state protects all marriages, but there is a preference for civilly married
if they already agreed before marriage, like the wife will
support, it is ok in certain conditions. Ex. the husband will be
able to pursue his personal interests, hobbies. If that agreement can preserve the marriage, then why not?
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
MARRIAGE MODELS; TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
GRAHAM V GRAHAM
FACTS: contract to pay husband to accompany wife
Margrethe Graham (defendant) and Sidney Graham
(plaintiff) were married. Sidney had a job and wished
to keep working, but Margrethe wished to travel and
for Sidney to accompany her. Accordingly, the
Grahams signed a contract under which Margrethe
agreed to pay Sidney $300 per month until they
decided to end the arrangement. Effectively, the
result of the contract was that Sidney would quit his
job, travel with Margrethe, and be paid by Margrethe
for doing so. Subsequently, the Grahams were
divorced. Sidney brought suit, seeking enforcement of
the contract.
ISSUE:
WON it was not an implied condition of the contract
that the obligations were to be effective only so long
as the parties remained man and wife so that it would
be automatically terminated by divorce;
HELD:
1. If the contract states that she is bound only as
long as she wills it, then her promise is obviously
illusory and the contract is now and was from the
beginning void. However, the provision in
question would seem to require action of both
parties to terminate it, and if that is so the
contract is not illusory
2. Unnecessary to decide the question of whether it
was not an implied condition of the contract that
the obligations were to be effective only so long
as the parties remained man and wife so that it
would be automatically terminated by divorce.
a. Contract itself does not recite any
consideration.
b. Even if the consideration is what counsel
claims, and plaintiff did agree to refrain
from work and accompany his wife on her
travels, the contract was not a
competent one for married persons to
enter into.
3. Doubtful if the alleged contract is within the
capacity of a married woman to make under
Michigan Law.
a. Under Michigan statutes a married
woman has no general power to contract,
but can contract only in relation to her
separate property.
b. Where the contract charges specific
property belonging to the married
woman, the law is not so rigid in requiring
that the consideration be for the benefit
of her estate.
couples
c. Mortgage on her property for the
payment of her husband's debts is
enforceable.
4. Even if the contract is otherwise within the
contractual power of parties, it is void because it
contravenes public policy.
a. Michigan law: marriage is not merely a
private contract between parties, but a
status which state is vitally interested,
and under which, certain rights and duties
incident to the relationship come into
being, irrespective of the wishes of the
parties.
i. E.g. hubby has duty to support
and live with wife; wife must
contribute her services and
society to husband, and follow
him in his choice of domicile.
5. Private agreement between married or soon-to-
be married parties which attempt to change
essential obligations of marriage contract as
defined by law, is contrary to public policy and
unenforceable.
Sec 587 Bargain to Change Essential Obligations of
Marriage:
(1) A bargain between married persons or
persons contemplating marriage to change
the essential incidents of marriage is illegal.
(2) Illustrations:
a. A and B who are about to marry agree
to forego sexual intercourse. The
bargain is illegal.
b. In a state where the husband is
entitles to determine the residence of
a married couple, A and B who are
about to marry agree that the wife
shall not be required to leave the city
where she then lives. The bargain is
illegal.
a. Contract says husband will follow wife,
when it should be vice versa.
b. Attorney says relinquishment by husband
of his rights constitutes consideration for
the promise of his wife; but, by the same
token, it makes the contract violative of
public policy.
c. The present contract also implies release
of husband from his duties to support
wife, which makes it void.
6. law prohibiting married persons from altering by
private agreement the personal relationships and
obligations assumed upon marriage is based on
sound foundations of public policy
a. It permitted, can lead to open an endless
field for controversy and bickering and
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
would destroy the element of flexibility
needed in making adjustments to new
conditions arising in marital life.
b. Wife can, of course, volunteer to pay
husband a monthly sum, or by husband
by mutual understanding quit his job and
travel with his wife. What’s objected upon
is putting such conduct into a binding
contract, tying the parties' hands in the
future and inviting controversy and
litigation between them.
7. to recognize that married persons could contract
with each other as freely as strangers would be
inconsistent with their disabilities of testimony
and the desirability of preventing them from
placing themselves ‘habitually in business
antagonism.
8. husband and wife cannot become partners with
each other, largely on the ground that the
recognition of the partnership contract would
impair the marital relationship by affording
opportunity for contentions between them.
RULING:
no law compels women
to assume husband's
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE name.
MODEL; THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN
DUNN V PALERMO
FACTS:
1. Rosary Palermo, Nashville Lawyer, married Denty
Cheatham, same, but she keeps her maiden
name.
2. Tennessee Registration Law mandates married
women to register under their husbands’ names,
otherwise be purges from the reg records (Sec 2-
206 T.C.A).
3. Her name was purged.
4. Rose seeks declaratory judgment judgement that
defendants’ interpretation of Sec 2-206 is
erroneous, or that it is violative of due process
and equal protection clause.
5. Chancellor:
a. Married woman had right to assume
husband’s surname. But this is by repute,
not by law.
b. Sec 2-206 does not operate to change the
name of a woman at marriage
c. Action of the Reg in purging plaintiff was
error - erroneous interpretation of law.
6. Registrar appealed: woman auto take hubby
name upon marriage.
ISSUE:
WON it is mandatory that a married woman assume
the name of her husband.
RATIO:
1. Tennessee has no statutory enactment saying
women auto assume hubby’s surname upon
marriage
a. Mere recognizes prevalence of virtually
universal custom under which woman
normally adopt surname of hubby.
b. Same for Department of Safety drivers’
license name change.
c. Change name authorized in adoption
proceedings.
d. All needed is that person file sworn
application in court of residence giving
reasons for desiring change. No
requirement that reasons be good and
sufficient; just that given – same for
married woman.
e. Divorce – wife may restore maiden name.
2. Common law
a. History
i. 11th century England, no surnames,
leading to confusion.
ii. 14th century, man adopted
surnames, by way of place of birth,
residence, calling, work, color,
adding “son”, or “fitz”, “Mac”, “O”,
physical characteristics, moral
attributes, nature.
iii. Edward IV (1465), statutes required
surnames.
b. Surnames were adopted and abandoned at
will. No requirement or custom demanded
that women adopt hubby name. Hubby
sometimes adopt wifey name.
c. Common law place more stress of
baptismal than surname per se.
3. Legal authorities
a. Laws of England: Person usually bears
surname of father, but may change it as he
pleases. No need to take formal steps
unless change of name is in compliance
with name at arms clause.
b. Change of name via repute v marriage v
deed poll
i. Deed poll – name change is not
done by deed poll per se. It is by
reputation, deed poll only good
evidence.
c. Provided that there is no fraud.
d. Cohabiting without marriage, ok for
women to assume hubby name.
e. Assumption by woman of hubby name
upon marriage is customary, not of law.
 Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
4. American jurisdictions
a. Chapman case, woman unable to show up
in court and declared in default. She did
not receive any notice since the “rebel”
stock is placed under her maiden name.
She was excused, because acc. to court,
she must sue and be sued under her hubby
name, her maiden name absolutely lost.
b. People ex rel. Rago v Lipsky. Rago used
her name professionally, socially,
exclusively after marriage. Was denied
permission to remain registered under her
maiden name.
c. Attorney General of Illinois says I do not
believe this Appellate decision should
control. Other court decisions establish
that women may retain maiden name with
or without court proceedings.
d. State ex rel. Krupa v Green. Prohibit Board
of Elections form placing maiden name on
ballot. Court says it is only by custom” in
English speakers that women adopt hubby
surnames.
e. Pierce v Brushart. Person may adopt name
he chooses so long as not for fraud.
f. Etc.
5. Conclusion:
a. There is a division of authority: we do not
claim judicial infallibility.
b. Court does not hesitate to depart from
rigid common law, where reason for
common law rule does not exist. Common
law does not have force of Holy Writ.
c. At common law, as of time of separation of
colonies, woman acquired new name by
repute, and her name is changed in fact
NOT in law.
d. Common law of America is revolutionary
not static and immutable.
e. The application of a rule of custom and its
conversion into a rule of law, would stifle
and chill virtually all progress in the rapidly
expanding field of human liberties.
i. Had we applied the rules of custom
during the last quarter of a century,
the hopes, aspirations and dreams
of millions of Americans would have
been frustrated and their fruition
would have been impossible.
f. to retain her own name, would eliminate
substantial administrative problems
incident to a change of name: increase of
divorces and re-marriage, name changes.
i. We may reach point of forbidding
change on name to bring about
besides, women now can pursue their careers, engage in socioeconomic activities
- changing names may make it hassle, inconvenient, hassle.
stability reduce confusion and
preserve identity of women.
g. Woman has freedom of choice.
h. So long as a person's name remains
constant and consistent, and unless and
until changed in the prescribed manner,
and absent any fraudulent or legally
impermissible intent, the State has no
legitimate concern.
i. We hold that appellee's legal name is
Rosary T. Palermo.
RULING:
Affirmed at cost of appellants.
DOCTRINE:
Women’s adopting of surname of husbands upon
marriage is effective in fact, and not of law. Women
have liberty of choosing WON to keep their maiden
names.
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
MODEL; BY PRIVATE CONTRACT: VALID V VOID
IN RE SANTIAGO
FACTS:
1. Complaint of SG v Roque Santiago of malpractice,
praying for disciplinary action against Santiago.
2. Ernesto Baniquit, separated from Soledad Colares
for 9 years, wanted second marriage. He sought
legal advice of Santiago as notary public in Negros
Occidental.
3. May 29, 1939 - Santiago assured that Baniquit can
separate with wife to remarry, and told latter to
bring wife that afternoon.
4. Santiago prepared document stipulating that
parties authorize each other to remarry,
renouncing or waiving their right of action one
might have against the marrying party –
Responded admits this.
5. Spouses shake hands, Santiago announce their
single-ness, and they can contract another
marriage. Santiago say he will tear his diploma
apart if agreement turns out to be invalid.
6. Santiago: thought 7 years of separation entitles
parties to remarry. That on June 30, parties signed
a deed of cancellation of agreement.
ISSUES:
RATIO:
1. Contract is contrary to law, morals. And subvert
vital foundation of family.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
2. Santiago’s actions constitute malpractice and
justify disbarment.
a. Admission of a lawyer to practice of law is
upon the implied condition that his
continued enjoyment of privilege
conferred is dependent on his remaining a
fit and safe person to society, otherwise
right to practice is terminated.
b. Here, Santiago was either ignorant or
carelessly negligent. Should be disbarred,
acc. to minority of Court.
3. Majority, though, follow the recommendation of
Honorable Sotero Rodas, Santiago is suspended
for 1 year.
a. He endeavored to correct his mistakes
immediately by making parties sign
another document cancelling previous
one.
RULING:
Santiago is guilty of malpractice and suspended for
one year.
SELANOVA V MENDOZA
DOCTRINE:
Extrajudicial contract during marriage is prohibited
and void.
FACTS:
1. Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E.
Mendoza with gross ignorance of law for
preparing and ratifying document (Nov 21, 1972)
extrajudicially liquidating conjugal partnership of
Selanova and Avelina Ceniza.
a. With 2 witnesses and wife.
b. Title “liquidation of Conjugal properties”.
c. Husband = Riceland; wife = house and lot.
2. Conditions of document:
a. Either spouse will withdraw complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each filed
against each other.
b. They waive their rights to prosecute each
other for infidelity.
3. Mendoza aware of invalidity of agreement, but
was assured by spouses that they will ask CFI of
Negros Oriental for approval.
a. Relied on Art 191 (4) NCC “ husband and
wife may agree upon the dissolution of
conjugal partnership during marriage,
subject to judicial approval.
b. Cites Lacson v San Jose-Lacson:
dissolution during marriage of conjugal
partnership as long as “subsequently”
approved by Court.
ISSUES:
RATIO:
1. It should be secured beforehand, NOT after
agreement is made.
2. Agreement contravenes
Art 221: the following shall be void and of no
effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement during
marriage, of the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and
wife.
3. While adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they are still crimes, and contracts
legalizing such are contrary to law, morals, and
public order.
4. Due to Mendoza’s unawareness of the legal
prohibition on contracts for personal separation
of husband and wife; for the extrajudicial
dissolution prepared by said void agreement; for
Mendoza did not study New Civil Code in law
school (1948); for he acted in good faith,
Mendoza deserves severe censure, NOT drastic
penalty.
RULING:
Respondent is severely censured.
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Art 2 FC. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer. (53a)
Age insanity sex
1. Legal capacity of parties. article 5 and 14. Should
have no existing impediment between parties
incest
(existing relationship or subsisting prior marriage)
2. Mutual consent. Law will not enforce any
agreement to marry. Parties have power to refuse
to give consent
a. Consent must be real: not vitiated by
mistake, duress, fraud.
b. Must be conscious or intelligent
c. Person must be free from insanity,
intoxication, drugs, hypnosis.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
d. Personally given consent
e. Free from terms and conditions
3. Marriage in jest. Subject to annulment at the suit
of parties. Even though a marriage is legal, if it is
by joke, and parties have no intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, with clear
understanding that parties are not to be bound;
ceremony not followed by any conduct indicating
purpose to enter into such relation; even though
solemnizer thought they were serious.
a. There is NO MARRIAGE.
b. Proving lack of real intent: circumstances
and statement of parties, even though
one of them claim that there was such a
marriage.
c. lack of real intent of one of the parties,
will not prevent sincere party from
asserting validity.
d. Also does not permit the liar to assert
validity.
4. Effect of mistake.
a. Void for lack of consent:
i. Nature and legal consequence of
ceremony.
ii. Identity of one of the parties (Art
35 (5))
b. NOT void:
i. Rank, fortune, character, health
of one of parties.
ii. Reason: “for better or for worse”
5. Differences of sex of parties.
a. Omitted in in NCC, but rule remains.
b. Purpose of marriage is procreation.
c. If marriage is done through deceit (e.g.
hermaphrodite and male), marriage is
void and inexistent. No legal effect on
person or properties of parties, without
prejudice to liability for damages of
fraudulent party.
Art 3 FC. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each
other husband and wife in the presence of
not less that two witness of legal age. (53a,
55a)
1. Absence of above render marriage void from the
beginning (Art 4)
2. Authority to solemnize.
a. Article 7 Marriage may be solemnized by:
i. any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s
jurisdiction;
ii. any priest, rabbi, imam, or
minister of any church or religious
sect duly authorized by his church
or religious sect and registered
with the civil registrar general,
acting within the limits of the
written authority, granted him by
his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the
solemnizing officer’s church or
religious sect;
iii. any ship captain or airplane chief
only in cases mentioned in Art 31;
iv. any military commander of a unit
to which a chaplain is assigned, in
the absence of the latter, during a
military operation, likewise only in
the cases mentioned in Article 32;
or
v. Any consul-general or vice-consul
in the case provided in Article 10.
(56a)
b. CC: authority of person solemnizing
marriage was an essential requisite for
the validity of marriage, and, therefore, a
marriage solemnized by someone w/o
authority is void since beginning (Article
80 (2))
c. Marriage law (Act # 3613) Sec 27.
Marriage is valid when at least on party
believed in good faith that that
solemnizer is empowered to do so, and
that marriage was perfectly legal.
i. CC removed this completely,
making such marriage void – acc.
Code Commission.
1. Since state officiates in
celebration of the
marriage through
solemnizer, it is logical
that such person has the
authority from the
government at the time.
Authority is foundation of
marriage.
2. Inconsistent that law
requires a license to
perform marriage, then
validate marriages done
by unauthorized persons.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
3. Without authority,
marriages might as well
be performed by anyone.
ii. FC restored the old Marriage Law.
Marriages performed by
unauthorized persons are void
unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both
parties in good faith.
d. Is a void marriage under CC considered
valid in FC?
i. YES.
ii. Art 255 FC: this code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired in accordance
with the CC or other laws.
iii. FC is curative remedial, and can
validate marriage in question;
serves interest of public.
3. Marriage license.
a. Essential but ONLY a formal requirement.
b. Marriages that precede issuance of
license is void; and subsequent issues
does NOT render such marriage valid AT
ALL.
c. BUT, law does not impose solemnizers to
investigate existence of license issued by
local civil registrar of the parties’ domicile.
Enough that the license was issued by
competent official, who is assumed to
have already validated the residence of
the marrying parties in his municipality.
d. Marriage under license is NOT invalidated
by fact that license was wrongfully
obtained.
4. Ceremony of marriage.
a. No ceremony = no valid marriage. Even if
there is a marriage license.
i. 2 witnesses of legal age (Article
6).
b. This requirement prevents PH to
recognize common law marriages
(agreement between parties with capacity
to enter into such relationship to be
husband and wife and cohabitate)
WORDS TO DEFINE:
• Nikah – marriage
• Rabbi –
• Imam –
• Wali –
• Ijab -
• Gabul -
Art 16 MPL. Capacity to contract marriage.
(1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
and any Muslim female of the age of puberty
or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this
Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon
reaching the age of fifteen.
(2) However, the Shari’a District Court may, Betrothal
upon petition of a proper wali, order the
solemnization of the marriage of a female
who though less than fifteen but not below
twelve (12) years of age, has attained
puberty.
(3) Marriage through a wali by a minor below
the prescribed ages shall be regarded as
betrothal and may be annulled upon the
petition of either party within four (4) years
after attaining the age of puberty, provided
no voluntary cohabitation has taken place
and the wali who contracted the marriage
was other than the father or paternal
grandfather.
Art 17 MPC. Marriage ceremony. No particular form
of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and
the gabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
and two competent witnesses. This declaration shall
be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or
marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing
the marriage. One copy shall be given to the
contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit
Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep
the third.
Art 18 MPC. Authority to solemnizing marriage.
Marriage may be solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali of the woman to be
wedded;
(b) Upon authority of the proper wali, by any
person who is competent under Muslim law
to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court of
Shari’s Cirtuit Court, or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper
wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
Art II Sec 22. The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Art XIV Sec 17. The State the recognize, respect, and
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to preserve and develop their culture, traditions, and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies.
Indigenous People’s Rights Act 1997 (RA No. 8371)
Sec 2 (c) IPRA. The State the recognize, respect, and
protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It
shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national laws and policies.
Sec 29 IPRA. [CULTURAL INTEGRITY] Protection of
indigenous Culture, Traditions, and Institutions. –
The State shall respect, recognize, and protect the
rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their
culture, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider
these rights in the formulation and application of
national plans and policies.
Sec 32 IPRA. Community Intellectual Rights. –
ICCs/IPs have the right to practice and revitalize their
own cultural traditions and customs. The State shall
preserve, protect, and develop the past present, and
future manifestations of their cultures as well as the
right to the restitution of cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property taken without their
free and prior informed consent or in violation of
their laws, traditions, and customs.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; LEGAL CAPACITY; MALE AND
FEMALE
JONES V HALLAHAN
FACTS:
1. Definition of Marriage
a. Webster’s: state of being married or
being united…opposite sex as husband or
wife… purpose of founding and
maintaining a family.
b. Century Dictionary: Legal union of man
and woman for life
c. Black’s Law Dictionary: one man and one
woman united in law for life, for the
discharge to each other and the
community of the duties legally
incumbent upon those whose association
is founded on the distinction of sex.
whether or not female persons are capable of entering
ISSUES: marriage with females
RATIO:
1. Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit
marriage bet persons of same sex, nor authorize
issuance of marriage license to such.
2. Some states recognize common-law marriages,
not needing license nor clergy.
3. Marriage, though, has always been considered as
union of a man and a woman; we are presented
with no authority to the contrary.
4. It appears to us the appellants are prevented from
marrying, NOT by statues of Kent or refusal by
county to issue license, but own incapability of
entering into a marriage as that term is defined.
5. If appellants concealed from clerk the fact that
they were of same sex, resulting relationship
would not constitute a marriage.
6. Baker v Nelson.
a. No constitutional sanction or protection
of right of marriage by same sex.
b. Claim of religious freedom not extended
to make professed doctrine superior to
law of land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself.
c. Relationship proposed by the appellants
does not authorize issuance of license
d. What they propose is not a marriage.
RULING:
Judgment affirmed.
DOCTRINE:
Same-sex marriage is not marriage by its definition.
*GOODRIDGE V DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
FACTS:
In Mass., a gay and lesbian support organization
(GLAD) sued the state’s Department of Health for
their failure to issue same-sex married couples a
marriage license. GLAD sued under the equal
protection clause. GLAD also argued that there are
many other benefits accompanying a marriage
license, such as property rights and tax benefits which
same-sex couples unjustly cannot receive. The state
of Mass. argued that there was a legitimate
governmental interest in discriminating on the basis
of gender, in that the institution of marriage existed
to promote procreation; and because same-sex
couples could not further than goal, the state had an
interest in disallowing their marital rights. The state
also argued that there were parental benefits inrearing
children
promoting different sex relationships. Finally, the
state argued that there would be administrative
state resources
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
inconvenience in suddenly allowing same sex couples
to marry.
ISSUES:
Whether the denial of a marriage license to same sex
couples violates the equal protection clause and/or
the Mass. state constitution.
RATIO:
Yes, the law is invalid and same sex couples shall be
allowed marital rights in the state of Mass. The court
wrote that the state’s arguments for denying marital
rights to same sex couples did not supply enough
justification in terms of the “governmental interest”
sought in their procurement. The court argued that
modern day technology and fertilization techniques
nullified the procreation argument. Same sex
couples, through adoption of other fertilization
methods could procreate. Secondly, the court found
no productive argument favoring the notion that
same sex couples were inferior parents to
children. Finally, the court believed the state did not
demonstrate adequate administrative difficulty to
fully deny a single class of citizens their basic marital
rights. As such, the state failed to supply their
legitimate governmental interest burden.
Philippine laws do not compel having children
RULING:
*US V WINDSOR
tax refund = estate tax exemption for surviving spouses
FACTS:
1. Windsor (Plaintiff) sued to recover the tax
payment she paid after inheriting her same-sex
spouse’s estate and being denied the estate tax
exemption for surviving spouses because the
Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage” and
“spouse” to exclude same-sex couples.
2. Plaintiff married Spyer in Canada. Their same-sex
marriage was recognized by the state of New
York.
3. Spyer died, leaving her estate to Plaintiff. Federal
law provided an estate tax exemption for
surviving spouses. Plaintiff sought to avail herself
of this exemption, but could not under §3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
a. DOMA defined the terms “marriage” and
“spouse” as used in federal law and
regulations to exclude same-sex couples.
4. Plaintiff paid $363,053 in estate taxes and sought
a refund, which was denied by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).
5. Plaintiff then sued for a refund, arguing that
DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. While the lawsuit was pending,
the Attorney General notified the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the Department of
Justice would not defend §3’s constitutionality.
6. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of
the House of Representatives intervened to
defend its constitutionality.
7. The district court held §3 unconstitutional and
ordered the IRS to refund Plaintiff’s taxes with
interest.
8. The court of appeals affirmed, but the IRS refused
to pay until ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
defining “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-
sex couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause?
RATIO:
RULING:
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions
of “marriage” and “spouse” that excludes same-sex
couples violates the Fifth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause
DOCTRINE:
*SILVERIO V REPUBLIC
Name and sex change in records after sex
FACTS: reassignment in bangkok
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as
a male, underwent sex reassignment in Bangkok,
Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the
Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by
one Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz. He then lived his life as
a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex before
the RTC of Manila. The court having underwent the
jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing
where Rommel presented his American Fiance as
witness.
Rtc approve name and sex change
RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on
equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be
taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the petition
were to be granted. His name was thus changed to
Mely, and sex to “female.” Republic filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the RTC. Ca reversed
ISSUES:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
RATIO:
1. Change of Name, primarily Administrative in
nature: Section 1 of RA 9048 provides in essence
that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors, which can be
changed by concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general. The jurisdiction
therefore is primarily lodged with these officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is
improper.
2. Grounds for change of name: RA 9048 provides
the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The
new first name or nickname has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or 3) The change will
avoid confusion.
From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name
for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications. Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. In this case, he failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
3. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment: By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register, excluding
the clerical or typographical error. Section 2 of RA
9048 provides expressly that no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
408 of the Civil Code (*please see the codal
provisions). The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after
birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
4. Purposes
a. Correction - To correct simply means "to
make or set aright; to remove the faults
or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute." The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is
necessary
b. Entry of Certain Acts under Article 407 -
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes
the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children
and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal
separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery
of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are
expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
5. Status of a Person is permanent. The status of a
person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. (emphasis supplied).
6. For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate
RULING:
Petitioner’s contention is not meritorious.
DOCTRINE:
REPUBLIC V CAGANDAHAN
SUBJECT: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45
Rules of Court) raising question of law and seeking
reversal of Decision January 12, 2005 of RTC, Siniloan
Laguna, granting Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate by Jennifer (Jeff) Cagandahan.
FACTS:
1. Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional
Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender
from female to male.
2. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a
rare medical condition where afflicted persons
possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary
male characteristics.
3. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in
court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon
of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in
addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically
is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and
female.”
4. The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court because the said petition did not implead
the local civil registrar.
ISSUES:
The issue in this case is the validity of the change of
sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the
lower court.
RATIO:
1. The contention of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the petition is fatally defective
because it failed to implead the local civil registrar
as well as all persons who have or claim any
interest therein is not without merit. However, it
must be stressed that private respondent
furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the
petition, the order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
course of the proceedings. In which case, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial
compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.
2. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the
determination of a person’s sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case
should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
delicate facts present in this case.
3. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings
forth the need to elaborate the term
“intersexuality” which is the condition or let us
say a disorder that respondent is undergoing.
INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is
the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. It is said that an organism with intersex
may have biological characteristics of both male
and female sexes.
4. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
the land consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright
denial.
5. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
6. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment
based on law and the evidence presented. In the
instant case, there is no denying that evidence
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
points that respondent is male. In determining
respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender.
7. The Supreme Court held that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex.
a. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive.
b. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed. The
Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain
as a female.
c. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently
knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy.
d. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus,
to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the
Supreme Court affirmed as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
DOCTRINE:
*LITTLETON V PRANGE
FACTS: medical malpractice; by surviving spouse
n Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.
1999), cert. denied 531 U.S. 872, 148 L. Ed. 2d 119,
121 S. Ct. 174 (2000), a transsexual, now called
Christie, who was born a man but had undergone sex
reassignment surgery, brought a medical malpractice
suit under Texas' wrongful death statute as a surviving
spouse of a male patient.
The doctor who was sued filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that Christie was a male and,
therefore, could not be the surviving spouse of
another man. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the doctor, and Christie appealed.
Christie has sex reassignment
Christie had a name and sex change made on her birth
certificate during pendency of the suit. During the
surgical procedures, Christie's penis, scrotum, and
testicles were removed, and a vagina and labia were
constructed. Christie also had breast construction
surgery. One of Christie's doctors testified that
Christie "has the capacity to function sexually as a
female" after the surgery. 9 S.W.3d at 225. Doctors
testified that medically Christie was a woman.
christia married a man, 10 years after
Christie married a man by the name of Jonathon in
1989, approximately 9 or 10 years after sex
reassignment surgery. The two lived together until
Jonathon's death in 1996, after which time Christie
filed suit against Jonathon's doctor. In Christie's
affidavit, Christie asserted that Jonathon knew about
Christie's background and sex reassignment surgery.
The court in Littleton stated that in Texas, marriage
must be between two parties of the opposite sex. 9
S.W.3d at 225. Further, in order for Christie to sue
under the wrongful death statute in Texas, Christie
must be the surviving spouse. 9 S.W.3d at 225. Thus, if
Christie was a man, summary judgment would be
appropriate. After a brief review of what
transsexualism is, the court next examined the case
law in this area. The court discussed Corbett and the
case of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971). The court also referenced
such cases as M.T. v. J.T., In re Ladrach, and K. v.
Health Division. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 227-29.
Based upon the doctors' testimony, the court came up
with four criteria for assessing the sexual identity of
an individual. These are:
(1) Chromosomal factors;
(2) Gonadal factors (i.e., presence or absence of
testes or ovaries);
(3) Genital factors (including internal sex organs);
 and
(4) Psychological factors.
ISSUES:
 Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Can there be a valid marriage between a man and a
person born as a man, but surgically altered to have
the physical characteristics of a woman?
RATIO:
Thus, the court found that even though surgery and
hormones can make a transsexual male look like a
woman, including female genitalia, and in Christie's
case, even breasts, transsexual medicine does not
create the internal sex organs of a woman (except for
a man-made vaginal canal). There is no womb, cervix,
or ovaries in the post-operative transsexual female.
The chromosomes do not change. Biologically, the
post-operative female is still a male. 9 S.W.3d at 230.
Even though some doctors would consider Christie a
female and some a male, the court concluded: "Her
female anatomy, however, is all man-made. The body
that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied." 9
S.W.3d at 231.
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
IN RE ESTATE OF THOMAS TREVINO ARAGUZ
SUMMARY: Mother and former wife of decedent filed
a suit to declare the decedent’s second marriage void
on the grounds that it is a same-sex marriage. Texas
CA ruled in favor of the mother and former wife.
FACTS:
• After Thomas Trevino Araguz III died, his
mother (Simona) filed a suit to declare his
marriage to Nikki Araguz as void because it
constituted a same sex marriage.
• Heather Delgado, the decedent’s former wife,
intervened as a next friend and represented
their two children to assert that the second
marriage constitutes a marriage between two
men because of the following:
o Nikki has undergone sexual
nikki was biologically
male when she reassignment only after she married
got married to thomas Thomas, meaning she has male
genitalia when she was married
o She was only declared FEMALE in her
birth certificate after her husband
died
● Nikki filed a counterclaim to declare her
marriage valid. Both parties filed opposing
motions for summary judgment and the trial
court declared Nikki and Thomas’ marriage
void.
● CA stated there is a genuine issue re: Nikki’s
sex so the TC erred in granting summary
judgement.
● Nikki filed no evidence motion for summary
judgment in CA. Hence, main consideration on
this appeal to was whether Heather and
Simona produced evidence to raise an issue of
material fact about Nikki being male during
the marriage.
ISSUE:
● WON Nikki is entitled to the reliefs prayed
for/ rendition of judgment in her favor
● WON the mother and former wife produced
sufficient evidence to defeat Nikki’s no-
evidence motion for summary judgment of
HELD:
● NO – Nikki’s no evidence motion for summary
judgment has been denied because it does
not support rendition of judgment. Hence, the
expert testimony of Dr. Cole she presented to
prove she was already a female during her
marriage with Thomas even though she has
not undergone reassignment was not
considered as evidence.
● YES- Only the evidence produced by Simona
and Heather were considered, and they were
able to prove that Nikki was still male during
the marriage.
RULING:
● CA ruled in favor of Simona and Heather.
● CA REVERSED the Trial Court’s judgment and
REMANDED the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Rule 103 RC. CHANGE OF NAME
Sec 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance
of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of
Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
Sec 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of
name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person on
his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide
resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner’s name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing at least once a week
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing
shall not be within three (30) days prior to an election
nor within four (4) months after the publication of the
notice.
Sec 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear
at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor
General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if
proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be
changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108 RC. CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Sec 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interest in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation of correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
Sec 2. Entries subjects to cancellation or correction. –
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; €
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil register
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
Sec 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
Sec 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and nay person
having or claiming interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Sec 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which
the proceeding is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon
the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
R.A. No. 9048: AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND
412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act,
the following terms shall mean:
"City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of
the local civil registry office of the city or municipality,
as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the
city or municipal mayor in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws.
"Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the
petition and who has direct and personal interest in
the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry or change of first name or nickname in the civil
register.
"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.
"Civil Register" refers to the various registry books
and related certificates and documents kept in the
archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine
Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General.
"Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of
the National Statistics Office which is the agency
mandated to carry out and administer the provision of
laws on civil registration.
"First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a
person which may consist of one or more names in
addition to the middle and last names.
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. -
Any person having direct and personal interest in the
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an
entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the
civil register may file, in person, a verified petition
with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the record being sought to be
corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another
place in the country and it would not be practical for
such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time
and effort to appear in person before the local civil
registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or
changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the
local civil registrar of the place where the interested
party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2)
local civil registrars concerned will then communicate
to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing
or domiciled in foreign countries may file their
petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine
Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil
registrar or the consul general shall be processed in
accordance with this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors
and/or change of first names or nicknames may be
availed of only once.
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or
Nickname. - The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce.
The new first name or nickname has been habitually
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that by that first name or
nickname in the community: or
The change will avoid confusion.
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. - The
petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed
and sworn to before any person authorized by the law
to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and
shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is
competent to testify to the matters stated. The
petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or
entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the
change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following
documents:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of
the page of the registry book containing the entry or
entries sought to be corrected or changed.
At least two (2) public or private documents showing
the correct entry or entries upon which the correction
or change shall be based; and
Other documents which the petitioner or the city or
municipal civil registrar or the consul general may
consider relevant and necessary for the approval of
the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the
petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published
at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the
petitioner shall submit a certification from the
appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no
pending case or no criminal record.
The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in
three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy
to the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or
the consul general; second copy to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General; and third copy to the
petitioner.
SECTION 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil
Registrar or the Consul General. - The city or
municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom
the petition is presented shall examine the petition
and its supporting documents. He shall post the
petition in a conspicuous place provided for that
purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds
the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in
form and substance.
The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general shall act on the petition and shall render a
decision not later than five (5) working days after the
completion of the posting and/or publication
requirement. He shall transmit a copy of his decision
together with the records of the proceedings to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General within five (5)
working days from the date of the decision.
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar
General. - The civil registrar general shall, within ten
(10) working days from receipt of the decision
granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn
such decision by way of an objection based on the
following grounds:
The error is not clerical or typographical;
The correction of an entry or entries in the civil
register is substantial or controversial as it affects the
civil status of a person; or
The basis used in changing the first name or nickname
of a person does not fall under SECTION 4.
The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the
city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of
the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the
notice thereof, the city or municipal civil registrar or
the consul general shall notify the petitioner of such
action.
The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil
registrar general or file the appropriate petition with
the proper court.
If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power
to impugn the decision of the city or municipal civil
registrar or of the consul general within the period
prescribed herein, such decision shall become final
and executory.
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal
civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may
either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general
or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; LEGAL CAPACITY; MINIMUM
AGE OF MARRIAGE
EIGENMANN V GUERRA
SUBJECT: pretense of age
Eduardo Eigenman action for annulment of marriage
to Maryden Guerra.
FACTS:
1. Eigenman wants an annulment of his marriage to
Maryden for the ff. reasons:
a. Age – He was only 16 – 20 y.o. at the time
of marriage, and there was no consent
from his mother, Maria de Mesa.
b. Forced – His own consent the marriage
was obtained via threat, intimidation, and
force by Froilan Guerra (Maryden’s dad).
c. Invalid license – marriage license was
obtained from a councilor of Quezon City,
who is not authorized to administer
oaths; hence an invalid marriage license.
2. Guerra made the ff. counterclaims:
a. False age– Eigenman represented himself
to be over 21 y.o.
b. Not forced – his mother was present
during the marriage ceremony, and
impliedly gave consent to marriage
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
c. No excuse – Eigenman should not excuse
himself from marital obligations, to the
prejudice of Maryden and detriment of
public interest; marriage as inviolable
social institution.
3. Background
a. They met each other at Clover Theater,
Manila as performers; decided to marry.
b. Feb 17, 1932. Filed applications for license
with Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City.
Eigenman indicates he is 25 years, 8
months old, Bday.
c. Nov 3, 1957. Parents of parties discussed
marriage at Maryden’s house.
d. Nov 5, 1957. Marriage by Judge Prudencio
Encomienda, license 358036.
e. They lived a week in M’s house,
transferred to E’s house for 3-4 mos.
4. Lower Court dismissed the action; hence this
appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON a marriage in which one party is older than
16 but younger than 20 years old is valid.
2. WON the consent to a marriage by a parent or
guardian must be in writing and under oath to
make such marriage valid.
RATIO:
1. Re. age: E falsely represented his age, making
defendants believe that he is of age to marry
without consent
a. He is now prevented by estoppel in trying
to prove otherwise. (Art 1431 CC: through
estoppel, an admission or representation
is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
b. If Court allows him to, it would be in bad
faith and disregard of rules on fair play
and honest dealing.
2. Re. threat: court finds no reasonable and well-
grounded fear of imminent and grave evil upon
appellant’s person or property.
a. Father said: Balia ko’y lumiligaw ka sa
aking anak. Pag niloko mo iyan, mag-ingat
ka.
b. Above is expected from concerned
parents.
3. Re. license. The law declared null and void ab
initio marriages that are WITHOUT license, AT
ALL.
a. Licensed marriages are not invalidated by
wrongfully obtained licenses, including
lack of authority of subscribing officer.
b. Local civil registrar and solemnizing officer
are not even required to investigate
marriage license.
4. Re. consent:
a. Article 61 CC: Males under 20 years old
and females less than 18 years old shall
exhibit to the local registrar the consent
to their marriage by their father, mother,
or guardian, or persons having legal
charge over them. Such consent shall be
in writing under oath.
i. Article 61 pertains only to
issuance of marriage license; not
needed for validity of marriage
solemnized under license.
ii. Court considers licensed
marriages valid, even though
license, which was issued by
competent official, was
improperly obtained or defective
(in this case, defective because of
false representation of age).
b. Article 85 CC. Marriage may be annulled
for the ff: Party who seeks annulment was
16 – 20 years old (male) or 14 – 18 years
old (female); that marriage is solemnized
without consent of parent, guardian, etc.;
unless, after attaining proper age, party
freely cohabits with other as husband and
wife.
i. Article 85 declares as voidable
marriage those that are
solemnized without consent of
the parent, guardian, or person…
authority.
ii. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that
consent may be given in any form,
including impliedly.
5. There is so merit on the contention that trial court
erred in holding that the mere presence of
appellant’s mother at time of marriage ceremony
was sufficient parental consent.
RULING:
Court a quo’s decision affirmed.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITE; CONSENT FREELY GIVEN
*PEOPLE V SANTIAGO
FACTS:
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe
Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wife’s niece, in an
uninhabited place across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother,
Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a protestant
minister who there and then officiated the ceremony
of their marriage. After having given money by Felipe,
Felicita proceeded home to her father and told what
had just occurred.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the marriage executed by the
protestant minister is of legal effect.
RATIO:
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the
appellant hoped to escape from the criminal
consequence of his act. It shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife and the
ceremony cannot be considered binding on her
because of duress. The marriage was therefore void
for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no
impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.
RULING:
DOCTRINE:
WASSMER V VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 ll Dec. 26, 1964
FACTS:
1. Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided
to marry 4 Sept 1954.
2. 2 Sept 1954. Velez left note: Will have to
postpone wedding – My mother opposes it.
Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do
not ask too many people about the reason
why – that would only create a scandal. –
Paquing”
3. 3 Sept 1954. “Nothing has changed rest
assured returning very soon apologize mama
papa love Paking”.
4. Velez never found again; Bea filed for
damages, Velez no answer and in default.
5. Bea adduced evidence to clerk of court as
comm.
6. 29 Apr 1954. Judgment: Velez to pay Bea P2K
(actual) + P25K (moral and exemplary) +
P2.5K (atty) + costs.
7. 21 Jun 1955. Velez filed petition for relief and
motion for reconsideration.
8. 23 Aug 1955. Date for amicable settlement.
Velez failed to appear; motion to defer
resolution for petition for relief for 2 weeks.
9. 15 Jun 1956. Wassmer says expired na 2
weeks, tagal na.
10. 13 July 1956. Another amicable settlement;
counsel of Velez says unlikely.
11. 21 Jul 1956. Court denies petition FR; Velez
appeals to SC with excusable negligence.
Affidavit not accepted – not factual but
opinionative.
12. Velez says first judgment is void because
evidence was adduced to clerk.
a. Pangasinan v Palisoc says Clerk is ok
to receive evidence (Rule 34)
b. Velez’ consent is not needed – in
default, no standing in court.
13. Velez says no provision of Civil Code for action
for mere breach of promise.
ISSUES:
1. WON mere breach of a promise to marry is
an actionable wrong;
2. WON defendant’s petition for relief on the
ground of excusable negligence is valid;
3. WON defendant must be held answerable in
damages;
4. WON the damages awarded were excessive.
HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Defendant’s petition was NOT VALID because
it wasn’t supported by an affidavit of merits
based on FACTS. The contention that his
failure to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous
event is a conclusion or opinion.
2. Mere breach of a promise to marry is NOT AN
ACTIONABLE WRONG (Estopa v. Biansay).
Congress deliberately eliminated from the
draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that
would have it so.
3. Art. 21 NCC. The circumstances surrounding
the breach of promise to marry are contrary
to good customs for which defendant MUST
BE HELD ANSWERABLE in damages. Article 21,
CC, provides that "any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage."
a. Article 2219 NCC, moral damages are
recoverable in this case.
i. No question was raised as to
the award of actual damages.
b. Article 2232 NCC, exemplary
damages are also recoverable
because the circumstances indicate
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
that defendant acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
4. Considering the particular circumstances, the
SC affirmed the lower court’s judgment but
REDUCED the initial moral and exemplary
damages from PHP25000 to PHP15000 as a
reasonable award.
DE JESUS V SYQUIA
G.R. No. L-39110 ll Nov. 28, 1933
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CESAR SYQUIA
FACTS:
Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier
for a barber shop of which defendant Cesar Syquia, an
unmarried man from a prominent family, was
accustomed to get his haircut. The two became
acquainted and developed an amorous relationship
which resulted to Antonia getting pregnant and giving
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
During the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy,
defendant was a constant visitor at her home, and in
February 1931, he handed Antonia a letter which was
addressed to the priest who was to christen the baby
acknowledging that “the baby” is his and that it be
christened in his name.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation
that even when he was abroad, he continued to write
to Antonia cautioning her to take care of herself so
that “junior” would be strong.
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in
his house where they lived together in regular family
style with all household expenses paid for by Syquia.
When Antonia showed signs of a second pregnancy,
Syquia left her and thereafter married another
woman.
During the christening of the child, the defendant
caused the child to be given the name Ismael Loanco
instead of the originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
ISSUE:
1. WON the breach of promise to marry is
actionable.
2. WON the several letters made by defendant
prove sufficiency of acknowledgment of
paternity.
3. WON Trial Court erred in holding that Ismael
Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of a natural child status;
compelling Def to acknowledge Ismael un Art.
135 No. 2 NCC
HELD:
1. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the trial court in refusing to give damages to
Antonia for breach of promise to marry. The
action has no standing in civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. This case exhibits none of the
features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the
defendant to recognize the second child,
Pacita Loanco.
2. The sufficiency of acknowledgement of
paternity is satisfied by the production of one
or more documents, of indubitable
authenticity, written by the recognizing
father, as contemplated in subsection 1 of
article 135 of the Civil Code. The admission of
paternity is contained in the note to the priest
and the other letters addressed to Antonia
during her pregnancy.
a. Child, upon being conceived,
becomes bearer of legal rights
b. Identity of child which Syquia
intended to acknowledge is clear,
based on the letters – he repeatedly
referred to junior.
c. It is ok that there are several
documents: Admission of paternity is
contained in letter to padre, others
connect it to the child Junior.
d. Only requirement is that letters are
indubitable.
3. NO.
a. Def agave child and mother a home,
in which they lived together.
b. The law gives no fixed period during
which child must be in continuous
possession… Even though the dad
conceded the status, child still had his
for quite some time
c. “continuous” in Subsec 2 Art 135 NCC
does not mean forever, as long as not
intermittent.
Art 4 FC. Absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (a).
Persons HW # 6 August 25, 2018
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall 1. Care and diligence must be exercised by the
render the marriage voidable as provided in Article parties to ascertain facts which are basis of and
45. form the incentive to the mutual undertaking.
a. Marriage contracts are more difficult to
An irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect avoid because of fraud than ordinary
the validity of the marriage but the party or parties contracts.
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, 2. The present FC limits the cases which would
criminally, and administratively liable. constitute fraud sufficient for annulment to those
1. Essential requisites. in Article 46. No other fraud may be admitted.
a. Found in Article 2 a. FALSE that any serious fraud of a fact
b. If a party gives consent to be husband or material to the marital relation is enough
wife, but unknowingly and voluntarily or ground for annulment.
free, or is misled, there is merely a defect
in the essential requisite of consent. Here,
consent is vitiated or defective, and
marriage is not void ab initio; only
voidable or annullable.
2. Formal requisite.
a. Absence of formal requisite in Article 3
has same effect as absence of essential
requisite; marriage is void ab initio.
b. Exception: Authority of solemnizing
officer. Even if he has no authority, if
party/parties were in good faith, marriage
is valid (Article 35 (2)).
c. Mere defect or irregularity in any formal
requirement has no effect on marriage
itself – remains valid IF all essential
requisites are present.
i. Party responsible for defect may
be prosecuted for crime
committed, or punished
administratively for breach of
duties.
d. Thus, when marriage license is issued by
local civil registrar without requiring
presentation of documentary proofs, or
when marriage license is issued before
expiration of period required by law for
posting of notice of the application for
license, or the notice is not posted, or if
marriage is solemnized in a place not
provided by law, there is mere defect in
formal requisites. Marriage remains valid
if essential requisites are present.
Art 45 (3) FC. A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife.