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Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 1986. 15:99-119 Quick links to online content
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SYSTEM AND PROCESS, 1974-1985

Joan Vincent
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Department of Anthropology, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York NY


100271
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INTRODUCTION

This review began with a search of 54 mainstream journals for articles and
books in which the relation of "system" to "process" was explicitly discussed.
The starting point was taken to be 1974 on the assumption that the publication
in that year of Wallerstein's The Modern World-System (128) would be a
triggering or threshold event. It was found that most of the articles appeared
within the domains of ecological, legal, and symbolic anthropology. Several,
but not as many, confrontations with the concepts occurred in the anthropolo­
gy of education, urban studies, and the study of the family. It was expected
that gender studies would be prominent, but they were not.
Most of the anthropologists whose work is reviewed use the concepts both
of system and process although frequently favoring one over the other.
Perhaps it should be clearly stated at the outset that "system" is not taken to be
synonymous with "structure." Rather structure is short-term process; process
is long-term structure (102). Their complementarity involves a different mode
of conceptualization from systems thinking. Some systems analysts use
"process" simply to mean "how"; some processualists gain considerable
analytical purchase by perceiving "systems" to be not constructs but con­
structed. Following Pepper (88), a systems vocabulary was discerned: stage,
level, environment, variable, evolution, trigger, feedback, integration. The
equivalent processual metaphors were found to be: phase, field, context,
element, history, threshold, movement, duration. I do not suggest that some
anthropologists are processualists and others systematicists: however, it is
possible to distinguish process thinking from systems thinking analytically
and to recognize the pervasiveness of both in anthropology.

IThis article was prepared while the author was at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
New Jersey 08543

99
0084-6570/86/1015-0099$02.00
100 VINCENT

Systems metaphors have tended to be hegemonic in professional an­


thropological discourse; a propensity to systematize is ever present (4).
Processual metaphors have been historically subordinate because of their
"nonscientific" character (6, 50). Both, however, have continuously coex­
isted as the genealogical manipulation of ancestors testifies. Systems thinkers
trace descent from Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown; processualists from Van
Gennep and Malinowski or from Boas. Darwin and Marx appear in the mythic
past of both.
The root metaphors of systems thinking are machines and organisms; those
of process thinking are context and historical event (88). Since "the event"­
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

especially the crisis event-is common to both, a great deal of significance


becomes attached to what is considered "historical" as opposed to "evolution­
"
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ary. The 1974-1985 literature reveals less use of "-isms" than of "-izations."
This might indicate a shift from system to process. Alternatively, system and
process may be recognized as part and parcel of the internal conceptual
contradiction that lies at the heart of theory, what Murphy has called an­
thropology's "frozen dialectic" (81; 4, p. 81). A shift from one to the other is
likely to occur when the second source of conceptualization in anthropology,
its empirical base, the fieldwork situation, changes. This review of the
literature suggests that the systems thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s gave
way to process thinking in the 1960s and 1970s partly in response to postinde­
pendence changes in the Third World. Although he does not make the
connection, the double-headedness that Barrett recognizes (4) in many con­
tributors to anthropological theory is Clearly connected to its internal dialectic.
Several anthropologists who applied systems thinking to their earlier field
data adopted a more processual bent in the 1970s and 1980s (7, 43, 85, 120).
It is necessary to recognize two forms taken by the system/process relation­
ship. One is system/antisystem; the other is system/nonsystem. Most of the
system and process thinking reviewed here falls into the first category. Where
it does not, it has been subjected to criticism. Yet an analysis of process that is
not related to system in any explicit analytical way has existed within an­
thropology since the nineteenth century coinage of "acculturation. " In all
three domains, processes such as desertification, sedentarization, adjudica­
tion, negotiation, sanskritization, and secularization become the subject of
study in their own right as processes. The analysis is deliberately partial rather
than holistic. Concepts such as "social fields" or "social formations" replace
"social system" and "society. " A 1986 review of system and process must
exist, moreover, within the context of Habermas's critique of systems think­
ing (47) and Thompson's Poverty of Theory (109). Both force recognition of
the opposition of systems thinking to historical-hermeneutic sciences and of
structuralism to historical materialism, oppositions that have not previously
surfaced to any great extent within anthropology, even while its practitioners
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 101

have been straddling, sometimes consciously sometimes unconsciously, their


great divides.
Systems theory has been subjected to both synthesis (94) and critical study
as in Buckley's Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (8), in which a
systems view of process may be found. There is no comparable process view
of process. "Process," according to Moore, is used in at least three ways to
describe 1. universal contexts of social contact (e.g. processes of competition
and cooperation); 2. series of events that recur in certain institutional contexts
(e.g. political, economic, educational processes); and 3. the kinds of cir­
cumstances that lead to certain results (e.g. the process of industrialization,
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

urbanization, segmentation, stratification). All imply temporality, the move­


ment of individuals, and change (72, p. 224). Moore does not explain why
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she uses the plural for the first two and the singUlar for the third. Indeed,
whether an analyst uses "process" or "processes" in certain contexts proves
significant. In process, change movement within a system is usually under
scrutiny; in processes, something more complex is involved. When an­
thropologists mis-cite and use the plural instead of the singular, as both Geertz
and his critic White do in the case of Agricultural Involution: The Process of
Ecological Change in Indonesia (43, p. 530; 134, p. 30), the historian of
science may well ask the significance of the error.
An exploration has been made of systems theory as a social movement and
as a social philosophy, in action and as ideology (57); no similar analysis has
yet been made of processual theory. Fabian, noting that "all human action is
intrinsically constituted by positive and negative moments," suggested that
"in the public exercise of social science, there has been a tendency to deny or
neutralize this dialectic by placing the negative on the safe side of some kind
of boundary, historical, developmental, or systematic. The negative then
belongs to earlier periods (savagery), to extraordinary phases (anomie), or to
external forces (ecological catastrophies being the current example)" (31, pp.
169-70). Frankenberg observed that "serious attention to the nature of social
processes as being capable of being understood . . . is and always has been
rare. It is, in fact, so dangerous to the continuance of sectional interests . ..
that. it has nearly always proved more attractive to seek descriptions in
analogy with forces of a physical or biological nature" (37, p. 2).
Yet systems thinking and process thinking are jointly part of an effort to
understand and in some cases to change complex reality (2, 17, 76). Whether
doing so requires recognition of the past in the present has always divided
anthropology and probably always will. Similarly, tension has always existed
between those who see it as a pure science and those who argue for its
practicality and application. Whether process thinking and systems thinking
belong consistently on either side of either divide cannot be decided from the
selected number of works reviewed.
102 VINCENT

The three domains reviewed are characterized by different mixes of sys­


tems and process thinking. The term "domain" is used advisedly to mean a
clearly defined area of activity marked by a degree of exclusive mastery and
control discouraging outside interference or unwarranted intrusion. It has
been suggested that within one domain at least, "many anthropologists are
apparently unaware of the complex intellectual history forming the backdrop
to the issues they investigate" (28, p. 1; see also 74, 120). Of the three
domains, ecological anthropology is at the moment predominantly systems
oriented, but a move is underway toward a focus on individuals (5, 85, 120,
121) and historical processes (7, 52, 103). Some who wish to move toward
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

process (24, 25) nevertheless continue to use the language of evolution. The
anthropology of law, the longest established specialization, has a pre­
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dominance of process to the neglect of systems. Here a move toward more


systemic study is underway (9, 16, 126). The study of symbolic systems and
ritual processes apparently falls somewhere in between, but in the journals
and books reviewed (and these did not include linguistics) the legacy of
Turner's processual paradigm (78, 79, 112, 113, 118, 132) moves beyond
both. It is in this domain that (generalizing what is particular in Hunter) "the
discovery of process also leads to the delineation of forms of explanation
other than cause and effect. In addition, interest in process usually results in a
perception . . . of a meaning that transcends events" (50, p. 320). This
trajectory is found in several recent works that do not fall squarely within any
of the three domains, and these are reviewed in the conclusion to this essay.
Themes common to all the domains include: holism in relation to partial
analysis, adaptation to crisis, methodological individualism, pluralism, dis­
tinctions between evolutionary and historical systems and processes, and
explorations of varieties of "process." Three models of the relationship
between system and process emerged from the review: a crisis model, a
friction model, and a model that for the present I call a transformation model.
It would appear that crises are giving way to routinization; the friction model
is now most used and has led to more attention being paid to individual and
group relations, heterogeneity, and pluralism; the study of transformation
(production, reproduction, and transformation) is in a somewhat unself­
conscious phase (105). Whether the three models actually appeared sequen­
tially can only be ascertained after reviewing a more complete literature.

ECOSYSTEMS: ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES

The domain of ecological anthropology contains both discussions of alterna­


tive theory (85, 120, 121, 135) and grounded ethnography. Examples include
the Indonesian cockpit (43, 51, 107, 108, 122, 134); pastoralism (27);
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 103

montane Latin America (15, 84, 131); and "the Hutterite case" (24, 119,
121). The domain permits, therefore, consideration of both the part played in
analysis by the historical situation in which the ethnographer found himself,
and the frozen dialectic. "The evaluation of differing theoretical positions is a
process running through generations whose battlefield is the totality of
ethnographic and ethnohistoric information" (24, p. 601). The main com­
batants at the moment are the neoevolutionary cultural ecologists and those
whom this establishment designates "the ecological movement in anthropolo­
gy" (25). Several labels describe the latter: "functional ecologists," "the
Columbia-Michigan school," and "human ecologists." There are many differ­
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org

ences between and within each camp, but several anthropologists concerned
with system and process belong to neither. The domain seems integrated by
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controversies rather than shared concepts and consensual cores. "Contentious


boundaries and concepts encourage the openness-though not the sanguine
peace--of epistemic communities" (59, p. 140).
The difference between human ecology and cultural evolutionary ecology
is said to lie in the concepts of causation, time, and temporal process
employed: "steady-state, externalistic, gradualistic leanings are opposed to
directional, intemalistic, and episodic views" (24, p. 4). The key notion to
which I would draw attention is the intemalistic/extemalistic dichotomy. The
dialectic of system and process is exposed in focusing on change: a theory of
historical change that takes into account only externalistic (the systems term),
exogenous (the process equivalent) causes can only be a theory of variation.
A seminal use of the ecosystem concept appeared in Agricultural Involu­
tion: the Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (39). The subtitle is
significant. General Systems Theory was about to enter anthropology from
the Wenner Gren conference hall at Burgenstein, and a more systematic
ecology than that of Geertz was about to be funded at Columbia (92, 93) and
institutionalized in a new journal, the Annual Review of Ecology and System­
atics. In 1984 Geertz published a critical review of the Indonesian research
and commentary his work had evoked.
Geertz attached particular significance to the setting in which he formulated
his ideas: the entry in the early 1950s of specialists from various disciplines
into the newly independent nations and, specifically, the "non-meeting of
minds between development-oriented economists and ethnographically
oriented anthropologists" (43, p. 512). A similar confrontation was taking
place in colonial Africa at the same time, and an ethnographic focus on
"process" similarly emerged (36, 133). There, however, "the judicial pro­
cess" (30, 44) and "the ritual process" (112) became the foci of attention. In
postcolonial Indonesia one "massive social fact," as Geertz puts it, the
overwhelming impact of that nation's population density, "made everything
else look rather secondary" (43, p. 513). He thus chose to delineate a crisis in
104 VINCENT

the process of ecological change, the paradigm most frequently found in the
ecological domain (7, 24, 25, 39, 51, 52, 54, 85, 92, 93, 103, 121). Some
systems analysts stress cybernetic feedback to overcome crisis. So desirably
scientific is such an emphasis that Mary Douglas recently suggested (26) that
Evans-Pritchard conceptualized the Nuer political system largely in terms of a
feedback system, foreshadowing the growth of cybernetics and General Sys­
tems Theory. One reviewer, it must be said, expressed some reservations with
this interpretation (87).
The main weakness of ecosystem theory is its emphasis on functional
integration and self-regulation so that diachronic processes become problem­
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atic. Problems of method arise out of its holistic propensity: boundary defini­
tion and crossing, notions of levels, and reification become problematic (80).
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Vayda surely puts the last nail into the ecosystemic coffin when he inserts into
anthropological discourse six biological findings: ecosystems are noncyber­
netic; ecological successions do not exhibit holistic tendencies; "a balance of
nature" does not exist; evidence of patterning in biological communities is
often dubious; there is no rigorous evidence to justify notions of community
and ecosystem persistence. The ecosystem concept is "a counterheuristic
throwback to essentialist Greek metaphysics" (120, p. 5).
To escape from the teleology of closed, functioning, eqUilibrium systems,
ecological anthropologists have turned to individuals (5, 85, 120) on the one
hand and evolutionary theory on the other (24, 25). Mounting a strong
argument for the former, Vayda (120) provides an overview of problems
relevant to all three domains because it is grounded in theory that has become
an integral part of the social sciences propounded by philosophers Boudon,
Davidson, and Popper; sociologists Dore, Giddens, and Skocpol; economist
Sen; historians Collingwood, Dray, and Fischer; anthropologists Geertz,
Moore, and Silverman. Vayda deals with the ecological fallacy, methodolog­
ical individualism, population movement, and short- and long-term change
(120).
In 1981 Robert Netting confessed (his word for it) that he "may have been
guilty of the ecosystemic fallacy" (83, p. 225). Aggregate studies permit us to
see change within systems; individual-level research allows for a processual
understanding of performance and context. Groping with their irreducibility
in the study of migrants' motivations and migratory trends in Central Africa
led to the adoption there of action theory, networks, and social fields analysis
(12, 69, 123). Ecological individualism resembles action theory in its
strengths and weaknesses (99, 100).
But this is not all there is to "processual theory," as Orlove seems to assume
when he describes individual decision making as "processual ecological
anthropology" (85, p. 245), or Cole when he writes of the "social process" or
the "entrepreneurial approach" (14, p. 362). Individual decision making and
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 105

entrepreneurial manipulation are not synonymous with processual analysis;


they are, as the literature since 1974 shows, now a very small part of it (53,
54, 60). The individualist approach might counter the homogenizing of
individuals from which ecological anthropology has suffered, a reductionism
that belongs to anthropology's natural science phase (2). Analytical Marxists,
turning from the logic of capitalism to the state, similarly explore method­
ological individualism (29). The friction model is well exemplified by Bates
& Lees (5), who argue that the "ecological adaptations" of Turkish nomads
result from their weak political position in relation to sedentary villagers and
the state.
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Diener has advocated that social fields analysis replace systems analysis
and greater recognition be given to cultural processes than to ecological
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populations. At issue is movement across boundaries, but his proposal is


marred by his attachment to the highly generalized evolutionary concept of
"the capitalist stage of economic integration" (24, p. 615). The mixing of
"open" concepts such as cultural processes and social fields with analytically
"closed" concepts such as modes of production and integrative stages in­
dicates transitional thinking. The advantage of the "fields" concept lies
precisely in the fact that it does not require any preconceived notion of
ecosystem, holistic cultural system, or mode of production, as Collier demon­
strates (15).
The study of process in ecological anthropology now includes the analysis
of the relation of demographic variables to production systems; the study of
population response to stress; a consideration of the formation and consolida­
tion of adaptive strategies; and an awareness of new work in Marxism (85).
Historical naivete is said to be "the major difficulty inherent in ecological
thought at present" and a "new evolutionary" approach is proposed distinct
from but complementary with human ecology (25, p. 2). A more genuinely
historical approach is advocated by Brown and provided not only in her work
(7) but, for example, in the Nuer reevaluations by Kelly (52) and Southall
(03), epitomizing the shift from classical systems thinking to process.

LEGAL SYSTEMS: THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

Like ecological anthropology, the domain is currently contested by "rule­


centered" and "processual" paradigms. Both, Geertz (42, p. 214) suggests,
miss the point: "the first through an overautonomous view of law as a separate
and self-contained 'legal system' struggling to defend its analytic integrity in
the face of the conceptual and moral sloppiness of ordinary life; the second
through an overpolitical view of it as an undifferentiated, pragmatically
ordered collection of social devices for advancing interests and managing
power conflicts." For Geertz, forms of law have imaginative power. "They do
106 VINCENT

not just regulate behavior, they construe it" (42, p. 2 15). Pospisil, on the
other hand, argues that laws are created through enforcement (90, p. 237).
For Geertz, the comparative study of law should focus not on rules or
disputes, certainly not on individuals, but on "the collective resources of
culture" (42, p. 2 15); for Pospisil, law (ius) is created by legislation and must
be distinguished from rules (lex) and precedent, two fonns in which it may be
contained (90, p. 238). Both take systems approaches.
Paradoxically, processualists, who have dominated the field since Gluck­
man's dialogue with Cardozo ( 1 1, 44), have found law to be so intertwined
with political and social processes (71) that they have begun to call for the
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dismantling of the domain (23). They have ipdeed swallowed and thoroughly
digested the red herring which Malinowski's Crime and Custom (58) was said
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by a systemicist to be; i.e. "one of the reddest herrings ever dragged into the
workings of orderly jurisprudence" (quoted in 125, p. 2, emphasis added).
Moore, who has explicitly argued the processual case in several arenas
(secular ritual, law, and politics), declares in Law as Process her conviction
that the same social processes that prevent the total regulation of a society
reshape and transfonn its partial regulation (71, p. 83).
The processual analysis of Comaroff & Roberts (23) is contained within a
social system. Explanation is sought not in history but in deeper structure,
"the constitutive order," a deeper logic, a notion that fellow processualist,
Moore, would surely contest (71, p. 12). This is the social anthropological
paradigm that Holy & Stuchlik (49) set out so well in Actions, Norms and
Representations. Greater contextualization (the ecological, economic, and
historical matter that one finds in Comaroff's other work) would have en­
hanced the processual in Rules and Processes (74). The book contains two
arguments, one about the relation of nonnative rules to instrumental action
and the other about rule and process perspectives in legal anthropology. They
explode the first dichotomy by documenting ambiguity, flexibility, negotia­
tion, and, as always, flux; they are, however, too ready to accept the utility
(let alone the validity) of the second.
The analysis of dispute processing contains elements of both the crisis
model and the friction model with an increased shift toward the latter (16, 75,
76) as analysis moved beyond the bounds of the courtroom to its temporally
and socially contextualizing processes. Individuals other than litigants and
judges entered the extended case as the spotlight focused not only on the
dramatic but on the routine (46, 72, 76). Derivative from action theory in the
work of Gulliver (46), conflict, choice-making, and dispute-processing re­
main prominent, but the time of Man-the-Finagler (74) has clearly passed (23,
76).
Collier adds a focus on ideology, and in so doing she moves process
thinking closer again to systems analysis. Different ideologies locate sources
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 107

of conflict differently: in deviant individuals, in definitions of deviant acts,


and in what she calls "the system of stratification. " After a decade of
discourse on the history, implications, and concommitants of "inequality,"
"class," and "social stratification," her choice of the systems term can only be
taken to be significant. She asks "how legal processes reflect, mask, sustain,
or undermine the existing distribution of prestige, power and privilege" (16,
p. 122). Clearly, once again, this is system process and not historical process;
since change is not contained within the paradigm, neither revolution nor
transformation enter.
In overreacting perhaps to the contextually abstracted, legalistically viewed
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case, Collier comes to question the case method which is so critical to


processual analysis. In moving away from focusing on individuals and dis­
putes, she moves unnecessarily away from process and history. Five Centu­
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ries of Law and Politics in Central Mexico, containing fine essays on women
in colonial courts, estate division, criminal justice among the poor, for
example, all placed within the political frameworks of empire and state,
indicate how productive is their retention (104). Similarly, analyses of mar­
riage contracts (19, 46), land tenure (20), succession (18), state law (20, 77),
inheritance and devolution (23, 73) go far beyond dispute processing alone.
Turning away from process toward system, from context to environment,
from parts to wholes, Collier (16) finally advocates a more evolutionary
perspective. Moore has suggested forcefully that neoevolutionary theory in
anthropology, like world-systems theory, trivializes "the very variations with
which anthropology is preoccupied, and about which it has something to say
(76, p. 1). For Moore "the most fundamental inequality in social life,
omnipresent in prestate societies as in modem ones, is the assymetry of power
between the individual and the group" (74, p. 15; 76).
An argument against the growth industry of dispute processing lies in the
possible misuse of anthropology's exploration of alternatives to litigation by
agencies seeking to cut back legal aid programs. This was prompted by
federally funded comparative research that grossly decontextualized the cases
being used, implying "romantic suggestions that both dispute and informal
processes in a class structured capitalist society are or can be 'the same' as
informal processes in pre-capitalist societies" (10, p. 393). The necessity of
always recognizing the role of the state in complex society is subtly un­
derlined in Moore's analysis of negotiations between university and commu­
nity over a National Science Foundation grant (75).
That there can be a consistent processual approach to legal systems is
demonstrated by Moore's magisterial "Legal Systems of the World" where
the term "legal system" is used loosely and with misgivings lest a false
impression be given of any necessary mechanical or logical consistency or
coherence (74, p. 2). As legal anthropology moves from the crisis model
108 VINCENT

toward the friction model and the historical analysis of legal change, legal
pluralism becomes more central (42, 74, 77, 126). Moore's tour de force
traverses the landscape' from multicultural arenas and plural legal systems,
legal pluralism, cultural pluralism, and legal transplants to national, religious,
and ethnic legal systems. Against the optimism of lawyers that "modernism"
will lead to universal human understanding (74) she pits Geertz's hope that
they will better appreciate the rich variety of the world's "visions of law"
(42).
Geertz urges a
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shift away from functionalist thinking about law-as a clever device to keep people from
tearing one another limb from limb, advance the interests of the dominant classes, defend
the rights of the weak against the predations of the strong, or render social life a bit more
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predictable at its fuzzy edges (all of which it quite clearly is, to varying extents at different
times in different places); and a shift towards hermeneutic thinking about it-as a mode of
giving particular sense to particular things in particular places (things that happen, things
that fail to, things that might), such that these noble, sinister, or merely expedient
appliances take particular form and have particular impact. Meaning, in short, not machin­
ery (42, p. 232).

Something like a hermeneutics of legal pluralism has developed in symbol­


ic anthropology, too. Moore stops short of underwriting both the "underlying
logic" of systems and hermeneutics.
Legal pluralism, historical processes, and the world system are all ad­
dressed between 1974 and 1985. The Imposition ofLaw (9) concludes with an
integrated model in which law is treated as an arena for the promotion of
interests. That considerable ambiguity and indeterminancy need to be built
into such a model has been demonstrated by the Comaroffs (22). Pospisil, for
whom "process" means systematic change in a given direction (90, pp. 237,
240), i.e. equating the processual with the historical, analyzes the impact of
colonial law on the Kapauku of New Guinea. Snyder's Capitalism and Legal
Change (101) sets out some of the changes in legal forms accompanying the
subsumption of precapitalist societies into the capitalist world economy. The
Banjal peasantry of Senegal provide the "particular instance" for examining
the processes involved and the transformations that occur in the meaning and
significance of their legal ideas. Snyder's thinking in the plural, as it were, is
striking throughout.
Social Facts and Fabrications: "Customary Law" on Kilimanjaro, 1880-
1980 (76), Moore's long-awaited monograph, analyzes the transformation of
Chagga legal and political ideas and practices during colonial rule and in the
socialist state of Tanzania. It is based on fieldwork and the use of administra­
tive and court records. Local events (disputes) are broadly and historically
contextualized; "fieldwork has become a peculiar form of current history" (p.
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 109

7). After an examination of the social foundations of colonial Chagga legal


order, an analysis of postindependence case reports reveals the individualiz­
ing and decontextualizing processes underway. A climactic extended case
analysis indicates the ultimate importance of rounded ethnography: the
lineage chronicle shows "what a finely edited version reaches the courts" (p.
243) and raises questions about the use of courts and the place of a system of
rules in a changing social field.
An epilogue suggests that processual analysis is neither model nor theory
but rather a redefinition of sUbject matter that has accompanied practical and
analytical interest in change. Change predominates but repetition (to the point
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of involution?) and reproduction are also processes. Moore calls her own
approach a hybrid historical/ethnographic perspective (76, p. 11). Politics,
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economy, and history provide its background; in the foreground, the field­
work moment is conceived in temporal terms. Moore finds that "the tension
between the fieldwork method and the historical questions into which it now
inquires continues to be problematic" (76, p. 321), one aspect surely of the
frozen dialectic.

SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS: THE RITUAL PROCESS

Nowhere has the relation of system to process been more explicitly addressed
than in the work of Victor Turner (111-114, 116). A large part of the
1974--1985 literature on symbolic systems and ritual process incorporates
crisis and friction models such as he used (13, 33, 34, 37, 78, 79, 95). The
transformation model is not well represented. The beginnings of a nonsystems
hermeneutical approach can also be discerned (31).
Turner, like Geertz, embarked upon fieldwork in a milieu of rapid and
dislocating economic change. He, too, centered attention on what appeared to
be of concern in the locality in which he worked. Geertz, in his small
administrative town, was at the hub of planned "development"; Turner in the
Ndembu forest found "rituals of affliction" paramount. In a series of publica­
tions he established an interrelated body of concepts for the analysis of ritual,
chief among them social drama, communitas, and liminality (118, p. 243-
51). Crisis-focused and cybernetic, it resembled Wallace's 1950s delineation
of revitalization movements (127). The Ritual Process (112) reflected the
systemic "correspondence" view of ritual of Robertson Smith and Durk­
heim, ritual being seen as symbolically and socially congruent with social
structure (132). Culture expressed in behavior led Turner to an exploration
of the meaning of their environment to ritual actors. His quite different
sense of meaning from that of, for example, Rappaport (92, 93) is reviewed
by Hanson (48).
In his original Morgan lectures Turner dealt with the systemic infrastructure
110 VINCENT

of ritual. In Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture (118) he moved from


the particular and local to the universal and transcendent. Theoretical shifts
were presented in several papers (115, 116) and in general terms (113). His
methodological discussions made it clear that questions of individuals and
institutions were matters of perspective not of reducible levels. Turner dis­
tinguished his processual symbolic anthropology (118) and that of Geertz
from the systems analysis and cognitive anthropology of Chicago's "symbolic
system" school. At the heart of the difference lay that school's assumption
that cultural systems have a high degree of coherence. Grounded in the "thick
ethnography" (41) of the extended-case method, and not content to analyze
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action without explanation of meaning and significance, Turner reached out to


other disciplines, notably and sequentially, psychology, cybernetics, linguis­
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tics, and performance analysis.


The symbolic and ritual studies of Turner and Geertz represent a movement
that can be discerned in the literature on system and process away from the
natural and social sciences toward the humanities and literary criticism.
Turner agreed with Geertz that cultural analysis suffered from its "construc­
tion of impeccable depictions of formal order in whose actual existence
nobody can quite believe" (41, p. 17). The rediscovery of a nonscientific,
non-Western, nonmodern processual paradigm (6, 36) has been captured by
classical historian Virginia Hunter (50). Ambiguity and manipulability led
Turner, unlike Geertz, to be wary of symbol systems and systems of thought
as such. Intellectuals in urban societies have as their "paid business, under the
division of labor . . . to devise logical plans, order concepts into related
series, establish taxonomic hierarchies, denature ritual by theologizing it,
freeze thought into philosophy, and impose the grid of law on custom" (118,
p. 146).
Turner's action semiotics focused on symbols in three types of social
processes: political, ritual, and therapeutic (12, 13). He moved away from
spatial time (arenas, fields, dramas) to passage and process in spaced and
inner time, with the emotional issues of performers liable to change between
one staged performance and another. Context and framework replaced en­
vironment. Communitas gave way to the liminal and liminoid. The extent to
which Turner rethought "communitas" (106) was perhaps underestimated
(95). He moved from communitas, locality, homogeneity, and "correspon­
dence" (113) to boundary crossing, passage, heterogeneity, and "dissonance"
(115-117). Leisure, flow symbols, and the work process in industrial societ­
ies (78) replaced his crisis model of ritual and symbol among the Ndembu
forest dwellers. Was it not said after all that the mystery of industrial relations
lay not in the strike but in the shift (37)?
Moore (72) undertook a further routinization of ritual concerned with
processes of "regularization . . . situational adjustment, and the factor of
SYSTEM AND PROCESS III

indeterminancy." Processes of regularization "produce conscious models,


rules, organization, customs, symbols, rituals, and categories, and seek to
make them durable." Processes of situational adjustment are those "by means
of which people .. . use whatever areas there are of inconsistency, contradic­
tion, conflict, ambiguity, or open areas that are normatively independent to
achieve immediate situational ends" (78, pp. 6-7). The debt to Turner is
overt, but Moore argues for analysis not of structure but of change itself.
Once again we are reminded of Southall's observation that "structures are
slow processes of long duration" (102, p. 44). Moore accentuates the plural:
societies and cultures are fields of interpenetrating processes containing not
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correspondences but dissonances-and hence her need to introduce the con­


troversial (90) concept of "indeterminancy."
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Can it be said that such analysis lacks "systematic sociology," that "society
... social groups, social relationships, social structures, social institutions"
are left out? (86, p. 134). It was similarly said that Malinowski had no
appreciation of systems (125), suggesting that systems thinkers and pro­
cessual thinkers sometimes talk past each other. Better to phrase the question
differently. Does a focus on parts only of a total system-events, situations,
extended cases-involve the sacrifice of breadth for depth? The concept of
social fields or fields of force (56) found in all three domains (15, 70, 113)
bridges the gap and is not incompatible with ideas of multiple systems and
change (3).
The routinization of processual symbolic theory has not gone unchallenged
(78, 79). Cohen observes that while drama "selects a few elements that are not
obviously related in ordinary life, indeed that are often contradictory, and
integrates them within a unity of action and form, a gestalt, that temporarily
structures the psyches of the actors and transforms their relationships," ordi­
nary social life "consists of complex processes of events involving a multi­
plicity of actors, themes, variables, issues and purposes in a never-ending
sequence" (13, p. 105). Like Dyson-Hudson in the ecological domain (27), he
calls for the rigorous analysis of variables in a problem-defined system in
order to arrive at transformations.
Processual studies of the form (33) and meaning (31) of religious move­
ments exemplify a shift from social and cultural meaning to hermeneutics­
from Geertz (40) and Hanson (48) to Habermas (31, 47) and Foucault (31,
35). Fabian distinguishes three approaches to religious movements: causal
inquiries, typologizing, and processual analysis. Causal explanations of the
kinds he discusses "necessarily victimize (make objects of) religious enthu­
siasts" (31, p. 14). Taxonomic anthropology can be a science only of things
cultural not of culture (31, p. 17; 35). Process provides an understanding of
movements as "providing historical conditions for the production of prophetic
discourse" (31, p. 11). Fabian calls for "a sharpened and deepened
112 VINCENT

historiographic consciousness as a prerequisite to theorizing about religious


movements. As we grow wary of older organizing concepts such as accultura­
tion, revitalization, modernization, and the coverall notion of social change,
we realize that research on religious movements ... is, after all, investigation
into historical process. Our subject is historical to the core, and so are our
ways of accounting for it" (31, pp. 20--21).
Fabian adds to the argument against the correspondence model of religion
and culture the "possibility that failure may be a normal or endemic state of
relations" between them (32, pp. 113-14). Religious movements may then be
seen as popular culture responsive to the crisis in the established church (32).
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In his born-again processualism Fabian expresses the ideas of structurel


antistructure not structure/nonstructure. A religious movement is generated
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within a "field of tension. " This has three poles (world-capitalist economyl
global culture; urban-industrial economy/popular culture; and rural-peasant
economy/traditional culture) each of which has a characteristic mode of
production, "a total praxis which encompasses activities as well as ideas, the
material as well as the spiritual" (32, p. 20).
Werbner's alternative analysis of cult movements (132) suggests the spatial
and temporal dimensions of cultural transformations in the processes of
boundary redefinition (revitalization), maintenance, and transcendence. He
treats social fields, conflict, and complexity in the same way as Moore and
Comaroff, adding explicit concern with pluralism and conversion to the
"inner logic" of alternative ritual forms. Problems of code-switching and the
recoding of differentiation reflect the characteristic attentiveness of all three
scholars to the politics of asymmetrical power relations.

CONCLUSION: WORLD SYSTEM AND HISTORICAL


PROCESSES

It has been indicated thus far that three subfields of anthropology­


ecological, legal, and ritual-have been involved in the past decade in a shift
of interest from systemic to processual analysis, although the issues involved
rarely have been addressed explicitly. The parochialism of the present is now
recognized in anthropology generally. This concluding section suggests,
much too cursorily against the backdrop of modem world systems theory, that
considerable work exists in which processual analysis is historical.
In the three domains reviewed effort seems to shift from system to process­
within-system to history. Turner (111) contemplated a "remarriage" of an­
thropology and history; Diener, Nonini & Robkin (25) regret the "historical
naivete" of ecological anthropology; Moore (76) finds problematic the tension
between fieldwork and historical inquiry. In the work about to be discussed
(61-68, 97, 98) nO such shift occurred; no relationship has to be established
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 113

between anthropology and history since they have never been separated. The
historicity of social facts is beyond question: the "fact of historicity is neither
an end nor by itself a means but a condition which must be recognized at
every step" (55, p. 336). On a different trajectory and from different tradi­
tions, Arensberg (1) and Comaroff (21) have expressed the same conviction.
Wallerstein's The Modern World-System (128), published in 1974, was not
greatly reflected in the literature reviewed here although anthropologists have
contributed a good deal to global inquiry (82). They appear to cite Wallerstein
for the vocabulary he has provided in much the same way as Walters (130)
says social historians quote Geertz, for legitimacy. But whereas Geertz is
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quoted, Wallerstein is cited. Indeed, critiques of his systems paradigm have


probably been as influential as the synthesis itself. Just as evolutionary theory
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was adopted earlier to order the accumulating data of primitive ethnology, so


today's anthropologists adopt the world-system model to order the complex
ethnography accumulated since the 1950s .

Six anthropologists have contributed to Review, the world-systems journal.


Magubane (58) and Gough (45) use theoretical frameworks other than world­
systems theory. Friedman (38) approximates the model but chooses to focus
on crises in imperial economics. He suggests fundamental continuity between
ancient and modem world-systems, echoing Jane Schneider's argument (96)
that Wallerstein's theory suffers from too narrow an application. Three
contributors, Mintz (64, 66), Price (91), and Trouillot (110) are Caribbeanists
alert to Wallerstein's observation that the Caribbean somehow "fitted differ­
ently" into his conceptualization of a world-system. Their work explores the
differences.
Nash suggests that anthropologists may have more difficulty with Waller­
stein's paradigm as he moves chronologically closer to times that "tie in more
directly into their own analysis" (82, p. 396). Her wording suggests that his
periodization has not been adequately assimilated. Certainly anthropologists,
with their finer regard for detail, need a delineation of phases in the trans­
formations of the global capitalist economy. Wallerstein himself now sees his
model as "an intellectual tool to help analyze the multiple forms of class
conflict in the capitalist world-economy" (129, p. 293), a much more limited
objective than earlier.
Wolf's readiness (136) to accept the systems premises underlying Waller­
stein's paradigm to a much greater extent than might have been expected,
substituting mode of production for exchange, perhaps reflects the difficulty
of delineating historical processes in times as remote from the present as those
of which they both write. Mintz (63), in "The So-Called World System, "
considers the formulation premature. In an important theoretical statement
(64) he uses the particularities of Caribbean plantation systems, slavery as
process, the makings of peasantries and a rural proletariat, and phases in the
114 VINCENT

history of capitalism to question mode of production analysis, the aggregation


of diversity, neglect of shifts within the "periphery" of the world-system, and
above all the neglect of cultural values.
Mintz along with Wolf, and like Geertz and Turner, is of that 1950s
generation whose first field experience was gained when closed, holistic,
systems models were found to be inadequate for the study of complexity and
change. For Mintz and Wolf, working under Murra and Steward, levels of
system integration gave way to the historical specificity of social facts and (to
a limited extent) the consideration of Puerto Rico's position within a capitalist
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global system. The root metaphor common to Lesser, Wolf, and Mintz is the
manifold (55, p. 334; 66a; 136, p. 3). Europe and the People without History
opens with: "The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind
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constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries


that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify
reality" (136, p. 3). What the world-system paradigm does, in the hands of
both Wallerstein and Wolf, is render endogenous variables that had pre­
viously been treated as exogenous in the analysis of change processes.
Anthropology, which since the 1950s had moved from the local to the
national in terms of encapsulated systems and in so doing had discovered that
causal explanations tended to lie in the environments of each (99), thus
arrived logically at its ultimate system.
It would be impossible to review the increasing number of monographs that
contribute not only to the analysis of processes within systems but of histori­
cal transformations. Many have found it particularly useful to focus upon the
crises surrounding the transformation from pre- (systems) or non- (process)
colonial society to colonial state, from one phase of capitalism to another
within a cosmopolitical context. Processes of class formation or nonformation
have attracted attention, and their ecological, jural, and symbolic dimensions
have been explored (9,20,22,51,64-66,73,76,77,89,98,101,104,107,
124, 126, 131). There has, however, been no explicit theoretical discussion of
system and process such as would require elaboration in this review. Some
have adopted a more systems-oriented approach; others have been more
concerned with cultural processes. All have been grounded in the particulari­
ties of ethnography now derived from both field and archival research.
Mintz's publications between 1974 and 1985 reflect these concerns both
theoretically and methodologically and begin to provide an intellectual
genealogy for those who would study historical systems and processes (61-
68). As one loses sight of specific individuals in the past, participants
observed in action and events, the differences between action theory and
processual theory per se become clearer. Mintz's recourse to the life history
(61) provides a middle ground since the life is "a history within a history, a
human frame within which to see the social and cultural pattern of change in a
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 115

Puerto Rican barrio in this century" (quoted in 68, p. 25). It also provides an
occasion for reflection on current work in henneneutical anthropology.
Whereas the anthropology of Wolf and Mintz arises out of a long es­
tablished tradition in historical anthropology, that of Gerald Sider (97, 98)
confronts a new. The writings of social historian Edward Thompson, and
particularly his processual view of class as not a thing but a happening (109,
p. 85), have entered anthropology. Focusing on transfonnations in the colo­
nial mercantile and capitalist economy of Newfoundland, Sider provides a
critique of the central concepts of social history and anthropology, class and
culture, and of corollary concepts such as agency and experience. As he puts
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it,
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people act in tenns of what they cannot understand, or understand in radically different
ways, and in tenns of relationships they cannot fonn, or sustain, or leave, as well as in
tenns of what "works", what they think they clearly understand and can probably do. From
this perspective we may then better understand how time and history come also to be
embedded in culture and class (98, p. to).

As Sider observes, when anthropologists focus on change, the concept of


culture is often deemed irrelevant. The concept itself is ahistorical, non­
processual, and totalizing (97, 98). Its dynamic structure is not understood.
On the other hand, the concept of class, often integral to the study of social
change, evades "questions of cultural variation and the impact of culture on
history" (98, p. 7) By examining detailed social and historical processes
within the working class culture of fisherfolk in Newfoundland from the
1500s to the present, Sider refonnulates a notion of culture as a particular,
active force at moments of formation and transformation. His response, as it
were, to Geertz's proposition that the culture concept be cut down to size and
rendered "a narrowed, specialized, and . . . theoretically more powerful
concept" (41, p. 4), is to discern culture "where class becomes dynamic;
where the lines of antagonism and alliance come together and apart" (98, p.
9). Revitalizing the key concept of American anthropology, Sider provides an
integrated processual analysis of the very issues that have been recognized
as problematic in the three subfields of ecological, legal, and symbolic
anthropology: complexity, heterogeneity, and pluralism, individuals and
institutions, agency and experience, crisis and routine, meaning and significa­
tion, and above all, movement and change in social and cultural fonnations.
Yet throughout, an understanding of merchant capitalism as a system is of
essence to the argument he unfolds.
The 1974-1985 literature on system and process in ecological, legal, and
symbolic anthropology contained proposals for regrouping. Specialization
had required separation; liminality involved interdisciplinary alliances
(marked by the pUblication of new journals and in some cases the establish-
1 16 VINCENT

ment of specialist societies or associations); the distinctiveness of the do­


mains, and perhaps their success, appears to have been followed by moves
toward reincorporation. Anthropology-at-Iarge has by no means remained at a
standstill, as this conclusion has attempted to demonstrate; the reentry phase
may provide real challenges for the currently self-isolating domains.

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