REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JENNIFER Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male
and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with
secondary male characteristics. To further her petition,
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body
secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower
court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth
certificate be changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It
held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered
“the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence
presented in court including the fact that private respondent
thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by
the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of
male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1)
the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter
of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After
the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of
defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between
them during their first night and same thing happened until
their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went
with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the
defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or
sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988
until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no
attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this,
they submitted themselves for medical examination to a
urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of
the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here
in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming
Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does
not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her
very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still
young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi
submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is
capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual
intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
and wholeness of the marriage.
Duncan Association v. Glaxo welcome,
Facts: Petitioner, Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent
Glaxo as medical representative, after Tecson had undergone
training and orientation. He signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by existing company rules. Another stipulation which is
also found of Glaxo’s Employee Code of Conduct provides the
duty to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. He, subsequently
entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, branch
coordinator of Astra in Albay, a competitor of Glaxo. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives
of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in
that area. The two married even with the several reminders
given by the District Manager to Tecson. In January 1999,
Tecson’s superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy
gave rise to a conflict of interest. Despite several reminders
and time allowances, Tecson was not able to resolve the issue
on conflicting interest. This situation eventually led to his
alleged constructive dismissal. This is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing CA’s decision and resolution.
Issue: Is Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying
an employee of a competitor company is valid?
Held: Yes. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a
competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees
is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships
of that nature might compromise the interests of the company.
In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to
protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give
life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta Respondents: Court of Appeals and
Alfredo Martin Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use
in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Issue:(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence;
Held:(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose
Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7,
1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.
They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to
her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent
for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such
acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor
of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her
husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is
by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce
from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to
support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his
wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides
that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this
option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his
wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because
of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.
Eugenio vs Velez Case Digest
Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the
former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988
issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent
sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of
habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner,
he had already obtained a burial permit. Petitioner claims that
as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her
body.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the
deceased.
Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters. Section 1103 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an
unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of
the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not
in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
that such relationships are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.(Eugenio
vs Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990).
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca
(Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon
C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server).
Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding
judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda- Baroy, clerk of court II. All work
in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages
even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the
following couples were able to get married just by paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias &
Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio
Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina
Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the
following couples did not reflect any marriage license number.
In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and
did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted
by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after
the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license.
They already started living together as husband and wife even
without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs,
judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there
were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court
held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed
it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage
license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already.
However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano
was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together for 6 years already before they got married
as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been
less than 13 years old when they started living together which
is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties
who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid
the marriage license requirement.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the
Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the
marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their
marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil
registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage
contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included.
It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in
the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of
Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater
& Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that
the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not
sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the

respondents. ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by
Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized

without a marriage license along with the other couples. The
testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the
photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon
who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared
Wassmer vs Velez
12 scra 648 Navarro vs Domagtoy
Breach of Promise to Marry
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4,
1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to
her that they have to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposed it. And on the next day he sent her the
following telegram “Nothing changed rest assured returning
very soon apologize mama papa love Paking”. Thereafter
Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by
Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared
in default. The record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff
and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-
to-be’s trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before
the wedding he never returned and was never heard from
again.
ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere
breach of promise to marry.
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower
court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.
ARTICLE 7
presumptive death - family code
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He
has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on
September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite
the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit
acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s wife has
been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to
have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged
that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he
solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the
request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display
gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it
was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or
ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the
wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was only done by one
party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the
elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing
officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as
provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
Arañes vs. Judge Occiano
 ARTICLE 22
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint,
for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late
groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s
death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not
recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed
against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the
Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court
Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on
the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the
ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by
the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to
solemnize the marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of
the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of the
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization,
respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render
the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the
respondent that they would give the license to him, but they
never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment
petitioner suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded
the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to conduct marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.


Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 425
FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the
widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and
practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory
Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death.
Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua
were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po
Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed
complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay
including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-
petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng
Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took
actual and active management of the partnership and that she
alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits
of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter
during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife,
still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate
children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and
1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in
1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved
and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate
wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949,
was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her
marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore
for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that
after the investment of the above-stated amount in the
partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the
import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail
trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she
was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and
Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child,
Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with
Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latter’s share.
HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of
the contracting parties that they take each other as husband
and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the
parties as well as by their witnesses and the person
solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of
a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person
who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract
or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first
presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported
certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop,
Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly
signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his
office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the
same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan
Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they
terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and
promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs since they
are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together
permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her
relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled
property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted.
All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No.
12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21,
1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-
parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on
December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to
enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of
the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio
Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo.
And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from
taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as
herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Vda. De Chua vs. CA
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita
A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May
1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the
death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration
over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein
petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole
surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the
decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City,
which means that the said court was not the proper forum to
settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage
contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of
said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and
a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and
1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and
was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was
stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he
was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court
ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and
even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the
appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on
their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to
Roberto Chua.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the
appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein
failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid
marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce.
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially
so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the
Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was
not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have
solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said
alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the
Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented,
this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with
other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage
contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should
have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make
the marriage dubious.
ARTICLE 25

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047

September 12, 1994

Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.

Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties
on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and
wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she
was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother,
with the consent of Cardenas.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial

evidences presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license
was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.

Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized

without a marriage license first issued by a local registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-
issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry
of a specified tenor was not being found in a registrar. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied
by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and
inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue
marriage license no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There
being no marriage license, the marriage of Angelina and Edwin
is void ab initio.