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Ann. Rev. Anthropol. 1986. 15:99-119 Quick links to online content
Copyright © 1986 by Annual Reviews 1nc. All rights reserved
Joan Vincent
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INTRODUCTION
This review began with a search of 54 mainstream journals for articles and
books in which the relation of "system" to "process" was explicitly discussed.
The starting point was taken to be 1974 on the assumption that the publication
in that year of Wallerstein's The Modern World-System (128) would be a
triggering or threshold event. It was found that most of the articles appeared
within the domains of ecological, legal, and symbolic anthropology. Several,
but not as many, confrontations with the concepts occurred in the anthropolo
gy of education, urban studies, and the study of the family. It was expected
that gender studies would be prominent, but they were not.
Most of the anthropologists whose work is reviewed use the concepts both
of system and process although frequently favoring one over the other.
Perhaps it should be clearly stated at the outset that "system" is not taken to be
synonymous with "structure." Rather structure is short-term process; process
is long-term structure (102). Their complementarity involves a different mode
of conceptualization from systems thinking. Some systems analysts use
"process" simply to mean "how"; some processualists gain considerable
analytical purchase by perceiving "systems" to be not constructs but con
structed. Following Pepper (88), a systems vocabulary was discerned: stage,
level, environment, variable, evolution, trigger, feedback, integration. The
equivalent processual metaphors were found to be: phase, field, context,
element, history, threshold, movement, duration. I do not suggest that some
anthropologists are processualists and others systematicists: however, it is
possible to distinguish process thinking from systems thinking analytically
and to recognize the pervasiveness of both in anthropology.
IThis article was prepared while the author was at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
New Jersey 08543
99
0084-6570/86/1015-0099$02.00
100 VINCENT
ary. The 1974-1985 literature reveals less use of "-isms" than of "-izations."
This might indicate a shift from system to process. Alternatively, system and
process may be recognized as part and parcel of the internal conceptual
contradiction that lies at the heart of theory, what Murphy has called an
thropology's "frozen dialectic" (81; 4, p. 81). A shift from one to the other is
likely to occur when the second source of conceptualization in anthropology,
its empirical base, the fieldwork situation, changes. This review of the
literature suggests that the systems thinking of the 1950s and early 1960s gave
way to process thinking in the 1960s and 1970s partly in response to postinde
pendence changes in the Third World. Although he does not make the
connection, the double-headedness that Barrett recognizes (4) in many con
tributors to anthropological theory is Clearly connected to its internal dialectic.
Several anthropologists who applied systems thinking to their earlier field
data adopted a more processual bent in the 1970s and 1980s (7, 43, 85, 120).
It is necessary to recognize two forms taken by the system/process relation
ship. One is system/antisystem; the other is system/nonsystem. Most of the
system and process thinking reviewed here falls into the first category. Where
it does not, it has been subjected to criticism. Yet an analysis of process that is
not related to system in any explicit analytical way has existed within an
thropology since the nineteenth century coinage of "acculturation. " In all
three domains, processes such as desertification, sedentarization, adjudica
tion, negotiation, sanskritization, and secularization become the subject of
study in their own right as processes. The analysis is deliberately partial rather
than holistic. Concepts such as "social fields" or "social formations" replace
"social system" and "society. " A 1986 review of system and process must
exist, moreover, within the context of Habermas's critique of systems think
ing (47) and Thompson's Poverty of Theory (109). Both force recognition of
the opposition of systems thinking to historical-hermeneutic sciences and of
structuralism to historical materialism, oppositions that have not previously
surfaced to any great extent within anthropology, even while its practitioners
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 101
she uses the plural for the first two and the singUlar for the third. Indeed,
whether an analyst uses "process" or "processes" in certain contexts proves
significant. In process, change movement within a system is usually under
scrutiny; in processes, something more complex is involved. When an
thropologists mis-cite and use the plural instead of the singular, as both Geertz
and his critic White do in the case of Agricultural Involution: The Process of
Ecological Change in Indonesia (43, p. 530; 134, p. 30), the historian of
science may well ask the significance of the error.
An exploration has been made of systems theory as a social movement and
as a social philosophy, in action and as ideology (57); no similar analysis has
yet been made of processual theory. Fabian, noting that "all human action is
intrinsically constituted by positive and negative moments," suggested that
"in the public exercise of social science, there has been a tendency to deny or
neutralize this dialectic by placing the negative on the safe side of some kind
of boundary, historical, developmental, or systematic. The negative then
belongs to earlier periods (savagery), to extraordinary phases (anomie), or to
external forces (ecological catastrophies being the current example)" (31, pp.
169-70). Frankenberg observed that "serious attention to the nature of social
processes as being capable of being understood . . . is and always has been
rare. It is, in fact, so dangerous to the continuance of sectional interests . ..
that. it has nearly always proved more attractive to seek descriptions in
analogy with forces of a physical or biological nature" (37, p. 2).
Yet systems thinking and process thinking are jointly part of an effort to
understand and in some cases to change complex reality (2, 17, 76). Whether
doing so requires recognition of the past in the present has always divided
anthropology and probably always will. Similarly, tension has always existed
between those who see it as a pure science and those who argue for its
practicality and application. Whether process thinking and systems thinking
belong consistently on either side of either divide cannot be decided from the
selected number of works reviewed.
102 VINCENT
process (24, 25) nevertheless continue to use the language of evolution. The
anthropology of law, the longest established specialization, has a pre
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montane Latin America (15, 84, 131); and "the Hutterite case" (24, 119,
121). The domain permits, therefore, consideration of both the part played in
analysis by the historical situation in which the ethnographer found himself,
and the frozen dialectic. "The evaluation of differing theoretical positions is a
process running through generations whose battlefield is the totality of
ethnographic and ethnohistoric information" (24, p. 601). The main com
batants at the moment are the neoevolutionary cultural ecologists and those
whom this establishment designates "the ecological movement in anthropolo
gy" (25). Several labels describe the latter: "functional ecologists," "the
Columbia-Michigan school," and "human ecologists." There are many differ
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ences between and within each camp, but several anthropologists concerned
with system and process belong to neither. The domain seems integrated by
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the process of ecological change, the paradigm most frequently found in the
ecological domain (7, 24, 25, 39, 51, 52, 54, 85, 92, 93, 103, 121). Some
systems analysts stress cybernetic feedback to overcome crisis. So desirably
scientific is such an emphasis that Mary Douglas recently suggested (26) that
Evans-Pritchard conceptualized the Nuer political system largely in terms of a
feedback system, foreshadowing the growth of cybernetics and General Sys
tems Theory. One reviewer, it must be said, expressed some reservations with
this interpretation (87).
The main weakness of ecosystem theory is its emphasis on functional
integration and self-regulation so that diachronic processes become problem
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atic. Problems of method arise out of its holistic propensity: boundary defini
tion and crossing, notions of levels, and reification become problematic (80).
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Vayda surely puts the last nail into the ecosystemic coffin when he inserts into
anthropological discourse six biological findings: ecosystems are noncyber
netic; ecological successions do not exhibit holistic tendencies; "a balance of
nature" does not exist; evidence of patterning in biological communities is
often dubious; there is no rigorous evidence to justify notions of community
and ecosystem persistence. The ecosystem concept is "a counterheuristic
throwback to essentialist Greek metaphysics" (120, p. 5).
To escape from the teleology of closed, functioning, eqUilibrium systems,
ecological anthropologists have turned to individuals (5, 85, 120) on the one
hand and evolutionary theory on the other (24, 25). Mounting a strong
argument for the former, Vayda (120) provides an overview of problems
relevant to all three domains because it is grounded in theory that has become
an integral part of the social sciences propounded by philosophers Boudon,
Davidson, and Popper; sociologists Dore, Giddens, and Skocpol; economist
Sen; historians Collingwood, Dray, and Fischer; anthropologists Geertz,
Moore, and Silverman. Vayda deals with the ecological fallacy, methodolog
ical individualism, population movement, and short- and long-term change
(120).
In 1981 Robert Netting confessed (his word for it) that he "may have been
guilty of the ecosystemic fallacy" (83, p. 225). Aggregate studies permit us to
see change within systems; individual-level research allows for a processual
understanding of performance and context. Groping with their irreducibility
in the study of migrants' motivations and migratory trends in Central Africa
led to the adoption there of action theory, networks, and social fields analysis
(12, 69, 123). Ecological individualism resembles action theory in its
strengths and weaknesses (99, 100).
But this is not all there is to "processual theory," as Orlove seems to assume
when he describes individual decision making as "processual ecological
anthropology" (85, p. 245), or Cole when he writes of the "social process" or
the "entrepreneurial approach" (14, p. 362). Individual decision making and
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 105
Diener has advocated that social fields analysis replace systems analysis
and greater recognition be given to cultural processes than to ecological
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not just regulate behavior, they construe it" (42, p. 2 15). Pospisil, on the
other hand, argues that laws are created through enforcement (90, p. 237).
For Geertz, the comparative study of law should focus not on rules or
disputes, certainly not on individuals, but on "the collective resources of
culture" (42, p. 2 15); for Pospisil, law (ius) is created by legislation and must
be distinguished from rules (lex) and precedent, two fonns in which it may be
contained (90, p. 238). Both take systems approaches.
Paradoxically, processualists, who have dominated the field since Gluck
man's dialogue with Cardozo ( 1 1, 44), have found law to be so intertwined
with political and social processes (71) that they have begun to call for the
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dismantling of the domain (23). They have ipdeed swallowed and thoroughly
digested the red herring which Malinowski's Crime and Custom (58) was said
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by a systemicist to be; i.e. "one of the reddest herrings ever dragged into the
workings of orderly jurisprudence" (quoted in 125, p. 2, emphasis added).
Moore, who has explicitly argued the processual case in several arenas
(secular ritual, law, and politics), declares in Law as Process her conviction
that the same social processes that prevent the total regulation of a society
reshape and transfonn its partial regulation (71, p. 83).
The processual analysis of Comaroff & Roberts (23) is contained within a
social system. Explanation is sought not in history but in deeper structure,
"the constitutive order," a deeper logic, a notion that fellow processualist,
Moore, would surely contest (71, p. 12). This is the social anthropological
paradigm that Holy & Stuchlik (49) set out so well in Actions, Norms and
Representations. Greater contextualization (the ecological, economic, and
historical matter that one finds in Comaroff's other work) would have en
hanced the processual in Rules and Processes (74). The book contains two
arguments, one about the relation of nonnative rules to instrumental action
and the other about rule and process perspectives in legal anthropology. They
explode the first dichotomy by documenting ambiguity, flexibility, negotia
tion, and, as always, flux; they are, however, too ready to accept the utility
(let alone the validity) of the second.
The analysis of dispute processing contains elements of both the crisis
model and the friction model with an increased shift toward the latter (16, 75,
76) as analysis moved beyond the bounds of the courtroom to its temporally
and socially contextualizing processes. Individuals other than litigants and
judges entered the extended case as the spotlight focused not only on the
dramatic but on the routine (46, 72, 76). Derivative from action theory in the
work of Gulliver (46), conflict, choice-making, and dispute-processing re
main prominent, but the time of Man-the-Finagler (74) has clearly passed (23,
76).
Collier adds a focus on ideology, and in so doing she moves process
thinking closer again to systems analysis. Different ideologies locate sources
SYSTEM AND PROCESS 107
ries of Law and Politics in Central Mexico, containing fine essays on women
in colonial courts, estate division, criminal justice among the poor, for
example, all placed within the political frameworks of empire and state,
indicate how productive is their retention (104). Similarly, analyses of mar
riage contracts (19, 46), land tenure (20), succession (18), state law (20, 77),
inheritance and devolution (23, 73) go far beyond dispute processing alone.
Turning away from process toward system, from context to environment,
from parts to wholes, Collier (16) finally advocates a more evolutionary
perspective. Moore has suggested forcefully that neoevolutionary theory in
anthropology, like world-systems theory, trivializes "the very variations with
which anthropology is preoccupied, and about which it has something to say
(76, p. 1). For Moore "the most fundamental inequality in social life,
omnipresent in prestate societies as in modem ones, is the assymetry of power
between the individual and the group" (74, p. 15; 76).
An argument against the growth industry of dispute processing lies in the
possible misuse of anthropology's exploration of alternatives to litigation by
agencies seeking to cut back legal aid programs. This was prompted by
federally funded comparative research that grossly decontextualized the cases
being used, implying "romantic suggestions that both dispute and informal
processes in a class structured capitalist society are or can be 'the same' as
informal processes in pre-capitalist societies" (10, p. 393). The necessity of
always recognizing the role of the state in complex society is subtly un
derlined in Moore's analysis of negotiations between university and commu
nity over a National Science Foundation grant (75).
That there can be a consistent processual approach to legal systems is
demonstrated by Moore's magisterial "Legal Systems of the World" where
the term "legal system" is used loosely and with misgivings lest a false
impression be given of any necessary mechanical or logical consistency or
coherence (74, p. 2). As legal anthropology moves from the crisis model
108 VINCENT
toward the friction model and the historical analysis of legal change, legal
pluralism becomes more central (42, 74, 77, 126). Moore's tour de force
traverses the landscape' from multicultural arenas and plural legal systems,
legal pluralism, cultural pluralism, and legal transplants to national, religious,
and ethnic legal systems. Against the optimism of lawyers that "modernism"
will lead to universal human understanding (74) she pits Geertz's hope that
they will better appreciate the rich variety of the world's "visions of law"
(42).
Geertz urges a
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
shift away from functionalist thinking about law-as a clever device to keep people from
tearing one another limb from limb, advance the interests of the dominant classes, defend
the rights of the weak against the predations of the strong, or render social life a bit more
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predictable at its fuzzy edges (all of which it quite clearly is, to varying extents at different
times in different places); and a shift towards hermeneutic thinking about it-as a mode of
giving particular sense to particular things in particular places (things that happen, things
that fail to, things that might), such that these noble, sinister, or merely expedient
appliances take particular form and have particular impact. Meaning, in short, not machin
ery (42, p. 232).
of involution?) and reproduction are also processes. Moore calls her own
approach a hybrid historical/ethnographic perspective (76, p. 11). Politics,
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economy, and history provide its background; in the foreground, the field
work moment is conceived in temporal terms. Moore finds that "the tension
between the fieldwork method and the historical questions into which it now
inquires continues to be problematic" (76, p. 321), one aspect surely of the
frozen dialectic.
Nowhere has the relation of system to process been more explicitly addressed
than in the work of Victor Turner (111-114, 116). A large part of the
1974--1985 literature on symbolic systems and ritual process incorporates
crisis and friction models such as he used (13, 33, 34, 37, 78, 79, 95). The
transformation model is not well represented. The beginnings of a nonsystems
hermeneutical approach can also be discerned (31).
Turner, like Geertz, embarked upon fieldwork in a milieu of rapid and
dislocating economic change. He, too, centered attention on what appeared to
be of concern in the locality in which he worked. Geertz, in his small
administrative town, was at the hub of planned "development"; Turner in the
Ndembu forest found "rituals of affliction" paramount. In a series of publica
tions he established an interrelated body of concepts for the analysis of ritual,
chief among them social drama, communitas, and liminality (118, p. 243-
51). Crisis-focused and cybernetic, it resembled Wallace's 1950s delineation
of revitalization movements (127). The Ritual Process (112) reflected the
systemic "correspondence" view of ritual of Robertson Smith and Durk
heim, ritual being seen as symbolically and socially congruent with social
structure (132). Culture expressed in behavior led Turner to an exploration
of the meaning of their environment to ritual actors. His quite different
sense of meaning from that of, for example, Rappaport (92, 93) is reviewed
by Hanson (48).
In his original Morgan lectures Turner dealt with the systemic infrastructure
110 VINCENT
Can it be said that such analysis lacks "systematic sociology," that "society
... social groups, social relationships, social structures, social institutions"
are left out? (86, p. 134). It was similarly said that Malinowski had no
appreciation of systems (125), suggesting that systems thinkers and pro
cessual thinkers sometimes talk past each other. Better to phrase the question
differently. Does a focus on parts only of a total system-events, situations,
extended cases-involve the sacrifice of breadth for depth? The concept of
social fields or fields of force (56) found in all three domains (15, 70, 113)
bridges the gap and is not incompatible with ideas of multiple systems and
change (3).
The routinization of processual symbolic theory has not gone unchallenged
(78, 79). Cohen observes that while drama "selects a few elements that are not
obviously related in ordinary life, indeed that are often contradictory, and
integrates them within a unity of action and form, a gestalt, that temporarily
structures the psyches of the actors and transforms their relationships," ordi
nary social life "consists of complex processes of events involving a multi
plicity of actors, themes, variables, issues and purposes in a never-ending
sequence" (13, p. 105). Like Dyson-Hudson in the ecological domain (27), he
calls for the rigorous analysis of variables in a problem-defined system in
order to arrive at transformations.
Processual studies of the form (33) and meaning (31) of religious move
ments exemplify a shift from social and cultural meaning to hermeneutics
from Geertz (40) and Hanson (48) to Habermas (31, 47) and Foucault (31,
35). Fabian distinguishes three approaches to religious movements: causal
inquiries, typologizing, and processual analysis. Causal explanations of the
kinds he discusses "necessarily victimize (make objects of) religious enthu
siasts" (31, p. 14). Taxonomic anthropology can be a science only of things
cultural not of culture (31, p. 17; 35). Process provides an understanding of
movements as "providing historical conditions for the production of prophetic
discourse" (31, p. 11). Fabian calls for "a sharpened and deepened
112 VINCENT
within a "field of tension. " This has three poles (world-capitalist economyl
global culture; urban-industrial economy/popular culture; and rural-peasant
economy/traditional culture) each of which has a characteristic mode of
production, "a total praxis which encompasses activities as well as ideas, the
material as well as the spiritual" (32, p. 20).
Werbner's alternative analysis of cult movements (132) suggests the spatial
and temporal dimensions of cultural transformations in the processes of
boundary redefinition (revitalization), maintenance, and transcendence. He
treats social fields, conflict, and complexity in the same way as Moore and
Comaroff, adding explicit concern with pluralism and conversion to the
"inner logic" of alternative ritual forms. Problems of code-switching and the
recoding of differentiation reflect the characteristic attentiveness of all three
scholars to the politics of asymmetrical power relations.
between anthropology and history since they have never been separated. The
historicity of social facts is beyond question: the "fact of historicity is neither
an end nor by itself a means but a condition which must be recognized at
every step" (55, p. 336). On a different trajectory and from different tradi
tions, Arensberg (1) and Comaroff (21) have expressed the same conviction.
Wallerstein's The Modern World-System (128), published in 1974, was not
greatly reflected in the literature reviewed here although anthropologists have
contributed a good deal to global inquiry (82). They appear to cite Wallerstein
for the vocabulary he has provided in much the same way as Walters (130)
says social historians quote Geertz, for legitimacy. But whereas Geertz is
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global system. The root metaphor common to Lesser, Wolf, and Mintz is the
manifold (55, p. 334; 66a; 136, p. 3). Europe and the People without History
opens with: "The central assertion of this book is that the world of humankind
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Puerto Rican barrio in this century" (quoted in 68, p. 25). It also provides an
occasion for reflection on current work in henneneutical anthropology.
Whereas the anthropology of Wolf and Mintz arises out of a long es
tablished tradition in historical anthropology, that of Gerald Sider (97, 98)
confronts a new. The writings of social historian Edward Thompson, and
particularly his processual view of class as not a thing but a happening (109,
p. 85), have entered anthropology. Focusing on transfonnations in the colo
nial mercantile and capitalist economy of Newfoundland, Sider provides a
critique of the central concepts of social history and anthropology, class and
culture, and of corollary concepts such as agency and experience. As he puts
Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 1986.15:99-119. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
it,
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people act in tenns of what they cannot understand, or understand in radically different
ways, and in tenns of relationships they cannot fonn, or sustain, or leave, as well as in
tenns of what "works", what they think they clearly understand and can probably do. From
this perspective we may then better understand how time and history come also to be
embedded in culture and class (98, p. to).
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