself Chair,
appointed others to replaced removed directors and appointed Atty.
Paguinto as Board Secretary.
October 15 2001, Gerango and his group took over GEMASCO offices
and pumpohouses, water facilities and operations. Atty Paguinto sent
notices to Chair and removed directors of their removial of the board.
They advised recipients to cease and desist discharging duties of their
position.
October 16 2001, Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa filed complaint for annulment of
proceedings from Oct 14, with the Cooperative Development Authority
–Calamba (CDA).
February 21 2002, The CDA Acting Regional Director issued a
resolution declaring the assembly null and void due to being in violation
of GEMASCO’s by laws and cooperative code. CDA later vacated the
Regional Director’s decision for lack of jurisdiction.
Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa then filed a disbarment case alleging that he:
1. Promoted or sued groundless, false, unlawful suit
2. Disobeyed laws of the land, promoted disrespect for the law and legal
profession
3. Did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, candor toward his
professional colleague and engaged in harassing tactics against
opposing counsel
4. Violated canon 19 – a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within
the bounds of the law Ruined
5. Damaged not only GEMASCO but water consuming community too
Court granted Paguinto’s request for extension. He didn’t file an answer.
He was asked to show just cause but failed to do so. Case was
recommended to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP: Violations against Code of Professional Responsibility: Canons 1,
8, 10, 19, Rule 12.03
Violations against lawyers oath: “Promoted or sued groundless, false,
unlawful suit, “Will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court” “Will delay no man for money or malice”
After conference, both parties were asked to file position paper on issue
of whether misconduct was committed by respondent. Atty Vaflor-
Fabroa complied while Atty Paguinto again failed to submit an a position
paper.
Commissioner Quisumbing found him guilty of violations against
lawyers oath, and canons 1,8,10 and rule 12.03. She recommended a
suspension of 2 years. He was previously suspended for 6 months.
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline opted to dismiss the complaint for
lack of merit. After M for Reconsideration, IBP-CBD recommended 6
month suspension
SC:
1. violation was conniving with GEMASCO board and Gerango on the
take over, he violated its by-laws and the Cooperative Code. He violated
lawyers oath : à to uphold constitution and obey laws
2. violation committed when he filed baseless criminal complaints which
promoted or sued groundless, false, unlawful suit. He violated lawyer’s
oath.
3. he failed to submit comment after asking for an extension, he ignored
court’s order show a cavalier attitude towards the court and disrespect
for its institution.
Sebastien v. Bajar, repeatedly ignoring orders of the SC constitutes
disrespect for judicial institution
Lawyers must respect court orders and processes and deference shows
wilful disregard that must be punished or subject to disciplinary action.
Because he was previously suspended, he must be meted a higher
penalty.
He is suspended for two years from the practice of law for violation of
Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.
TITLE: Bugaring and RBBI v. Hon Espanol [G.R. No. 130990,
January 19, 2001 (Canon 12 Court Process)]
Canon 12, section 4: Effect of non-compliance. It the order is not
obeyed, or in case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may
order the striking out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which
the order was directed or make such other order as it deems just.
PONENTE: De Leon, JR, J:
FACTS:
• Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated
March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring
petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of
court.
• The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held
on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled “Royal
Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz
Alvaran, et al.”, for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title,
Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of
respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
• Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis
pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on
April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19,
1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens
was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve,
and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a
Motion for Contempt of Court.
• During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on
December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct
contempt of court, thus:
• During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present
together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking
pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel, Atty. Rexie
Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was
ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to
cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite,
Diosdado Concepcion.
• The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that
he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take
pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a function, and
that was the reason why the said cameraman was in town with him
and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given,
the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court took exception
to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public
and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was
not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
• When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion
manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right then
and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent him, the
case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty.
Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present
his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga
was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading
for his client, considering that the Motion has so many
ramifications and the issues are complicated.
• At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to
mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact
he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has
not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears
to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and
wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
• While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime
he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at
which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words insulting
the Court; such as: ‘that he knows better than the latter as he has
won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he
knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to move for
the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being
antagonistic to his client,’ and other invectives were hurled to the
discredit of the Court.
• Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct
contempt and order the Court’s sheriff to arrest and place him
under detention.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Atty. Bugaring is guilty of contempt of court.
HELD:
1) Yes, Atty. Bugaring is guilty of contempt of court.
RATIONALE:
• Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that
the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and
legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful
towards the court as he always addressed the court with the
phrase “your honor please.”
• The Supreme Court disagree.
• Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
• Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or
to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge
and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a
superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or
both, if it be an inferior court.
• We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner’s alleged deference to the trial court in consistently
addressing the respondent judge as “your Honor please”
throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
• 1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the
trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42,
Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that “a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts”.
• 2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent
judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge “motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case”.
• 3. behaving without due regard to the trial court’s order to
maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer’s
duty to “maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude”
in order to maintain its importance in the administration of
justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to “observe and
maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others”.
• 4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow
counsel who at the time he was making representations in
behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in
edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39,
Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and
• 5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to
exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of
Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of
law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness “with
fairness and due consideration,” and Canon 12 of Code of
Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to
“exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.”
• The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the
petitioner’s use of the phrase “your honor please.” For, after using
said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the
Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum
is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.
• But “a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client’s
cause” (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should
not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of
Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br.
15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore,
misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule
10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12
of the same Canons (Ibid).
• “Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist
the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends
to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
 contravenes such lawyer’s duty.”
• WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, Bugaring was sentenced
to 3 day imprisonment and a fine of P3,000. The Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to the
petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of
the original fine of P3,000.00.
RENERIO SAMBAJON, et al. vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING
Facts: Complainants sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing on
the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainants were the complainants in NLRC Case
Microplast Inc. vs Ardan, et al., for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), Illegal
Dismissal and Illegal Strike, while Atty. Suing was the counsel for the
respondents.
Ruling: 1) Disbarment is not in order. Instead, the respondent is found
guilty of negligence and gross misconduct. The Court says that a lawyer
serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice
expected of men of good intentions. Diligence is the attention and care
required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence.
2) Yes, respondent was guilty of coaching his client in the
latter’s testimony before Commissioner Hababag. Not only did
respondent try to coach his client or influence him to answer questions
in an apparent attempt not to incriminate him (respondent).
Any act on the lawyer’s part that tends to obstruct, perverts
or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct.
While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the
proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a
disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the
misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.
The respondent is likewise suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Said case was dismissed by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente

Santos and the respondent employer was declared guilty of ULP. The
employer was directed to reinstate all the complainants to their former
position with full back wages. The decision having become final and
executory, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution.

In the meantime, on the basis of individual Release Waiver

and Quitclaims purportedly signed and sworn to by seven (7) of the
complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before Labor
Arbiter, in the presence of the respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
said case insofar as the seven (7) complainants were concerned.

Four (4) of the seven (7) complainants who purportedly

executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received
the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative
complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his
clients, “frustrated” the implementation of the Writ of Execution by
presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents.

In a related move, complainants also filed a criminal

complaint for Falsification against respondent together with his clients.

In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Commissioner

Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an investigation of the
administrative complaint at bar, recommended that respondent be
faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor with warning.

The Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted

the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hababag.

The Court notes the attempt of respondent to influence the

answers of his client Manuel Rodil when the latter testified before
Commissioner Manuel Hababag.

Issues: 1) May respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, be disbarred for his

alleged manipulation of four (4) alleged RELEASE WAIVER AND
QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed the
same as bogus and falsified?
2) Was respondent guilty of coaching his client in the latter’s
testimony before Commissioner Hababag?

Law: Canon 12

Case History: Investigated by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) through IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag on 27
September, 2015.
CANON 13
Domingo V. Austria vs. Hon. Antonio C. Masaquel, G.R. No. L22536
August 31, 1967
FACTS: Respondent Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring the
plaintiffs (one of them is Domingo Austria) the owners of the three parcels of
land in question located at San Carlos and Bayambang in the province of
Pangasinan. Pedro Bravo was ordered to vacate the lands and pay the
plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang. The
plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment — which
motion was granted by respondent Judge Masaquel and, upon the plaintiffs'
having posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed them
in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.
Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of Judge Masaquel,
when the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to the
bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo.
Through Atty. Sicat, Bravo then filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution
of the judgment, which was later on granted by Judge Masaquel. Austria had
asked for the appointment of a receiver over the parcel of land located at
Bayambang, which prayer was granted by Judge Masaquel, but upon the filing
of a bond by Bravo for the nonappointment of a receiver, the order receivership
was set aside. Pending the approval of the defendant's amended record on
appeal, Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial. Judge Masaquel granted the
said motion. The hearing on the retrial was finally set.
Before the opening of the court's session, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for
Austria and his co-plaintiffs, saw Judge Masaquel in his chamber and verbally
transmitted to him the request of Austria that he (the Judge) inhibit himself
from further hearing the case upon the ground that the new counsel for the
defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. Judge Masaquel,
however, rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the
request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge
provided for in the Rules of Court. Judge called Domingo Austria, and inquired
from the latter if it was true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to
approach the Judge in chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself from
trying this case because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly
associated with the said Judge. Austria was also asked if he has lost faith in
the sense of fairness and justice of the Presiding Judge of this Court simply
because of Judge Masaquel‘s former association with the defendant's lawyer.
Domingo Austria answered both in the affirmative. Judge Masaquel declared
said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he was ordered to
pay a fine of P50.00.
Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under protest.
He filed this instant petition for certiorari before this Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Domingo Austria should be held in direct contempt of court.
HELD: No. Austria is not guilty of direct contempt of court.
RATIO: When the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself
from further trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite
party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner did so
because he was impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the
mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an advantage on the part of his
adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not
disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to
the court. The respondent Judge had decided the case in favor of petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond
they were already placed in possession of the lands in question pending
appeal. It was when Atty. Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the
latter was given back the properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the
judgment which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent
Judge over the opposition of petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same
counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by
respondent Judge in spite of the vigorous objection of counsel for the petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of the fact that his
adversary, the defendant Pedro Bravo, had been boasting in San Carlos that
he was sure to win his case because of his new lawyer.
While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify
himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel
for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason
for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so
decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the
said Rule 137.
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion
as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
EMETERIO GALLO through Counsel Atty. Francisco C.
Aurillo, complainant,
vs. JUDGE JOSE CORDERO, MTC, Babatñgon, Leyte, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a sworn complaint dated September 8, 1994 of Emeterio Gallo,
charging Judge Jose Cordero of the Municipal Trial Court of Babatñgon, Leyte
with non-feasance, manifest bias, gross ignorance of the law, and graft and
rank favoritism.
The complaint is made in connection with Criminal Case No. 2194 entitled
"People v. Cristuto Barreta, Alberto Macabata, Danilo Morillo, and Rodolfo
Villanueva," which complainant filed in respondent judge's court on August 23,
1994 for violation of P.D.No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law.
The criminal complaint alleged:
That several years ago, at Barangay Bagong Silang, municipality of
Babatñgon, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the land owners,
did then and there, succeeded in occupying and possessing certain
portions of the property of the latter against their will for residential
and small farming purposes, and have refused to vacate the
property despite demands for them to do so.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On August 26, 1994, respondent issued a subpoena1 to complainant requiring
him to appear and to testify regarding his affidavit and to bring with him
documents attesting to his ownership of the land. Complainant appeared as
directed on August 30, 1994 in respondent's office. According to complainant's
affidavit dated September 7, 1994,2the following transpired:
That on August 30, 1994 I saw Honorable Judge Jose Cordero in
his office, having been summoned to appear before him on that
day;
That he then asked me if I have papers of ownership of land, such
as tax declaration, and I said yes but did not bring them as this was
no trial; and besides, he already had the records submitted by the
chief of police;
That since he insisted on seeing our tax declaration, with his
permission I went to the office of the municipal assessor, secured a
certified copy of the tax declaration of land in Bagong Silang, and
gave it to him; and noting the area to be 21 hectares the Judge
commented that ours is quite a big tract of land;
That when I asked the Judge if the accused have already been
arrested, he said No; so I said, what about this case of ours? And
he asked what I really wanted. When I said I want them ejected
from our land the Judge said: "No, you cannot eject tenants now
under the law." I countered that the four accused are not tenants,
but the Judge said, "Even then, nobody can eject them.
That disappointed at his answers which clearly were biased for the
accused, I asked permission to leave, which was granted. But he
added that I should see him again on Sept. 14, the day before trial
which he set for Sept. 15; . . . .
The following day, according to complainant, his son Roger Gallo went to
respondent's office to deliver his letter in which he inquired from the judge
whether he had already issued a warrant of arrest against the accused; that
upon entering the office, Roger saw respondent conversing with the accused in
the criminal case;3 that an aide of respondent received the letter and opened it;
that respondent did not however say anything nor reply to complainant's letter;
that when Roger left the office, respondent judge and the four accused
continued their conversation.4
Complainant charges that (a) in violation of art. 207 (malicious delay in the
administration of justice) and art. 208 (negligence and tolerance in the
prosecution of crimes) of the Revised Penal Code respondent judge refused to
order the arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 2194; (b) that respondent
privately conferred with the accused in his office on August 31, 1994 which
"logically and naturally arouses suspicion of graft and rank favoritism;" and (c)
that he acted with bias and ignorance of the law in telling complainant, "You
cannot eject tenants now under the law," and that even if the accused were not
tenants, "nobody can eject them." Complainant Gallo prays that (1) respondent
be preventively suspended or ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the case
and that another judge be assigned to handle the case and (2) after due
hearing, respondent be dismissed from the service.
In his comment, respondent alleges that he did not order the arrest of the
accused for the following reasons: (1) the complaint charges no offense under
P.D. No. 772 because of "the absence [of] recital in the body of [the] complaint
that the property occupied possessed is within the urban communities" per the
ruling in People v. Echavez,5 that the crime of squatting applies only to urban
communities,6 (2) the complaint is defective because of its failure to state the
name of the offended party and the date and time of the commission of
the offense; (3) respondent acted in compliance with Administrative Circular
No. 8-92 which "reiterates to all trial court judges the need for a careful
consideration of the proper application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (RA 6657) to avoid conflict of jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Boards," and (4) he thought that complainant Gallo was
merely pressuring the accused to vacate the property through the filing of a
criminal case against them.
Respondent also contends that he cannot be liable under art. 208 of the
Revised Penal Code, because this provision applies to the failure of public
prosecutors to prosecute for law violations.
Respondent denied uttering the statements attributed to him allegedly showing
that he had prejudged the case, the truth being that he merely
asked complainant certain questions to ascertain compliance with Rule 110 §§
6 and 11 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
As for his alleged "private conference" with the accused, respondent claims
that he merely tried to advise them of their right to a counsel de oficio in case
they could not afford to hire a lawyer.
With regard to complainant's demand for his inhibition, respondent alleges that
there was no basis for complainant to say that he could not expect justice from
him (respondent judge) because the case had just been set for the
arraignment of the accused.
To be sure, Criminal Case No. 2194 was filed invoking the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of respondent judge's court, considering that under P.D.
No. 772 the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6
months to 1 year or a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than
P5,000.00.8 Hence, in accordance with Rule 112, §9(b), in relation to §3(a)
thereof, respondent's job was to determine at the outset if there was sufficient
ground to hold the accused for trial, on the basis of the complaint and affidavits
submitted. If there was no sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial, the
judge should dismiss the complaint or information, otherwise, he should issue
a warrant of arrest after personally examining the complainant and his
witnesses in writing and under oath in the form of searching questions and
answers.
Apparently, respondent judge found sufficient ground to hold the accused in
the criminal case for trial. That is why subpoenas were issued to the
complainant and the accused. In the case of the complainant,
the subpoena required him to testify and bring with him the papers showing his
title to the land. But respondent judge did not examine him with a view to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Instead, as he now says in his comment,
he subpoenaedcomplainant only to determine the sufficiency of the complaint.
Yet, respondent likewise required the accused to present their evidence the
next day, August 31, 1994.
It would thus appear that respondent was confused about what to do. He says
in his comment that he found the criminal complaint to be insufficient because
it does not state the time of commission of the offense and the name of the
offended party. He also contends that it does not charge an offense because in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Echavez,9 the offense punished under
P.D. No. 772 is committed only in urban communities, although in Jumawan v.
Eviota 10 we overruled People v. Echavez and held that what is punished by
the law is squatting on land which is used for residential, commercial or other
purposes. Be that as it may, however, what respondent should have done was
to dismiss the criminal case. The fact, however, is that he did not dismiss the
complaint; neither did he, on the other hand, order the arrest of the accused in
that case.
Respondent judge also opened himself to charges of partiality and bias by
meeting privately with the four accused. He says that he merely wanted to
apprise them of their constitutional right. Whatever his purpose was, it was
improper for respondent judge to meet them without the presence of
complainant. As already stated, the subpoenarequired the accused to appear
in court on August 31, 1994 to give their testimony. But no hearing was set on
that date. In fact complainant's son, Roger, merely chanced on the accused in
the office of the judge on August 31, 1994 because he had been sent by his
father to deliver the latter's letter inquiring whether the judge had yet issued a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Thus, respondent judge not only has shown gross ignorance of law and
procedure but has also failed to live up to the norm that "judges should not
only be impartial but should also appear impartial." 11 He thus violated Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." In the words of
Rule 2.01 of that Canon, "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Respondent judge was compulsorily retired on March 11, 1995, after reaching
the age of 70. This fact, however, does not render this case moot and
academic. As held in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos: 12
[T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency
of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. . . . If innocent,
respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully;
if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
ACCORDINGLY, a FINE of P10,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Jose
Cordero, the same to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he may
be entitled to receive from the government.
SO ORDERED.
Eduardo L. Martelino, et. al. vs. Jose Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894, March
25, 1970
FACTS: This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings
against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of
the AFP, and the officers and men under him, for violation of the Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
At the hearing, petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the President
of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read
newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident which had come to be referred to
as the "Corregidor massacre". The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item
appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily Mirror and cited other news
reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the President (of the
Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were
given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President
candidate, had gone to Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the
petitioners cite in this Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which
states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training operations] issue was
bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could
not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration."

The petitioners argue that the case had received such an amount of publicity in
the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election as to imperil his right to a
fair trial. The petitioners further allege that the adverse publicity given in the
mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an
issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly
influence the members of the court-martial. In support of their contention they
invoke the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau
vs. Louisiana, Estes v. Texas, and Shepard v. Maxwell.
In their answer, the respondents as members of the general court-martial
assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has
been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and
impartiality have been impaired.
ISSUE/S: WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such
as to prejudice their right to a fair trial.
HELD: No. The spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners.
RATIO: Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely
disparate from this case in a fundamental sense.
In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitioner's
arrest in connection with six murders committed, the prosecutor and police
officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the
six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and
pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months preceding
his trial." Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on
the ground of prejudicial publicity.
In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, which involved elements of publicity,
the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the
selection of the jury, "It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial influence than a
press release by the officer of the court charged with defendants' custody
stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn to,
unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to
the jury.
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was
similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving
picture film was taken of him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The "interview,"
consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had
perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen
and heard on television by 24,000 people. His lawyers promptly moved for a
change of venue but their motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and
sentenced to death to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail
to the crimes with which he was later to be charged.
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being
inherently a denial of due process. The state ... says that the use of television
in the instant case was "without injustice to the person immediately
concerned,".
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused
of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom. The Court held that from the unfair and prejudicial publicity from the
minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused. Of course, there is nothing
that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom.
But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates,
or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. If publicity
during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be
ordered.
In the case at bar, the spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was
claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by
newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent
here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from
massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial
either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to
another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall
have subsided. Indeed, the trial of the petitioners was being held under
circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative
decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial"
publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have
been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of
publicity, the Court thinks that the suspension of the court martial proceedings
has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause,
by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The
atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the
Corregidor incident has so far abated that the court believes that the trial may
now be resumed in tranquility.
Cruz v. Salva
FACTS: Manuel Monroy was killed in 1953 and a number of persons were
accused of such killing. These persons were found guilty sentenced to the
penalty of death. They all appealed. Pending the appeal, President Magsaysay
ordered a reinvestigation of the case which was conducted by the intelligence
agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacanang. The
result of the reinvestigation also points to the convicted persons as the real
killers of Monroy.
The counsel of the defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case on the basis of the affidavits and confessions
obtained by the investigator of Malacanang which was made available to him.
Salva formed a committee composed of himself as the chairman and two
assistant city attorneys. Salva subpoenaed Cruz to appear at his office for the
investigation.
Atty. Baizas, counsel of Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to
conduct the investigation considering that the case was pending appeal in SC.
Salva contended that he subpoenaed Cruz et al because of their request to do
so and that were it not for his request, he would not conduct the investigation.
Although Cruz denied having made such request, the SC believed that he
indeed made a request of reinvestigation.
However, the Supreme Court was interested in the manner to which the
investigation headed by Salva was conducted. The investigation was made not
in Salva‘s office but in the session hall of the Municipal Trial Court to
accommodate a big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. Microphones were installed. There were reporters
everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures.
ISSUE: W/N Salva violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The way Salva conducted the investigation is reprehensible. He
publicized and sensationalized the case. He committed what was regard a
grievous error and poor judgment. His actuations went well beyond the bounds
of prudence, discretion, and good taste. Salva was publicly reprehended and
censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism he had
given to and allowed in connection with his investigation which is considered
and found to be contempt of court.