Aristotelian Matter As Understood by St. Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus

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ARISTOT~LIAN MATTER AS UNDERSTOOD BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
by Simon. Emilia MASSOBRIO

Department of Philosophy
McGil1 University
Montréal, Canada
January 1991
A thesis submitted to the

Faculty of Graduate studies and Research
in Partial Fu1fi11ment of the requirements for the degree of
ryoctor of Phi1osophy
Copyright (c) 1991 by Simona Massobrio

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE. • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • •• i
ABSTRACT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• i v
RESUMÉ • • • • • • • . . • . • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . . • • . • • •• v
CHAPTER l INTRODUCTION... • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • . • •• 1
Section 1 - Aristot1e....................................... 5
Section 2 - The Potentia1ity of Prime Matter

in the Phi1osophy of Aristotle ••••••••••••.•••• Il
Section 3 - Aristotle: the Inte11igibi1ity

of Matter and the Real
Distinction between Matter
and Forro....................................... 47
Section 4 - Aristot1e on the Role of Matter

in Definition and in Essence 61
Section 5 - Aristot1e on the Role of Matter

iI! the Problem of Individuation ~ .. 83
CHAPTER I I ST. THOMAS AOUINAS................................. 191
Section 1 - The Potentiality of Prime Matter

in the Philosophy of
Saint Thomas Aquinas.......................... 196
Section 2 - Aquinas: the Intel1igibi1ity

of Matter and the Real
Distinction between Matter
a;:d Forro...................................... 143
Section 3 - Aquinas and the Ro1e of Matter

in Definition and in Essence.................. 158
Section 4 - Aquinas on the RaIe of Matter
in the Problem of.~ndividuation.~ 167
CHAPTER III JOHN DUNS SeOTUS.................................. 186
section 1 - The Potentiality of Prime Matter

in the Phi1osophy of
John Duns Scotus................................. 194
Section 2 - Scotus: the Inte11igibility of

Matter and the Real Distinction
between Matter and Form 228
Section 3 - Scotus and the Role of Matter

in Definition and in Essence 245
Section 4 - 5cotus on the RaIe of Matter

in the Problém of Individuation 261
CHAPTER IV SOULS, ANGELS, AND THE PLURALITY OF FORMS

ACCùRDING TO AOUINAS AND SeOTUS ••••••••••••••••••• 284
Section 1 - Angela, Souls, and

Ur..iversal Hylomorphism.......................... 284
section 2 - The Essential Unit y of the

Composite and the Issue
of the Plurality of Forms 314
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•. 357
BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 386
i
PREFACE
The idea for this project was initially conceived du ring a
graduate seminar in late medieval philosophy taught by Professor Calvin
Norrnore at the University of Toronto. The study of the notions of
substance and accident in the Philosophy of William of Ockham lead me to
research and write a paper on the individuation of matter in his
philoBophical system. The paper was later read at the "International
Colloquium on the Thought and Writings of William of Ockham" in 1985 and
was published in the issues of Franciscan Studies dedicated ta the
proceedings of that conference. In the course of my research for that
paper and in reflecting ufo~ commenta made about it at the conference l
was struck by the similarities between the views of John Duns Sco~us and
of William of Ockham on the concept of matter as well as ~y the marked
difference between their notion of matter and that of St. Thomas
Aquinaae Because aIl three philosophera, as was commer. at the time,
claimed the authority of "the Philosopher" in support of their views, l
later became interested in studying the original concept of matter as
treated by Aristotle and in comparing it to the Thomist and Scotist
interpretationse While the secondary literature on Aristatle, Aquinas,
and 5cotus is immense, l realized that no particular attention has been
devoted ta their treatment of mattere Because the concept of matter is
so basic in the systems of ail these thinkers, l decided that a detailed

.-r
: study of the concept would be both interesting and useful. In addition,
•
ii
l had become cOI~vinced that the generally accepted viewB on the
philoeophical orientations of Aquinas and Scotus were incorrect when
applied te th'air treatment ef matter. While it is acknowledged, in
fact, that thie ie by no means tr'le cf aIl aspects of their
philosophies, it is generally accepted that Aquinas's claim to
Aristotle's support is better founded than Scotus'S analogous claim.
More generally, the Franciscan tradition is widely believed to be closer
te Plata and Neoplatonism while Aquinas and the Thomist tradition are
considered to be mo~e faithful ta Aristotle. This ie believed ta be
particularly true where their treatment ef natural philosophy ie
concerned. l had come te suspect that, while this may be true of the
Franciscan tradition up te Scotus's time, it may not be true of Scotus's
treatmp-nt of matter. In addition, l had become uncertain about the
eimilarity between Aristotle's concept of matter and that of Aquinae.
Little'e clairn in The Pla~onic Heri~age of Thomism that Aristotle's
concept of matter corresponds in principle to that of Suarez and of
Scotus convinced me that these questions were both interesting and
important.
l am grateful for the opportunity to thank those peopl~ whose
support and aseLatance have made this wcrk better and more exhaustive,
and ite completion easier and more pleasant. In particular l would like
te thank Professor Jim Hankinson of the University of Texas at Austin
whoee assistance in selecting sources and whose ~,'.!idance and suggestions
in researching Aristotle were invaluable. To Professor Calvin No~more
of the University of Toronto l am grateful for teaching me so much about
medieval philosophy in the very little time l spent at the University of

iii
Toronto. l cannet thank him enough for his suggestions and comments.
They greatly improved thia work. l wo~'i alao like to thank my family
for their p~tience and support, and l am especially thankful ta my
husband, Neil Howe, for our many interesting and helpful discussions,
for his encouragement, and for his assistance in editing the final
draft. l am most of all indebted to Professer Harry Bracken, rny
superviser, for advice and encouragement without which l doubt that l
could have brought thia ~roject to complétion. l alao wiah to thank
Professer Marguerite Deslauriers, co-superviser for this project, fer
her helpful guidance. Finally, l would like to thank Professor John
Trentman for introducing me to the study ef medieval philosophy during
my undergraduate years and first two graduate years at McGill
University. l am aleo grateful ta the Catholic University of America in
Washington, D.C., for the use of their library and ~esearch facilities.
iv
ABSTRACT
The concept of matter as it la treated in the philosophical
systems of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus ia examined,
partly te asce~tain the influence which the original Ariatotelian
concept of matter had on the two medieval thinkers, and partly te
determine which of these two thinkers remained more faithful ta the
original Aristotelian concept. An analysis ia carried out of the viewB
of the three philosophera regarding the ontological statua of matter;
the intelligibility of matter, the issue of the real distinction between
matter and form; the role played by matter in individuating composite
substances; and its raIe in defining composite substances and
deterrnining their essences. Finally, the viewe of Aquinas and Scotus
regarding the theory of universal hylomorphism and the theory of the
plurality of forme are discussed and compared. It is shawn that, while
rnost of the Franciscan philosophical tradition up to Sc~tus's time was
far more influenced hi Platonist than by Aristotelian principles,
Scotus, theugh a Franciscan, was rnuch closer te Aristatle than te Plate
in his views regarding matter. In fact, the few deviatiene fLom the
original Aristotelian concept found in Scotus's ~heory can be ascribed
to theological concerns. It is argued, furthermore, that Scotus'e views
on the concept of matter are far closer to the original Aristotelian
theory than our analysis shows Aquinas himself to be.

-- v --
~sUMÉ
Dans cet essai on examine la notion de matière dans les systèmes
philo~ophiques d'Aristote, de st. Thomas d'Aquin, et de Jean Duns Scot.
Ct2t analyse vise à déternlinp.r l'importance de l'influence exercée par
Aristo1;e sur les deux philosophes médiévaux et à décider lequel des deux
reste le plus fidèle au .oncept aristotelique original. On analyse les
théories des trois philosophes à l'égard de l'état ontologique de la
matière; de la question de la distinction réelle entre la matière et la
forme; du rôle de la matière dans l'individuation des substances
composées; et de son rôle dans leur définition et dans la déter~:nation
de leurs essences. On examine et rapproche enfin les théories et les
arguments de St. Thomas d'Aquin et de Jean Dun3 Scot au sujet de
l'hylemorphisme universel et de la pluralité des formes. On montre que,
à difference de la tradition franciscaine du moyen âge, qui a une
tendance très marquée à suivre la philosophie de Platon plus que celle
d'Aristote, Scot, même s'il était un franciscain, reste bien plus fidèle
à Aristote qu'à Platon dans sa discussion de la notion de la matière.
En effet, on trouve que la théorie de la matière de Scot semble être
différente de celle d'Aristote seulement quand il s'agit de défendre des
dogmes de l'église ou bien des doctrines théologiques. On montre par
ailleurs que la position de Scot en ce qui concerne la théorie de la
matière est plus proche de celle d'Aristote que la position de st.
Thomas d'Aquin lui même.

-- 1 --
CRAPTER l
.!NTRODUCTION
It has generally been accepted by philosophers and historians of
philosophy that the rnost faithful interpretation of Aristotelian thought
in the Christ~an medieval tradition was provided by St. Thomas Aquinas. 1
This view has often been expressed by those who aIse believe that the
Franciscan tradition, represented in this discussion by Scotus, i5
further from the original Aristotelian framework, and in sorne instances
must be consioared positively anti-Aristotelian. 2
The purpose of my analysis i5 ta examine the truth Qf this thesis
as it applies te the concept of Aristotelian matter found in the
philosophies of Aquinas and ScotU6. l consider it important ta carry
out such an analysis because l am nct at all convinced that Aquinas is
1. Note, for exalflpLe, severaL passages in Gilson, Le Thomisme, 169, 186,225·226, 233, 243, and 248.
In these passages, Gilson argues over and over again that Aquinas generally intcrpretcd
Aristotle correctly, whiLe also claiming that he surpassed Aristotle. See alsc ~he general
tone of Goheen, The Problem of Matter and Form in the IlDe Ente et Essenda" of Thomas
Aguinas.
2. See, for example, Harris, Duns Scotus, Vot. l, 303-304 and Vol. II, 78·79, where the subject of
the comparison is precisely the theory of matter. Longpre also agrees that: Ht'attitlode de
Duns Scot à l'égard de S. Thomas d'Aquin le situe également à côté du Séraphique Docteur ct
" de ta plupart des maitres du XIIIe siècle, contre lesquels te Docteur Angélique s'était
prononcé dans son effort pour intégrer à la philosophie chrétienne l'aristotélisme
8lJthentique. 1I (Longpré, La PhiLosophie de J.O. Scot, 257).
-- 2 --
closer ta Aristotle in his interpretation of the concept of matter than
scotUB. l will argue in the end that in sorne ~mportant respects SCOt l 15
La in fact more faithful ta th~ Aristotelian viewpoint than Aquinas
himself.
In order ta stress the importance of determining which of these
philosophera ie in fact closer te Aristotle, l will begin by offering a
short outline of the major differences in the views they are gener~lly
believed ta hold with respect ta the concept of matter. l will proceed
te diseuse the concept of matter as it ia found in Ar~stotle's warka.
Finally, l will examine the concept of Aristotelian matter found in the
warka of Aquinas and S~otus in order ta determine what their views in
fact are, and in order ta compare them ta thase of Aristatle.
One of the few pointa of agreement between Aquinas on the one hand
and Scotus on the ather, as far as the tapic under discussion ia
cancerned, ia that, at the basic level (the level of the four elements),
Sensible subatances 3 are camposed of Prime Matter and Subatantial Form.
3. Deciding what exactly counts as a sensible or material substance in Aristotle 1S not an easy
task. Aristotle often cites that which he calls the comman opinion about this issue at the
beginning of his own discussions of the topic. Thus, about this question he says that:
"substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and 50 we say that not only
animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and
water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these
or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical un~verse
and its parts, stars and moon and sun." (Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.2.102S ba-13).
Aristotle goes on to exclude most of the entities listed in the passage just quoted.
lIEvidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies
both the p~rts of animals (f~r none of them exist separately; and when they ~ separated,
then too they eX1st, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of
them is a unity, but as it ~ere a mere heap, till they are worked up and sorne unit y is made
out of them. 1I (Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.16.1040bS·10). Yhat will count as a substance
in the strict sense in Aristotle will become clearer during the development of my
discussion, but it is cle6r fram what has been said 50 far that for an entity to qualify as
a substance it has ta be capable of separate existence (which disqualifies individual
properties) and of separate existence not 'merely as matter'. It seems, therefore, th3t ft
-- 3 --
L This ia wha~, in effect, makes them bath more or less Aristotelian, but
this ia aiso wheL~ the agreement between them seeme to end. Aquinas
holds, for example, that prime matter ie purely potential where Scotüa
holds that prime matter has sorne actuality of its own. Bath aides, of
course, claim the authority of the Philosopher in support of their
respective views. From these oppcsing views on the statua of prime
matter it follows according ta Aquinas that prime matter 19 nct a
positive principle, and it follows equally clearly for ScotUB that it ia
a positive principle. Aquinas 8eeme ta argue that forro and matter are
nct re&lly distinct, while S~otus will argue, on the ether haDd, that
they are re;'ly distin~t. According te Aquinas, because ferm and matter
are net really distinct r it fallows that prime matter cannet exist
without any form inhering in it at all. From Scotus's thesis that form
and matter are really distinct, on the other hand, it fallews that it is
possible (although perhaps not naturally possible) for prime matter to
exist without any ferm inhering in it at ail. From the view that prime
matter is not actual in itself, it follows for Aquinas that prime matter
is nat intelligible in itself; fram the epposite thesis that prime
has to be capable of the kind of separate existence which is characteristic of an

individual. A substance according to Aristotle, it seems, must have the kind of unit y
profJer of the individualj cf. Aristotle, De Anima, I1.1.412bs-9. It will become apparent
that the only entities which will pass this test will be individuals (in the category of
substance). Thus, Frede says that: "it is characteristic of ZHO that Aristotle tends to,
or in fact does, restrict substances to natural abjects (Z 7,1032 8 19; Z 8,1034 a4; Z
17,1041b28-30; H 3,1043 b21-22). It tS not entirely dear whether this is suppo~ed to
restrict substances to animate things, but these certainly are paradigms of natural
abjects." (Frede, Essays in Ancient Phitosophy, 76). Other scholars have agreed that
animate things or living beings are ...hat Aristotle considel's sensible or material
substances: III iving organisms, then, which alone according ta Aristotle are in the strict
sense substances u (Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, 328);
"1iving things alone of all perishable things are in the full sense substance. Il (Ross,
Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. l, cxiv); "the st rang irrplication of Z is that only living
OOings, among perishables, and the imperishable heavenly beings ... are materiat ousiai. 1I
(Haring, "Substantial Form in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z Ill," 311).
-- 4 --
matter iB in Borne senae actual, for Scotus the opposite conclusion
followB, i.e., that prime matter ia intelligible in itself. For
Aquinas, and ScotUB will agree with him in this instance, prime matter
ia Ilot a particular, but ia common ta aIl composites. Later Ockham will
argue that prime matter, like everything eise which existe, ia a
particular and iB in itself extended. In the second part of this
statement, i.e., that prime matter ie in itself extended, ScotUB agrees
with Ockham. Scotus and Aquinas aIse seem ta disagree over the
appropriateness of matter as the principle of individuation; over the
possibility of a plurality of substantial forms in one composite; and,
most importantly, over the consequences, for the essential unity of the
composite, of the real distinction between matter and form and of the
actuality of prime matter.
Given such striking differences of opinion among these two
philosophers, given the fact that they often appeal to Aristotle in
support of such different viewpoints, and especially given the
strikingly divergent conclusions to which their views lead, it is
important and useful for a clearer understanding both of their own
theories and of Aristotle's own philosophy (which, for better or worse,
ia often filtered through medieval interpretations), to re-examine these
thinkers's views on the concep~; of matter as well as their relationships
to Aristotle.
-- 5 --
ARI5TOTLE
In this section l will turn te an examination of sorne issues in
Aristotle's philosophy4 which are net only essential ta my present
discussion, but which have aIse raised much controversy in their own
right bath in the past and in recent years. By looking at these issues,
l hope te corne ta sorne acceptable conclusion regarding Aristotle's
theary of matter and the rale it plays in his picture of the physical
world. My discussion of Aristotle's views will be divided into two
major parts. One part will examine the statua of prime matter itself in
Aristotle's philoBophy; whether he considera it purely potential or
actual in Borne sense; whether it la intelligible in itself or net; and
whether he thinks it ia extended in itself or note The second part of
the discussion will concentrate on the role, if any, matter is ~~upposl?d
to play in the solution of the problem 0: individuation.
Concerning the question of Aristotle's belief in the existenc~ of
prime matter, that which is called the traditional view roughly
maintains the following: (i) Aristotle does believe in the existence of
prime matter; (ii) he believes it ta be purely potential and completely
indeterminate; and (iii) he believes prime matter to be a positive
4. 1 u~ed the Oxford translation of the works of Aristotle, unless otherwise indicated. One of the
exceptions 1S Charlton's transLation of the Physics 1. Il: my chai ce of this transLation is
mainly due to the fact that Charlton transLates 'ousia' as 'reality' and not as
'substance', thereby better preserving the meaning of the word 'ousia' which Owens also
renders by the term 'Seingness' and not by the term 'substance'. Charlton also translates
'hupokeimenon' as 'the underlying thing' rather tha" 'substratum', thus preserving more
distance between Aristotle and his medieval followers.
-- 6 --
-"l.. 8ubject able ta receive predication. 5 The emphasis and starting point
of the analysis here is a concept of prime matter which is primarily the
subject of predicatio4 and not that of the substratum for substan~ial
change which ia needed in order ta render Aristotle's theory of change
coherent. 6 The traditional view of prime matter finally believes that
(iv) prime matter fulfills the role of rendering Aristotle's theory of
change coherent by being, nct ooly the ultimate subject of predication,
but alse the substratum for the rnost basic kinds of generation and
corruption; e.g., the changes from air ta water or water ta earth.
Owens characterizes Aristotelian matter in the following way:
in this way the notion positive ie shown ta be independent

of determinate. For Aristotle, "actual ll was a synonym for
"determinate. What lacked actuality, or in technical
lI
language the potential, could therefore be positive. By

establishing the concept of the potential as positive even
5. Cf. the followi n9 passage: "the concept wi II have ta be that of a pas i tive subj 2ct, able to
receive predication. No negation is able to express the nature of matter. Yet from that
notion of positive subject every determination will have to be removed, even, or rather
especially, the determination expressed by 'something'. Matter is explicitly not a
'something' nor a 'what' nor an 'it' . •'\lt Q.!terminatlon, even the mast elementary, has to
be drastically ellminated fram the notion of the positive in this concept. The concept
thet expresses the Aristotelian notion of-matter will have to be the concept of a positive
object that is wholly indeterminate. 1I (Owens, lIMatter and Predication in Aristotle,1I 87).
6. Matter pLays a very basic role in Aristotle's explanation of substantial change and in his theory
of the composition of substances. According to Aristotle, matter is thet part of the
composite substance which remains through the change. He thereby aLlows one element to
change into another without being forced to maintain th et what is normaLLy described as a
case of generation and corruption is, in fact, a different phenomenon altogether in the
course of which the first element is annihilated while the second is generated out of non-
being. Aristotle thinks, in fact, that it is impossible te give an account of the
generation and corruption of sU~.stances or of their alteration unless there is a substratum
which enables us to provUe a satisfactory explanation of these changes. IlIt is equally
reasonable to aSSI~ that this body wilL be ungenerated and indestructible and exempt from
increase and alteration, since ev~rything that comes to be cornes into being from its
contrary and in sorne substrate, and passes away likewise in a substrate by the action of
the contrary into the contrary••• ," (Aristetle, .Q!"! Caelo, 1.3.270a13-16). Without matter
to play the role of the substrate, then, there would be, according to Aristotle, no
generation, no corruption and no alteratien. It taLlows trom this that all changeable
substances have to be composite substances and that matter has te be one of th~ component
parts.
-- 7 --
though non-actual or indeterminate, A~istotle has been able

ta set up matter as a positive though entirely non-actual
subject of predication. Becauee the potential ia positive
without being determinate, this concept of matter ia
possible to the human mind. It is the concept of a
principle wholly undetermined, yet necessarily posited in
reality by any ferro that ia extended, multiplied in
singulars, or terminating Bubstantial change.?
A relatively recent and oppoaing view rnaintains, generally, that
this traditional picture of prime matter attributed ta Aristotle ia nct
tenable,8 that Aristotle doea nec in fact hold this view, that he doea
nct believe in the existence of prime matter, and that he believes that
the simple bodies themselves are the substratum for the simplest kinds
of generation and corruption.
It is my opinion that, although both views have correct intuitions
about different aspects of the issue, neither is completely faithful ta
Aristotle's motivations. Neither represents Aristotle's views
correctly. In the first part of the discussion, therefore, l will try
to present what l believe ta be Aristotle's viewB on the status of prime
matter. My conclusion will be that, although Aristotle does believe in
7 Owens, IlHatter and Predication in AristotLe,lI 92. l believe that the distinctions Scotus draws
between the two senses of being in potentiaLity and the two corresponding senses of being
in actuality, which l will discuss later, are a different way of getting at the same
distinction between determinate and indeterminate being. In Scotus matter is said to be
'actuaL' in the sense that it is a positive entity even though it is indeterminate from the
point of view of predic~tion. There are, however, differences here: in Scotus and, l wiLL
argue, in Aristotle, matter is going te have essential characterizations which cannet be
separated fram it and that therefore cannot be predic&ted of it. For example. matter needs
ta be a physical entity capable of explaining change, and as such it will have extension in
itself.
8. Charlton, Aristotle's Physics Ir II, (appendix)j King, "Aristotle without Prima Materiau; and
Yilliams, Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, (appendix) hold this view, but they
differ in as much as Charlton and King do not attribute the traditional view te \ristotle
while Williams does. They offer basically the same solution ta the inconsistencies
presented by the traditional view: the simple bodies, on their interpretation. pLay the
same role played by prime matter in the traditional view. 1 will talk in more detail about
both interpretations when 1 offer my own solution of this problem.
-- 8 --
the existence of prime matter, part of the characterization given of it
in the traditional view makes it unable ta fuifill its role in
Aristotle'5 theory and doea indeed render it an incoherent concept. l
intend ta show, furthermore, that there ia evidence in Aristotle that he
did not hold the traditional view of prime matter.
With regard to the problem of individuation, it has traditionally
been held that Aristotle considers matter to be the principle of
individuation. 9 In ether words, it has been held that according ta
Aristotle what differentiates individuals within the sarne species ~s the
fact that they have differen~ bits of matter. This view has been
challenged bath by medieval commentators and recently with the argument,
among others, that matter could not possibly be the principle of
individuation, at least not if we insist that it he in itself purely
potential, completely indeterminate, and common to aIl things. In
short, if the traditional view of matter iB accepted, matter itself
needs to be made actual and individuated before it can itself become the
principle of individuation. It ia necessary, in other words, to appeal
to a further principle of individuation for matter itself: this
principle could be form, which makes matter actual and determinate, or
it could be sorne other entity. The need for an additional principle of
individuation, be it form or something else, makes it in any event
plausible to doubt that the role of matter ia essential or, indeed, even
necessary for the process of individuation. Once it ia admitted, in
other words, that matter itaelf needs to be made actual and
individuated, it ia nct at ail, clear that it ia, in itself, capable cf
9. See Ansconbe, "The Pdnciple of IndividJJation Part II."

-- 9 --
- performing any useful role as the principle of individuation. It has,
furthermore, been maintained that Aristotle believes net matter, but
ferro or a conjunction of matter and ferm ta be the principle of
individuation. 10
l am going ta argue that if the issue ta framed in the proper way
it will turn out that bath views are partly right, and that in
Aristotle's picture bath matter and ferm will be needed in arder te give
a complete picture of individuation. It seeme ta me that the correct
solution ta the prcblem of individuation can only he given if it ie
framed in terms of at least two different questions: (i) what
differentiates individuals withi~l the sarne species? (a metaphysicaJ.
question) or, how are individuals within the sarne species te be counted?
(an epistemological question); and (ii) what makes an individual a
'this', i.e., the individual it is? Answering this second question, l
think, is essential if one is te understand and answer accurately the
first question, (be it in its metaphysical or in its epistemoiogical
forro). Given the notion of prime ~atter developed in the tirst part of
the discussion, l am going to ~rgue that Aristatle will use prime matter
te give part af the answer to bath questions. The raie of prime matter
in the answer ta bath questions will, however, remain subordinate te the
role played by form: prime matter will be unable to fulfill its role
without first being made determinate by and being determined to a
particular ferm. Once the prime matter has beceme determined ta a
particular form, it will in its tu:.n make us capable of recognizing
10. See, for exarrçle, Regis, llAristotle's 'P:""inciple of Individuation'," 157, and also Ross,
Arlstotle's Metaphysics, Vol. 1, cxv.
-- 10 --
individual forms Buch as the ferro, for exampl~, of this particular
man. 11 l will argue, then, that various texte il~ Aristotle do indeed
Buggest that he uses matter, and that he aiso uses ferro, for a partial
answer ta bath questions. l will aIse argue, however, that for a
complete answer ta bath questions Aristotle needs ta use and doea use
bath matter and ferro in answering each. In orde~ ta clarify my
discussion of individuation l will aIse look at the role played by
matter in definition. l will, in ether words, ask whether according ta
Aristotle one should include matter as weIl as ferro in talking ~~out the
essence of physical substances. l am going ta argue that, given the
role played by matter in Arietotle's notion of definition, ~atter should
be included in a discussion of the essence of a physical substance.
". For similar conceptions of Aristotle's views on individuation, cf. Wiggins, Sameness and
Substance; and Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, chs. 4-5. In this work Frede argues
that it is possible in Aristotle's system to individuate forrn by matter and matter by form.
Thus Frede says that: llthis is possible only because, though Aristotelian matter c~n be
identified only by means of the form of an object and hence be identified only with respect
to a form, this form need not be the form of the matter at the time of its identification;
for example, the gold of this statue can be identified as the gold of this statue but also
as the gold of that crown wh.~h was melted down. Thus, we can distinguish forms on the
basis of matter without getting involved in the circle that this matter, in turn, can be
distinguished only on the basis of the abjects and hence the forms. 1I (Frede, Essays in
Ancient Philosophy, 69). 1 will come back to this issue later during my discussion of
individuation.
-- 11 --
THE POTENTIALITY OF PRIME MATTER
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE
In exarnining Aristotle's notion of prime matter, and in order ta
determine whether there ie such a thing in his system, it Beeme ta me
that it ie of the utmost importance te decide what his motivation would
be for positing Buch an entity, aüd, of course, whether he dO~ê, in
fact, have such. a motivation. It geems ta me that, in de;veloping his
theory of change and of the principles of nature, Aristotle's main
concern i8 centered around the problem of being and becorning.
Although Ariatotle begina by rejecting the moniam of the

Eleatics as making the science of nature impossible (Physics
1.2.185 8 ) he nevertheless returns again and again te the
Eleatic dilemma, sa much sa that his anS"'ler ta the general
problern of the principles of nature is cO::iditioned by the
need he felt of meeting the Eleatic logic. Unleaa we take
account of Aristotle' s preoccupation with this problem we
will not underatand hia approach to the larger problem. 12
The Eleatic problern,13 roughly stated, starts from the premise
that a thing can only come into existence either from that which ia or
from that which ia not. If it cornes to be from that which ia, then it
already was before coming ta be, and it is impossible for anything ta
come from that which is not. This leads ta the most unwelcome
conclusion that change is impossible. The second problem with which
12. O/~onoghue, IlAristotle / s Doctrine of 'The UnderLying Matter',11 18; cf. also Ari::totle, Physics,
1.6-7.
13. For the original statement of the problenl by Parmenides and Mel issus see Kirk and Raven, rh!
Presocratic Philosophers, 272, and 276-277 for Parmenides; and 300-301, and 304-305 for
Melissus.
-- 12 --
Ariatotle haB ta deai ia the problem of the underlying matter, that
which the tiret philosophera consider the common etuff out of which all
things come ta be. Aristotle's solution ta the more urgent Eleatic
problem will be given by his solution ta the problem of the underlying
nature.
For, those who poait severai elements make them come te be

by their acting upon and being affected by one another, and
equally those who make them come ta be fram a single element
cannet avoid speaking of action. And Diogene8 ia right ta
say that if it were n~t the case that everything ia from a
single thing, there would nct be any acti.ng upon or being
affected by one another, e.g. what i9 hot b~ing cooled, and
vice versa for heat and co Id do nat change into each
ether. What changes is clearly the substratum; so abjects
between which there ia action and passion necessarily have a
single underlying nature. 14
This passage, given that Aristotle believes that there ia change
of the sort described, offers a preliminary solution to the problem of
the underlying nature: there has to be a common underlying matter for
two thinga A and B between which there is interaction. It is obvious,
though, that this alone will not solve the Eleatic problem. At the
beginning of De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotle seems to d3ny what
l have just argued he affirms. He says that:
those who construct everything out of one thing necessarily

identify generation and corruption with alteration; for
according ta them the substratum remaina one and the sarne
throughout, and this is just the sort of thing which we say
"alters ... 15
It seems to me, however, that interpreting this passage as denying
that there is one common underlying nature would be to misunderstand
14. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, I.6.322 b10-20 (tr. Williams).
15. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, I.1.314b1-5 Ctr. Williams).

-- 13 --
Aristotle's meaning. The emphasis of the passage should be understood
te be in the claim that the substratum for this particular chanye dosa
remain "one and the sarne throughout." In alteration, i.e., in man
becoming pale, the substance, i.e., the man, remains one and the sarne
throughout and the quality, i.e., the paleness, cornes ~o it or leaves
it; but nct in generation and corruption, in which the substance, i.e.,
the man, c~meB te be and passes away. Aristotle, in fact, explains this
in a passage in the following chapter:
these people think that all allah change ia alteration, but

there iB in fact a distinction. For within the substratum
there ia something which corresponds te the definition and
something which corresponds to the matter. When, therefore,
the change takes place in the se it will be a generation or
corruption: when it takes place in the affections,
accidentally, it will be alteration. 16
This development goea a little further in elaborating the doc,:rine
of the underlying matter and in explaining how Aristotle'a notion of it
allows him tü make a distinction between alteration on the one hand, and
gen9ration and corruption on the other. Aristotle is in effect saying
that if there is just one basic element (as the material monists,
Thales,17 Anaximenes, et. al., held), then there is only one substance
which, persi~cing through all change, eliminates the possibility of
substan~ial change. But there is no reason, Aristotle thinks, to hold
that the underlying element need be a substance as such. This doea not,
however, tell us anything yet about the nature of the underlying matter
and only hints at the solution of the Eleatic problem. It will turn
16. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.2.317a 23-27 Ctr. Williams).
........ 17. There is sorne dispute over the accuracy of the claim that Thales was a material monist. For a
discussion of this issue, cf. Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, 89, 92-93, and
97-9B.
-- 14 --
out, in fact, that the definition of a thing, in the most proper sense,
ia the ferro, and it will be partly with the distinction between prime
matter and Bubstantial form that Aristotle will solve the E~eatic
problem. A second distinction, however, ia necessary bath for the
solution ta the Eleatic problem and for Aristotle's own theory of
change. Aristotle discus':=les it in the Physics.
And in one way it [matter] passes away and cornes ta be, and
in another nct. Considered as that in which, it doee in
itself pass away [for that which passes away, the lack, ia
in it]. Considered, however, as possible, it doea nct in
itself pase away, but can neither be brought ta he nor
destroyed. If it came ta be, there would have te be
something underlying, out of which, as a constituent r it
came ta be; that, however, is the material nature itself,
for by matter l mean that primary underlying thing in each
case, out of which as a constituent and not by virtue of
concurrence samething cornes ta be; sa it wauld have ta be
before it had come to be. 1B
Aristotle's solution ta the Eleatic problem ia, therefore,
twofald. On the one hand, he argues, there is something which always is
(i.e., the underlying nature) and which prevents things from coming into
existence out of that which is not. On the other hand, he argues,
change is nevertheless possible because although matter ia a being, it
ia a potential being: in other werda, matter ia patentially F, but net
actually F, for any F which can be naturally generated and corrupted.
Partly through the existence of the lack in it, and partly through its
own potential existence as the subject of generation and corruption, it
is the substance which it will become, but only potentially.
In one way it ia from what ia not that a thing cornes ta be

simpliciter, thaugh in anather way it is always from what
18. A~istotle, Physics, 1.9. 192a25~33 (tr. Charlton).

-- 15 --
lB; for that which ie potentially but ia nct actually must

1 neceBsarily pre-exist, being described in bath these ways.19
It ia not my intention ta diseuse the Eleatic problem in any
detail, and, although l realize that the outline of the solution te it
which l have just given ia very sketchy, it performs the task it was
roeant te perform. Since it iB clear from what has been said thus far
that Aristotle believes in the existence of Borne ~nderlying matter or
ether, ir. remains te diseuse {il whether Charlton'B and King's
descriptions of the underlying nature (i.e., as the elements), or Borne
ether conception of prime matter, ia a more faithful characterization of
Aristotle's own belief and (ii) if prime matter should turn out to be
the correct choice, then., whether (a) the traditional view of prime
matter should be aceepted or (b) a new ~haraeterization of it should be
offered. It is to these two questions that l want ta turn now. In the
appendix of his translation of Aristotle's Physics l and II, Charlton
argues, l think rightly to a great extent, that when Aridtotle uses the
expression primary matter he should be taken ta be referring ta
proximate matter;20 he himself, however, admits that even though
Aristotle does not generally cali the underlying nature primary matter
he may still believe in its existence and proce2ds ta argue against this
possibility. l think in this he is wrc·.lg. l will diseuse this issue
below where l will outline the eharaeteristics prime matter should have
19. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.3.317b14~17 (tr. \Jilliarns).
20. For a detailecl discussion of this thesis, see Charlton, Aristotte's Physics 1, Il, 129-131.
Although l think that there may be one or two passages in which he does refer to it as
prime or 'lltimate matter: "either the proximate matter or the ultimate ... l1 (Aristotle,
Metaphysics V.6.1017aSff.)i the list of the elements seems to be given only as an example
in flristotle, Metaphysics IX.7.1049824-27i lIor the tirst in general .... " (Aristotle.
MetB21ysics V.4.101S aSff.l.
-- 16 --
'.~
..
'~ in order ta be a consistent notion and where l will argue that it doea,
in Ariatotle, have these characteristics.
For the moment, l want ta diseuse King's and Charlton's claims
that in place of the traditional view of prime matter, there should be
substituted the view that the elements or simple bodies are the mast
basic kind of material. 21 The claim that the four elements are the most
fundamental sort of matter ia based on their conclusion that Aristotle
rejects conceptions of prime matter as more basic than the elements
(e.g., Anaximander's fifth element; see Aristotle, De Generatione et
corruptione, I.6.322 blO-21). Anaximander's fifth element, however, ia a
determinate and perceptible thing, and Robinson argues canvincingly22
that what Aristot1e means to exc1ude by the arguments cited by King and
Charlton is no.;.. . prime matter under any description but prime matter
either (a) as a type of body in its own right, or (b) as pure1y
geometrical, or (c) as separable fram the elements. King's formulation
of the notion of the most basic kind of matter admits that there is
samething which remains as a substratum through the changes, but this
something which remains is not prime matter. Rather, it is the simple
bodies. He argues that the simple bodies are not composite substances:
now Aristotle"s word for the composite of form and matter is

sunthetos. "
Il However, he is careful to sayon several
21. See King, IIAristotle without Prima Materia," and Charlton, Aristotle's Physics 1. Il,
(appendix). Although their argumer.ts for this thesis are different, for my purposes it is
sufficient that they corne to the same conclusion. For more detaîled refutations of their
views, cf. the following: against Charlton see Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle U ;
against I(ing see Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter: a Reply to Hugh R. King"; against
bath Charlton and I(ing see Williams, Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, (appendix).
22. Robinson, lIPrime Matter in Aristotle," 169.

-- 17 --
occaaiona that hia four elementa are "hapla" (aimple) and

net "suntheta" (composite) .23
The fact that Aristotle refera te the elements as simple, however,
doea net show conclusively that they are net compoaed of prime matter
and Borne kind of ferro; nor doea it show that, even though they may net
be composed of prime matter and substantial ferro, they may net
nevertheless be compoaed of prime matter and the contrarieties. The
fact that Ariatotle doea not apply, in ta1king about the elementa, the
ward generally used ta refer ta the composite of ferro and matter, doea
net, in itself, mean that he wants te exclude ail types of composition
in the elements, but only the type of composition in question. l think
that the view that the elernents are composed of prime matter and the
contrarieties, and net of prime matter and substantial form, ia a
tenable view, and it has more support in the text than King's own view
that the four elements are simply the contrarieties. It is further to
be noted that Aristotle, by calling the elements simple, may not intend
to imply that there ia in them no form of compoaition, but that they are
the bodies whoee movement is simple. In the De Caelo, during his
discussion of the existence of a fifth kind of simple body whose natural
motion would be circular motion, Aristotle argues that there is a strong
connection between the notion of simple bodies and that of simple
movement. He starts from the premiss that bodies are either simple or
compounded out of simple bodies and goe8 on to define the simple bodies
as those which possess the principle of their movement in their own
nature. To these kinds of bodies will correspond different kinds of
movements: to simple bodies will correspond simple movements and to

.. ~".
23. King, IIAristotle without Prima Materia," 373.
-
r-·-
t-;
-- 18 --
compound bodies movemente that are "in sorne sort compound." :J'rom this
Aristotle will conclude that there must be a 'fifth body', of which the
stars are made. His conclusion ia derived from the belief that circular
motion ia a natural kind of motion and that it i5 in fact the most
perfect of the natural kinds of motions, and fram the observation that
it ie not explained by the motions of the four Elements. In the course
of his argument Aristotle affirma that there ia a strang :onnection
between the simple bodies and the notion of simple movement. He argu~s
in fact that:
supposing, then, that there ia such a thing as simple

movement, and that cir::.:ular movement ia an instance of it,
and that bath movement of a simple body is simple and simple
rnovement ia of a simple body (for if it ie rnovement of a
compound it will be in virtue of a prevailing simple
element), then there must necessarily be sorne simple body
which revolves naturally and in virtue of its own nature
with a circular movemente 24
It seems that the simple bodies are called such not in virtue of
the fact that they are not compound, but, rather arbitrarily, in virtue
of the fact that they are those bodies which have as part of their
natures their own principles of movemente Aristotle gives what seems to
be a definition of the simple bodies based on this principle.
Bodies are either simple or compounded of such; and by

simple bodies l mean those which possess a principle of
movement in their own nature, such as fire and earth with
their kinds, and whatever is akin ta theme 25
From this it also follows that there are different ways of
interpreting the terrn 'simple': it might refer ta that which is nat
24. Aristotle, De CBelo, I.2.269a2-6.
25. Aristotle, De Caoalo, I.2.268 b26-29 (~asis added).

-- 19 --
composed of matter and substantial ferro or, alternatively, ta the kind
of composition which le found in those bodies which possess in their
nature their own principle of movement. It ia plausible ta argue, then,
that the four elements are called simple, nct because they are nct
composites in any sense of the ward, but because they possess in their
nature their own principles of motion. This does nct preclude sorne
ether ferro of composition peculiar ta them. The plausibility of my view
of the simple bodies will alse become apparent fram the discussion of
sorne passages which Bearn ta me ta argue aven more conclusively against
King's and Charlton's views. In the Metaphysics Aristatle argues that:
in general, change of quality is necessarily done away with

for those who speak thus, for on their view cold will not
come from hot nor hot from cold. Fer if it did there would
be eomething that accepted the contrarieties thernselves, and
there would be sorne one entity that became fire and water,
which Empedacles denies. 26
Arietotle, of course, would want ta preserve change of quality,
and, fram this passage, it seeme ta follow that "something that accepted
the contrarieties ll
is a necessary condition for these changes to occur.
Furthermore, in several ether places Aristotle denies that the
contrarieties can change into one another or act on one anather.
For it ie hard to see how density could be by nature su ch as

to act on rarity or vice versa, and similarly whatever the
opposition: l,ove does not gather up strife and make
something out nf it, nor does strife act thUG with love, but
bath must act on a third thing distinct fram them. 27
In De Generatione et Corruptione he again makes a similar point.
26. Aristotle, Metaphysies, 1.8.989 a26-30.
27. Aristotle, Physics, I.6.18y a22-27 (tr. Charlton). Aristotle also devotes a long discussion to
the four elements and their properties in Meteorologiea, IV and De Caelo, Ill.
-- 20 --
Once again, if there ia ta be air fram fire, this will

:~
happen through the heat changinq into its contrary. This
contrary will accordingly belong to the air and the air will
be Bomething cold, so that it i8 impossible for it ta be hot
air because the Barna thing would then be sirnultaneously hot
and cold. Both therefore will be sorne other identical thing
and sorne other matter comman ta them bath. 2B
similarly in the Hetaphysics he argues that:
there must be something underlying which changes into the

contrary etats; for the contraries do nct change. Further,
samething persista, but the contrary doee nct persist; there
ia, then, sorne third thing basides the contraries, viz. the
matter. 29
And finally in a passage in De Generatione et Corruptione already
quoted above, a atrong statement ie made ta the affect that the
contraries cannat change iota each ether by themselves. 30
Aristotle clearly believes that the elements do change into one
another, and the view that there is nothing in the elerr~nts other than
the contrarieties would lead to the consequence that they cannot do so.
This seems to support the view that, although the simple bodies may not
be, properly speaking, composite substances, they are at least composite
of prime matter and the contrarieties. In De Genera~ione e~ Corrup~ione
Ariatotle states what he claims te be his own view of the composition of
the elements.
Our view is tha~. there is a matter of the perceptible

bodies, but that this is not separable but is always
together with a centrariety, from which the so called
Il elementa
came te be. A more precise account of them has
Il
been given elsewhere. Nevertheless, ainee this is the way

in which the primary bodies are from the matter, we must
28. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, II.5.332 8 14.18 (tr. Williams).
29. Aristotle. rletaphysics, XII .2.1069%-9.
30. Cf. Aristotle, De Generatl0~e et torruptione, I.6.322c

-- 21 --
give an account of these aIso, regarding, certainly, as a

principle that ia really firet, the matter which, though
inseparable, doea underlie the contraries (for neither ia
the hot matter for the cold nor the latter for the hot, but
the substratum ie matter for them bath); so firet that which
ia perceptible body in potentiality ia principle, and
secondly the contrarieties (I roean, for example, hot anà
cold) , and only thirdly fire and water and the like. For
these change into one another, and it ia nct as Empedocles
and others say (for there would be no alteration); but the
contrarieties do nct change~31
This very important passage shows conclusively that:
(i) if th~ elernents were the mast basic kind of matter there would
nct be generation and corruption, or alteration because there wou Id nct
be a substratum for changes between the contrarieties;
(ii) the contrarieties cannot themselves change into one another;
and
(iii) the nimple bodies are made up of prime matter and the
contrarieties.
The third point is made again by Aristotle in the Metaphysics
where he argues that:
modifications and movements and relations and disposit.ions

and ratios do not seem to indicate the substance of
anything; for all are predicated of a subject, and none is a
"this. " And as to the things which might seem most of aH
ta indicate substance; water and earth and fire and air, of
which composite bodies consist, heat and cold and the like
are modifications cf these, not substances, and the body
which is thus modified alone persista as something re~l and
as a substance. 32
31. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, II.1.329 8 24·329 b (tr. ~illiams).
32. Aristotle, Ms!]~, III.5.1001 b30-100za4.

-- 22 --
It 8eemB ta me clear from these passages that the elernents cannet
be the most basic kind of matter, because in arder for them te come te
be and pase away into one another (and they do come te be ~~d pas8 away
into one another; see above, Aristotle, De Generatione e~ Corruptione,
II.1-2.329 a 36ff.) they have to be composed at leaet of prime matter and
the contrariet.ies because "that which cornes ta be ia always
composite. 1133 The composition in the elements, however, doea nct make
them composite Bubstances in the full sense of the ward because it i5
not: a composition of matter and substantial ferm. They are, however,
s~batances in a potential sense because they are composed of prime
matter and the contrarieties. Aristotle, in fact, in Metaphysics
VII.1S.1040 bS-10, after discussing the common opinion which considers
them to be substances, calls the four elements potentialities as opposed
to substances. The reason he gives for not considering them substances
in the full sense but only potentially is that "none of them are one,
but they are like a heap." It is possible that, since it is the
substantial ferro which makes a thing a 'this', and therefore a unit y,
and aince, as we will see, it is the substantial form which provides the
preliminary criterion for countability, the reason they are not one and
are not countable ia that they do not have a substantial form. This is
confirmed by Aristotle in those passages of the Metaphysics dedicated to
the discussion of the various meanings of the term 'one'. Aristotle
says that that which is one can be called such either by accident or in
virtue of its own nature. That which ia called one in virtue of its own
nature can be calledone in more than one sense. Of th~se senses two
33. Aristotle, Physics, I.7.190b1D-11 Ctr. Charlton).

-- 23 --
are of special interest in our present discussion: the sense in which
things are called one because their substratum doea nct differ in kind
and the sense in which things are called one because their substance ia
one. In his discussion of those things which are called one because
their substratum daes nat differ in kind Aristatle says that:
the substratum meant ia either the nearest to, or the

farthest from, the final etate. For, on the one hand, wine
ia said ta be one and water ia sa id ta be one, qua
indivisible in kind; and, on the ether hand, ail juices,
e.g. ail and wine, are said ta be one, and SQ are aIl things
that caO be rnelted, because the ultimate substratum of aIl
ia the sarne; for aIl of these are water or air. 34
The four elements, then, can be called one in this sense, but not
in the stricter sense in which things are called one whose substance ia
one because:
the things that are primarily called one are those whose
substance is one - and one either in continuity or in form
or in definition; for we count as more than one either
things that are not continueus, cr those whose fcrm is not
one, or those whose definition is net one. 35
This, then, seems to be the sense in which "none of them are one,
but they are like a heap." Aristatle seems ta be saying that ta the
extent to which things do not have a form, and therefore a preper
definition, they cannet be counted. 36 It would make sense, according te
this view, te maintain that "none of them are one," i.e., that they are
34. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.6.1016 a20-24.
35. Aristotle, Metaohysics, V.6.1016b9·11. Aristotle makes the same point again :.; ~~hysics,
X.1.1052819-35.
36. This seems to be a distinction analogous to the modern di1tinction between 'mass terms' and
'count nouns' or 'sortals'. For a discussion of the differences between the criteria of
identity applicable to 'mass terms' and those appliCable to 'count nouns', cf. also
laycock, IIMatter and Objecthood Disentangled," 20-21.
-- 24 --
nct countable, if they are nct considered te be substances because they
do nat passess what is praperly called a farm. It alsa fallaws fram
this that it is the substantial farm which pravides us with the
principle and the starting point for countability. Wiggins, in hie book
Sameness and Substance, gives an analogous account of the elements
involved in the procesa of counting. Wiggins quotes Frege in support of
hie own views.
Frege wrote in Foundations of Arithmetic, ch. 54, "only a

concept which (a) delimits what falls under ~t in a definite
way, and (b) which dosa nct permit any arbitrary division of
it into pa..:ts, can be a unit relative ta a finite numbe.': ...37
It iB on the basia of unit y of ferm that the criterion for the
strictest kind of unity is derived, while thase things which are called
one because their substratum doee nct differ in kind are called one in a
more general sense. 38
l will come back ta the issue of the raIe played by farm in the
cantext of the countability of individuals when l diseuss individuation.
For the moment l wauld like ta go back ta the discussion of .he
37. Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, 73. Wiggins continues by explaining that: "his purpose
concerns counting, and the second condition, marked (b), is precisely what is needed for
there ta he a universally applicable distinction between right and wrong answers to the
special question 'how many'?" (Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, 74).
38. For a discussion of the differences between that which is 1I0ne in nUTber," that which is "one in
kind,1I and that which is 1I0ne in genus," in Aristotle, cf. Frede, Essays in Ancient
Philosophy, 51-52. There Frede argues that Aristotle thinks that that which 1S one in
number is in the strictest sense the individuel ('atomen'), that two or more things are one
in kind if they belong to the same species, and that two or more things are one in genus if
they do not belons to the same species, but only to the same genus. Cf., for example, the
following passage: "(for there is no difference of meaning between 'm.merically one' and
'individual': for this is just what we mean by the individual - the numerically one, and by
the universel we mean that which is predicable of the individuals);" (Aristotle,
Metaphys i cs, 111.4. 999 b32-1000a).
-- 25 --
composition of the four elementB. About the type of composition present
in the elements Sokolowski explains that:
the following passage irnplies that the powers of hot, cold,

fluid and solid, far from being consequent upon the
eleme:ltp, are really more fundamental. Rather than follow
upon the ferro of the simple bodies, they constitute the
ferro: "Therefore tiret what ia perceptible body potentially
ia a principle, secondly the contrarietic3 l roean for
instance heat and co id - and thirdly fire and water and the
like." (De Generatione et Corruptione ILL 329 8 32-35). The
contrarieties come "between" matter and the simple bodies;
they do not follow upon ~::e simple bodies. The
contrarieties are irnmediately present in the underlying
matter, and the simple bodies like earth and tire are the
result of the fusion of the 3lemental pewers and underlying
matter."?
In this paper sokolewski goes on ta argue thac, even though the
€'\lements do net h",ve, properly speaking, a substantial forro, still the
actualization of their potentiality, i.e., the motion tewards their
natural place, can be accounted for by the presence of the contrarieties
in them. And that this, in fact, given ths simple kind of activity they
perform in nature, accounts for it better than the presence of a
substantial form. What l wanted ta show, however, was that the four
elements could not be the most basic sort of matter, and this l think
has found ample support in Aristotle's text -- notwithstanding the fact
that there is truth in King's and charltan's contentions that the simple
bodies are net subetances in the full senee of the term.
There is anether intuition which ia ehared by Charlton, King, and
Williame which ie, however, even more relevant ta my general argument.
Given that there ie in Aristotle an underlying nature, and given that
39. Sokolowsld, lIHatter, Elements and Sub~,tance in Aristotle," 268-269. Also, see this paper for a
fuller and very good discussion of Aristotle's theory of the four elements.
-- 26 --
thie underlying nature ia nct, as l have argued, represented in
Aristotle's philoBophy by the four elements, the commen feeling shared
by Charlton, King, Williams, and myeelf ia that, whatever ite other
merits may be, the traditional notion of pri~e matter cannet fulfill the
role of substratum for substantial change assigned te it. King
characterizes one version of what 8eeme te me ta be the traditional view
as maintaining that:
the prima materia is no being at aIl but a principle of

being; that this "characterless substratum" ia nct a part of
Nature's body but an abstract concept of the restless,
infinite and eternal potentiality within Her. 40
Prime matter aB pure potentiality and, therefore, considered
primarily as the subject of predication or, if considered as part of
nature, as completely devoid of all determination including extension,
doee net seem te be able to perform its preeminent task, i.e., the task
of underlying change, of remaining throughout the procesB of change, and
of preventing things from coming into existence out of "that which is
not eimplici'ter. Il The problem seems ta be this: intuitively, if we
admit that, as the traditional view of prime matter would have it, at
the basic level (at the level, that is, at which water, for exarnple,
changes into air), prime matter is purely potential and has no actuality
of its own, then it seems plausible to ask what the point would be of
having something called prime matter at all, or, alternatively, what the
difference would be between sucn a notion of prime matter and nan-being.
One of Aristotle's most urgent reasans for intraducing the notion of
prime matter is the need he feels for a solution to the Eleatic problem.
40. I(ing, lIArhtotle wlthout Prima Materia,1I 370.

-- 27 --
But ta solve this problem he doea net need a logical concept of prime
matter te serve as the subject of predication. Instead he needs a real
material substratum ~hich allows him ta give a coherent account of
change able to invalidate the Eleatic objection.
l think it ia important, at this point, ta rnake a distinction
between prime matter as a logical concept and prime matter as a physical
notion. 41 The two notions are net necessarily incompatible and may
refer to two different ways of looking at the same entity. l think that
it i9 possible ta accept bath conceptions of prime matte~ in different
contexte. Prime matter as the underlying substratum for the most baRle
sorts of generations and corruptions (i.e., those which take place
between the four elements), must refer ta actual physical etuff: it must
be in sorne sense actual, and it must be the real substratum which
41. For B similar differentiation between prime matter as the subject of predication and prime
matter as the substratllTl of substantiel change, cf. Lobkowicz, "Conment" to Owens, "Matter
and Predication in Aristotle,1l 96·99. Understanding the notion of matter in Aristotle is
quite a difii~ult task, but it seems to me that this di~tinction between prime matter as
the subject of predication and prime matter as the substratllTl of substantial change is a
reasonable way to start clarifying the issue. Another equally acceptable way to
characterize the distinction might be to sugsest that the traditional view of prime matter
concentrates on the part of prime matter which Aristotle cells 'the laek' because as the
ultimate ~ubject of predication prime matter would represent that which lacks
determination. This, as we will see, would correspond to Scotus's notion of matter as pure
objective potentiality and hence to non·being. Prime matter, on the other hand, is also
characterized as 'positive' by sorne of the proponents of the traditional interpretation of
prime matter: this brings to mind not the part of prime matter which Aristotle cells 'the
lack', but that part which he claims remains throughout the change. Prime matter in this
sense could not be indeterminate in the seme sense in which prime matter as the ultimate
subject of predication is called indeterminate. It also seems to ~ true that prime matter
as the ultimate subject of predication cannot be called 'positive' in the same sense in
which matter as the substratllTl of substantial change is so called. Again, as we will see,
prime matter as the substratllTl of substantial change will be said by Scotus to be in
'subjective potentiality'. The feeling that there are here two different senses in which
the word prime matter is used is also expressed by Wi II iams, "Form and Matter 11. 11
William, in fact, says that: IIwhile Aristotelian Ilmatter ll generally denotes the entity,
part, or compo~~nt which performs the roles 1 indicated (thet which "as form, for exemple)
• matter in the concrete • it often seems to mean just the role itself in the abstract (the
relational status of heving form, for exemple)." (Williams, llForm and Matter IJ," 500).
-- 28 --
guarantees that iwhat ia' doea nct come fram 'what is not'. Prime
matter, in that context, can he called purely potential with respect te
the form it ia about ta receive, but it iB only called such in virtue of
being a constituent of reality devoid of that forme As a logical
notion, matter will, at any level ether than that of the most Dasie
sorts of generations and corruptions, stand for that which ia potential
and will be made actual by the inherence of the substantial ferro it
lacks at that moment. While at the most basic level, it iB possible ta
calI prime matter purely potential because it is nct predicable of
anything and everything cao be predicated of it, it is important ta note
that if prime matter is called purely potential in the sense that it has
no actuality and no existence of its own as the substratum of
Bubstantial change, the expression 'purely potential' rnay acquire a
different rneaning. When it is used to refer ta the subject of
pr~dication and when it is used to refer ta the physical constituent of
e1ubstances, in fact, the meaning of the terrn 'prime matter' differs:
while in the former sense it simply means that prime matter is that of
which everything is predicated and has no positive det~rminations of its
awn, in the latter context referring ta prime matter as purely potential
rnay turn out ta be equivalent to calling prime matter non-being.
Matter, therefore, can be called purely potential at all levels with
respect to the form it ia about ta receive, because matter in this
context will stand for and refer to everything in the composite other
than the substantial form that it is to receive. It should be kept in
mind, however, that when the terrn 'matter' ia used to refer ta the
physical stuff which underlies change, matter cannot be purely
potential. There is evidence that Aristotle, though he may not have

-- 29 --
formally distinguished between these two ways of describing prime
matter, uses bath in different senses and in different parts of hie
warka: in the Physics and in De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotle
uses the physical concept of matter, while in the Metaphysics he looks
at matter from the logical point of view. 42
It aeeme ta me that the traditional conception of prime matter
sees prime matter only as a logical notion and consequently cannat make
sense of Aristotle's solution ta the Eleatic dilernrna. This ie SQ
because what ia required ia nct a logical notion but a real material
substratum which, by remaining the sarne physical etuif throughout the
change, provides the material continuity necessary for the claim that
things are nat in fact generated out of non-being simpliciter, while at
the sarne time, because of its indeterminacy, also making it possible to
42. In the Categories Aristotle says that: lIeverything except primary substances is either
predicated of primary substances, or 1S present in them, and if these last did not exist,
it would be ifl1JOssible for anything else to exist." (Aristotle, Categories, v.2bs-?). In
this passage Aristotle is describing the logical status of individual substances. He is
also seying that on their existence depends the existence of everything else and that
everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Primary substances are
composed of matter and form as their constituent parts, and matter is the underlying
constituent. In Metaphysics, VII.3.102Sb3S-1029a3 Aristotle says that the substratum is
th et of which everything else is predicated and which is not itself prcdicated of anything
else. It is reasonable to assume that the substratum, even more th an primary substance, is
that of which everything else is predicated, "(for the predicates other than substance are
predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter)." (Aristotle,
Metaphysics, VII.3.102S b3S·1029a3). As the subject of predication, then, matter is purely
potential because it has absolutely no determinations of its own. The passage fram the
Categories, however, goes on: lIand if these last (i.e., primary substances) did not exist,
it would be i"1JOssible for anything else to exist. ll (Aristotle, Categories, V.2b7~9). Here
Aristotle does not seem to be talking about primary substances as subjects of predication,
but of primary substances as constituents of reality. If it is true of primary substances
that if they did not exist it would be i"1JOssible for anything else to exist, this has to
be all the more true of their constituent parts. It follows, then, that prime matter as
the subject of change has to exist in order for anything else to exist: it has to be real,
actual, though again, entirely undetermined stuff. As a logical concept, as the subject of
predication, prime matter will, therefore, be purely potential; as the subject of change it
will exist and therefore be actual as the substratum required for generation and
corruption.
-- 30 --
say that things are nct generated out of that which ia completely
determined being. The traditional account of prime matter, by
characterizing prime matter exclusively as the subject of predication
cannat claim ta solve precisely that problem which it was introduced ta
solve. The notion of prime matter adopted in the traditional account
can invalidate one side of the dilemma because it can claim that things
are nct generated out that which already i8; it doea nat, however, Beern
ta be able ta invalidate the other aide of the dilemma because it cannat
explain how things are nct generated out of that which ia nct
simpliciter. l think, however, that l will be able to show that the
traditional view of prime matter doea nct represent Aristotle's only
notion of prime matter.
Ariatotle in several places 43 talks about matter as being (in sorne
sense) a substance: it seems to me that this cannot just be dismissed as
a mistake or as an imprecision on the part of Aristotle and that it has
te mean that matter, accerding te his views, has sorne actuality ef its
own. The kind of actuality appropriate for matter is not the kind of
actuality which is appropriate for ferro, just as matter is not a
substance in the sense in which ferm ia a substance. Prime matter ia
purely potential as substance in the sense in which forro ia substance,
but this does not mean that it cannet be something else in its own
right. Williams says that:
matter "exists in potency," then, just in the sense that it

is specially involved in there being potency.44
.,., 43. Cf., for exampLe, AristotLe, De Anima, II.1.412a6-10 and Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.3.1029a·5 •
44. Williams, lIForm and Matter, II,'' 511.

-- 31 --
l take this ta Mean that matter la specially involved in there
being potency, nct in the sense that matter itself ia pure potentiality,
as the traditional view would have it, but in the sense that it ia in
matter ~hat we find one of the propelling forces for change, i.e.,
privation. There ia an important distinction here which neede te be
stressed and ta which l will come back later in the course of the
discussion. In the Metaphysics Aristotle saya that:
clearly matter aIse lB substance; for in aIl the opposite

changes that oceur there lB something which underlies the
changes, e.g. in respect of place that which ia now here and
again elsewhere, and in respect of increase ... ; and
similarly in respect of substance there ia something that ia
now being generated and again being deetroyed, and now
underlies the process as a "this" and again underlies it in
respect of a privation of positive character. 45
In this passage both the matter involved in accidentaI change and
the matter invoived in substantial change are referred to as substance.
Again in the Metaphysics he argues that:
if then matter is one thing, forro another, the compound of

these a third, and bath the matter and the form and the
compound are substance, even the matter is in a sense called
a part of a thing, while in a sense it is not, but only the
elements of which the formula of the ferro consists. 46
The major point of this passage is that there are two ways of
considering the parts of a composite substance: in one sense ma~ter is a
component,47 but in another ooly the forro, i.e., that which iB properly
45. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII.1.1042 a33-1042 b4.
46. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.10.1035 a 1-4.
47. The type of unity which is assigned by Aristotf~ to a composite substance such as an individual
horse or an individual man is characterizt~ oy him as a consequence of the way in which
matter and form are parts of that composite substance. IIlf, then, we have to give a
general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first grade of
" ~,..
actuallty of a natural organized body. That 1S why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary
-- 32 --
speaking the essence, that which ia contained in the formula, will be
part of the thing. This point, however, will be taken up in the
discussion of the role played by matter in definition. The second point
te be made ia that if a thing i6 te be considered truly composite it
must have at least two components, bath of which have ta be real in sorne
senee. If forro were the only part of the composite to have any
actuality of its own, then we would nct, it 6eeme ta me, be talking
about a composite at all. 48 In another very important passage Aristotle
says that:
the substratum i5 that of which everything else i5

predicated, while it ia itself nct predicated of anything
else. And so we must firet determine the nature of this;
for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be
in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter
is said ta be of the nature of substratum, in anather, shape
(eidos), and in a third, the compound of these. 49
the question whether the soul and the body ar~ one: it is as meaningless as te aSK wh ether
the wax and the shape given to it by the 5tamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing
and that of which it i5 the matter. Il (Aristotle, De Anima, II.1.41Zbs-B). The sense in
which matter and form are parts or components of a compoRite substance i5 not the same as
the sense in which an individual man is part of the species "man. 1I IlFor a secondary
substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for ft is not one
and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man,' 'animal,' are predicable of more
then one subject." (Aristotle, Categories, V.3b15~1B). The distinction between the two
senses of part mentioned above is well characterized by the medieval distinction between
, integral part' and 'subjective part'. liTe distinguish between this sense of 'part' and
the more familiar c~e, we can avail ourselves of the Scholastic terms 'integral' and
'subjective': a wall is an integral not a subjective part of a house, sinee we cannot say
of it thet it ~s a house; Socrates, though, is a subjective not an integral part of man,
sinee we can say of him that he is a man. 1I (Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 52).
Matter and form, then, are integral parts of the composite substance, but not subjective
parts. Aristotle suggests, however, that the soul can by itself be called 'the man' of
which it is the seul, while the matter can never be said te be the man.
48. This point is made repeatedly by Scotus and Ockham in their arguments against the Thomist view
thet matter is pure petentiality.
49. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V:I.3.1028b35~1029a3. For further statements to the effect that the
substratum is thet of which everything else is predicated and is not itself predieated of
anything else, cf. Aristotl~, Categories, 1 and II.
-- 33 --
In order ta deterrnine the nature of the substratum (and in order
ta Bee why, even though everything ia predicated of it and it ia
predicated of nothing else, it cannat he conaidered substance in the
fulleat sense), we must turn ta the account given by Aristotle in the
Physics. There in book II, while talking about nature, he says that:
such a thing is always a reality (ouaia); for it ia an

underlying thing (hupokeimenon), and nature ia always in an
underlying thing (hupokeimenon).50
However, just below he starts explaining how matter ia a reality
or substance by saying that:
the forro has a better claim than the matter to be called

nature. For we call a thing something, when it is that
thing in actuality, rather than just in potentiality.51
Thue, as l said above, it turne out that matter ia only
potentially substance. As such, a-·::ording ta Aristotle, it yearns ta
become that which it is only potentially. The forro determines the
particular type of substance, whereas the matter ia indeterminate with
respect to a whale range of possible substances.
But the truth is that neither can the form yearn for itself,
since it is in need for nothing, nar can its opposite yearn
for it, aince opposites are mlltually destructive, but it is
the matter which does the yearning. 52
In arder to understand haw matter can perform this function, how
in order to be potentially substance it has ta have sorne actuality of
its own, as well as how matter is related ta the privation or the lack
50. Aristotle, Physics, JI.l.192 b32-35 (tr. Charlton).
51. Aristotle, Physics, JI.l.193 b7-8 (tr. Charlton).
52. Aristotle, Physics, 1.9.1ç:2 aZO·Zl (tr. Charlton).

-- 34 --
which ia in it, I shall introduce two important distinctions made by
Scotus between two senses of 'being in potentiality' and two senses of
'being in actuality'. Theae distinctions l think will clarify
Aristotle's meaning in severai passages. Scatus reasons, rightly l
think, that to say that matter is pure potentiality without any
qualifications makes it equivalent ta saying that matter ia non-being,
and la thuB unable ta perform any function at aIl. As a consequence he
thinks that a thing cao have subjective potentiality or objective
potentiality. If a th in:. has subjective potentiality that means that it
la the Bubject of the potentiality (bronze as the uninformed material of
a statue ia the subject of the potentiality and, therefore, has
subjective potentiality). If, on the other hand, a thing has objective
potentiality it is the term or object of the potentiality (this would be
the statue, or the property of being a statue; before the statue cornes
to bel. For something to be pure objective potentiality is for that
thing ta be non-being. 53 To this distinction between two senses of
being in potentiality, Scotus adds another distinction: the one betw6en
two senses of being in actuality. In the first sense being in actuality
is understood as opposed to being in potentiality (objective
potentiality) an" in this sense matter is in actuality. In the second
sense, in which being in actuality is understood as being which informs
53. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Opera Omnia, Vol. VII, Quaestiones subtilissimae Super libros
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Wadding ed.: 26 vols. Paris: Vives, 1893·1894), Lib. VII, q. 5,
n. 3; all subsequent citations from this work are to tnis edition. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Opera Clmia, Vols. VIII-XXI, Quaestiones in Ubr·os Sententiarun (Wadding ed.: 26
vols. Paris: Vives, 1893-1894), Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 10; all subsequent citations fram
this work, where the Vatican edition is not evailable, are to this edition.
-- 35 --
another, matter ia nct in actuality, but it ia the firet subject of that
\o,rhich ia in act. 54 With these distinctions scotUB ia able ta conclude:
dico igitur, quod materia est par se unum principium

nati.:lrae, ut dicit Philos. primo Physicor. et 2. Q1.:od est
per se causa, ut dicit 2. Physic. et Me~aph. Quod est pars
alicujus compositi, 7. Me~aph. Quod est per se fundamentum,
primo Metaph. Quod est per se Bubjecturn mutationum
Bubstantialium, quinto Physic. Quod est per se causa
compositi, secundo Physic. Quod est terminus creationis;
igitur sequitur quod est aliquid, non in potentia objectiva
tantum, ut probant amnes rationes s~lpra dictae, sed oportet
tune quod ait in potentia subjectiva existens in actu, val
actus (non euro quodcumque dicatur) secundum quod omne illud
dicitur esse actu, vel actus, quod est extra causam suam. 55
Matter, then, is substance in a certain sense. i.e., in
potentiality, because in a certain sense it itself is in act; and it can
yearn for a form because it has sorne actuality of its own. The two
distinctions just made can help us to better understand the distinction
made by Aristotle between matter and lack or privation, as weil as give
a better explanation of the many roles which are to be played by matter
in Aristctle's theory.
The underlying thing, however, though one in number, i5 two

in forro. On the one hand there is the man, the gold, and in
general the measurable matter; thia ia more of a this thing
here, and it ia net by virtue of concurrence that the thing
which cornes to be cornes to be from this. On the other hand
there ia the lack or opposition, which ia aupervenient. 56
The underlying thing is one in number, but it is two in forro in
virtue of the distinction between matter and privation. The underlying
54. Cf. John Duns Scotus, auaestiones in Libros Sententian.m, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 11.
55. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. ~I, d. XII, q. l, n. 11. The view
that Scotus offers an accurate interpretation of Aristotle's notion of matter, and for that
matter one that is more faithful to Aristotle'S notion of matter than Aquinas's, is shared
by Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 184-188.
56. Aristotle, Physics, I.7.190 b23-28 (tr. Charlton).

-- 36 --
thing "ia more of a this thing hersu than the privation, and Aristotle
g08a on te explain this distinction in the i'ollowing manner:
we for our part say that matter and lack are different, and
that the one, the matter, by virtue of concurrence i9 not,
but is near to reality (ousia) and a reality (ousia) in a
way, whilst the ether, the lack, in itself ia nct, and ia
not a reality (ousia) at ail. According to them, on the
other hand, the great and the smaU, whether together or
separate, are what 18 nct in the sarne way. SA their three
things and ours are completely different. 57
And again he Baye that:
the one remains, joint cause with the ferro of the things
which corne ta be, as it were a mother. The ether half of
the opposition yeu might citen imagine, if you ioelle on its
evil tendency, te be totally non-existent. SB
Theae two passages in Aristotle find a parfeet fit, it geems ta
me, in the distinctions offered by Scotus. The lack, described by
Aristotle as "totally non-existent" and as something which "in itself is
not, and is not a reality at aU," fits perfectly weU the notion of
objective potentiality in Scotus. The matter, on the other hand, is
described as remaL1.ing, lias it were a mother,1I and as something which
"by virtue of concurrence is not, but is near to reality [in the sense
of forro], and a reality in a way" ail of which, again, fits very weil
Scotus's notion of subjective potentiality, as well as the sense of
being in act which he assigne te matter. In De Generatione et
Corruptione Aristotle gives the fallawing argument:
fc= if something cornes ta be, clei::i.rly there will exist

potentially, not actually, sorne substance fram which the
57. Aristotle, Physics, 1.9.192a5-9 (tr. Charlton).
58. Aristotle, Plwsics, J.9.192 8 14-15 (tr. r:;larlton)_ In this passage Aristotle refers to matter as
remaining like a mother because he believes that in the process of animal gener8tion the
matter i5 supplied by the mother and the form by the father.
-- 37 --
coming te be will arise and into which that which oeasee ta

be has to change. Now will any of the others belong to this
actually? What l mean is: Will that which is only
pctentially individual and existent, but neither individual
nor existent simpliciter, have any quality or quantity or
place? If it has none of these, but all of them
potentially, that which in this sense is not will
consequently be separable, and further, the principal and
perpetua~ fear of the early philosophera will be realized,
namely, tnè coming te be of something from nothing
previously existing. But if being individual and a
substance are nct going te belong ta it while sorne of the
ether things we have mentioned are, th~ affections will, as
we have remarked, be separable from the substances. 59
Arietotle here Beeme te be saying tliat if we want te avoid two
consequences, Le., (il that that which in this sense is not, "be
saparable" 60 and (ii) the "coming ta be of something from nothing," then
we have to admit that that which is only potentially individual and
existent has quality, quantity, and place, not only potentially, bur
actualJ.y. It seems to me that Aristotle would want to avoid both of the
above mentioned consequences. 61 Furthermore, in arder ta allow for that
59. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, I.3.317b23-33 (tr. Williams; emphasis added).
60. By the expression 'separable' in this passage Adstotle means 'separable in place'.
61. For the difference between separability in pl 'ce and separability in definition, cf. Aristotle's
discussion of the mode of existence of t : abjects of mathematics. According to Aristotle,
it is impossible for the objects of mathematics to exist in sensible things; he also argues
that it is equally impossible for them to exist separately, and concludes, therefore, that
they must exist separately, but only in definition (in knowledge): cf. Aristotle,
Metaphysics, XIII.2 and 3. TIlt has, then, been sufficiently pointed out thet the objects
of mathematics are not substances in a higher degree tnan bodies are, and they are not
prier to sensibles in being, but only in definition, and that they cannot exist somewher~
apart. But since it was not possibt~ for them to exist in sensibles either, it 1S plain
that they e1ther do not exist at all or exist in a special sense and therefore do not
'exist' without qualification. 1I (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII.3.1077b11~16). The same type
of distinction is made by Aristotle between what he calls 'matter of generation' and what
he cells 'matter of growth.' The matter of growth 1S not separable in place, but only in
definition, fram the matter of generation: cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione,
I.5.320b14-16. Aristotle seems to distinguish a third meaning of the word separable: 'a
this' r he says, lIis capable of being isolated either in place, or in form or thought. 1I
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, X.1.10S2 b17). Whether separability in thought and separability in
fonm are the same or different is left ambiguous by the form of the sentence.
-- 38 --
which ~s potentially existent and individual ta have place, quality, and
quantity, aIl Aristotle 8eeme te think he has te accept as a consequence
iB that the affections be separable fram the substances. In ether
words, he would h~7e to allow that the matter can have quality,
quantity, and place, without having firet become individual and a
substance in the full sense. If my interpretation ia correct,
Ar.istotle's view of the composition of the four elements requires
precisely that the matter have quality, quantity, and place without
being either individual or a substance (in the sense of having a
Bubatantial forro). Tt 8eeme, then, that Aristotle has no preliminary
reasons for rejecting the possibility that matter have qua~_ities without
having firet received a substantial forme There ia, indeed, his view of
the composition of the four elements which points in the opposite
direction: it seems in fact that Aristotle would have sorne reason (over
and above the desire to avoid (i) and (ii) above), to accept the
possibility that matter, without first receiving a substantial form,
could receive other affections: i.e., his view of the composition of the
four elements.
It seems, then, tnat Ar.istotle would be prepared to allow that
matter qua potential cou id have place, quality, and quantity, not only
potentially, but also actually (in scotUS'3 first sense of actuality).
It is to this that l will now turn. In the next few pages, he seems to
give his solution te the problem he outlines in this passage, in terms
of the distinction between matter and privation.
If the distinguishing characteristics of the matter signify

.,.. individuality to a greater degree, the matter itself is to a
greater degree substance; if they signify privation, not-
being. For example if heat is a positive characteristic and
-- 39 --
a form, but cold a privation, earth and fire differ in

accordance with these distinguishing characteristics. 62
If one sees this explanation in terme, again, of the Scotist
distinction, it will turn out that matter has characteristicB of its
own, though nct in the sarne way as substance, i.e., nct in the full
sense. Matter will, therefore, be actual, whereas privation will nct be
actual at all and will approach non-being. 63 This view of matter, of
course, has ta be reconciled with the famouB passage used innumerable
times as evidence that Aristotelian matter si~n~ld be conceived according
te the traditional interpretation.
For the other things are afflictions and products and

potentialities of bodies, or again length and breadth and
depth are particular quantities [of bodies 1 but not
substances - for the sa-rnuch iB nct substance - but rather,
that primary thing te which the se belong, that is substance.
But length and breadth and depth being stripped off, we see
nothing left over unless it be something that is
demarcated by the agency of ~hese, sa that the matter alone
necessarily seems te be substance ta these who are
investigating in this way. l call matter that which, in its
own right, ia neither said te be something [ti] nor so-much
nor any of the other things by which being is demarcated.
For there is something of which each of +chese is predicated,
something for which being [to ei"ai) i'3 other than what it
is for any of the [other) p"edicates (for the others are
predicated of the substance, but the substance itself ia
predicated of the matter), so that the last [member of this
sequence, i.e. the matter] is, in its own right, neither
semething [ti] nor so-much nor anything else; nor ia it the
negations [of these], for these too will belong per
accidens. 64
62. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.3.31Sb14-19 Ctr. uilliams).
63. 1 would a1so advance the following claim and 1 will argue for it in the following pages. Prime
Matter in Aristotle will have quantity and, as a consequence, place, in a strunger sense
th an the one in which it has quality. The simple bodies Cwhich themselves are not
substances in the full sense in Aristotle) will also have quality, i.e., heat and cold,
etc •• Quality, in Aristotle, seems to be a special kind of property: cf. Aristotle,
Metaphysics, V.14.1020a34·1020b25. Also compare this to Ockham's view of quality as the
only real category other than the category of substance.
64. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.3.10~9a12-26 Ctr. Furth).

-- 40 --
This passage, though it does not literally make the following
claims, cao plauaibly be interpreted te . lean:
(i) that matter, though it la something, iB ocr. a particular
something.
Matter G5 , in fact, in order ta become a particular thing needs the
inherence of a substantial form which will make it into na this thing
here." Matter in itself ia common te aIl things, as Aristotle saya in
severai places. This, however, doee nct in any way praye that matter
cannet, as -the substratum of substantial change, have some actuality of
its own. The passage cao aIse be interpreted te mean:
(ii) that matter, though it has extension, doee nct have a
perticular quantity.
l think that this can be interpreted as meaning not that it does
nct have any quantity at aIl, but that it doea nct have any particular
quantity necessarily, i.e., it does not have the specifie quantity which
follows upon a particular substance, but it has extension. This follow&
from the fact that it is common to all thinge, and not particular in
itself. It seems that here Aristotle is using the term 'quantity' not
to refer to the category of quantity, but to refer to dimensions or
extension. 66 Thirdly, the passage claims:
65. For a discussion of a similar interpretation of this passage see Sorabji's own interpretation
and his account of Simplicius's interpretation in Sorabji, Matter. Space and Motion, 5-12.
66. It is possible that Aristotle is usine the ter~ 'quantity' in two different senses here. Only
the quantity possessed by an individual properly belongs to the category ?f quantity,
whereas the quantity possessed by matter, and described here, just refers to extension.
This view seems to be supported b~' the beginning of the passage in question in which
Aristotle seems te make a distinction between the "affl ictions and products and
-- 41 --
(iii) that matter is not .. any of the other things by which being
is demarcated. 1I
l think this has to be right, both in the obvious sense that
matter doee nct belong ta any of the ether accidentaI categories and
aiso in the sense that it i8 in po~entiality (in the sense of subjective
potentiality) with respect to possessing the being given by all these
categories. Another way to put this is to say that matter cannot be
assigned te any of the categories by which being ie determined because
matter itself iB neither place, nor colour, nor any of the ether
determinations of being, although it ia the ultimate subject of that
which will receive thema The discussion of quantity ia separate fram
that of the ether categories because here Ariatotle ie nct only
referring ta the category of quantity, but aiso ta quantity as extension
and as l have suggested, matter as the substratum of substantial change,
according ta Aristotle, has extension in itself. The category of
particular things, i.e., the category of substance, is alse discussed
separately because, a-;rain, matter as the substratum ef substantial
change does, in a sense, belong ta the category of Substance (to which,
l have arqued, it is sa id ta belong potentially because it is not a
particular thing but ia common to all thinga). The passage, in fact,
can be interpreted as excluding matter from the category of substance as
a particular thing, hut not as substance altogether. Matter, in fact,
potentialities of bodies,lI i.e .. , presunably the accidentaL categories, and the "length and
breadth and depth" which he caLts quantities: iq::llying in turn a distinction between
quantity as used in referring to extension and the category of quantity properly speaking.
The length, breadth, and depth attach directly to matter because: IIlength and breadth and
depth being stripped off, we see nothing left over - unLess it be something that is
demarcated by the agency of these. lI A similar point 15 made by Sokolowski, "Matter,
Elements and Substance in Aristotle,lI 2n: and by Sorabji, Matter, space and Motion, 7.
-- 42 --
should be assigned ta the category of substance, nat as na this thing
here," nct as a particular thing 1 but as common ta all things. 67" This
explains why
(iv) matter ia nat Uthe negations [of these] for these too will
belong per acciàens."
They belong to it only by accident because a substance in the
sense in which matter ia a substance doea nat have any attributes
(except for quantity understood as extension) or their negations
necessarily, but only accidentally. Denying matter ail actuality would
also leave the following part of the passage unexplained:
(v) "there ia something of which each of these ia predicated,
something for which being [ta einai] ia ether than what it ia for any cf
the [other] predicates."
This obviously means that that of which everything is predicated
has being, i.e., sorne kind of existence, although it needs ta be
stressed that ita being ia different from the being of each of its
predicates. This interpretation fits in very well with the way matter
needs to be characterized for the solution of what l have argued to be
Aristotle's main preoccupation in designing his notion of matter: the
Eleatic problem. For the solution of the Eleatic dilemma, the central
67. Frede expLeins thet matter in Aristotlc is not, properLy speaking, considered a substance
because matter is not actually, but only potentiaLLy, a particuLar this. Cf. Frede, Essays
in Ancient PhiLosophy, 77. For an entity to be a substance it is necessary, in fact, that
it be an individueL and that it possess the kind of unity proper to an individual. Matter
Lacks both of these requirements. Cf. Frede's discussion of individuaLs in AristotLe;
Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, section 4; and my discussion of the type of unity
whic~ is attributed to the four elements on 22-24 above.
-- 43 --
requirement in fact iB that the being of that out of which things are
generated should be different fram the being of that which iB generated
out of it as weIl as fram non-being.
Ta SUffi up the discussion, then, l claim that Aristotle believes
that matter iB actual (in the tiret sense of actuality), i.e., in the
sense that it ia in subjective potentiality with respect ta all of the
categories. It ia in subjective potentiality with respect ta being a
particular thing, with respect ta being of a particular quantity, and
with respect ta being assigned ta any eth ~ of the categories.
Furthermore, l claim that it has actuality of its own, in a somewhat
stronger sense, in the category of substance: ta the category of
substance it belengs because, although it is net a particular, it existe
actuaUy as cemm,)n te aU things.
This conclusion seemB te imply that another subdivision should be
added to Scetus's first sense of actuality: (il the first sense ef
actuality ie appropriate for matter as belonging to the category of
substance and as possessing extension in the full sense; and (ii) the
firet sense of actuality belongs to matter as being in potentiality ta
possessing the propurties given by aIl of the other categories i:i a
weaker sense than it does to matter as belonging ta the category of
substance and as pcssessing extension. The other categories need to be
one step further removed, because before these affections can belong to
matter, it has te be made into an individual by the inherence of the
substantial forro, or it must have dimensions or extension (as, fo~
example, happens in the composition of the four elements). The four
elements are, as we noted, called potentialities by Ariatotle; this,

-- 44 --
however, has nct prompted anybody ta claim that Aristotle considered
them purely potential. This, it 8eeme te me, explains why matter should
nct be asaigned te any of the ether categories "by which being ia
demarcated,U i.e., because allah categories can only follow upon matter
once it ie actual (in the sense in which ferro i8 actual), and it has
quantity (also in the sense described). substancehood and the
possession of quantity are ontologically prier ta the ether categories
when the subject of discussion ia a substance in the full sense.
Another interesting point about this passage ia that the category
of quantity is the only category other than the category of substance
which iB discussed apart fram the ether accidental categories. l think
this iB because matter has extension necessarily; nct, however, a
particular quantity of necessity (e.g., a man is 6 feet tall qua matter
of that man, but not qua matter). A similar point is made by Sokolowski
in his paper "Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle," where he
makes a similar distinction between quantity and extension. 68
68. The distinction Sokolowski draws between quar.~ity and extension is the following: while he
thinks that matter and quantity in Aristotle are distinguishable and that quantity refers
to 8 specific and particular size only, he thinks that mztter and extension are not so
distinguishable. "Aristotle is atterrpting to determine t;,e nature of place and tries ta
find whether place is matter or form. In talking about other opinions, particularly that
of Plato, he sa'/s: "To thase who look: at it in this way, the place of each [thing] is the
fonm; but if place seems to be the extension [interval; diastema] of a magnitude, it ir. the
matter; for this [the extension] is other th an the magnitude, it is that which is bounded
and determined by the form, e.g., by a plane and a limit; such a thing is matter and the
undetermined; for wh en the limit and the attributes of the sphere are taken away, nathing
is left besides the matter" (Aristotle, Physics, IV.2.209bs-11). Although this text
appears within an examinatior. of Plato's concept of place, with which Aristotle do es not
agree, the principles by which he draws inferences do express his own idees. 1I (Sokolowski,
"Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle," 277). He concludes fram this that Aristotle
thinks that the matter is ell that is left over when the boundaries and attributes are
take" away, and that matter is itself extended. If matter i~ itself extended, tbis may
imply that it also has in itself sorne quantity or other, althougn not any particular
quantity. A similar point would be made by Ockham: see Weisheipl, llThe Concept of Matter
in Fourteenth Century Science,1I 159·162.
-- 45 --
He argues, it 8eeme te me quite rightly, that once all the other
qualities have been taken away:
the matter le ft over is something bounded by determined

dimensions. In itself it doea nct have any specifie
dimensions, but it ia capable of receiving them, i.e.,
capable of being marked off into determinate sizes. This
implies that matter already has extension in itself. The
powers of hot and cold, fluid and sol id modify the state of
matter, but do nct give it its primary extension ...
Aristotle admits that the density of matter may vary as
chemical caanges take place, so that a given mase of matter
may be compresseà into a smaller space or extended into a
larger one (Physics, IV.9.217 a 26- b12). However, the matter
in a given place can never be compressed ioto a point
without extension. 69
Sokolowski 90e6 on te argue, aga in rightly, from Aristotle's
discussion of the void 70 to the fact that he identifies matter and
extension, and that in order to avoid the existence of the void
Aristotle's matter has to be continuous. The space between bodies, in
order not to be identified with the void, has to be an extended
continuuœ of rnaterial stuffs. From these considerations, however,
Sokolowski does not draw the conclusion that matter is not pure
potentiality, because he does nct consider extension an attribute of
matter: this, he thinks, follows from the fact that nonextended matter
ia a contradiction. It aeeme ta me that, far from meaning that
extension ia not an attribute of matter, aIl that thia shows ia that
extension ia an attribute which belonga ta matter neceaaarily.
69. Sokolowski, IlMatter, EletlY~nts and Substance in Aristotle," 2n. 1 think that the claim that
"matter aLready has extension in itself ll is proved by Sokolowski in the following paragraph
(see note n. 67 above), and on the following pages. (Sokolowski, "Matter, Elements and
Substance in AristotLe,1I 278ff.).
70. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, JV.9.

-- 46 --
l would claim, then, that it follows bath fram the various
arguments given above, and fram a careful consideration of Aristotle's
motiv~tions in formulating his theory of change, that in Aristotle
matter nct only has, but needs ta have, sorne actuality of its own. The
actuality possessed by Aristotelian prime matter at the basic levei of
the hierarchy of being is an actuality different from the actuality
which only belonga to form. It ia actuality nonetheleaa, becauae prime
matter needs ta be diff6rent fram non-being; and it is actuality
different fram the actuality of ferm because it aiso needs ta be
different from fully determined being. In thia way Aristotle can
explain change, bath substantial and accidenta!, while at the sarne time
escaping the Eleatic problern.

-- 47 --
ARISTOTLE: THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF MATTER
AND THE RE~L DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM
Befere l turn te the next major question, i.e., the question
regarding the role of matter in the solution of the problern of
individuation, and the related one of the role played by matter in
defining physical substances and in determining their essence, l want ta
draw Borne conclusions and make a few commente about sorne ether issues
related ta our general discussion of matter which will praye use fuI to
our analysis of the medieval interpretations of Aristotle. One of these
issues ia that concerned with the real distinction between matter and
form, the other is that of the intelligibility of prime matter.
As far as the real distinction?1 between matter and ferro ia
concerned, we already eaw that Aristotle thinks matter is inseparable.
Our view is that tIiere is a matter of the perceptible

bodies, but that this is not separable but it ia always
together with a contrariety, frem which the SQ called
"elements" come to be. . .. , regarding, certainly, as a
principle that is really first, the matter which, though
inseparable, does underlie the contraries ... ;72
The inseparability of matter is aIse stressed in ether places:
so it ie better in every case ta make the matter

inseparabIe, by way of being one and the sarne numerically
thaugh not one in definition. But points cannat be posited
as the bady's matter either; nor, for the same reasons, can
lines: the matter iB that of which these are the limit, and
71. For the notion of separability in AristotLe, cf. also notes n. 60 and n. 61 on 37 above.
72. AristotLe, De Generatione e~ Corruptione, II.1.329 a24-31 Ctr. ~ilLiams).

-- 48 --
it i~ impossible for it ever ta exist without affections and

-, without shape. 73
And:
sinee there is a matter of corporeal substance (and this is

already the matter of a particular kind of body, for there
ie 00 kind of body common ta everything), the matter of size
and affection will be one and the same as thia, separable in
definition but nct separable in place, uniess the affections
too are separable.~
Now, given the fact that a real distinction between matter and
form would imply that the matter can exist wlthout the form or that the
ferro cao exist without the matter, it folloWB that accepting a real
distinction between the two would involve an acceptance of the
separability of matter from ferro or of ferm fram matter. As we have
seen in the passages just quoted Aristotle rejeets the separability of
matter in reality (though not its separability from substantiel form),~
although he maintains that it ia separable in definition~ in the latter
point we will see that he may differ from Aquinas. It rernains te be
73. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, I.S.320 b13·16 (tr. ~ilLiams). ln this passage
Aristotle is talking about the Platonists and the Pythagoreans. Cf. also his discussion in
Metaptwsics, II.1~3.
74. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.5.320b22-25 (tr. ~illiams).
75. The notion that matter according to Aristotle cannot be found separate in reality needs to be
somewhat qualified. 1 think that the fact that Aristotle thinks that matter cannet be
found separate does not necessarily ~~n that it cannot be found separate fram form. Given
Aristotle's notion of the mode of composition of the 'so called' elements, it fotlows that
in the elements matter is not found separate fram the contrarieties, but that it is found
separa te fram what is normally understood as the substantial form: cf. Aristotle, ~
Generatione et Corruptione, 11.1.329a24-31 quoted above. From this it folLows also that
the end of the passage frein De Generatione et Corruptione, I.S.320 b13-16 also quoted above
(lland it is ilrÇlOssible for it ever to exist without affections and without shapell) shoutd
be interpreted as meaning that matter can be found either without the affections 2r without
shape, but not without bath. Strictly speaking, then, matter is really distinct fram form
(because ~t can exist without a substarotial form in the four eLements), but is not reaLly
distinct from the affections (because the four elements are prior), and it is not really
distinct from bath et the same time.
-- 49 --
sean whether Aristotle would aIse say that ferrn cannat exist separate
from matter. If it should turn out that he thinks form is separable
fram matter, his view might again be different from that of AquinQg.
In a passage in De Generatione et Corruptione already cited aboya
Aristotle implies that something which lB not an individual and existent
simpliciter cannat exist separately.76
The implication of that passage has a perfectly consistent
Aristotelian ring te it: it saya, in effect, that the ooly entities
which cao exist separately are those which are individual and exisr.ent
sirnpliciter. Because the ooly entities which are individual are those
which Aristotle calle primary substances it aeeme ta iollow that ooly
they can exist separately: they alone can be called individual and
existent in the full sense. Neither the matter nor the form, which are
meant to be the two components of the composite, can exist separately.
But now let us resume the discussion of the generally

recognized substances. There are the sensible substances,
and sensible substances aIl have matter. The substratum ia
substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by
matter l roean that which, nct being a "this" actually, ia
potentially a "this"), and in another sense the formula or
shape (that which being a "this" can be separately
formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two, which
alone is generated and destroyed, and is without
qualification, capable of separate existence; for of
substances completely expressible in a formula sorne are
separable and sorne are oot. n
76. Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.3.317bZ5-3D.
n. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII.1.1D4Z a 25-33. ln this passage, when he talks about "the substances
corrçletely expressible in a forrwla ll and says that sorne are not separable, he seerns to be
referring to the forms of destructible things, as he explains a little later: "whether the
substances of destructible things can eX1st apart. 1S not yet at alL clear; except that
obviously t~is is impossible in ~ cases· in the case ~f things which cannet exist apart
fram the individual instances. e.g. house or utensil. ; :rhaps, indeed, neither these
things themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature, are
-- 50 --
Aristotle iB saying here that, of the entities which are ta be
considered in one sense O~· another substrata, (i) only those which are
the composite of matter ?-~d form are capable of independent existence
without qualification, (ii) the for:nula or shape ia that which C?.~l be
separately formulated 78 and (iii) that of substances completely
expressible in a fornmla Borne are separable and sorne are nct. That,
however, which ia completely expressible in a formula ie the edsenCê and
this could be either the composite or the form alone of the composite.
In this context it cannet be the composite because Aristotle has just
finished saying that the composite ia the only thing which ia without
qualification capable of separate existence. If the formula of the
essence, then, in this case refera only te the form, this would seern ta
imply that Aristotle considers that, while all forms can be separately
formulated (i.e., are separable in notion), only sorne forms could have
separate exi~tence. Aristotle Baya that the form is separable in
severai places:
it follows, then, thi3.t "substance" has two senses, (A) the

ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of
anything else, and (H) that which, being a "this, is alse Il
separable - and of this nature is the shape or forro of each

thing. 79
And he makes a similar statement again later in the Metaphysics.
If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter

is Bubstancea But this is impossible; for both separability
and "thisness" are thought to belong chiefly to substance.
substances et allj for one might say that the nature in naturaL objects is the only
substance to be found in destructible things. 1I CAristotLe, Metaplwsics, VIII.3.1043 b19-24).
78. Owens calls this separability in notion, but the passage on which he bases this third kind of
separability is, as we have seen, by no me~ns unambiguous (cf. note n. 61, 37 above).
Owens, The Doctrine of Seins in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 381.
79. Aristotle, MetBehysics, V.8.101?b24-25.

-- 51 --
And Ba farIn and the compound of ferro. and matter would be

thought te be substance, rather than matter. The substance
compounded of bath, i.e., of matter and shape, may be
dismissed; for it ia posterior and its nature ie obvioua. 80
Should it turn out that ferro ia substance in the senae which
Aris~otle ie here investigating, it will alse be true of ferro that it ie
nct only separable, but aIse that it la an individual, i.e., la this'.
In sections 4 and 5 of his book Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Michael
Frede argues rather convin~ingly that Aristotle in the Hetaphysics does,
in fact, hold the view that forms are individual. Frede argues that in
the Hetaphysics Aristotle abandons the notion, which he ho Ids in the
Categories, that the primary substance in the sense of the composite is
that which underlies the attributes, te replace it with the view that it
is the ferro that iB t~e primar~ s~bstance which underlies the
attributes. 81 The view that forms can be individual is derived bath
frem several pasB?ges in which Aristetie himself says that the ferm ia
'a this' and that which makes something 'a this',82 as weIl as from the
80. Aristetle, Metaphysics, VII.3.1029 8 26-32 (emphasis added).
81. Cf. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 72-77. He concLudes this part of the discussion by
saying thet lIif substantiel forms are the ultimate subjects, they nust be partlcular. A
moment's reflection, though, shows that this is the view that Aristotle is committed to
anyway. For in Z 13 he argues at length that no universal can be a substance. But since
he also want~ ferms to be substances, he has to deny that forms are universal. And, in
fact, we do find him claiming that the form of a particular object is particular tO that
objeet, just as iL matter is; Socrates's form, i.e., his soul, ts different fram Plato's
form, i.e., PLato's soul (Met. XII 5,1071 a24-29.).1I (Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosoohy,
77).
82. Cf. AristotLe, Metaphysics, V.a.1017b25; Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII. 1. 1042 828-29; Aristotle,
Metapbysics, IX.7.1049 828-29; Arlstotle, Metaphysics, VII.12.1D37b25-28; Aristotle, De
Generatl0ne et Corruptione, I.3.318b29; and Aristotle, De Anima, 1J .1.412 86-10. The fact
that form is ealled 'a this' is noted as signifieant aLso by Owens, The Doctrine of Seing
in the AristoteLian 'Metaphysics', 317-318. Owens's explanation of this fact rests upon an
interpretation of the expression 'a this' whieh makes the form in itself neither individual
nor universel. With this underst8nding of form he explains that Aristotle does not think
that fOim can be universaL in itself, beeause that which is universel is not a substance
(Owens, The Doctrine of Seing in the Arlst~telian 'Metaphysics', 367); Aristotle thinks,
-- 52 --
fact that if ferm i8 te be called a substance (as Aristotle wants it ta
be, cf. Aristotle, Hetaphysics, VII.11.1037 a 28-30; Metaphysics,
VII.7.1032 b l-2; Hetaphysics, VII.11.1037 a 5-6; and Hetaphysics,
VII.17.1041 b S-7), then it cannat be a uuiversal. Substances, in fact,
are nct universal.
If they are universal, they will nct be substances; for

everything that ie common indicates nct a IIthis" but a
"auch," but substance i8 a "this." And if we are ta be
allowed te lay it down that a common predicate ia a "this"
and a single thing, Socrates will be severai animals-himself
and "man Il and "animal," if each of these indicates a "this"
and a single thing. 83
Because Aristotle Beeme ta think that ferro ia, at least in ~30me
contexte, individual and 'a this', it iB aiso plausible ta think that he
considera it ta be, ta the extent te ~hich it is individual, also
separable. It seems, then, that Aristatle thinks that, even theugh
matter is net separable fram either ferro or the alfectiena, farro ia
separable fram matter and an individual. Owens, hawever, explains how
this impression is mistaken and how the separability of form is
however, that the form is that which is known when the universel definition is known
(Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 360-365, and 393-394); and
this meens that the form cannot in itself be an individuel either. Owens, 1 think, could
equally well have said that the form is both individual and universal, and at sorne point
his discussion seems to point thet way: "entity as form has been finally located in the
ultimate difference expressed in the definition. lt appears very strongly in the sense of
determinetion. As the ect of sensible matter, the form is within the si~gular sensible
thing. As the Bct of intelligible matter, it is the species and is a universel. Within
the sensible thing it has been established as Entity, • in a secondary way as substrate, in
the primary way es what-IS-Being. il (Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotel ian
'Metaphysics', 365). He does say that the forro as the Bct of intelligible matter is the
speeies and is the universel, but does not quite want to say that form as the ect of
sensible matter is the individual and is a partieular: he says instead that Ues the eet of
sensible matter, the form is within the singutar sensible thing. ll It seems to me then,
thet, elthough the form in itself it neither a universal nor an individuel, it is truly
individL~~ when it is the form of sensible matter, Jnd equally truly universal when it is
the form of intell igibl.e matter.
83. Aristotle, Hetaphysics, 111.6.1003 a7-12. Cf. elso Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.15.1040b23-24 and
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Xll.5.1071 e21ff.
-- 53 --
discussed in general in the passage which implies that aIl forms are
separable; while the passage in which sorne forms are described as
separable and sorne as nct separable ia more explanatory of the
separability applicable ta sensible forms.~ The forms of sensible
substances are, therefore, nat separable in reality. l think this has
ta be inaccurate: Aristotle cannat mean here that the forms of sensible
composites are merely separable in definition, b~~du8e this type of
separability applies even ta 1na~tar, and it obviously has ta apply te
forms. It 8eemB more plausible ta interpret Aristotle as saying that,
while aIl ferms are separable in place, nat aIl forms are found actually
separate in place. Thua, while the forms of composite substances are
separable, but not actually found separate; those forms which are not
forms of composite substances are not only separable, but also found
separate. This notion would correspond to what we calI logical
possibility: it is possible, though not naturally possible, for forms to
be separate. There is, therefore, in Aristotle a real distinction
between matter and for~, as weIl as a distinction of reason. This i9
true both on the side of matter and on the side of forro. On the side of
f.erro it ia logically, though not naturally possible, for senGible forms
ta be separate from matter. On the side of matter, because it ls true
that sa long as matter is four.d with the affections, it can be found
separate from forro (e.g. in the simple bodies), it is naturally pesci,ble
for matter to be separate from ferm. In Aristotle, then, beth the forro
and the composite substance are individual and are separable, but, while
84. Owens, The Doctrine of Seing in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 379-381. The o~ly forms which
~-
are truly separable (in the sense that they are actually separate in place), it will turn
out, are those forms which are not forms of sensible substances.
-- 54 --
only the composite substance ia naturally separate or separable in
place, the forro is not naturally separable in place: they are both
individual and they are bath separable, though in different senses; the
matter, though nct an individual can exist without form provided that it
is "together with the affections."
When Aristotle talks of matter as inseparable he also
characterizes it as imperceptible. In the De Generatione et
corruptione, in fact, he saya that:
if there ia just one contrariety according ta which they

change, there will have te be two of them; for the
intermadiate ia the matter which ia imperceptible and
inseparable. 85
Aristotle's intention here ie nct ta deny the existence of an
underlying nature, it ia, rather, ta argue against Anaximander's
characterization of the 'infinite' as perceptible, separable, and
corporeal,86 for which Aristotle substitutes both ii.c.ce and elsewhere a
notion of matter as inseparable and imperceptible. The most important
difference, in fact, between generation and corruption, and alteration,
is that in alteration thaf, which underlies the change is perceptible,
whereas in generation and corruption it is not.
When, however, the whole changes without anything

perceptible remaining as the same substratum, but the way
the eeed changes entirely into blood, water into air, or air
entirely into water, then, when we have this sort of thing,
it is a case of generation (and corruption of something
else); particularly if th~ change takes place from what is
imperceptible to what is perceptible •••• B7
85. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, II.5.332 a35-b1 (tr. ~i.:iams).
86. Cf. Williams, Ar;stotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, (appendix) n. 8, 214.
87. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, J.4.319b15-18 (tr. Williams).

-- 55 --
The imperceptibility of matter obviously has a bearing on the
question of the intelligibility of matter. The starting ~~int of human
knowledge in the Aristotelian system ia sensible knowledge. M It ia
sensible knowledge, in fact, which rnakes it possible for man ta come te
knowledge of the universal. The fact that prime matter cannat be
perceived through the senses obviously makes it impossible for man ta
have sensible knowledge of prime matter, which, in turn, makes it
impossible for man ta know prime matter in itself. Aristotle will say
in fact that:
the underlying nature, it must be grasped by analogy. As

bronze stands ta a statue, or wood ta a bed, or [the matter
and] the formless baiera it acquires a ferro ta anything else
which has a definite forro, so this stands to a reality
(ouaia), te a thiB thing here, te what i3. This, then, ie
one principle, though it neither ie, nor ia one, in the Bame
way as a this thing here; •.. 89
It seemB pretty clear, then, that given that prime matter is not
perceptible, it has to be known by analogy to form and to the
relationship which obtains between the proximate matter and the
composite. once this question ia settled, however, not all questions
about the knowability of prime matter are settled with it. The fact
that prime m&~i;er is knowable to us only by analogy does nat, in fact,
imply that it is unknowable 'per se'. In addition, once it has been
established that man cannat know prime matter other than by analogy and,
therefore, that man cannot know prime matter 'per se', it iB still
reasonable ta ask whether it ig possible (in the sense of logical
possibility) that prime matter be known 'per se' by a higher mind. This
',. 88. CL, for exaiJ1Jle, Aris·~otle, De Anima, 111.3; and Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Il.19.
89. Arlstotle, Physics, 1.7.191a9-14 Ctr. Charlton).

-- 56 --
question ia rather meaninglesB in the context of Aristotle's philosophy,
and, although he says in the Metaphysics that matter is not knowable in
itself, this problem doea net present itself as a practical problem te
Aristotle. The passage in the Metaphysics is the following:
but matter ia unknowable in itself. And sorne matter i8

perceptible and sorne intelligible, perceptible matter being
for instance bronze and wood and aIl matter that ia
changeable, and intelligible matter being that which is
present in parceptible thing8 net qua perceptible, i.e., the
objects of mathematics. 90
90. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Vll.10.1036a9-12. 1 do not intend te discuss the differences between
intelligible matter, sensible matter, and topical matter in any detail; but a few comments
on This tapic would perhaps be useful at This point. Owens (Owens, The Doctrine of Seing
in the Aristotelian 'Metaphys;cs', 342-345), argues that intelligible, sensible, and
topical matter are all differentiations of the same prime matter caused by a form. While
he ecknowledges thet Aristotle says that the different types of forms (i.e., intelligible
vs. sensible forms, for exeflllle) require different kinds of matter, he argues that: "this
must not be understood to meen thet the absolutely undetermined matter can of itself
constitute different kinds. Sorne determination would be necessary to account for the
differences •••• When Aristotle speaks of a special kind of matter required for different
forms, he is referring to matter in sorne way already determined. A perusal of the texts,
with their numerous examples, readily shows that the Stagirite means a matt~r already
determined by sorne forrn. 1I (Owens, The Doctrine of Seins in the Aristotel ian 'Metaphysics',
344). Thus, for example, prime matter becomes sensible matter by the inherence of the hot
and the dry, hence becoming one of the four elements. Similarly, prime matter by the
inherence of a geometrical property becomes intelligible matter. Regarding this issue,
Mueller, "Aristotle on Geometrical Objects," argues thet intelligible matter is just prime
matter with extension added to it. As we have seen, however, 1 hav~ argued th et extension
is necessarily attached to prime matter. Mueller gets to this conclusion that intelligible
matter is just prime matter with extension partly by interpreting Aristotle, Hetaphysics,
VII.3.1029a12·18 to be saying thet when length, breadth, and depth are taken away there
remains prime matter. (Mueller lIAristotle on Geometrical Objects", 103.> 1 have
interpreted the same passage, with Sokolowski, as saying that there is nothing there unless
it is bounded by Length, breadth, and depth. MueLLer's view of intelligible matter would,
combined with my sccount, make intelligible matter equivalent to prime matter. Owens's
views on this issue seem to be closer to my own than to Hueller's, since Owens clearLy
thinks thet the differentiation between the different types of matter requires a formal
deterrnination. Regarding topical matter, Owens says that lIif the heavenly orbs have matter
in their constitution, that matter must be of the sensible type. Yet· he continues if
this kind of matter is the capacity to be or not te be, why are the heavenly bodies
indestructible? The answer remains obscure." (Owens, The Doctrine of Seing in the
Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 345). Owens, however, adds thet, even though the answer to
this question may not be clear, it is certain that the solution does not lie in the matter
itself. Owens continues by seying that: "the explanation, whatever it may be, ITUSt lie in
the form, or in the way in which the forrn possesses the matter. 11 (Owens, The Doctrine of
Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 345). The only differencp between sensible matter
and topical matter lies in the fa ct that topical matter can onLy change with respect to
-- 57 --
It 8eeme ta follow from this passage that Aristotle doea not think
prime matter lB knowable in itself. The reaBon for my claim that in
Aristotle the question of the knowability of prime matter in principle
ia meaningless stems fram the observation that the question doea not,
for Aristotle, have any practical urgency. In the medieval context this
would change radically: for medieval philosophera, the question which we
can ask today in terme of logical pOBsibility was ask~d in terme of
God's knowledge and absolute power. Given the way in which the
ChriGtian God ie characterized by rnedieval philosophera it rnakes perfect
sense, and indeed it ia necessary ta ask, whether it ia possible for Gad
ta know prime matter. Putting the question in this context makes it
obvious that it could not even arise in Aristotle's own mind. In
Aristotle it might or might not be possible to know prime matter in
itself, but the question lacks urgency because 'in itself' doea not
translate to the powers of any being. It does not transla~e ta human
powers because we have already seen that human beings do nct have su ch
place. ~ristotle says that: "all things that change have matter, but different matter; and
of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter ~ not
matter for generation, however, but for motion from one place to another." (Aristotle,
Metaphysics, XII.2.1069b2S-27). It seems ta me that the difference between sensible matter
and topical !TIatter is likely ta lie in that determinatioo which first differentiates the
two. Prime matter becomcs sensible matter when through the inherence of the contrarieties
it becomes differentiated among the four elements; it seems plausible ta infer from this
that it i$ the first quality which inheres in prime matter to rnake it the matter for local
motion, aS opp~sed to generation and destruction or alteration, which holds this character
and passes it on ta the matter. It is clear, in fact, from Aristotle's discussion of the
existence of the fifth 'simple body' (cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, 1.2), that the composition
of this fifth simple body is analogous to that of the other simple bodies. like them it
too has a naturel motion peculiar ta ;tself, and like them it is a simple body. The ooly
difference Aristotle rernarks on is the fact that it is more perfect and its motion is
eternal (cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, 1.2.269b1S-18). The fact that it too is a simple body,
if we follow my account of the meaning of the expression 'simple body' in Aristotle as
applied to the four elements, means that, like them, it is not determined directly by a
substantial form, but only by a quality. The qualities in the case of the four elements
are the contrarieties; in the case of the fifth elements it may well simply be a quality
which determines it to be susceptible to change of place only, and not ta eny other.
-- 58 --
powers. It aiso doea not translate ta divine powers because Aristotle's
Gad ie not interested in knowing anything about the physical world. He
cannat, in fact, know anything about the physical world racause He only
knows that which ie Pure Act, i.e., Himaelf.
Even though the question of God'g knowledge of prime matter i5 not
relevant in the Aristotelian context, and indeed cannet cogently be
asked, it seems that the fact that the human intellect cannot know
matter in itself can cause Aristotle sorne problems. The Medievale
surnrned up Aristotle's position regarding knowledge in the dictum that
science iB of universals and perception ia of particulars. The major
probleme Beern te be these:
(i) there is no possibility of knowlo.dge of individuals in
Aristotle's theory.
(ii) If, as Aristotle see~s te think, matter iB in sorne way
involved in the definition of composite substances and, as a
consequence r in their essence, it seems th~t even universal knowledge of
composite substances is to sorne extent compromised.
(iii) If, in fact, ail univers al knowledge is reached by man
through a process of abstraction from knowledge of particulars, and this
knowledge of particular composite substances i5 incomplete beC~'!ge man
cannot know one of the necessary components of these compoEites in
itself, it could follow that the knowledge of the universal will in its
turn be somewhat incomplete.

-- 59 --
It is undeniable that these are problems in Aristotle's system,
but they become attenuated if, for the traditional view of prime matter,
ia substituted the notion of prime matter presented in the previouB
section~ In that case at least it can be argued that, aven though the
knowledge of prime matter acquired by analogy te ferro ia incomplet~
knowledge, it ia at least knowledge of a positive entity. This approach
does not by any means solve ail the problems mentioned, but if that
which ia known by analogy ia a positive entity it makss more sense ta
claim that it ia a part of the definition and of the essence of a
composite Bubstance. Theae problerns, however, do nct have eaBY
solutions, and WB will see them reappear as the subject of heated
debates in the rnedieval periad.
First, Aquinas, wanting ta remain faithful ta Aristatle's claim
that prime matter is unintelligible in principle and adapting t 11e view
that it is pure potentiality, will find himself faced with the problem
that not only hurnan knowledge of prime matter is impossible, but alsa
that Gad cannat knaw prime matter 'per se'. This, in turn, seems ta
imply that it is impossible in principle ta know individuals not only
for us, but also for Gad. This, of course, cannot be an acceptable
conclusion for Aquinas.
Scotus will reject the claim that prime matter is unintelligible
in principle and, adopting samething very close ta the view of prime
matter outlined in the previous section, would probably claim that
Aristotle was only considering human knowledge when denying the
intelligibility of prime matter because the concept of an all-knowing
being involved in the affairs of the natural world, su ch as the

-- 60 --
Ch.cistian Gad, would nct have occurred te hirn. From these assurnptions,
ScotUB cao clairn with Aristotle that human knowledge of prime matter
and, therefore, of individuals, i9 problematic -- not, however, because
prime matter ia in principle unintelligible or because the human
intellect cannet structurally know prime matter, but because the human
intellect is not equipped for the knowledge of singularity in 'statu
iata'. He cao aiso say, however, that ainee prime matter ~s a positive
entity and ia intelligible in principle, Gad knows prime matter and has
a proper concept of it.

-- 61 --
ARISTOTLE ON THE ROLE OF MATTER IN DEFINITION AND IN ESSENCE
Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim

superius in sexto, quod res naturales habent in sui
definitione materiam sensibilem, et in. hoc differunt a
mathematicis. Unde relinquitur quod Ii'ateria sensibilis
ait pars essentiae Bubstantiarum naturalium, non solum
quantum ad individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsaso
Definitiones enim non dantur de individuia, sed de
epec iebu e. 91
la Aquinas right in his interpretation of Aristotle? In the
Posterior Analytics, Aristotle discusses the difference between a
definition and a demonstration and saya that:
there ia no demonscration of that of which there ls

definition. For definition ia of what a thing is and of a
reality (ouaia); but all demonstrations evidently suppose
and assume what a thing is .•. 92
It seeme, therefore, that in arder ta find the essence of a thing
one haB to look for the definition, and a definitien is said te be
universal.
For definition seemB te be of what a thing is, and what a

thing ia is in every case universal and predicative; but
deductions are seme of them privative and sorne not
universal . . . . 93
91. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Cathala, Spiazzi, eds.:
Romae, Taurin;: Mariett;, 1964), Lib. VII, lect. IX, n. 1468j all subsequent citations from
this work are ta thi: edition.
92. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II.3.90 b3D-32 (tr. Barnes).
93. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Ir.3.90 b4-6 (tr. Barnes).

-- 62 --
While discussing the distinction between the things studied by the
mathematician and the student of nature, Aristotle saya in the Physics
that:
those who talk about ideas do nct notice that they are doing
this: they separate physical things though they are le .."
separable than the objects of mathematics. That becumës
clear if you try to define the objects and the things which
superven~ in each clase. Odd and even, straight and curved,
number, line, and shape, can be defined without change but
flesh, bone, "nd man cannet. They are like snub nose, nct
l ike curved. 94
The important point which l think Aristotle is ma king here is the
following: given that things like snubness are in a sense incapable of
being understood without their matter, because they are necessarily
re~l.ated ta matter, one should nct try te understand what they are, :L. e. ,
one should nct try ta give a definition of them, without taking into
account their relationship to matter. In ether words, 2ven though the
matter of a thing may not, properly speaking, be centained in the
db:inition (which gives the essence of that thing), one cannat arrive at
the definition without considering the material element. At the
beginning of Metaphysics, VII, Aristotie explains that the essence of
each thing, which is expressed by its definition, "is what it is said ta
be propter se, ,,95 and goes on ta explain why it is that "being a white
surface," for example, is not the essence of surface. The reason he
gives ia that "being a white surface" i5 not the essence of sarfac8
because "surface" it5eIf i5 added. Aristotie is cIearIy 5aying that
there are certain attributes which, being accidentaI te the substance in
94. Aristotle, Physics, Il.2.193b35-194a6 (tr. Charlton).
95. Aristoil.e, Metephysics, VII .4.1D29b14.

-- (,3 --
which they inhere, are net te be censidered as part of its definition.
He aIse cencludes that these terms are net definable in the preper sense
of the ward. In the next chapter of book VII of the Hetaphysics,
Aristetle diecusses other attributes which seem to be more closely
relatad to the essence of a substance. He saya that:
it is a difficult question, if one denies that a formula

with an added determinant is a definition, whether any af
the terms that are nat simple but caupled will be definable.
For we mus't expIa in them by adding a determinant. E. g. ,
there ie the nose, and concavity, and snubnees, which ie
compounded out of the two by the presence of the one in the
other, and it is nat by accident that the nose has the
attribute either of concavity ar snubness, but in virtue of
its nature; nor do they attach te it as whiteness doea to
Cal lias , or te man (because Callias, who happens ta be a
man, ie white), but ae "male" attaches ta animal and "equal"
te quantity, and as aIl so-called "attributes propter se"
attach ta their subjects. And auch attribut es are those in
which ie invelved either the formula or the name of the
subject of the particular attribute, and which cannet be
explained without this: e.g. white can be explained apart
from man, but not female apart from animal. 96
Theae kinds of attributes are ~lse not going ta be definable in
the preper sense of the word according te Aristotle, and he will
conclude that only substances are definable in an unqualified sense. Tt
should be noted here, however, that while Aristotle is primarily
discussing whether attributes 'propter se' are definable he ia also
saying that attributes 'propter se' belong te their subject becauae ef
its nature. The nase, in fact, either has concavity or snubness nct by
ac~~dent, but in virtue of its nature, i.e., presumably not by accident
but by necessity. The attributes 'propter se' will therefore be
necessary for a proper understanding ef the nature of their subject.
This view is confirmed by Arietotle's discussion of that which is of
96. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.S.1030 b1S-25.

-- 64 ~-
necessity. His discussion there centers around the question of whether
that which ia of neces8ity ia sa only given a certain hypothesis or
simply unconditionally. Presumably, though this i8 not always clear
from Aristotleis discussion, the unconditional necessity would be that
of natural things, whereas that which resta on a hypothesid would be
that of artifacts. The discussion ia carried out by means of a
distinction between the matter and the account, and Aristotle explains
that the necessity ia that which ia given by the matter (as the matter
of the nose ia either concave or snub) and the changes it undergoes.
The fact that the attributes 'propter se' are necessary te the
understanding of the nature of the thing of which they are attributee,
then, eeeme ta der ive from the accaunt of the matter. The matter in
turn would have ta be necessary ta the underetanding of the nature of
the abject, and it wauld be more so than the attributes 'propter se'
because it :s that which explains their neceseity. Aristatle's
conclusion, hawever, 5eeme to be etronger than just this as far as
matter iB ccncerned. It implies that the matter is nat anly necessary
for a proper explanation of the account, but it ie part af it. He
concludes his argument, in fact, by saying that:
perhaps the necessary enters even into the accaunt. Suppose

the work of sawing is defined as a certain sort of division:
that will net be, unless the saw has teeth af a certain
sort, and there will nct be teeth like that, if it is nat
made of iran. For even in the accaunt there are parts which
stand ta it as matter. 97
The matter clearly is necessary for a proper understanding of the
account of the thing of which it is a part. But in the last passage
'.
97. Aristotle, Physics, Il.9.20obs-8 (tr. Charlton).
-- 65 --
Aristotle seemB ta be uns ure as ta whether the matter i5 aIse a part of
the account itself. Matter ia clearly necessary for certain things ta
be what they are, but Aristotle i9 unsure whether matter ia alse part of
what i9 properly called the essence.
Relevant te this issue ia the question Aristotle asks after
discuBsing the sort of definition which can be given of attributes. He
asks whether each thing and its essence are the sarne or different.
we must inquire whether each thing and its essenc~ are the
sarne or different. This ia of sorne use for the inquiry
concerning substance; for each thing iB thought to be nct
different fram its substance, and the essence ia said ta be
the substance of each thing. 98
Since the essence ia the subatanc~, and here the substance seemB
ta refer l lt to the composite, but to the forro, it turne out that if
each thing ia the sarne as its essence, the matter will be excluded from
the definitiona Aristotle'a conclusion will be that, although this ia
not true of accidentaI unities such as 'white man' (because the essence
of white ia not the sarne as the man or the white man, but it is the sarne
as the attribute white, Aristotle, Meeaphysics, vrr.6.1031 b 26-27), it is
however true of "each primary and self-subsistent thing."
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing ia one

and the sarne as its essence. The sophistical objections to
this position, and the question whether Socrate a and to be
Socrates are the sarne thing, are obviously answered by the
sarne solution; for there is no difference either in the
standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in
that from which one could answer it successfully.99
98. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.6.1031 a1S·1S.
99. Arlstotle, Metapnysics, VIJ.6.1032 aS-10.

-- 66 --
This would lead one ta believe that by thia Aristotle means ta
exclude matter from the e8s~nce of the composite, and in the next
chapter he says twice that only the forro is the essence of a thing: "(by
ferro l roean the essence of each thing and its primary substance.)"
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.7.1032 b ); and "and when l speak of
substance without matter l roean the essence." (Aristotle, Metaphysics,
VII.7.1032 b14). These two passages seem to imply that the form is the
essence of a thing and that the essence of each thing excludes its
matter. If this ia true, however, Aristotle might end up holding a
position closer ta Plate on Forms than he would like. In other words,
if Aristotle were ta hold that the only essential and necessary element
in the definition of a phyaical substance ia the ferro, there would seern
to be nothing to distinguish his position from Plato's position that the
only real world ia the world of Forms. This can only be avoided if it
turne out that Aristotle doee include matter in the definition of
composite substances; or that the form in Aristotle ia an individual and
'a this' in a sense different from the sense in which Forme are
individuals in Plato; or that the Aristotelian universal from which the
definition is derived is different in nature from the Platonic Form~
There ie, as we have seen, sorne evidence that Aristotle thinks forms to
be individual, not in the sense in which Plato's Forms have to be
individual, but in the sense that, when they are individual forms of
individual substances, they are never universal~ Furthermore, while
Aristotle's universal is not, as we have seen, a substance because it is
predicated of many, Plato's Forma are real and are substances in the
sense in which Aristotle'a individual substances and the particular
forms of particular individuals are real.

-- 67 --
In the chapter in which the passage just quoted Qccurs, however,
Aristotle ie describing the process by which things come ta be and are
produced, and by saying that only the ferm ia the essence he might
simply be explaining that ':: is that which determines the kind of the
thing preduced. This may net be meant ta imply, either that the matter
ia nct ta be included in the essence of the thing which results fram the
production, or that the ferro i8 that which, in aIl contexte, makes a
thing , a Buch', bue never ' a this'. 100
la there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spherea

or a house apart fram the bricks? Rather we say that no
"this" would ever have been corr.,i.,ng ta be, if this had been
80, but that the "farm" means ttle .. such," and i5 nct a
"this" - a definite thing; but that the artist makes, or the
father begets, a lfsuch" out of a "this"; ànd when it has
been begotten, it is a "this such~ Il And the whole "this,"
Callias or Socrates, is analogous to "this brazen sphere,"
but man and animal te "b:cazen sphere" in general~ 101
100. Salme argues that Aristotle in his account of division in biology uses the terms senos and
eidos at di Herent levels of general ity. uThe fenos/~ analysis can therefore be useful
at various levels of generality, for they are different concepts or tools of analysis.
Aristotle shows this by using both terms at all levels from the mast general 'bloodless'
animal down to varieties of the species 'dog'." (Balme, IIAr;stotle's Use of Division and
Differentiae," 72. Cf. also Pellegrin, IIlogical Difference and Biologlca~ Difference: the
Unit y of Aristotle's Thought," 313-338). This would seem to have as a consequel ,',C that
Aristotle, having made all the necessary adjust~nts, can use the term form ta l~fer either
to the kind or ta the genus in different contexts. This in turn means th~t ln givcn other
contexts the form can mean the individual form. This explains why in sorne passages in the
Metaphysics, for exarrple, form seems to refer ta the 'sl~ch' whereas ln ~ome ot::~rs it
clearly refers to the 'this'. It also partly exptains why Owens ~ays that the form ln
Aristotle is neither universal nor individual. l have already said that ln arder to make it
clear that form in Aristotle plays different roles in different contexts, it might perhaps
be better to say that it is bath individual and universal though in different contexts.
Balme also says that that whieh 1S ta be defined in Aristotle can be taken at any level of
generality 50 that the definition, at any level, is the definition of its abject. UFor the
definiendurn which the division aims ta reaeh can be at aroy Level of generality, sa long as
it is treated as not fu~ther divisible. SA far as logie is concerned, therefore,
successive differentiation adequately secures the unit y of the definition as rcpresenting
the unity of the object. lI (Balme, "Aristotle's Use nf Division and Differentiae," 73).
101. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.8.1033 b2D-25.

-- 68 --
This passage, for example, would seern ta indicate that the ferro ia
nct 'a this', but only a 'such' and that Aristotle means ta deny that
forms are ever individual. l think that read in its proper context this
passage only meane that when taken te refer te the 'such', the forro
ahould nct he considered ta he a 'this'. In ether words, in arguing
against Plato'B views that Forma understood as terme which reter ta the
kind or species are individual and self-subsistent, Aristotle ia saying
that the forms, when taken ta reter ta the kind, should nct be
considered (as Plata did) a definite thing and 'a thls', they are, taken
as Buch, useless, at least with regard ta comings-to-be and ta
substances, and the Forms need noL, for this rea5an at least, ba 5elf-
subsistent substances (Aristotle, Netaphysics, VII.8.1033 b25-31). It
seems clear that Aristotle in this context i5 not discussing the notion
of forro aB individual in the sense that there i5 an individual form in
each individual: what he is denying i5 that the form taken in this last
sense can ever be universal. Even if Aristotle were to reject the view
that matter is to be included in the definition of composite substances,
then, his theory would still be different from Plato's provided that the
forro which is the essence af the thing defined ie an individual form,
and nat, aB it ie far Plato, a self-subsistent entity which refers ta
the kind ta which the object belongs. It is aiso clear that a farm
which is individual in this sense can be separable without implying by
this very fact Plato's world of Forms.
While, as we have seen above, Aristotle seems ta think that a farm
is individual when it daes not refer ta the species, and while the
discussion above seems to be a satisfactory explanation of the fact that

-- 69 --
he calle a form a 'such' in sorne contexte, while in ethers he calle it a
'this', it dosa nct satisfactorily explain why Arietotle saya that the
form when considered as the primary substance should be considered the
essence (Aristotle, Hetaphysics, VII.7.1032 b ). It ia still possible ta
hold that Aristotle considera the ferro taken as the primary substance
the essence of the composite and nct the forro and the matter taken
together. 102
Aquinas, however, thinks that Aristotle includes matter in the
definition, i.e., in the formula of the essence of composite substances.
Et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas

speciai, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam
quidditas speciei, est composita ex materia et forma, non
tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim
camponitur individuum, ut socrates et Cailias. Et haec est
sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitula, quam introducit ad
excludendum opinionem Platonis de ideis. Dicebat enim
species rerum naturalium esse per se existentes sine materia
sensibili, quasi materia sensibilis non esset aliquo modo
pars speciei. Ostenso ergo, quod materia sensibilis ait
pars speciei in rebus naturalibua, ostenditur quod
impossibi le est esse species rerum naturalium sine mater ia
sensibili, sicut hominem sine carnibua et oasibus. et sic de
aliis. 103
A qualification ia needed here, however: what has been said thus
far regarding substances, if true, is going to be true only of natural
substances, and not of artifacts. This too, l think, will find
102. Cf. the foLlowing statement: lias per se, the what-IS-Seing is illustrated in V by the exa~le
of the individual man. llCallias 1S Rer se Callias and the what-IS-Being of Callias ll
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.1S.1022 a 26-27). To foLlow out the notion of per se as skctchcd
in V, the treatment of VII should show first that the what-IS~Bein9 belongs per se ta the
sensible individual, and secondty that it is identical with the individual. 1l (Owens, The
Doctrine of Seing in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', 249).
103. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorl.l1l Arîstotelis E1.positîo, Lib. VII, lccL IX, n.
1469.
-- 7D --
confirmation in Aristotle. At the end of Metaphysics VII.S Aristotle
concludes that:
in one senae nothing will have a definition and nothing will

have an essence, except substances, but in another sense
ether things will have thern. Clearly, then, definition ia
the formula or essence, and essence belongs ta Bubstances
either alone or chiefly and primarily and in the unqualified
sense. 104
As we have seen, Aristotle ia hers talking about the distinction
between the category of substance and the ether categories with
reference te their definability and explains that although the ether
categories are in sorne sense definable, definition applies primarily ta
the category of substance. SA when he saya that "essence belengs te
substances either alone or chiefly and primarily and in an unqualified
sense," he is saying that definition applies most properly to
substances, but also that other things, i.e., the other categories, are
definable. A similar kind of distinction might weil be applied within
the category of substance. Aristotle, in fact, makes a distinction,
within the category of substance, between the primary substance, in the
sense in which he 5eems ta use the term in the Me~aphysics te designate
ferro (and form dees not by definition include matter), and composite
substances (which do include matter). Aristotle might weil have thought
that there are two kinds of essences, bath referring to entities in the
category of sub~tance: the essence of the composite and the essence of
the forro of the composite. Aristotle seems to make this type of
distinction precisely at the beginning of Me~aphysics, VII.1D where he
says that:
104. Aristotle, Metaphyslcs, VII.5.1031 8 10-14.

-- 71 --
Binee a definition ia a formula, and every formula has

parts, and as the formula ia ta the thing, 80 ia the part of
the formula ta the part of the thing, the question ie
already being asked whether the formula of the parts must be
present in the formula of the whole or nct. For in sorne
cases the formulae of the parts are seen ta be present, and
in sorne nct. lOS
But we ha~e seen, of course, that matter ia a part of composite
substances because in order for Bomethir..g ta be a certain kind of
composite substance it ia necessary tha,t it should be made out of a
certain kind of matter (e.9., a man in order ta be a man must have a
body made up of flesh and blood, and would nct be a man if his body were
made, for instance, of iran and ail). Ta the extent, then, that there
ia su ch a distinction between types of essence in the category of
substance, matter, though clearly not part of t~~ 9ssence of the ferro,
would be entailed by the definition of the ferro of sensible substances,
and would be part of the definition of the composite substance. This
feeling is confirmed by a passage in the Metaphysics (among others)
where Aristotle asks explicitly whether matter is part of the definition
of a physical substance4 His conclusion is that:
the matter is a part; for this is present in the process and

it is this that becomes something. But is the matter an
element even in the formula? We certainly describe in both
ways what brazen circlea are; we describe bath the matter by
saying it is brasa, and the forro by saying it ia such and
such a figure; and figure is the proximate genus in which it
ia placed. The brazen circle, then, has the matter in its
formula. 106
Here Aristotle seems to allow matter to be part of the formula in
the sense in which the term applies to the formula of the whole. But l
lOS. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.10.1D34 b20-24.
106. Aristotle, Metapbysics, VII.7.1032b33·1033 a4.

-- 72 --
th:nk that, though partly correct, interpreting this particular passage
in this way would be an oversirnplification for at least two reasons: (i)
he ia talking about the way we describe things l and the inclusion of
matter here need not be taken te roean that it should be considered part
of the definition (if our description of the circ le assumes, in ether
words, that the bronze is going to be part of the definition of the
brazen circIe, then it la obvious that th~ matter will, in thia case, be
part of the formula); and (ii) the example he is giving in the passage
ia one of an artifact and artifacts do not have an essence in any case.
In fact, in v~rious subsequent passages Aristotle denies that matter ia
part of the formula.
If then matter ia one thing, ferro another, the compound of

these a third, and both the matter and the form and the
compound are substance, even the matter ia in a sense called
part of a thing, while in a sense it is not, but only the
elements of which the formula of the form consists. E.g.,
of concavity flesh (for this is the matter in which it is
produced) is nat a part, but of snubness it is a parti and
the bronze is a part of the concrete statue, but not of the
statue when this is spoken of in the sense of the ferm.
(For the form, or the thing as having form, should be said
to be the thing, but the material element by itself must
never be said ta be sa). 107
There are a number of points in this passage which are important
for my argument:
(i) matter in a sense is and in a sense is nat part of the thing,
and therefare, l think, of the formula of the whale.
107. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.10.1D35a·1035a9.

-- 73 --
(ii) Flesh (i.e., the matter) ia nct a part of concavity as a
geometrical concept, but it iB part of the n0se, presumably becaue~ a
nase ia necessarily a material thing_
(iii) Ferm can, by itself, be said to be the thing, but matter,
again by itself, must never be said ta be 90.
Ari8tot~e, however, seeme ta deny that matter i9 part of the
formula and ta maintain that it cao only be part of the individual, of
which, however, there ia no definition.
For even if the line when divided passes away into its
halvas, or the man into banee and muscles and flesh, it doea
not follow that they are compoeed of the.e as parts of their
essence, but rather as matter; and these are p3.rts of the
concrete things, but nct aiso of the forro, i.e., of that to
which the formula refersi wherefore also they are nct
present in the formulae. In one kind of formula, then, the
formula of such parts will be present, but in another it
must not be present, where the formula does not refer to the
concrete obj ect. 10a
This passage does not need to be interpreted as meaning that the
matter is only part of the individual concrete object and not of the
formula. In the light of the distinction which Aristotle had drawn
earlier between the formula of the part and the formula of the whole,
this passage needs to be interpreted as saying that matter is nat
included in the formula of the form, but that it is included in the
formula of the whole. Aristotle is saying that of the essence of the
part which refera only to ~he form, the matter ia not a part; while of
the essence of the whoie, matter is a part. To the formula which doea
not refer ta the concrete individual, the matter cannat belong.
108. Aristotle, Metaphyslcs, VIJ.10.103S a 17·23.

-- 74 --
Al:istotle in the course of this discussion iB aIse making ~nother type
of distinction which he makes more explicit Boon after the passage just
quoted. The distinction la one which he considere relevant te the
discussion of definition. There are two sorts of things: those sorts of
things which Oceur in specifically different materials (as circles may
exist in bronze or stone or wood), and those things which are not seen
te exist apart (as man doea nct exist without flesh and bones). In
other words, Aristotle is here talking of the diffeë~nt statu~ of the
subjects: circles (and ether figures) are indeterminate with respect to
matter (apart fram their intelligible matter); but proper individuals
(composite substances) are nct thus indeterrninate~ About the firet
group Arietotle saye that they do not cause any problem, because it is
easy to see why the formula of the forro should not include the matter;
but in the case of the second group a prob12ro arises. Since man is
always found in flesh and bones one may think that they are aiso parts
of the formula of the form, and he quickly adds that they are not; they
are the matter and that it is only because they are always found in man
that we are confused. This, however, does not exclude matter from being
part of the formula of the whole and, therefore, part of the essence of
man, although it certainly is not part of the essence of the form
(which, as ~e will see, will turn out to be '~h~ most proper definition
of man). Although not part of the essence in the case in which it
refera only to the formula of the form of man, matter is to be
considered necessary in understanding what the essence of the forro of
man is~ Matter, on the other hand, is part of the essence of man
underatood as a composite substance~

-- 75 --
But man and herse and terme which are thuB applied ta
individuale, but univereally, are nct Aubstanc"es but
something composed of this particular formula and this
particular matter treated as u~iversal; and as regards the
individual, Socrates already includes in him ultimate
individual matter; and similarly in aIl other cases. 109
They, man and horse, ho~ever, are nct substances, and hence nct
part of the essence of the ferro. but only this particular formula and
this particular matter taken u~iversallv. While the tact that this will
no~ represent the proper definition of the composite substance will
become apparent later, it iB clear that the role of matter in definition
iB 90in9 ta be more prominent in Aristetle than it was in Plate. In
fact, Aristetle goes on to criticize those who assert the Ideas, and
says that:
te reduce aIl things thus to Forms and ta eliminate matter

ia useless labour; fer sorne things surely are a particular
ferro and a particular matter, or particular things in a
partit"".. . . lar state. And the comparisen which Socrate a the
younger used te make in the case of "animal" is not sound;
for it Ieads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that
man can possibly exist without its parts, as the circle can
without the bronze. But the case i5 not similar; for an
animal i5 something perceptible, and it is not possible to
define it without reference te movement - nor, therefore,
without reference te the parts' being in a certain state. 110
There are four things te be noted here:
(i) again the distinction i5 stressed between those things which
can exist apart from a special kind of material component, and those
things which cannat.
109. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.10.103S b28-32.
110. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V!!.11.1036 b22-29.

-- 76 --
(ii) Man cannat p06sibly exist without its parts, i.e., flesh and
banes, and they are, therefore, necessarily parts of man.
(iii) Man (Animal), being eomething perceptible, cannat be defined
(a formula for it cannat be given) without reference ta movement.
(iv) Matter i9 that through which there ia motion, and, in fact,
movement in man cannat be detined without reference te the parts, i.e.,
fl~Bh and banes.
The parts of man, therefore, seern ta be required in order te give
the formula of the composite (i.e., the more general definit~on of the
composite), though they are not included in the formula of the form
(i.e., the rnost proper definition of the composite; cf. Aristotle,
Netaphysics, VII.I0.103S 6 17-25). This, moreover, aeemB ta be true nct
,:;::ly of individual men, but alse of man in general. 50, although there
i5 ~~:-' definition of one particular man, there is a way ta talk about man
in genernl as the composite substance: as Ilthia particular formula and
thia particular matter taken universally." We have also seen, however,
that when Aristotle talks about the definition of a substance he talks
about the formula af the form alane as ~epresenting the proper way of
defining that substance. This type of formula will obviously not
include matter; it will be the formula or definitien of the primary
substance, i.ee, of the form which is in the fullest sense substance and
is that which will give the true essence of the form. Whether this
latter formula, or the one given by the generalization of the particular
elements, represents the proper way of defining a substance still
remains a question.
-- 77 --
l think that, while it is undeniable that Aristotle's language
often implies that the definition of man can equally weil be given by
either of the two methods described, hie considered opinion la that the
proper way te define man la through a definition of its substance.
Aristotle believes that the essence of man la derived exclusively fram
the ferm of man and that, while only the ferro la the true essence of
man, that essence will include as part of iteelf the material element
necessarily present in the concrete individuals fram which the
definition of man la derived. Thua, while Aristotle thinks it quite
possible simply ta take the individual ferro and the individu al matter
and arrive at a univers al which la analogous ta the particular, he doea
nct eeem ta think that by thia method the true definition of man will be
obtained.
It ia clear also that the eoul ie the primary substance and

the body ia matter, and man or animal is the compound of
bath, taken universallYi and "Socrates" or "Coriscus," if
even the soul of Sacrates may be called Socrates, has two
meanings (for sorne roea.l by su ch a term the soul, and others
roean the concrete thing) f but if "Socrates" or "Coriscus"
roeans simply this particular soul and this particular body,
the individual ia analogeus te the universal in its
composition. 111
The true definition of a substance will be given, he th~nks, by
its forro alone. He explains carefully, in fact, that na',:uriJl composite
substances are to be considered analogous ta artifacts in this respect.
Just as we have no trouble seeing that the matter of the statue or of
the circle ia not part of the statue or of the circle understood as the
forrn, so, he thinks, we should not have any trouble understanding that
1'11. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.11.1D37a S-9.

-- 78 --
the Barne holds true aven for those composites which are nct seen ta
oceur in specifically different substances.
Yet if this ia nct plain it ia nct possible ta define

anything; for definition ia of the universal and of the
forrn. If then it ia nct evident what sort of parts are of
the nature of matter and what sort are not, neither will the
formula of the thing be evident. In the case of things
which are found te oceur in specifically different
materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or atone or wood,
it 6eemB plain that these, the bronze or the stone, are no
part of the essence of the circle, ainee it ia found apart
fram them. Of things which are net Been ta exist apart,
there ie no reason why the sarne may nct be true, just as if
aIl circ les that had ever been seen were of bronze; for none
the Iese the bronze wouid be no part of the form; but it is
hard to eliminate it in thought a E. 9 a the farm of man is
always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are
these then parts of the forro and of the formula? No, they
are matter; but because man is not found aiso in other
matters we are unable to perfarm the abstractiona 112
Ariatotle, then, thinka that the most proper definition of
composites is obtained through the formula which applies to the form
alonea The matter will be necessary because it is included in the
notion of the forro of those substances which are composites of matter
and form. The form of su ch composites will in fact refer to the
function of the composites (and ta that of their parts" and the account
given of the function, in turn, will involve sorne reference to the
matter a
And Binee the Boul of animals (for this i~1 the substance of
a living thing) is their substance according to the formula,
i.e., the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind
(at least we shall define each part, if we define it well,
not wit,hout reference to its function, and this will not
belong ta it without pezception), sa that the parts of soul
are prior, either all or sorne of them, to the concrete
"animal," and 50 too with each individual animal; For
112. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.11.1r36B2S·1036b7. Cf. also Aristotle, ~~taphysics, VII.10.1036 a -

9; AristotLe, Metaphysics, VII.11.1037a25-1037b5; and AristotLe, Metaphysics,
VII.1Z.1038a S-8.
-- 79 --
they cannat aven exist if severed fram the whole; for it ia

nct a finger in any and every etate that ia the finger of a
living thing, but a dead finger ia a finger only in name.,'3
Thus Aristotle can conclude that those things which include matter
are nct the sarne as their essence.
But things which ara of the nature of matter, or of wholes

that include matter, are nct the sarne as their essences, nor
are accidentaI unities like that of "Socrates" and
"musical"; for these are the Barne only by accident."4
Aristotle aIse thinks that, because the definition derived from
the ferro alone includes the matter as part, sa ta spaak, of the
explanation of the function of the composite, he haB aIse explained why
the unit y of the composite in question i9 more than accident al unity.
The unit y of the composite is essential because it is defined in terme
of one element only and that element in itself is capable of including
all the other elements necessary for the proper knowledge of the
composite. Because this is nct possible for any other kind of
composition, no other kind of composition either is essential or can be
properly defined. Hence, while:
in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as

one of actualitYi w • • 115
Ariatotle can still say that they are one and not many because the
last 'differentia' alane is the substance of the composite and itg
definition:
not because they are present in one thing; for on this

principle a unit y can be made out of all the attributes of a
113. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.10.1035 b14-25.
114. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.11.1037b4-6.
115. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII.6.1045 a35. Cf. also Arlstotle, Metaphysics, VII.15.1040b16·20.
-- aD --
thing. But Burely all the attributes in the definition must

be one; for the definition ie a single formula and a formula
of substance, SQ that it must be a formula of sorne one
thing; for substance meana a "one" and a "this," as we
maintain. 116
l am inclined ta conclude, then, that when he ia talking of the
definition of substance in the mast proper sense, Aristotle has ta
exclude matter becaus8 the substance in the moat praper sense le just
the farm of the composite and nct the composite itself: the definition,
in this sense will be derived fram the formula of the ferro alone.
Aristotle aIse thinks, however, that the composite substance can be
described by taking this individual formula and this individual matter
and creating, 50 to speak, a universal to correspond to the particular.
This process, however, will not produce that which he considera to be
the most proper definition of the composite in question. This means
that, in talking about the essence of a thing, one can be talking at two
different levels: the more appropriate level is that of definition
prcper with which proper knowledge of the substance and of its unit y is
achieved by considering only the formula of the form; the less
appropriate level is that at which a general concept which corresponds
to the particular composite is constructed by taking this particular
form and this particular matter as universal. When giving the proper
definition of the composite, the forro alone is to be considered, but,
although one doea not need to talk about matter, it will always be
incl:lded as a necessary component in any discussion of the essence of
substances which are composites of matter and forro even if they are
defined through their form alone. The essence of ~an, then, in the rnoet
116. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.12.1D3?b23-27. Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.12.1D38a18~22;

and Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.12.103S a29-31.
-- ~l --
proper sense, is going ta be the ferro with matter as a necessary
component, but nct as proper part of the essence. At the Iesa
appropriate levei, the one which simply represents a generalization of
this formula taken with this matter, the essence will have matter as a
part: this will not, properly speaking, be a definition because while it
includes aIl the elernents of the composite it doea nct properly
represent its essential unity. The definition, on the other hand, gives
a proper and accurate account of the true nature of the composite
because it captures bath its composition and its essential unit y: this
iB so because, even though what makes a man a man le the soul, i.e., the
forro that he ie, nevertheless man is necessarily a compesitp- of matter
fi~d forme Matter will, therefore, enter alse ioto the proper definition
because even there it will be part of the explanatian. 117 It might be
warth thinking af it in the fallawing way: the essence af man is given
by reference ta a particular type of soul (where "soul" is of course
braadly construed ta caver nat juat cognition, but growth, nutrition,
etc.); but it is the soul of an animal: and qua animal at least it must
be flesh and blaod. Thus matter enters in, but at a higher level of
generality than that provided by simply taking the individual composite
and making it universal: it entera in as part of the last 'differentia',
thUG providing a more accurate characterizatian .,Jf the essence of "man."
Keeping in mind Aristotle's understanding of the raie respectively
played by matter and by farm in definition will also help, l think, in
getting a better grip on his conception of the relationship between
-~, .
117. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Il.9.20obS-B.

-- 82 --
matter and ferro in the context of the issue of the individuation of
composite substances.
-- 83 --
ARISTOTLE ON THE ROLE OF MATTER IN THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
Given the notion of matter discussed above, it becomes a lot lesa
problernatic ta see how matter could play a partial role as the principle
of individuation in Aristotle's philosophy. It ia important at this
point in the discussion ta keep one thing in mind about the relevance of
the actuality of matter ta the problem of individuation. While any
matter (flesh, blood, fire) may serve as the principle of individuation
at any level of the metaphysical hierarchy above the base level, and
while at those levels, the problem of the existence of prime matter doee
nct arise (and hence neither doea the problem of its actuality),
nonetheless, in Aristotle's system, for any level of the hierarchy above
the base level, it must be true in sorne sense that the explanatione at
that levei depend on those closer ta the base4 SA while prime matter
may not directly be a problem in the individuation of man, for example,
or animals, it becomes a problem at the ultimate level4 At the levei of
the four elements it is plausible to hold that prime matter being actual
and extended in itself can prcvide the basia for the individuation of
the four elernents once it iB informed by the properties which
differentiate the four elements in kind. The on1y notion of unit y
applicable to the four elements, it S2\:ms, is something analogous to
unit y in genua or at most in kind: it certainly ie not numerical unity.
Becauee the four elements cannat be considered one in the sense in which
an individual i9 one, therefore, the fact that prime matter is net 'a
this' doea nct constitute a problem. Becauee the four elements,

-- 84 --
however, are nct informed by a proper form, but only by their
characteristic qualitiea, if prime matter were nct in itself actual and
extended, it would be impossible for the qualities ta inhere in it aince
they cannat be considered capable of providing the substratum with all
of its actuality as a proper ferro can do. There would be, in other
words, no foundation upon which ta base the capacity for differentiation
provided by the difference between the qualities which make up the four
elements. It should be noted, however, that although the actuality of
p;'ime matter and its extension are absolutely necessary at chis level,
it ia the quality which makes tire different fram water, and nat the
prime matter itself.
Ta the extent that prime matter haa sorne actuality of its own, and
it is necessarily extended, then, it might be argued, there ia no
problem of individuation: one doea not need any additional notion to
perform the function oi individuating. l think, however, that this ia
inaccurate, although l also think that the notion of prime matter
adopted by Aristotle can at least begin to perform the task, whereas
prime matter as pure objective potentiality could not even do that. l
will argue that for Aristotle both matter and form will be needed in
order to individuate things at the metaphysical level, while in order
for us to knew individuals at the epistemological level l18 Aristotle will
include accidental categories as well as matter and ferm.
118. For this distinction, see rrry paP':r "The Individuation of Ma\;'~ ...~ in Ockham's Philosophy.1I As
far as 1 can see, there is only one major difference between Ockham's and Aristotle's
account~~ Ockham considers matter individual end does not l'''-:ed form for individuation at
the me!,; iphysical level; Aristot~e considers matter cCl1'll1r.n to all things and not 'a this
thing here', and, therefore, needs form not only at the epistemological Level, like Ockham,
but also et the metaphysical leveL.
-- 85 --
Although matter, ~ Baid, ia in a better position, given the way
in which it haB been ch~racterized, to help in performing the taBk of
individuating, from what Aristotle eaye it seeme quite clear that it
neede the assistance of form in order to perform this taek properly:
this ie true becauee, even if matter ia actual in Borne ~2neE and ie
extended, it ie in iteelf not one in the sense :..n which an individual ie
one and is not 'a this'. Form, according to Arietotle, makee it an
individual, "a this thing here." In the Physics 119 he affirme that
matter iB not, and iB net one "in the same way" as a this thing here.
This means, it seeme to me, that althcugh matter is (in the sense
apecified in the second section), and ia one in sorne sense, it cannat by
itself account for individuation. In fact, Aristctle, as we have seen,
repeatedly affirma that the form ia 'a this' and that what makes
something 'a this' is the form. Thus, he says that:
we are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind

of what is, substance, and that in several sensee, (a) in
the sense of matter or that which in itself ie net "a this,"
and (b) in the sense of ferro or essence, which is that
precisely in virtue of which a thing is called "a this," and
thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compaunded of both
(al and (b).120
This sarne point ie made by Aristotle in Physics, I.7.190 blO-13; in
Metaphysics, V.8.l017 b23-25, and in several other places. l want ta 9~
back now te the distinction made in the introductory remarks of this
section between two questions ~hich can be asked when talking about
individuation: (i) what differentiates individuals within the sarne
species? (metaphysical question) or, hcw are individuals within the sarne
119. Cf. Aristotle, Physic~, 1.7.191 8 10-14.
120. Aristotle, De Anima, II .1.412 8 6-10.

-- 86 --
-. species ta be counted? (episternological question) and (ii) what makes an
individual 'a this', i.e., ~he individual it ia? It 8eeme te me that
from the passage just quoted from De Anima a number of conclusions can
be drawn if it is read in the light of other Aristotelian tenets.
(a) Given that matter la nct one in itaelf, it will not, by
itself, be able ta answer question (i), although it ia a most important
elernent in the anawer ta the epistemological queBti~~. As we have seen,
in tact, matter playa an important rale in the account of the essence of
a substance, and Aristotle places great emphasis on the fact that for
those substances which are never seen te be apart fram a certain kind of
matter, we assume, because of this, that the matter ia part of the
definition. It is clear from this that matter, though secondary in the
individuation of substances in the rnetaphysical sense, is very important
for our recognition of the individuality 0f composite substances.
(b) Forrn will be the other component needed in order to answer
question (i) especially in the metaphysical sense, and question (ii)
because it will make the substratum 'a this', while at the same time
rnaking it 'this kind of thing'. One of the most important roles of form
in making matter 'a this', for the purposes of individuation, is that it
will give it a particular quantity.121 In determining the role of form
in the proceea of individuation, it is again useful to draw upon
121. It is interesting to note that the individuation of the same object through time in AristotLe
seems to invoLve the permanence of form and not matter. The question of wheth~r we can step
into the same river twice is answered in the affirmative by Al'ÎstotLe. He can answer ft in
the affirmative onLy if the sameness of the river is a sameness of forro (i.e., this river),
since clearly its matter (i.e., the water) 15 not the same. For a discussion of this
issue, see Hartman, "AristotLe on the Identity of Substance and Essence"; and Wiggins,
•• Sameness and Substance, 35-42.
-- 87 --
Aristotle's views on what the essence of substance8 ia. Because clearly
he thinks that the essence of composite substances ia derived from their
ferm alone, it ia plausible ta infer that any type of metaphysical
question about individuation will be answered by ma king appeal te that
sarne principle. If the essence of an individual ia its forro, it will be
that sarne ferro primarily which will make it the individual it ia and
which will differentiate it from ether individuals within the sarne
species.
(c) Matter gives the most important part of the answer ta question
{il taken in the epistemological sense because it, in turn, with the
help of accidentaI properties, will be what rnakes the forro which ia
Socrates and t" ~ ferro which is Callia,s numerically distinguishable for
US. 122
It 8eems, then, that in arder ta answer question (i) bath matter
and forro are needed, although matter is more important than form with
reference to the epistemological side of the question. The function
performed by matter in the process of individuation, however, cannat be
performed independently of the function performed by form: the role of
matter is, in fact, subordinated te the role of forme It 15 impossible,
in effect, te individuate or count individuals until it has been
determined that they are individuals of a certai~ species. In the case
of a river, for example, it would be impossible ta individuate that
122. See sok.olowski, "Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle,1I 283, note n. 33. In that note
Sokolowsk.i refers to Owens's argl.lllent that since ferm is neither universal nor individua"l
in itself, and hence, as 1 see it, really individual when in the individual as well as
-, really universal when taken as such, there is no problem of individuation in Aristotle.
There is n~ problem, then, with the fact that a form makes the substratum 'a this thing
here' as well as 'a thing of such and such a kind'.
-- 88 --
river today as the sarne rive~ that it was yesterday, or as different
fram any other river, by the matter alone (except in che general sense,
which however doee nct differentiate this river fram any oth~r river,
that rivera in order to be rivera muat be made of water). It ia
necessary, in effect, ta know that it ia this river (i.e., that it has
this kind of ferro, as well as that it ia this particular ferro), in order
ta give unit y ta the matter of this river and render it capable te
differentiate this river fram any ether river. 123 The matter alone
(i.e., the water) would, without the forro, be utterly unable ta provide
any criterian for saying that this river iB nct the Barne river as any
ether river. There i9 Evidence, furthermore, that Aristotle made a
distinction between these two que~tions regarding individuation himself.
Ago.in, sorne thinge are one in number, others in species,

ûthers in genus, others by analogy; in number those whoae
matter is one, in species those whoee definition ie one, .•.
The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former
are; e.g. things that are one in number are also one in
species, while things that are one in species are not all
one in number;... .124
Aristotle in effect ie eaying that thare can be no numerical
distinction y;ithout specifie distinction, in other worde, that the farm
is preauppoaed for numerical differentiation. Only in light of this,
and not independently of it, matter can be considered the principle af
123. Compare this account of the matter with the general account given by Wisgins of these kinds of
cases (Wigsins, Sameness and Substance, 35-42). With respect to the particular case of the
river, \.Ii9gins writes that: llunlike the water, the river on which 1 moored my boat
yesterday is not a part of the Aegean. Rivers are indeed water but this means that water
goes ta make them up. 'Same water' is not therefore a covering concept for an identity
statement identifying a river with something. ll (Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, 35).
124. AriGtotle, Metaphysics, V.6.1016 b31-1017a .

-- 89 --
incl~viduation, and it ia in this context, l think, that Aristotle saya
that:
when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh
and in these banee, this ia Cailias or Socra\:es; and they
are different in virtue of their matter (for this iB
ditferent), but the sarna in form; for their form ls
indivisible. 125
Aristotle ia here saying that Socrates and Cailias qua human
beingB are numerically diverse by the matter. And, as l said, numerical
diversity ia given ta them primarily by matter, because it ia the matter
which makes the forms taken ta stand for the species, forms of different
individuals. It ia aIse true that when taken as individuals, already
determined as te the species, Socrates and Cailias are differentiated as
different individuals by their particular forms:
ainee the term "unity" is used like the term "being, II and
the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose
substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently
neither unit y nor being can be the substance of things, just
as being an element or a principle cannat be substance. 126
We have seen in the section dedicated to the discussion of
Aristotle's viewB on definition that he considera the substance of a
composite to be the form and that he thinks that a universal can never
be a substance. At the sarne time the passage just quoted maintains that
the Ilthings whoae sl'bstance i9 numerically one are numerically one." In
the light of these considerations, it is clear that this passage can be
rephrased in the following way without distorting its meaning in any
way: "things whose ferm ia nume:cically one are numerically one." il: is
12S. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIJ.S.1034 aS·S.

1 126. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIl.16.1040b17-20.
-- 90 --
.. equally clear that, given the tone of the discussion of bot:lk VII and its
conclusions, Aristotle (i) could not be talking of univereals when he ia
referring t.a substance, (ii) could no',:, in this passage 1 be talking
about specifie unit y, and (iii) ia here denying what he Beeme ta have
affirmed in severai ether places, i.e., that matter ie either the
primary element or even involved in the numerical differentiation of
individuals. Because it 8eeme unwarranted ta assume that Aristotle ia
contradicting himself regarding this issue, it ia more reasonable te
explain the discrepancy by maintaining, as 5eeme most plausible, that
when he saye that things are numerically one by their matter he means
(il ta isolate that element in the composite which is found only in
things which have nurnerical unit y, as opposed ta things which have
specifie unity, (ii) ta express the fact that the things which are
different in number have different bits of matter, nct as the primary
cause but as a concomitant cause of the fact that they are different in
number, and (iii) te express the conviction that, while matter by itself
is not the cause of nurnerical differentiation, it is by the diversity of
their matter among other things that we recognize the diversity among
individuals within the Barne species.
Aristotle cao adopt this theory of individuation because, as was
mentioned above, according ta him forro in itself ia neither universal
oor individual, and because matter ia of itself actual and extended~
Form in this framework cao perform two functiQ~lS: considered as the
universal concept which refera ta a species (i.e., man), it will provide
the sortal concept necessary for grounding intraspecific
differentiationi considered, on the other hand, as the forro of 50crates,

-- 91 --
it will be the particular ferm of one individual which will make the
matter it informa the matt.er of Socrates and hence the individual it
informa, numerically one. 127 l think, therefo~e, that what Aristotle ie
essentia11y saying is that at the 1eve1 of genera1izati~~ at which the
farm ie conaidered universal, the matter ia that which provides the
grounds for numerical differentiation. Thiat however, ie true only in
the sense that the form, f';=~iGh ia in itself neither universal nor
individual, ia only truly individual when, because it ia instantiated in
matter, it ia a pal:'ticular ferro and can be recognized by us as the
particular ferro of a particular individual. When forro, on the ether
hand, ia nct considered as the term which refera ta the species, but as
the partic~lar from which the essence is derived, it clearly is itself
that which makes 50crates numerica11y different from Ca11ias. It is
also true, however, that we recagnize the numerical diversity of the
forms of 50crates and of Ca11ias by the diversity of their matter.
The fact that matter in Aristot1e is of itse1f actua1 and extended
makes his ac~ouht of individuation more plausible in virtue of the fact
that his view, rather than considering matter a principle tatally
dependent on farm even for its very existence, makes it an entity ta
sorne extent independent of form and capab1~ for this very reason to be
cansidered a principle in itself. Hence, while the fact that matter is
itaelf actual and extended is nat directly relevant ta the question of
individuation because matter is net 'a this', it nonetheless is
important and indirect1y relevant to the question of individuation
because a tota11y dependent being cannot be considered the foundation
127. Cf., for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.12.1037b24~28.

-- 92 --
for the explanation of any part cf a theory. Matter as itself extended,
rnoreover, ia able ta provide the foundation for ail those accidentaI
properties, allah as quantity, which are considered te belong ta a
composite through its matter and which, as will become clear later, will
account for the fact that we recognize numerical d~~~rsity aise through
the help of matter. 50, although bath matter and ferro are needed in
order ta answer the firet question about individuation, the primary
roles are performed metaphysically by form and epistemologically by
matter.
The answer ta the second question about individuation follows
directly fram our discussion of the f 4.rst.. In the anawer ta question
(ii) l think that, as should be clear, both matter ~nd form are again
needed: in the solution ta this question ferro will again be the moat
important factor, although matter will be also included.
It ia clear, then, that the ferro ia what rnakes a thing the kind of
thing it ia; but, of course, in order to answer a question as te what
makes this individual the individual that it is, two things will be
included. Clearly one will have to include in the answer the kind of
thing that it is; iae., it is a 'this such'; equally it ia clear that it
ia not only a 'auah', but aiso a 'this', and this is where one has to
include the matter as well as the form: this is true beaause once a
substance has become 'this particular thing' through its form, it will
neceasarily have at one time the particular matter it has and not any
other. Moreover, even as a 'allah', its characterization will inciude
matter; not chis particular lump of matter (although perhaps this
particular kil1ri of matter). What l mean is that if it is a horse, it

-- 93 --
will be made of a certain sort of matter and it will be made of matt~L
n~cessarily; obviou~ly it is not ~ horse that it has t~is particular
parcel of matter, aven at this particular time, but gys the individual
that it is. It is ciear aiso that it is the individual that it is
because it ia composed of this particular forro and this particular
matter. 128
Evidently, then, "other" and "unlike" aIse have severai

meanings. And the other in one sense is the opposite of the
sarne (so that everything is either the sarne as or other than
ev'erything el se ) • In another sensi. things are ether uniese
both their matter and their definition are one (so that you
are other than your neighbour). 129
In this passage it is cieariy stated that both the matter and the
forro are considered necessary by Aristotle in order te make me other
than my neighbour. It has aiso been made clear how this interpretation
ia confirmed and paralleled by our discussion of the respective roles cf
matter and of ferm in definition and in essence. There, there was no
question that when one is taiking about individuais one has to taik both
about their matter and about their form, aithough of individuais there
is no definition. This is how l think Aristotie wouid answer the
question of individuation at the metaphysical levei.
At the epistemological level, i.e., in order for us te know
individuals, or in order for us te be able ta differentiate among
individuais, however, it seems that Aristotie wouid add a third
requirement te the twc previcus cnes. Thu~1 i~ the De Anima Aristctle
notes that:
128. Cf. Aristotle, Hetaphysics, VII.10.103S b28-32; and Aristotle, Met~physics, VII.11.1037aS-10.
1 129. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X.3.1054 b14-17.
-- 94 --
it 8eemB nct ooly usefu~ for the discovery of the causes of

the der.ved properties of substances ta be acquainted with
the essential natFr:'e of those substances (as i.n mathematics
it is useful for the understanding of the property of the
equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right
angles ta know the e9Be~tial nature of the straight and the
curved or of the line and the plane) but aiso conversely,
for the knowledge of the essential nature of a substance iB
largely promoted by an acquaintance with its properties:
for, when we are able ta give an account conformable ta
experience of aIl or most of the properties of a substance,
we ahall be in the most favourable position ta say something
worth saying about the essential nature of the subject;
130
In this passage Aristotle 5eemB te claim that at the
epistemological level it is also necessary ta take into account the
attributes of a thing in order to know what kind of "thing it is: this
is, on the face of it, quite plausible. In fact, given that our
knowledge iB acquired thraugh the senses, it would be implausible ta
claim that in the individuation of abjects we do not use their sensible
properties. ~n the other hand, Aristotle, in this passage, might
simply mean to suggest that when we are clear as to what things about an
individual are merely accidental, or simply attributes, we then know by
elimi,nating the se what the substa~ce consists in. l think that even
chough the latter is clearly true, the meaning of the passage is
stronger than that. In one of his discussions of definition,131
Aristotle explains that in any description of attributes ipropter se'
(and l use the ward "description" because Aristotle concludes that
strictly speaking there is no definition of anything other than
substance) we will always be using the definition or at least the name
of the substance in which they inhere. They cannot in effect be
130. AristotLe, De Anima, I.1.402 b16-25.
131. Cf. AristotLe, Metaphysics, VII.5.1030 b 16·25.

-- 95 --
understoo~ without sorne reference ta their subjects. This has ta mean
that upan recognition of auch attributes we will also know what kind of
suL stance they are always found with: if we have recognized, for
example, that something ia a male then, given certain other conditions,
we will also know that it ia an animal. In this sense, then, it is also
clear that attributes 'propter ee' will have a rale in the proceas by
which we determine what kind of thing a certain abject is. Like matter,
these attribut~B will be necp-ssary to our understanding of the essence
of a substance. It ia plausible to argue, therefore, that like matter
they should help in our pracess af individuation. The passage above,
however, doea not make any distinction between attributes 'propter se'
and ether kinds ef attributes and plainly argues that by being able te
give an account of all or most of the properties of a substance we are
rendered capable of saying sornething true about the essential nature of
their subject. Befere attributes can be useful in helping determine the
essence of a subject, hewever, it seems obvieus that they have ta be
useful in its individuation. A related point i3 made by Standferd
Cashdollar in hie article an Incidental Perception. 132 His general
argument is deveted to Aristotle's treatment of perception of incident al
sG~sp-abjects, to proving that in Aristatle incidental perception ia a
case 01: simple aiathesis, and t~ showing that incidental senee-abjects
can include things other than particular substances. In the course of
hie general argument he makes a number of points which are relevant ta
our diacussion of the role of attributes (accidental and otherwise) in
the individuation of substances. In particular hie characterizatian of
132. Cashdollar, UAristotle's Account of Incidental Perception. Il

-- 96 --
1 what constitutes a case of incidental J:.'erception shows quite clearly
that, rightly or wrongly, we often identi~y a substance Buch as
Socratea, or Plate, or 'the man l met yesterday' through its sensible
propertiea.
Incidental perception takes place when we perce ive "the son

of Cleon - nct because [the sense abject ia] the Bon of
Cleon but because it ia white, and ta be the Bon of Cleon ia
incidental ta being white." Again he says (De Anima,
III. 3. 42S b2l-22) about incidental sensibles that "one cannot
err [in perceiving] that it ia white, but one can arr as ta
whether the white i5 this or something else." l shall rafer
ta these as the exemplary cases. 133
It aeema, then, that even the least essential property of a
substance can be thp starting point for its individuation. Clearly, it
will be necessary to ~erify the initial perception which can naturally
be wrong. The fact remains, though, t~at Aristotle considera properties
one of the starting points for knowledge because knowledge starts with
perception, and perception can be of the properties of an abject before
it becomes perception of the abject (as it happeHs in incidental
perception). Cashdollar goes on to explain that what particularly
differentiates incidental perception from proper perception is the fact
that in incidental perception there is predication of attributes. In
this, incidental perception is analogous _~ noetic assertion by which we
assert that something i9 true of something. Incidental perception and
noetic assertion, however, are net equated by Aristotle, Cashdollar
argues, and the main difference lies in the fact that the kinds of
predications which characterize the two processes are different.
The incidence within the inceived sensible is the reverse of

predication of sumbebexota as we usually understand it, ~0r
133. Cashdollar, "Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception," 157.

-- 97 --
observation of tho various examples suggests a reversaI of

the usual order of subjp~t and predicate when compared with
thought. The exemplary cases reveal that incidental
perception iB the true or false rscognition of a particular
substance which in the order of nature lB prior ta its
attribute or incidental quality, but which quality is proper
ta one of the five senses. Since this ia Ba, in the order
of perception the quality is prior while the particular
substance ia understood as if it were an attribute: and
aince it iB nct "of necessity or for the mast part" that,
e.9. the white be the son of Cleon, the substance ia viewed
as something incidental ta the white percept which ia
necessarily perceived. 134
This reversal of the order of predication which corresponds ta a
reversaI in the order of nature and of definition, in which the
substance is prior to its attributes. characteriz0s rather well that
wnich l see te be the difference between the appropriate ways of
answering those which l have called the metaphysical and the
epistemological questions about individuation. 135 The answer to the
metaphysical questions about individuation will fallow the arder of
nature in the sense that those things which are ontologically prior will
be those which will be prior in answering this question. We have seen,
in fact, that the metaphysical individuation of a substance is
determined primarily by what the essence of that substance is. Thus the
definition of x will tell us what kind of substance x is, and the ferro
(from which th6 universal, and hence the definition, is derived) of x is
what makes x the individual substance that x is. The form i5
ontologically prier and hence individuates the substance metaphysically.
The matter in this context is subordinated te the ferm because the ferm
134. Cashdollar, lIAristotle's Account of Incidental Perception," 162.
135. On this issue, cf. also Aristotle, ~~ysics, V.'1.

-- 98 --
.... centaine the matter ta the extent that the matter ~s part of the account
of the essence of a substance.
For ~he answer ta the epistemological question about
individuation, which represents the way in which we recognize the
distinction between substances, the order will be reversed, as it ie in
the case of incidental perception. That which ia prier in nature will
become poste=ior in the process by which we individuate substances. In
this case ferm, being prier in nature, will be last, and the accidental
properties such as quality especially and quantity and place will have
priority. In this context matter will be prier ta ferro, but nct te the
attributes, because it ia posterior ta ferm in the order of nature, but
prior to the attributes. Thus when perceiving something te be white, we
might incidentally perceive, first that it is oometh~ng material
(pr~oumably because only rnaterial abjects are capable of being coloured)
and subsequently that it is -;he man l met yesterday (because it is white
and it has a body, as weIl as ether attributes l may also have
perceived) •
Ta sum up, then, if l have been right, we can draw the following
conclusions:
(i) there is prime matter in Aristotle.
(ii) Prime matter should not be replaced by the simple bodies.
(iii) The traditional characterization of prime matter i8 partly
inadequate and doea not represent Aristotle's view accurately.

i"""
-- 99 --
(iv) Prime matter i9 in sorne sense actuHl, it ia necessarily
extended, and it c.ln, therefore, be the substratuI:l. for substantial
change.
(v) Matter ia in a diminished sense part of the definition derived
fram the formula of the ferro cf composite substances, and it ia,
therefore, necessary for an understanding of the essence of these
s' ibstances.
(vi) Both matter and ferro are required as principles of
individuation in answering questions at t~e metaphysical levei. It
should be noted, however, that matter can only fulfill its role as a
principle of individuation in a subordinate rnanner (i.e., once it has
been determined that it is the matter of a certain kind of thing as weil
as that it is the matter of a particular individual). Both matter and
forro will be necessary in order ta answer questions about individuation
at the epistemological level: at this level the subordinate role will be
played by the form.
(vii) Both matter and form are required to answer the first
question about individuation, i.e., what differentiates individuals
within the same species? or, how are individuals within the same species
to be counted?
(viii) Both matter and form are required to answer tne second
question about individuation, i.e., what makes this individual the
individual it is? This conclusion follows as an obvious consequence of
(v) above.
-- 100 --
(ix) If it ia true that Aristotle beli~ves that in perception the
metaphysical order ia reversed, it aise 6eeme plausible tu argue that at
the epistemological level Aristotle wauld want ta include attributes
(bath accidentaI and neces6ury) in the process of individuation.
AccidentaI properties, which at the metaphysical level have the least
priority, in the epistemological process of individuation acquire a much
more prominent roie.

-- 101 --
CHAPTER II
SAINT THOMAS AOUINAS
8y the tirne Aquinas wrote it had becorne universally accepted that
sornething very close to the Aristotelian theory of the structure of
composite substances was correct. It must be kept in mind, however,
that this did not rnean that rnedieval thinkers had come to agree on the
structure of reality. Even though it was widely accepted throughout the
Middle Ages that composite substances were made up of ma~ter and ferm,
there was no agreement about the internaI details or even the general
structure of the various theories. It must be remembered that many
different currents of thought and interpretations came together in the
development of medieval philosophy. The two rnost important ancient
systems ta influence m~;dieval philosophy were, of course, those of Plata
and of Aristotle.
Although it is clear that aIl rnedieval philosophers were to a
greater or lesser degree influenced by one or the ether of these
systems, the influencG exercised by Aristotle on Aquinas has often been
exaggerated.
Faute de l'avoir saisie dans son originalité et sa

profondeur, d'excellents historiens ont cru pouvoir dire que
saint Thomas ne faisait que répéter Aristote, d'autres qu'il
n'avait même pas su le répéter correctement, d'autres enfin,
-- 102 --
qu'il n'avait réussi qu'un mosaique de fragments

hétéroclites, empruntés à des doctrines inconciliable et que
nulle intuition dominante ne venait unifier.'
It gOBa without saying that Gilson considera all of the aboya
alternatives ta be mie~uided, erroneous, and unfaithful ta the true
spirit cf Aquinas's philosophy. It ie alse true, as l mentioned in the
introduction, ~nat he thinks that Aquinas has generally interpreted
Aristotle correctly while expanding and improving on his theories.
En reprenant à son compte l'ontologie et la logique

d'Aristote, saint Thomas les a donc transposées, de leur ton
original, qui était celui de l'easanee, dans Bon propre ton,
qui était celui de l'être. L'ontologie de saint Thomas,
prise dans ce qu'elle apporte de nouveau par rapport à celle
d'Aristote, est une doctrine du primat de l'acte d'exister. 2
If in ontology and logic Gilson sees Aquinas following the general
guidelines of the Aristotelian system while at the Barne time
reinterpreting it for his own purposes, in studying Aquina~'6 philoBOphy
of nature Gilson finds that Aristotle's original picture has hardly heen
changed at all and that Aquinas concentrates his efforts on anewering
what he sees as Platonist attacks. At the beginning of chapter III of
Le Thomisme, Gilson states that:
l'ordre de la science naturelle est certainment celui où

saint Thomas a le moins innové. Ici, le philosophe
chrétien n'ajoute rien à la doctrine d'Aristote, ou si peu
de chose qu'il ne vaudrait guère la peine d'en parler.
Quelle que soit donc la manière, ou les diverses manières,
dont il juge pcssible de l'accorder avec le récit de la
Genèse, l'univers visible, tel que saint Thomas le conçoit,
reste essentiellement celui d'Aristote: ... 3
1. Gilson, le Thomisme, 169.
2. Gilson, Le Thomisme, 186.
3. Gilson, Le Thomfsme, 225·226.

-- 103 --
He goea on to exp1ain that in the rea1m of natura1 phi10aophy
Aquinas's main preoccupation ia the defense of Aristotle's conception of
the structure of the physical world against Platoniat criticisme. ThuB
he aaya that:
derrière chacune des docrines qu'il combat, saint Thomas

décèle la présence latente du platonisme, s'il les rejette,
c'est qu'à BeB yeux le monde que la philosophie a charge
ct' interpréter est le monde réel ct' Aristotle, non le monde
d'apparences décrit par Platon. 4
Though widely accepted by modern students of ancient and rnedieval
philosophy, this general explanation of the connection between Aquinas
and Ari~totle5 ia nct the on1y one. Scholars like W. Charlton and H. R.
King have recently advanced arguments (sorne of which we have seen above}
to prove that new interpretations of Aristotle were necessary to account
for his real views regarding, fer example, the concept of matter. As
far as l can see, these phi1osophers argue more or 1ess explicit1y 1)
that modern readings of Ari~totle have been too great1y inf1uenced by
Thomist interpretatiens of his theories; 2) that Aquinas was nQt only
inf1uenced by Aristot1e but a1so by other ancient phi10sophers (most
notab1y P1ato, Neop1atonists, and Pseudo-Oionysus); 3) that these oth~~
influences -- detectable in Aquinas's system and more powerful than
generally conceded -- were mistakenly attributed to Aristotle aIse; and
4) that, as a consequence, our reading of Aristotle's theory of matter
ia distorted.
4. Gilson, Le Thomisme, 233.
S. want ta stress that 1 am not here claimin'~ that most scholars deny aU Platonist influence on
Aquinas's philosophy. What 1 want ta l~hasize, however, is the general beLief that
whatever infLuence PLato might have had on Aquinas, Aristatle's is considered far greater.
-- 104 --
Charlton argues very rnuch ta this effect in the appendix ta his
translation of Aristotle's Physics I, II. 6 His conclusion iB that the
belief that Aristotle supports the notion of prime matter arose through
a series of late-ancient and early-medieval misunderstandings. From
this conclusion we can in fer that he alse believes that Aquinas's notion
of prime matter had te be derived not, as commonly believed, from
Aristotle, b·.", t :from Plata.
In fact it 8eeme ta me that the notion of prime matter was

reached by putting together Plato' s language with
Aristotle's concept of a material factor, by adapting
Aristotle' 8 underlying thing so that the Timaean account
would fit it. Aristotle must bear sorne responsibility for
this development, ainee he certainly represents Plata as
trying in the Timaeus to characterize the underlying
nature. 7
In reference to Aguinas's understanding of Aristotle on matter, he
explains that:
Aquinas certainly believed that Plato had a theory of matter

(5. T. i. 66, art. 2, cf. in Phys. 1.133), but in D~
principiis na~urae, written, perhaps, before the Su~na
Theologiae, but representing the thought of a new
generation, he appeals throughout to Aristotle without
mentioning Plato. It does not follow that he approached
Aristotle with a fresh and open mind. The De princ. nat. ia
on the whole an accurate and clear summa~y of the doctrine
of Phys. I-II, but in ch. 5 Aquinas says: "And sinee in
coming to be the matter or underlying thing (subjectum)
rernains, but the lack (privatio) doea nct, nor doea that
which consists of the matter and the lack, it follows thac
that matter which doea not bring in the lack ia permanent,
whilst that which doea ia transient." As waa said above,
thia can be shown to be Aristotelian doctrine only when the
corning te be ia a caae of alteration, of somethtng's coming
6. Charlton, Ar;stotte's Physics 1. Il, 141·145.
7. Ch~rlton, Ar;stotle's Phys;cs Ir Il, 142.

-- 105 --
ta be something, nct when it i5 a case of something's coming

simply into existence. 8
As 1 argued in the introduction, 1 think that Charlton's
conclusions about Aristotle's notion of prime matter are unsubstantiated
in Ariatotle's own writings and quite misguided. It should aIse be
said, however, that his claim about. the influence of Plata on later
theories of matter which consider it pure potentiality deserves careful
consideration. 9 This observation brings the discussion closer ta my
present cancern. The following discussion of Aquinas's theory of matter
is intended to show that, although few scholars entirely deny non-
Aristotelian influences on Aquinas, auch influences are nevertheless
underesti:aated. It will show that, while sorne aspects of Aquinas's
notion of matter are purely Aristotelian, sorne others are the product of
other systems combined with that of Aristotle.
8. CharLton, Aristotle's Physics I, II, 145. ALthough CharLton's text taLks about a ~
Phi Losophiae et the place where 1 have the Summa Theologiae, 1 assume the titLe has been
misprinted. The view that the notion of prime matter in Aquinas is derived predominantly
fram Plata and not only from Aristotle is also shared by Little, The Platonic Herit~ge of
Thomism, 191-204.
9. For the simpLe reason that CharLton rejects the idea thet AristotLe believes in prime matter (for
eny description of prime matter) while 1 don't, 1 would also not accept CharLton's more
•
extreme cLaim th et the notion of prime matter itself has no basis in Aristotle's system at
all. 1 aLso reject the immediate consequence of this, i.e., the inference which shauLd be
draWM tram this that any notion of prime irBtter needs to be tl"aced away fram Aristotle and
more in the direction of Plata.
-- 106 --
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT THOMAS AOUINAS
Aquinas's philosophy, being part of the medieval tradition in
which "by the end of the thirteenth century orthodox philosophy is
Aristotelian, ,,10 has itself been considered the paraàigm of Ariatotelian
philosophy in the Middla Ages. Particularly in natural philosophy and
natural science, as we have seen Gilson argue in Le Thomisme, Aquinas la
considered nct te have brought any dramatic changes ta the original
system of Aristotle. This la certainly true ta a great extent. Even
where this ia truet howl~ver, Aquinas' s motivat.ions for accepting certain
Aristotelian theories were different from those of Aristotle himselfn
It iB moreover important, when considering Aquinas'g concept of matter,
to n~te that througho~t the Middle Ages Plato and Aristotle were thought
to be largely in agreement regarding the hylomorphic composition of
physical subs~ances.'l Both of the se points should be kept in mind
throughout the following discussion.
Ae we have already seen, one of Aristotle's most pressing reasons
for introducing the notion of prime matter la the need for a plausible
solution to the very real and very urgent problem caused by the Eleatic
10. Charlton, Aristotle's Physics 1. II, 145.
11. See Charlton's discussion in Charlton, Aristotle's Physics Ir 11, 142-154, and especially his
mention of the pseudo-Grosseteste: nin the essay on matter (tract. iv) pseudo-Grosseteste
treats Plato and Aristotle as equal authorities, in broad if not complete agreement, and
cites bath freely.1I (C:-'arlton, Aristotle's Physics Ir Il, 145). This is also true of
Calcidius. Cf. Van Wint1en, Calcidius on Matter his Doctrine and Sources.
-- 107 --
dilenuna. No Christian philosopher t. '..lU Id have shared this motivation
with Aristotle, and Aquinas ia no exception. Both M. M. Adams 12 and
Gilson argue in different ways ta the effect that Aquinas's commitroent
ta the Christian doctrine of creation 'ex nihilo' in effect makes the
Eleatic dilemma completely ineffective. Aquinas, in fact, cannat share
~ith Aristotle the conviction that being-after-non-being ia intelli~ible
only if a substratum i9 posited which underlies and ia the subject of
this type of change. He cannat agree because, according ta Christian
doctrine, Gad created the universe 'ex nihilo' and thus rendeted any
allch substratum unnecessary. The Christian Gad, moreover, can, if he 80
chooses, reduce aIl of creation te nothing in such a way that none of
its par.ts remains. Christian theologians generally regarded
Parmenides's argument -- specifically, the claim that nething can come
te be frem what is not -- as ambiguous in a 1;lay qt' i.te different frem
that mentioned by Aristot1e. They agreed that that which is not in any
sense cannet be the material out oÏ which anything is made; and they
agr~zd in this sense that nothing can come ta be from what is net. But
they a1so be1ieved in the passibi1ity that samething might be brought
into being by an efficient cause without making use cf any materials at
a11; and they insisted in this sense that Gad created the war1d 'ex
nihilo' .
Gilson explaius that the effect of Aquinas's acceptance of the
notion of creation and annihilation introduced an essential difference
between the fundamental pri~ciples of Aquinas's thecry of matter and
those of Aristot1e's.
12. Adams, William Ockham, 635ff.

-- lOS --
Expliquer l'existence d'un être, c'est expliquer l'existence

,-;.;;; de tout ce qu'il est. Or les présocratiques avaient bien
justifié l'existence des individus ccmme tels, Platon et
P..ristote avaient bien justif ié l'existence des substances
comme telles, mais ni les uns ni les autres ne semblaient
avoi~ même songé qu'il y eût lieu d'expliquer l'existence de
la matière. Pourtant, comme la forme, la matière est un
élément constitutif des corps.13
Giving auch an explanation of the existence of matter for
Christian theologians and for Aquinas arnounts ta the rejsction of the
eternit~~ of the world, endorsed by Aristotle, and ta the acceptance of
the creation of the world, and therefore of prime matter, by God. 14
This difference, it seems to me, offers a good preliminary reason for
suspecting that Aquinas's notion of prime matter may be different from
that of Aristotle. In light of the argument that Aristotle's main
motivation for introducing the notion of prime matter is the need te
solve the Eleatic problem, and in light of the fact that the Eleatic
argument does net pese the same thréat te Aquinas, the claim seems at
least plausible that Aquinas might have a notion of prime matter, and ef
its role in the physical wcrld, quite different frcm that cf Aristotle.
This claim is made more plausible by the further observation that,
although prime matter as pure potentiality does not seem to help in the
solution of the Eleatic dilemma, it might well be just the kind of
entity used by God in the process of creation. Although important
ccnceptually, because it gives an important clue as te the frame of mind
with which the prcblem is approached, nevertheless this point shculd net
be everemphasized because, in the end, the test ef the Buitability cf
13. Gilson, le Thomisme, 154-155.
14. The originator of the arguments in favour of creation seems to be John Philoponus. Cf.
Davidson, Proofs for Eternity. Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and
Jewish Philosoohy, chapter IV, 86-116.
-- 109 --
the notion of prime matter in Aquinas's system will be its ability ta
explain change in the physical world. This means that, although Aquinas
ia committed ta accepting the possibility of creation and annihilation
and their intelligibility, it should be kept in mind that he
nevertheless considera them supernatural phenomena and accepta, as an
accurate description of avants in the natu~~l world, Aristotle'8 views
on change.
Aquinas's acceptance of Aristotle's theory of change and natural
philosophy, however, should not blind us to possible differences. The
following analysis of Aquinas's notion of prime matter will show that it
parts ways with Aristotle's in sorne important respects. The firet
problem l want to a~dress is the problem of the potentiality of prime
matter. l argued in the introduction that Aristotle does not in fact
accept the notion that prime matter ia pu~~ly potential. l want ta show
that Aquinas does accept this notion and ta examine how and why their
understanding of prime matter. differs in this respect.
The starting point of Aquinas's theory of generation and
corruption ie the sarne as Aristotle's. Although Aquinas differs from
Aristotle in hie acceptance of creation, he nonetheless sees that a
plausible account of how individual substances come into existence and
cease te exist still requires Aristotle's general analysis.. As far as
individual substances in the na~ural arder are concerned, observation
still makes it necessary to posit the existence of prime matter aud
substantial forro. If we do not want to admit that the only possible
type of change is alteration and if, at the sarne time, we also do not
{
want to Le forced ta admit the power of the Eleatic argument,
-- 110 --
Aristotle's theory of matter and ferro still furnishes us with the best
explanation of how it ia pos~" ible that natural substances change into
one another. Aquinas like Aristotle finds evidence in support of this
kind of explanation, and especially in support of the existence of prime
matter, in the observation of the changes which take place in artifacts
and of changes which take place between composite substances.
Materia autem prima consideratur subiecta omni formae. Sed

scitur secundum analogiam i idest secundum proportionem. Sic
enim cognoscimus quod lignum est aliquid praeter formam
Bcamni et lecti, quia quandoque est eub una forma, quandoque
eub alia. eum igitur videamus hoc quod est aer quandoque
fieri aquam, oportet dicere quod aliquid exietene eub forma
aeris, quandoque sit sub forma aquae: et sic illud est
aliquid praeter formam aquae et praeter formam aerio, sicut
lignum est aliquid praeter formam scamni et praete~': formam
lecti. Quod igitur sic se habet ad ipsas sub~ta~~iaB
naturales, sicut se habet aes ad statuam et lignum ad
lectum, et quodlibet rnateriale et informe ad formam, hoc
dicimus esse materiam primam. 15
Aquinas offers similar evidence for the existence of prime matter
in the COlnmen~ary on the Metaphysics, where he argue~ te the effect that
if th~ existence of prime matter is denied it will follow that aIl
cbange is accidentaI change. In arder for us ta be able to deny that
aIl change is accidentaI, it ia of course necessary not only to admit
that prime matter exists but aise te deny that it is fu11y a substanC",
in its ewn right:
ex hac autern Aristotelis ratione apparat, quod generatio et

corruptio substantialis sunt principiurn veniendi in
cognitionem materiae primae. Si enim materia prima de se
haberet aliquam fc~mam propriam, per eam esset aliquid actu.
15. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, Vol. II, In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio (Iussu
irrpensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae: Typographia Polyglotte, 1882-1971), Lib. l,
cap. VII, Lect. XIII, n. 9; all subsequent citations tram this work are to this edition.
See also an analogous passage in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Dmnia, Vol. VIII, Commentarium in
Lib. Il Sententiarum (Frette, Mare, eds.: Paris: Vives, 1871-80), d. XII, q. l, a. IV
solutio; all subsequent citations tram this work are to this edition.
-- 111 --
Et sic, eum superinduceretur alia forma, non simpl.i.citer

par earn Basat, sed fieret hoc val illud ans. Et sic Bsset
generatio secundum quid et non simpliciter.. Unde amnes
ponentes primum subiectum esse aliquod corpus,- ut aerem et
aquam, posuerunt generationem idem esse qilod alterationem.
Patet autem ex hac rations qualiter accipiendus ait
intellectus materiae primas; quia ita se habet ad amnes
formas et privationes, sicut se habet subiectum alterabile
ad qualitates contrarias .. 16
Up to this point Aquinas and Aristot1e are in full agr~arnent. The
first part of their accounts on which they differ cornes with the
discussion of the composition of the four elements. As WB have seen
above, there ia little evidence in Aristotlé's account of the
composition of the four elements for interpreting him ta be saying that,
like everything else, they are cempesed of prime matter and substantial
form. In Aristotle the four elements seem indeed ta be quite different
from other composite substances: instead of des~ribing them as being
compesed of prime matter and substantial ferro, Aristotle de scribes them
as being composed of prime matter and the contrarieties. Aquinas
recognizes that there is indeed such evidence in Aristotle. Unable to
believe that Aristotle actua11y thought the four elernents to be without
a proper substantial forro, Aquinas interprets him ta be saying, not that
the four elements are cemposed of prime matter and the contrarieties,
but that i~ this case the centrarieties are substantial forma. Aquinas,
however, arguing that it i9 impossible for the sarne thing to be a
substantial ferm in sorne contexts and an accidental property in others,
concludes that it must have been Aristotle's intention ta maintain that
the contrarieties are the preper effects of the substantial forms in the
four elements.
1~. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. VIII, Lect. 1, n.
1689.
-- 112 --
Secundum hoc ergo sequitur quod caler et frigua sint formae

substantiales igni5 et terrae~ Quod est ornnino impo6sibile.
Primo quidem quia non est possibile quod idem in une ait
accidens et in alie forma substantialis, ni9i aequivoce
diceretur: calidum autem et frigidum in aliia corporibuB
sunt accidentia, de quibus tamen univoce dicuntur eum
elementis, ex quorum commixtione in eis huiusmodi qualitates
inveniuntur. Non ergo potest ess~ quod calidum et frigidum
in elementis sint formae substantiales. Secundo quia nulla
forma substantialis est per se sensu perceptibilis, sed
aolum intellectu, cuiua obiec~um est quod quid est, ut
dicitur in III De anima: 17
The argument is twofold. In the first place, saying that the
contrarieties are the substantial forms of the four elements would lead
to the unwelcome conclusion that the sarne qualities can be accidental
forms in sorne substances and substar,tial forms in others. Secondly, it
would imply that there are sorne 5ubstantial forms which can be known by
the senses. The latter is denied by both Aquinas and Aristotle.
Aquinas, therefare, tries ta solve this prablem in the following
passages by explaining that Aristotle ceally meant to say that the
contrarieties are the proper effects of the substantial farms of the
four elements.
Differentiae substantiales, quia sunt ignotae, per

differentias accidenta:ds manifestantur: et idee multoties
utimur differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium. Et
hoc modo Philosophus hic dicit calidum et frigidum esse
differentias igrais et terrae. Calidum enim et frigidum, cum
sint prapriae passiones harum corporum, sunt proprii
effectus formarum substantialium eorumdem: ... 18
17. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, VoL. III, ln libros AristoteLis De Generationc et Corruptione
Expositio (Iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae: Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-
1971), Lib. 1, cap. [II, Lect. VIII, n. 5; att subsequent citations from this werk are te
this edition.
18. Thomas Aquinas, In Libres Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Expositio, Lib. [, cap. [II,
Lect. VIII, n. 5.
-- 113 --
Aquin"s's considered opinion, therefore, i5 that the Elements like
everything else have substantial forms:
prima habilitas, quae est materia, est ad fo~.dm elementi.

Unde non invenitur aliqua forma media inter mater~am primam
et formam elementi, sicut inveniuntur rnulta media inter
materiam primam et formam animalis; ... 19
Aquinas thUG concludes that Aristotle, like himself, roeant ta
assign substantial forms te the four Elements. As was shown in the
introduction, there are various reasens A~istotle's text gives us for
denying that the four Elements are composed of prime matter and
Bubstantial forma The most important ls Aristotle's claim that the four
Elements are nct substances in the full sense but only potentialities. 20
The natur~' of the composition of the four elements is, therefore, the
first point of disagreement between Aquinas and Aristot1e.
Aithough Aquinas assigns the saroe raIe ta prime matter which was
assigned to it by Aristot1e, his understanding of its nature, 1ike his
understanding of the nature of the composition of the four elements,
geeme ta be different in sorne important respects. Aquinas thinks that
prime matter, in arder te fuifiii its raIe as substratum of subatantiai
change, haB te be potential in a sense much stranger than l have argued
Aristot1e thought it to be: Aquinas ho1ds something very close to what l
have called the traditional view of prime matter. In the Commentary on
the Hetaphysics Aquinas explains that if it is maintained that the
elements change into one another, then it is necessary te say that they
have a matter common to them a11:
( 19. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. II Sententiarum , d. XII, q. I, a. IV solutio.
20. Cf. the discussion in section II, chapter I, 16-25 above.

-- 114 --
quia igitur ornnis rnutatio est de contrario in contrariurn,

necesae est subesse aliquod subiectum, quod posait rnutari de
contrario in contrarium. Et hoc PhiloBophus probat
dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia unum contrariorum non
transmutatur in alterurn; non enirn ipsa nigredo fit albedo.
Unde, si debeat fieri transmutatio de nigro in album,
oportet aliquid esse praeter nigredinem quod fiat album.
Alio modo probat idem ex hoc, quod in qualibet
transmutatione invenitur aliquid manens; sicut in
transmutatione, quae est de nigro in album, corpus manet;
aliud vero, Bcilicet contrarium, ut puta nigrum, non manet.
Unde manifestum est, quod materia est aliquid tertium
praeter contraria. 21
In this characterization of the potentiality of prime matter, as
in other passages, Aquinas seems te be in agreement with Aristotle: he
says, in fact, that the potentiality is in the matter. Another passage
in which Aquinae holds a position similar ta this ene, and in which he
geeme te assign an active role to matter, appears in the Commentary on
the Physics.
Hoc autem dicit quia materia, quae est ens in potentia, est
id ex quo fit aliquid per se: haee est enim quae intrat
substantiam rei factae. Sed ex privatione vel forma
praecedente fit aliquid per accidans, inquantum materiae ex
qua fit aliquid per se, conveniebat esse sub tali forma vei
eub tali privatione; ..• 22
In the Commentary on the Metaphysics Aquinas examines the very
famous passage which the traditional view of prime matter often cites in
its own support. We have seen above that it is plausible ta interpret
that passage in a qualified manner, and also that in light of other
aspects of his theory it seems indeed necessary ta do so. Thus, while
21. Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum AristoteLis Expositio, lib. XII, Lect. Il, nn.
2429-2430.
22. Thomas Aquinas, ln Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. l, cap. VIII, Lect. XIV,
n. 8. All of lecture XV of the same work also argues aLong the same Lines. In that
.~ discussion Aquinas draws distinctions between matter and privation. For a similar
treatment of these issues, cf. also Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. V, Lect. V, n. 816; n. 819; n. 821; and n. 826.
-- 115 --
AquinaB interprets the passage in the more natural way and in the way
subsequently used te argue that Aristotle believes prime matter ta be
purely potential, l think this was nat Aristotle's own meaning.
~nde et Philoso~hus accipit hic de materia, quae in phyeicis

aunt investigata, dicens: Dico autern materiam eSBe "quae
secundum se," idest secunàum sui essentia considerata,
nullatenus est "neque quid," ioast neque substantia, "neque
qualitas, neque aliquid aliorum generum, quibus ans
dividitur, val determinatur." Et hoc praecipue apparat
motu. Oportet enim subiectum mutationis et motus alterum
esse, par se loquendo, ab ut roque terminorum motus, ut
probatum est primo Physicorum. Unde, eum materia ait primum
aubiectum substans non salum matibus, qui sunt secundum
qualitatem et quantitatem et alia accidentia, sed etiam
mutationibuB quae sunt secundum substantiam, oportet, quod
materia ait alia secundum sui essentiarn ab omnibus fo:rmis
subatantialibus et earum privationibus, quae sunt termini
generationia et corruptionis; et non solum quod sit aliud a
quantitate et qualitate et aliis accidentibus. 23
A1though this passage a10ne does not prove conc1usive1y that
Aquinaa believes prime matter to he purely potential, it nevertheless
seems to show two things: 1) Aquinas does not be1ieve that prime matter
can have quantity, quality, or any ether accidenta). preperties in
itself; and 2} he doea net believe it can have auch properties in itself
possibly because he does not believe that, "secundum sui essentiarn
considerata," prime matter has any existence of its own. l argued that
Aristot1e be1ieves both 1) that prime matter, a1though in potentia1ity
to being an individual spJ:)stance, has sorne existence of its own, in the
sense that, though in a way different from that applicable to forrn, it
has sorne being, 2) that matter iB in itself extended, and 3) that,
therefore, it has at 1east the property of being extended in itself and
23. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. VII, Lect. II, nn.
1285-12%.
-- 116 --
necessarily. l think, however, that it ie necessary ta find ether
evidence for Aquinas's bellef in the pure potentiality of prime matter.
Aquinas in various passages saya that prime matter ia purely
potential because it ia nct 'hoc aliquid', while ferro ia actual because
it ia indeed 'hoc aliquid,.24 If this ia hie only considered opinion it
ia, of course, fully compatible with my interpretation of Aristotle: nct
being 'hoc aliquid' ia nct equivalent te nct being 'aliquid'; it ia nct
incompatible with being 'aliquid'; and being 'aliquid' could be
considered equivalent ta being 'hoc aliquid in potentia'. This ia, in
affect, what Aristotle believes, but it doee nct Bearn te be quite what
Aquinas believes about prime matter. 25 In various passages Aquinas's
characterization of the potentiality of prime matter seems to be much
stronger than this. While in the Commentary on Aristotle'S Metaphysics
he affirma that prime matter is the necessary substratum for substantial
change, in the Summa Theologiae and in the Commentary on the Sentences
he also maintains that it does not exist in reality. In the Commentary
on the Metaphysics Aquin~s explains, by using an analogy with what
happens in accidentaI changes, how it is necessary that there be
24. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, ln Ouodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, lib.
VII, lect. Il, nn. 1292-1293.
25. Cf. the following passage: "sed hic oportet adiungl;;re: si sit al iqui:::! existens, ad differentiam
universaliSj nam universale praedicatur eti?m de aliis, et alia non pÎ~edicantur de eOj nec
tamen est materia, eurn non sit aliquid subsistens. Universale enim et sub~~ctum differunt
per hoc, quod subieetum est hoc al iquid, non autem universale." (Thomas Aquinas, !.!2
Duodecim libres Metaphysicorum Aristorelis Expositie, lib. IX, Lect. VI, n. 1841). This
passage implies that if matter were te be 'aliquid subsistens' ewhich accerding ta the
passage it is not), it wauld either be 'hoc aliquid' (i.e., a partieular) or a universal;
we kn~w ft 15 not a part1cuLar, therefore it would have ta be a universal.
-- 117 --
something ~f the nature of matter ta underlie the type of change which
oceurs in generation and corruption:
Dicit, quod necesse est in substantiis sensibilibus panere

materiam quasi substantiam et subiectum. In omni enim
mutatione oportet esse subiectum commune terminis mutationis
in contrariis mutationibus; sicut in mutatione secundum
locum est aliquod commune subiectum, quod nunc est hic, et
iterum alibi. euro igitur ait quaedam mutatio secundum
substantiam, scilicet generatio et corruptio: oportet esse
aliquod commune subiectuffi, quod subiiciatur contrariis
mutationibus secundum generationem et corruptionem; et hoc
positis terminis, qui sunt forma et privatio; ita scilicet
quod quandoque ait actu par formam, et quandoque sit
subiectum privationis illius formae. 26
In this passage Aquinas seems to hold the view that only two ter~nlS
are neceasary for explaining generation and corruption: form and
privation. In effect, while the presence of a subject is mentioned in
the passage, its being aesms to be tqtally depandent on it being
informed by a particula~ forro or by its privation. While maintaining
this point of view in the Commentary on Aris~~tle's Metaphysics, he says
in the Summa Theologiae:
ad tertium dicendum quod materia prima non existit in rerum

natura pGi seipsam, cum non sit ens in actu, sed potentia
tantum: unde magis est aliquid concreatum, quarn creatum.
Nihilominus taroen materia prima, etiam se:::undurn pc...tentiam,
non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quia eiua
potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas naturales. 27
and he Bays again in the Commentary on The Sentences:
26. Thomas Aquinas, !n Ouod~cim libros Metap'h~· ~cotelis Expositio, Lib. VIII, lect. 1, n.
16S8.
27. ïhomas Aquinas, Oaera Ornnia, Vols. IV-XII, Surrrna Theologiae (Iussu impensaque leonis XIII, P. M.
edita: P.ûmae~ Typographia Polyglotta, 1882·1971), lib. l, q. VII, a. Il ad tertium; all
subsçquent citations from this work are to this edition.
-- 118 --
idee materia prima sic accepta non potuit esse duratione

l ante corpora ex ea formata. 28
Altheugh these two passages agree with Aristotle to the extent
that they affirm that the substratum of substantial change cannet exist
8~parately in nature, Aquinas's meaning turns out ta be stronger. We
will see later that the notion of inseparability in Aquinas does not
only i~~olve inseparability in nature, but aIse inseparability in
principle. One of the major reasons why ~quinaB denies separability in
principle l think to be the following:
similiter etiam non potest intelligi non artS simpliciter,

quod sit privatio pura sine forma: quia materia nunquam
denudatur ab omni forma, ita quod ait sub sola privatione.
Ergo oportet par non ans in quod tendit corruptio simplex,
intelligi privationem quae est adiuncta alicui formae. 29
This passage quite clearly implies that if matter were te be found
without any forro inhering in it at ail it would be non-being: it would
be non-being because it would have only privation in it, and privation
is non-being. This explains why it is extremely important for Aquinas
to maintain that prime matter can never, even by Ged's ab se lute power
(as is clear fram his views on transubstantiation which will be
discussed briefly belew), be found withaut any ferm inhering in it at
ail. This concept of pure potentiality, therefere, seems indeed to be
equivalent ta non-being. If, in fact, matter ia made actual by the
28. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. Il Sententiarum, d. XII q. l, 8. IV solutio. Cf. also the
following passage: "sed contra, omne esse est a forma. -go materia primt> fuit ante
rerun di stincti onem, oportet quod formam al i quam habueri t. 1I (Thomas Aqui nas, Commentar; lI'Tl
in Ub. II Sententiarum, d. XII, q. 1, a. IV sed contra).
29. Thomas Aquinas, In Libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Expositio, Lib. l, cap. III,
lect. VIII, n. 3, emphasîs added. Cf. also the following passage where Aquines says thet:
Umateri 8 8utem non habet esse. Il (Thomas Aqui nas, Seri ptun Super Libros Sentent i arl.fTl
Magistri Petri Lorrbardi CMandonnet, ed.: Paris~ Lethietleux, 10'::")' L1b. 1, d. VIII, q. V,
a. II salutio; all subsequent citations trom this work al'e to this edition).
-- 119 --
inherence of form, then it should aIse be admitted that it ia made into
non-being by the absolute absence of form, i.e., by the presence of that
which Aquinas considera the contrary of ferro: privation. This
conclusion aIse fallowa fram ether passages:
nam generatio per se quidem est ex ente in potentia, idest

ex materia, quae est sicut subiecturn rerum naturalium:
accidit enim materiae ex qua aliquid generatur, quod ait
subiecta alteri formae, secundum quam est ens actu, et
privationi formae inducendae, secundum quam est non en.e
actu: .•. 30
In the Commenta.ry on the First Book of the Sentences Aquinas again
emphasizes the pure potentiality of matter oy drawing a parallel between
the existential status of prime matter and that of God. The same
proportion ia found between prime matter and potentiality as ia found
between Gad and actuality: prime matter ia, therefore, pure passive
potentiality.
Et hoc modo se habet materia prima, quae est primum

recipiens, ad potentiarn passivam, sic:ut se habet Deus, qui
est primum agens, ad potentiam activam. Et idee materia est
sua potentia passiva, sicut et Deus sua potentia activa.
Oronia autem media habent utrarnque potentiam participative,
et p'otentia materiae non est ad aliquam operationem, sed ad
recJ.piendum tantum. 31
The fact that this is indeed the traditional notion of prime
matter which we discussed in the introduction is also confirmed by
Gilson.
Prise précisément en tant que matière, à part du tout dont

elle fait partie, elle n'existe pas: "En effect, l'être
(esse) est l'acte de ce dont on peut dire: ceci est; or on
30. Thomas Aquinas, In Libros AristoteLis De Generat;one et Corruptione Expositio, Lib. 1, cap. III,
Lect. VII, n. 6, emphasis added.
31. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri lombardi, Lib. l, d. III, q.
IV, 8. Il adquartun.
-- 120 --
ne dit pas de la matière qu'elle est; on ne le dit que du

tout; on ne peut donc pas dire que la matière est; c'est la
substance même qui est ce qui est. ,,32
We have seen, then, that Aquinas accepte Aristotle's notion that
physical Bubstances are composed of prime matter and BubBtantl.~l forme
We have aIse seen that Aquinas's notion of prime matter ie quite
different from that of Aristotle. l don't think that at the level of
the composition between matter and ferro it was Aquinas's intention ta
modify Aristotle' 5 pi.cture radically. It would be worthwhile,
therefore, ta try te explain why their notions of prime matter are, in
the end, 50 different.
Aquinas's complete conception of the elements involved in the
composition of reality in general and of the physical world in
particular ia very different from Aristotle's in one important respect.
Aquinas adds ta Aristotle's composition of matter and form, the
composition, which he made famous, between essence and existence:
quod quidem manifestum potest esse ex consideratione rerum

materialium, in quibus invenitur duplex compositio. Prima
quidam formae et materiae, ex quibus constituitur natura
aliqua. Natura autem sic composita non est suum esse, sed
esse est actus ~ius. Unde ipsa natura comparatur ad Buum
esse sicut poten't,ia ad actum. Subtracta ergo materia, et
posito quod ipsa forma subsistat non in m~teria, adhuc
remanet comparatio formae ad ipsum esse ut potentiae ad
actum. 33
This very important addition ta Aristatle's picture of reality
will move the focus of the analysis from a discussion of substance to a
discussion of existence, and even though it ia quite clear from the
32. Gilson, L~ Thomisme, 173. Also look at Gilson, Le Thomisme, 228 for more detail on Gilson's
views on the non' existence of prime matter.
33. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. I, q. L, a. II ad tertfum.

-- 121 --
·r
passage just quoted that the language in which the èistinction between
essence and existence is couched is faithfully Aristotelian, this should
not be allowed to hide the fact that the terms of any discussion of the
actuality of ferm and of the potentiality of matter are now extremely
different. l consider this distinction crucial, nct only in its own
right, but aIse for any comprehensive explanation of Aquinas's deviation
f~~m Aristotle's original characterization of prime r.,atter.
There are, l think, three major reasons why Aquinas characterizes
prime matter as pure potentiality and Aristotle doea nct: the firet ie
the importance placed by Aristotle, and nct by Aqu.inas, on the solution
of the Eleatic problern; the second ia Aquinas's i.ntroductia~ of the
distinction between essence and existence in his philosophical system;
and the third is the inevitable influence of Plato and the Neoplatonists
on Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's concept of matter.
We noted earlier that, while for Aristotle the predominant
motivation for introducing prime matter is the need for a plausible
solution to the Eleatic dilemma, this cannot be Aquinas's predominant
purpose, although he may consider it important to solve the problem in
ord..r to account for change in the physical world. Aquinas accepts the
notion of creation out of nothing, a notion which for Aristotle is as
absurd as the notion that there is no change in the physical world.
This in turn explains why it is important for Aristotle, and not for
Aquinas, ta adopt a notion of prime matter which bath prevents coming
into existence out of nothing, and coming into existence from that which
al~€ady is fully existent. Prime matter as pure potentiality cornes tao
close, in Aristotle's mind, ta resembling non-being ta be able ta strike

-- 122 --
auah a delicate balance. In Aquinas prime matter ia created by Gad
together with form, and even though in this s~nse the problem doea nct
arise, l still find it puzzling ta have t0 think of the substratum of
change i.e., of that which i5 supposed ta be the physical stuff of
the material world -- as of sornething which has no being of its own,
however incomplete its being should be thought to be.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa non ostendit quod

materia non ait creata, sed quod non ait creata sine forma.
Licet enim arone creatum sit in actu, non tamen est actuB
purus. Unde oportet quod etiam illuâ quod se habet ex parte
pot~ntiae, ait creatum, si totum quod ad esse ipsius
p:-'~·":inet, creatum est. 34
The notion of the concreation of prime matter a~d substantial ferro
makes it prima facie implausible ta question the consistency of the
notion of prime matter as pure potentiality when taken alone. However,
the problem does arise for Aquinas, as it did for Aristotle, when the
discussion turns from creation to substantial change. l think that at
that level the notion of prime matter adopted by Aristotle ia a much
better one.
Aristotle's notion of prime matter ia better because it iB a
consistent notion, even when considered in itself. This is BO because,
while in Aristotle tao, matter ia never found in nature without a
Bubatantial form or at least the contrarieties which united with matter
make up the four E'.~.ements, nevertheless the notion that matter in itself
has sorne existence and is extended renders it capable of being the
physical stuff which lies at the lower end of the scale of being. This
physical stuff is united to the contrarieties to which it will give the

".-",.
34. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloqiae, Lib. 1, q. XLIV, a. II ad tertium.

-- 123 --
being and the extension which they thernselves do nct have. The four
elementa, becauae they lack a substantial forro, and becauae their
actuality ia that which is given to them by the qua1ities that make them
up and by prime matter, are ca11ed potentia1itiea by Aristotle without
any implication that they are in sorne way ta be considered non-existent.
The conclusion ta be drawn i5 that, because the four elements do nct
possess the unit y reserved ta individuals in the category of subatance,
they are nct 'a this', but ooly 'a this' potentia:ly. Like prime
matter, however, they are beings, though nct completely actual beings.
Actual being, in affect, ia the bGing of individuals; and matter, as
well as the four elements, ia cornrnon te aIl things and nct individual,
but as common it must exist because its existence ia what makes
Aristotle's account of substantial change coherent. Aquinae'a notion of
prime matter, on the'othe~ hand, is one of an entity which is, taken in
itself, non-being, but that when united with a substantial form, fram
which it gains all of its existel"i-=e, is capable, with that form, to form
an individual in the category of substance. Although it is difficu1t to
insist that, in arder ta understand their respective roles in nature, it
should be possible to separate matter and form, and this in a way
stronger than Aquinas would allow, it nevertheles8 8eems clear that, if
this ie done even if they are considered separate only in definition,
the notion of prime matter adopted by Aquinas cannet be seen as
adequate. If prime matter, in tact, is considered necessary in the
explanation of substantial change because it provides cent inuit y and
persists through generatien and corruption, it iB clear that it must be
considered a being in its own right. Aquinas considers it a being only
because it ia always united with forro, fram which, in effect, it derives

-- 1::4 --
its very existence. Matter in itself iB simply non-being. Non-being
simply cannat be what Aristotle was looking for when he conceived of the
necessity of prime matter. Non-being, in tact, iB precisely one of the
two extremes he was trying te avoid. Aquinas's notion of prime matter
cao be considered adequate, therefore, ooly if considered, aven in
thought, ta be always together with forme Even i i this ie the way it
ia, in fact, alwaya found in nature, this shoulè not prevent us fram
examining its consistency as a notion in its own right. I1: ie when
Aquinas's notion of prime matter ia considered in this light that its
ahortcomings become apparent.
The second reason which in Aquinas's mind might justify the pure
potentiality of prime matter may be provided by his distinction between
essence and existence. In Aristotle there ia no allch distinction, and
the Bubstantial ferm nct ooly gives the matter its essence but aIse
gives it its existence (it rnakes it a 'this' and a 'allch'). In
Aristotle actuality rneans nct ooly nature or essence but aise existence
(in the sense of existence of a certain kind of thing). In Aquinas, tne
distinction between essence and existence means in effect that for
composite substances there will be two leveis of potentiality and two
leveis of actualization. At the firet levei the matter will acquire a
nature, an essence, but nct existence; at the second levei the essence
which ia already composed of matter and ferro will acquire existence {the
forro makes the matter a 'such', the existence added ta the essence makes
it a 'this')o Even if the process does not take place in the sequential
fashion in which l describe it, still, at the conceptual level, it needs

-- 125 --
two kinds of potentiality.35 This, l suggest, makes it prima facie more
likely that Aquinas, and not Aristotle, would accept a notion of matter
as purely potential. In effect l am arguing that the notion of creation
out of nothing combined with Aquinas's distinction between essence and
existence make it much 1e93 important for Aquinas te avoid having his
notion of prime matter resemble non-being so closely. This sarne notion
of prime matter, on the ether hand, would have caused Aristotle's
program te fail at the very outset. It hould have nullified his effort
'00 solve the Eleatic problem and it would have made his real world
35. The problem of the real distinction between (or real composition of) essence and existence ;5
more complex than ;t might st tirst appear. Thus, ft is generally 8greed that Aquinas
thinks th et there is a real distinction between ess~nce and existence, because "merely
logical or conceptuel composition of such entities will hardly be sufficient for him to
support his claim, that such entities are not in fact pure actualities." (Wippel,
Metsehysical Themes in Thomas Aguinas, 109). In addition it is equally clear that by the
fact th et he maintains that there is a real distinction between essence end existence,
Aquines does not mean to su~gest that an essence can exist without 'esse'. It is,
therefore, unclear exactly what the real distinction amounts to. While maintaining that in
creatures there is a real composition of essence and existence, Aquinas in fact believes
that there are no mereLy possible individuals: an essence cannot have independent existence
unless it has 'esse'. This, for Aquinas, as for many of his contemporaries, means that
these essences, priar ta their actual realization, only exist in the divine intellect. nAd
primum erga dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem
in mente divina." (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. XVI, a. VII ad primum).
"Prior to the actual creation of a given entity there is a divine idee to which that
creature wiLL correspond if it is ever brought into actual being. 1I (WippeL, MetaphysicaL
Themes in Thomas Aguinas, 166). It is important to keep in mind, however, that these
divine ideas are really identical with the divine essence: the essences of possibLe beings
do not enjoy any independent existence. IlAd secundurn dicendum, quod rationes ideales
rerum r qUa~ sunt in Deo ab aeterno, non sunt aliud secundum rem ab ipso intel Lectu et
essentia divine. 1I (Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri
lombardi, Lib. l, d. XIX, q. V, a. III ad secundum). Cf. also the folLowing passage in
which Aquinas holds that: "ad tertium dicendum quod Oeus secundum essentiam suam est
similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihi1 est aLiud quam Dei essentia." (Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, lib. 1, q. XV, 8. 1 ad tertium). Therefore. Ilthere is no place
within Thomas's metaphysics for any eternally preexisting possible that would enjoy sorne
kind of being in distinctil,n from that of the divine essence itseLf. According ta Thomas,
prior to fts reaLization as an existing individual, a possible enjoys no distinctive
reaLity from eternity apart from its presence in the divine intellect as a divine idee.
And since a divine idea is really identical with the divine essence, a possible enjoys no
reelity in its. lf apart from that of God." (Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aguinas,
167).
-- 126 --
resemble Plato'B world of illusion far too closely. The form in
Aristotle gives the matter a nature and it actualizes it, therefore, as
a certain kind of thing. But there i9 no question in Aristotle that the
matter has existence of its own, because, he stresses that it ia nct
non-being. If it weret it 8eemB that Plata might have been right in
claiming that the physical world is only a copy of the rea1 world of
Forma.
The notion of a synthesis between Plate and Aristotle in Aquinas
ia nct novel. 36 l am nct alone, therefore, in claiming that ta sorne
extent Plato's concept of matter has indeed influenced Aquinas's
characterization of Aristotelian matter, and has thus contributed ta
Aquinas's notion of matter as pure potentiality.
It has been maintained that in Plato matter is identified with
non-being37 and l think that this identification fits perfectly we1l
with Plato'8 notion that the real world is the world of Forms and that
the material world is on1y il1usory. For Plato, just as the physical
world has no reality of its own, so tao the matter from which it cornes
to be has no actuality of its own. In the Timaeus Plata characterizes
matter in the following way:
inasmuch as she always receives ail things, she never

departs at ail from her own nature and never, in any way or
at any time, assumes a ferro like that of any ef the things
which enter into her; she lS the natural recipient of ail
36. See, for exarrple, Gilson, Le Thomisme, chapt el" IV, section JI.
37. Cf. Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 176-184.

-- 1'<7 --
Lmpressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and

appears different fram time ta time by reason of them. 38
Plata aise characterizes matter as:
the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in

any way sensible things i5 nct te be termed earth or air or
fire or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the
elements fram which these are derived, but ia an invisible
and formless being which receives aIl things and in Bame
mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and is most
incomprehensible. 39
The description 'mother' used in referring ta matter, Bllch as in
"as it were a mother," iB aise taken up by Aristotle, without, however,
bringing along aIl the conceptual baggage which Plato had attached to
it. In neither of these passages doea Plata directly mention matter or
identify it with non-being. In neither passage ia matter identified as
the substratum for substantial change, but in both it ia called the
receptacle of sensible things. Plato aiso says, in the first passage
quoted, that "she never departs at ail from her own nature,1I implying
therefore that matter has its own determined nature different from that
of ferro; and that she "never, in any way or at any time, assumes a form
like that of any of the things which enter into her." Both of these
characterizations of matter are quite different from Aristotle's own.
Neither passage, however, directly identifies matter or passive potency
with non-being. Calcidius in his Commentary on Plato's Timaeus 40
examines the concept of matter in aIl the Greek philosophical systems
3S. Plata, Timaeus, SObS·c3. It should be noted here that Plate does not use the terms matter or
passive patency, which are purely Aristotelian, in discussing these notions. Cf. Little,
The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 182, note n. 3.
39. Plato, Timaeus, S1a4-b2.
40. Van \'Hnden, CaLcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Source~. Cf. aLso O'Donnell, "The Meaning of
'Si Lva' in the Conmentary on The Timaeus of Plato by Chalcidius."
-- 128 --
with which he lB familiar. He refera ta matter as 'silva' and
identifies Aristotle'e matter with Plato's receptacle. 41 In his account
of matter, Calcidius consistently mixes what seern te be clearly
Aristotelian elements with ether elements which are clearly Plato~tc:
thus, for example, he calls matter "that out of which (ex quo)"
fo11owing Aristotle. but a1so "that in which (in qua)" following
Plato. 42 This synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian elements makes it
quite hard te determine what Calcidius thinks Plato's view of matter te
be, and cften it ls quite clear that he believes Plate and Aristotle ta
be in agreement in their views on the concept of matter. It i~,
neverthelesB, possible ta say that, aven though CalcidiuB never
identifies matter with non-being directly in interpreting Plato's
thought. he does, fo11owing Timaeus 52 b • identify it with space. 43 In
his own treatrnent of th~ characteristics of 'silva', however, CalcidiuB
41. Cf. Van Winden, Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 29·31.
42. Cf. Van Winden, Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 31; cf. also 50, 164, 165, ln,
196-, 219, 242, and 244. Van Winden also points cut that: "at first sight the Aristotelian
doctrine preponderates: the terms and expressions silva, patibilis, subiecta corporis
principaliter, ex qua. On reconsideration, however, the Platonic character proves, at
Leest, te be equally streng, especially in the intrinsic immutability ascribed to the
silva. Evidently Calcidius wanted to associate himself closely with Plate. The
expressions which, to us, sound purely Aristotelian, w~,c, te him, in perfect agreement
with Plate." (Van Winden, Calcidius en Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 32). Cf. also
O'Donnell, IIThe Meaning of 'Silva' in the Corrrnentary on The Timaeus of Plata by
Chalcidius," 2, 8, 9, and 19.
43. Plate, limaeus, 52bff. Cf. Van ...· lflden, Calc:idius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 39, 174,
and 219; and: "this receptacle PLato later on identifies with space. lI <O'Donnell, "The
Meaning of 'Silva' in the Corrrnentary on The Timaeus of PLato by Chalcidius,1I 3). Calcidius
alse identifies the receptacle with spa ce and with the ....oid: llsed obscurs quadem lllJlinis
presumptione, non ut quid sit explices, sed contra sublatis, quae sunt, singulis, quod
solum remanet, ipsum esse, quod quaeritur, inteLligendum relinquas; hoc P.St ut uni ....ersis
corporibus, quae intra gremium sil ....ae ....arie ....aria formantur, mutua ex aLie in aliud
resolutione singi llatim ademtis, solum ipsl..m vacuum sinum speculatione mentis imagineris.'·
(O'Donnell, "The Meaning of 'Silva' in the corrrnentary on The Timaeus of Plato by
Chalcidius,lI 11).
-- 129 --
presents as Platonic a view of matter which ia, in certain respects,
quite close te Aquinas's own.
Fer matter by itself is net ameng the things that are,

because it i9 eternal. Therefore, that which stands between
these two natures ia nct really existing. Since it ia the
image of what really exista, it geeme ta exist te sorne
extent; but ainee it ia nct permanent and undergoes change,
it doea nct exist in reality, as the exemplars do; for these
indeed enj oy true and unchangeable existence. Hence there
are the three following realities: that which always ia,
that which a1ways is net and that which is net a1ways.44
Ca1cidius, thinking quite right1y that he is fe11ewing Plate,
identifies matter as "that which always ia nct," the Forms as "that
which always ia," and the substances which are part of the physical
world as "that which ia nct always." Aquinas of course does not believe
that matter is eternal or that it can ever be found without forro, but t
according to Aquinas, should it be possible to find matter without form,
it weu1d be nen-being. 45
44. Van Winden. Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 192. Van Winden makes the following
cOllll'lent on this passage: llthe two statements can be combined in the assertion that matter
i5 alwaY5 the same, but that its 'being' is a potential one, and that, in so far, it is
right to say: quod semper non est. For matter always remains what it is (semper non est),
but, on aCCaunt of the addition of the qualities 'from without', it may also be said that
it is (quae est quidem) •••• He (Calcidius) explains the preceding words thus: 'of itself
matter is nothing of all that is seen in it and which actually exists and which, therefore,
gives it an ever changing appearance (non eadem semper), because it is eternal (quae est
quidem)'.u (Van Winden, Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 192).
45. Plato's receptacle is identified with space, the limitless, and nonobeing (cf. Q'DonneU, "The
Meaning of '5i lva' in the Corrmentary on The Timaeus of Plato by Chalcidius," 3). We salol
that Plata identifies the receptacle with space in the Timaeus (Plata, Timaeus, 52 bff), and
Aristotle also says that Plata identifies prime matter with space (Aristotle, Physics,
IV.2.2D9 bl1). Little (Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 171-204) argues that the
notion of matter used by St. Thomas, as well as his solution to the Eleatic problem, are
derived from Plato and not from Aristût~e. He argues, furthermore, that Aristotle's notion
of matter, far from being equivalent to non-being 00 as he thinks it te be bath in Plata
and in Aquinas -- is quite close to the Scotist l"1\Jtion of matter. Little argues, frOltI
Plato's later dialogues, that Plato thinks nonobeing te be equivalent to the Aristotel ian
notion of passive potency. His analysis starts from the notions of division and limit as
understood by Plato. He notes that Plata, in his attempts to counter Parmenides's
arguments always emphasizes the need to praye the reality of non-being (Plata, Sophist,
-- 130 --
:..;, In any event, Aquinas himself seems ta think that according ta the
Platonists matter ia non-being. 46 Thua, although Aquinas iB often found
fighting Platonic influences, it 5eems quite obvious fram what has baen
said aboya that the pure potentiality of prime matter ia more Platonic
in character than Aristotelian.
Aquinas, as we saw, certainly follows Aristotle in believing that
prime matter ia the substratum of substantial change and indeed ia
necessary te explain the v~ry existence of such change. There i9.
however, a Neoplatonist element which gives a more complete explanation
2378 ). "And tater in the same dialogue (Plate, Sophist, 256·258) the reality of non-OOing
1S proved as the real exclusii':-: of other ï)ossible perfection." (Little, The Platonic
Heritage of Thom'sm, 176-177). Non·being is, therefore, equivalent to limit, and Little
says that: "Plata therefore meant by non-being in a thing the real exclusion of possible or
actual positive reality or perfection, ••• Thus non·being is the exclusion of the other's
being. He en.,nasizes that that exclusion is a realitYi ••• 11 (Little, The Platonic Heritage
of Thomism, 178). From an examination of the Philebus Litt~e concludes thet the principle
which Plato calls the infinite in the Philebus is the same as thet which in the Sophist he
calls nonwbeing. Since non·being in the Sophist is the limiting principle, it must fol!~w
according to Little that in the Philebus the infini te has to play the part of the limit.
l i t t is in fact an undetermined l imit." (Little, Th~ Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 180).
Little thinks that this notion of non-being as the exclusion of all positive reality
provides the correct solution to th~ Eleatic dilemma. Unfortunately, however, Plate goes
on to equate non-belng with a complete sLlbstance: this he does in the Timaeus where he
equates the principle of division with empty space. IlAnd now Plato's doctrine on pae-.sive
potency and his answer to Parmenides ean be summarized. Non-being or 'me on' is ~ ~
or the principle of difference between being and being. It is also therefore ~he limit or
exclusion of one being by another being. It is also therefore the division of 0'.1e being
fram another. And Plato concluded that therefore it was identified with space regarded as
substantial. 1l (Little, The Platonie fieritaqe of Thomism, 183). It seems plausible to claim
that the Platonic equivalent of Aristotelian matter is the same as non-being. Sinee the
'silva' is identified with empty space, and empty spaee itsetf is identified with non-
being, division, the limit, and the infinite, it would seem ta follow that matter ean be
identified with non~being.
46~ Cf. the following passage: "l ieet, secundum Platonieos, diei possit quod materia prima est non
ens, propter privationem adiuneta~· (Thomas Aquinas, Surrma Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. V, a.
III ad tertium). The notion of privation here mentioned by Aquinas is cleerly of
Aristotelian origin. Plato himself, as we saw above, thinks that matter never departs tram
its own nature and never assumes the form of any of the things which enter into her.
Presumably neither does she assume the privations of those forms. For additional
confirmation of this point, cf. Van Winden, Caleidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources,
32 and 148.
-- 131 --
of Aquinas's characterization of prime matter as pure potentiality: this
ia the notion that potentia1ity 1imits actuality.47 Aquinas aaya, in
fact, that:
creaturae autem materiales habent infinitatem ex parte

materiae, sed finitatern ex parte formae, quae limitatu'c per
materiam in qua recipitur. 48
The firet ""'art of Aquinas' s statement iB fully Aristotelian:
matter ia infinite and it i5 lirnited by forme But the second part ia
nct: ferm iB limited by the matter in which it iB received. The
explanation of the fact that matter limita ferro is as follows: matter ia
limited by ferro because, while befere receiving a ferro it was in
potentiality te receiving many forms, it has now been finalized by one.
The form, on the other hand, is limited by the matter because when
conaidered in it~elf it is COmmon to many, while by the fact that it ia
received in matter it ia made into the ferro of one particular substance.
Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formarn, et forma per

materiarn. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia,
antequèlîù recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas:
sed eum recipit uncun, terminatur per illam. Forma vero
firitur per materiam, inquan"!:um forma, in se eonsiderata,
communie eet ad multa: sed per hoc quod reeipitur in
materia, fit forma determinate huius rei. 49
Ariatotle would have accepted the statement that the forro limita
or determines the matter, but nct that the form is in any way limited or
determined by the matter which it informs. This second conception of
47. For a more cOfIlllete di scuss i on of th i s vi ew see Clarke, lIThe Limi tat i on of Act by Potency:
Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism. 1l Cf. also my discussion of limitation of act by potency
in Aquinas and Scot us in chapter IV, section I, below.
48. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, Q. L, a. II ad quartum.

".:..
49. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. VII, a. 1 resp.
-- 132 --
1 the matter limiting the ferro i5 nct a picture in whi~h the potentiality
of prime matter ia sirnply, as Aristotle would have it, potentiality for
substantial change; it ia a more power fuI kind of potentiality which ia
capable of limiting the actuality of form.
Finally there are sorne other elements found in the Neoplatonist
and Platonic characterization of matter and the material world which
have filtered down ta Aquinas's own. Theae are descriptions of matter
which would in sorne cases be too extreme for Aristotle given his view of
the physical world, but which are quite in tune with a Chri~tian world
view. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas says that matter ia imperfect
becauee it ia being in potenti.ality and ooly being in actuality cao be
truly said to be perfecto Ta this he adds a 1itt1e later that no being
cao be said ta be evil inasmuch as it ia being, but ooly inaemuch aB it
lacks sorne being. 50 He also says that matter is only good in
potentiality because it only exists in potentiality.
Ad tertium dicendum quod materia prima, sicut non est ens

niei in potentia, ita nec bonum nisi in potentia. Licet,
secundum Platonicos, di~i possit quod materia prima est non
ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed tamen partieipat
aliquid de bona l scilieet ipsum ordinem vel aptitudinem ad
bonum. Et ideo non canvenit sibi quod sit appetibile, sed
quod appetat. 51
A eimilar point is made again by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae,
Lib. l, q. III, a. II resp., where in explaining why there is no matter
in Gad, he saya that ail that ia compoaed of matter and ferm ia geod and
perfeet in virtue of its form, and that sinee the matter i5 only made
50. Thomas Aquinas, SUTIll8 Theologiae, Lib. l, q. IV, a. l respj and cf. also Lib. l, q. V, 8. III ad
tertiun.
51. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolog;ae, Lib. l, q. V, a. III ad tertium.

-- 133 --
good by participating in the farro, it i5 impossible that there be matter
in Gad becauae it ia impossible that Gad be good by participation.
Matter, of course, la nat considered by Aquinas ta be purely evil
because he thinks it was created by God,52 but it i8 quite clear that it
ia nat goad in itself. 53 There i8 in any case a non-Aristotelian flavor
in this discussion of matter and of ferro as good or evil and in the
repeated references ta the notion of 'participation'.
Finally, while there is an overall emphasis in Aristotle's system
on the ultirnate harmony found in the relationship between matter and
form, one finda in Plata a much stronger sense of strif~ which l think
ia reflected in this passage in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
In quibuB vero forma non complet totam potentiam materiae,

remanet adhuc in materia potentia ad aliam formam. Et ideo
non est in eis necessitas essendi, sed virtuB essendi
52. See Gilson, le Thomisme, 244, for a discussion of this tapie.
53. Because in Aquinas prime matter in itself is pure privation and is not d positive entity, when
Aquinas explains that no being can be said to be evil inasmuch as it has being, but only
inasmuch as it lacks some being, it is clear that, as a consequence, matter is in itself
evil because in itself it is nothing but lack of being. Aristotle also refers to the leck
that is in matter as having an evil tendency and as being totally non-existent because of
thi& evil tendency (cf., for example, Aristotle, Physics, 1.9.192814-15). The implication,
however, is not the same. Because in Aristotle matter is a positive entity 8nd has sorne
actualityof its own, prime matter in itsel; cannot be seen as equivalent with the lack,
although it is th~t in which the leck is found. The lack of form, which is that which is
totally non-existent in virtue of its evil tendency, is not the same as the matter in
itself, which is said ta rernain joint cause with the form of the things which corne to be.
Matter, then, in Aristotle, is not evil, but joint cause with the form; priva··," i5 evil,
but privation is not the same as matter. A simi lar argtrnent regarding the re: ,'.. ionship
between matter, privation, :md evi l in Aristotle is fouOO in Calcidius: "Calcidius
concludes that, theref~je, not matter but privation is the source of evil. This is
inferred from the fact that, contrary to privation, matter is not simply non~existent; "
(Van Winden, Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources, 91; cf. also 85). In Aquinas,
on the other hand, the privation is evil, and matter, when totally without form, is nothing
but privation of form, and, as a consequence, when considered in itself, totally deprived
of form, matter i5 evil. Cf. also Armstrong, The Cambridge History of later Greek and
Early Medieval Philo5ophy, 25-26.
-- 134 --
• consequitur in eis victoriam formae super materia: ut patet

l in elementis et elementatis. 54
l .,..> uld like to conclude this section on the potentiality of
matter in Aquinas by looking at sorne of the Most irnrnediate consequences
of his views. It 8eemB ta me that there are four major problems caused
in Aquinas's system by the PU~Q potentiality of matter. The firF;t
problem ia one of which l think. Agu~,nas himself ia conscious and tries
to solve: it is, quite independently of the problem of individuation,
the problem of how quantity will inhere in matter ta prepare it for its
appropriate forrn. The second problem il' that this notion of prime
matter leaves unsolved the Eleatic dilernma. The third, which i.e a
consequence of the second, concerna the notion of matter comman te a~l
things which Aquinas is left with. The fourth is the notion that the
composite of matter and forro can, in fact, be considered a composite in
Aquinas'e philosophy. l will briefly diseuse the se in turn.
The firet problem, a~ l said, is one of which l think Aquinas ia
aware. In his earlier writings Aquinas accepts the notion of the ' .:orm
of corporeity'; this form provides a distinction between corporeal
matter and intelligible matter, and it predisposes ma~ter for the
reception of ita appr~priate form.
Et propterea materia prima, prout consideratur nu da ab omni

forma, non habet aliquam diversitatem, nec efficitur diversa
per aliqua accidentia ante adventum formae substantialis cum
esse accidentale non praecedat substantiale. Uni autem
perfectibili debetur una perfectio. Ergo oportet quod prima
forma substantialis perficiat totam materiam. Sed prima
forma quae recipitur in materia, est corporeitas, a qua
nunquam denudatur, ut dicit Comment. in l Physic., texte
• 54. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Ornnia, Vols. XIII-XV, Summa ~ontra Gentiles (Iuss~ impensaque leonis XIII,
P. M. edita: Romae: Typographia Polyglotta, '~82-'971), lib. Il, ~ap. XXX, emphasis added;
at\ subsequent citations tram this wark are ta this edition.
-- 135 --
corn. 63. Ergo forma corporeitatis est in tata materia, et

ita materia non erit niai in corporibus. 55
The 'f~rrna corporeitatis' solves one problem: given that in
Aquinas prime matter has no quantity or dimensions at aIl - a problem
which doea nct arise in Aristotle - the 'corporeal ferro' allows
Aquinas's purely potential matter te have dimensions so as ta he
predisposed for the inherence of ether forms. Aquinas, however, cornes
ta the conclusion that the 'ferro of corporeity' causes more problems
than it solves: the major problem it causes ia that of committing
Aquinas to the acceptance of the theory of the plurality of forma.
Aquinas will later reject the plausibility of the theory of the
plurality of forms on the grounds, roughly, that it destroys the
essential unity of the composite, and with it he will be forced ta
reject the existence of the 'ferro of corporeity'.
Aquinas, however, remains aware of the fact that he needs to have
dimensions in matter, not only in order ta make his theory of
individuation 9lausibIe, but aIso, more simply, in arder ta allow for
the inherence of substantial forms in matter.
By the time Aquinas wrote the Summa Conera Geneiles he had
rejected the notion of the form of corporeity a~ a separate forro but
wanted to retain its function:
oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma

substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima
rationalis, quae in sua materia hoc requirit quod h~beat
tres dimensiones; est enim actus corporis alicuius. - Alio
modo accipitur corporeitas prout est forma accidentalis,
secundum quam dicitur corpus quod est in genere quantitatis.
55. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Mag;stri Petri Lombardi, Lib. l, d. VIII, q.
V, 8. Il solutio.
-- 136 --
Et sic corporeitas nihil aliud est quarn tres dimensiones,

quae corporis rationem constituunt. 56
The ferm Df corporeity has thus become nothing ether than the
three dimensions necessary ta make something a body. But Aquinas aIse
thinks that the dimensions in matter are presupposed for the inhere~~e
of ferro. ThuG he argues in the Co.mmentary on the Sentences that there
can be no differentiation in rr.atter bafora the inherence of corporeity,
inasmuch as Bllah differentiation would presuppose the existence of
parts, and allch differentiation into parts, in turn, can only follow
fram the inherence of quantity. Quantity, however, cannat exist without
corporeity. Aquinas, therefore, having rejected the ferro of corporeity,
seems ta find hims~lf faced with a vicious circle. The three dimensions
needed for the inherence of form presuppose parts, the division into
parts presuppose quantity, quantity presupposes corporeity, and it, in
turn, presupposes the substantial fOI:m which requires the three
dimensions before it can inform the matter.
Sed ante corporeitatem non potest inte11igi a1iqua

diversitas. Quia diversitas praesupponit partes, quae non
possu~,t esse niai praeintelligatur divisibilitas quae
conBe~~lçur quantitatem, quae sine corporeitate non est. 57
56. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. IV, cap. LXXXI.
57. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. II Sententiarum, d. Ill, q. l, a. i solutio. A similar

argt.ment is also found in the Sunma Contra Gentiles: lI et quia sola quantitas dimensiva de
sui ratione habflt unde multiplicatio indiv:duorum in eadem specie possit accidere, prima
radix huiusmodi multiplicationis ex dimensione esse videtur: quia et in genere substanriae
multiplicatio fit secundum dimensionem materiae; quae nec intelligi posset nisi secundum
quod materia sub dimensionibus consideratur: nam, remota quantitate, substantia omnis
indivi sibil i s est, ut patet per Ph i losophum in 1 Phys i corum. Il (Thomas Aqui nas, Sl.J'1'IM Contra
Gentiles, Lib. IV, cap. LXV).
-- 137 --
This Barne need for something analogous t v the forro of corporeity
la expressed again and even mJ.'~·= clearly in the C'ommen~ary on the
Hetaphysics, where Aquinas says explicitly:
haee autem est materia. Quantitas enim dimensiva videtur

inesBe materiae immediate, eum materia non dividatur ad
recipiendum diversas formas in cliverais Buis partibus, nisi
per huiusmodi quantitatem. s8
It la quite clear fram this passage that it i9 necessary that the
quantitative dimensions inhere directly in the matter befere it can
receive its proper form. The problem at hand is this: with the denia1
of the form of corporeity Aquinas wants to deny that quantity is a
substantial ferro; on the ether hand, he realizes that he needs the
quantitative dimensions ta inhere in the matter befere the ferro; at the
sarne time, however, he denies that accidentaI forms can inhere in the
matter befere it has received its substantial ferro. Unfortunately, if
the quantitative dimensions are not supplied by a substantia1 form they
will be preciseLY supplied by an accidentaI ferro inhering in the matter
before the substantial form. In an effort to solve this prob1em,
Aquinas helds that quantity is a special accident because, he says, it
is cleeer to substance than the ethers:
sciendum autem est, quod qU=intitas inter alia accidentia

propinquior est substantiae. Unde quidam quantitates esse
substantias putant, Nam sola quantitas habet divisionem
in partes proprias post substantiam. Albedo enim non potest
dividi, et per consequens nec intelligitur individuare niai
per subiectum. Et inde est, quod in solo quantitatis
genere aliqua significantur ut subiect~, alia ut
passiones. 59
58. Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodeeim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. VII, teet. II, n.
1283.
59. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodeeim Libros Metaplwsicorum Arisfotelis Expositio, Lib. V, leet. XV, n.
983.
-- 138
He realizes, of course, that while this describes quite accurately
the special statua of quantity - sa special indeed that Ariatotle has
made extension a necessary attribute of matter - it doea nct do anything
te solve the problem at hand. Aquinas's solution will be that aven
though the accident of quantity cannat, in fact, inhera in matte= bafare
the substantial form, it ia, however, 'understood' in matter bafera the
forro.
Sicut enim Commentator dicit in l Phys., text.63, et in lib.

De su,Jstantia orbis, cap. l, in materia generabilium et
corruptibilium oportet intelligere dimensiones interminatas
ante adventum formae substantialis; alias non possat
intelligi divisio materiae, ut in diverais partibus materiae
diversae formae substantiales essent. 60
Even though this seems to have been Aquinas's considered opinion,
l am not sure that it is a satisfactory solution for this problem. If
in fact it ia n.ecessary, as Aquinas seems to think, that the inherence
of quantity or dimensions prepare the way for the inherence of form,
then this wi.ll have to be the case either in the conceptual realm or in
the actual process of generation itself. Since matter itself cannot
exiat apart from form, it aiso cannot exist with quantity apart from
form. This seema to exclude temporal precedence. Because, however,
ferm can on17 inhere in matter 'signed' by quantity, there must be
another sense in which form presupposes matter 50 signed. AquinaB Beems
te have in mind a relationship different from the temporal one when he
saya that "oportet intelligere dimensiones interminatas ante adventum
formae substantialis." The expressio!1 'intelligere' suggests a
60. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Dmnia, Vol. X, Commentarium in Lib. IV Sententiarum (Frette, Mare, eds.:
Paris: Vives, 1871·80), d. XII, q. l, a. II solutio; aLl subsequent citations from this
work are ta this edition.
-- 139 --
conceptual relationship, but it ls hardly clear how allch a precedence
relation can BoIve the prob~em. It 19 clear, then, that either Aquinas
sees a different presupposition relation, or he will be le ft with a
vicioUB circie. Whether or nct Aquinas can, in fact, cffer a plausible
solution, this problem will have ether ramifications as weIl. We will
encounter them when we discuss Aquinas's account of individuation and
Scotus's criticisme of it.
The second and third problems which the notion of prime matter as
pure potentiality 8eeme ta cause are very simply stated: that which ia
the substratum of substantia1 change, in itself and apart from its
relationship ta ferro, ia non-being. This unpleasant consequence issues
directly, as we have seen in discussing Aristotle, from the acceptance
of the traditional view of prime matter. We also saw above that Aquinas
accepta precisely such a view. According to this view prime matter
conaidered in itself, without any form inhering in it at aIl, ia pure
passive potentia1ity; this in Aquinas amounts to saying that it is pure
privation, and pure privation, in turn, is simply non-being. It 5eeme
quite c1ear, then, that prime matter itse1f if complete1y devoid of form
is simp1y non-being. 61
61. 1 take the expression 'matter in itself' to mean matter as devoid of all forme The fact that
Aquinas would have to identify matter, if devoid of all form, with non-being, is confirmed
by the following passage: Il extra animam duo invenimus, sci l icet rem ipsam et negationes
et privationes rei, quae quidem duo non eodem modo se habent ad intellecturn: res enim ipsa
ex specie quam habet divine intellectui adaequatur sicut artificium arti, ••• sed non ens
extra animam consideratum neque habet aLiquid unde intellectui divine coaequetur, neque
unde cognitionem sui fadat in intellectu nostro, •••• " (Thomas Aquinas, Opera Ormia, Vol.
XXII, Cuaestiones Oisputatae De Veritate (Iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae:
Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-1971), q. 1, a. V ad secundum; all subsequent citations fram
this work are to this edition). Should matter, therefore, ever be found without form, it
would be simply privation and negation: hence, matter would in that case have to be
identified with IInon-ens extra animam." It is important, however, to note thet according
to Aquinas matter is necessarily conjoined with form and as sa conjoined it is not non-
-- 140 --
The most important re~son, however, for positing the existence of
prime matter ia the necessity for a subs~ratum of substantial change
capable of preventing things from being generateâ out of non-being, and
from being corrupted into non-being. Quite independently of the
acceptance of the notion of creation, it ia still necessary that in the
natural pracasses of generation and corruption there be Buch a
Bubstratum. If, however, this sul.,cratum in the end turns out ta be
non-being, or at least quite indistinguishable from non-being, then the
proceSB of generation and corruption of substances has nat really been
explained and the initial problem has nct been solved. This problem for
Aquinas e'<tends te all levels of the hierarchy of being because all
processes of generation and corruption are traced back te prime matter
in a seriaI fashion.
Licet enim generatio sirnplicium corporum non procedat

secundum ordinem, eo quod quodlibet eorum habet formam
immediatam materiae primae: in generatione taroen corporum
aliorum, oportet esse generationurn ordinem, propter rnultas
formas intermedias inter primam formam elementi et ultimam
formam ad quam generatio ordinatur. Et idee sunt multae
generationes et corruptiones sese consequentes. 62
The third and related problem is a consequence of the one just
discussed, and it amounts te ~he fact that the matter, which i5 said te
being. It is clear that Aquinas believes that matter is made ta be exclusively by its
relation to form because otherwise he would not hoLd that matter cannot be made to exist by
itself evel". by God. Matter is, in fact, not created, but concreated. In the De Ente et
Essentia , for exa~le, he says: Ilper formam enim, quae est aetus materia<:, il'lbteria
efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. 1I (Thomas t.quinas, Opera Omnia, Vol. XLIII, De Ente et
Essentia (lussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae: Typogranhia Polyglotta, 1882-
1971), cap. Il, n. 30ff.; all subsequent citations fram This work are to this ediiion). 1
am not sure, however, that it is legitimate to hold that a thing can be made te be
exclusively by its relation ta ancther created thing: This, of course, excludes the obvious
sense of IIbeing made to be u in which all created things are made to be by, or reeeive their
being fram, Gad.
62. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles , Lib. II, cap. LXXXIX.
-- 141 --
be common ta aIl things which exist in the physical world, doea nct
itself exist in it. It simply is non-being:
non enim potest esse aliquod corpus commune, quod ncn ait
determinatum ad aliquam speciem et ad aliquod individuum.
omne autem tale corpus necesae est habere aliquam passionem,
v~l consequentem formam specificam, qualis est propria
passio, vel qualitercurnque aliter advenientem, siout Bunt
accidentia individualia. Ergo nscesae eqt quod eadem
materia quae est 5ubiectum magnitudinis, ait etiam subiectum
..
paBS~Onl.s: ..... 63
since Aquinas repeats this again in various places, there ia no
doubt that he believes it to be the case. 64 The facr that matter as
purely potential and hence as commen ta aIl things dosa not, in fact,
exist because it ia non-being will become more rele~ant nct only in the
discussion of individuation, but also in the discussion of
intelligibility and especially in the discussion of the role of matter
in definition and essence.
The fourth and last problem l only mention in passing. Aquinas
puts much stress on the importance of the essential unit y of the
composite of prime matter and substantial forro, and su ch unit y is indeed
weIl preserved by his theory. What l caU into question is llot the
unit y of the composite but its status as composite. If in effect aIl of
the cemposite's actuality and being i5 given to it by the ferro and none
by the matter, and i f the matter considered in itself is pure passive
potentiality (and indeed non-being, if considered apart from form and in
itself), it 8eems that the composite is not really a composite at aIl
63. Thomas Aquinas, ln libres Aristetelis De Generatione et Corruptione Expositio, lib. 1, cap. V,
lect. XPI, n. S.
64. See for example: Thomas Aquinas, ln libros Aristotelis Oe Generatione et Corruptione Expositio,
Lib. 1, cap. V, Lect. XII.
-- 142 --
sinee it ie 'composed' of form and something which in itself doee not
exist and acquires aIl its being from the forro.

-- J.43 --
AOUINAS: THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF ~iATTER
AND THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORN
Unlike Aristotle Aquinas thinks that prime matter is pure passive
potentiality, and unlike Aristotle he 5eemB ta deny that there iB a real
distinction between matter and form. To put it in Aristotelian terme,
he dosa nct seern ta believe that the matter and ferro of composite
substances can exist separately fram each ether. In the Commeneary on De
Generatione et Corruptione Aquinas saya:
et ita non sequitur quod id quod corrumpitur secedat a tata

rerum natura: quia quarnvis fiat non ens hoc ~ad est
corruptum, remanet tamen aliquid aliud, quod est generatum.
Onde non potest materia remanere quin ait subiecta aliqui
formae: ... 65
One question which would not have made any sense if asked of
Aristotle (ainee he dosa nct believe that the Prime Mover ac~~ on the
physical world, or, for that matter, acta at all) can, however, be asked
of Aquinas. The question is the following: whether, granted that there
is no real distinction in the natural arder between matter and form, it
would be possible through God's absolute power that matter and form
exist separately. Moreover, it could be suggested that in the passage
just quoted Aquinas is only expressinç what he thinks Aristotle's
position to be, and net his ewn views. Nevertheless, Aquinas's ewn
answer seems te be that even Ged's absel~te power cannet make it
65. Thomas Aquinas, ln libros Aristotelis De Generatione et COiïW~!~~ne Expositio t lib. 1, cap. III,
teet. VII, n. 6. See also in the same work lib. l, cap. V, tect. XIII, n. 5; and cf.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. Il, cap. XXXIII.
-- 144 --
possible for matter and ferro te exist separately. Aquinas saye, in
fact, that Gad creates matter and ferro together:
ad tertium dicendum quod ratio lila non Detendit quod

materia non ait creata, sed quod non ait creata sine forma.
Licet enim orone creatum ait in actu, non taroen est actuB
purus. 66
And again in the 5umma Theclogiae, while discussing the
transubstantiation of the body and blood of Christ ioto bread and wine,
Aquinas explains that if it is argued that the subatantial ferro remains
there are ooly two ways in which it cao remain: it can remain either in
the matter or separated from matter. He argues that the subatantial
form cannat remain in the matter because if it does, then the whole
substance of the bread would remain. He also argues that it cannot
remain in another matter because this would violate the theory that
there is a proper p~oportion between the farm and the matter. If, on
th~ other hand, it i~ argued that it remains separate fram matter, then,
this means that it ia an intellectual form in act, because ail forms
which are separate from matter are intellectual.
Secundo quia, si forma aubstantialis panie remaneret, aut

remaneret in materia, aut a materia separata. Primum autem
esse non potest. Quia, si remaneret in materia panie, tunc
tata substantia pania remaneret: quad est contra praedicta.
In alia autem materia remanere non posset: quia propria
forma non est niai in propria materia. - Si autem remaneret
a materia separata, iam esset forma intelligibilis actu, et
etiam intellectus: nam amnes formae a materia separatae sunt
ta1es. 67
66. Thomas Aquinas, .?L';rma Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. XLIV, a. Il ad tertiU'll; cf. in the Mme work. Lib.
l, q. XLVI, a. 1 ad sextllTl.
67. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. III, q. LXXV, ~. VI resp. Cf. also in the same work.,
Lib. III, q. LXXV, a. III resPi and Thomas Aquinas, Sunrna Contra Gentiles, Lib. IV, cap.
LXIII.
-- 145 --
This ia aIl the more surprising because in the sarne discussion, in
order ta explain how the accidents of the bread and wine can exist
without the substance of the bread and ·i;he wine, Aquinas admits that by
God's absolute power accidents can indeed exist without their proper
substance:
ad tertium dicendum quod rarurn et densum sunt quaedam

qualitates consequentes corpora ex hoc quod habent multum
vel parum de materia eub dirnensionibus: siout etiam ornnia
alia accidentia consequuntur ex principiis Bubstantiae. Et
sicut, subtracta substantia, divina virtute conservantur
alia accidentia; Lta, subtracta materia, divina virtute
conser'Tantur qualitates materiam consequentes, siout rarum
et densum. 68
Denying a real distinction between matter and farrn would
exacerbate the problem which l mentioned earlier regarding the
plausibility in Aquinas's system of maintaining that the composite
between matter and forro ie in fact a composite. We already sa\-! that the
fact that matter is purely potential and receives all of its being from
the form renders the notion of a real composite precarious. Even though
Aquinas stresses over and over that the composit3 is made up of two
parts, one part being the matter and the other ~art being the form, the
notion of composition becomes less and 1ess plausible should he affirm
that the distinction between matter and ferm is not a real distinction.
We might compare this to what Aquinas thinks about the rea1 distinction
between essence and existence. The distinction between essence and
existence, he thinks, has to be a real distinction - and net just a
distinction of reason which does not correspond to an onto1ogical
68. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 111 1 q. LXXVII, a. II ad tertium. Cf. also in the same
work, Lib. JII, q. LXXVI, a. 1 ad tertium; and Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. IV
Sententiarun, d. XII, q. 1, a. 1 solutio 1.
-- 146 --
distinction in the real world. If essence and existence are nct really
distinct, then their composition ia nct a real composition, but only a
manner of speaking. Indeed if the composition between essence and
existence in substances ether than Gad i5 nct real, then they cannat in
fact be distinguished from God. If the same argument is applied to the
composition between matter and forro, it ia eaBY ta Bee that the
conclusion should be that the composition ia nct a real one. The
comparison of the distinction between matter and ferro with the
distinction between essence and existence complicates the terme of the
discussion somewhat. As we have sean earlier, in fact, Aquinas doea nct
take the real distinction between essence and existence te mean that an
essence can ever exist without its 'esse'. It is possible, therefere,
that Aquinas may think that matter and ferro are really distinct in the
way in which essence and existence are really distinct. This weuld
iroply that, at least as far as this part of the difficulty is concerned,
there ie real composition between matter and forro. The analogy between
the composition of essence and existence and the composition of matter
and forro is, unfortunately, not complete. Thus, while the essence of
possibles exists in the mind of God without yet possessing their
existence, Gad doee not have a proper idea of matter, separate from that
of the composite. Equally true is the fact that while Aquinas ho Ids
that we can conceive of an essence, for example the essence of phoenix,
and therefore know what a phoenix is independently of its existence, we
canno'c 50 conceive of matter. Thus,'" .:fuinas in the Commen'tary Oll "tile
Metaphysics says that the form can be separated from the matter by
.. '~
reason, but that nat even by reasan can the matter be separated fram the
forro.
-- 147 --
Forma enim est. separabilis ratione, quia potest intelligi

sine materia sensibili individuante; rnateria vero non pote st
intelligi sine intellectu formae, eum non apprehendat~r nisi
ut ena in potentia ad forrnarn. 69
should the real distinction between matter and f~rm imply nothing
else, it ahould at least imply that matter and ferro can .0':: k'10wn by Gad
independently of each other (as essence and existence are). Becauee, in
fact, it Beeme reasonable ta assume that a real distinction implies a
cli.F1tinction of reason, should it be found that according ta Aquinas
there ia not aven a distinction of reason between matter and forro, that
would provide ample evidence in support of the fact that he does not
believe that there can be a real distinction between the two. Gcd cao
certainly know form without matter, but nct matter without form: there
is a d~Qt!u~~ion of reascn on the side of ferm, but net even a
distinction of reason on the side of matter. This, at most, suggests
that Aquinas rnay conceive of a real distinction between matter and forro
on the side of form, but 5uch a distinction on the side of matter 5eems
to be excluded. The fact that matter cannot even be separated from ferm
by a distinction of reason, could partly be anticipated by taking note
of Aquinas's statement, queted earlier, that matter can cnly be known by
analogy (at least by US).70
69. Thomas AC1uinas, 11', Duodec;m Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotel;s Expositio, Lib. VIII, lect. If n.
1687.
70. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libres Metaphysicor~ Aristotelis Expositie, lib. VII,
leet. Il, n. 1296; and the following passage: "q:..'d sic patet. Hateria enim 'ostenditur
neg8tione', idest natura materiae intell igitur per negatione ormiurn formarun. 1l (Thomas
Aquinas, ln Ouodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. X, lect. X, n.
2125); and Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, (Recensuit S.
Decker, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), q. IV, a. II, n. 1 resp; all subsequent citations trom
this work are to this edition.
-- 148 --
This brings us te our next tapie: the unintelligibility of matter.
Here Aquinas agrees with Aristotle. Aquinas argues that ainee
intellectual power ia highest in those beings which lack matter, it
follows that those things are most intelligible which are moat separate
fram matter. This is a consequence of the view that there muet be a
proportion between that which is intelligible and the intellect. Those
thing are most separate from matter which nct only are separate from
'signated matter' (Bllch as natural forms taken universally), but are
also separate from sensible matter altogether. Aquinas adds that those
beings which are most separate fram matter are 50 separate according ta
their being, allah as Gad and the intelligences, and nct only according
ta reason, auch as the objects of mathematics.
Nam eum unaquaeque J.'e9 ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat,

quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime
intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata.
Intelligibile enim intellecturn oportet proportionata esse,
et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu
sint unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a materia separata, quae non
tantum a signata materia abstrahunt, "sicut formae naturales
in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat scientia
naturalis," sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum
secundurn rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secunctum
esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae. 71
It fallows frem this passag3 that matter nat only is
unintelligible in itself, but it also impedes intelligibility in those
things of which it i5 a part. This is true in twa ways: 1) matter in
the abject impectes intelligibility, and must be remeved beiere the
abject can be knewn; and 2) matter in the knawer limita intellectual
71. Thomas Aqu;nas, In Ouodecim Libros Metaphysiccrum Aristctelis Expcsitio, Prooemium S. Thomae;
cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. l, cap. XLIV; and Thomas Aquinas, De
~ __~~·~ent;a, cap. V, n. 45ft.
-- 149 --
power in the sense that the intellect cannot be mixed with the body if
it ia going ta be able ta perform ~ts proper function.
The fact that matter limita intellectual power in the knower doea
nct cause any problem for Gad, who ia pure act, and for angels, whose
composition ia nct of matter and ferro, but of essence and existence. The
matter becomes more complicated when the knower i5 the human Boul
because, aven though it ia immaterial, it ia nonetheleSB in part the act
of a material body. Thua, Aquinas explains that in the human soul there
are two cognitive powers: by the one, which ia the act of a liv'ing body,
we know things as they are in individual matter; by the other, which ia
nct an ~ct of the body, W~ know natures as abstracted fram matter.
Ea igitur quae non habent esse nisi in materia individuali,

cognoscere est nobis connaturale: eo quod anima nostra, per
quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius materiae. Quae tamen
habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae est actus
alicuius corporei organie Et huic connaturale est
cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali:
unde sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus
cognoscitiva eius est intellectus, qui non est actus
alicuius orqani corporalis. Unde per intellectum
connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non
habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non taroen secundum
quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod
abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. 72
Because the human soul is, 50 to speak, half way between the
sensible and the intelligible, it can know both particu1ars, with the
he1p of the sensitive part of the soul, and universals, through the
intel1ectua1 part of the soul which abstracts forms from matter.~ What
72. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, q. XII, a. IV resp.
73. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, q. XIII, a. XII ad tertium; cfe also Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. LXXV; and Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in
Lib. Il Sententiarlltl, d. III, q. 1, a. J solutio. Regarding our I<nowledge of the forms of
natural things through abstraction, it is interesting to note the following passage: "nam
-- ISO --
might seem advantageous at first sight, however, cornes with ita
disadvantages: because our knowledge starts from the senses, thoEe
things which are closer te the senses are better known ta us than those
things which are more knowable in themselves. Our knowledge of formal
principles ia acquired through the mediation of the senses. From this
~t follows, according te Aquinas, that we cannat know Bubstances which
are altogether separate fram matter clearly.~ Theae things, then,
formae rerum naturalium s~ne materia existere non possunt: cum nec sine materia
intelligantur. u <Thomas Aquinas, SUl111la Contra Gentiles, Lib. l, cap. LI). This pas"!Jge has
interesting implications regarding the knowledge not only of natural things, but also of
the forros of natural things. If such forms cannot be known without matter, then it is not
clear what kind of role is left ta abstraction and whether it helps. Given that matter
impedes intelligibility, and given that this passage says that the forms of natural things
cannot be known without matter, it is also not clear that it 1S ever possible to have any
kind of knowledge of material entities. The solution ~hich Aquinas is going to propose, of
course, is that the genus term contained in the definition of composite substances
expresses the matter. ln the De Ente et Essentia, cap. II, Aquinas explains that neither
the matter alone nor the form alone can be said to be the essence of composite substances:
the definition of natural substances, he says, contains not only form, but also matter. He
adds, however, that matter cannot be included in the definition of these substances as a
being outside the essence of natural substances because, if it were 50 added, mat~er would
be treated as an accident. Accfdents, he explains, do not, properly speaking, have an
essence, and the substance of which they are accidents has to be included in their
definition. Because this is not the case with matter, he conclude5, it is clcar that the
essence of composite substances includes both matter and form. Since the matter to be
included in the definition cannot be the matter which is the principle of individuation, it
follows that the definition will not include 'signated matter' and that matter will have to
be included in sorne other way. lIEt ideo sciendum est quod materia non quol ibet modo
accepta est principiun individuationis, sed solum materia signata"; (Thomas Aquinas, De
Ente et Essentia, cap. II, n. 75). It follows that the matter contained in the definition
will be the matter contained in the genus: the genus term in the definition of a nvtural
substance will express or stand for the matter. ln the case of animals the matter wiii be
expressed by the term 'corpus', and Aquinas says: lIet hoc modo corpus er;t genus animalis,
quia in animali nichil erit .:Iccipere quod non implicite in corpore contineatur. 1I (Thomas
Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. Il, n. 140). Aquinas concludes by saying: lIet ex hoc
patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materi~m et
formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem cum llla: quia neque genus est
materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum; neque diffcrentia forma, sed a forma
sumptaut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem ~sse animal rationale, et non ex animali
et rational i sicut didmus eum esse ex anima et corpus. 1I (Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et
~'ltia, cap. II, n. 195ft.).
74. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. VII, lect. Il,
n. 1302; Thomas Aquinas, Sunma Theol09iae, Lib. l, q. XII, a. Xl resp; and Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. LX; and Lib. II, cap. LXII.
-- 151 --
-~
which are mast knawablE'1 in themselves are Iesa knowable 'quoad nos'
because our knowledge ~~oceeds from the senses; it la aise true,
however, that, through no fauit of our own in this instance (but because
know1edge is not of singu1ar~. but on1y of universa1s), we also have no
perfeet know1edge of those things whieh are 1east knowab1e in
themselves:
item. Ex hoc aliqua res est intelligens quod est sine

materia: cuiua signum est quod formae fiunt intellectae in
actu par abstractionem a materia. Unde et intellectuB est
universalium et non singularium: quia materia est
individuationis principium.~
It ia clear, then, that matter la unintelligible ta us; it ia aIse
e1ear that in human beings matter impedes inte11igibi1ity in two ways:
because it ia part of material substances through which we come ta know
universals; and. because it ia through our material component that our
proeess of knowledge begins. Given that matter is uninteI1igib1e for
us, the more interesting question becomes whether matter is also
uninte11igible in prineip1e. In Aristot1e the Prime Mover is pure aet,
did not ereate the wor1d, and knowing the physiea1 wor1d wou1d be for
Him a mark of imperfection. Aristotle's God, therefore, only knews
HimseIf, henee the question as to whether and how God knows anything
ether than Himself daes nct arise.
Aquinas'a Gad ia very different from Aristotle's in at least two
ways which are relevant te the present discussion: He created the world,
and, therefore, has ta knaw samething about it, and He ia interested in
75. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. l, cap. Y.lIV. This statement that faimS become
intelligible in actuality only by being abstracted from matter seems incompatible with
Aquinas's often repeated belief that both God and created i~tellects know singulars.
-- 152 --
what happens in the world He has created. This Ieads ta two interesting
questions: 1) whether Gad created matter, and 2) whether Gad knows
singulars (and for that matter whether angels know singulars). The
firet question has already been answered in the positive, although we
have also eeen that Gad created matter together with form and nct
independently. The answer te the second question depends on whether or
nct matter ia unintelligible in principle or ooly 'quoad nos'. If matter
ia unintelligible in principle and, therefore, impectes the
intelligibility of the object in which it is found no matter who the
knower ia, then it should follow that Gad doea nct know singulars
(because they contain matter). If, on the other hand, the answer ia
that matter is unintelligible only 'quoad nos', then it is possible for
God to know singulars.
Aquinas 8eems te say that matter ia in principle unknowable~ He
holds, in fact, that even Gad doea nct have a proper idea of matter
independent of the idea of the composite and this follows from the fact
that matter in itself doea nct have 'esse' and ia nct knowable.
Sed quia nOB ponimus materiam creatam a Dea, non taroen sine
forma, habet quidem materia ideam in Dea, non taroen aliarn ab
idea compoaiti. Nam mate ria secundum se neque esse habet,
neque cognoscibilis est. 76
Aquinas, however, in various other passages 8eems ta imply that
Gad can indee'l know matter in itself. In the Summa Theologiae, during a
discussion ct the question regarding the possibility of God's knowledge
of non-being, he 8eems ta contradict the passage which was just quoted
76. Thomas Aquinas~ SLI'I'IT\a Theologiae, Lib. Ir q. XV, a. III ad tertil.rn.

-- 153 --
by saying that God can even know non-being and therefore can presumably
know prime matter as pure1y potentia1:
omnia cognoscit Deus, etiarn si actu non sint. Et pro tante

diei potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. n
Aquinas's considered opinion, in fact, i5 less extrema than the
one expressed in the firet passage, but more moderate than that
expresaed in the second. It i5 that Gad can indeed know matter but not
in itself. God, in fact, knows matter through knowledge of that to
which its potentiality extends, i.e., through knowledge of ferm and
privation:
Deus cognoscit non solum formam, sed etiarn rnateriam, ut

supra ostensum est. Materia autem, eum Bit ans in potentia,
009n080i perfecte non pote st nisi cognoscatur ad quae aius
potentia se extendat: sicut et in omnibus aliia potentiis
accidit. Extendit autem se potentia materiae et ad formam
et privationem: quod enim potest esse, potest enim non esse.
Erqo Deus cognoscit privationem. 78
This passage combined with the previous two 68ems ta be saying the
following:
77. Thomas Aquinas, Summa TheoLogiae, lib. 1, q. XIV, a. IX resp. In the passage just quoted
Aquinas is clearly discussing God's knowledge of possibilia. It ceuld be argued,
therefore, that the passage in question does not apply to the knowledge of prime matter
because, since prime matter cannet exist in itself, it is not potential in the sense of
being a possible abject. Even though this 1S true, Aquinas in the next paragraph proceeds
to make B distinction between those things, on the one hand, which are now not in act, but
either have been in act in the past or wiLL be in act in the future and, on the other hand,
those things which are not in act now, have not been in act in the past and will not be in
act in the future. About the latter he says that, even though urespectu ho l'lin non dicitur
habere scientiam visionis, ••• ,11 nevertheless it is possible ta have "si"1Jlicis
intelligentiae. u (Thomas Aquinas, SUfl1Tla Theologiae, lib. 1, q. XIV, B. IX resp). Although
this category seems ta be able ta include prime matter, Aquinas adds a further
qualification which seems ta exclude it: he says that these things wnich are not, have not
been, and will not be, are ta be things which are either in God's power or in the power of
creatures. Matter, we have seen, cannat, even by God, be created separate fram ferm and,
therefere, is not in God's power. It seems, then, that Aquinas does not mean to i"1Jly by
this passage that God can know prime matter in itself.
78. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. l, cap. LXXI.

-- 154 --
1) Gad doea nct know matter in itself, because matter in itself
neither la nor ia knowable.
2) Gad knows everything including non-being which i5 pure
privation.
3) Gad cannat know matter perfectly uniese he knows those things
to which its potentiality extends itself. Those things are form and
privation. Therefore God doea nct know matter perfectly uniese he knowB
ferm and privation.
4) Cod knows form.
5) From 2 it follows that Cod knows privation.
6) Therefore Cod knows matter perfectly because he knows both form
and privation.
PropositiOJ~S 1 Rnd 6 are directly contradictory, unless it should
be claimed that knowing matter perfectly i5 nat the sarne as knowing
matter in itself. Granted that they are nat the sarne, it follows from
this, that even though Gad doea nct know matter in itself, he knows
matter perfectly and hence he aIse knows singulars perfectly because in
them matter is combined with forro.
Aquinas, in fact, believes that God knows singulars:
Deus igitur cognoscit res alias a se non solum in

universali, sed etiam in singulari. 79
79. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. LXV.

-- 155 --
Gad indeed knowB everything, including singulars, through His own
essence.
Sed Dei cognitio usque ad materiam et accidentia

individuantia et formas pertingit. euro enim suum
intelligere git sua essentia, oportet quod intelligat omnia
quae sunt quocumque modo in eius essentia; in qua quidem
virtute Buet, sicut in prima origine, omnia quae esse
quocumque modo habent, eum sit primum et universale essendi
principium; a quibus materia et accidens non sunt aliena,
cum materia ait ens in potentia et accidens ait ens in alio.
Deo igitur cognitio singularium non deeat. BD
In the commentary on the Sentences,81 in the Summa Theologiae,82
and in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains that Gad knows
everything, including singulars, because they are in God as in their
cauae, and that God'e knowledge of a particular does nct, therefore,
derive from anything taken from the particu1ar itse1f. In the Summa
Contra Gentiles Aquinas argues that just as it is i~possible ta
understand the nature of genus without understanding its 'differentiae'
and its praper affections, or just as it is impossible to know the
nature of number perfect1y without a proper know1edge of odd and even,
it is equally impossible to hold that God, in knowing His own essence,
knows the common natule of being perfectly, without also admitting that
he knows equa11y perfect1y the singu1ar and the universa1.
Natura generis perfecte non potest cognosci nisi eiua

differentiae primae et passiones propriae cognoscantur: non
en~ perfecte sciretur natura nurneri si par et irnpar
ignorarentur. Sed universale et singulare sunt
differentiae, yel per se passiones entis. si igitur Deus,
80. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. J, cap. LXV. Also see Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, lib. l, q. XIV, 8. IX resp.
81. Cf. for example Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Masistri Petri Lombardi, Lib.
I, d. XXXV, q. 1, a. III solutioj and Lib. l, d. XXX.. ,. ., q. l, a. V solutio.
1 82. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, q. XIV, a. IX resp.
-- 156 --
cognoscendo essentiarn suam, perfecte cognoscit naturam

communem entie, oportet quod perfecte cognoscat univers ale
et singulare. Sicut autem non perfecte cognosceret
universale si cognosceret intentionem universalitatis et
non cognosceret rem universalem, ut hominem aut animal; ita
non perfecte cognosceret singulare si cognosceret rationem
ainqularitatis et non cognosceret hoc vel illud singulare.
Oportet igitur quod Deus res singulares cognoscat. 83
Aquinas's conclusion, then, i5 that, although matter iB in
principle unintelligible and impedes intelligibility, nevertheles8 Gad
can know individuals perfectly through His own essence in virtue of the
fact that He is the first cause of all things including matter. This,
however, leaves a question: given that God knows ail things through His
own essence, includ~ng mate rial substances, it seeme that Aquinas would
have to accept that there is in God's essence sorne potentiality, i.e.,
the potentiality which is in the matter of the composite substances
which he knaws thro~gh His own essence. If tais is the case then Gad
cannat be pure actuality and God's knowledge of individuals instead of
adding ta God's perfection seems to detract from it.
Aquinas, on the other hand, cannet admit that Gad doea net know
matter sven when it i~ together with form because that would entail,
firstly, that God either does not know sorne part of the world He has
created, or did nct create matter; and, secondly, that he does nct know
singulara, Admitting that would in turn entail all kinds of
consequences unacceptable ta Christian faith. It would entail, for
example, that God doea not know the individuals te whom, for their
individual actions, he is supposed ta dispense e~~ner eternal salvation
'.:"';;."
83. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. LXV. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. XIV, a. XI resp.
-- 157 --
or eternal damnation; it would also make nonsense of God's direct action
in the affaira of man described in the Scripturea •
•
-- ISF --
AQUINAS A~~ THE ROLE OF MATTER IN DEFINITION AND IN ESSENCE
Aqulnas; we saw, disagrees with Aristotle in maintaining that
matter is pure potentiality, and even though he sees that quantity is a
special type of accident he does nct think that it cao be assigned ta
matter in itself. Despite this he maintains that quantity needs ta
inhere in matter before the substantial forro in order ta p~epare it for
the forma This caUF45 problerns for Aquinas, and we will see how he
tries te solve them in our examination of his theory of individuation.
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that matter ia unintelligible in
principle. We saw that even though Gad knows matter perfectly in
individuals (Gad knows individua15 perfectly), Gad does nct know matter
in itself. 50 matter ie pure potentiality and unknowable in principle.
Both of these conclusions should be kept in mind during our discussion
of the role of matter in definition and essence.
In Aristotle the essence of a being i5 given by its definition.
Aristotle 5eems to think that for composite substances the definition
centains ferro and matter, but while form is essential in the definition,
it 5eems that the matter is merely necessary. In effect, Aristotle
thinks that even in the most proper definition of composite substanc~s,
which is derived from the formul~ cf the forro, matter will come in as
part of the explanation of the forme In his discusdion of that which ia
necessary in Physics, II.9, in tact, we have seen Aristotle explain
that, while the formai and final causes are those which ~rovide U~ with
-- 159 --
1 the explanation of the essence and of the end, and while the necessary,
i.e., the matter, ia almost considered as a concomitant cause in as much
as it ia determined by the formal cause but doea nct determine it,
neverthelesB he concludes that the matter, which represents that which
iB necessary Dut nct essential, should probably be included in the
explanation of the essence because the fun ct ion of a substance cannat be
properly carried out unless the ferm, which specifies the function, ia
the ferm of a certain kind of matter. Aristotle iB saying, in effect,
that the need for a certain kind of materia1 in dictated by the type of
ferro which will inform it, and that, therefore, because the form iB
prior ta the matter it will be that which determines the essence of the
substance, while the matter, being posterior to the f~rm, will be merely
necessary. The necessity for a certain type of material ia dictated by
a condition; in other words, it is conditional upon a certain type of
form and cannot as a consequence be censiderect essential. If the ferm,
then, ia easential but the matter i5 only neces5ary, that will mean that
the ferm is the essence while the matter, theugh net the essence, will
necessarily accompany it. This is net Platcnism because it does ~ot
exclude aIl consideration of matter, but it also avoids the inclusion of
an unknowable element in that which is the essence in t:he strictest
sense. The essence, after all, is that thraugh which we are suppased ta
acquire knawledge, and is that which pravides the foundation for
science.
Aquina8 agrees with Aristotle that the essence of things is
expressed by their definition anâ that the definition properly speaking
it1 univeI"sal :
-- 160 --
ad tertium dicendum quod essentia proprie est id quod

significatur per definitionem. Definitio autem
complectitur principia speciei, non autern principia
indiv idual ia. 84
Matter i5 part of the substance for those things which are
composed of matter and farrn. aS Tt 5eemB, therefore, that matter should
be included in the definition and essence of composite substances.
Although in the Commentary on the De Caelo et Munda Aquinas 8eemB te
deny that matter ie part of the definition altogether, n ••• quod qui
dicit ceeIum, dicit formam, qui autem dicit hoc coelum, dicit formam in
materia,,,86 in the Commentary on the Metaphysics he Be8mB te concur with
Aristotle that the matter i5 nct fully part of the definition but ia
necessary to it.
Et, quia unumquodque consequitur naturam vel generis vel

speciei per forrnam suam, natura autem generis vel special
est id quod significat definitio, di cens quid est res, idee
forma est ratio ipsius "quod quid erat esse," idest
definitio per quam scitur quid est res. Quamvis enim in
definitione ponantur aliquae partes materiales, tarnen id
quod est principale in definitione, oportet quod ait ex
parte formae. 87
Aquinas goea on ta explain that the matter is contained in the
definition of man, but that it is expressed in the oblique case, e.g.,
ucorporis organici ...... This part of the definition stands for the
genus:
84. Thomas Aquinas, ~umma Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. XXIX, a. II ad tertium.
85. Cf., for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, lib. Il, cap. LXIV.
86. Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, Vol. III, ln Libros Aristotelis De Caelo et Munda Expositio (Iussu
impensaque leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae: Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-1971), Prooemium
S. Thomae, n. 2; all subsequent citations from this work are te this edition.
,-...
87. Thomas Aquinas, ln Ouodecim Libres Metaohysicorurn Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. V, Lect. II, n.
764.
-- 161 --
sicut enim animal gressibile bipes est forma hominis, ita

animal, et gressibile, et bipes. Ponitur autem interdum
materia in definitione, sed in obliqua; ut eum dicitur, quod
anima est actus corporis organici physici potentia vitam
habentis. B&
Matter ie contained in the definition of man through the genuo
because it ia part of the definition of animal, which in turn ia used te
explain part of what man ie. Aquinas argues that neither animal nor
rational are parts of man: animal ie abstracted fram one part of man and
rational fram another. Thua, animal ia that which has the sensitive
nature, while rational i9 that which has reason. This ia how the genus
ia abstracted from the matter, the 'differentia' fram the forro, and the
species from both the matter and the form.
Non enim animal est pars hominis, neque rationale; sed

animal sumitur ab una parte, et rationale ab alia. Animal
enim est quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod
habet rationem. Natura autem ser..sitiva est ut materialis
respectu rationis. Et inde est quod genus sumitur a
materia, differentia a forma, species autem a forma et
materia simul. Nam homo est, quod habet rationem in natura
sensitiva. 89
88. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, lib. V, Lect. II, n.
764.
89. Thomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum AristoteLis Expositio, Lib. VII, Lect. IX, n.
1463; cf. als':>, nn. 1467·1468; n. 1469, and n. 1472. ALso see Thomas Aquinas, l.!:!..Qf1Q.
Libros Physif.:orum Aristotelis Expositio, lib. l, cap. l, Lect. 1, n. 2; lib. II, cap. III,
tect. III; and Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 111. It should be noted here that
since human beings can exist without a body after death • though in an attenuated state -
the defin:tion of man may be different from the definition of other composites. Aquinas,
however, seems to be committed to holding that the definition of man has to parallel the
definition of other composites because he beLieves that the natural mode of existence fo~
man is its bodily existence and not its disembodied state. Thus, because the soul can
survive the body, it is not a material form; but because the natural mode of existence of
the soul is in the body, it is the form of a body and not the same as the form of separated
substances whose existence is always separate from matter. Thus, Pegis says that: Uthe
nature of the soul will remain in the separated soul, but its actual union with the body
will not." (Pegis, UThe Separated Soul and its Nature in St. Thomas," 139); and, he adds
that: Uthe esse of the angeLs is not received in matter, nor dependent on matter; the esse
of material forms is received in matter and is dependent on matter. The human soul, as
form of the body, receives its esse in matter and is joined to the body in its esse; but,
unlike 8 material form, the souL does not depend on the body because the esse of the soul
-- 162 --
It 6eemB, then, that for Aquinas matter i5 essential in the
definition of animal. This means that at the highest level of
generality, the levei of genus, matter i5 essential, but it aiso 6e9mB
te be esaential in the definitic.n of the composite:
et propter hoc, si homo definitur, oportet quod definiatur

par animarn, et quod nihilominus in aiua definitione
ponantur partes corporis, in quibus primo est ani~.la, sicut
cor aut cerebrum, ut supra dixit. 90
This ie aIse confirrned ta be his considered opinion, and nct just
his interpretation of Aristotle, by passages in warka ether than his
commentaries on Aristotle. Thud in the De Ente et Essentia he says
t.3.t:
in substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est,

ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod
alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim
materia sola rei non sit essentia, planum est, quia res per
essentiarn suarn et cognoscibilis est, et in specie ordinatur
vel genere; sed materia neque cognitionis principium est,
neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel ad speciem
determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque
etiam forma tantum essentia substantie composite dici
potest, quarnvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex hiie enim
que dicta sunt patet quod essentia est i11ud quod per
can be conservec:l without the body.1I (Pegis, IIThe Separated Soul and its Nature in St.
Thomas," 142). Pegis rnaintains that: "embodiment is of the essence of the hunan soul,
deriving from its intellectual nature; sa much sa, that, under the pressure of his own
teaching, St. Thomas came to see (and even ta underscore, in the Cuaestiones de Anima) that
the separated state of the soul was, in terms of its constitution as a nature, praeter
~.Il (Pegis, UThe Separated Soul and its t.lature in St. Thomas,1I 155). ln effect, it
should be rernembered that according to Christian teachings it is not the soul alone, but
man, the composite of body and soul, that is destined ta immortality. The separation of
the soul from the body is not a fulfillment of the soul's nature, but a defect brought upon
man by death. Pegis concludes his article in the folLowing manner: "but if the souL is in
its essence the form of the body, then for the soul ta be without the body is contra
naturam. Only, let us notice, this outcome contains more than the reinforcement of a
religious truth by a rational argument; it aLso cantains the shaping of a rational ar
philosophical truth by a religious truth. The future resurrectian of the body will remove
the contra r.aturam of the separated soul. 1I (Pegis, UThe Separated Saul and its Nature in
St. Thomas," 158).
90. Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodecim Libros Metaphysicarum Adstatelis Expositia, Lib. VII, lect. XI, n.
1531.
-- 163 --
diffinitionem rei significaturi diffinitio autem

Bubstantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed
etiam materiam, aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et
mathematice non differrent. 91
He alse explains that matter cannat be included in the definition
of a composite substance as something added from outside because this
method ia appropriate for accidents:
nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantie

naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentie eius val ans extra
essentiam aius, quia hic modus diffinitionum proprius est
accidentibus, que perfectam essentiam non habent; unde
oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiE"::tum recipiant, quod
est extra genus eerum. Patet ergo quod essentia
comprehendit et materiam et formam. 92
This ia also eanfirmed in later warks:
solum illud videtur esse praeter essentiam ve1 quidditatem

rei quod non intrat definitione ipsius: definitio enim
significat quid est res. Sola autem accidentia rei sunt
quae in definitione non cadunt. Sola igitur accidentia sunt
in re aliqua praeter e9~entiam eius. 93
The essence of composite substances, then, ia given by both matter
and form. But sinee the definition which signifies the essence is
universal, just as the composite i5 made up ef matter and ferm, sa must
the definition and therefore the essence contain matter and ferm taken
not individually, but universally.
Ad cuiua intellectum sciendum est, qued in rebus eompesitis

ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel
essentia et suppesitum. Quia essentia vel natura
comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione
speciei: sicut humanitas cemprehendit in se ea quae cadunt
91. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. II, n. 1ff. Cf. also the general argument in cap. II,
and cap. Il J.
92. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. II, nn. 18-25.
93. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. 1, cap. XXI; cf. also Lib. II, cap. LVIii and Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, q. LXXV, a. IV resp.
-- 164 --
in definitione hominis: his enirn homo est homo, et hoc

significat ~~manitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed
materia i'j·i';.vidualis, eum accidentibus omnibus
individuantibu,;;< :;.,?sam, non cadit in definitione speciai: non
enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haee ossa,
aut albedo vel nigredo, •.• 94
This implies that the matter included in the definition of
composite subEtances ie matter which ia commen, i.e., nct designated
matter:
et idee sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta

est principium individuaticnis, sed salum materia signata;
et dico rnateriam signatam que sub determinatis dimensionibus
consideratur. Hec autem materia in diffinitione que est
hominis in quantum est homo non ponitur, sed poneretur in
diffinitione sortis, si Sortes diffin itionem haberet. In
diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia n~n signata: non
enim in diffinitione hominis poni.t'.1r hoc os et hec caro, sed
os et caro absolute quae sunt mater ta hominis non signata. 95
Since in Aquinas as well as in Aristotle prime matter la in
principle unintelligible, it is hard to understand why either
philosopher would want to include it, either essentidlly in the case of
Aquinas or necessarily in the case of Aristotle, in the definition,
which signifies the essence which, in turn, i~ supposed tr be that by
which we acquire knowledge. Even granting that knO\'11Edge ' per se' is
not of individuals, but only of universa~si does not strike me as very
helpful in view of the fact that for both philosophers, even if matter
ia unintelligible, it ia involved in the definition which, again, by
both is considered universal.
94. Thomas Aquinas, St.mna Theolosiae, Lib. l, q. JII, a. III resp.; cf. also Lib. I, q. XXIX, a. Il
ad tertium; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra ,~entiles, Lib. l, cap. XXI.
1 95. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. Il, nn. 73-84; cf. also cap. IIIj and Thomas Aquinas,
Expositio Super Llbrum Boethli de Trinitate, q. V, a. Il, n. 2 resp.
-- 165 --
This preb1em is aggravated in Aquinas by his c1aim that prime
matter ia nct ooly unintelligible but aIse purely potential. For
Aristotle it would be consistent ta claim (though he doea nct argue this
himself) that even though matter ia unintelligible, firet of all it iB
nct an essential part of the definition but only necessary ta it.
Secondly, he could say that matter need nat be taken separately fram
form in the universal definition. Even if it has ta be taken
separately, matter still has quantity or extension necessarily in itself
and haB Borne actuality of its own. Moreover, even if the~e
characteristics do nat make it intelligible in itself, they can create,
by analogy with individual substances, a confused notion of matter. The
kind of science we possess of composite substances is, in any event, not
perfect and this is due precise1y te the fact that they centain matter.
These avenues of defence are, l think, unavaiiabie ta Aquinas.
Undesignated matter in Aquinas has to be matter compieteiy uninformed
because, for any substantiai ferm te ent9r into the matter, the matter
hns ta be prepared by receiving determined dimensiens. 96 It shouid aise
be kept in mind that uniike Aristotie, fer whem matter in the case of
the elements could receive accidentai forms directly, Aquinas thinks
that the first ferm te inform matter has te be a substantia1 ferm; if
this were net the case, he could argue that only substantial forms
require determined dimensions in the matter before they ca~ inform it.
In that case the problem he has in accounting for the presence of
96. Aquinas argues that the determined dimensions are understood in the matter before the form, but
do not, in fact, enter into the matter before the form because they are part of the form.
1 will discuss the merits of this argument in the section on the role of matter in
individuation. For now 1 just want to point out that 1 don't consider it to be a very
convincing argument.
-- 166 --
somethinq unintelligible in the definition would becorne attenuated and
more sLmilar te the problem faced by Aristotle. When he ia talking
about undesignated matter or comman matter, therefore, Aquinas iB
talking about purely potential prime matter, and about the knowledge we
can have of it he saya:
materia enim "ostenditur negatione," idest natura materiae

intelligitur per negationem omnium formarum. 97
There ia then in Aquinas's conception of universal definition and
essence the notion of sornething completely unintelligible and purely
potential. Our knowledge of that which in itself is eminently knowable
ia quite imperfect, that which in itself i5 best known ia, therefore,
the least known 'quoad nos'. This now 5eeme ta become true aIse of that
which, because of its material nature, is in itself the least knowable,
but is suppased ta be that which we, in our human condition, are better
capable of knowing or grasping.
97. Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expoo;itio, lib. X. lect. X, n.
2125.
-- 167 --
AOUINAS ON THE ROLE OF MATTER IN THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
In discuBsing the ro1e pJ.ayed by matter in Aquinas's theory of
individuation l am 90in9 ta use the sarne distinction l used in my
discussion of Aristotle's: the disti~ction, that ia, between what l
called the metaphysical question about individuation and the
epistemalogical question. The metaphysical question ia answered without
any reference ta what allows us te individuate substances; it only
addresses the elements necessary for the individuation of substances in
themselves. The epistemological question ia answered with reference ta
what allows us ta individuate substances and ta pick out differences
between them. The metaphysica1 question will occupy the first part of
this section.
For Aquinae the question of individuation ia, in sorne respects,
more complicated than it ie for Aristotle. In Aristotle's system the
forro is the entity which gives .he object both it~ .xistence (actua1ity)
and ita essence (although we saw that matter is necessary in explaining
the essence of the object for material substances). The form, in other
wards, gives the substance bath its unit y and its specifie
individuation. Aristotle also selects matter as the principle of
intraspecific individuation. It is that which (thaugh only as
subordinate to the form and with the he1p of the forro) allows the
differentiation of individuals which belong to the same species. In
Aquinas the question as ta what makes a substance one ia not answered by

-- 168 --
reference te its ferro but by ref~rence ta its 'esse'. The role of ferro
iB restricted te answering part, although admittedly the most important
part, of the question regarding what makes a substance the kind of
substance it ia: this question i5 answered by reference te the
substance's essence, and for composite substances we saw that the
essence includes bath matter and ferro. Aquinas, believing he ia
following Aristotle, chooses matter as the principle of individuation
within a species.
Befere l diseuse the role of matteL i~ Aquinas's theory of
individuation, l want te make a few brief commenta on the concept of
'esse' because, even though it ia nct directly relevant ta my present
discussion, it ia an important part of Aquinas's views regarding the
individuation of human souls. In Le "De Ente et Essentia" de s. Thomas
D'Aquin Roland-Gasselin makes the point that in Aquinas substance is
individuated by itself:
c'est bien aussi ce que paraissent insinuer plusieurs

textes; la substance est individualisée par elle-même, à la
différence des a.;cidents qui le sont par la substance; et
par ailleurs, dans la substance c'est la matière qui est le
premier sujet, celui qui recoit la forme elle-même et la
rend incommunicable, bien que par contre la forme soit le
principe de l'être substantiel, de la subsistance. 98
Matter, claims Roland-Gasselin, is justified as the principle of
individuation by the fact that substance is individuated by itself, and,
ainee matter is the ultimate subst~dtum of the substance, it will be at
the base level that which individuates it. But, as l see it (and l
think as Aquinas also sees it), matter as completely indete=minate and
98. Roland-Gosselin, Le "De Ente et Essentia ll de S. Thomas D'Aguin. Etude 1. Le Principe de

l'Individuation, 115-116.
-- 169 --
purely potential cannet be such a principle by itself. Individuation
will therefore need a more stable ontological foundation. The
foundation ia being, or, more precisely, the unit y which ia given ta the
Bubstance by its being.
L'individualité suppose l 'unit~ et se fonde sur elle.

Mais dans les natures matérielles, la complexité et la
diversité des principes de l'être introd\1.it une distinction
importante entre l'unité et l'individualité; et
l'individualité donne naissance à un nouveau mode d'unité,
qui est l'unité accidentelle ou quantitative, principe du
nt.lmbre. 99
80th of these clairns searn te be confirmed in Aquinas's texts. 100
The unit y which is at the foundation of individuation cou1d be looked at
in this way: ainee the matter doea not have its own separate being, form
doea not have sorne other being, and the accidents do not have yet
another being, once you have one being you have identified one substance
compoaed of matter, form and essential and accidental properties. This
idea that the ultimate principle of indiviàuation is not matter or forro,
but th", being itself of the object, shou1d be kept in mind because it
will play an important role in Aquinas's discussion of the individuation
of human souls after death.
Aquinas, however, argues throughout his writings that matter is
the principle of individuation for composite substances in the sense, at
least, that il allows us to differentiate between substances in the sarne
99. Roland-Gasselin, Le IIDe Ente et Essentia ll de S. Thomas D'Aguin. Etude 1. le Principe de

l'Individuation, 125.
100. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. III, a. JI ad tertium; cf. also Lib. 1, q. XXIX,
a. 1 and a. Il; and Th~~s Aquinas, Cuaestiones Disputatae, Vol. 1, De Potentia (Paris:
111 Lethielleux, 1882), q. IX, a. 5, 315 ad octavum; all subsequent citations fram this work
'4"
are to this edition.
-- 170 --
species. When we consider this view, the question immediately arises a&
te how this iB possible for an entity which ia in itself completely
indeterminate, purely potential, an.à common te ail things. Aquinas ia
aware of the objection and says:
8&~ rnateria invenitur communia in diverais secundurn speciem,

quia eadem materia formis contrariis subditur; alias
habentia contrarias formas non trans~utarentur invicem.
Ergo rnateria non est principium diversitatis secundurn
numerum, nec forma, ut probaturn est. 101
Matter by itself cannet be the pri~ciple of individuation, Aquinas
argues, and in his early writings we saw that he accepta the notion that
the ferm of corporeity provides the means for the solution of this
problem. Later, however, Aquinas rejects thE: notion of the' foriR of
corporeity', but retains the outline and spirit of the solution which
the 'fo~n of corporeity' had pravided. Matter, in arder ta be the
principle of individuation, needs to be in sorne way determined. More
particularly, matter needs quantity, and the quantity must be
'understood' in the matter befare the form in such a way as to give
matter determined dimensions. The matter becomes matter signed by
quantity.l02
This is the view which Aquinas also expresses in the De Ente et
3ssentia and in book l of the Ccmmentary on the Sentences. Later on,
however, ir. .3ook rI of the Commentary on the Sentences, Aqninas' s view
101. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, a. II sed contra 3; also
see Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. Il, nn. 73-84; Thomas Aquin~s, ~
Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. III, a. II ad tertium; and Lib. l, q. LXXV, a. VII resp.
102. Thomas Aquinas, Conmentarium in Lib. II Scntentiarum, d. 111, q. 1, a. 1 soLutio.

-- 171 •.-
~J
<il B88mB ta change slightly:103 he talks of undetermined dimensions rather
than determined dimensions. He explains that the dimensions which are
understood in the matter baiera the adven~ of the substantial ferrn need
ta be undatermined dimensions because the final determination of the
dimensions follows upon Lhe ferro: . '.

ad quartum dicendum, quod dirnensio ~~ae praej~t~~ligitur
ante formam substantialem in materia, non hdbe~ esse
completum, quia non est dirnensio terminata; terminatio ~~im
dirnensionis est par formarn. sed dimensiones quae manant
post consecrationem, sunt dimensiones terminatae quae habent
certam mensuram et figuram. 104
This view ia aIse accepted in the Expositio super Librum Boethii
de Trinitate. 10S Aquinas' s motivation for substitu'ting undetermined
dimentions for determined dimensions ia certainly related to his
criticisIf. of Boethius' s view that accidents individuate. In his
criticism of Boethius's view, Aquinas maintains that arguing that it ia
the accidents which individuate wouid amount to denying that objects can
change. He thinks, in fact, that tte theory, if held consistently,
forces the conclusion that the change of accidentaipropertiea in an
individual ia equivalent to its becoming a different individual. In
effect, Aquinas argues that if it is ~ai~tained that what metaphysica11y
individuatea F ia any accidentaI property, then the change of that
accidental property causes an es~ential change in F: the change ia so
103. For a more complete discussion of the evolution of Aquinas's theory of individuation see:
Roland-Gossel in, Le !IDe Ente ... Essentia ll de S. Thomas D'Aguin. Etude 1, Le Principe cie
l'Individuation, 104-117.
104. Thomas Aquinas, Corrmentariun in lib. IV Sententiarun, d. XI, q. 1, a. 1 soLutio 3 ad quartllTl;

cf. atso d. XII, q. l, a. II solutio 4, and solutio 6 ad quintum.
105. See, for exemple, Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Libr~~ Boethii pe Trinitate, q. IV, a. Il, n.
8 ad tertillTl.
-- 172 --
essential that F cannet be said ta be F any longer~ It i~ easy ta Bee
how this theory ia impossible te de fend in the case of any changeable
composite, since it entails that aven the least significant change Buch
as, for example, a change of colour or a change in weight or size wou Id
cause the individu al in question ta become another individual. Even if
it were argued that it ia a cluster of accidentaI properties which
individuate a substance and that, therefore, the change of just one
accidentaI property cannat cause an individual te change into another
individual, it can easily be argued that even a change in aIl of the
accidentaI properties of an individual does not cause that individual ta
change identity. It 15 easy to see how this sarne criticism CQuld be
applie~ te Aquinas's theory that it is determined dimensions in the
matter which perform the task of individuating. The view that it is
determinate dimensions which individuate a particular substance, if held
consistently, would in fact entail that any change in the dimensions
causes the individual under consideration to become another individual.
Individuation by ctetermined dimensions, just as individuation by
accidents, woulà give rise to the 'frozen indivldual'.
On Aquinas's earlier view, both in the case of deterroined
dimensions and in the case of undetermined dimensions, the matter
receives its dimensions frem a forro: the 'ferm of corporeity'. Aquinas,
however, later becomes convinced that the inherence of another forro, the
'ferro of corporeity', in the matter befere its proper forro would make
the inherence of the proper form accident al and would threaten the
essential unit y of the composite. He therefore rejects the notion of

-- 173 --
the ferro of corporeity and maintains te the end that only one
substantial ferro cao be present in the matter.
This change may have 601ved ether problems, but it causes
difficulties for Aquinas's theory of individuation because, as we saw
earlier, Aqvinas maintains that division in matter ia presupposed for
the inherence of the substant;.al ferro: division in turn presupposes
quantity which the matter in itself, and without the forro of corporeity,
dOBe nct have. Having eliminated the ferrn of corporeity Aquinas will
say that the quantity inheras directly in the matter.
prima autern dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundurn

ipsam attenditur divisio aius et indivisio, et ita unitas et
multitude, quae sunt prima consequentia ens; et propter hoc
Bunt dispesitiones totius materiae, non huius aut illiua
tantum. Unde emnia alia accidentia mediante quantitate in
substantia fundatur, et quantitas est prier eis
naturaliter; ••• 106
The theory now seems to be that the principles of individuation
are matter and quantity. But Aquinas has argued that matter cannat be
the principle of individuation because of itself it is campletely
undetermined and purely potential; he has alse argued, against
Boethius's theory of individuation, that accidents do not individuate.
Now he is arguing that both taken together can be the princip1e of
individuation, something which cannot be consistently maintained even if
it ia granted that "nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem
106. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. IV SententiaruTI, d. XII, q. 1, a. 1 solutio 3; see also d.
XII, q. l, a. 1 solutio 3 ad primum.
-- 174 --
divisionis niai quantitas ... 107 Aquinas ia aware of this problem and aIse
of a second one in this theory.
Admitting that the quantity inheres in the matter befere the
subatantia1 form but without the form of corporeity brings with it the
consequence that accidentaI forms can inhere in the matter befere the
Bubstantial ferm, a thesis which Aquinas never accepted. He will try ta
solve this problem by arguing that, although q~antity, and therefore
dimensions, do nct inhere in the matter befere the substantial ferro,
they are understood in the matter beiore the substantial ferro.
Quantity, and aIl ether determinations, will come ta the matter aIl
together with the inherence of the substantial ferm: the quantity,
however, which ia presupposed for the inherence of the substantial forro,
will be understood in the matter before ail the other determinationa
a1ao brought to the matter by the substantia1 form.
Ad aecundum dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt

accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae
convenit. Dnde materia iam intellecta sub cerporeitate et
dimensionibus, petest intelligi ut distincta in diversas
partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ulteriores
perfectionis gradus. Quarnvis enim eadem fr;=,na sit secundurn
essentiam quae diverses perfectionis gradus materiae
attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem
rationis differt. lOB
107. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, a. II, n. 8 ad tertium.
Aquinas thinks that dimensions are distinct of themselves: lIad quarttnl dicendum quod corpus
naturale non habet quod repleat locum ex parte materiae, neque ex parte formae, sed \~x
parte dimensionum; unde secundum Phi Losophum in IV Phys., tex!. 8, in III Metaph., tex!. 9,
dimensiones separatae si ponantur esse, vel corpus mathematicum, quod idem est, replent
locln, et non possunt esse simul cum aLio corpore. 1I (Thomas Aquint.:" Corrrnentarium in Lib.
IV Sententiarum, d. X, q. I, a. III solutio 1 ad quartum). This pas~age also establishes a
clear connection between quantity and place.
108. Thomas Aquinas, SL.rmla Theologiae, Lib. l, q. LXXVI, e. VI ad secundLl'l1.

-- 175 --
According te this view the forro, which ia ooly one in each
particular substance, gives different perfections ta the matter
Buccessively: there ia a distinction of effects in the ferro, but thi~
doea nct mean that there are several really distinct forms, the
distinction ia a distinction of reason~ Roland-Gasselin describes the
process in the following way:
mais i l est bien entendu qu il ne s'agit toujours là que

1
d'une antériorité purement logique, laquelle ne peut nuire

aucunement à l'unité et à la priorité réelle de la forme
supérieure. De ce point de vue réel les dimensions ne
peuvent en aucune manière (ni déterminées, ni indéterminées)
précéder la forme substantielle. 109
There ia one serieue objection which can be made to this
explanation. The quantitative dimensions have to be in the matter prior
to the substantial ferm in order te erganize the matter for the
inherence of its substantiai form. But in order to prevent the
inherence of the quantitative dimensions in the matter before the
substantial form, Aquinas is saying, in effeLt! that even theugh it is
reaIIy the form which inheres in the matter prier te the quantitative
dimensions, the quantitative dimensions are understoed in the matter
befere the ether effects ef the substantia1 ferro. But the quantitative
dimensions are really presupposed in the matter bafere the forro can
inform Lt. It geems to me that Aquinas h~re is tryin~ ta solve a
problem which presents itself at the ontoJogit.:al levei with logical
categories. If the quantitative dimensions are really part of the form,
a part which is \4i.\derstoed separate only by a distinction of reason,
then the forro ia really in the matter before any of its parts can have
109. Roland·Gosselin, le IIDe Ente et Essentia U de s. Thomas D'Aguin. Etude 1. le Principe de

l'Individuation, 114.
-- 176 --
any effect on the matter. The explanation 5eems ta becorne circular: the
quantitative dimensions are presupposed in the matter in order for the
Bubstantial ferro ta be able ta inform the m~~ter, but at the Barne time,
given that the quantitative dimensions are really part of the
substantial forro, the substantial forro itself is presupposed for the
quantitative dimensions ta be able te inhera in the matter, and so on ad
infinitum.
It 6eeme at this point that Aquinas should be forced ta admit
either that matter itself individuates or that it iB ferro which really
performa the taak of individuating. Aquinas cannat admit the firet
because he saya himself that matter as completely undetermined and
purely potential cannat individuate and needs ta be individuated by
something else. There is also very little evidence that Aquinas ever
abandoned the idea that matter combined with quantitative dimensions
(either determined or undetermined)110 individuates in favor of the idea
that form individuates. In question IV, article II of the Expositio
super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, while arguing against the view that
accidents are the principle of intraspecifie individu~tion, Aquinas
8eems te espouse a view which could entail the notion of individuation
by 'esse'. He e::plains, in fact, that intraspecific individuation
should be considered in analogy to generic and specifie individuation.
Just as matter determines gene~ic difference, and ferm determines
110. Roland-Gasselin (Roland·Gosselin, Le "De Ente et Essentie ll de S. Thomas D'Aguin, Etude I, Le

Princioe de ~Itndividuation, 109·110), ar~lJes "that, althaugh Aquinas never abandons the
idee that quantitative dimensions are part of the principle of individuation, in his later
wr~tings he seems to be undecided as ta whether he should use determined or undetermined
dimensions.
-- 177 --
,
,1'
.. specifie difference, sa this matter and this ferro determine numerical
differentiation.
Inter individua vero unius speciai hoc modo consideranda est

diversitas. Secundum Philosophum eoim in VII Hetaphysicae
sicut partes generis et speciai sunt rnateria et forma, ita
partes individui sunt haee materia et haee forma. Unde
sicut diversitatem in genere val specie facit diversitas
materiae vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in numero
facit haee forma et haee rnateria. Nulla autem forma in
quantum huiusmodi est haee ex se ipsa. 111
Because earlier in the discussion Aquinas makes it perfectly clear
that neither matter oor farro are individuals in themselves, this passage
could be read ta entail the view that it is the combinat ion of this
ma~ter and this form made individual by the 'esse', i.e., their very
combination, which accounts for numerical differentiation. Aquinas,
however, in the discussion following the passage goes on to explain that
because matter is not an individual in itself it needs te be
individuated by quantity, thereby reconfirming his acceptance of
'signated matter', When faced with the choice between determined
dimensions and undetermined dimensions in the Expositio Super Librum
Boethii de Trinitate, Aquinas chooses matter combined with undetermined
dimensions as the principle of numerical differentiation. 112
111. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethi; de Trinitate, q. IV, 8. Il, n. 6 resp.
112. The choice of undetermined di mansions over determined dimensions seems ta be dictated, not only
by the need ta avoid the problem of the 'frozen individual', but also by the need ta
address a different but related problem of individuation: i.e., the need to give an aceount
of what it is that makes a physically ehanging per~ ... _l One and the same over time.
Nutrition and growth seem to require that the matter whieh makes up a body change over
time. Because of this it is impossible to suppose that the 'signated matter' whieh
individuates ~e exaetly the same matter and quantity over time. ln selecting undetermined
dimensions as the principle of individuation for matter, Aquinas explains that determined
dimensions would be inadequate: lIquia eum tal is terminatio dimensionllll varietur frequenter
cirea individullll, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret selllJer idem nunero. lI (Thomas
1 Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, a. Il, n. 7 resp). The
principle of individuation through time, therefore, could even be something other th an
-- 178 --
The issue of individuation, however, becomes aven more complicated
when the composite substance in question happens ta be a human being:
man la composed of a body and a soul, which ie its substantial ferro, and
the human Boul survives the death of the body. The question immediately
arises as ta how souls remain individuated after death. Given the fact
that the principle of individuation within the species ia matter
combined with quantitative dimensions, bath of which are part of the
body, it seems that the most plausible explanation wou id be that human
seuls become like the angels, i.e., instead of being a different
individual within the sarne species, each soul become a different
species. But a further complication ie provided by the fact that
according ta Christian dogma the soul 15 90in9 te be reunited with its
body on the day of final judgement when the body is going to be
resurrected. Aquinas, therefore, does not want to accept the conclusion
that each human soul becomes a species unto itself, partly becauae the
human Boul has to preserve sorne link with the body to which it is sorne
day supposed ta be reunited.
Aquinas's solution of the prablem of the individuation of the
human soul after it has been separated tram its body relies on what he
calls an adaptability of the soul to the body. He argues that the soul
after death remains individuated. It does not, however, remain
individuated by any essential principle ·,:l;';'h";'n the soul, but it ia
individuated by its adaptability ta a particular body. This
adaptability works in su ch a way that each saul is only adaptable ta its
's;gnated matter'. A good candidate for Aquinas would be the 'esse' which, in fact, does
not change over time.
-- 179 --
own body. This relationship remains as the principle of individuation
of the Boul aven after death.
Multitude igitur animarum a corporibus separatarum

consequitur quidam diversitatem formarum secundum
Bubstantiam, quia alia est s~bstantia huius animae et
illius: non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate
principiorum essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum
diversam rationem animas; sed est secundum diversam
commensurationem anirnarum ad corpora; haee enirn anima est
commensurata huie corpori et non il1i, illa autem alii, et
sic de omnibus. Huiusrnodi autem commensurationes remanent
in animabus etiam pereuntibus corporibus: ... 1'3
The soul, then, fram the union with the body, acquires an
adaptability te that particular body which it retains even after its
separation from that body at death. This should make it possible to
maintain that the soul is the substantial form of the body, that the
principles of individuation are material in character, and still that
the human soul remains individuated, even after separation from the body
at death, by the privileged relationship it has '_itr that body of which
it once was the substantial form.
Although this view is quite plausible for the solution of the
problem at hand, if this relationship or adaptability of the human soul
to its body simply amounts to indiv~duating the soul after death by
matter signed by quantity, then it is quite clear that the theory simply
extends the general problem Aquinas has with his theory of individuation
to the specifie problem of the individuation of human souls after
death. In support of this view that the human soul after death is not
individuated by its relationship to the body's matter signed by quantity
..
.. 1
Aquinas says:
113. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LXXXI.
-- 180 --
sed si una anima cliverais corporibus generatis unitur

successive, redibit idem Humera homo per generationem .. 114
This passage ia pu:zling. The soul's union with a numerically
different body through generation should individuate it as a different
soul because it now inheres in a different bit of m~~ter signed by
quantity. This should be 60 uniese the soul's relationship with its
past body endures over time in such a way as te rnake it possible for the
soul te individuate this different bit of matter as the sarne body which
it informed in the past. The latter alternative entails the view that
in this cQse the principle of individuation ia nct matter signed by
quantity at all, but the 'esse'. For individuation though time, in
fact, it 8eems that 'signated matter' would be an inadequate principle
of individuation unlesB joined with a more durable principle. 115
The last alternative seems to be the more promising. As we have
seen in the course of the more general discussion of individuation,
there is, in fact, sorne evidence that in this case Aquinas does nat
simply refer ta matter signed by quantity, but ta a fuller relatianship
of the soul ta its body: it seems that here the individuating principle
is not matter signed by quantity alone but the 'esse' which makes the
substance one: 116
sequitur etiam et aliis c;,:uibuscumque: quia, cum unitas rei

sequatur formarn, sicut et :S~é, oportet quod illa sint unum
numero quorum est forma numero una. Non igitur est passibile
114. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LXXXIII.
115. Cf. footnote n. 112 above.
116. Recall my remarks at the beginning of the section about the importance of the concept of being
as th~ ultimate principle of individuation.
-- 181 --
unam animam diverais corporibus uniri. Ex quo etiam

sequitur quod nec animae fuerunt ante corpora. 117
The human soul after it leaves the body ia nct individuated by the
quantitative dimensions it once was in, at least nct exclusively, but it
is also individuated by the other properties of the body it was in.
Hoc autem esse terminaturn, quarnvis acquira~ur animae in

corpore, non tamen ex corpore, nec per dipendentiam ad
corpus. Unde, remotie corporibus, adhuc remanebit unicuique
animae esse Buum terminatum, secundurn affectiones vel
dispositiones quae consecutae sunt ipsam, prout fuit
perfectio ta1is corporis. 118
Aquinas will explain this passage by saying that the human soul ia
like wax which retains its characteristics once the container which
impressed them ta it ia removed, and nct like water which once the
container is removed does not. Aquinas's meaning, then, 5eems to be
that it is the bein~ of the human sou1 whi~h identifies it after death.
The being, we aaw, is that which gives the substance its unitYi roughly
speaking, it is that wllich takes the matter, the ferm, and the 'per se'
accidents (1 am talking about 'per se' accidents, i.e., necessary
accidents, because other accidents have been excluded by Aquinas in his
discussion of Boethius's theory of individuation, 50 supposedly he would
not use them himse1f), and brings them all together to make them one
substance ..
According te this explanation, th2~1 we have the saroe individu al
after death because it has the sall:e 'esse'; we have the sanie substance
117. Thomas Aquinas, SlIlJT1ël Centra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LXXXIII.
118. Thomas Aqu;nas, Scr;ptum super Libres Sententiarum Mag;str; Petri Lombard;, L;b. l, d. VIII, q.
v, a. Il ad sextum.
-- 182 --
becauae the nature remains the sarne, but the saroe nature existe in two
different ways:
The soul, as united te the body and as separate fram it, has
indeed different modes of being. But there ia more te be
said: aCrOsB these two modes of being the nature of the soul
remains the sarne: manente tamen eadem animae natura. '19
The human soul aiter death, in tact, ls an incomplete being:
This ia SQ true that we can only wonder whether St. Thomae'e

purpose in the whole article was nct ta show that embodiment
was more than a question of a etate of existence; it was
expressive of a nature, 50 that, just as the embodied etate
was natural, so the separated state was beyond the
conditions of the soul' s nature. 120
If this le indeed Aquinas's view cf the individuation of human
souls after death, it might even be possible that he abandoned his
ear1ier idea that matter signed by quantity is the principle of
individuation for composite substances at the metaphysical level and
substituted it with the view that being is not cnly, as we saw above,
the ultimate principle of individuation, but the only p~inciple of
individuation. This interpretation is supported by the fact that God,
who is the only being whose knowledge of reality corresponds perfectly
with reality itself, "scit materialia immaterialiter, et composita
simpliciter ..... 121 If t.his were Aquinas' 5 considered view of
individuation it would, of course, be free from those problems at least
which are caused in his theorï by the view that matter is the principle
of individuation. There is, however, little evidence that Aquinaa enda
119. Pegis, "Th~ Separated Seul and its Nature in St. Thomas,lI 135.
.,.'"'t- 120. Pegis, "The Separated Seul and its Nature in St. Thomas,ll 137•
121. Thomas Aquinas, SlIlTna Theelegiae, Lib. I, q. XIV, a. XIV resp.

-- 183 --
up adopting this view. It ia clear at least that he doea nct aâopt it
te the exclusion of the vlew that the principle of numerical
differentiation is 'signated matter,.122
Whether or not the 'esse' could work as the principle of
individuation at the metaphysical level, it cleaYly cannat do so at the
epistemological level. In order te explain how we individuate
substances and differentiate among thern, Aquinas will use those sensible
properties which follow upon matter for the individuation of numerically
different individuals and those which follow upon ferro for i_ndividuating
differences in species. Matter signed by quantity and forro will, in
thie case, be the foundations. The most prornising candidate for
differentiating arnong numerically different individuals ia location in
place: and, in fact, location in place is closely related to quantity
and quantitative dimensions in Aquinas's thought. In his article
"'Alteritas' and numerical diversity in st. Thomas Aquinas" David
Winiewicz writes that:
St. Thomas argues that just as time is the measure of

motion, so, indeed, place is the measure of a body. There
is a twofold relation of body to pla,;:e. A body may be
located in this or that determined place, or a body may be
considered to be absolutely in place by the very nature of
the composite. A body' s dimensions are equivalent to the
dimensions of its place. 123
This view is confirmed in numerous passages in Aquinas:
122. It is possible that Aquinas may have decided to use three different principles of individuation
st the metaphysical level: one for individuating material composites, i.e., 'signated
matter'; a second one fOl individuating human souls in their disembodied state, ipe., the
'esse'; and a third. i.e., the mere fact that they differ in species, in order to
individuate angels.
123. \Jiniewicz, liA Note on 'Alteritas' and numerical diversity in St. Thomas Aquinas,1I 703.
-- 184 --
et idee ipsa diversitas locorum in se considerata est signum

diversitatis secundum numerum, siout et de aliia
accidentibuB praeter dimensiones primas indeterminatas supra
dictum est. Sed si diversitas loci consideretur secundum
suam causam, sic planum est quod diversitas loci est causa
diversitatis secundum numerurn. '24
While the second part of this passage clearly expresses a
metaphysical relationship between location in place and numerical
diversity, it ia equally clear that the firet part refera ta the
relationship of location te our capacity te individuate substances.
Aquinas, in fi.\ot, considera location in place, as weIl as oth~r
accidentaI ~roperties, a 'sigo' of numerical diversity. Location in
place, however, does not seern te be the only accidental property which
ia used as a aign of, or as a way of recognizing, nurneric~l diversity.
Aquinaa says that the other accidents are not the principle of
individuation, but that they are a way of recognizing the distinction
between individuals.
Alia vero accidentia non sunt principiur.'. individuationis,

sed sunt principium cognoscendi distinctionem individuorum.
Et per hune modum etiam aliia accidentibus individuatio
attribuitur. 125
What haB been said about the process by whieh we come ta
individuate substances numerieally is ap~1.icable in an analogouB way to
the process by which we recognize specifie differences:
ad tertium dicendum quod, quia substantiales differentiae

non sunt nobis notae, v~l etiam nominatae non sunt, oportet
interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco
substantialium, puta si quis diceret: ignis est corpus
124. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, a. IV resp.j cf. a1so q.
IV, a. III, n. 5 resp.
125. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitat~, q. IV, a. Il, n. 8 resp.; cf. also
Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, :ap. VI, n. 87ff; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Lib. Il 1, q. 1l, a. III ad primum.
-- 185 --
simplex, calidum et siccum: accidentia enim propria sunt

effectua formarum substuntialium, et manifestant eab. 126
By this procesB, i.e., by coming ta know the neceseary and
accidentaI properties which are directly or indirectly derived from the
material nature and fram the formaI nature, we come ta know the material
and the formal components of the substance. The material component and
the f01~al component, combined with those necessary and accidental
properties through which we have come ta know them, are, as we saw, made
into a unit y by the 'es~~' which ia the ultimate principle of
individuation of substances. By corning te know the unique combinat ion
of matter, forro, and properties in one substance, we have, then, come ta
know that it ia one baing: this would mean that we have come to know
that it is one being because of the particular combination among the
elements of which it is raade.
126. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, lib. l, q. XXIX, a. 1 ad tertium; cf. also Thomas Aquinas, ln
Duodecim Libres Metaphysicorum Aristetel;s Expositio, Lib. XII, Lect. VIII, n. 2541.
-- 186 --
eHAPTER III
JOHN DUNS seoTUS
This chapter will be devoted to the exposition of Scotus's
discussion of matter and its implications for the questions that have
already ~een raised in the chapters on Aristotle and on Aquinas. As l
examine each question, my general purpose will be te trace the
differences and sirni1arities between the views of Scotus and Aristot1e.
l will aiso question the strength of Scotus's often-stressed
relationship ta the Neoplatonist Augustinian tradition. More
particularly, my discussion will concentrate on sorne interesting
consequences of the differences bet~'een the views of Scotus and Aquinas,
as weIl as on Borne issues which arise exclusively in the context of
Scotua'S own sYBtl~m and fram his criticisme of opposing views.
The Franciscan tradition to which Scotus be10ngs is often
associated with the Neoplatonist Auyustinian tradition. Most Franciscan
phi1osophers did in fact fo11ow this tradition. But by the tirne scotus
wrote the Augustinian and the Aristotelian traditions were net as
c1ear1y differentiated as they had once been. Moreover, as Sharp
exp1ains, the Franciscan tradition at Oxford in the ear1y thirteenth
century (through the influence of Grosseteste, hirnse1f not a Franciscan)

-- 187 --
.•,-'1>
had come into contact with the phi1osophy of Aristot1e more free1y than
had been possible in Paris cluring the sarne period. ~lhi1e 'Jiscussing
GrOBseteete's influence on the teaching at Oxford, Sharp obs~rves that:
his familiarity with the "philosopher" shows th~t while

Paris was harnpered by the condemnations of 1210, 1215, 1231,
and 1245, Oxford had a1ready 1earnt to appreciate Aristot1e.
Hence it ia ta Grosseteste rather than ta Albert the Great
that we must assign the honour of having introduced
Aristot1e into the West.'
As a matt~~ of fact, Bharp adds in a footnote 2 that both Albert
the Great and Thomas Aquinas were indirectly influen~ed by Grosseteste
through their contact with the latter's intirnate friand, William of
Auvergne. This shows, l think, that during the thirteenth century the
so-called "Aristotelian-Thomist" and "Neoplatonist-Augus-t:.inian"
traditions certainly had muc~ influence on each ether. Thus i.t ia
possible te claim at the outset sorne Neoplatonist and Augustinian
influences on Aquinas, as weIl as sorne Aristotelian influence on Scotua.
What ia more relevant to my present argument, however, ia the fact that
Grosseteste introduced Aristotle to the Franciscan Tradition at Oxford
and that, through his teaching there, his know1edge of Aristot1e
exercieed a powerful influence on the University.
Mypurpose in examining Scotus's views on matter and their
implications in the 1arger context of his system is to show that
Franciscan thought, at 1east as exemplified by Beatus, was far more
Aristotelian in the thirteenth century than is common1y held. l a1sv
want to find support for the stronger claim that Scotus, in ~ome aspecta
1. Sharp, Franciscsn Philosophy at Oxford in the XIII!h Century, S.
2. Sharp, Francises" Philosophy Bt Oxford in the XIII!h Cent ury, 9, note n. 5.

-- 188 --
of his thought, iB net only closer ta the Aristotelian tradition than ta
the Neoplatonist or Augustinian cnes, but aIse that his systenl ia, in
very important ways, more faithfu1 to AristotLe than the system of
Aquinas himse1f.
We have seen at the beginning of my discussion of Aristot1e3 that
rnost Bcholars, though sometirnes with caution and qualifications, place
Scotus's thought direct1y in the Augustinian tradition and consider his
work ta be at odds with the foundations and basic motivations of
Aristotle's philosophy. Theae feelings are expressed, as l have Baid,
by Longprè and Harris, whi1e Bettoni in his book Duns Seoto sees Scotus
attempting to assimi1ate Aristot~~ into the Augustinian tradition.
Anche la sua sintesi è un nuovo tentative di assimilare

l'aristote1ismo tomista, divenuto nel frattempo più
familiare e quindi p~u compreso ed apprezzato,
nell'agoBtini~mo,in un agostinismo divenuto più rigoroso e
quindi più es"enziale, sotte ia lima formidabile del nuovo
aristotelismo. 4
The attempt mentioned in the passage just quoted seems to be
judged largely a failure by Bettoni when he later claims that the root
of all the differences between the metaphysics of Aristotle and Scotus
lies in Scotus's own inability ta understand the Aristotelian-Thomist
conception of potentiality. Bettoni goes on to say, possibly with sorne
justification, that Scotus is unable to understand how it can be that
the potentiality of matter is reai 'extra causam suam' and aiso that
matter should be denied ail actuality.5 By this claim Bettoni draws a
3. See sf.. ..:;tian l, chapter 1, note n. 2 above.
4. Bettani, Duns Scata, 31.
5. This argument is made in Bettani, Duns Scata, 89-90.

-- 189 --
rather sha~p distinction between the two traditions ta which, according
ta him, A~Ainas and ScctUB belong, while making it quite clear that a
misunderstanding of the 'Aristotelian-Thomist' tradition implies a
misunderstanding of Aristotle himself. He aIse places the concept of
prime matter at the very heart of his discussion of the differences and
similarities between Scotus and Aristotle.
Prosper~ Stella, in the conclusion of L'Ilemorfismo di G. Duns
Sco~o, ie in general agreement with Bettoni's opinion when he indirectly
sets Seotus against Aristotle by setting hirn against Thomas Aquinas, who
in his opinion follows Aristotle against Plato. 6
l am not the only one who would dispute these claims. Harris
nimself admits, during one of his references to the authenticity of the
De Rerum ~rincipio, that if this work were te be censidered spurieus, as
it i. now generally agreed to be, Scotus's thought would end up being
closer ta the Aristotelian than to the Augustinian tradition.
With many of Fr. Longprè's conclusions l am in substantial

agreement, but l cannot follow him when he condemns the De
Rerum Principio as spurious. To do sa would alter
considerably our conception of Scotus's position, and bring
him more closely into line with the Aristotelianism of the
Thomist School, thus missing what seems to me to be the
vital interest and significance of his philosophy - namely,
hie reconstruction of the Augustinian tradition. 7
Although l quite agree with him that the De Rerum Principio does
rather drastically change the complexion of Scotus's views, l think that
the exclusion of this work from his corpus has not produced unchallenged
6. Stella, L'llemorfismo di G. Duns Scoto, 301-302.
7. Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. l, note on 37.

-- 190 --
agreement with the statement that Seatus iB a more faithful follower of
Aris'cotie than ia generally admitted, and even less with the further
claim that he ie, in sorne respec~s, more Aristotelian than Aquinas.
A view slightly different from that of Harris is taken by Landry
in the conclusion of Duns Scot in which he argues, without questioning
the authenticity of the De Rerum Principio, in favour of a development
in the philosophy of Duns Scotus from the AUJustinianism of his early
period (characterized by works such as the De Rerum Principio) to a
later stage in which ~he Augustinian influence on BeatuB lies really
only in a certain use of language. Landry conc.1.udes in effect that
Scotus's system develops in a direction that runs against the
Augustinian tradition.
Toutefois, l'influence augustinienne ne toucha Duns Scot que

légèrement 1 déjà il rejetait de nombreuses théories
traditionnelles, par exemple celles de la pluralité des
formes et des raisons séminales; et à celle qu'il admettait,
coonne la théorie de l'unité de la matière dana tous les
êtres créés, il faisait subir une profonde transformation.
L'augustinisme du Docteur Subtil se réduisait à une certaine
manière de parler 1. • • or, cette philosophie, très
originale, s'etait constituée par apposition à
l' augustinisme. 8
Regardless of the view taken on this issue (i.e., whether the De
Rerum Principio is te be considered spurious or whether Scotus's system
is to be seen as developing away from the Augustinian tradition), it is
undeniable that there are several very basic tenets characteristic of
the Augustinian tradition which Scotus clearly rejects. Regarding a few
of these, there is almost complete agreement. It is generally agreed,
for exemple, that Scotus rejects Augustine's theory of divine
8. Landry, Ouns Scot, 336·337.

-- 191 --
illumination9 and the theory of the 'rationes seminales'.'O Regarding
ethers, there ia les a agreement, but, as we will see du ring the course
of this discussion, l think that he dOBs r~ject them: these include the
theory of universal hylomorphism, rejected by ScotUB because he denies
that the human soul and angels are cornposed of matter (corporeal or
spiritual) and form;11 and, to a large extent though not comp1etely, the
theory of the plurality of forms. 12 To the extent to which, as it
seems, Scotus accepta the presence of the ferro of corpor.eity in Borne
composite substances, he accepts a plurality of forma in one composite;
9. The theory of divine illumination, roughly stated, holds that because the human mind is by nature
changeable and imperfect man needs divine illumination in arder te come to know that which
is unchangeable and eternal. ln arder to acquire knowledge of eternal truths, therefore,
the hLII\Bn mind ner:ds to be aided by divine i llunination. For Scotus's rejection of the
theory of divin~ illurnlnation see, for example: Landry, Duns Scot, 204~205; ~olter, rh!
Trenscendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Scotus, 31-32; and Bettoni, ~
§S2!g, 59~60.
10. In Augustine's philosophy the 'rationes seminales' are considered the Ugerms of things or
invisible powers or potentialities, created by God in the beginning in the humid element
and developing into the abjects of various speC"5es in their terJ1Xlral unfolding."
(Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, par~ 1, 91). According to this view the
'rationes seminales' are invisible, are not the abject of experience, and are not purely
passive but, if unhindered by external circumstances, develop according to the divine plan.
For Scotus's denial of the theory of 'rationes seminales' ~ee, for example: Harris, Duns
~, Vol. l, 154; Bettoni, Duns Scoto, 72; Landry, Duns scot, 66-67; Stella,
L'llemorfismo di G. Duns Scoto, 144; and Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the
XllIth Century, 287. See alsa the fotlowing statement by Gilson in which, although he does
not admit thet Scotus rejects the theary of s~inal reasons, he nevertheless agrees that
Scotus does not think. they are the matter or a passive potentiality of the matter: liA.
Landry (Duns Scot, 66~67) semble avoir confondu deux problèmes différents en soutenant que
Duns Scot rejette la doctrine des 'raisons séminales', par où il brisait avec la tradition
franciscaine, etc. Il faut distinguer, Duns Scot nie que la raison séminale soit matière
ou puissance passive de La matière ••• ; il n'admettrait pas non plus sans bien des réserves
que La raison séminale soit acte, et il conteste expressément, contre l'ancienne école
augustinienne, qu'on soit constraint de les poser pour êviter de faire de La causalité
naturelle une véritabLe création•••• 11 (Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 473, note n. 2).
11. For the view thet Seotus denies any kind of hyLomorphic composition in the human soul and
possibLy aLso in angels, cf. Sharp, Francisea" Philosophy at Oxford in the Xllith Century,
317-319, and 343-344.
12. 1 wiLL discuss bath the theory of the plurality of forms and the theory of universal
hylomorphism in the next chapter.
-- 192 --
ta the extent, however, that Scotus denies a plu~~lity of forma ta
everything exce~t animate substances and believes in the unit y of the
human soul (and Ln a formal distinction among the different soule and
the facu1ties), he can be said to deny the theory of the p1ura1ity of
forms. 13
Even though, ScotUB enda up disagreeing with many poin~s of
Augustinian doctrine by the end of his career, it ia of course nct by an
argument denying that Scotus is a faithfu1 fo11ower of the Augustinian
or Franciscan traditions that $cotus will be shown ta be more of a
fo11ower of Aristotle than genera11y be1ieved. We shou1d, therefore,
turn ta a detailed exposition of SCOtUS~9 own theory of matter and of
its rale in the context of his philosophy in order ta determine whether
these preliminary stat~ments about his views can be corroborated by his
own statements.,
As has been shown by my references ta the De Rerum Principio, any
study of Scotus's system has to begin by determining which of the works
that have been attributed to him at one time or another are real1y part
of the authentic corpus and therefore are reliab1e sources for his
views. Much controversy has surrounded this issue, but a consensus has
13. For an argument ta the effect that Scotus stands halfway between the theory of the plurality of
fonms and the doctrine of the unit y of farm, cf. Harris, Duns Scotus, Vol. l, 159; for a
rether st ronger statement to the effect that in man there is not even a really distinct
fonm of corporeity, but the distinction is only a formal distinction, see Gilson, Jean Duns
~,s07. Also see Landry, Duns Scot, 164-165, for an argument ta the effett that the
theory of the plurelity of forms i5 admitted by Scotus only ta the extent that it is
necessary in arder to save certain dogmas and only for theological scruples; it is limited,
( therefore, only to a belief in the real distincton of the form of corporeity fram the other
fonms.
-- 193 --
generally baen reached by now on most of the warka ir question. 14 In my
exposition of Scotus's system l will therefore follow Sharp's policy and
rely exclusivety on those warka which are considered beyond question ta
be authentic.
14. See the Sl.IlmBl"'Y of Scotus's authentic worlcs in Gi lson, Jean Duns Scot, 672-675. In his
assessment Gilson is in general agreement witn Day, Intuitive Cognition: a Key te the
Significance of later Scholastics, 48, 70, 71, 94·96, and 9Bj with Sharp, Francisean
PhHosophy et Oxfol"d in the XIII!" Century, 284-286; and with the very detailed discussion
of the authenticity of Scotus's works by longprè, La Philosophie de J.O. Scot, part 1,
cheptel'" 1. For 8 more recent study on the authenticitY of Scotus's works, see Balie, Il The
Life and 1J0rks of John Duns Seotus,1l 14·27.
-- 194 --
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS
Encountering Scotus's account of the potentiality of matter, the
reader cannot help but be struck by one of the main arguments used by
Scatus against the Thomist view of the potentiality of matter and
against Aquinas's definition of matter as pure potentiality. Scotus's
argument ia a very simple one: matter as pure potentiality cannet
poeeibly be considered the substratum for substantial change.
Non salvatur etiam mutatio substantialis secundum hanc viam,

quia nihil aliter se habet in mutatione substantiali. Quod
enim aliter se habet nunc quam prius, oportet manere et
esse, et secundum hanc viam, rnateria non est niai in termina
vel terminis generationis, ut videtur. Et idee panens
materiam solum in potentia objectiva, et non subjectiva,
negat omnem rationem Philosophi de materia. 15
Scotus gives an argument te the sarne affect when he asks the more
general question of whether or not there is in composite substances sorne
poeitiv8 entity really distinct from form. In that discussion he writes
that when Aristotle says of natural generation that from opposite
opposite is made, he doea not rnean ta say that the opposite remains, but
that something other than, and cornrnon to both opposites, remains. This
other entity is matter which cannot be the same as either of the
opposites because one opposite does not remain with the ether:
in generatione naturali, secundum Philosephum primo de

Generaeione, semper aliquid corrumpitur, et aliquid
generatur. Sed t·.nc accipit Philosophus quod in
15. John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes in libres Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. 1, n. 10.
-- 195 --
" generatione, ex opposite fit oppositum, non quod oppositum

maneat, sed aliquod commune utrique termina, quod vult esse
materiam, quae non potest esse idem euro aliquo oppositorum,
quia unum oppositorum non manê..!t eum alie. Et iata
videtur intentio Philosophi prLmo de Generaeione, ubi dicit
quod in hoc distinguitur generatio ab alteratiane, quia in
generatione totum convertitur in totum; non sic in
alterc.:tione propter ht:)c, quod generabilia et corruptibilia
sune par se entia simplicia. 16
Once again ScotUB 90es on ta argue that if matter ia nct ether
than ferm and if it doea nct ramain through the change there cannet be
any Bubstantial change. If, in tact, in generation and corruption there
were nct a comman subjec~, i4e., matter, there wculd net be a change
from form to privation in corruption, or one from privation to form in
generation, since privation requires a subject. It wou1d then be
impossible to say, as Aristotle does, that generation ia a change from a
non-subject to a subject, and that corruption is a change from a subject
to a non-subject.
Praeterea, si materia non est distincta a forma, non est

possibilis aliqua mutatio substantialis. Probe par
Phi10sophum 5 Phys. mutatio quaedam est de non subjecto in
subjectum, alia a subjecto in non subjectum, alla de
subjecto in su~jectumi ... sed si non est ibi materia, quae
ponitur subjectum commune, igitur generatio non est a non
subjecto in subjectum, nec corruptio a subjecto in non
subjectum, hoc est, non erit in corruy~lone mutatio a forma
in privationem, nec in generatione a privatione ad farmam,
si ibi nan est subjectum materia, quia privatia non est niai
in subjecto apto nato. 17
Much emphasis is put again and again on the fact that the matter
remains and remains the same thraugh substantial change·:
16. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 4.
17. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 6. The same
general view is expressed in John Duns Scotus, Opera Qmnia, Vols. XXII·XXIV, Reportata
ParisiensiB (Uadding ed.: 26 vols. Paris: Vives, 1893-1894), Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 7;
all subsequent:itations fram this work are to this edition.
-- 196 --
qua utitur Philosophus pro banda materiam esse aliam rem a

forma~ quia manet eadem sub oppositis formis. 18
And again:
et idee eum ex aqua generatur igni5, aqua,. _. tata transit

in ignem, qui est totum vere unUffi; sed non ssquit....:tr quod
nihi1 maneat commune~ quia primum totum fuit unurn totum per
se, et recedente prima forma, advenit materiae nova forma,
quae facit aliud totum per se, et idee quia unum totum
succedit alteri, idee dicitur totum conversum esse in totum,
manet tamen subj ectum commune. 19
What is striking about a11 these arguments is that they a11 make
reference ta what l argued ta be Aristotle's mast basic motivation for
introducing the notion of prime matter: the need te provide a substratum
for substantial change which would circumvent bath horns of the dilemma
p9sed by the E1eatic phi1osophers: things cannat be a110wed to come out
af nan-being and at the same time cannat be said to come out of that
which already is in a completely determined way. Thus Scotus's view, as
expressed by sharp, is that:
while matter i5 non-being in relation to the process of

becoming, it has being inasmuch as it iB that which becomes
and that is a factor of the composite. 20
Scotus, l c1aim, is far more impressed than Aquinas by the
importance of this point. Scotus, in effect, makes the argument from
physics the starting point for his theory of matter. Aquinas, on the
other hand, bases his view of matter more on the argument from logic
contained in Metaphysics VII.3.1029 a20-26, which sees matter as the
18. John Duns Scotus, Opera Dmnia, Vols. I-VII, Oralnat;o (Studio et Cura Commissionis Scotist~cae:
Civitas Vaticane: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-1982), Lib. Il, d. l, qq. IV et V, n.
204; all subsequent citations of this work, where available, are ta this edition.
19. John Duns Scotus, Reporteta Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 8.
20. Sharp, Francisee" Philosophy at Oxford in the Xllith Century, 377.

-- 197 --
ultl.mate subject of predication rather than as the substratum of
substancial change. Which of these two arguments iB taken ta be the
major source for Aristotle's notion of matter geemB ta determine which
aspects of the notion will be emphasized.
Seatus, as a matter of fact, doea nct even consider the passage
which gives the argument from logic (Metaphysics VII.3.1029 a2C-26) to be
a statement of Aristotle's own view on matter, but thinks it ta be a
statement of the Pre,iocratic position which Aristotle ia attacking. 21
For Seatus, therefo~e, the bast praof of the existence of matter, and
the best starting point for determining which sort of entity it shou1d
be considered to be, will be the argument from physics.
Incidentally, the fact that Scotus rejects the argument from logic
in the Metaphysics should nct be taken ta mean that Seatus ia unaware of
the role that matter plays as the ultimate subject of predication. The
relationship of matter and predication, however, becomes more
interesting for Seatus nct when matter iB considered as the ultimate
subject of predication, but when matter is considered as predicated of
21. This view is expressed in John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XII,
q. l, n. 12. In the following excerpt, however, the dismissal of the passage is qualified:
"vel si concedatur auctoritas, potest dici quod ipsa solvit seipsam, quae dicit quod
materia non est aliquid eorum, quibus determinatur ens. Talia enim sunt species et
differentiae, quibus dividitur ens, et concedo quod materia nec sit species, nec
differentia, entia etiam determinantur et distinguuntur per actus et formas. 1I (John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 21). In the Cuestions on the
MetaDhysics he says: "respondeo, non in actu, sed in potentia." (John Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones SubtHissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. V, n. 1).
Fr~~ the caBbination of all these statements it looks as though Scotus has decided that the
passag~ could be interpreted in more than one way and, even though he is in faveur of the
interpretation according to which Aristotle is net talking about his own conception of
matter, nevertheless, should it turn out that he is wrong, Scotus offers sorne arguments
against those who interpret the passage to be a statement in support of the notion of
matter as pure potentiality.
-- 198 --
the composite. This too, according ta Scotus, will show that matter
cannat be considered ta be purely potential. In the Questions on the
Metaphysics he explains how matter can be predicated of the composite:
nec pars de toto, nec e conversa praedicatur proprie, sed

aliquo modo denominative, etai non sicut accidentia, quia
non denominatione extrinseca alterius generis; sic ergo
materia non est homo, sed humana. 22
And in the Reportata Parisiensia, making appeal ta Aristotle, he
claims that this kind of predication cannot be appropriate for that
which ie nothing but non-being, and therefore, as he sees it, it cannat
be appropriate for prime matter if prime matter is considered ta be pure
potentiality:
quia Aristoteles 9. Metaph. text. 25. vult quod materia

praedicetur denominative de composito. Unde dicit quod hoc
non est illud, sed illium, vel illius, et arca non est
lignum, sed lignea. Non ans autem non praedicatur
denominative de aliquo; non ergo materia secundum se est non
e",s.23
Going back to our main argument, it should be noted in this
connection that, not surprisingly, when Aristotle is mentioned in
support of scotus's views in the passages quoted above, reference ia
made to the Physics and te On Generatic,n and Corruption, in which the
argument from physics is contained, but not to the Metaphysics, which
contains the argument from logic. l think that Scotus's choice of the
argument from physics as the most plausible starting point for his
notion of matter shows quite clearly that he appreciates the importance
the Eleatic problem has in Aristotle's mind. Even though, like Aquinas
22. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. V, n. 4.
23. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Par;siens;a, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 22.
-- 199 --
or any ether Christian philosopher, he cannet share Aristotle's belief
that there cannat be coming te be out of nothing,24 ScotUB neverthelesB
understands th~ importance of Aristotle's cancern with the fact that if
the E1eatic argument is accepted so al~o shou1d be the denial of the
pOBBibi1ity of natur~l change.
There are, of course, ether reasans in Scotus's mind for rejecting
the notion of matter as pure potentiality. He cannet see how matter
conceived in this way cao be differentiated fram non-being simpliciter.
In the Questions on the Metaphysics, Scotus expresses this view in the
fo110wing way:
respondeo, si vis habere inter quodcurnque aliquid et nihil

unum medium, erit illud aliquid val nihil infimurn, quod est
in substantia, dum Bit aliquid, est infimus actue, et
potentialis respectu omnium aliorum actuum. Si vis habere
propriam potentiam puram sine omni actu, habebis nihil,
sicut si privationem sine subjecto, de hoc in nana, quaest.
1. 25
Scotus, as a consequence of the importance he gives ta the
argument from physicB, a1so thinks that Aristotle's statement that
matter iB to be considered part of the composite should be given greater
importance than is, according to him, given to it by Aquinas. Thus in
the Questions on the Metaphysics, while explaining in which sense matter
24. Related to the permanence of matter through ~hange another probLem, not discussed by Scotus, but
which 1 wouLd Like to mention even if only as an unanswered question, might be seen to
arise within the conceptuaL framework of Aquinas's notion of matter as pure potentiality.
The probLem is this: given that matter is pure potentiaLity and has no actuaLity of its own
spart from form, what assurance do we have that the matter of the substance which was
corrupted and the matter of the substance which was generated are, in fact, the same
matter?
25. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q.V,n.S.
-- 200 --
-'!
-.{'
\L can be said to be generated and in which sense only the composite can be
said to be, he says:
ad utramque quaestionem Philosophus vult, quod solum

compositum generetur per se. Unde de subjecto supponit
Philosophus, quod generatio fundatur in materia et quaerit
quid generatur ut terminus, et illud est compositum, et est
ratio Philosophi talis: omne quod fit, fit ex materia quae
est pars, solum compositum habet materiam quae est pars. 26
FolJ.owing this line of thought, in the Opus Oxoniense Scotus
expresses the conviction that if matter is taken as pure potentiality
still another undesirable consequence follows: composite substances will
net be composite after aIl because they will be 'composed' of ferro and
something which according to Scotus is not at all different from non-
being. Thus he Baya that in order to have a meaningful criterion for
the distinction between that which is simple and that which is
composite, it ia necessary that in that which ia composite there be
another part of the composite really distinct and really different from
form.
Praeterea, substantia per se existens, dividitur in

substantiam simplicem et compositam; sed composita non
potest esse par se divisa contra simplicem, niai habeat
partem realiter differentem, et realiter distinctam a forma;
ergo. Z7
26. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphvsicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. X, n. 3. This is also found in John Duns Scotus, Opera Ornnia, Vols. XXV·XXVI,
Quaestiones auodlibetales (Yadding ed.: 26 vols. Paris: Vives, 1893·1894), q. IX, n. 8; all
subsequent citations from thls work are to this edition. Scotus is here discussing in
passing the essential unit y of the composite.
27. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 9; cf. also the
following passage: lIigitur sequitur necessario tertium, sei 1icet quod al iquid co~nitur ex
al;quo et al;quo, s;cut ex materia et forma - Non est autem inconveniens quod in composito
sft al iquid et al iquid, sicut non est inconveniens quod al iquid sit co~situn.1l (John Cuns
Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 13). C1". also John
Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 15. In these ~assages Scotus
is nat anly aiguing in favour of his thesis that there must betwo parts in an entity in
order that it may be catled a composite, but is a~~ trying ta answer the abj~ction that if
-- 201 --
This differentiation between that which is simple and that which
ia composite, Scotus argues, cannat be made if matter ia conceived as
pure potentiality. Furthermore, the composite, which ia corruptible in
virtue of something intrinsic, cannet be corruptible in virtue of the
forro aince it ia apparent that none of the substances which are simple
forms are corruptible in virtue of something intrinsic. It follows that
those things which are corruptible must be sa in virtue of something
intrinsic ether than form, and that something can only be matter.
Aliqua substantia est corruptibilis per aliquid intrinsecum

eibi, per Philosophum, 7. Metaph. 0.5. sed nulla substantia,
quae est forma simplex, est corruptibilis per aliquid Bibi
intrinsecum; ergo eum aliqua ait corruptibilis, hoc erit per
aliquid intrinsecum aliud a forma: hoc non est" niei
materia, ut dicit Philosophus in eodem septimo, quod materia
est qua res potest esse et non esse. 28
Indeed, should it not be the case that both parts of the composite
are eseential to it, the composite itself will turn out to be equal to
that part of it which is essential and, again, ~ll composition would be
lost:
~i quid habet tantum unam partem essentialem, non est nisi

illa, imo jam non est pars, nec causa, propter primam
regulam dictam; ••• 29
scotus, however, is not unaware of the fact that bath parts of the
composite cannot be real in the same way, and that one has to be
potential in sorne sense. Thus also in the De Primo Principio he
bath parts of the composite are actual, there will be no criterion for calling the
substance 'per se one' or essentially one. 1 will discuss this issue in the next chapter.
28. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 6. Cf. also
John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 6.
29. John Duns Scotus, Opera Ornnia, Vol. IV, De Primo Rerum Omnium Principio (~adding ed.: 26 vols.
Paris: Vives, 1983-1984), cap. II, n. 5; all subsequent citations fram this work are to
this edition.
-- 202 --
explains how it ie possible for two positive entities, bath actual in
soma sense, ta make up something which ia one 'par se'.
Quod non est materiatum, non est compositum ex partibus

essentialibus, quia in omni sic composite perfecte une,
altara pars est potentialis, quia non fit unum par se niai
gXactu et potentia ex 7. et 8. Metaph text cap. 22. 27. et
60. et circiter. Quod igitur non habet partem per se
potentialem, non est cornpositum; ergo nec formatum, quia
formatum est compositum habens formam partem sui. 3D
We have seen, then, that ScotUB rejects the Thomist interpretation
of matter which deems it to be pure potentiality_ It is, however, clear
from the passage just quoted that Scotus thinks that matter is
potential, though in a sense different from that of pure potentiality
accorded ta it by Aquinas, because "non fit unum par se niai ex potentia
et actu." It aesma, furthermore, that matter in scotus's mind ie a
positive entity because lIio omni substantia generabili est aliqua
entitas positiva, alia a forma,,,31 and a composite is made "ex aliquo et
aliquo." Even at this, Scotus will not want to say that the actuality
to be assigned to matter is the sarne kind of actuality possessed by form
because this would irremediably destroy the essential unity of the
composite substance and make matter, and not the composite,
ontologically basic.
Scotus will define his notion of matter, and of the ways in which
it should be considered potential and actual, through a distinction
between two ways of being in potentiality which has already been
mentioned in the discussion of Aristotle's concept of matter (chapter l,
30. John Duns Scotus, De Pr;mo Rerum Omn;um Pr;nc;p;o, cap. II, n. S.
31. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 9.

-- 203 --
·.'
1
. ·'r section I I aboya). There l argued that this distinction Beeme te give a
good characterization of what Aristotle i5 trying ta say about his own
concept of matter. In looking more closely at the distinction it will
aiso became more apparent that it doea in fact suit Aristotle's theory.
In book IX of the Questions on the Hetaphysics, Scotus opens his
discussion of potentiality by saying that: "de fundamento eius, qualem
entitatem habet antequam existat, difficultas est magna, ••• ,,32 This
statement could just as weIl be applied ta a discussion of matter. In
book VII of the Questions on the Hetaphysics Scotus explains what these
two senses of being in potentiality are and in which of these two ways
matter should be said to be in potentiality.
Quia taroen materia dicitur esse in potentia, intelligendurn,

quod aliquid dicitur in potentie. dupliciter. Uno modo, ut
terminus potentiae, sive ad quod est potentia, ut albedo
generanda. Alio modo, ut subjecturn potentiae, sive in quo
est potentia, ut superficies dealbanda. Qui dicunt materiam
esse primo modo ans in potentia, dicunt eam simpliciter esse
non ans, nec videtur aliquo modo salvare intentionem
Ariatotelia. secundo ergo modo materia ens est in
potentia, et magis quam subjectum accidentis, quia minus
habens in se actualitatis, et majoris actualitatis capax; et
iata potentia fundatur in aliquo actu ... quia recipere non
convenit niai habenti in se prius aliquam entitatem
poaitivam, •.. 33
32. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. IX, q.
II, n. 6.
33. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. V, n. 3. Roughly the same distinction is re",tated later in the same work where Scotus
also adds that: "subjectiva potentia et objectiva potentis, non sunt une patentie
diversimode considereta, sed duse, quia in doubus, licet ad eurndem terminum, ac per hoc,
non ita duse, sieut seeundae objectivae sunt duae. 1l (John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones
subtilissimae super Libros Hetaphysicorum Aristotelis Lib. IX, q. II, n. 8). For the same
j
distinction agein see: John Duns Scotus, Reportera Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n.
11, and n. 17; and John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. II, d. XII,
q. l, n. 10.
-- 204 --
Seing in potentiality, then, can be understood te signify the term
of the potentiality or the 6ubject of the potentiality. Matter,
according te Beatus, ia in potentiality in the sense that it ia the
subject of the potentiality. He also thinks that those who believe that
matter is in potentiality in the sense that it is the term of the
potentiality equate matter with non-being simpliciter. Tc these two
senses of being in potentiality will correspond two senses of being in
actuality: one will be the sense in which we normally call things
actual, i.e., the actuality of ferm, that which divides, distinguishes
and perfects matter; and the other will be the actuality of that which
is receptive of form.
Dico quod si accipias esse actu, ut distinguitur contra

potentiam, secundum quod actus et potentia dividunt totum
ens, sic dico quod materia potest diei in actu; et licet non
dicatur actue, quia aatue habet eam distinguere et
denominare, pOB~et tamen diei actue, secundum quod
Aristoteles accipit actum in 6. et 8. Met. si autem actus
dividatur contra illud quod recipit actum, sic materia non
est actue, quia est primum receptivum actuB; tale autem
oportet esse denudatum ab omni actu, quia est distinguibile
per emnem acturn, ut sic possit esse pars ornnis entis. 34
Thus form will still be the only part of the composite which gives
actuality and which possesses actuality in a det~rminate way: matter,
while still being potential (in the sense of subjective potentiali.ty)
with respect to the sort of actuality just described (the act"Lality
possessed by forro), can still be clairned te be actual because ever.if it
is po~ential, it is not pure objective potentiality.
34. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 15. Cf. also
the following passage: "dico quod si accipis actlJTl pro actu informante, materia non est
actus; si sutem secipies aetum pro omni eo quod est extre eausam suam, sic materia potest
die; ens actu vel actus~:u_:,,:~~ Duns Scotus, Ouaestiones in Ubros SententhrllTl, lib. Il,
d. XII, q. l, n. 20>. Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII,
q. 1, n. 18, and Lib. IV, d. Xl, q. 111, n. 12.
-- 205 --
l argued in the discussion of Aristotle' 5 notion of matter tha't
objective potentiality 6eems te fit weIl the descriptions of privation
provided b.' Aristotle, and while l am still convinced that this is the
case, l think that the description of the parallelism can be made more
precise. Privation as the opposite of ferm has ta represent objective
potentiality, i.e., that which represents the thing, so te speak, bafera
it cornes te be. Tc use one of Scotus's examples the matter of the
statue bafera the statue i5 carved will possess in it the privation of
the forro of the statue. This doee fit well with the statements
Aristotle makes about privation: "the lack, in itself is nct and i5 nct
a reality at. ail"; and "the ether half of the opposition yeu might
often imag.Lne, ••• to be totally non-existent ... 35
The situation Be8mB te become more complicated when our attention
shifts to the status of subjective potentiality: subjective potentiality
doea net seem te be the sarne as matter. As far as l have been able ta
understand this very complicated ~art of Scotus's system, his meaninq ie
this: matter is a positive entity which has in it one completely
negative element (the privation, i.e., the objective potentiality) and
al sc one potential but net negative element, which is the subjective
potentiality and which renders it that which can receive the actuality
given by ferm. This disposition te receive form, it should be stressed,
could not be,given ta matter by the privation becauae the privation
it8elf ia nct a positive principle in any sense. If it ia nct the
matter itself (and it does not seem to be, because if it were, once the
form informa the matter, the matter itself should disappear with the
35. Aristotle, Physics, 1.9.192a5·7; and Phys;cs. 1.9.192a14-1S.

-- 2D6 --
subjective potentiality) , then it must be in the matter together with
the privation. The subjective potentiality ia, in fact, the passive
potency which Scotus thinks is in matter and makes it able te change and
be the subject of jiff2rent forms. The fact, however, that matter is
nct the sarne as subjective potentiality is, according ta Scotus, beyond
question:
et ex his sequitur tertium, quod potentia subject':'va in

quocumque, sive in materia, sive in subjecto aliquo, non est
eadem essentialiter il1i in quo est, quia illud in quo est,
manet eum actu, et non numeratur. Et secunda ratio est ad
hoc, quod illud in quo est, est absoluturn; potentia non. 36
This series of distinction~, l think, explains the process of
generation and corruption as it ia conceived by Aristotle (though
admittedly not explained by him in the same terms) far better than the
simple concept of pure potentiality adopted by Aquinas and suggested to
him by the famous passage in the Metaphysics. Scotus wlll call upon the
support of Aristotle 37 in describing more precisely what hg means when
he saya that matter is potential and yet a being in actuality -- when
being in actuality ia understood to be different from the actuality of
form. It ahould be noted in thia connection that all of the atatements
which Scotus attributes ta Aristotle are in fact contained in his
writings:
qualiter ergo mat~ria est ens in potentia? Dico quod

materia est per se ,:"rincipium,
ex primo Physic text. 52. 6
Eat etiam per se causa, ex 2. Phya. text. 7. et 5. Metaph.
36. John Duns Scatus, Quaestiones subtilissim~e super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. IX, q.
II, n. 10.
37. It is interesting te note that Scatus does not call upon the support of Augustine for most of
his statements on matter. This is also noted by Gilson in Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 435
notes no. 5, 6, and 7 and 436 note n. 1. In the notes Gilson gives a List of the passages
in Aristotle te which Scatus refers in the passage just below.
-- 207 --
text .. 28. Est etiam per se pars compositi, ex 7. Metaph.

text:.. 2.. Et est per subj ectum generationis ex 5.. Physic: ..
text. 17. manens idem in tata mutatione, ex 1 Physic. text.
7. et 8. Et ut probatum est per tertiam ra~ionem, est etiam
terminus creationis, per Augustinum 12.. Confess. et etiam
per Aristotelem l Physicor. text. 60. est ingenita et
incorruptibilis; ergo est aliquod ens positivum extra suam
causam, non solum ens in potentia, ••• 38
Although this passage makes it quite clear that matter ia in
actuality and dosa not only have being in potentiality, l think it still
neede te be made clear in which way exactly the actuality of matter
differs from the actuality of ferro. After aIl, ferm "in iteelf ia aiso a
principle, a cause, and a part of the composite; and even though it ia
nct a subject of generation and corruption which remains through the
whole change, it is created and it is not generable and corruptible.
The only thing, according to Aristotle, which is generable and
corruptible 'per se' is, in fact, the composite itself~
In describiny the most important way in which the actuality of
matter differs from the actuality of forro, again we find Scotus in
agreement with Aristotle. The being of matter before it receives a form
is, in fact, completely indeterroinate. For this statement we fir.d
support in"~h~ following passage:
quanta ergo causa indeterminatior est indeterminatione

illimitationis, sive indeterminatione imperfectionis (sicut
materia est indeterminata, quando est in potentia) ... 39
38. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 12. The same passage, which
was quoted in chapter 1, section 1, aLso appears in J~hn Duns Scotus, OuaestiQnes in Libros
SententiarlJll, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. J, n. 11.
39~ John Duns Scotus, cuaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. IX, q.
VI, n. 9~ For a statement to the effect that Aristotle considered matter a positive
entity, though completely indeterminate, see the passage already quoted above from Owens,
"Matter and Predication in Aristotle," 92.
-- 208 --
In the Opus Oxoniense Scotus makes reference ta the sarne
indeterminate character of matter by criticizing, like Aristotle l · tha
notion of matter accepted by the Presocratic philosophera. He argues
that if the matter of generation and corruption ia considered ta be a
body already possessed of its own ferro, then there i9 no difference
between generation and alteration. He adds that, in his view, the
actuality of matter is not the kind of actuality given by the presence
of a substantial form.
Dico, quod antiqui ponebant corpus habens formam

substantialem, esse materiam et subjectum generationis, ut
patet primo de generatione; alii scilicet terram, ece. et
sequitur quod faciebant omnem generationem alterationem.
Sed in proposito non pona quod materia sit actuata et
distincta per aIiqu~n formarn substantialem. 40
In discussing Aristotle, l came te the cenclusioü that Aristotle's
matter, though completely indeterminate, has exteüsion or quantity in
itself. It should be remembered, however, that the quantity matter has
been as~igned is net the determinate quantity which is accorded to a
complete substance by the inherence of the quantity which belongs to the
accidentaI category. Landry, in discussing the comparison which is
semetimes made between the notion of matter in Scotus and in Descartes,
seems to think that matter in Scotus is not extended. 41 In the
40. John Duns Seotus, Quaestienes ;n Libres Sententiarun, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 15. This
interpretat;on ;s confirme!, for example, by Minges, Joannis Duns Seoti Doetrina
Philosophiea et Theologiea, Vol. l,20, although his support for the faet that matter is
eompLetely indeterminate is drawn fram a passage in the De Rerum Prineipio.
41. Landry, Duns Scot, 61-62, where, in crder ta show that matter as seen by Scotus cannot be
eompared to the extended substance of Descartes, he maintains that matter in Scotus is not
extended. 1 think his argument is the product of the folLowing misconception: even though
matter in Scotus may well turn out to be extended (and still not have a determinate
quantity), it still is V(~I'y different from Oescartes'S matter. Matter or extended
substance in Descartes, as far as 1 understand him, means body, in other words, the
material part, let us say, of the human being, as opposed to the spiritual or thinking
-- 209 --
Questions on the Metaphysics SCOtU6 explains that if substance were ta
have its own extension essentially then it would be possible for the
Dame substance te have two extensions at the same time: in the case of
fire, for example, there would be the extension of fire itself and the
extension of the haat. This is not acceptable, and, therefore, neither
should the proposition that substance ia essentially extended be.
Notice, however, that Scotus ia talking about substance and not matter,
and that, in this case, he might well be talking abou" sorne particular
extension, and not about extension as it would belong te matter.
Matter, in fact, may turn out te be of itself extended but not with any
determinate extension.
In question XI of the Quaestiones Quodlibetales Scotus discusses
place and the possibility of a vacuum. In particular the question he
raises concerns the possibility of both body and place existing while at
the same time Gad causes the body not to have ubeity or location in
place. Scotus analyzes the question into four subdivisions:
part, i.e., the soule In Descartes bath are complete in themselves. Matter in Scotus does
not mesn body; rather it means one of the two incomplete parts which together form the
substance ealleJ the human being. It might be more to the point, though 1 still do not
think it would be eompletely accurate, to compare Descal tes's notion of extended substance
ta Scotus's notion of the composite of matter and form of corporeity. Scotus, in fact,
san that: llmateria nastra vel corpus nostrun extenditur magnitudine per se extensam, et
perficitur per animam intelleetivam non exten:;am, ••• 11 (John Duns Scotus. Quae!>tiones in
Libros Sententiarun, Lib. l, d. VIII, q. l, n. 4). Here Scotus tS clearly talking about
matter as extended by the presence of the form of corporeity. This composition of matter
and the form of corporeity constitutes in Scotus's view an incomplete being, but et leest
it is certainly extended and a body. Minges thinks that the reason Scotus is compared with
Descartes lies in "suam d~ formaI itatibus doctrinam ••• set;undum quem res singulae nomisi
soot modi substantiae unius extensae. ll (Hinges, Joannis Duns Scoti Doctrina Phi losophica et
Theologiea, Vol. 1, 90). The role, however, thet geometry pleys in Descartes as thet which
characterizes the essence of matter and the apparent fact that we have no genuine knowledge
of the ~ ~ of any material object does not make comparisons with Scotus unreasonable,
but eertainly guarantees that they will be difficult.
-- 210 --
i) given place in general, i5 it possible for body in general nct
to have ubeity?
ii) Given body in general, is it possible for place in general not
te circumscribe it in Buch a way that there i5 no ubeity?
ii1) Given this particular body, this particular place, but this
body not present in this place, is it possible that this body lack this
ubeity?
iv) If this body and this place exist and this body is present in
this place, is it still possible that it lack this ubeity?
In reply to the first question Scotus maintains that there is no
contradiction in the fact that a body should exist without sorne
containing body and, hanca, without ubeity. He maintains, in fact, that
this is what happens in the case of the outermost heavenly sphere, which
doea nct have a containing body. The answer te the question posed in
the second subdivision i5 analogous: Scotus argues in fact that there
does not seem to be any contradiction in the possibility that a concave
spherical surface should exist without being the container of any other
body. In answer to the third question Scotus maintains that if the body
is not present in the place it is clear that the body has no ubeity
there because it is not circumscribed by the place. He adds that if the
body i5 nct in this place it will be somewhere else and ainee it cannat
be in two places at once it cannot have ubeity in this place.
In the context of the fourth question Scotus thinks that the
( notion of presence in place can be interpreted in three different ways:

-- 211 --
(i) the body can be understood to be present in the place quantitatively
without another body being present there quantitatively; (ii) two bodies
can be understood ta be copregent quantitatively in the place; and (iii)
the body can be understood to be present in this place but not
quantitatively. Regarding the first interpretation, ScotUB maintains
that it ia obvioUB that such presence could no more be without ubeity
than it could be without the body's being circumscribed by the place.
The circumscription, in fact, 5eems ta roean no more than the fact that
the body is present quantitatively in the place and that the body is
coincident and coextensive with the place. The second interpretation
aise receives a negative answer fram Scotus. He maintains, in this
case, that both bodies would have ubeity in the place. He argues that
when the two bodies are present in the place as coextensive and
coincident with the place, then either they are bath located in the
place, or neither of them ia. If it is maintained that neither of them
is located in the place then it follows that this place in which it is
posited that two extended bodies are located is empty space. This
conclusion could not be accepted by anyone and it follows therefore that
the bodies are both located in the place. This, he thinks, is clear
also from the following argument: should one of the two bodies be
removed fram the place the ether one would ramain in the place and have
ubeity there. It is clear, however, that the remaining body would not
be present in the place in any way different from the way in which it
was present in the place before the removal of the second body. This
argument is clarified, Scotus thinks, by considering the case of a body
and an angel occupying the same place. In this case, should the body be
removed the place would remain empty becauae the angel ia not coincident
-- 212 --
and coextensive with the place and does nct have ubeity there. The
opposite would be the cass, Scotus argues, if two bodies coexisted in
the sarne place.
Istud patet per oppositum de Angelo, quia si Angelus sit

simul eum corpore, non habet proprie ubi in iata 10co, in
quo corpus coexiatens habet proprie ubi, quia Angelus non
est ibi coextensus et cornmensutatu8 illi loco 1 nec replet
ilIum locum, unde si corpore amoto solus Angelus ibi
maneret, locus i11e proprie diceretur vacuus. Opposita
istorum eunt vera de corpore coexistante alteri corpori. 42
Yet te the fourth question understood in its third meaning the
answer, at last, ia positive: if a body ia present in this space but nct
as coextensive or coincident with the place, i.e., nct in a quantitative
way, then that body, properly speaking, lacks ubeity in this space. The
reason a body under these conditions would not have ubeity is that
ubeity ia a farm that ie divisible ' secundum se' ,and for this reason
ubeity pertains only to that which is divisible and which is present in
the place in a divisible mode. A body, however, which ia nct
coextensive with the place, but which is present in the place in such a
way that the whole of it is present in each part of the place, is not
divisible with respect ta that place, nor, as a consequence, doea it
have ubeity there.
Potest diei, quod tune proprie non haberet ubi in hoc loco,
quia proprie ubi est forma secundum se divisibilis, eum
secundum eam par se pessat esse motus, et idee non convenit
alieui, nisi divisibili, et per modum divisibilis se
habentij corpus autern, quod non coextenditur loco, sed est
totum praesens cuilibet parti illius loci, non habet modum
divisibilis in comparatione ad locum, nec per consequens
habet ubi proprie respectu eius; ... 43
42. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones OuodLibetales, q. XI, n. 15.
43. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. XI, n. 17.

-- 213 --
l Beatus however adde that if the meaning of ubeity ia extended ta
the kind of simple presence according te which it ia said that an angel
is in place, then it should be admitted that a body present in place in
this way can be said to possess ubeity improperly because such a body is
truly present in place but iB not circumscribed by it:
extendendo tamen ubi ad talem praesentiam simplicem,

secundum quam Angelus dicitur esse hic, sic concedendum
eeset, quod corpus praesens, secundurn istum intellectum
diceretur improprie habere ubi, nam vere est hic praesens
non circumscriptum. 44
In his solution te the firet questiùn Seatus had maintained that
there is no contradiction in the fact that a body should exist without
Borne containing body and, hence, without ubeity. The reason for this ia
that there is no contradiction in the fact that that which is absolute
should remain without a relationship te that which ia neither prier te
it nor simultaneous with it. sinee by nature place is neither
simultaneoua with, nor prior to, body, it is not contradictory that body
exista without ubeity. To the objection that being in place pertains to
body 'per se', that corporeity is th~reason for the body's being in
place, and that therefore it is a contradiction to maintain that the
formaI ground far samethin~ exists, while the thing in question doea
not, which is raised against his view, Scatus'5 reply is the following:
the fundarnental proximate reason for being in place i5 extension, and if
the formaI reason for being in place i5 understood in this way then it
is possible to separate this formaI rea50n from that of \1hich it iB eaid
44. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. XI, n. 17. Jt is important to Scotus that an
angel, though it may not properly be said te have ubeity, be said to be present in place
because on this depends the angel's ability te act and to be a cause in the natural order.
On this see Lang, IlBodies and Angels: the Occupants of Place for Aristotle and Duns
Scotus."
-- 214 --
ta be the reasona Separation, he explains, should he understood te mean
separation in act, because it i5 nct possible ta separate extension fram
the aptitude or potency to being in place.
Ad primum potest dici, quod dimensio est ratio fundamentalis

proxima respectu ubi, vel si sic intelligeretur ratio
formalis, bene poteet talie ratio formalie eeparari ab illo,
respectu cuiua dicitur esse ratio, et hoc intelligendo in
actu, licet non separaretur ab aptitudine val potentia ad
illud. 45
Scotus goes on to explain that corporeity ie the fundamental
reason a body can be in place and also that it is the fundamental reaeon
a body ia actually in place. It i5, in fact, the proper and proximate
reason for both becauee the eubject of the actuality (i.e., that which
ia actually in place) ie the saroe as the subject with the corresponding
potentiality (i.e., that which can be in place). Corporeity is a
necessary reason, however, only with respect ta the po~entiality,
because the aptitude to being in place ie intrinsic to a body by the
definition of corporeity, while actually being in place is contingent
upon an agent reducing the potentiality into act. The proposition "a
body can be located," therefore, is necessary, while the proposition lia
body is located" is contingent. Because extension cannet be separated
trom the aptitude or potency to being in place, but only from the
actuality, it should follow that matter, becauee it can be located in
place, has extension in itself.
45. John Duns ScotU~, Qua~stiones Quodlibetales, q. XI, n. 4. This v~ew is expressed aLso in the
Reoortata Pari's;ensia, where Scotus says that: Ildimensio enim, veL quanti tas est ratio
formaL 1S ~sse~i in Loco, Guia est ratio formal is eius, qwod est esse in loco, ... 11 (John
Duns Scotus, Repo.·tata Parisiensia, Lib. IV, d. x, q. III, n. 24).
-- 215 --
In book IV of the Reportata Parisiensia Scotus maintains that
matter can be said te be in place in two different ways:
respondeo, materia habet duplex ubi, unum ubi definitive,

quod correspondet ei, secundum propriam essentiam suarn, et
inquantum est quaedam substantia; et habet aliud ubi
circumscriptive, ratione quantitatis, quae in ea fundatur,
et per quam sic extenditur; ubi autem definitive est ratio
suscipiendi ubi circumscriptive, advenien~€ nova quantitate,
quia rnateria est fundamentum quantitatis, et idee materia in
generatione definitive manet ubi praefuit forma corrupti,
et non circumscriptive ratione quantitatis corrupti, quia
illa non manet in generato. Et idee materia in eodem ubi
definitivo recipit formam at quantitatem novam, per quam
acquirit novum ubi circumscriptive, nec pesset naturaliter
alibi fieri circumscriptive, nisi materia esset alibi
definitive. 46
Thua, while matter in itself i5 nct in place 'circumscript:ive' it
clearly is in potentiality to being so. The potentiality will be
actualized by the inherence of quantity which will give matter a
particular extension. Because, as Scotus maintains, extension cannat be
separated from the aptitude or potency to being in place, or from the
aptitude or potency ta having quantity, it follows that matter in itself
has extension, though not any particular extension.
In the following passage fram the Repartata Parisiensia Scotus
expresses the belief that matter has parts, nct given by quantity, but
essentially and in itself.
Sustinendo tamen quod habet partibilitatem, et non per

quantitate;;n, sed in essentia, quod verius credo, adhuc esse
partibilis, sed non haberet partem extra partem, sicut
locatum circumscriptive. 47
46. John Duns Scotus, ReDOrtata Parisiensia, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. Il, n. 6.
47. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. 11, n. 7. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. Il, n, 5.
-- 216 --
Her~ again matter ia said ta be in potentiality ta being divided,
but ia alse said nct ta be actually divided in auch a way as ta have
part outside of part as that which ia in place 'circumscriptive'. It
Beeme clear, then, that if matter ia in place 'definiti,;'e' without the
inherence of quantity, and in place 'circurnscriptive' by the inherence
c."f quantity 1 then it must be the case that matter, bafora the inherence
of the quantity which will give it location 'circumscriptive', must have
extension essentially in itself. Matter will have extension nct in
virtue of the fact that it is in place 'definitive' (though, we have
boden that " u bi autem definitive est ra'tio suscipiendi ubi
circumscriptive"), ainee this ia possible aiso for angels (and they are
not extended), but in virtue of the fact that it is in potentiality to
being in place 'circumscriptive' and to having part outside of part. 48
Thue, it seems that extension iB that which gives matter the aptitude or
potency to being in place, while quantity actualizes that potentiality.
Hence matter in itself has extension because it certainly has the
potentiality te being located 'circumscriptive', but it does not have
any determinate extension because it still lacks quantity which is that
which actualizes the potentiality to being in place 'circumscriptive'.
48. For a body ta b'J in place 'circlJTlScriptive' means that each part of the body occupies its own
place distinct fram that occupied by each other part: eaen part has one restricted and
circLmScdbed location. Circumscriptive presence in place is the natural way in which
bodies are in place. To be in ptace 'definitive' is a characteristic which generally
applies to immaterial or spiritual substances. Spiritual substances do not occupy place,
as physical substances do, in such a way that each part of the body is in part of the place
al'd the whole of the body in the whole place, but in such a way that they are whole in each
part of the space as well as whole in the whole space in which they are located. The fact
that Scotus maintains that matter is in place 'definitive' through its awn essence should
not be interpreted ta mean that he believes matter to be an immaterial substance, but
simply that matter is not yet extended with any particular extension and does not yet have
part autside of part. Matter, in other words, has extension, i.e., a potency or aptitude
ta receiving quantity, but does not yet have quantity.
-- 217 --
Scotus confirma this view in book IV of the Opus Oxoniense where he
m~intainB that position i5 a differentia of quantity.
Conceda quod pars est extra partem, prout ly extra respicit

per se ipsas partes corporis, et requiritl.!r ad positionem,
quae est differentia quantitatis, sed prout extra pertinet
ad locum, sic pars non est extra partem, id est, non est
extra ilIum locum in quo gst alia pars. 49
If l have been right, therefore, in my conclusions about the
status of matter in Aristot1e and the fact that he considera matter
extended before the inherence of quantity (which can on1y come to the
composite), in this aIse the views of Scotus and Arlstotle generally
coincide.
There are two more questions ta be considered regarding this
genera1 notion of matter. Neither of them createa much of a prob1em
because there is general agreement between Scotus, Aquinas, and
Ariatot1e about both. The firat queation concerna the individua1ity or
commonness of matter. We have seen that Aristotle and Aquinas think
that matter ie common to all things, and Scotus generally agrees:
et hinc est, quod totum dicitur converti in totum, quia

totum per se unum fit post corruptionem alicujus totius,
quod vere fuit unum, et per cone~quens vere totum corruptum,
quamvis subjectum maneat commune. SO
This, however, needs to be qualified in certain ways as a
co~sequence of Scotus's views on universals, common natures, and
individuals. In the Reportata Parisiensia Scotus says:
49. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. X, q. l, n. 17.
50. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libres Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 7. Cf. also
Scotus's statement that: "si autem rnaterialiter, concede, quia une est materia diversorun
nunero in eadem specie, et si accipis oppositum, petis contra me. 1I (John Duns Scetus,
Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. V, q. VII, n. 7).
-- 218 --
dico quod priuB natura est substantia materialis haee, quam

ait existentia actualis; ..• 51
And later on, when 5eatus argues that whatever cao be conceivcJ
universally ie nct 'de se hoc' and needa te be individuated by BOrne
positive entity, he explains,
et eum non pote st ita concipi est de se haee, idee in

materia est natura et haee proprietas, et similiter in
forma, similiter et in composite. 52
These two passages together lead me to believe that, although
Seatus thinks that matter exista as comman te aIl things, it iB nct one
and doea nct exist in the sarne sense in which an individual ia one and
exista. In arguing against the view that existence individuates Seatus
will say that because existence cornes te an individual aftar the
individuating difference, existence cannat individuate. The individual,
because it is an individual, according to Scotua, ia the only entity
which has numerical unity. Numerical unity ia given by the 'haecceity',
and actual existence follows upon it. Matter, therefore, will only be
numerically one once it ia individuated by the 'haecceity', and, in
turn, this seems to oocur before it becomes part of the composite.
Et per rationem, quia ipaa materia est eadem sub oppositis

formis, forma autem non potest sine ipsa manere; nunc autem
ad variationem posterioris non sequitur variatio prioris;
non ergo, si haec forma recipiatur in aliqua alia materia,
sequeretur quod illa fieret ista, nam ibi non est niai
inductio formae in materiam, quae prius eam non habuit;
materia autem transiens a privatione ad formarn, non propter
hoc fit materia, quae ipsa prius non fuit. 53
51. John Duns Scotus, Reeortata Paris;ensia" Lib. II, d. XII, q. V1I, n. 3.
52. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Paris;ens;a, lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 8.
c. 53. John Duns Scotus, Quaestior.es cuodlibetates, q. X, n. 10. Cf. also: IlS; ergo materia ut est
~, est omn;no eadem in se, nullo modo potest esse atia propter aliam formam receptami
Il (John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones ;n Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. Xl, q. 111, n. 19).
-- 219 --
Matter will then be combined with the form (which will also have
its own 'haecceity') and at that point receive the existence which
befits an individua\. The individuality, however, ia received by bath
matter and form before they become so united. It aeeme, then, that two
individuals Can have numerically t.he same matter when one ia generated
from the other, but not if they exist at the same time.
Sic ergo est eadern in genito et corrupto, quo modo non est
eadem in duobus simul' genitis, quia tune generatio et
corruptio non magie concluderent rnateriam unam, quam simul
existentia diversorumi ergo materia ut quid, si est eadem in
aere corrupto, et in igne genito ex ipso, ipsa ut quid est,
non sic est eadem in aere et i9ne simul existentibus. 54
It follows from th'. s that the matter which is common to aU things
will not be numerically one in all things, but will be one in all things
with a unity less than numerical unity.55 This is the unity which
befits common natures. The matter common te aIl things, therefore, ia a
common nature. This is confirmed in the Questions on the Metaphysics
where Scotus explains that:
oportet distinguere de materia considerata in universali et

ln particulari; et de materia per se, quae nullam
conditionem includit extra rationem materiae, ut est flara
substantiae, quae vere est substantia; ... 56
Common natures are nct really distinct from the individuals in
which they are; hance matter, as a comrnon nature, only 'really' exista
54. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 18.
55. See, for example, John Duns Scotus, Ouaestienes Ouodtibetates, q. X, n. 10.
56. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtitissimae super Libres Metaphysicorum Aristotetis, Lib. VII,
q. XVI, n. 5. Cf. a1so the following statement by Minges. "Nam materia prima, quae per se
existere potest separata a forma, non est res universa1is, sed individualis. Quare inter
singulas materias primas non est identitas numerica, sed distinctio numerica, quamvis non
aistinetio specifiea vel generica. Hanc propositionem in variis lacis Scotus clare
exprimit. 1I (Minges, Joannis Duns Scoti Doetrina Philosophiea et Theologica, Vol. l, 49).
-- 220 --
in individuals, as an individual. Matter, on the ether hand, as truly
comman ta aIl things, will only exist in the mind, as a universal.
This, of course, ia nct true in Aquinas because in his system there i5
no really existing middle term between individuals and universals:
roughly epeaking, individuale are individuale in the real world and
universals are in the mind, after having been abstracted from the
individuals. It follaws, as expectedf from Aquinas's beliefs that
matter as common ia only in the mind, that it ooly has existence in the
miod. In Aristotle, on the ether hand, because matter has its own
actuality and, as OWens rnaintains, forro ia neither singular oor
univers al and yet it exists / S7 the picture 5eeme ta be much closer te
that of Scotus. In fact, the picture in Aristotle seems te be quite
close to a fair description of scotus's notion of commen nature.
Scotus's concept of commen nature will be discussed more at length
later. For the moment let me only remark that hie view, though
admittedly still quite far from Ockham's, helps open the way for the
latter'e notion that matter, like all else, is an individual. The only
claim Ockham needs ta make, once the discussion has been set in these
terme, is that the only things which really exist are those thinge which
57. Owens says the foLLowing about the status of form in AristotLe's system. liT he form, then, as
separate at Least in notion from the matter, is in Aristotelian terminoLogy a 'this' though
not a 'singuLar'. The probLem of determining the meaning of a 'this', in regard to the
term itseLf, is secondary as far as the doctrine of Being is concerned. The interest in
the term is soLeLy ta find an AristoteLian expression that wiLL characterize a form which
i5 neither singuLar nor pLural. The doctrine is clear on other grounds. The form cannat
be a singuLar, because it is knowable and definable, and is tne principle by which the
compos;te is known and d~fined. It cannot be universal, because it is Entity, and the
primary instance of Entity.1I (Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotel ian
Metaphysics: a Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought, 388·398). This
description of form in Aristotle's system bears a striking resembLance in its r.~st
important elements to a description which could be given of Scotus'S notion of commcn
nature.
-- 221 --
have numerical unity. Alternatively he could claim that there ia no
distinction, real, formaI, of reason, or otherwise, between the
individual and the comman nature, and, in conjunction with the statement
that the only things which exist are individuals, thereby eiiminate the
concept of comman nature altogether. This claim, of course, could be
made even when faced with a theory of universals and individu aIs like
the one adopted by Aquinas. It 8eemB ta me, however, that Scotus's
distinction between numerical unit y and unit y less than numerical unit y
-- which corresponds te his theory that ether than universals (in the
mind, and abstracted tram individuals) and individuals (in the real
world) there are al se common natures (which are in the individuals, are
formally distinct from them, and are to be made universal by the mind) -
- clarifies the distinction and rnakes it easier, in a way, to eliminate
the trait-d'union between universals and individuals.
The second question concerna the permanence of matter, i.e.,
whether matter is generable and corruptible. Aristotle, of course,
thinks that matter is neither generable nor corruptible because the
generation and corruption of matter would require another substratum for
the generation of matter, and that, in turn, wauld lead to infinite
regress because at each stage a substratum would be required and
something would be presupposed.
Aquinas and Scotus both agree with Aristotle that this is the case
as far as change in the natural order ia concerned (matter,
incidentally, ia generated and corrupted 'per accidens', as the Bubject
but not as the term of the generation and of the corruption, through the
'per se' generation and corruption of the composite substance). But,

-- 222 --
obviously, neither scotua nor Aquinas can agree that matter ia eternal
because bath believe in Divine creation. There ia, however, one major
difference between Beatus and Aquinas on this subject. For Aquinas, we
saw, aven though matter and ferro are created by Gad, they are not
created separately. Properly speaking, in fact, in the case of matter
and form according to Aquinas, we should not talk of creation but of
concreation.
In Beatus the situation i5 quite different: he believes that
matter and form are created by God independently of each other.
Ad primum argumentum principale conceda quod ..lateria est

ingenita et incorruptibilis; non taroen ex hoc sequitur quod
~it sempiterna, quia licet non habeat materiam unde fiat,
eat taroen ipsa producta tota, - quae 'productio' non est
generatic', quia generatio et corruptio sunt Cl:l~positorum et
non simplicium. 58
Aquinas's conclusion that ferro and matter are not created
separa':ely is based on his observation that matter and forro can never be
found separate in nature and presumably on his desire to remain faithful
to what he considers Aristotle's view on the subject. Scotus's view, on
the other hand (as we will see in the next section), is based on his
belief that, even though Aristotle is right in maintaining that matter
and form are never found in nature to be separate, nevertheless by God's
absolute power, they can be created and conserved separately. In other
words, Scotus follows Aristotle in the observation that in the natural
order matter and form cannot be found separate; but he aiso sees that,
given the difference between Aristotle's notion of God and a Christian'a
58. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 11, d. 1, q. !I1, n. 173. See also John Duns Scotus,
Repol"tata Pal"isiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 13.
-- 223 --
notion of Gad, place has te be made, aven in a system with very strang
Aristotelian foundations, for this difference in perspective. Of the
issue of the separability of matter and form l will talk at greater
length in the next section.
There is one last point whieh l want to diseuss very briefly in
this section. This ia the issue of the 'rationes seminales', nct
because they are an important point of comparison among Aquinas,
Aristotle, and SCOtU8 directly, but because it ia one of the issues
which show, as l have remarked at the beginning of the section, how
inaccurate it ia ta categorize Scotus salely as a follower of the
Augustinian tradition.
As we saw at the beginning of this section, there ia almost
unanimous agreement tt. ~ Scotus rejects the notion of 'rationes
seminales' characteristic of the Augustinian tradition and advocated by
Augustine himself to exalt God's agency in the world. After examining
what the role of seminal reasons could be, Scotus, in a number of
passages in the Opus Oxoniense, in the Reportata Parisiensia, and in the
Questions on the Metaphysics, confirma that, if seminal reasons are
taken as described by the Augustinian tradition, there is no reason to
suppose that they should exist. For example he says:
idee non est in materia naturali aliqua ratio seminalis,

quae ait pars formae, quae sit pars eius, neque est ipsa
materia, nec petentia receptiva materiae, nec actus; neque
est necessaria haee ratio seminalis ad vitandam creationem,
aut annihilationem. 59
59. John Duns Scatus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XVI II, q. l,n. 8. A similar passage i5
found in John Duns Scotus, Ouaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XVIII, quaest.
uniea, n. 6; and in John Duns Scot~s, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis, Lib. VII, q. XII, nn. 3·4. Other passages to the same effect are those in
-- 224 --
Even though most scholars of Seatus agree, and sorne of thern quite
reluctantly, that Seatus rejects the notion of 'rationes seminales',
Gilson insists that Scotus does not reject it altogether. Gilson
maintains in a footnote that, aven though Seatus thinks that the seminal
reasons are nct the matter or the passive potency in the matter, he
nevertheless affirma the existence of seminal reasons: they are, and
this ia no~ very clearly stated by Gilson, ei'~her in the 'semen' or the
'semen' itself. Gilson initially says, in fact, that the ward 'semen'
la often replaced by the ward 'ratio seminalis', but, he adds, they do
nct roean exactly the sarne thing, and goea on te explain that, supposedly
according te Seatus, the seminal reason i5 in the 'semen,.60
This statement tends ta confuse matters and needs ta be clarified.
Firstly we should make it clear, ta the extent necessary for discussing
the point at hand, what the terro 'ratio seroinalis' roeant to the
Augustinian tradition which used it and with which it ia bound te be
aaaociated. Secondly we ahould decide whether this notion of 'ratio
serninalis' is the notion of 'sernen' accepted by Scotus. And, finally,
should it turn out that the two notions do not quite coincide we should
either chaoae another term to express the Scatist notion, or we ahauld
rnake it very clear that we are using the term 'ratio seminalis' in a way
which Scotus argues that the 'rationes seminales' are not necessary in explaining the
difference between natural and artificial generation because the passive potency present in
matter is sufficient for the task, and there is no need to posit an active power in the
matter: cf. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XVIII, q. l, n. 7; John
Duns Scatus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libras Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XII, n. 9; and John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, Lib. 11, d. XVIII,
quaest. unies, n. 6.
60. This whole explanation (to me rather confusing) is offered in Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 473. The
footnote referred to just above, and already mentioned at the very beginning of this
chapter in the brief discussion of seminal reasons, is note n. 2 on 473.
-- 225 --
different from the way in which it i5 normally used in the Augustinian
tradition. l think that if this procedure is followed it will turn out
that Scotus, in fact, rejects the notion of 'rationes seminales'a
Leaving aside a more detailed examination of the theory of seminal
reasons, the Augustinian tradition, as normally understood, takes the
'rationes seminales' te be the germa of aIl things created by Gad in the
beginning and which will develop in the future into those things of
which they are the potentialities. We have already seen that Scotus
excludes a certain number of reasons for positing the notion and
explains that he, as Gilson himself adroits, doss nct think the 'ratio
seminalis' te be the matter, the passive potency in the matter, a part
of the form, a part of the matter, the form itself, or an act. It is
true that after this discussion Seatus adroits that there i5 in sorne
things something which he calle a 'ratio seminalis'. It seeme ta me,
hawever, that what Seatus calls a seminal reason, passibly so as ta
remain faithful to the Augustinian tradition at least in his use of
language, is nct what Augustine or his followers meant by their use of
the word. Scotus's discussion of his own theory of seminal reasons in
the Reportata Parisiensia begins by the following words:
declaro igitur in quibus est 'ratio seminalis', et in quibus

non. 61
For anyone advancing the theory that Scotus accepts the
traditional version of the concept of seminal reasons, this passage
provides quite a peer foundation: it i5 already clear frem it, in fact,
that Scotus does not think that for al' things there are seminal
61. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XVIII, q. l, n. 9.

-- 226 --
reasons. His discussions of the sarne tapie in the Opus Oxoniense and
in the Questions on the Metaphysics do not make the situation any better
because they tao begin in roughly the same way and proceed ta give
generally the sarne argument. The conclusion of the argument gives us
the following description of seminal reasons.
Quid igitur est ratio seminalis? Dico quod forma seminis,

inquantum semen, val qualitas oonsequens forma seminis. Et
ex hoc patet quod in adventu formae non remanet ratio
seminalis, quia nec pars formae, et idee est ratio seminalis
pars formae sequentis. Sed ad quid ponitur semen? Dico
quod tanquam medium necessarium, et non tanquam principium
activum generationis, intelligendo par semen aliquid
?lniforme, CJ':;od non est divisibile in duo, quorum alterum sit
activum, et alterum passivum, .•. 62
In the discussion of seminal reasons contained in the Questions on
the Hetaphysics, it is made even clearer that seminal reasens are net
required for ail types of generation and that in any event they are not
ta be considered active powers (as they are in the traditional
Augustinian theory of seminal reasons).
Ad quaestionem ergo dici potest, quo.d quia pluralitas non

est ponenda sine necessitate, sicut universaliter negatur
ratio seminalis coaeva materiae, ita ponitur in generali,
quod non ait ratio seminalis in quacumque alteratione
praevia generationi, sed solum in illa, ubi ex sensu necesse
est eam ponere; et hoc est ubi absente agente extrinseco,
alterandum ex se perficit, ut fiat generatio, quod in nul lis
videtur, niei in genitis ex semine preprie; idee ibi solum
ponitur ratio seminalis, ... 63
This is a notion of seminal reasons which would probably be
accepted by Aristotle himself, is contained in Aristotle's ewn theory of
62. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XVIII, q. 1, n.. 10. Cf. ~lso John Duns
Scotus, Cuaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XVIII, quaest. unica, nn. 8-12.
63. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones Subtilissimae super Libr~s Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XII, n. 7.
-- 227 --
the actualization of sorne natural patencies, would be accepted by anyone
who believes that sorne things grow out of aeads, should probably nat be
called a theory of seminal reasons, and, finally, does nat Bearn ta me te
be anything aven vaguely resembling, neither in content ncr in
motivation, the traditional theory of seminal reasons. The only
connection which l can find between ScotUS'g theory and the Augustinian
theory of seminal reasons i5 the fact that Scotus himself sometimes uses
the tarm "seminal reasons" ta rafer ta t'.le entities which he iB talking
about.
It 8eems, therefore, ~hat if Gilson wants te talk about Scotus
accepting the notion of seminal reasons h~ should make it quite clear
that this cannot be taken to mean that Scatus accepts the Augustinian
notion of seminal reasons. l would say, furthermore, once again, that
nct only would Aristotle recognize this as a natural consequence of hie
own theory of the actualization of certain types of potencies, but even
Aquinas, who quite explicitly rejects the notion of seminal reasons,
might well accept the theory, though without calling it a theory of
seminal reasons. l would say, then, that Scotus's intention in calling
these entities seminal reasons might simply be to pay lip service to the
Augustinian notion, while at the sarne time emptying it of all its
original content.
--
-- 228 --
SCOTUS: THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF MATTER
AND THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATTER AND FORN
In this section l want te turn my attention ta two tapies on which
Scotus Beeme ta disagree nat o;~ly with the views ot Thomas Aquinas but
aIse, ta Borne extent, with those of Aristotlee As we saw, in fact, bath
Aquinas and Aristotle deny the intelligibility of matter and, for all
practical purposes, the separability of matter fram forme It ia nct
clear, however, whether Aristotle means to deny the intelligibility of
matter and the separability of matter and form in principle, cr whether
these denials are simply the conclusions he draws from his observations
of natural processes. Be that as it may, it ia clear that Aristotle
does not have any reascn or pressing motivation for investigating the
effect which the absolute power of God would have on the answer given to
these two questions. It has also become clear from our discussion of
Aquinas's views on tha intelligibility of matter and on the separability
of matter and form that, given the Christian notion of God, it is a
mistake on the part of Aquinas te maintain that matter ia in principle
unintelliqible and that form and matter cannot be made to be separate
even by Cadis absolute power. In both cases Aquinas severely restricts
the power of God and causes his own system sorne otherwise avoidable
problems, sorne of which, as we saw, he shares with Aristotle. scotus,
as we will Bee in the course of the present discussion, answers both
questions affirmatively. l will begin by discussinq the question of the
intelliqibility of matter.
-- 229 --
Aquinas argues from the pure potentiality of matter to its
unintelligibility, bath for us and in principlei Scotus, f~om the
aetuality of matter, will argue that it is intelligible in prineiple,
but nct for us. The starting point for the discussion of this question
s~ems ta have become reversed. Aquinas, starting from the premise that
matter ie in principle unintelligible, has ta try ta perform miracles ta
free himself from the natural consequences of this premise, i.e., that
Gad does nct know matter and, therefore, does nct know material
partieulars perfeetly. For 5eotus the starting peint is elearly
different. Firstly, matter ia actual, and this, aven if it ia nct by
itself a strong enough reason frem whieh te eonelude that matter must be
intelligible, does nct cffer any prima facie reason ta believe that it
ia nct. secondly -- and l believe this ta have baen Scotue's real
starting point Gad knows material substances perfectIy, which implies
that God knows matter, whieh in turn implies that matter is intelligible
in principle. Regardless of the direction of the inference, it ia quite
elear that aeeording to Seotus God knows matter.
Secundo, contra hoc quod dicit de cognoscibilitate materiae,

arguitur: Intellectus qui non pote st ex nobiliori
intellige·re ignobilius, nec universaliter ex une aliud per
collationem, si perfecte cogn05ci omnia, cognoscit ea
secundum eorum proprias naturas, ut in se sunt, alias enim
intellectus talia esset collativus in cognoscendo; sed Deus
sic intelligit omnia; igitur cognoscit materiam ut in se,
non per analogiam, et per coml!arationem ad formam; igitur
materia secundurn naturam, qua in se est, est cognoscibilis,
et non tantum per naturarn formae; igitur sic habebit
ideam. 64
64. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 9. For other statements to
the same effect, cf. also John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. l, d. XXXVI, q. IV,
n. 23; Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 23i Lib. Il, d. XII, q. II, n. lai John Duns Scotus,
Cuaestiones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotetis, Lib. VII, q. XVI, n. 7;
and, finally, John Duns Scotus, auaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. Il,
n. 7.
-- 230 --
It is equally clear, and partly a consequence of the
intelligibility of matter, that God has knowledge of material singulars
and that singulars are knowable in principle:
ita etiam intellectio Dei respectu objecti finiti, ut

respectu lapidis, est formaliter infinita; infinite enim
intelligit lapidem, quia modus agendi sequitur virtutem
agentis. si autem quaerat quaestio de terminante
secundo modo, quia tale non necessario exigitur ad actum,
sed magie sequitur actum, et dependet ab actu; sic aliquid.
aliud a Deo potest esse objectum, et intelligibile ab ipso,
65
Ir,\ fact, Gad knows all things through his own essence. If God
knows his own essence perfectly, he will know perfectly ail the ways in
which his own essence can be imitated as weil as the foundations of the
imi~ation and the entities which imitate it. This ia SQ becauee it iB
impossible to argue perfect knowledge of something of which the
foundation is not perfectly known.
Debet igitur ratio sic intelligi, quod si Deus parfeote

cognoscit suam essentiam imitabilern, igitur perfeote
cognoscit omnem modum imitandi eam, et ita orones imitationes
ipsius et fundamenta et entitates in quibus fundantur
hujusmodi imitationes, quia non parfeote cognoscitur
imitatio, niai cognoscatur fundamenturn, et terminus
imitationis. 66
It is also important thst ail things be known by God through their
own proper idea because only then are they known distinctly. The proper
65. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia. Lib. l, d. XXXVI, q. il, nn. S, 7. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. l, d. XXXVI, q. Il, nn. 8-9; John Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. Ill, pars l, qq. V et VI, n. 191; and John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. i, q. 1, n. 42.
66. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. l, d. XXXVI, q. Il, n. 11. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d_ XXXVI, q. Il, n. 12; John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio,
Prologus, pars tlI, qq. 1-111, n. 200; John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. XXXV,
quaest. unics, n. 32; and John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. XXXVIII, quaest. uniea,
n. 9.
-- 231 --
idea has to be the idea of the individual because if the individual is
known through sorne other idea, that idea will be the idea of the
species. But, 5COtU8 holds, through the idea of the species the
individual is nct known distinctly, h.~cause the idea of the individual
ia contained in the idea of the species only potentially and in a
confused manner.
Nam illud requirit propriam rat":'nilerr .::~.,noscendi, quod par

nullam rationem alterius distincte pote st cogn08ci; sed tale
est individuum. Probatio, quia si par rations alicujus
alterius pessat 00gn05ci, hoc Basat par rationem quidditatis
specieii sed par illam non potest distincte c09n08ci,
quia solum continet illa in potentia et confuse; talia est
autem communitas speciei, siva quidditas; si igitur
debet distincte 00gn08ci, oportet ut cognoscatur par ideam
propriam. 67
Furthermore, as is suggested by the passage just quoted, the
proper idea of each singular entity has to be different from the idea of
the species because otherwise nothing would be added by individuality to
that which is already given by the species:
item, si perfecte per ideam specieL cognoscaretur

individuum, igitur quidquid po~itivum dicit individuum,
contineretur in specifica natura, ~.ive in quidditate, et sic
individuum nihi1 adderet super specie~, nisi negationem, val
privationem, et sic secundurn propriam rationem individui
esset non ens. 68
It should be noted and stressed, however, that in Scotua's system
there ia no relation between the capacity ta know matter and the
67. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. I, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 16. See also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. J, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 13; and John Duns Scotus, Q.g
P";mo RerllTl Ofmiun Principio, cap. IV, n. 17.
68. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 17; cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 18.
-- 232 --
capacity ta know singulars as far as singularity itself iB concerned.
Scotus makes this clear when he says that:
materia pertinet ad quod quid est, non individualis taroen ut

penit; ergo licet res effluant a Deo secundum formam et
~ateriam, ut sunt partes quidditatis, non oportet tamen ex
hoc arguere cognitionem singularis. 69
The knowledge of material singulars would obviously become
problematic should it turn out that matter is unintelligible: the
connection would, howeve~, be quite strictly one due te the presence of
matter in auch singulars, and it would not be in any way related ta
their individuality or te the question of individuation as it ia, for
instance, in Aquinas. As we shall see in the section dedicated ta
individuation, Scotus resolutely rejects any notion of individuation by
matter or by 'signated matter': hie principle of individuation will be
the 'haecceitas' or 'thisness'. The only resemblance this 'haecceity'
bears ta matter ia the fact that, like matter, it ia quite knawable in
principle and therefore to God, but, also like matter, it is not known
te us 'pro statu iste'. Gad, therefere, knaws matter, material
aingulars, and singulara in general.
For Scotus, then, it ia nct a question of explaining how Gad,
unable ta know matter in itself, is noneth~less able to know materidl
particulars, as he must in the framework of Christian Theology, a task
which causes considerable problems te Aquinas, and which, l think, he is
in the end unable te accomplish. For Scotua it ia a question of
explaining why, sinee matter and singulars, material and otherwise, are
knowable in principle, singularity itself should be unknown to us. We
69. John Ouns Scotus, cuaestiones in LibrCl,~~Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. III, q.XI, n. 7.
-- 233 --
will see that this task turns out to be considerab1y easier than the
task faced by Aquinas.
It shou1d a1so be noted in passing that Scotus discusses both the
possibi1ity that it might be the materia1ity and the possibi1ity that it
might be singularity which makes the 'haecceitas' of material singulars
unintelligible for us. scotus'S conclusion iB that, because individuals
are the most knowable entities, it ia neither materiality (because
matter iB knowable in itself) nor singularity which prevents us from
knowing individuals in their singularity. The answer therefore is that
the defect in this case lies, nct on the side of matter or of
singularity, but on the side of the human mind.
Ad secundum, unus Doctor dicit, quod singulare potest per se

intelligi, lice~ non singulare materiale, quia singularitas
non prohibet, sed materialitas, alioquin Deus non esset
intelligibilis, cum ait singulare, quod falsum est; et tunc
patet responsio, quod propositlo assumpta de non
intelligendo singulare, non est vera, niai de singulari
materiali. Neutrum credo ess= verum, niai forte
loquendo de intellectu, qui propter imgerfectionem sui, non
potest forte quodcurnque intelligibile intelligere; non sic
inte11ectus ange1icus. 70
Beotus also notes that maintaining that God does not know
individua1s entai1s the obvi0US contradiction invo1ved in holding both
that God does not know in1ividuals and that he created individuals and
His providence is primarily directed towards them:
contra secundum, quando enim dicit quod individuurn non est

de intentione naturae, et tamen providentia divina est primo
cirea individua, videtur esse contraditio, ... 71
70. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. III, q. VIII, n. 14; cf. alsa
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib.
VII, q. XIV, n. 1 and n. 5.
71. John Duns scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 14.
-- 234 --
It ia truet on Scotus's account, that regardless of the presence
of matter in individuals the human intellect will find obstacles in its
=·..; tempt te come ta know them in their singularity. Accorâit;.g ta ScatuB
the problem does not lie in the materiality or in 'he singular.ity of
individuals but in the fact that, because of our etate in thil3 2.ife, we
are incapable of knowing singularity.
Respondeo, nulla potentia cognoscitiva in nobia cognoscit

rem secundum auam absolutam cognoscibilitatem, inquantum
scilicet est in se manifesta, sed solum inquantum est motiva
potentiae, quia potentiae cognitivae hic moverentu~ ab
oppositis; natura autem non mavet secundurn graüu~
singularitatis. 72
The anawer ta these questions which have been asked about our
knowledge of singulars (why don't we know matter, why don't we know
individuals in their singularity, and finally why don't we know
singularity in general) will be the same. The fundamental explanation
ia that, because oi a defect of our intellect, we cannat know matter and
singularity itself in this life. In sorne cases there are, of course,
ether secondary explanations. In the case of matter, aince it ie nct
the principle of any sensibl~ operation, it will only be known to us by
analogy to those things which are principles of sensible operations.
Aliter, propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui e:'.

sensibilibus cognoscit. Primo in formae notitiam inducimur
per operationes sensibiles, materia nullius operationis
sensibilis est principium, tamen ex formis succedentibus,
quae sunt aliarum operationum principia, concludimus illud,
quod ad sas habet analogiam, ut receptivum ad receptum.~
72. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XV, n. 6; cf. also John Duns Scotus, Ouaestiones Subtilissimae super libros
Metaphysicorum Arist~telis, Lib. VII, q. XIV, n. 3.
13. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae sU~er Libros Metaphysicorum AristoteLis, lib. VII,
q. V, n. S. Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n.
23; and John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. 1, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 10.
-- 235 --
This ie confirmed in various ether places:
sad non sequitur, non est cognoscibilis a nobis, nisi par

analogiam ad formam; ergo non est alia entitas positiva
distincta a forma, nam nec perfectissima in natura et
suprema, nec imperfectissima et infima, sunt a nobis
cognoscibilia pre statu iate, nec proportionata intellectui
oastra, sed media, et taroen illa in se sunt vere entia et
distincta contra alia. 74
The sarne basic argument applies ta our knowledge nct ooly of
matter but also of singularity in general. The 'haecceitas', whether it
be the 'haecceitas' of material or immaterial substances, ia, as we have
seen, intelligible in principle. It follows that it must be because of
sorne defect in our own intellect that we cannat know the 'haecceitas':
non tamen sequitur ex hoc, quod sit maxime intelligibile

cuicurnque intellectui, quia ex debilitate intellectus nostri
potest esse defectus • . . • et dictum est, quod per sensum non
cognoscitur hoc singu1are ut hoc, sed selum ut natura, et
sic petest inte11ectus nester intelligere singu1are.~
The same explanation will also basically apply to our knowledge 01
Gad and angels or separate substances in this life, because in this case
no knowledge of sensible properties is available ta us. In the case of
Gad and angels, and of anything which is not corporeal, in fact, the
situation is further complicated by the fact that they have no sensible
properties frem which, by analogy, we can infer their nature.
Respondetur ad questionem, quod anima conjuncta corpori non

potest intelligere quidditates substantiarum separatarum
propter duo. Primum est, quia sic conjuncta nihi1
intelligit nisi per abstractionem a phantasmatibus;
74. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 23.
75. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 10. Singulars are known
by us through the universal because the 'haecceity', which is the individual difference, is
unintelligible to us in this life: for this argument specifically cf. John Duns Scotus.
Reportata Padsiensia, Lib. JI, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 3.
-- 236 --
Bubstantiae autem separatae non faciunt phantasma, nec ex

his quae faciunt phantasma possunt 009n05ci; ... 76
ScotUB ia nat clear about what exactly ia to be read into the
expreasion 'pro statu iata' and leaves a few possibilities open:
'statua' non videtur esse nisi 'stabilis permanentia',

firntata legibus sapientiae. Firmatum est autem il1ia
legibus, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu
iata nisi illa quorum species relucent in phantasmate, et
hoc sive proptr:".L" poenam peccati criginalis, sive propter
naturalem concordantiam potentiarum animae in operande,
•• .T7
It iB worth neting here that Scotus makes sorne attempts ta argue
ta the effect that if Aristotle had had a notion of Gad more similar ta
that of Christianity, he would then have admitted that singulars are
knowable in principle:
primo ostenditur ex intentione Philosophi oppositum,

scilicet quod singulare potest per se intelligi, quia si
certius agit, qui plus per se cognoscit singulare; ergo
agens, ut Deus et Angelus, quod certissime agit, certissime
~ognoscit per se singulare et maxime; ... 78
There is another issue which l would like ta mention in passing
and which is somewhat related ta our discussion of the intelligibility
of matter and of individuality: the issue of the proper abject of the
human intellect as it is seen by Scotus. In spite of the fact that
Scotus thinks matter and individuality ta be intelligible, nevertheless
76. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. Il, q.
III, n. 4; cf. also John Duns Scatus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis, Lib. II, q. III, n. 26.
77. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. 111, pars l, q. III, n. 187; for a similar statement,
see John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars 1, q. VIII, n. 13.
78. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. 1, q.
V, n. 3.
-- 237 --
according te him the essence of rnaterial substances cannat be the proper
object of the human intellect.
Here again we find Scotus at adde with Aquinas, who, despite his
view that matter ia unintelligible, follows Aristotle in maintaining
that the proper abject of the human intellect ia the 'quidditas rei
materialis 1 •
The problem of the knowledge of the nature of singulnrity is one
which arises for our intellect in this 1i;-, though for different
reasona, for bath Aristotle anà Aquinas, and for Scotus. Aristotle's
problem is limited to this life and so is Scotus's because of his appeal
ta a defect of our intellect 'in via', and aIso, as we will see shortly,
because of his choiee of 'being in itself' as the proper abject of the
human intellect.
Aquinas, according ta Scatus, encounters a different set of
challenges. If he argues that the proper object of the intellect after
death remains the essence of material substances he then faces two
problems: 1) human beings would still only be able to achieve imperfect
knowl~dge of the proper object of their intellect, because the problem
does not lie on the side of the human mind, but on the side of the
object of knowledge; and 2) human beings would be unable to acMieve the
beatific vision because Gad wauld not be the proper abject of the human
intellect. If, on the other hand, in order to avoid these problems, he
chooses to say that the proper object of the intellect changes at death,
then he is faced with having to accept the idea that the human being at
the moment of death changes species. Since in fact the soul, which iB
-- 238 --
(; the substantial ferm of man, ia aIse that through which we achieve
knowledge, it follows that if the proper object of the intellect
changes, then the intellect will, at that point, become part of a
different species. 79
Scotus admits that the 'quidditas rei materialis' is that which
firet moves our intellect "pro statu isto," but he doee nct think that
it follows from this that it should be considered the proper object of
the human intellect in itself:
tamen ei pro statu iata adaequatur in ratione motivi

quiditas rei sensibilis, et idee pro ista statu nan
naturali.ter intelliget alia quae non continentur sub iate
primo motivo. 8D
According to Scotus the proper object of the human intellect is
being in itself, Aristotle's choice as the subject of metaphysics. This
choice allows Scotus to escape charges of skepticism which might arise
from the fact that his views grant us, in the end, very little knowledge
in this life. Scotus tries to escape the charge that his views lead to
skepticism through a combination of his belief that being in itself is
the proper object of the intellect and his theory of the univocity of
being.
Nullus igitur conceptus quiditativus habetur naturaliter de

substantia immediate causatus a substantia, sed tantum
causatus vel abstractus primo ab accidente, - et illud non
est nisi coneeptus entis. 81
79. For arglRents te this effect in Scotus see, for example, John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones
guodLibetales, q. XIV. n. 12: and John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. l, d. 1II,
4, l, nn. 3·9.
80. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. l, d. 11 1, pars 1, q. III, n. 186.

(,
8l. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. J, d. 1Il, pars l, q. 1Il, n. 145.
-- 239 --
Since the univocity of being applies te substance and accidents,
it turne out that through our knowled\;~ of accidents we cao reach a
concept of being capable of covering substance as well as accidents.
This, it should be noted, clarifies not only the notion that substance
ie made known by accidents, but aIse the notion that matter in its turn
ia known by analogy ta ferro. The notion of the univocity of being, it
turne out, applies nct ooly ta our knowledge of sensible substances in
this life, but aiso ta our knowledge of Gad. God ia, in fact, a being
and as auch He iB covered by the theory of the univocity of being: thuB
it follows that, though imperfectly, we can know God in this life. It
is also true that because the proper object of the intellect is 'being
qua being' and because the theory of the univocity of being asaures us
that the concept applies to God as well as to creatures, our death and
the possibility of the beatific vision do not force any radical changes
in the basic structure of our intellect or any fundamental problems for
Scotus's theory.
Ergo non est impossibile intellectum, ex parte intellectus f ,

cognoscere substantiam immaterialem in particulari ex quo
cognoscit materiale, quod est effectus eiua, et ita primum
objectum intellectus non excedit illud irnmateriale. 82
It should be noted, at this point, that it does not follow from
what has been said 50 far that in Scotus's theory the rnaterial substance
has no basic relevance. To the contrary, in Scotus's system Aristotle's
primary substance has probably more importance than it has in Aquinas's.
Scotus, however, instead of emphasizing its materiality, which he
probably considers problematic for sorne aspects of a Christian
82. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. III, pars l, q. III, n. 116.
-- 240 --
philosophical system, emphasizes its individuality. This will be made
more apparent in scotUS#B discussion of individuation, but it ia already
made clear by Nhat has been said thus far.
It should be remarked befere concluding our discussion of the
intelligibility of matter that if the presence of matter in the object
doea nct hinder the knowability of the abject, nevertheless it BeemB
that according ta Scotus the lack of matter in the knower doee improve
the capacity for knowledge in that knower.
Certitude provenit ex immaterialitate, quanto enim virtus

cognoscitiva est irnmaterialior, tante est in cognoscendo
certier. 83
The following passage, l think, ia an excellent summary of
Scotus's viewe on the intelligibility of matter and individuals.
Ad probationem, quando dicitur qucd materia non est

cognoscibilis niai per analogiam ad formam, dicendum quod
est falsum, secundum se considerando materiam; ab intellectu
taroen nostro non potest aliter cogno5ci, 5icut nec forma
eubstantialis cognoscitur a nobis, ni5i in comparatione ad
operationem; Sic inte11ectus non cogno5cens aliquid,
niai ex sensibilibus, non cognoscit materiam esse, niai
videndo a1iquid transmutari a contrario in contrariurn, et
non potest totum transmutari in totum; idee conc1udit
aliquid esse subjectum utrique contrariorum, quod vocat
materiam, . ~ •, taroen i11e inte11ectus, qui perfecte
cognoscit res secundum suas entitates, quas habent in se,
et non ex une ad a1iud, cognescit materiam non plus per
habitudinem ad formata, quam e converso, sed cognoscit ipsam
in se secundum suam entitatem propriam; et talis est
intellectus divinus, et idee cognoscit materiam per prepriam
ideam materiae. 84
83. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones SUbt;lissimae sucer Libres Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Prologus,
n. ,.
8-4. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. l, d. XXXVI, q. IV, n. 23. A very simiter passage
is found in John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes in Libres Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n.
20.
-- 241 --
According ta Scotus there i5 nothing in the nature of matter
itaelf which makes it impossible for it exist apart fram forme He
agrees that this never happens through natural agency, which i5 why
Seotus thinks Aristotle to have presumed that it is not possible for it
ever ta happen. It ia nonetheless passible, by God's absolute power,
that matter and ferm should exist one without the ether. ScotUB'B major
argument for this conclusion -- that i~ La logically possible for matter
te exist without any ferro informing it -- roughly rune along these
lines: should it be logically impossible that matter exist and not have
sorne forro or ether informing it, then it would follow that there ia sorne
particular forro without which matter cannet existe This ia plainly
false. Scotus concludes, therefore, that matter, by God's ab se lute
power, cao exist witheut any ferm informing it at aIl:
probe, quia si est necessitas absoluta cennexionis materiae

ad formam, ut tu dicis, igitur materia sibi determinat
aliquam formam de necessitate. Probatio cansequentiae:
quod determinat sibi aliquad genus, determinat sibi aliquam
speciem in genere i110, et amne quod determinat sibi
speciem, de necessitate determinat sibi esse in a1iquo una
individuo iatius speciei, ut amne quod de neeessitate est
homo, est hic homo ve1 i11e; sed materia non determinat sibi
de necessitate ha ne fermam vel i11am, manifestum est; erga
nec totum genus formae. a5
85. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. Il, n. 4. The seme
argument is found in John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. II, d. XII, q. II, n. 6.
Scotus seems to be erguing here that because matter do es not necessarily need the inherence
of eny one particular form, it should follow that matter does not need the inherence of eny
fonm et ell in order ta existe He supports this argument by maintaining thet that which
determines a gen~s ta itself determines sorne species of that genus to itselfj likewise that
which determines a spccies to itself necessarily determines itself to being in one
individual of that species. That which by necessity is man is either this man or that man,
etc. Matter does not by necessity determine this form or that to itself, therefore matter
does not determine the whole genus of form ta itself. The argument seems to be invalid,
and it seems to involve a fallacy of composition. Uhile it is true, in fact, that matter
does not necessarily determine d!lY one particular form to itself, it may still be true thet
it determines the disjunction of all forms to itself. Matter may be able ta exist without
each of the forms in the disjunction taken severally, but not without ell of the forms et
once. In ether words. matter may not need the inherence of this form necesserily, or of
-- 242 --
This ia nct the only argument, however, which leads ScotUB ta the
conclusion that matter must be able ta exist without ferro. Another
arqument Le that in order ta preserve the real composition of composite
substances it must be maintained that the parts of which the composite
iB composed are absolute beings. 86 :latter, therefore, as one of the
essential parts of composite substances, must be an absolute being.
Furthermore, matter ia prier ta ferro.
Tenendo; ut in priori quaestione dictum est, rem materialem

esse compositam ex duobus, quae sunt partes rei compositae,
et quod semper aliquid generat_~ _ praeexistit generato, eub
forma corrumpendi; uico quod nqn est contradictio materiam
esse sine forma quaecumque, materia est ans absolutum
distinctum et prius forma quacumque .•. Quod enim materia
sit quid absolutum satis patet, quia facit cempositionem
realem et absolutam; quod autem sit prior forma, saltem
natura et origine, patet, quia est receptivum formae et
fundamentum ejus, sed receptivum et fundamentum formae est
pr ius forma. 87
In any case, many ef these who deny that matter and ferro can exist
independently of each other admit that it is possible, by God's absolute
power, that accidents should exist and be separate from their subject.
It would seem that matter and forro, which are more basic te t-ne process
of generation and corruption, should be more independent from each ether
than accidents are from their subject.
that form necessarily, etc., but ft may still necessarily need the inherence of either this
fonm or that form, etc.
86. The distinction between absolute and relative being should be explained in terms of the ten
Aristotelian categories. Scotus, like most of his contemporaries, beLieves that only the
categories of substance, quality, and quantity designate absolute beings. The other seven
categories only invotve relative things or beings. Ockham later on allowed only to the
members of the categories of substance and quality the status of absolute beings.
87. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libl'OS Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. Il, n. 3. Several
other statements te the effect that matter is an absolute being and prier to form are found
in the fellowing works: John Duns Scotus, De Primo Rerum Omnium Principio, cap. II, nn. 5-
6; John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. Xl, q. III, n. 19;
and, finally, John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. Il, d. XII, q. II, n. 4.
-- 243 --
Contra, Non minus dependet accidens a substantia quam

materia a forma; sed accidens potest fieri sine subiecto,
ergo et materia sine forma. 88
That matter and ferro can exist separately i9 also shawn by the
fact that form cannat be considered ta be part of the essence of matter:
if form were part of the essence of matter, then the essence of matter
would change every time a ferro iB corrupted in it and another ferro
generated. Furthermore, whatever Gad can do mediately, through a
secondary cause, he can do immediately without any secondary cause.
Henee, ainee form i9 nct the primary cause through which Gad givea
existence ta matter, because Gad can give it existence without the
mediation of form, ferro ia nct part of the essence of matter. Scotus
a~gues to this effect in the following passage of the Opus Oxoniense:
sed forma est causa secunda, quae non est de esaentia

materiae, inquantum materia est, mediante qua Deus dat esse
materiae; ergo Deus sine illa potest facere materiam. Quod
autem forma non sit de essentia materiae, patet, quia aliter
adveniente alia et alia forma, esset alia et alia essentia
materiae. 89
From the foregoing arguments Scotus concludes that matter ie
really distinct from fcrm.
Dico quod distinguitur ab ipsa realiter, quadam realitate

receptiva, omnino alterius rationis a forma, et alteriue
essentiae, et est primo diversum ab illa, quia illa sunt
primo diversa, quae sic se habent, quod nihil unius
includitur in alio, nec e converso; forma autem et materia
sunt huiusmodi; ••. 90
88. John Duns Scotus. Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XII, q. Il, n. 1; cf. atso
John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. II, d. XII, q. Il, n. 8.
89. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XII, q. Il, n. 3; cf. also
John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. Il, n. S.
90. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 19. For expticit statements
of the real distinction between matter and form, see also John Duns Scotus. Repor~~·:
-- 244 --
In confirmation of this conclusion it should aIse be remé.~ered
that Scotus maintains, against Aquinas's views, that matter and ferm are
bath terme of creation, and are nat concreated. In fact, Scotus nat
only thinks that matter can be created and conserved by Gad without form
in the universe, but he al se believes that matter can be Ba created by
Gad outside the universe.
Et si quaeras ubi esset illa materia sine forma? Dico quod

sicut Angelus, qui non est quantus, est in loco aliquo
definitive, non circumscriptive, supposito quod ait in
universe, si tamen fieret extra universum, ubi locus non
est, non esset in loco definitive, sic materia, si fieret in
universo sine forma, es set definitive alicubi; si autem
fieret extra universum, nusquam esset localiter vel
definitive, tamen esset natura quaedam absoluta. 91
Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. II, n. 4; and John Ouns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros
Sententiarun, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, nn. 13-14.
91. John Duns Scetus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. II, n. 5; see also
John Duns Scotus, Reporteta Parisiens;a, Lib. II, d. XII, q. II, n. 7. The fact that
matter, by God's absoLute power, can be made to exist outside the uni verse where there is
no place in the Sense of location bears no relation, in Scotus's system, to the question of
whether matter is in itself extended. This is so because, as we saw during our discussion
of Quodlibetal Question xr, since extension is the primary foundation of the aptitude or
potency ta being located in place, that which has the potentiaLity of being located in
p~ace necesserily has extension. Because matter has that potentiaLity in itself, matter
also has extension in itseLf. Moreover, we saw that Scotus holds that a body can be in
pLace without having ubeity there: this presumably is a consequence of the fact that Scotus
believes place to be incorruptible in the sense that a given body must always occupy the
same dimension. This implies that, in the sense of dimensions, place is incorruptible
independently of change in location. The fact, then, that matter, by God's absolute power,
could he made to exist outsid~ the uni verse where there is no location does not have any
bearing on the extel'ision of matter. Matter, in fact, couLd exist outside the uni verse
without location or ubeity, but stilL be in pLace in the sense that it still has
dimensions. This clearly makes the reLationship between Location and extension et the same
time more intimate and Less 50. On the one hand, because being in place rneans the same as
having dimensions or extension, the relationship is r.~re intimate; on the other hand,
becBuse being in pLace does not entai l being locateel in pLace ~ .• having ubeity there, the
relationship between extension and location is completeLy severed. For more on the
relationship between extension and Location in Scotus, see Lang, IIBodies and Angels: the
Occupants of Place for A... istotle and Duns Scotus."
-- 245 --
SCOTOS AND THE ROLE OF MATTER IN DEFINITION AND IN ESSENCE
In this section l want ta diseuse the role of matter in scotUB'S
definition of material composit~s and ta determine whether matter ie
part of their essence. l will begin by examining the role of matter in
definition. Here, like Aristotle and Aquinas, Scotus begins by asking
what a definition ie and what it ia supposed te do. In doing so he
follows Aristotle very closely.
Primum patet ex l Topicorum: "Definitio est oratio, indicans

quid est esS9 rei. .. Secundum patet per Philosophum X
Hetaphysicae: "Totaliter quaerendum est quid 'unum',
quemadmodum et quid ens, tamqu-?m non sufficiens, quia hoc
ipsum iatiue natura ... 92
The definition ia that through which science ia acquired and for
Scotus therefore, as for Aristotle and for Aquinas, the definition will
be universal:
ad primum responsio, scientia acquiritur per medium quod est

definitio, illa non est singularis ex 2. Metaphys. text.
comm. 53. sed tamen universali5, et idee tantum de
universali est deroonstratio et scientia. 93
As might be expected from the fact that according to Scotus matter
i5 a positive entity, i5 an abselute being, ha5 sorne actuality of its
ewn, and i5 really distinct from forro, it turns out that taken
92. John Duns Seotus, Ord;natio, lib. l, d. XXV, quaest. uniea, n. 10. See also John Duns Scotus,
Quaest;ones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. l, q. 1, n. 2.
93. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones subtil;ssim~e super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. V, q.
VII, n. 6 extra. Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Prologus q. 1, a. 1, n.
4.
-- 246 --
universally matter will be contained in the definition of material
composites. Scotus, in fact, explains that if matter turne out nct ta
pertain ta the definition it becomes impossible te argue against Plata
that Ideas are not definable because they are just forms. He concludes,
therefore, that that which is defined is really composed oi matter and
form, and that bath pertain te ite definition. Moreover, he adde,
because it ia impossible ta know a composite substance weIl unIsse its
matter is also known, it follows that the form is not the whole essence
of that which centaine matter.
Item in eodem cap. 3. text. comm. 9. secundo contra

Platonem, omnis definitia habet quid, quaIe, et oportet hoc
esse ut materiam, illud ut formam; niai ergo materia
pertineret, non haberet contra Platonem, quod idea non est
definibilis, quia est sola forma; ergo quod definitur vere
habet materiam et formam, et utrumque pertinet ad
definitionem. sed impossibila est perfecte cognoscere
rem, non cognita rnateria eius; ergo forma r..on est tota
quidditas eius, quod habet materiam. 94
Since the definition expresses the essence or quiddity of the
substance, it will quite readily follow from the fact that matter is
part of the definition of material composites, that it will equally be
part of the essence of those substances which are rnaterial.
Si ergo est abstractio qualis dicta est, sequitur quod

quidditas includit quaecumque communiter sumpta, quae
singulariter surnpta includuntur in per se individuo illius
communis, licet non illa, quae in simul toto. Patet ergo,
quod per se rnateria non individualis, nec simul totius
proprie surnpti, sed in communi considerata, est de
94. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtiliss;mae super libros Metapnysieorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XVI, n. 2. Cf. also John Duns Seotus, Ordfnatio, lib. 1, d. VIII, pars 1, q. III, n.
105; and John Ouns Seotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. IV, d. Xl, q. Ill, n.
ft? c;;:d n. 49.
-- 247 --
quidditate speciei, non prout species dicitur forma, sicut

in littera. 95
Scotus's position on the structure of the definition and essence
of composite substances cornes out clearly in his discussion and his
rejection of the possibility that God be in a genus. In the course of
that discussion, while showing that God is not part of a genus through
an argument from infinity, Scotus argues that the genus ia derived from
a reality whi:h in itself is in potentiality to the reality from which
the differentia ia derived, and that nothing infinite ia in potentiality
te sorne ether thing. Scotus explains that:
hanc rationem aliqualiter pertractando intelligo sic, quod

in aliquibus creaturis genus et differentia accipiuntur ab
alia et alia realitate (sicut ponendo plures formas in
homine, animal accipitur a sensitiva et rationale ab
intellectiva), et tune illa ras, a qua accipitur genus, vere
est potentialis et perfectibilis ab illa a qua accipitur
differentia. 96
From this ScotUB concludes that, because it ia impossible ta
reconcile composition with the idea that a reality which is in something
else should be infinite, and because if a reality is infinite in itself
it cannat be in potentiality ta any other reality, it follaws that,
because in Gad any essential reality is formally infinite, there is
nothing in Gad from which it is possible ta abstract the notion of
genus:
95. John Duns Scotus, Qua@stion@s subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII,
q. XVI, n. 5. Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libros
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. XVI, n. 3; John Duns Scotus, Ouaestiones
Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. X, n. 8; John Ouns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. JI, d. III, q. 1, n. 4 and n. 9; John Duns Seotus,
Ordinatio, Lib. 1, d. Xl, q. Il, n. 44; and, finally, John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II,
d. 11, q. 11, n. 93.
96. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. l, d. VIII, pars 1, q. IIi, n. 106.
-- 248 --
iata compositio realitatum potentialis et actualis

minima est quae sufficit ad rationem generis et
differentiae, et iata non etat eum ho~ quod quaelibet
realitas in aliquo ait infinita: realitas enim si esset de
se infinita, quantumcurnque praecise 6umpta, non eaeet in
potentia ad aliquam realitatem; ergo eum in Deo quaecumque
realitas essentialis ait formaliter infinita, nulla est a
qua formaliter posait accipi ratio generis. 97
From this argument it clearly follows that according to Scotus the
definition of composite substances i5 structured in the following way:
te the material part corresponds the genus, ta the formai part
corresponds the differentia, and together they give the definition of
the species. This becomes more evident a little later when, in
answering objections to his view, Scotus summons Aristotle in support of
his thesis.
Ex eodem sequitur quod nihil est dictum in 'quid' de Dea ut

genus. Quidquid enim habet genus, potest habere
differ~ntiam et definitionem, quia (in VII Metaphysicae)
genus 'aut nihil est praeter species, aut si est, est quidem
ut materia', et tune cuius est genus, oportet ponere ipsum
posse habere differentiam tamquam formam. 98
It should be recalled that in our discussion of Aristotle's
position on this issue, we came to the conclusion that Aristotle
considera matter te be necessary, but nat essential, ta the process of
defining material composites. We concluded, consequently, that
according to Aristotle matter, though not strictly speaking part of the
most praper definition of the essence of material composites (which only
includes form), is nevertheless neceasary for a proper understanding of
that definition and therefore of the essence of that composite.
Furthermore, matter ia part of the more general defini~~on of material
97. John Duns scotus, Ord;nat;o, Lib. 1, d. Vll1, pais l, q. III, n. 107.
98. John DI..'ns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 1, d. VIII, pais Ir q. III, n. 124.
-- 249 --
composites and therefore part of their essence more generally
understood.
The interpretation of Aristotle's viewB on this tapie, however,
has baen the subject of great controversy. Many scholars, ever aince
Scotus's time, have come te the conclusion that Aristotle simply had nct
made up his mind about this issue: he had, in ether words, la ft it an
open question whether or nct matter should be included in the essence of
material composites.
Scotus's answer to those who held that Aristotle did not make up
his mind on this issue sounds very close ta the solution that l have
suggested was Aristotle's own.
Ad secundum, quod forma est quod quid est, dicendum, quod 2.

Physicorum, texte corn. 10. et inde, dicit quod forma est
natura, quia determinat rem ad esse; et dicitur res natura,
quando habet formarn, et res completive de se, non est nisi
per formam, ideo dicitur etiam, quod est quod quid est rei.
Verum est completive, non tamen est totum quod quid est, sed
illud quod aggregat formam et materiam. 99
Scotus's explanation of Aristotle's apparent indecisien about this
issue, however, goes further than this. Scotus thinks that Aristotle
uses the term matter in two different senses, te correspond to two quite
distinct entities. One meaning of the term matter ia the one which we
have always associated with Aristotle's own use of the term: i.e.,
matter as the substratum of subatantial change. The second meaning
which ~c~~':~ chinka Aristotle gives ta the term ia one which, even
though used by Aristotle, has not generally been considered to be used
99. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Ar;stotelis. Lib. VII,
q. XVI, n. 7.
-- 25D --
by him ta stand for an entity different from the substratum of
substantial change. This second type of matter would be that which
Aristotle uses as the principle of individuation. Scotus, in effect,
thinks that Aristotle uses matter in the second sense te stand for
something very similar ta his own notion of 'haecceity', and, more
importantly, quite different fram matter understaod as the underlying
substance. l don't want te discuss this matter in any detail. For our
present purposes it ia enough ta note that according ta Scotus matter
understood as the underlying thing should be included in the universal
definition, while, of course, matter understood as a precursor of his
own 'haecceity', should nct.
Materiam enim quandoque vocat principium receptivum faciens

compoaitionem eum actu sive eum forma, quomodo dicit
materiam et formam esse duo principia, 1 Phys. et multis
aliis lacis. Et per oppositum forma dicitur illud aliud
prineipium, quod habet rationem actus, quod eum materia
constituit compositum. Alio modo forma dicitur quidditas
secundum ipsum in multis locis, et per oppositum materia
dicitur quidquid habet rationem contrahentis vel
determinantis ipsam quidditatem. Et hoc modo differentia
individualis, quaecumque sit ipsa, dicitur materia respectu
quidditatia specificae; dicitur ergo materia quandoque illud
quod recipit formam informantem; quandoque, illud quod
contrahit vel determinat quidditatem indifferentem. 100
When, therefore, against 'che view that matter is part of the
essence, it is argued that Aristotle thinks that in those things in
which there ia no matter the essence i5 the same as the thing of which
it ie the essence, Scotus is in a position to explain that this is true
100. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. II, n. 20; cf. also John Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. II, n. 21. The same distinction is advocated in all of
Scotus's otner major works: cf., for example, John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae
super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. XVI, n. 7; John Duns Scotus,
Reeortata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. III, q. l, n. 7; and John Duns Scotus r Ordinatio, Lib.
Il, d. Ill, pars 1, qq. V et VI, M. 204, 207.
-- 251 --
bath for material and for immaterial substances, but in two different
senses depending on the meaning assigned ta the terrn 'matter'. Matter,
in fact, can be taken ta mean either one of the two parts out of which
the composite ia formed, or the entity which individuates the essence.
Scotus argues that in the firet case Aristotle's contention that in
those things which are separate fram matter the essence i~ the sarna as
the thing of which it i5 essence i5 true, while in the second case
Aristotle's statement i5 true 'sirnpliciter' because where there iB no
individuating entity the thing defined i5 the sarne as the essence
expressed in the definition. This, he adde, i5 only true of Gad.
Primo modo, est propositio vera, secundum Philosophum 7.

Metaph. text.. 20. quod in separatis a materia, idem est,
etc. Secundo modo est simpliciter vera, quia ubi non est
conditio contrahens quidditatem, est idem curn quidditate, et
haee est in solo Dea, secundum veritatem. 101
His reasons are the following: the claim that the essence of a
thing is said to be the same as the thing of which it is the ~ssence can
be understood in two ways. They can be the sarne 'identitate reali' or
they can be the same 'identitate praecisa adaequata'.
Probatur hoc, quod quid esse idem cum eo cujus est, pate st
intelligi dupliciter, vel idem identitate reali, vel
identitate praecise adaequata. 102
In the first ~:ay, Scotus argues, the statement "the essence of a
thing is the sarne as the thing of which it is the essence" ia true of
material things as well as of immaterial things, while identity
'praecise adaequata' is net discusse~ by Aristotle because, accerding ta
101. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. Il, d. III, q. l, n. 7.
102. John Ouns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. III, q. 1, n. 7.

-- 252 --
( him, where there i5 no matter understood in the sense of the ether part
of the composite, there aIse is no matter understood as the
individuating principle.
PrLmo modo, idem est quod quid cum BO cujus est, in

quolibet, sive sit materiale, sive j.mmateriale. Sed de
identitate praecisa non intelligit Philosophus, et secundum
ipsum, ubi non est materia primo modo, non est materia
secundo modo. 103
The second kind of identity is derived from the fact that those
things which are separate fram matter are formally necessary in
themselves, and if this principle is denied then the conclusion aIse
will be denied. According ta Seatus, therefore, Aristotle was rnistaken
in concluding that those essences which lack matter are one in number.
A similar argument appears aIse in the Opus Oxoniense where Seatus goea
into more detail in discussing this issue. Here he explains that the
'quod quid est' can be understood in two senses: either as the nature
itself or as the suppositum of the nature. In the first sense, the
'quod quid est' of material as weil as of immaterial substances ia the
sarne as that of which it is the 'quod quid est', In the second sense,
the 'quod quid est' is nat the sarne as the substance of which it is the
essence because the substance includes an entity outside its essence,
i.e., the matter understaod as the individuating principle.
Secundo modo, habens non est idem, quando includit aliquarn

entitatem extra rationem suae quiditatis; tune enim non est
idem cum quod-quid-est primo, quia quod-quid-est non est
eiua primo, pro eo quod habens includit entitatem aliquam
extra rationem eius quod est quod-quid primo. 104
103. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Par;siensia, Lib. Il, d. III, q. l, n. 7.
104. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars l, qq. V et VI, n. 205.
-- 253 _o.
Scotus, therefore, interprets Aristotle as saying that in thoae
things which are immaterial in the sense that they do not have matter
understood as the principle of individuation, the essence ia the same as
the substance of which it ia the essence, while in those thing8 which
are material in the sense that they contain the individuating principle,
the essence will not be the sarne as the substance of which it ia the
eBser.~'~ because these substances contain an entity which ia not,
properly speaking, part of their universal definition.
Ad propositum igitur Philosophi dico quod in non conceptis

eum materia (hoc est non eum entitate individuali
contrahente quiditatem), idem est primo quod-quid-est eum eo
cuiue est, quia 'tale' cuiue est, nullam rationem habet
extra rationem eius quod est quod-quid-est; in conceptis
autem eum materia (hoc est eum entitate individuali
contrahente quiditatem), non est idem primo quod-quid-est et
illud cuius est, quia sic conceptum primum non haberet quod-
quid-est ex se sed tantu:n per partem, scilicet per naturam
quae contrahitur per illam entitatem individualem. Non
igitur ex isto habetur quod materia quae est altera pars
compositi sit extra ratienem per se quiditatis, immo
materia vere pertinet ad quiditatem, et species (et habens
formam in universali) habet primo quod-quid-est et primo est
idem sibi; et idee non sequitur qued materia quae est altera
pars compositi, sit individuans, sed tantum sequitur de
materia quae est entitas contrahens quiditatem quod
concessi. 105
It can be safely cencluded from the foregoing discussion that
Scotus believes matter taken universally te be a legitimate part of both
the definition and the essence of material composite substances.
There is another question related ta Scotus's views on de finit ion
and essence which, l ~hink, is quite interesting and possibly
controversial and which therefore should nct be overlooked in this
context. The question is whether or net Scotus believes that, broadly
105. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars l, qq. V et VI, nn. 206·207.
-- 254 --
speaking, there can be a definition and an essence for individuals. l
want te look, therefore, at what Scotus says about the possibility that
there can be a definition of the individual in itself. scotus will say
that, properly speaking, there ia none:
ad illud de definitione dico quod si aliqua ratio possit

exprimera quidquid concurrit ad entitatem individui, non
tamen illa ratio erit perfecta definitio, quia non exprimit
quod-quid-erat-esse, - et secundum Philosophum l Topicorum
definitio est exprimens etc.. Et idee concede quod
singulare non est definibile definitione alla a definitione
speciai, et tamen est par se ans, addens aliquam entitatem
entitati speciei; sed illa 'par se entitas' quam addit, non
est entitas quiditativa. 106
This passage, aven though it confirma the view that there ia
properly speaking no definition of individuals, nevertheless leaves the
reader with the impression that there is something very close ta a
definition of the individual. This impression is confirrned when Scotus,
while repeating that there is no definition of the individual, says that
not only the definition (taken in the strict sense given to it by
Aristotle, and reiterated in the passage just quoted) expresses the
'quid est esse rei'.
Contra I. Topicor, cap. 4. definitio est oratio indicans

quid est esse, sed ratio individui cum addito, indicat quid
est esse individui. Respondeo, quid est universalis, non
quid est individui, quia non omnis ratio indicans quid est
esse rei, est definitio; ergo illa ratio ex natura speciai
euro differentia individuali superaddita, non est
definitio. '07
106. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. Il, d. III, pars J, qq. V et VI, n. 192. For similar
statements. see alsc John Duns Scotus, Reperteta Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n.
10; and John Duns Scotus, auaestiones Subtilissimae super Libres Metaphysicorum
Ar;stotel is, Lib. VII, q. XII 1, n. 13.
107. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones subtilissimae sup~r libres Metaphysicerum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XIII, n. 13.
-- 255 --
If it iB true that net only the definition expresses the 'quid est
esse rei', it follows immediately ~hat there ia a 'quid est esse rei'
other than the 'quid est esae rei' expreesed in what i9 normally
considered the definition, i.e., ether than the 'quid est esse rei' of
the species, because the 'quid est aaBé rei' of the species iB precisely
that which ia expressed by the definition understood strictly. There
ia, then, an essence ether than the essence of the species. l am going
ta assume for the moment that this ia an essence which ia individual: it
aeeme that fram this it should follow that there ia aiso a definition
which i8 individual. Seatus see~s ta say precisely thi~ in his
Questions on the Metaphysics.
Ad primum, differentia individualis a nulle nota est in hac

vita communiter • • • . ergo non possumus individuum definire,
non ex parte eius, sed ex impotentia nostra, sicut nec
substantias separatas, ut patet in quadam quaestiene super
secundum 1ibrum. 108
If Scotus means what he says in this passage 1itera11y, it fo11ows
that there is after ail a definition of the individual. It ia a direct
consequence of the fact that in this life we cannet knew individuating
differences themse1ves that we a1so do not know their definition. There
ia, however, such a thing. If there are definitions of individuals, it
follow that our assumptien was correct and that there are individual
essences.
108. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros ~ett.physic~rum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XIII, n. 23. Sharp makes a point similar to mine :;1 the follouing passage: lIScotus
admits that it is impossible to ~ay definitely what the individuating positive ~ntity is.
We have a vague intuition of it but ~P- cannot define it, for that which we define is
appl~cable to every individual in that particular species, and the point about
indiv1dL!3lity 1S its repugnance to other beings ••• The fault lies not in the individual,
since that is perfectly intelligible in itselr, but in the weakness of our intellect •••• "
(Sharp. Franciscan Philosophy at Dxford in the XITlth Cent ury, 30S>.
-- 256 --
Ad aliud, quod definitia secundum Logicum non est niai

speciei, et sic loquitur Philosophus ibi. Tamen absolute
loquendo, et realiter est ipsius individui. Tamen ad formam
dico; quod quod quid est speciei non est idem eum singulari,
quia addit aliquid ultra speciem scilicet materiam
individualem, unde cum suc proprio, quod quid est singulare
est idem. Ad aliud dico, quod quando Socrates
generatur, quod quid eiua generatur per 5e. 109
Given that they exist, the se individu al essences must be made
different from the specifie essence by that which is added to the
specifie nature in each individual. ~f this ia truet as it ffiust be, the
individual essence has ta be partly expressed by the 'haecceity' which
ia, as we will see shortly, that positive entity which, added ta the
specifie nature, perfarms the task of individuating. Ta canfirm the
tact that given that there is an individual essence it must be made
different fram the universal essence by the 'haecceity', Gilson says.
Nous savons donc d'avance que la cause de l'individuation se

situera quelque part sur la ligne des essences et qu'elle
sera incluse dans leur coordinatian."O
In scatus, in fact, just as it is the cammen nature which provides
the basie in things for the universal definition, sa it cauld be the
'haecceitas' which provides the basis for the individual definitian.
The common nature in scatus has a unit y less than numerical unit y and
can, therefare, be made inta a universal definition by the action of the
m~nd. It stands to reason that, since the only thing which the
'haecceitas' adds ta the comman nature is the numerical unit y which
'09. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones subtiliss;mae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. VII, n. 5. Cf. also John Ouns Scotus, auaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros
Metaphysicorum Aristoteli~, Lib. VII, q. VII, n. 3.
110. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 45~. This is also suggested by sorne passages in Scotus where the
,ff coordination which Gitson is referring to is quite plainiy stated. See, for example, John
ifl.. Duns Scotus, ~?Ort~ta Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 2; and John Duns Scotus,
Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. VIII, n: 4.
-- 257 --
makes the individual indivisible inta subjective parts, and hence
different fram aIl ethers, the definition of an individual should nct be
capable of being made universal by the action cf the minci.
In the individual, however, the commen nature and the 'haecceitas'
are not really distinct but only forrnally distinct:
igitur non neeesse est rem, a qua accipitur differentia

specifica, esse aliud ra ab 1110 a quo est genus acceptum,
semper taroen est non idem formaliter; sed iata proprietas
individui nunquam est res alia a forma specifica, taroen
semper est non idem formaliter, licet aliquid posait
cantinera unitive utrurnque.'"
Since the commen nature and the 'haecceitas' are nct really
distinct, it geemB te follow that the universal and the individual
definitions which are derived from t~lem are also not really distinct,
but only forrnally distinct. If this is true, as it seems it should be,
it might have sorne interesting consequences for the way in which we
should interpret 5cotus's views regarding our knowledge of the
individuating difference or lack thereof. In order to discuss this
point l want to introduce the distinction Scotus makes between
abstractive and intuitive cognition.
Ad declarationem minoris, est sciendum quod duplex est

cognitio; quaedam quidem est per speciem, quae est rei non
in se praesentis, et haec vocatur cognitio rei, abstractiva;
alia est cognitio rei ut habet esse in actuali existentia,
et haec dicitur cognitio intuitiva. 112
111. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 3.
112. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Prologus, q. JI, n. 15. It is not my intention, here,
to discuss Scotus's theory of knowledge in any detail or to enter into a discussion of the
possibility that Scotus might have thought that it is possible for us to have intuitive
cognition of singularity in this life. If 1 am correct, however, my interpretation will
-~
add one argument in favour of the position that we do not, in this life, have intuitive
cognition of 'haecceitates'.
-- 258 --
In discussing this distinction in his book Intuitive Cognition: A
Key to the Significance of Later Scholastics, Day makes the following
remark:
the difference lies nct in what is known, but in how it ia

known. Abstractive cognition abstracts entirely fram the
actual existence and presence of its abject, while intuitive
cognition grasps precisely what abstractive cognition
ignores, namely the actual existence or presence of the sarne
object. 113
If my interpretation of Scotus's views on definition i5 correct,
it Beems ta me that Day's remark, while correct, overlooks the
possibility that the difference may well lie both in what is known and
in how it ia known. He ia, in fact, right in holding that the
difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition mirrors a
difference in how a thi~g i5 known: he might, however, be wrong in
holding that there is no difference in what is known. Indeed, it may
well be that it is through the intuitive cognition that the individual
definition and essence, but not the universal definition and essence,
are macle known to those intellects which can know them. In this case,
therefore, since there is a formal distinction between the individual
definition and the universal definition, there should also be a formal
distinction between those things which are known through each.
Abstractive cognition renders the knowledge of the univers al definition
possible, whi.le intuitive cognition makes the knowledge of the
individual definition possible. 114 Scotus himself seems to give sorne
support to this thesis.
113. Day, Intuitive Cognition: a Key to the Significance of later Scholastics, 73.
114. There are two senses of notitia abstractiva in Ockham (see Adams, Yilliam Ockham, 515 534) and,
w
1 think, also in Scotus. ln one sense abstractive cognition abstracts from existence, as
-- 259 --
Secundam, scilicet quae est quidditatis rei secundum ejus

existentiam actualem, vel quae est praesentis secundum talem
existentiam, voco cognitionem intuitivam, Bed
simpliciter intuitiva, eo modo quo dicimur intueri rem,
siaue est in se. 115
If this interpretation should turn out ta be correct, it would
provide an additional argument in faveur of the view that according te
Scotus we do nct have an intuitive cognition of singularity in this
life. 116 Such an interpretation, however, would alsa explaLI why, a.:s
Sharp saya, we have a 'vague intuition' of the 'haecceitas'. Since, in
fact, the two definitions are nct really distinct, but only formally Ba,
it would stand ta reaeon that in knowing the universal we aiso come to
have this vague intuition of the 'haecceitas'.
l want to suggest, therefore, that just as he believes that the
common nature and the 'haecceitas' are enly formally distinct in the
individual, Scotus might alse believe that, in correspondence with this
Day holds, while in the second sense it abstracts in such a way as to produce general
concepts. The connection between the mode of knowledge provided by obstractive cognition
and our knowledge of universals is made clear by Scotus in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales,
where he argues that the fact of our knowledge of universaLs shows that there i~
abstractive cognition because we can know universaLs independentLy of the presence or
existence of any individual instance of the universal in question: "unus indifferenter
potest esse respectu objecti existentis, et non existentis, et indifferenter etiam respectu
objecti, non realiter praesentis, sicut et reaLiter praesentis; istum actum frequenter
exprimitur in nobis, quia universalia, sive quidditates rerum intelligimus aeque, sive
habeant ex natura rei ~ extra in aliquo supposito, sive non, et ita de praesentia et
absentia." (John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones QuodLibetales, q. VI, n. 7).
115. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. lit, q. IX, n. 6, emphasis
added. Here Scotus, by the expression "rem sicut est in se," seems to mean more than just
presence and existence: this seems to be especially true if it is taken in conjunction with
the beginning of the passage, lIquae est quidditatis rei secundum eius existentiam,1I which
implies that this quidditas is somewhat different from the quidditas known by abstraction.
Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XLII, q. IV, nn.
10, ", and 12.
116. With respect to this issue, Day argues that, while it is reasonably cLear that Scotus thinks
that we do have intuitive cognition of individuals in this lite, he does not believe that
we have intuitive cognition of singuLarity itself, i.e., of the 'heacceitas', in this life.
See Day, Intuitive Cognition: a Key to the Significance of Later Scholastics, 114-123.
-- 260 --
( distinction, there iB an individual essence which ia nct really distinct
fram the essence of the species, but i5 forrnally distinct fram it. As a
consequence there ia aIse a definition of the individual formally
distinct fram the definition of the species. It ia this individual
definition which ia known by those intellects who can know individuality
clearly and distinctly.
Returning te our discussion of matter and whether it ia contained
in that which ia properly called the essence, we will see our
conclusions further confirmed by Scotus's views on individuation. In
fact, we will see in the next section that one of the reasons for the
inability of matter ta serve as the principle of individuation ia
precisely the fact that it is part of what is properly called the
essence, and as such it is not 'per se hoc' and will itself be in need
of individuation.
COncede enim quod rnateria abselute, ut est natura, non est

ratio distinctionis vel individuationis; quidquid enim est
natura in quocumque genere, totalis vel partialis, non est
de se haec, - et idee inquirendum est per quid sit haec. 117
117. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. JI, d. III, pars J, qq. V et VI, n. 200. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. l~t, pars l, q~. V et VI, nn. 169-172; John Duns Scotus,
Quaest;ones Subtilissimae super Lib~~~ ~dtaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII, q. XVI, n. 4;
and John Ouns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 8.
-- 261 --
seoTUS ON THE ROLE OF MATTER IN THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUATION
As l have already suggested in the previous section, ScotUB thinks
that matter understood as the underlying substance cannat play any roie
in the process of individuation. As we will see, he believes this ia
true whether individuation i5 considered from the metaphysical point of
view or fram the epistemological point of view. scotus aise thinks that
'signated matter' cannet be considered appropriate for the individuation
of substances. 118 Many of the arguments he uses against the thesis tr.at
matter or 'signated matter' can be principles of individuation seern ta
be directed against Aquinas's theory or against a theory very close to
his.
In the first part of this section, therefore, l want te examine
Scotus's arguments against the views that matter or quantity or
'signated matter' individuate. l will not discuss the arguments given
by Scotus against a11 the other thsories of individuatioti unless th":,'
are directly relevant to his discussion of the reasons for the inability
of matter or of 'signated matter' to serve as princ:,les of
individuation.
In the second part of the section, l will turn my attention to
Scotus's own theory of individuation. In both of these discussions l
118. The expressions 'signated matter' and 'matter signed by quant~cy' are generally used
interchangeably to refer to the principle of individuation for substances according to
those who, like Aquinas, believe that such a principle of individuation is matter taken
together with either determined or undetermined dimensions.
-- 262 --
..
:.~
will only consider the rnetaphysical aspect of the problem, ainee it la
the only one which Scotus 5eemB ta consider.
Finally, l will turn briefly to the episternological side of the
problem and try ta determine what Seatus thinks the basia i5 for the way
we identify or individuate substances.
In 1001. ~ng at the way Scotus approac•.ê!s the problern of
individuation, it should be immediately noted that the way in which he
asks the rnetaphysical question about individuation is quite different
frorn the way in which it had been asked up until this point.
Sed, quia in entibu5 est aliquid indivisibile in partes

subiectivas, hoc est, , cui formaliter repugnat dividi in
plura quorum quodlibet ait ipsum', quaeritur non quo
forrnaliter illud repugnat, (quia repugnantia forrnaliter
repugnat), sed quo ut fundamento proxima et intrinseco iata
repugnantia insit isti. Est ergo intellectus quaestionern de
hac materia, quid ait in hoc lapide, per quod sicut per
1
fundamentum proximum' simpliciter repugnat ei dividi in

plura quorum quodlibet ait ipsum, quaiis Idivisio l
est
propria toti universaii in suas partes subiectivas. 119
The question, then, i9 one about indivisibiiity or
incornrnunicability, and it becornes roughly this: What is it that rnakes a
substance indivisible into subjective parts? Or equally accurately:
What rnakes a substance nurnerically one? The question could equally well
be asked, in modern terms that wouid be quite aiien ta Scotus, as
follows: What gives a substance self-identity? We will see that
Scotue's anewer to thie question is quite different fram those given by
most of hie predecessorsa Once the question i5 asked in these terrna it
119. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Liba Il, d. Ill, pars 1, q. Il, n. 48; cf. also John Duns Scotus,
Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars l, q. IV, n. 76.
-- 263 --
becomes quite clear th;,;\t matter or ' signated matter' may nct be the bast
candidates for principles of individuation a
In the second book of the Opus Oxoniense, after having argued
aqainst the view that rnaterial substances are individual 'par se',
Scotus concludes by explaining what he means by the expression 'comman
nature' and by showing that because comman nature ia nct particular in
itself it itself naeds ta be individuated. Citing Avicenna, ScotUB
explains that 'equinitas', for example, should be considered neither
'par se' one nor 'par se' many, neither particular nor universal:
potest aequaliter videri par dictum Avicennae V

Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod 'equinitas sit tantum equinitas,
nec est de se una, nec p1ures, nec universa1is nec
particu1aris' • Intel1igo: non est ' ex se una' unitate
numerali, nec 'plures', pluralitate opposita il1i unitati;
nec 'universalis' actu est (eo modo scilicet quo aliquid est
universale ut est obiectum intellectus), nec est
'particularis' de se. Licet enim nunquam sit rea1iter sine
aliquo istorum, de se tamen non est a1iquod istorum, Bed est
prius natura1iter omnibus istis, .•. 120
He will then go on to give a number of reasons for holding that
this principle of individuation cannot be something negative, but needs
to be a positive entity:
concede igitur conclusiones istarum rationum, quod neeesse

est per a1iquid positivuhi intrinsecum huic lapidi, tamquam
per rationem propriam, repugnare sibi dividi in partes
subieetivas; et illud positivum erit illud quod dicetur esse
per se causa individuationis, quia par individuationem
intelligo i11am indivisicilitatem sive repugnantiam ad
divisibilitatern. 121
120. John Duns Sc.otus, Ordinatio, lib. Il, d. III, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 31-32.
121. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars 1, q. II, n. 57. Cf. also John Duns Sc:otus,
Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XlI, q. VIII, n. 2.
-- 264 --
( Given the need for individuating common natures by sorne positive
entity, which, then, are Scotus's reasons for rejecting matter and
'signated matter'? One of the reasons for rejecting matter we have
already encountered: it ia that matter, as part of the essence of
composite substances, must be considered univc~8ally, and because aIl
things which can be considered universally must be commen, it will be
appropriate te ask for a principle of indi.viduation for matter itself.
This makes it plain that matter cannat serve as the principle of
indivi '\uation itself. 122
A second problem with the theory that matter is the cause of
individuation issues directIy fram its potentiality. This, as we saw,
ia a problem in Aquinas's theory because he considera matter purely
potential. It would, according to Scotus, be a problem even if matter
were considered as actual, as he himself does, because even then
matter's essence would consist in being completely indeterminate.
Ad aliam quaestionem, dicendum quod materia non est

principium distinguendi eum de se sit indistineta. 123
According to Scotus, a direct consequence of its indistinctness,
indetermination, and commonness (because it is part of the quiddity), is
the fact that matter is the same in that which is generated "d
corrupted. If matter were the principle of individuation, Scotus
arg\,es, it would follow that if water were to change into fire and then
into water again, the first water and the second water would have to be
122. Cf. note n. 120 above.
123. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Ari~totelis, Lib. VII,
q. XIII, n. 13; cf. atso John Duns Scotus, Repo~tata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. IV,
n. 7.
-- 265 --
considered ta be the sarne water in virtue of the fact that they have the
same matter.
Kateria est eadem in generato et corrupto; igitur habet

eandem singularitatem in genito et corrupto. Et si
respondeas quod non sit eiusdem speciai in genito et
corrupto, argua siout prius ' contra quantitatem
indeterminatam', et ita erit generat~io circularis: primo
i90i9 ex aqua, secundo aquae ex i9ne; aqua primo corrupta
et aqua secundo generata habent eadem materiam et sunt
eiusdem speciai, ergo sunt realiter 'haee aqua'; ergo primum
redit naturaliter idem numero, quod est contra e09. 124
Furthermore, against those who argue that matter or 'signated
matter' ie the principle of individuation in virtue u: the fact that it
ia impossible te find in nature any distinction within the sarne species
in those cases in which there ia no matter or 'signated matter', ScotUB
argues that if that were the case it would not only be impossible in
nature, but aIse by God's power, that there be such a distinction and
that it not involve matter or 'signated matter'. Finding su ch a
distinction without the presence of matter would, in fact, involve a
contradiction. According to Scotus, however, intraspecific
differentiation without matter does not involve a contradiction:
sed oportet istos dicere, quod non solum est hoc impossibile
per naturam, sed impossibile Deo, quia si praecisum
distinctivum individuorum in eadem specie est quantitas, vel
materia sub quantitate, contradictio est quod sint
didtincta, et non ab illi principio. 125
124. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars 1, qq. V et VI, nn. 140-141. For a similar
argtnent see also: John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. Il, d. XII, q. IV, n. 7;
and John Duns Scotus, auaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis,
Lib. VII, q. XIII, n. 6.
125. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. II, d. III, q. l, n. 3. 1 will discuss the issue
of the individuation of angels and of human souls after death in the next chapter.
-- 266 --
Boiore considering the possibility that matter ia the cause of
2..ndividuation, Scotus decides that quantity cannat serve that sarne
purpose. He argues against quantity and against the general view that
accidents can serve as principles of individuation. Firstly, he argues
on Aristotle's authority, that the unit y that cornes fram the combination
of a substance with an accident allah as quantity ia nct an essential
unit y but only accidentaI. The unit y which ia necessary for
individuation, he thinks, has te be essential unit y:
contra: sicut arguitur ad secundam quaestionem, prima

substantia per se genera'Cur et per se operatur, et hoc in
quantum distinguitur a secunda, cui iata non conveniunt par
se. Sed iata non conveniunt 'enti par accidens': de
'generari' patet VI Metaphysicae; de 'operari' patet, quia
unum per se agens est unum per se ens, et hoc in une ordine
eausae. 126
Quantity, mereover, sinee it is not 'de se haee', and preeisely
beeause it ie 'per se' divisible, cannat give substance the property of
being indivisible into subjective parts:
eum dicitur, quanti tas est de se haee, falsum est, quia

quantitas nullius est de se haee. Et eum dicitur, ipsa
separata est plurificabilis ex se, quia ex se potest dividi,
ex hoc sequitur oppositum, quia quod ex se est
plurificabile, non est principium dividendi, quia quod est
r.~tio dividentis, vel plurificabile, vel confuse accipitur,
~unquam est principiurn dividendi partern a parte; neque
derelinquit quantitas talem modurn in substantia, qui non
ait aliud a substantia, sicut dictum est prius. 127
Furthermore, and more importantly, if quantity were the cause of
individuation, the smallest alteration in the quantity of a substance
would make it a different individual. It would also follow from this
126. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars 1, q. IV, n. 70.
(.
127. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. V, n. 15.
-- 267 --
view that if Gad chooses ta change the quantity of a substance with
another quantity this rneans that that substance has undergone a
substantial change. This, of course, ia not true because a change in
quantity ia only an instance of accidental change.
Sed Bubstantia actu existens, nulla Bubf,tantiali mutations

facta in ipsa vel mutata, potest sine contradictione ease
Bub alia et alia quantitate et quocumqu€"accidente absoluto;
igitur nullo tali est formaliter 'haee substantia', hac
singularitate, signata. Miner patat, quia non est
contradictio quod Deus substantiam quantam iata quantitate,
eamdem conservet et informet alia quantitatei nec propter
hoc iata substantia, actu existens, mutabitur mutatione
substantiali; quia non erit rnutatio niai a quantitate in
quantitatem. 128
This cau also be shawn ta be false by an exarnination of the
consequences it would have on the theory of the Sacrament of the
Eucharist. There, by God's absolute power, it would becorne possible for
the quantity of the first bread to remain the same in another bread.
The firet and the second bread wou Id, in that case, be the same bread:
sed hic panis erat primus terminus generationia panie,

postea, transubstantiato pane, manet idem accidens numero,
per quod est hic, Deus potest alium panem producere,
afficiatur eadem quantitate; igitur ille idem esset i11e
panie, vel oportet dare quod non eet hic panie hac
quantitate. 129
By the sarne token this bread could not remain this bread if the
quantity were to be taken away, while ~ change of quantity in this bread
would make this bread no more equal to the bread it was before than to
the bread on any other altar.
128. John Duns Scotus, Ordinat'~, Lib. II, d. III, pars l, q. IV, nn. 77-78. Roughly the same
argument is found in John Duns Scotus, Reportata ~arisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. IV, n. 4.
129. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. IV, n. 5. Cf. al!.., John Duns
Scotus, Quaestiones Cuodlibetales, q. X, n. 9.
-- 268 --
Igitur facta quacumque rarefactione hostiae non magis est

hase:: hoetia eadem eum praecedente, quam eUm hostia in alia
altari; igitur non magis est novus modus essendi corporia
Christi in hac hostia, quam mille hostiis in diverais
altaribus, quod est absurdum. 130
A worse consequence, however, would be the fact that if quantity
were the cause of individuation it would be impossible for the bread t~
become transubstantiated into the body of Christ:
et sequitur ultra quod idem ' hic pania' est

transubstantiatu5 et non-transubstantiatus, immo sequitur
quod nullus pania ait transubstantiatus - (ql.lia non pania
universalis, - nec pan.Ls hic, singularis, quia iate panis
manet non-mutata quantitate qua erat ' hic' formaiiter, e)~
dato); igitur nihii emnina est transubstantiatum in corpus
Christi, ••• 131
The absurdity of all these consequences confirms the fact that an
accident such as quantity cannet be the cause of individuation. This ia
aiso shown by the observation that substance is prior ta accidents, both
in nature and in definition. It follow from this that that which is
prior cannot be individuated by that which is pasterior:
praeterea, eo modo substantia est prior naturaliter amni

accidente, quo est subiectum amni accidenti. In quantum
enim subiectum probatur esse prius definitione amni
accidente, quia sic penitur in ardine definitianis
cuiuslibet per additamentum; sed ut est s~b;,ectum, est 'haec
substantia': quia, secundum Philosophum l Physicorum et II
Metaphysicae, singularium sunt causae singulares (in
quocumque genere causae), ergo singularis accidentis
singulare subiectum est causa. 132
1~O. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. IV, d. XII, q. V, n. 9.
131. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. Ill, pars l, q. IV, n. 81.
132. John Duns Scotus, ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars 1, q. IV, n. 87. For the same argllTlent see
also: John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensh, Lib. II, d. Xl1, q. IV, n. 5j and John Duns
Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super Libros Metaphys;corum Aristotelis, Lib. VII, q.
XIII, n. 3.
-- 269 --
-'.;;0 As a corollary of this it follows, as i5 made clear in the passage
just qu:lted, that substance can only be the cause of quantity or of any
ether accident once it has become individuated and nct before. Bath of
theoe are consequences of the fact that it ia possible, without
contradic~ion, for a substance ta exist without any accidents and still
remain singular.
sicut non est contradictio, intelligendo substantiam habere

propriam existentiam sine quocumque accidente, haee enim est
prioritas eiue tempore, ita non est contradictio intelligere
ipsam eamdem in propria existentia, eum mutatione
quorumcumque accidentium; igitur eadem substantia pesset
esse succe~sive individua, duabus singularitatibus, si esset
singularis per aliquod accidens .. 133
Aquinas, as we saw, chooses as the cause of individuation a
combinat ion of quantity and matter: he thinks the cause of individuation
is -latter signed by quantity or 'signated matter'. This combinat ion of
matter and quantity as the cause of individuation is rejected by Scotus
on the general grounds that if neither matter nor quantity can perform
the task separately, there is no reason to think that the two combined
can do any better. Furthermore, most of the argument employed to
disprove the suitability of quantity as the cause of individuation can
equally well be applied te 'signated matter'. Scotus thinks, in fact,
that this theory amounts in the end to individuation by the accident of
quantity.
Scotue, however, has a few arguments specifically aimed against
this particular theory. To Aquinas's claim that quantity is to be
understood in the matter befere the ferm, although it i5 not really
.. ~<. 133. John Duns scotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. XlII, n. 3.
-- 270 --
distinct fram it, for example, he replies that no quantity can precede
the introduction of the substantial ferro because in that case an
accident would perieet matter befere the substantial forme Accidents,
however, naturally follow the introduction of the substantial ferro and
therefore come ta the composite already in existence.
Primo, quia impo5sibile est aliquid dependens a posteriori

naturaliter, esse idem priori naturaliter, quia tune es set
prius et non prius, sed subztantia est prier naturaliter
quantitate, per eos; ergo nihi1, qualitercumque praeexigens
naturam quantitatis, potest esse idem substantiae. Non ergo
illa signatio est substantiae et taroen causata a
quantitate. 134
Furthermore, there i9 no need to posit the presence of an accident
i1l nH:itter before the inherence of forro because the distinction among the
parte Df matter precedes quantity, and the quantity inheres in something
which ~~ already a 'hoc aliquid':
licet enim ' alia forma sit in alia rnateria', non tamen
propter alietatem materiae est alia- forma, sed sicut entitas
formae est prior, ita et sua alietas; similiter, alia
praemiesa - scilicet quod ' est alia pars materiae propter
aliam partem quantitatis' falsa est, quia sive sit
distinctio partium materiae in se quantitativae sive non,
prior est distinctio partium materiae quam quantitatis (quia
huiusmodi accidentis subiectum est hoc-aliquid). 135
We also saw that Aquinas does not seern te have been quite sure
whether matter should be combined with determined or undetermined
quantity. Scotus attacks both the view that matter plus determined
quantity ie the cause of individuation, and the view that matter plus
undetermined quantity is the cause of individuation. Here the sarne
134. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 11, d. III, pars 1, q. IV. n. 94.
135 .. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars l, q. IV, n. 114.
-- 271 --
arguments apply which are used against the idea that quantity determined
or undetermined can individuate.
contra secundam opinionem, aut quantitas interminata, aut

terminata. Non prima, quia manet in generato igoe et
corrupto aere, et in aere iterum generato ex igoe; igitur
primus aere et sEcundus esset idem numero~ Non secunda, tum
quia illa sequitur formarn in materia, et quantitas
individuans ponitur in materia praecedere formam, ut faciens
partem materiae distinctam, et capacem formae distinctae
secundum eos, quia indistincta materia receptae. 136
Aquinas's vulnerability ta Scatus's criticisme ia, l think, rather
accurately summarized in this passage:
St. Thomas's doctrine of the principle of individuation

remains one of the weakest points in the whole Thomistic
system. Ali attempts to save it by later Thomists have been
of no avail. 137
In coneidering the obvious problem of Aristotle'e apparent support
for the theory that matter individuates, Scetus argues in at least three
different ways that embracing the theory is not the Philosopher's
intention. The first, as we have already seen in the previous section,
appeals to a distinction Aristotle would allegedly have made between two
different types of matter. Scotus argues that Aristotle uses the term
matter in two different ways: in one way he means matter ';:,S T.he
substratum for substantial change, and in the other he means a
completely different entity which contracts thé nature and, therefore,
individuates. In ether places Scotus argues that even if in seme
passages Aristotle seems te support the theory that matter individuates,
i36. John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes Subtilissimae super libres Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. V!I,
q. XIII, n. 5. Cf. also John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. Il, d. III, pars J, q. ;:\1, n.
99.
137. Mf':y;:r, The Philesoolw of St. Thomas AglJinas, 532.

-- 272 --
there are equally many passages which show that he does not and could
nct support ita This, of course, would imply that for those passages in
which he 8eeme ta endorse the theory sorne ether explanation needa ta be
given. This either takes us back ta scotus'S first explanation or takes
us forward ta yet another. In an alternative explanation of Aristotle's
use of the concept of matter in the context of individuation, Scotus
argues that those passages in Aristotle's text which entail support for
the theory really only imply that he considera matter a manifestation of
the singularity of the substance -- in much the sarne way, it should be
observed, as Scotus himself considera sorne types of accidents a
concomitant cause of the individuation of substances.
Secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae cap. "e partibus

definitionis': otpalam est quod anima est substantia prima,
corpus autem materia; homo vero aut animal - quod est ex
utrisque ut univerr.:~liter, Socrates autem et Cariscus"
(supple, 'ex his" "ut singulariter siquidem anima dupliciter
dicitur." Et postea subdit: "Si vero anima haee et corpus
hoc, ut quidam universale, et singulare." Et ante, in eodem
cap. : "Homo et equus et quae ita in singularibus
universaliter non sunt substantia" (id est forma), "sed
simul quoddam totum" (id est compositum) "ex hac n,ateria et
hac rati.one" (ubi per ly 'hac' nen intendit materiam
uniformem et singularem, sed determinatam, alioquin
contradiceret sibi ipsi; unde 5ubdit ibidem: (ll u t
universaliter"). Et subdit pestea: "ex ultima materia
Secrates iam est" etc. 138
We might infer, therefore, that Scotus thinks Aristotle te have
anticipated his own theory of 'haecceity' as the principle of
individuation. 139 It is very difficult to say with certainty whether
this is true, but the view that in book VII of the Metaphysics Aristotle
138. John Duns Scatus, Ordinatio, Lib. Ilf d. Ill f pars l, qq. V et VIf nn. 136-137; cf. also John
Duns Scotus Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. Ill, pars l, qq. V et VI, nn. 182-183.
f
139. Cf. footnote n. 100 above and the discussion on 249-253.

-- 273 --
~.,
Beems ta believe the ferro ta be individual lends Borne support ta
Scotus's contention that Aristotle in fact anticipated his own theory of
the ' haecceitas' . ScotUB 1 s claim, in any event, bas .:.cally amounts te
this: when Aristotle uses matter te roean the principle of individuation
of substances, he means matter in a sense different from the one he ia
employing when he talks about matter as the substratum for substantial
change. 140
Landry takes Scotus's declarations at face value and assumes,
th~refore, that Scotus means that the 'haecceitas' iB an entity with
much the sarne characteristics which are attributed ta Aristotle's notion
of matter.
Il semble bien, en effet, que Scot fait de "l'haeccéité" une

pure matière; elle ne possède aucune activité et n'imprime
pas, même partiellement, son caractère dans l'action de
l'individu; son rôle est unique et c'est celui qui est
dpi;arti au principe potentiel dans le système thomiste: elle
li::....te la nature spécifique. 141
It seems to me that a good part of this statement represents a
basic misunderstanding of Seotus's intentions. Bettoni, in providing
his own explanation of the relationship Seotus sees between matter and
the 'haecceitas', says that, because the 'haecceitas' constitutes the
individual "in ratione subjicibilis" and hence "in esse materiali," the
140. Stella thinks that there is very Little basis for Scotus's claim: "a norma delle determinazioni
di studiosi mena interessati, in Aristotele la .:ret"esa doppia accezione si armonizza e si
unifiea nell'unica nozione di potenza soggettiva, che a parte manchevolezze e imprecisioni,
presenta tuttavia una fisionomia ancora ben definita. ll (Stella, L'ilemodismo di G. Duns
~, 279).
141. Landry, Duns Scot, 117. Much the same notion ts expressed by Bettoni: "si pub dire perde che
l"haeeceitas' considerata logicamente, costituisce l'individuo 'in ratione subjicibilis' e
quindi 'in esse materiali': infatti solo cio che è predicaUle 'habet rationem formae,.11
(Bettoni, Duns Sccto, 85).
-- 274 --
individual, like matter, cannat be predicated of anything, but
everything ia predicated of it. In fact, Betteni saya, this explains
why Aristotle never separates the individual fram the notion of matter.
Ooly that which ia predicable, Bettani adds, "habet rationem formae. 11
The fact, however, that neither matter oor the individual cao be
predicated of something else, while true, i5 true in totally different
ways. Individuals, unlike matter, are completely determinate. This
makes it impossible ta predicate them of something el se nct because, as
ie the case with matter, there ia nothing below them of which they cao
be predicated, but because they are unique and ontologically basic.
Furthermare, the individuating differences, as Wolter says, are
irreducibly simple: they are actual, not potential, and they are
deterrnining, not determinable. 142 The 'haecceitas', therefore, as the
final individuating difference, is irreducibly simple, actual,
determining, and net determinable. Because it is determining, it
contracta the apecies to one individual and can be predicated of the
individual. 143 Because, on the other hand, it is not determinable it
makes the individual no longer determinable in the same arder of
quiddity, acting much like the species acts with respect to the genus.
The 'haecceity', therefore, must add a perfection te the common nat~re,
and, as 5cotus says repeatedly in arguing against the view that it is by
a negation that substances are individuated, it is precisely a
142. Walter, The Transcendentals and their FUMetien ;n the Metaphys.cs ef Seotus, 83.
143. USicut responslll1 est de different;;s primo diversis, ita respondeo de entitat;bus
ind;viduantibus quod sunt 'primo diversa' (id est in nullo eodem numeroconvenientia), et
tamen non oportet 'distincta' esse simpliciter diversa; sieut tamen illae entitates sunt
inc~ssibiles, ita et individua habentia illas entitates." (John Duns Seotus, Ordinatio,
lib. Il, d. III, pars 1, qq. V et VI, n. 186).
-- 275 --
perfection and nct a privation which 15 necessary for making the
individual indivisible into subjective parts.
Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quoci per aliquid positivum est

substantia materialis haee, quia nulla imperfectio repugnat
alicui, niai propter perfectionem sibi inhaerentemi sed
dividi in partes subjectivas est irnperfectionis; igitur non
repugnat substantiae materiali, nisi propter perfectionem
sibi inhaerentem. 144
ScotUB indeed always describes the 'haecceity' as a positive
entity and often describes it by cornparison ta the specifie ferm which
determines the essence of the substance:
dico quod illa realitas a qua sumitur differentia specifica,

est actualis respectu illius realitatis a qua sumitur genus
vel ratio generis, Quoad hoc ista realitas individui
est similis realitati specificae, quod est quasi actus,
determinans illam realitatem speciei quasi possibilem et
potentialem, - sed quoad hoc dis similis , quia iata numquam
sumitur a forma addita, sed praecise ab ultima realitate
forrnae. 145
We have already seen in the preceding section that there ia an
argument to be made for the position that the 'haecceitas' might be
considered by Scotus as part of something very close to an individu al
essence. This view iB confirmed by descriptions such as these where the
role of the 'haecceitas' with respect to the individual is compared
rather closely to the role of the formal difference with respect to the
species. According ta this view, the individual would probably be
defined following the model provided by the universal definition. In
the universal definition, there is a part expressing the genus and
144. J(l:'.1 Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. VI, n. 4. L.f. also John Duns
Seotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. XXVI, quaest. uniea, n. 45.
145. John Duns Seotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars l, qq. V et VI, nn. 179·180. Cf. also John
Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Subti l issimae super l ibros Metarhyslco:'!"[11 Aristotel is, Lib. VlJ,
q. XIII, n. 16.
-- 276 --
another part expreasing the specifie difference. Analogously, in the
definition of the individual, the species would play the role played by
the genuB in the universal definition, and the individual difference
would play the role played by the specifie difference. The fact,
moreover, that Scotus considera the 'haecceitas' a perfection makes it
quite clear that it ia a qualitative and nat a quantitative
determination which through it accrues ta the substance. And, as Gilson
affirme again and again, it i5 in the hierarchy of substances that we
are ta find the 'haecceity' and nct in that of existence. 146 This view
would explain and in turn be confirmed by passages such as these:
Bed conceptus existentiae actualis non est idem conceptui

essentiae; igitur substantia rnaterialis non individuatur par
esse actualis existentiae. 147
And again in the Opus Oxoniense, where he is arguing against the
view that existence is the principle of individuation, Scotus wants to
exclude existence because everything which belongs to the hierarchy of
substance, including the individual, can be found without ~~r.~al
existence.
Igitur sicut invenitur supremum in genere praecise

considerando illud eub ratione essentiae, ita inveniuntur
genera intermedia et species et differentiae; invenitur
etiam ibi infirnum, scilicet singulare omnino circumscripta
existentia actuali, 148
And:
146. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 455, 456, 458, and 461-
147. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VU, n. 2; emphasis added.
(:
148. John Duns Scotus, Ordfnatio, Lib. Il, d. Il J, pars 1, q. J II, n. 63.
-- 277 --
tune eum divisio ~peciei in individua, maxime conveniat eum

divisione generis in species, quia eum aliia non convenit,
sequitur, quod est qualitativa, sicut divisio generis. 149
This aIse 6eems ta be the most plausible way of explaining the
evolution of Scotus's thought f ~m the views expressed in the Questions
on the Metaphysics te those expressed in later warka. It 8eems, in
fact, quite plausible that his thought might have evolved f~om the idea
that the cause of individuation is a forro in its own right, ta the view
that it ia an entity in the hierarchy of naturas, an entity only
formally but not really distinct from the specifie nature that it
individuates.
Turning now ta the last part of this section, l hope it has become
apparent fram rny remarks on Scotus's theory of knowledge that our
capacity ta individuate substances will nct issue from any direct
knowledge of the individuating entity itaelf, ainee it ia net
intelligible to us in this life.
While 5cotus does not think that we individuate substances through
any direct knowledge of the 'haecceity', he nevertheless thinks that we
do so, at least in part, threugh acquaintanep. with their accidents.
There are twe reasens l believe this te be the case. The first is
represented by the fact that 5cotus considers accidents to be
concomitant causes of individuation:
ad primum principale, de Boethie, ~oneedo quod varietas

accidentium faeit in substantia aifferentiam numeralem, eo
modo quo forma dicitur faeere differentiam, quia emnes
distinctae fermae faciunt sic aliquam differentiam in eis in
quibuB sunt; accidentia autem non pessunt facere
149. John Duns Scotus. Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum Arlstotelis, Lib. VII.
q. XIII, n. 16.
-- 278 --
differentiarn specificam in substantia in qua sunt (ex X

Hetaphysicae cap. paenultimo), itaque faciunt in
substantiis differentiam, et hoc numeralem; sed non faciunt
primam differentiam (sed alia est, prior, differentia
numeralis), neque ipsa Bola faciunt differentiam numeralem.
Dico quod omnem distinctionem numeralem concomitantur
distinctio accidentium, et idee ubi nulla potest esse
accidentium varietas. ibi nulla pote st esse distinctio
numeralis; ••• 150
Through the knowledge of concomitant causes, ~rovided only that we
know these and that we identify them as a manifestation of the real
cause, therefore, we come ta individuate substances. According ta
Scotus, moreover, it ia principally through our knowledge ~Z accidents
that we, in our present etate, know substances.
Nullus igitur conceptus quiditativuB habetur naturaliter de

substantia immediate causatus a substantia, sed tantum
causatus vel abstractus primo ab accidente, - et illud non
est nisi conceptus entis. 151
This sarne conclusion can also be reached by combining a number of
statements Scatus would endorse: he thinks, (1) that Aristatle means ta
consider matter a manifestation of individuality and not its cause; (2)
that in this life we know matter by analogy to form; (3) that we know
forrn through its operations; and (4) that we know its operations through
150. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars l, q. IV, nn. 122-124.
151. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. l, d. III, pars 1. q. III, n. 145. Scotus continues: uper
idem concluditur etiam propositum de partibus essentialibus substantiae. Si enim materia
non immutat intellecturn ad actum circa ipsam, nec forma substantialis, quaero quis
conceptus simplex in intellectu habebitur de materia vel forma? Si dicas quod aliquis
conceptus relativus (puta partis) vel conceptus 'per accidens' \;"Jta alicuius proprietatis
materiae vel formae), quaero quis est conceptus quiditativus cui iste 'per accidens' vel
relativus attrfbuitur? Et si nul lus quiditativus habetur, nihil erit cui attrfbuatur iste
cenceptus 'per acddens'. Nulll.iS autem quiditativus potest !":o.beri nisi impressus vel
abstractus ab illo quod movet intellectum, pUta ab accidente, et ille erit conceptus entis:
et itB ni~~l cognoscetur de partibus essentiel ibus sl.~bstantiae nisi ens sft cOltlTlUne
univocum e"'s et accidentibus.1I (John Duns Scotr..:s, Orc,'fœ.!ig, Lib. l, d. Ill, pars l, q.
Ill, n. 146). Cf. also: John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones 5ubtilissimae super Libres
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis. Lib. VII, q. III. n. 3; and John Duns Scotus, Reportata
Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, 4. V, n. 10.
-- 279 --
their sensible manifestatiy:..:;. Theae, of course, are made known by the
accidents of substances.
Unde dictum Philesephum habet veritatem de intellectu

nastra, et de materia par comparationem ad intellectum
nOBtrum~ nos enim sicut non concipimus entia perfectissima,
nisi par effectue, et par habitudinem ad efficiens, ita nec
etiam diminuta, nisi par entia perfectic.·ra Ët.. per
sensibilia; et idee materiam non cognoscimus, nisi par
habitudinem ad formam, quia transrnutatur ab una forma ad
aliam, et hoc propter irnperfectionem intellectus nostri in
via, quia non intelligit niai par sensibilia, et ex hoc non
sequitur quod materia secundum se non est cognoscibilis. Et
mirum est quod aliqui intelligentes ex hoc concludant quod
materia secundum se non est cognoscibilis, quia non est
cognoscibilis a nobis, nisi per analogiam ad formam, quia
nec substantia est cognoscibilis a nobis, nisi per
habitudinem ad accidentia; non enim cognascimus substantias
niai per accidentia, ut quilibet potest experiri in se;
igitur eadem ratione pesset concludi qued substantia non ait
secundum se cognoscibilis, nisi in habitudine ad
accidentia. 152
It seeme, in fact, that Scotus thinks that the weakness of our
intellect in this life prevents us from knowing substances in any way
ether than threugh their accidents. This, in turn means that the enly
cause of individuation which we cao know directIy is a concomitant
cause. A concomitant cause, hawever, seems to be a condition sine qua
ncn of individuality, at leaat for material substances. Throu~h our
knowledge of accidents, therefore, we can differentiate among material
substances and, therefore, we can individuate them.
If it i8 true, however, that we really only grasp accidents
directly, t.hen it must he of these primarily that we have intuitive
cognition. In Vision and =ertitude in the Age of Ockham Katherine
Tachau argues that one of Scotus's reasons for introducing intuitive
152. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisle:~sia, Lib. l, d. XXXVl f q. IV, n. 10.
-- 280 --
cognition ia the fact that he realizes that through abstr~ctive
cognition only the accidents c 7

the external abject can become known,
and not the substance itself.
The problem Scotus saw was not simply that the species
informed the knower only of the accidents, not the
substance, of the extramental object. This in itself
entailed theological and philosophical difficulties.
Scotus's attempt ta solve these difficulties was many-
pronged, but his most significant step was ta provide the
knower with immediate, direct contact with objects by
poaiting an additional, concurrent process ai cognition,
bath in the senses and in the intellect: intuitive coqnition
(cognitie or netitia intuitiva) .153
While l don't want ta pursue this issue in any datail sinee it is
beyond the scapa of my general discussion, ne'·ertheless it aeeme ta me
unlikely that this should be the case. Should Scotus, in fact, intend
to maintain that it is net only through accidents that we know
individual substances in this life, but that WB know substances
directly, it is quite likely that he would also maintain that it is
possible for us in this life to know singularity in itself. This he
seems to have denied. If, on the other hand, accidents are the only
means through which we come ta know substances in this life, as Scotus
saye, then it i5 of these accidents that we have intuitive cognition.
The difference between abstractive and intuitive cognition in this life,
we have seen, lies in effect also in the manner of knowledge and not
only in the object known. Intuitive cognition and abstractive
cognition, l have argued, do differ in the object which is made known by
them, inasmuch as i~tuitive cognition could give us knowledge of the
'haecceitas' while abstractive cognition gives us knowledge of the
153. Tachau. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. 68·69.

-- 281 --
universal. This difference, however, ia made relatively irrelevant by
the fact that knowledge of the 'haecceitas' i9 impossible 'in via'. It
ia more interesting, therefore, ta concentrate on the fact that while
the know1edge proviàed by abstractive cognition is meàiated by the
species and doee nct provide us with existential certitude r the
knowledge provided by intuitive cognition i5 irnrnediate and doea provide
us with existential certitude. This distinction would nct be rendered
lesa effeotive by the discovery that, at least in this life, our
know1edge of substance can only be derived from our knowledge of the
accidents of substance. The abject remains the sarne, and while ScotUB
doee not say exp1içitly that the object of intuitive cognition, as well
as of abstractive cognition, are the accidental properties of the
substances, ther(. is sorne evidence that he bslieves this ta be the case.
Firet1y, while in the passages quoted above he d08S not specify that he
ia talking about intuitive cognition, neither does he make any direct
reference ta abstractive cognition as the mode of knowledge by which it
is impossible for us to know substance other than through its accidents.
Second1y, all the passages l have seen in which he illustrates the
difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition offer as ex&nples
our knowledge of accidental properties. Thus Scotus says that;
distinguo de operatione, ..• Aliqua ergo cognitio est per se

existentis, sicut quae attingit objectum in sua propria
existentia actuali. Exemplum de visione celoris, et
communiter in sensatione sencus exteriorir;. Aliqua etiam
est cognitio abjecti, nan ut existentis in se, sed v~l
objectum non existit, vel saltem illa cognitia non est ejus,
ut actualiter existentis. Exemplum, ut imaginatio coloris,
quia contingit imaginari rem, quando non existit, sicut
quanào existit. 154
154. John Duns scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. XIII, n. B.

-- 282 --
In book IV of the Opus oxoniense Scotus concentrates on giving
Evidence of the fact of intuitive cognition in this life, and in sc
doing he stresses nct ooly that the abject of intuitive cognition iB the
object as existent, but also that it is the object as known by the
senses. The memory of the abject as existent Scotus calle imperfect
intuitive cognition:
suppoeito enim quod intellectus non tantum cognoscat

universalia sed etiam int.'.litive cognoscat illa, quae
sensus cognoscit, et etiam quod cognoscit sensationes
sequitur quod in intelleotu possint inveniri amnes
conditiones prius dictae pertinentes ad recordari. 155
This becomes even clearer when, in a parenthetical remark, ScotUB
explicitly says that that which is known as existent ia known through
the senses:
(et utrumque probatur per hoc quod cognoscit propositiones

contingentes veras, et ex eis syllogizat; formare autem
propositiones, et syllogizare proprium est intellectui;
illarum autem veritas est de objectis ut intuitive cognitis,
sub ratione scilicet existentiae, sub qua cognoscuntur a
sensu) .156
It 8eems, therefore, that not only for abstractive cognition, but
also for intuitive cognition, the basis and starting point for our
knowledge of substances are the accidents of those substances. In fact,
as Day argues,157 the senses are limited ta knowing an abject under the
aspect of existence, and hence through its sensible properties, while
the intellect is not. This rneans, in effect, that sensible knowledge ia
always intuitive, while i~tellectual knowledge can be both intuitive and
155. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. XLV, q. III, n. 17.
156. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. IV, d. XLV, q. Ill, n. 17.
157. Day, Intuitive Cognltion: a Key to the Significance of la ter Scholastics, 59-63.
-- 283 --
abstractive. Scotus does nct introduce intuitive cognition, therefore,
primarily as means of elirninating the mediation of accidental properties
fram the procesB by which we come te know substances. Instead, what he
intends ta guarantee i9 the certainty of the existence of the abject of
our knowledge.
-- 284 --
CHAPTER IV
SOOLS, ANGELS« AND THE PLURALITY OF FORMS ACCORDING TO
AOUINAS AND SCOTUS
ANGELS« SOOLS« AND UNlVERSAL HYLOMORPilISM
In discussing the faithfulness of Scotus's system to the
Augustinian Scheol and in particular te St. Bonaventure, Longpré rnakes
the following remark regarding the issue of the hylomorphic composition
of spiritual substances:
le point qui marque le mieux les divergences

caractéristiques de leurs systèmes est relatif à la
composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles. Il
est difficile d'etablir que Duns scot admette la théorie
bonaventurienne: même le De Anima ne présente cette opinion
que comme un ~qrollaire du sentiment de S. Thomas d'Aquin.'
In fact, it seems quite clear that, in those works which are
beyond doubt authentically his own, Scotus either ignores the question
or denies universal hylomorphism.
1. Longprè, La Philosophie de J.O. Scot, 265. The De Anima is either consjdered, as Longprè does,
te be a set of Thomist views and their consequences in which Scotus does not express his
own views (cf. also Stella, L'Ilemorfismo di G. Duns Scote, 91-92) or a spurious work. On
this question, cf .. Berubè, "La Connaissance Intellectuelle du Singulier Matériel chez Ouns
Scot,1I 49 ..
-- 285 --
In the case of the human Boul there are a number of passages which
make it rather doubtful that Scotus believes the soul tc be composed of
matter and forme Farthermore, there is at least one passage in which
Scotus makes it clebL chat a composition of matter and form in the human
soul is to be excluded.
Quod apparet, nam anima vel angelus (qui est de se

indivisibilis, hoc modo) - non potest recipere quantitatem,
sicut nec partes. 2
From such passages the immateriality of the soul could be
inferred, but they do nct explicitly affirm it sinee the immateriality
discussed in them might simply refer to lack ofccrporeal matter but not
te lack of spiritual matter. The~e ie no evidence, however, ta show
that Sc~tus believes that, if there should be spiritual matter, it
should be different from the matter found in corporeal substances.
There are, in any case, aIse a number of pasaages of a more
general nature in which the existence of simple beings other than God is
affirmed and which can be taken to refer to the nature of the
intellectual soul or of the angels.
Conceda ergo quod aliqua creatura est simplex, hoc est non
composita ex rebus. Tamen nulla creatura est perfecte
simplex, quia aliquo modo composita est et componibilis.
quia habet entitatem eum privatione alieuius gradus
entitatis. 3
2. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars 1, qq. V et VI, n. 166. Cf. a!so the
followi ng passage: IIpraeterea 1 anima est inmateri al i s i ntri sece et per essenti am suam; ... 11
(John Duns Scotus, ~uaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XVI, quaest. unica, n.
2) •
3. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 1, d. VIII, q. Il, n. 32. Cf. also the following passage: Ilita
etiam sunt quaedam entia causata a causis intrisecis pluribus, ut composita, et quaedam
non, ut entia si~l icia, quae tamen habent causam forma lem, non materialem: ... 11 (John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensfa, Lib. III, d. XXII, quaest. unfca, n. 12). And "agens prilrul1
286
In sorne ~f these passages, as in the one just quotod, 5COtUB talka
about Borne composi'ci..,n even in these simple beings. This, however,
should nct be taken ta mean that they must have a material element
because, although SCOtU8 thinks that matter ia passive, he doea nct seern
to think that ail passivity is matter: this, l think, will become clear
from his discussion of the possibility of a multiplicity of angels
within ane speciese
The fact that Scotus generally refers to the relationship of the
soul to the body in Aristotelian terms should perhaps be considered
additional evidence for the thesis that he doea nct believe it ta be
composed of matter and forme For example, he says:
anima secundum Buam essentiam est actus; Nec est siroile

de dare vitam et operari, quod scilicet, sicut est
principium vivendi per essentiam, ita est principiurn
cperandi per essentiam, etc. quia anima est principiur.1
formale, quo vivum est vivum, quia ipsa formaliter dat esse
vivum. Est enirn anima immediaturn principium formale
essendi, et immediaturn principium operandi; •.• 4
Finally, there are still other passages in which Scotus's
intentions seem to be beyond doubt.
Praeterea, animae intellectivae distinguuntur numero in

eadem specie, et tamen sunt formae purae licet perfectivae
materiae; non igitur est impossibilitas a parte formarum
quod distinguantur numero in eadem specie: 5
And:
quia essentia animae in se simplex est receptiva omnium

potentiarum suarum, quae sunt diversae specie; igitur sicut
potest produeere multa individua sine materia, ••• U (John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones
subtilissimae super libros Metaphysieorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, q. XIII, n. 14).
-....
~
4. John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. II, d. XVI, quaest. uniee, n. 6.
5. John Duns Seo tUS, Ordinat;o, lib. Il, d. III. pars 1, q. VII, n. 230.
-- 287 --
ipse ponit simplex receptivum, ipse habet panere ipsum esse

principium causale diversorum. 6
In passages auch as the Se there ia n~ question of mistaking
corporeal matter and spiritual matter. Should it be scotus'S intention
tl~ affirm a composition between spiritual matter and form in the
intellectual soul he would certainly nct chaoae te refer 1:0 the soul as
a pure forro.
The fact, how9ver, that Scotus doea nct think that the soul ie
composed of matter and ferro doee nct praye that he aIse believes it ta
be the forro of the body in the Aristotelian sense: he can still hold
that the soul without the body, while it is not composed of matter and
form, ia neverthelesB a perscn, 'per se subsistent', and that its union
with the body, following a Platonic model, is one of mover to that which
ia moved.
In Quodlibetal Question IX, while discuBsing the possibility that
Gad could make angels become infot~ing forms, Scotus gives severai
argumenta and makea several remarks which render his position on the
relationship between the intellectual soul and the body quite clear.
Scotus's answer te the principal question consiste in the following
argument: that which is simply subsistent 'per se' cannot be the forro of
matter. Since angels are this sort of being, it is clear that angels
cannl}t be forms of matter. After giving this argument, Scotus goes on
te expand cn what he means by the expression 'per se being'. He says
that 'per se being' can mean thre.. different things. In the first
senae, Scotus explains, 'per ee being' designates something which exista
6. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Par;s;ens;a, L;b. Il, d. XVI, ~u~est. un;ca, n. 7; emphas;s added.
-- 288 --
apart from a subject or in isolation: in this senae an accident can be a
'per se being' when it doea not inhera in a subject. The Bacolnd sense
of 'par se being' doea not rafer te something which exista in another,
but ta something which neither actually exista in another nor has the
capacity ta do BO. It ia the sense in which, not only the composite,
but aIse matter and ferro are said ta be 'par se beings': thus, while the
substantial form ia said ta be in the matter it informe, it cannat be
said ta inhera in the matter because te inhere in a Bubject iB nct the
sarne as informing a subject 'par se'. Most importantly, however, that
which inheres cannet be said ta be an act, neither 'per se' nor in a
qualified manner, and it do~s not ferrn with its subject something which
is 'per se' one. That which informa, on the other hand, has all the
opposite characteristics. The third sense of 'per se being' deaignates
that which has its ultimate actuality in such a way that it is unable ta
be ordered ta sorne other act sa that a further actualization is capable
of belonging to it 'per se'. Scotus adds that a 'per se being' in this
third sense is what is cclled a suppositum: this suppositum, should it
be of an intellectual nature, would be called a per.son. Only in this
third sense, furthermore, can a 'per se being' properly be said ta be
subsistent.
A little further scotus adds that this discussion should make it
clear why the soul apart fram the body cannot be called a person. The
reaeon is that the soul, in that etate of separation from the body,
cannot be said ta be a 'per se being' in the third sense:
hine etiam patet quare anima separata non est persona, licet
enim non sit nata inhaerere, et ideo sit ens per se secundo
modo praedicta, licet etiam posset esse ens per se primo
modo, id est, solitarie, non tantum per virtutem causae
-- 289 --
extrinsec~, sicut potest accidens vel forma materialis, sed

virtute naturae suae sibi derelictae, et hoc quia non
necessaric dependet a materia in proprio sua esse~ t~nen non
potest esse ans per se tertio mod.o praedicto, ,=t solum
illud, quod est sic par se ans, dicitur suppo~itum; in
natura autem intellectuali dicitur persona, •.• 7
Because the soul cannat be said ta be 'par se being' in the third
sense, but only in the second, it follows that the soul informa the body
and ia therefore the ferni of the body, it ia simply an act and it forma
a 'par se' unit y with the subject which it informa. Scotus gives
further arguments to the effect that an angel cannot be the form of
matter, and indirectly makes further arguments te the affect that the
soul is the form of the body. He argues, for example, that, while the
state~ent that a potency is no more excellent than the substance which
has it, is certainly true of purely intellectual natures such as the
angels, it is net equally clear that it is true of the intellectual soul
because it has sense pcwers in addition to intellectual powers. This,
Scotus adda, is due to the fact that our soul depends on matter for its
operations and, eonsaquently, for its being:
quia potentia non exeedit substantiarn; et videtur ista

consequentia praecipue t~nere de natura illa, quae est mere
intelleetualis, cujusmodi est natura Angeliea; non sic
manifeste tenet de natura, quae est diminute intellectualis,
et eum hoc sensitiva quantum ad aliquam potentiam, sicut est
anima nostra, quia illa dependet a matE~ria in operando,
saltem aliqua operatione; sed natura mere intellectualis
nullo modo dependet a materia in operando, nec per
consequens in essendo. 8
In answering two of the objections against his views, Scotus
pr'ovides us with further evidence that he believes the soul to be the
7. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales. ~. IX, n. 4.
8. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. IX, n. 7.

-- 290 --
.. ~-,..
ferro of the body. The firet objection, devoted specifically ta Scotus's
views on the soul, consista in arguing that the soul see~lS ta }:.. e
something 'par se subsistent' tecau~e its function ia 'par se'. Ail t~e
functions, in fact, which are operations of the composite 'par se' do
nct pertain ta the ferro alone, but the function of understa,nding dOBs
pertain ta the soul when it ia separated fram the body. Hence the Boul
geeme ta be 'par se subsistent'. The second objection, aIse devoted
specifically ta Scotus's views regarding the intellectual soul, holds
that since the being of the soul is the being of the composite, the
being of the soul ia nct ordered ta the being of the composite.
Scotus's answers te these two objections are the following. Ta
the first objection he answers that the basis for its conclusion seems
te be the assumption that the intellect ive seul is subsistent, but, he
adds, the soul is net subsistent in the third senae. When it ia joined
to the body, moreever, the soul is not subsistent in the first sense
either because if it were it would net inforrn the body since what ia
'per se' in this first sense does not inform anytlaing. Therefore,
Scotus concludes, if the soul were a 'per se being', like the accidenta
ar~, when it is joined with the body, it would retain the sarne mode of
being for what concerns intellection, whether it was informing or note
Ad secundum, quamvis ista ponatur ratio fundamentalis pro

conclusione ista, quod anima intellectiva est subsistent,
tamen conclusie non videtur vera, loquendo proprie de
subsistente eo modo quo prius dictum est, quod ens pcr se,
tertio modo ibi accipiendo, dicitur subsistens; sed nec
anima intellectiva unita est per se subsistens, id est,
solitarie, sicut accidens in Altari dicitur per se ens, quia
tune unita non inforrnaret corpus, separata enim, quia sic
- est per se ens, non inf~rmat; si ergo unita, es set aie per
-- 291 --
se ens, eumdem modum essendi habE!ret informans, et non

informans. 9
Scotus gOBa on ta explain that the soul ia said ta understand 'par
se' because it ia the proximate recipient of intellection. When it ia
united, however, the soul ia nct just a recipient because it ia also the
reaeon man as a whole understands in virtue of his forme Scotus adde
moreover, that man can only be said ta understand as a remete subject
ainee he ie a recipient of intellection only because the soul, as his
ferm, receives intellection proximately. Scotus concludes thèrefore
that:
ex iata patat, quomodo intellectio est immaterialis,

scilicet non quod non ait ipsius animae unitae, proue
informat. materiam, sad quia ipsa est saliua animae, ut
proximi suscepti ~,Ti; totius autem compositi, tanquam remoti
susceptivi, et tantum secundum partem formalem sui. 10
In the answer ta this objection we see Scotus stating clearly that
the soul is the form of the body by stressing the fact that the soul
could not be 'per s~' in the first sense because in that case it would
not inform the body. The fact that the soul is the form of the body is
also made clear by Scotus's conclusion which explains that it is obviaus
how intellection is immaterial: it is immaterial not in the sense that
it does nct pertain ta the soul as informillg matter, but in the sense
that it pertains ta the soul alone as immediate recipient, and ta the
composite, as remote" subjec~, in virtue of its forro.
Ta the second objection Scotus a:nswers that the fact that the
soul's being is the sarne as the composite's being would nct entail that
9. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q. IX, n. 14.

{
10. John Dun~ Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, q~ IX, n. 15; emphasis added.
-- 292 --
the soul's manner of being ia imperfect when it la nct united with th~
body. This ia sa bec3use the soui, when it ia separated fram the body,
ia nct deprived of anything except for the fact that i~ ia nct
communicating its being ta another. The being of the soul, therefore,
remains the same whether the soul ia joined ta the body or separated
fram it. In the sarne way, the bping of the whole remains the sarne only
as long as the whole continues te exist with that being. ScotUB
concludes, therefore. that the view that the being of the soul is the
sarne as the being of the composite should be denied because the Boul
with its being 8eeme te be cnly a part of the being of the coa~osite.
ScotUB goea on ta explain that in order ta understand properly his
awn answers ta bath of these objections it is necessary to distinguish
between two senses of the term 'being'. 'Being', in one sense, can
refer to anything which formally departs from non-being, i.e., anything
extramental or anything which is more than a po~~ibility in its cause.
In a second sense 'being' refers te the ultirnate act, i.e., that to
which nothing needs to be added in order to give it being in an
unqualified manner. This is what is said te have being 'primarily'. In
this sense only the composite can be called being; a part of the
composite can only be called being 'per accidens', or 'participative',
because it shares in the being of the whole. When being is taken in
this second sense, Scotus says, only the composite is 'per se being',
while the intellectual soul can be called subsistent irnproperly and in a
qualifi~d sense. The soul i9 ,'per se being' if the term 'being' is
taken in its first sense. In this way it becomes clear in which sense
-- 29: --
the soul can be said ta be imperfect and in which sense it can be said
ta be perieet, when it ia nct united with the body.
Ex hoc patet quomodo anima separata dicitur imperfecta in

essendo, quia eo modo quo ipsa est unita, potest dici
perfecta in essende, non essentialiter et primarie, sad
participative; suc quidam proprio esse est aeque perfecta
separata et conjuncta, sad conjuncta perfecta est esse
totius participative, licet non primarie. Et quantum ad hoc
separata est imperfecta, quia caret ipso esse totius, et
posset dici quod ista imperfectio est imperfectio
simpliciter, quia caret il10 esse, quod est perieetio
simpliciter, licet non propria, ime ipsa est major
parfeetio, quam esse ejus pToprium, quia includens illud
esse. Non igitur dicitur imperfecta ex hoc solo quod non
comm~nica~ suam perfectionem alteri, sicut nec ipsa
perficitur in hoc quod communicat, sed dicitur imperfecta ex
carentia perfectionis esse totius, quae carentia
concomitantur illud non communicari. 11
It is clear, then, that Scotus in the case of the human soul and
its relationship to the body follows the Aristotelian biological theory
that the soul is the form of the body, and not the Augustinian tradition
in which the soul is 'per se subsistent', and a person in its own right
or a complete substance composed of matter and form.
In the case of angels Scotus àoes not make his position quite as
clear, but it can be inferred from several things he says that in all
probability he denies a composition of matter and forro in angels as
well. In the first place the lack of matter in angels could be deduced
from Scotus's statements 011 the different intellective powers: in these
stat~ments, for instance, he describes the cognitive powers of separated
substances as completely separated from matter. It 8eems unreasonable,
in fact, to think that there should be matter there, but that it should
serve no apparent purpose in the cognitive process. This argument,
{
11. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones Quodl;betales, q. IX, n. 18.
-- 294 --
,u.-' however, would probably be disputed should it turn out that ScotUB
believes in a distinction betwp-on spiritual and corporeal matter, and it
ia, therefore, in itself nct conclusive.
The arguments fram cognition, however, do cffer sorne preliminary
evidence that in angels there ie ~10 composition with a material element.
In arguing in faveur of the intelligibility of singulars, Scotus cffers
the following argument:
ad secundum dicit unus doctor quod 'singulare potest per se

intelligi, licet non singulare materiale, quia
singularitas non pl:'ohibet,. sed materialitas' (alioquin Deus
non esset intelligibilis, eum ait singulare, - quod falsum
est); et tune patet responsio, quod propositio assumpta 'de
non intellecto singulari' non est vera niai de singulari
materiali. Aliue dicit quad ' non valet nec se nec alia
intelligere euh ra1:.iane singularis (materialis vel
immaterialiaj, ser.! universalis, quod est par se obiectum
intelleetus, quod etiam relueet in habitu intelligibili; et
eecundum hoc etiam patet respansio ad argumentum. - Neutrum
taroen credo esse verum nisi laquendo de intellectu
materiali, qui propter imperfectionem sui non potest - forte
quodeumque intelligibile intelligere, quod intelleetus
angelieus potest. 12
This passage ia interesting becauae it makes it very clear that
aeeording to seotus the only possible explanation for the fact that we
are incapable of reaehing knowledge of singularity lies not in the
abject of cognition, which is the Barne for us and for the angels, but in
our cognitive powera and in the fact of our union with the body: "niai
loquendo de intellectu materiali, qui prapter irnperfectionem sui ... "
Scotua, in fact, doea not believe that matter in the abject impedes
12. John Duns Scotus, Ordinat;o, Lib. Il, d. III, pars II, q. 1, n. 294. The nature of angels is
alsa the closest ta Gad (cf. John Duns Scotus, Cuaest;ones in Libros Sen~~ntiarum, Lib. IV,
d. XII, q. Il, n. 11); and it s~e1S, therefore, unreasonable to believe that if Gad is
immaterial and 50 is the human intellect, then the nature between them should contain
matter.
-- 295 --
intelligibility. l think that this passage gives us good reason to
believe that Scotus means ta deny aIl composition of matter and ferm in
angels as weIl as in God.
In the Ouaes~iones Quodlibetales 5cotus makes reference te the
intellectual powers which angels and human souls have in commen,
stressing, however, that while it cao be inferred fram the capacity for
these intellectual powers that the natures possessing them can be
separated fram matter, the further inference cannat be made that it ia
impossible for allah natures ta inform matter.
Ex hoc ergo media, scilicet operatione, potest concludi

ipsius naturae talia immaterialitas, hoc est, a materia in
essen_L.J separabilitas; non autem illa immaterialitas
ulterior, quae est impossibilitas informandi materiam, et
hoc est rationabile, quod ex intellectione, quae est medium
et commune animae et Angelo, possit concludi immaterialitas
communis utrique .. 13
The immateriality they have in common, if Iny conclusions about
human souls are correct, is the immateriality of 'formae purae', even if
angels and human souls belong to different species. This is confirmed
by the fact that the passage quoted above, in whi:h Scotus concludes
that h'.lman souls are ' formae purae', continues with a comparison applied
to angels:
13. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones cuodlibetales, q. IX, n. 12. Angels, in fact, are more perfect
than hunan souls. "Consequentia ista probatur, quia majori perfectioni attestatur quod
aL icui repugnat esse formam materiae, quam quod sibi conveniati ••• 11 (John Duns Scotus,
Cuaestiones Cuodlibetales, q. IX, n. 5). lt seems, moreover, that when Scotus explains the
difference between the species to which angels belong and that te which human souls belong
the main difference lies in the aptitude of the soul ta inform matter, an aptitude which
angels do not have (they can inform matter only by God's absolute power). Cf., for
eX8ll1'le t the following passage: "conclusio istius quaestionis certa est, quod scilicet
angelus et anima differunt specie, quia formae eiusdem rationis eandem rationem habent
perficiendi et non·perficiendii sed anima naturaliter est perfectiva corporis organici ut
forma, angelus autem natural iter non est perfectivus al icuius materiaei igitur etc." (John
Ouns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. l, q. VI, n. 301).
-- 296 --
non igitur est impossibilitas a parte formarum ",..od

distinguantur numero in eadem specie: quidquid enim
concluderet istam impossibilitatem ratione formae, in
angelis, concluderet et in animabus. 14
This implication will only hald, of course, provided that angels
and human souls are of the sarne nature ;'n the ways relevant te the
argument, i.e., in being 'formae purae,.1S
The discussion of the individuation of angels, and more
particularly scotus's criticisms of the Thomist position, cffer further
evidence that he considere ang~ls ta be irnrnaterial. While we have seen
that ScotUB doee nct believe matter ta be involved in the procesB of
individuation as a principle, nevertheless it Beeme ta me that ~f he had
net believed angels te be irnmaterial his criticisms of Aquinas's views
would have been directed primarily to the Thomist denial of the
hylomorphic composition of spiritual substances.
One of the most obvious and rather problematic consequences of
Aquinas's theory of individuation is that there is no apparent
possibility of individuation within a species for beings which are not
composed of matter and form. This does not constitute a problem in the
case of God because obviously in His case there is no need of
individuation. Nevertheless, Aquinas, like scotus and unlike much of
14. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. 1Il, pars l, q. VII, n. 230.
15. In Scotus the difference between angels and God will be determined, among other things, by the
fact that God is infinite and angels are fjnite beings. This difference is manifested
through their operations. Angels, for example, need to be with their effects; they cannat
act at a distance, while God cano This will mean that they need to acquire a body and be
in place. For a very good discussion of how Scotus considers this possible for angels, cf.
Lang, "Bodies and Angels: The Occupants of Place for Aristotle and Duns Scotus. ll l.ang
argues very effectively that while Scotus begins his discussion with Aristotle's definition
of being in place, his final definition equates being in place with dimensionality, or
having dimensions, and is qu;te different from Arlstotle's def;nition.
-- 297 --
L the Auguatinian tradition befere him, doee nct believe that angels and
human Bouls are composed of matter and forme
Si quis autem panat quod Angeli et anima sint ex materia et

forma compositi, adhuc haee opinio stare non potest. Si
enim taro in Angelis quam in anima ait materia de se una,
sicut omnium corporum inferiorum est materia una,
diversificata tantum securndurn formam; oportebLl: etiam quod
divisio illius materiae unius et communia ait principium
distinctionis Angelorum ab invicem et ab anima. 16
Aquinas believes, furthermore, that even if there were matter in
spiritual substances this would still nct be able ta provide a principle
of individuation for spiritual substances within the sarne species:
si tamen angeli haberent materiarn, nec sic possent esse

plures angeli unius speeiei. Sic enim oporteret quod
prineipium distinetionis unius ab alio esset materia, non
quidem secundum divisionem quantitatis, eum sint incorporei,
sed secundum diversitatem potentiarum. 17
The fact that human souls do not contain matter does not cause
Aquinas any problem peculiar to the discussion of the individuation of
human souls as long as they are united to the body, but, as we will see
shortly, will cause a problem for the individuation of human souls after
death. For angels Aquinas simply denies that they can be individuated
within the sarne species, and affirme, in fact, that there can only be
one angel in each species.
16. Tnomas Aquinas, Opera Ormia, Vol. XIV, Cuaestiones Disputatae. Cuaest. Un•. De A',,!,i..!!,@ (Frette,
Mare eds.: Paris: Vives, 1871~80', a. VII resp.; all subsequent citations fram this work
are to this edition. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Cuaest. Un •. De Anima, a. VI resp., and
several other passages such as: Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omn;a, Vol. XIV, Cuaestiones
Disputatae. Cuaest. Un.! De Spiri~ualibus Creaturis (Frette, Mare eds.: Paris: Vives, 1871·
80), a. VIII ad XIII (all subsequent citations fram this work are to this edition); Thomas
Aquinas, Cuaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. IX ad nonum; Th~s Aquinas, ~
Theologiae·, Lib. I, q. L, a. II; Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentiô .. cap. V, nn. 44~59;
and Thomas Aquinas, ConmentariLlTl in lib. II SententiarllTl, d. XII, q. }-.- i-; V solutic.
17. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. l, q. L, a. IV resp.

-- 298 --
Si enim immateriales ponuntur~ eum nuila forma vel natura

multiplicet numerum niai in diversitate materiae, oportet
quod forma simplex et immaterialis, non recepta in aliqua
materia, ait una tantum: unde quidquid est extra eam est
alterius naturae, so quod distet ab eo secundum formam, non
secundum materiale principium, quod ibi nullum est. Talia
autem diversitas causat differentiam in specie. 18
Aquinas, howevar, has ta be able ta account for the difference
between Gad and separated substances. The difference which la necessary
in order ta account for the difference between Gad, who la absolutely
simple and lacks all composition, and the angels, who are not completely
simple, will be provided according ta Aquinas by the fact that angels,
"though nct composed of matter and forro, are nonetheless composite
substances. In angels, in fact, as in ail other creatures, there will
be composition of potentiality and actuality:
ad tertium dicendum quod, licet in angelo non si~ compositio

formae et materiae, est tamen in eo actus et potentia. 19
This composition, which is absent in God but present in spiritual
substances, is the composition between essence and existence.
Et ideo i~~a quidditas angeli est quod subsistit etiam ipsum

suum esse, quod est praeter suam quidditatem, et est id quo
est; sicut motus est id quo aliquid denominatur moveri; et
sic angelus compositus est ex esse et quod est, vel ex quo
est et quod est; •.. idee ipsa quidditas est sicut potentia,
et suum esse acquisitum eût sicut actus; et ita per
consequens est ibi compc1sitio ex actu et potentia; et si
18. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. Il Sententiarum, d. 111, q. l, a. IV solutio. Cf. also
Thomas Aquinas, Summa TheoLogiae, Lib. 1, q. L, a. IV resp; Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in
Lib. IV Sententiarum, d. XII, q. 1, 8. 1 ad tertium; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. XCIII.
19. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolosiae, Lib. l, q. L, a. Il ad tertium. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas,
Cuaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, 8. 1 resp.; Thomas Aquinas, Q'Jaest. Un. De
Seiritualibus Creatcris, a. 1 ad XV; Thomas Aquinas, Cuaes!. Un. De Spiritualibus
Creaturis, a. 1 ad XXVi and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. LIlt.
-- 299 --
iata potentia vocetur materia, erit compositus ex materia et

forma: ••• 20
This type of composition will be a.ble to account not only for the
difference between Gad and spiritual substances, but aiso for the
differentiation amenq spiritual Bubstances nat within the sarne apecies,
but among the different species of angels. The composition itself
allows Aquinas to differentiate God, who i3 perfectly simple, from the
angels; while the different degrees of perfection in the essences of the
angele allows him te account for the difference among different species
of angels. The ferro itself, in this case without matter, will represent
the essence of separated substances. The different species of angels
will, in fact, have different degrees of perfection, according ta the
perfection of their forro and according te their relative distance from
the absolute perfection of God.
Et sic relinquitur quod amnes Angeli ab invicem specie

differunt secundum majorem et minorem perfectionem formarum
simplicium, ex majori vel minori propinquitate ad Deum, qui
est actus purus, et infinitae perfectionis. 21
20. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Lib. II Sententiarum, d. III, q. l, 8. 1 solutio. See also
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libres Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, Lib. 1, d.
VIII, q. V, a. 1 solutio; Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri
Lonbardi, Lib. l, d. VIII, q. V, a. II solutio and ad prilTUl1; Thomas Aquinas, Cuaest. Un.
De Spiritualibus Creaturis, B. 1 resp.; and, finalLy, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. L.II; and cap. UV.
21. Thomas Aquinas, Cuaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. VIII resp. Cf. alsa Thomas Aquinas,
Conmentarium in Lib. Il Sententian!!!, d. III, q. J, a. V solutio; and Thomas Aquinas,
Conmentariun in Lib. II Sententiarum, d. III, q. 1, a. VI solutio.. It is quite clear, of
course, that the difference between the species of angels will be of a qualitative and not
of a quantitative nature. "Et quia unaqueque res individuatur ex materia et collocatur in
genere veL specie per suam formam, idee accidentia que consequntur materiam sunt accidentia
individui, secundum que individua etiam eiusdem speciet ad invicem differunt; aceidentia
vero que eonsequntur forrnam sunt proprie passiones veL generis vel speciei, unde
inveniuntur in or.nibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sieut risibile
consequitur in homine formam, quia risus contingit ex al iqua apprehensione a:~imae
hominis. 1l (Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. VI, nn.87~97).
-- 300 --
This account of the composition of spiritual substances has
implications which Scotus cannet accept and which he probably considere
dangereuse One of the implications he doee nct want te accept ie that
aIl forma which are separated from matter have the whole perfection of
their species:
falsa est igitur illa propositio assumpta. guod 'illud

individuum quod potest esse sine materia, ex hac sola causa
privativa - quia est sine materia - habet totam perfectionem
speciei', quia si eum hoc ponatur quod nihi1 positive fiat
circa ipsum (sed sola separatio), nihi1 ponitur quod non
praefuit. Si autem intelligatur prout habet aliguam
probabilitatem, quod videlicet ' forma, si esset separata a
materia, ipsa habet totam perfectionem speciei quia non est
participabilis a materia' , ist:~ est falsa et petit
principiurn, nisi intelligatur prout rnateria dicit illam
entitatern individualern, contrahentern formam. 22
Fu=therrnore, because of the lack of multiplication within a
species, all these separated essences become formally necessary, and
this also has to be denied.
Sed discordarnus ab eo in hac propositione, , ornnis quiditas

non habens materian, est formaliter necessaria', 23
Aquinas faces similar sorts of objections ta the effect that,
because everything created is created as a 5ign of God's goodness, and
therefore is itself good. it is unacceptable that there should be
severai species in which numerieal multiplication is impos3ible. In
fact, it seeme ta cantravene this very principla of goadness because
everything which is good God should will to be multiplied. To this
argument Aquinas's reply is very simple: sinee more perfection is
contained in the species than in the individual, it is a greater sign of
22. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars 1, q. VII, n. 249.
~,
~;..
23. John Duns ScotUS, ord;natio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars l, q. VII, n. 239.
-- 301 --
Gad's goodnese that there should be a multiplication of species rather
than of individuals. The fact that Go~ chose te create angels for whom
there ia no numerical multiplication, but only specifie multiplicati~n,
ie in effect a greater expression of God's gcodness.
Mu1tip1icatio igitur specierum plus addit nobilitatis

universo quam multiplicatio individuorum in una specie.
Perfectio autem universi maxime consistit in substantiis
separatis. 24
Scotus's firet substantive argument against the Thomist conception
of anqelic natures appeals ta the fact that because aIl essences,
including the divine essence,25 are communicable there ia no reason te
believe that this should be denied of angels.
Ornnis quidditas quantum est de se, est communicabilis;

igitur quidditas Intelligentiae; igitur non repugnat sibi
esse in multis suppositis. si repugnaret alicui
quidditati communicari, aut hoc esset ratione perfectionis,
aut ratione imperfectionis; non ratione perfectionis, quia
quidditas perfectissima, puta divina, communicabilis est,
licet non in diversitate naturaej nec ratione
imperfectionis, quia tunc quidditas mat~rialis non esset
communicabilis. 26
Moreover, all created essences, including the angels and the human
soul, can be understood universally, and this would not be possible if
they were 'de se haec':
praeterea, quaelibet quiditas creaturae potest intelligi sub

ratione universalis, absque contradictione; si autem ipsa de
24. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Lib. II, cap. XCIII; cf. also the following passage:
lIunde magis apparet divina bonitas in hoc quod sunt multi angeU diversarlltl specierlltl, quan
si sint unius speciei tantllll. 1l (Thomas Aquinas, Conmentarium in Lib. 1t Sententiarll'11, d.
tI t, q. l, a. IV ad tertiun).
25. Presumably this means that even Cod's nature is communicable in the sense that in the Trinity
the same nature is found in three Persons.
( 26. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. tir d. III, q. l, n. 4. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. Il, d. III, pars l, q. VII, n. 227.
-- 302 --
se esset 'haee', contradictio esset e~ intelligerc eub

ratione universal i.s ••• 27
It ia interesting te note, at this po: .it, that because for Aquinas
there ia only one angel per species, the species in thia case will be
represented by one individual only, and that Aquinas will aiso hold the
view that there ia no proper definition of Angela.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet sola species

definiatur proprie, non tamen oportet quod ornnis species ait
definibilis. species enim immaterialium rerum non
cognoscuntur per definitionem vel demonstrationem, sicut
cognoscitur aliquid in scientiis speculativis; sed quaedam
cognoscuntur per simplicem intuitum ipsarum. Unde nec
Angelus proprie potest definiri: non enim seimus de eo quid
est; sed potest notificari per quasdam negationes vel
notificationes. Anima etiam definitur ut est corporis
forma. 28
Presumably, therefore, one is justified in concluding that
Aquinas, because of his belief that it is impossible to provide a proper
definitien of the angelic nature, simply disagr~es with Beatus as te the
possibility of understandlng their essence universally. ~this also
implies that Aquinas thinks the nature of separated substances not to be
communicable as Seatus argues it should be.
In Seotus's eyes another undesirable consequence of Aquinas's
views on the nature of angels is that if Gad were to annihilate one
angel he would thereby annifiilate the whole species:
item, Angelus potest annihilari, et non propter hoe neeesse

est totam illam naturam perire, quin possibile sit Deum
istam naturam restaurare, quia licet Deus annihilet naturam
alicuius, non propter hoc efficitur talia natura, cui
repugnat esse, sicut chimaerae, non plus quam ante
27. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. III, pars 1, q. VII, n. 228. Cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. 11 1, q. 1. n. 4.
28. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Un., De Af1 1ma, a. VII ad XVI.

-- 303 --
creationem. Sed secundum istOB non potest Deus eurndem

-jj
',- Angelum restaurare, quia secundum ipsos in materia de
resurrectione, non pesset fa cere unum hominem redire, si
partes essentiales annihilarent~r ut materia et
intellectiva; .•• 29
In any case Scotus believes that it iB possible ta individuate
immaterial substances, allch as human souls and angels, and that this
should be done without the help of matter. 30
5cotus~s own position on how it ia posaible ta individuate
immaterial beings within the same species will obviously involve his
notion of the 'haecceitas'. The cause of individuation for immaterial
beings will, in fact, be the 'haecceitas' which will contract, as it
doee in aIl beings, the common nature. In angels, as well as in human
souls, there will be a composition of the common nature, which in this
case will be the potential principle, and the 'haecceitas', which will.
actualize it ..
Many of the sarne arguments Scotus uses against Aquinaa's views on
angels apply also to his criticism of Aquinas's theory of the
individuation of human souls after death.. There is, nevertheless, an
interesting and, l think, effective argument which applies only ta the
problem of human souls.
Aquinas's views about the individuation of human souls after death
differ from his views regarding the nature of angels. He does~~t think
that there is only one soul per species; he believes instead that souls
29. John Duns Scotus, Reeortata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. III, q. l, n. 5.
30. Cf. notes n. 14 and n. 22 above in this chapter. Those which Scotus considers the undesirabLe
consequences of individuating human souls through the body will become apparent shortly.
-- 304 --
can be individuated within the sarne species through their union with the
body.
Animae enim humanae non differunt specie ab invicem, sed

numero solo: alioquin et homines specie differrent.
Differentia autem secundum numerum est secundum principia
materialia. Oportet igitur diversitatem animarum secundum
aliquid materiale sumi. Non autem ita quod ipsiuB animae
ait materia pars: ostensurn est enim supra quod est
substantia intellectualis, et quod nulla talia Bubstantia
materiam habet. Relinquitur ergo quod secundum ordinem ad
diversas materias quibus animae uniuntur, diversitas et
pluralitas animarum Bumatur, ea modo quo supra dictum est.
Si igitur sunt diversa corpora, neeesse est quod habeant
diversas animas sibi unitas. 31
Aquinas al sa realizes, as we saw, that using signated matter by
itself as the principle af individuation for human souls would only be
able to account for the individuation of souls while they are united to
their body. signated matter cannet account for the individuation of
souls after death, and this certainly presents a big problem far
Aquinas. He reaches the conclusion, therefore, that the soul after
death is individuated not. by signated matter but by its relationship to
the body it once inf~rmed.
Multitudo igitur a~imarum a corporibus separatarum

conseq~itur quidem diversitatem formarum secundum
substantiam, quia alia est substantia huius animae et
illius: non taroen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate
principiorurn essentialium ipsius animae, nec est secundum
diversam rationem animae; sed est secundurn diversam
commensurationem animarurn ad corpora; haec enim anima est
commensurata huic corpari et non illi, illa autem alii, et
sic de omnibus. Huiusmodi autem commensurationes remanent
in animabus etiam pereuntibus corporibus: sicut et ipsae
31. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LXXXII1, Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, ~
Un., De Anima, a. VI ~ë q~~rtum; and Thomas Aquinas, auaest. Un" De Anima, a. VI ad XIII.
-- 305 --
earum substantiae manent, quasi a eorparibus seeundum esse

non dependentes. 32
It is important to note at this point that Aquinas believes that
eaeh indivièual soul is ereated by God fer eaeh individual body and not,
as sorne believe, independently of their future inherenee in the body.
Aquinas does net, therefcre, eonsider it neeessary that he should
acccunt for the individuation of the soul befere its union with the
body.33 scotus, hawever, disagrees. Scatus elaims that, withaut even
censidering its merits as the principle of individuation for human souls
after death, this eriterian for the individuation of the soul through
its relationship to the body does not take into account the fact that
ainee the soul ia a term of cr~Qtion it has ta be individuated b~fore
God infuses it into the body:
praeterea, inatatur de anima intellectiva, quae prius natura

est terminus creatianis, quam infundatur. Primus autem
terminus ereationis, ut talia, formaliter est hic; ergo
anill\a naturaliter priua est haec, quam unitur materiae, et
pari rat;.one de alia anima, prius natura est haee, quam
uniatur materiae. 34
A plausible anewer ta this argument could be that the soul, in the
instant before its union with the body, is ~ndividuated by its aptitude
ta inform this particular body. Gad would, in effect, create 'this
32. Thomas Aquinas, $tmna Contra GentHes, Ub. 1l, cap. LXXXI. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Scriptun
Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri lombardi, lib. l, d. VIII, q. V, a. Il ad sextumi
and Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in lib. II Sententiarum, d. XVII, q. l, a. Il ad primum.
33. Aquinas devotes a good amount of space to arg~ing against the position that souls are created
and exist before their infusion into the body. For instance: Ilsequitur etiam et aliis
quibuscumque: quia, curn unitas rei sequatur formam, sicut et esse, oportet quod illa sint
unum numero quorum est forma nunero una. Non igitur est possibile unam animam diversis
corporibus uni ri. Ex quo etiam sequitur quod nec animae fuerunt ante corpora. 1I (Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. LXXXIII).
34. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Cuodlibetales, q. 11, n. 5.

-- 306 --
particular soul' with an aptitude ta inform 'this particular body' and
not any other.
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra animam unirî corpori ut formam.

Formas autem oportet esse propriis materiis proportionatas:
eum se habent ad invicem sicut potentia et actus; proprius
enim actuB propriae potentiae respondet. 35
Scot~s will naturally feel that this proportion or aptitude to
inform the body cannat be considered appropriate as a principle of
individuation. His answer ta this argument will be that an aptitude
cannet individuate the soul because the soul itself has ta be prior ta
the aptitude.
Si dicatur quod non est haee sic per materiam, scilicet per
unionem actualem, vel per esse actuale in ipsa, sed per
aptitudinem essendi in ipsa materia, et ipsa non est prier
illa aptitudine, istud non evadit argumentum, quia natura
ipsa absoluta est prior natura ipsa aptitudine, et haec
anima habet aptitudinem hanc ad corpus, et illi animae
repugnat aptitude huiusmodi ad corpus hoc, et convenit sibi
alia aptitudo ad aliud corpus. 36
In fact, this aptitude, since it is not an absolute entity,
presupposes the individuality of the soul in order to become
individuated itself. The point is this: the aptitudes are ail the sarne,
and they are differentiated only by being the aptitudes of numerically
different souls:
quod si dicas quod animae habent inclinationem ad diversa

corpora et ita habent aptitudinem perficiendi materiam, et
idee per diversas habitudines distinguuntur, contra: ista
inelinatio non est entitas absoluta, quia non potest aliquid
inelinari ad sei igitur praesupponit aliquam entitatem
absolutam et distinctam, et ita in illo priere distinguitur
haee anima ab illa. Ergo animae sine huiusmodi
35. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra û~nt;les, Lib. Il, cap. LXXXIII; cf. also Thomas Aquinas, ~
Contra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LXXV.
l 36 John Duns Scotus, Quaest;ones Ouodllbetales, q. Il, n. 6.
-- 307 --
habit1'!.dinibus, ut sine formali ratione distinguendi,

distinguuntur. quia est haee anima, idee habet hanc
inclinationem, et non e converse •••• igitur haee inclinatio
non est ratio essendi hanc anirnam, sed praesupponit eam. 37
According ta Seatue, choosing their relationship ta the body or
their aptitude to inform the body as the principle of individuation for
human souls iB nat any better than selecting quantity ta individuate
matters. lt amounts, in any case, te selecting an accidentaI pro~erty
as the principle of individuation.
Iata aptitude non est de prima ratione animae, quia non est
niai respectus ad corpus, et probatum est prius quod
respectus non est de fermali intellectu absoluti formaliter,
licet il1e respectus non easet res alia; igitur possibile
est in intellectu concipere quidditate animae sine isto
respectu. 38
l think that in this debate Scotus has the better of Aquinas, but,
as l have pointed out earlier in the chapter on Aquinas, and as Roland-
Gosselin argues in his exposition of the De Ente et Essentia,39 there is
sorne evidence to suggest that Aquinas may have come to change his mind
about individuation. Roland-Gasselin argues, in fact, that Aquinas came
to conclude that the principle of individuation is not the matter by
itself, or the form by itself, or any accidental property by itself, but
that by which all the elements which make up a composite substance are
held together in such a way as to constitute something which is
essentially one. The ultimate principle of individuation on this
37. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. 11, d. Ill, pars 1, q. VII, nn. 231-233. For the same
argument, cf. also John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones CuodLibetales, q. II, n. 6; and John Duns
Scatus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. III, q. l, n. 6.
38. John Duns Scatus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. III, q. 1, n. 5.
( 39. Cf. section IV, chapter Il, 167-168. Also see Roland-Gosselin, le "De Ente et Essentia" de S.
Thomas D'Agu;n, Etude I, Le Principe de l'Individuation, 115-116, and 125.
-- 308 --
interpretation will be the 'esse'. It will be the 'esse', then, which
gives the composite its identity and which makes it the individual that
it ia. The 'esse' ia that which, by giving the ultimate degree of
actuality ta the composite of matter, forro, and accidents, pulls aIl the
elements together and makes the composite 'this individual'. On this
view, roughly stated, what provides the grounds for differentiating one
individual from another iB the particular combinat ion of cornponent parts
bound together by the 'esse'.
If this interpretation ia correct, Aquinas cao argue that when the
body dies the soul cao remain individuated as the soul which once
belonged to that particular body and no other because the 'esse' of the
soul remains the sarna after death, although that same 'esse' now belongs
to an incomplete substance. The 'esse' which uniiied all the
inseparable elements of the composite, continues to actualize the soul
when separated from the body after death. The soul is the same soul
because it has the sarne 'esse'. Even this solution, however, doea r.ot
succeed in answering all of Scotus's objections. scotus, in fact, doea
not consider the 'esse' to be a satisfactory solution to the problem of
individuation. Scotus argues, in fact, that because existence cornes te
the individual after the individual difference, existence cannot be the
principle of individuation. 40
40. Cf. the feLLowing argt.Jnents: "idee dico ad quaestionem, quod non, quia quaelibet coordinatio
habet intrinsece supremum et infimum, quod non includit aliquid alterius generis; sed
concept us existentiae actualis non est idem conceptui essentiae; igltur substantia
materialis non individuatur per esse actualis existentiae. Ad rationem principalem, dico
quod p~ius natura est substantia materialis haec, quam sit existentia actualis; ideo licet
conveniat ormi et sol j, non temen est prirrun distinguensj "(John Duns Scotus, Reoortata
Par;s;ensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VII, nn. 2-3).
-- 309 --
From Borne of the issues we have just discussed and fram our
examination of Aquinas'B views, it can be inferred that Aquinas clearly
sees matter as a principle of limitation of forro, thereby distorting
Aristotle's conception of the relationship between matter and ferro. In
Ari.stotle, in fact, the relationship ia reversed.
The essential nature of the infinite ia te be that which ia

of itself the incomplete, the indefinite, or the
indeterminate, and hence the imperfect. No complete
Bubstance, therefore, can exist as actually infinite.
In what is the type par excellence of act and potency for
Aristotle, namely, the composition of ferro and matter, he
tells us explicitly that the role of form or act is to
impose a limit on the formless infinity of matter in itself
and thus confer upon it determinatian and
intelligibility: .•• 41
The Neaplatonic influence referred ta in Clarke's article cannat
be absent from Scotus's system to the extent that he believes infinity
ta be a perfection. In aIl other basic respects, hewever, SCOtU8 8eems
ta preserve intact the Aristotelian relatianship between matter and
form. In his system it is the ferm which limita the matter. It is true
that the species can be multiplied an infinite number of times, but the
species itself is limited in virtue of the presence af the 'haecceitas'.
The potentiality of matter for Scotus, as for Aristotle, consista in
being campletely indeterrninate and, therefore, needs ta be determined,
41. Clarke, IIThe Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotel ianism or Neoplatonism," 179. In this paper
Clarke argues very convincingly that Aquinas combines two quite different notions of the
relationship between act and potency. One notion derived from Greek philosophy and shared
by Aristotle is the notion of limitation of potency by act; the other of Neoplatonic origin
is the notion of limitation of act by potency. This latter, he argues, cannot plausibly be
ascribed to Aristotle for whom infinity is not a sign of perfection. Cf. also Little/s
îemark that: "Aristotle never mentions the principle of the l imitation of the act by the
potency, ••• But he never adverts to the corollary that therefore individuation is
limitation, thet being this is not~being that or is the exclusion of the other. He does
not therefore co~":'eive of matter as a principle of limitation, lTlJch less as a limit. 1I
(Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 188-189).
-- 310 --
defined, divid~d, and limited by ferro. In ether words, ScotUB thinks
that the ferm, in itself not unlimited or infinite, doea not need ta be
1imited by the potentia1ity of matter:
quia forma finitur per materiam; ergo guae non est nata esse
in materia, est infinita. Hoc reputo nihi1 valere, quia
secundum ipsos, Angelus qui est immaterialis, non eet
infinitus natura. Numquid esse posterius essentia, secundum
ipsos, essentiam finitabit? Unde quaelibet eat.i.tas habet
gradum intrinsecum perfectionis, non par aliud ans. Et si
forma finitur ad materiam, ergo si non ad illam, non
finitur: fallacia est Consequentis. Corpus finitur ad
corpus; igitur si non ad corpus, est infinitum. Sophisma
est tartii Physicorum: quia corpus prius in se finitur, ita
forma finita prius in se, finita est, quia scilicet prius
est talis natura in entibus, quam finiatur per materiam: nam
secunda finitas praesupponit primam, et non causat eam;
prius ergo in aliquo signo naturae est essentia finita: ergo
non est finibilis per esse; ergo in secundo signo non
fini tur per esse. 42
This passage makes it very c1ear that actua1ity need not be
1imited by potentia1ity. For 5cotus the perfection of the species is
the sarne in each individual under that species. According ta him it is
simp1y necessary to individuate each particu1ar by means of the
'haecceitas', which, however, doea not fill the role of limiting
principle in the sense of limiting the perfection of the apecies. In
substances compased of matter and forro, as we will see shartly, ScotUB
like Aristatle thinks that it ia ferro which limita and determines
matter. It 6eems, then, that ScatU9 with his notion of 'haecceitas'
succeed6 in keeping Aristotle's picture of the relationship between
actua1ity and potentia1ity intact.
42. John Duns Scotus, De Primo RerllTl OmnillTl Principio, cap. IV, n. 30; cf. also John Duns Scotus,
Ordinat;o, Lib. II, d. 111, pars l, q. VII, n. 236.
-- 311 --
( In Aquinas's case the situation ia different. Aquinas quite
clearly adroits a second composition between potentiality and actuality
ether than the one between matter and forro, i.e., the one between
essence and existence. This composition suffices te make angels
different from Gad. This ia precisely where the notion of limitation of
act by potency originally cornes in. Aquinas, in fact, thinks that if
this distinction were not available angels would be indistinguishable
from God because nothing would 1imit their actuality. The distinction
between essence and existence, however, ia not sufficient ta allow there
ta be distinct angels within a given species. For this Aquinas thinks
he should require the composition of matter and ferro which, however, ie
not present in the Gupernatural world. Hence he arrives at the theory
that there is only one angel per species. The remaining question iB
whether this on1y ref1ects Aquinas's be1iefs regarding the individuation
of spiritual substances and their differentiation from God, or whether
it also involves the notion that, in arder to limit the actuality af a
substantial fc~, the potentiality of matter le required at ail levels
at which such romposition of matter and farro i6 found. l think that
Aquinas be1ieves that the notion of the limitation of act by potency
app1ies at a11 1eve1s of composition, and that he thinks that any form
woula be infinitë and wou id conta in the who le perfection of the species
if the potentia1ity of matter were not present to limit its actua1ity.
If this were not the case, Aquinas wou~d not hold that ane ange"
possesses the perfection of the whole spec~~s.
(
-- 312 --
The following passages confirm the fact that for ~cotUB it ia nct
the potentiality of matter whieh limita the form, but the aetuality of
form whieh limita the matter:
similiter licet probet non esse necessarium compositurn

terminari, sed tantum materiam, taroen non probat quod non
ait -possibile; potest enim forma produci a Dea, non quasi de
materia naturaliter praesupposita. 43
And:
forma enim determinat sibi membra convenientia, et

distinguit, non autem materia respectu taliurn actuum,
materia enim·non distinguit formam, sed e conversa. 44
For Aquinas the evidence ia just as conclusive that he universally
holda both prineiplea: that of the limitation of aet by poteney and that
of the limitation of poteney by net:
finitur autern quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per

materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia,
antequam recipiat formarn, est in potentia ad multas formas:
Forma vero finitur per materlam, inquantum forma, in se
considerata, communis est ad multa: sed per hoc quod
recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate huius rei. 45
And:
omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in

quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum
recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo
terminatur: Deus autem est actus nullo modo Jn alio
43. John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. V, q.
XI, n. 22.
44. John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, lib. II, d. XVI, quaest. uniea, n. 14.
Cf. also the following passage: Ilforma autem est principal ior ratio distinetionis quam
materia, quia sieut forma est prineipalius quo 'compositum' est, quam materia, ita est
principalius quo 'eompositum' est unum, et per consequens in se indistinctum et ab alio
distincttnl. lI (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. II, d. III, pars 1, qq. V et VI, n. 209).
45. Thomas Aqulnas, SlJTITJa Theolo9iae, Lib. 1, q. 'JII, a. 1 resp.

-- 313 --
existens: quia nec est forma in materia, Relinqu~tur

( igitur ipsum esse infinitum. 46
And again:
ornnis enim forma in propria ratione, si abstracte

consideretur, infinitatem habet; sicut in albedine abstracte
intellecta, ratio albedinis non est finita ad aliud. 47
46. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. XLIII.
47. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, lib. l, d. XLIII, q.
1, a. 1 salutio. Cf. also the following rather conclusive passage: "nuLLus enim aetus
invenitur finir; nis; per potentiam que est eius receptiva: inveninxJs enim formas l imitar;
c secundum potentiam materl~.11 (Thomas Aquinas, Opera Dmnia, Vol. XLII, Compendium TheoLo9iae
(Iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae: Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-1971), cap.
XVIII; all subsequent citations from this work are to this edition).
-- 314 --
..,.
THE ESSENTIAL WITY OF THE COMPOSITE
AND THE ISSUE OF THE PLURA:LITY OF FORMS
As we turn now ta our last two tapies, it should be remembered
that in our discussion of the actuality of matter we saw that if ~quinas
can be accused of failing ta account for the composition of the
'composite substance', Scotus cao equally easily be accused of failing
te give a satisfactory account of the essential unit y of the composite.
This part of scatus's system is charged with entai1ing at 1east twa
unacceptable consequences. Firstly, it ie rnaintained that his views
make matter, and nct the composite substance, the ontologically most
basic unity. According ta Scotus, matter ia actual of itself; it cao
(by God's abs~lute power) exist without any ferro informing it at aIl;
and matter, as weIl as forro, iB individuated before it becomes part of
Lhe composite. Secondly, Scotusls views on the actuality of matter are
accused of destroying the essential unit y of the composite. As a
consequence of his claims that matter has sorne actuality of its own, and
iB individuated before it becomes part of the composite, his opponents
cao accuse him of having eli~inated at least two reasons for the
composite's 'per se' unity: the fact that matter ia potential and form
is actual, and the fact that matter and form become individuated only
when they are together in the composite, i.e., the fact that matter and
forro outside the composite are nct individuals.

-- 315 --
(: The accusations brought up againet those who maintain that matter
ha~ sorne actuality of its own issue, then, partly fram considerations
allah as these.
In order ta understand this dispute, it ie important ta keep in
mind that for Scotus the emphasis lies on the composition of substances,
whereas for Aquinas it lies on the unit y of the composite. For scotus,
in fact, it ia a contradiction that matter should be said ta be a part
of the composite and that at the sarne time it should be considered ta
have no actua1ity at a11.
An additional but nct unrelated cause for dissension i5 afforded
by the fact that Scotus defends the rea1 distinc'tion between matter and
form. His opponents cannat see how two really distinct entities of allch
different natures could be apt to be brought together to form a being
which ie essentially one. Scotus's defence against this accusation
consists in claiming that it is precisely the fact that they are
dissimilar which makes them more apt to form together a being which is
essentially one:
quomodo igitur ex quo Eunt duo principia distincta et primo

diversa possunt constituere aliquid unum simpliciter? Dico
quod quando aliqua sunt magis distincta et diversa,
formaliter. tanto sunt magis disposita ad faciendum per se
unum, quia in illa constitutione non requiritur similitudo
in natura, sed proportio conveniens, quae potest esse inter
primo diversa. 48
It is interesting ta note in this connection that in the
composition of the human soul, according to those who defend the unity
48. John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes in Libres Sententiar~, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 16. Cf. alse
(: Jehn Duns Scotus, Quaestienes Subtilissimae super Libres Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib.
VIII, q. IV, n. 6.
-- 316 --
of the soul, the elements which c~~e te ferro the one soul i.e., the
vegetative, sensitive, and intellective soul -- are found separately in
ether composites and must therefore be said ta be really distinct and
independent entities. Furthermore, this happens naturally and not, as
in the case of ferm and matter, through the absolute power of God. Yet
the advocates of the unity of soul find that it is quite .:',asonable to
argue that these three souls, which are oiten found in nature as really
distinct and in different composites, should be united as different
powers of the human soul ta ferro somethL1g which ia nct only essentially
one, but which ia the cause of the essential unit y of the composite
substance. Theae sarne philosophera argue that it ia impossible for two
really distinct entities, such as matter and form, which could anly be
found separate in nature through Gad's absolute power, ta come together
ta make something essentially one.
The evidence that they are distinct from each other is that
each one posscsses a separate existence; hence one cannat be
the other. The vegetative is like the genus ta the species;
it is therefore in plants as weil as in animais; but plants
and animaIs are specifically diversified. Nevertheless,
from the fact that each taken separately is specifically
distinct, it does not follow that they are also distinct
substances when they are united. 49
Not only can this type ci argument be used to argue that matter
and ferm, theugh really distinct entities, can come tegether ta ferm
something essentially one, as it is argued to be possible for the three
different souls in man, but it can also be used to argue that if there
are really distinct soule in man, as we will see the pluraliste argue,
they can still cerne together ta ferro something which is esaentially one.
,""
. f-"
49. caHus, liT he Origins of the Problem of the Unit y of Form,lI 265-266.
-- 317 --
..
(" This cun be done provided that it can also.be held that each of the
souls, excluding the most perfect, is still in potentiality to the
following one, and that only the advent of the last soul can be said ta
make the composite a complete being and essentially one.
A second objection claims that if matter, as weIl as forro, ia in
act there will be no generation and corruption, but only alteration
because aIl forms which come ta a being in act are accidentaI forms and
only cause accidentaI change.
Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse

simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae jam existenti in actu per
aliquam formam, non erit forma substantialis. Sed hac
positione facta, sola prima forma, quae faceret esse
substantiam actu, easat subatantialis; aliae vero amnes
accidentales; quia forma substantialis est quae facit hoc
aliquid, ut jam dictum est, art. 1. 50
Scotus's reply to this criticism makes appeal again to Aristotle's
main motivation for introducing the notion of matter in hie natural
philosophy. Scotus argues in effect that, far from eliminating the
distinction between generation and alteration, his view secures it,
whereas there could be no generation and corruption but only creation
and annihilation if the view that matter ia pure patentiality were ta be
accepted.
Praeterea, si materia non est distincta a forma, non est

possibilis aliquéi mutatio substantialis. Probe per
Philosophum 5 Phys. mutatio quaedam est de non subjecto in
subjectum, alia a subjecto in non subjeetum, alia de
subjecto in subjeetumi de non subjeete autem in non
subjectum est impessibilis: sed omnia mutatio est aliter se
habentis. Tune sic: generatio est mutatio de non subjecto
in subjectum, corruptio est a subjecto in non subjeetumi
igitur est ibi aliquid aliter se habentis. si igitur non
50. Thomas Aquinas, QUaest. Un.! De Anima, a. IX resp.i cf. aLso Thomas Aquinas, Summa TheoLo9iae,
Lib. J. q. LXXVI. a. IV resp.
-- 318 --
est ibi materia, quae ponitur subjectum cormnune, igitur

generatio non est a non Bubjecto in subjectum, ... 51
Furthermore, argues Scatus, if composite substances are nct
composed of at least two parts, bath of which are actual, then they are
not in any way different from simple substances. As it is, they have a
unit y which ia different fram the unit y of simple substances:
sicv~ ergo omnino simplex se toto est ens et unum, ita ans
~ompositum ex principiis etJsentialibuB aius, sicut materia
et forma, quae sola nata sunt aliquod ans par se
constituera, est unum per se, et hoc propria unitate
51terius rationis ab unitate simplicia, sicut et ab
entitate, altera est encitas. S2
The type of unit y which ia essentially one, scotus'e opponents
argue, ia nct produced by two beings in act but by two beings one of
which is in potentia1ity and the other in actuality. In the Commentary
on the Metaphysics Aquinas asks what it is which makes man one and not
many:
unde merito dubitatur quid est quod faciat definitionem

hominis esse unam, et hominem cuius ratio est definitio.
eum enim homo sit animal et bipes, quae videntur e=se duo,
merito dubitatur quare homo est unum et non plura. 53
In book VIII of the Metaphysics, which Aquinas is discussing
here, Aristotle explains how it i5 impossible that the definition of man
shou1d be one if the P1atonic theory of Forms is accepted. If, in other
51. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libres Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII. q. 1, n. 6. Atso quoted
D~ "ot~ n. 17, section l, chapter III above.
52. John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes Subtitissimae super Libros Metaphysicoïum Aristotelis, Lib. VIII,
q. IV, n. 2; cf. atso John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes subtilissimae super Libros
Metaphysicerum Aristotelis, Lib. VIII, q. IV, n. 3; and note n. 27, section l, chapter III
above.
53. inomas Aquinas, In Duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, lib. VIII, lect. V, n.
1756.
-- 319 --
words, man ia composed of the idea 'man', and the idea 'animal', and the
ides 'two-footed', it ia clear, he argues, that neither the definition
nor the abject defined can be one. This problem cffers yet more
evidence that PIato ' s theory of Forms cannat be accepted as a viable
basis for the exp1anation of phenomena in the physica1 wor1d and of the
composition of man. It is c1ear, then, that the theory which ho1ds that
Forms, or universals, are separate entities should be rejected. A
better theory in this context, and one which explains Qan's unit y and
the unit y of the defiLition of man, ia that which tries te explain the
composition of man, for exarnple, through an account of the physic~l
elements of which man ia compo8~d: i.e., matter and ferro.
primo proponit unde appareat via ad solutionem dubitationis;

dicens, manifestum esse quod si aliqui acceptent quod dictum
est de positione Platonis, et transmutent sic naturas rerum,
quod ponant universalia separata, sicut Platonici
determinare et dicere consueverunt, non contingit reddere
causam unitatis hominis, et solvere dubitationem praedictam.
Sed, si ponatur, sicut dictum est supra, quod in
definitionibus sit unum sicut materia, aliud sicut forma;
unum sicut potentia, aliud sicut actus: quaestio taro facilis
est ad solvendum, quod dubitationem non videtur habere. 54
According to this view, it is of course crucial that one part of
the composite be potentia1 and the other actua1. Shou1d they both be
actua1, Aquinas thinks, the prob1em just solved shou1d come back to the
center of the discussion: the definition of man, or of anything sa
composed for that matter, shou1d again be made up of two parts, both
54. St. Thomas Aquinas, ln Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Excositio, Lib. VIII, Lect. V,
n. 1758. This discussion is directed more specifically to the problem of the plurality of
forms which will he discussed shortly. It applies to the problem of the actuality of
matter to the extent that the advocates of the pure potentiality of matter hold the view
that the essential unity of the composi'.:is compromised not o~ly by the existence in it of
more th an one substantial form, but also by the existence in it of more than one actual
element, whether that element be form or matter.
-- 320 --
actual, and man aIse would be made up of at least two parts, again bath
actual, and would, therefore, be two and nct one.
Non enim fit simpliciter unum ex duobus actibus, sed ex

potentia et actu, inquantum id quod est potentia, fit actu;
et propter hoc homo albuB non est simpliciter unum; sed
animal bipes est simpliciter unum, quia hoc ipsum qucd est
animal est bipes. 55
Scotus's reply here is partially going to admit the truth of the
statement of his opponents, but will quai ify it by means of his
distinction between two senses of beinq in potentiality and two senses
of being in actuality.
Et nescivit Philosophus aliam dare, niai quia hoc est actus,

et illud potentia, ita quod hoc est potentia essentialiter
receptiva secundum totum genus suum, et illud actus
essentialiter perficiens aliud, et idee e~ his fit unum per
se, scilicet ex materia et forma. Non sic est de subjecte
et accidente, quia enim tam materia quam ferma sunt causae
intrinsecae entis cempesiti, idee faciunt per se unum;
albedo vere et heme nen sunt causae intrinsecae, quia heme
in ultima actualitate sua petest esse sine albedine, et idee
nec per se habet petentialitatem ad albedinem, et idee
tantum faciunt unum per accidens. 56
Matter, however, though its essence is that it ia in petentiality
te being actualized by a ferm, ia nct enly potential:
55. Thomas Aquinas, CUBest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. III resp.; cf. also the following:
"quia ex diversis actu existentibus non fit aliquid unlll1 per se: ••• 11 (Thomas Aquinas,
auaest. Un., De Anima, a. XI resp.). Both of the arguments from which these passages are
taken are directed Bgainst the thesis that there is a plurality of souls in man. Because,
however, the point stressed is that this is impossible since it implies the existence in
man of more than one component which is actual, they can and are, in fact, taken 6S
arguments aeainst the view that the actuality of matter does not threaten the essentiel
unity of the composite.
56. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XII, q. 1, n. 14. For the
same explanetion see also: John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. l,
n. 17; John Duns Scetus, auaestiones in Libres Sententiarun, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 53;
John Duns Scetus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarun, Lib. III, d. Il, q. II, n. 10; John
~,.
Duns Scotus, Quaestiones Cuodlibetales, q. l, n. 4; and, finally, John Duns Scotus,
Quaestl0nes Quodlibetales q. IX, n. 5.
j
-- 321 --
sed accipiendo actum primo modo, prout actus dicit entitatem

positivam distinctarn a sua causa, qua est extra suam causam
tanquam differentia entie, sic ex duobus in actu fit unum,
imo nunquam fit unum, niai ex duobuB sic in actu, quia non
potest fieri unum ex duobus, nisi utrumque ait aliquid
positivum extra Buam causam, nisi fieret unum ex aliquo et
nihilo. 57
Furthermore, Scotus thinks that his position has been
misunderstood, ainee his opponents seern ta think that because matter ia
a beinq with sorne actuality of its own, matter ia aiso a being
completely independent, completely determinate, and in need of no other.
This, of course, ia a mistaken interpretation of 5cotus'S theory. He
thinks, in fact, that the only substance which is fully complete and
self sufficient is the composite substance: both the matter and the form
are partial entities.
Sed illa ratio substantiae est par se existere separabiliter

ab aliis, non dependens ab aliis. Sed illud non convenit
materiae, nisi par formam. Et ad dictum Philasophi, quad
substantia prima non dicitur talia solum, quia subatat
aliia, sed quia siatit in se, non dependens, et intelligitur
iata camparatie respectu secundarum substantiarum et
accidentium, non res'Ç)ectu formae qua subsistit subatantia
prima. 58
It is also true, however, that they are both essential parts of
the composite because they are both principles and causes both of its
existence and of the very fact that it can be called a composite:
quia ergo per se et essentialiter convenit materiae esse

causam entis compositi in suo ordine, et similiter est
essentiale formae in sua genere, idee ex hoc habent unitatem
essentialem ad invicem in une composite. Non enim forma est
causa essentialiter rei secundum se, sed in ordine ad
57. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. l, n. 18. For the same argument
see also John Duns Scotus, Ouaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XII. q. 1, nn.
13-14.
58. John Duns Scetus, Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libres Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Lib. VII,
q. VI, n. 2.
-- 322 --
materiam, et similiter e conversa. Et ex opposite hoc est

causa quare ex homine et albo non pote st unum fieri par
se. 59
In the final analysis, however, Scotus thinks that, if the reasons
already given are nct considered satisfactory, no further reason can be
given for the essential unit y of the composite. This unit y ia juat a
'passio entie':
dico quod unum par se est pasaie entie, et haee val

immediata, ita quod nihi1 est medium, par quod posait
demonstrari aliud ab ente et quidditate rei; val si est alia
passio media, non est illa nobis netier de ente, et sicut
unum in communi est pasaie entie in communi immediata, ita
in speciali unum talia entie est immediate consequens natura
ejus, nec potest demonstrari par aliquid nobis notiuB val
prius. 60
It is quite possible that Scotus may think that what assures us of
the essential unity of the composite substance and what makes that unity
different from the unity proper to the composition of substance and
accident i.s that sarne entity which makes the substance an individual.
The 'haecceity' is, in fact, the conditio sine qua non of numerical
unity.
Item per eadem rationem, per quam repugnat alicui dividi in

aliqua, per earndem rationem habet unitatem suam positivam
repugnantem i11i divisioni, sicut patet de differentia
specifica, ••• 61
59. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. J, n•. ~. Cf. also John Ouns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. J, n. 17; and John Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. 111, d. Il, q. JI, n. 9.
60. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. J, n. 16; cf. also John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. JI, d. XII, q. l, n. 15j John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XII, q. l, n. 13j and John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
Quodlibetales, q. IX, n. 4.
61. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VI, n. 4.
-- 323 --
However effective may be Scotus's replies ta the attacks mounted
against hie position on the actuality of matter, his position 5eeme ta
become even more problematic with the introduction of a plurality of
forma in the composite. Whether Scotus accepta the theory of the
plurality of forms, and if he doea, ta what extent he accepte it, ia the
next tapie l propose ta discusse In the course of that discussion we
will see that the attacks against what is generally called the pluralist
position will be added ta those already mounted against the consequences
of the actuality of matter for the essential unit y of the composite.
The Pluralists, who generally also believe in the actuality of
matter, der ive their name from the fact that they 9ubscribe te the
theory that there ;'s a plurality of forms in one composite.
Aquinas, as an advocate of the unit y of ferm in man and in aIl
composites, believes that there is, and can only be, one forro in each
composite: in holding this view he also believes that he is faithful to
Aristotle's intentions. Roughly speaking, the two positions differ in
the following way. The Pluralists believe that corresponding to each
determination in a composite there is a forro: this means that if the
mixture, for example, manifests the qualities of three of the elements
that means that it contains the forms of those three elements, not only
potentially, but actually. The same is true, and this is the point
around which the medieval debate primarily centers, for animaIs and man.
This means that in man there is a ferro corresponding to each power of
the soul: i.e., a vegetative forro, a sensitive forro, and an intellectual
forro, as weIl as a forro 9f corporeity which is that which makes the

( matter a body apt to receive aIl further determinations.
-- 324 --
The Unitarian position, claLming the authority of Aristotle,
argues, on the ether hand, that there ia no reason for believing that
there should be a really distinct and actually existing form
corresponding ta each determination displayed by the composite, or, in
the case of man, corresponding te each power of the soula It ia simply
necessary that aIl the forms responsible for the activities observable
in the composite should be virtually or potentially contained in the
substantial ferm of the composite. According te this view, for example,
the qualities observable in the mixture can be accounted for by saying
that the mixture cantaine the forms of the elements responsible f.or
those qualities not actually, but only potentially. The same is true of
man in whom the intellectual soul ia said te contain virtually the
corporeal ferro, the vegetative soul, and the sensitive soul. With this
view, then, it is possible ta explain the presence in man of
intellectual, sensitive, and vegetative powers without having recourae
te an accounc positing the existence of more than one soul in man.
According to the advocates of the unit y of the soul, their theory has
the added, and not unimportant, advantage of preserving the essential
unit y of the composite, which, they claim, their opponents's views have
the disadvantage of destroying.
Aquinas himself places great importance on the essential unit y of
the composite, not only in man, but in aIl composites. This, in great
part, is due to the fact that he believes the theory of the plurality of
forms to be incompatible with those basic principles of Aristotle's
philosophy which he himself accepts:

-- 325 --
serl t.,3,ec positio, secundum vera Philosophiae principia, quae

consideravit Aristoteles, est impossibilis. 62
The belief in the unit y of the Boul in man ia thus a necessary
consequence of, as weIl as a power fuI reasan for, holding the view,
undoubtedly Aristotelian in origin, that the soul ia united ta the body
as the form of that body, and nct, as Plata had believed, as a mator ta
that which ia moved. Aquinas believes, in fact, that if the Platonic
picture of the union between Boul and body ia accepted, then it ia aiso
possible to accept without inconsistency the theory of the plurality of
souls in manu On the Platonic view, in fact, man is nct a composite of
forro and matter, but a soul using a body: the union between the body and
the seul ia nct essential but ooly accidentaI. If, on the ether hand,
one accep~B the Aristotelian picture of the soul as the form of the
body, then it is necessary to hold that there can be no m~re than one
Bubstantial form in man, and, as a matter of fact ~in any composite.
Si enim anima rationalis unitur corpori solum per contactum

virtualem, ut motor, ut aliqui posu~runt, nihil prohibebit
dicere quod sint multa media inter animam et corpus; et
magis inter animam et rnateriam primam. Si vero ponatur
anima uniri corpori ut forma, necesse est dicere quod
uniatur ei immediate. omnis enim forma, sive substantialis,
sive accidentalis, unitur materiae vel subjecto. 63
According to Aquinas, then, the belief in the essential unity of
man requires that the soul be the forro of the body, and, in turn, the
view ti:..t the soul is the form of the body immediately entails the
essential unit y of the composite. At Aquinas's time, the view that the
62. Thomas Aquinas, QUaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 111 resp.
63. Thomas Aquinas, QUaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. III resp. Cf. also the following:
"sed si pon8ll'l.ls animam corpori uniri sicut formam, OfTllino impossibi le videtur plures animas
per essentiam differentes in une corpore esse." (Thomas Aquinas, SLmna Theologiae, Lib. 1,
q. LXXVI, a. III resp).
-- 326 --
soul is the form of the body was generally considered a threat to the
immortality of the soule It was believed that the Aristotelian view
would make it problematic for the soul, as the form of the body, to
achieve immortality once separated fram the body. It was aiso
considered important te stress that the Boul ia a 'hoc aliquid' and
s~mething 'per se subsistens', a substance in itself capable of
independent existence as well as of being the form of the body.~ In
confirmation of these misgivings about the consequences of accepting the
Aristotelian view of the human soul, Aquinas doee in fact say that the
soul when separated fram the body ia nct a complete substance nor a
species, but that it ie only part of a species, and ia, therefore, noL a
'hoc aliquid' in the full sense. It should be stressed, however, that
Aquinas thinks none of these claims to be incompatible with a belief in
the immortality'of the soul.
Unde anima licet posait esse et intelligere a corpore

separata, tamen non habet perfectionem suae naturae cum est
separata a corpore; ut Augustinus dicit , XII Super Genes.
ad litteram, cap. xxxv. 65
Again in the Quaestiones D.isputatae he answers an objection to the
effect that, if the seul is not itself a species and an 'hoc aliquid'
and 'per se subsistens', then it will be impossible ta held that once
the body perishes the soul survives. Hie answer consiste in maintaining
that it ia indeed true that the soul ie nct a species, but only a part
of one. According to Aquinas however, this does not imply that the soul
cannot survive the body.
64. For a more ~e!~iled discussion of the issues involved in this debate, see Pegis, St. Thomas and
the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century, 26·34.
65. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. Il ad quintum.

-- 327 --
Ad vigeeimumprimum dicendum quod anima licet per se posait

esse, non tamen per se habet speciem, eum ait pars
speciei. 66
Aquinas also believes that the soul, though it survives the body,
ia not properly p.peaking a 'hoc aliquid': it can, in fact, be said ta be
a 'hoc aliquid' because it ia subsistent and hence can survive the
body's demiee, but it ia not a 'hoc aliquid' in the rnost strict sense
because that would imply that it is a complete substance.
Relinquitur igi.tu\: quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se

potens subsistere; non quasi habens in se completam speciem,
sed ~~asi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et
sic ~imiliter est forma et hoc aliquid. ~ •• Ad tertium
dicenclum, quod anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut
substantia, completam speciem habens; sed sicut pars
habentis spec~cm completam, ut ex dictis patet. 67
66. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Un., De Anima, a. XIV ad XXI. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. XCIV.
67. Thomas Aquinas, auaest. Un., De Anima, a. 1 resp. and ad tertium. Cf. also the following
passages: lIanima autem rational is, quantun ad al iquid potest dici hoc al iquid, secundum hoc
quod potest esse per se subsistens. Set quia non habet speciem completam, set magis est
pars speciei, non ormino campetit ei quod si! hoc al iquid." (Thomas Aquinas, Opera Onnis,
Vol. XLVII, Sentencia libri de Anima (Iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P. M. edita: Romae:
Typographia Polyglotta, 1882-1971), lib. II, cap. 1, nn. 108·113; all subsequent citations
fram this work are to this edition); and also: lIal ia opinio est Aristotel is, Il De Anima,
cap. XI, quam ormes moderni sequuntur, quod anima unitl.1i corpod sicut forma materiae: unde
anima est pars humanae naturae. et non natura quaedam per se: et quia ratio partis
contrariatur rationi personae, ut dictum est, ideo anima separata non potest dici persona:
quia quarnvis separata non sit pars actu, tamen habet naturam ut sit pars •••• Ad t~rtium
dicendum, quod anima ~ationalis dicitur hoc aliquid per modum quo esse subsistens est hoc
aliquid, etiam si habet natura partis; sed ad rationem personae exigitur ulterius quod sit
toturn et eompletum. 1I (Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in lib. 111 Sententiarum, (Frette, Mare
eds.: Paris: Vives, 1871-80), d. V, q. III, a. Il solutio and ad tertium; all subsequent
citations fram this work are te this edition). It sheuld be noted ineidentally that Seotus
agrees with Aquinas's assessment of the status of the hunen soul. Scotus in fact says
thet: lIanima proprie non est species, sed pars speciei: et talT':~jl ipsa est prima ratio
distinguendi su~m speciem cuius est pars ab angelo, et idee prima ratio distinetionis
specificae ex parte speciei suae est in ipsa." (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio; Lib. Il, d. l,
q. VI, n. 318). Sharp, quoting part of the same passage, claims that it might be Scotus's
intention to imply that the soul and the angels are of the same species. Cf. Sharp,
Francisean Philosophy et Oxford in the XIIIth Cent ury, 315. In this she is certainly
wrong: for further confirmation of this, cf. also John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. II, d.
1, q. VI, n. 301.
-- 328 --
.. "..
According te Aquinas, the unit y of the Bubstantial ferm ia also a
consequence of the most basic principle~ of the Aristotelian theory of
change. Aristotle believes that, in the process of generation and
corruption, ta each generatian corresponds a corruption during which the
previous form leaves the composite and the new form takes its place~ A
clear consequence of this theory ia the denial of the possibilit.y of a
plurality of substantial forms in one composite.
Et quia materia nunquam denudatur ab omni forma; propter hoc

quandocumque recipit unam formam, perdit aliam, et e
conversa. Sic ergo dicimus quod in hoc homine non est alia
forma substantialis quam anima rationalis; et quod per eam
homo non solum est homo, sed animal, et vivum, et cortus, et
subs~an~ia e~ ens. 58
Starting from the eaaential unity of man and believing the Beul te
be the form of the body, i.e., the first perfection and act of the body,
Aquinas thus thinks that, aince the seul i8 that which gives existence
ta the body and since man is essentially one, there should ooly be one
such source of existence in each man. 69 He also thinks t ~t it ia the
first substantial form, and not any other, which gives the composite its
being.
Quia omnis formae quae advenit post aliquid esse

substantiale est forma accidentalis. Si eniro post esse in
genere substantiae constitutum advenit, ergo, ea recedente,
adhuc remanet individuum in genere substantiae; quod est
contra ratianem formae substantialis, sicut dicitur in II De
Anima, texte 8. Et praeterea, cum ornnis forma det aliquod
68. Thomas Aquinas, CUaest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. III resp; emphasis added.
69. As Pegis explains: "the ullity of man requires that there be a unique principle of existence in
the c~site, and as it is the soul which lS the principle of man's existence, it ITlJst !Je
through the soul that man exists. In other words, the existence which belengs te the saut
as B subs~stent form will become the existence of the being of which it is a form: 'ess~
enim conjuncti non est ni5i esse formae,.11 (Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the SOl!l
in the Thirteenth Century. 139). Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Lib. 1, q.
LXXVI, a. III resPi and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. II, cap. LVIII.
-- 329 --
esse, et impossibile ait unam rem habere duplex esse

( substantiale, oportet, si prima forma substantialis
adveniena materiae det sibi esse substantiale, quod secunda
superveniens det esse accidentaIe: et idee non est alia
forma qua i9ni9 est i90i8, et qua est corpus, ..• 70
This soul in man, of course, ie the rational soul:
unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in

homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; ... 71
The Franciecan tradition, on the ether hand, partly as a
consequence ~f sorne of the considerations mentioned earlier, normally
holds that which, up te Aquinas's time, was beyond discussion the more
popular theory. The theory in question maintains that the soul is a
'hoc aliquid' in a sense stronger than the sense attributed te the
expression by Aquinas: in the sense, indeed, that the seul i8 a person
in its own right and is united to the body only accidentally. This view
also allows followers of the Franciscan tradition to hold (and the two
beliefs, though not entailed by one another, are often found together)
that there is more than one forro in each composite. They affirm, as we
saw, the existence of a form of corporeity and more generally the
existence of different forms to correspond to different facuities of the
soul. Many aiso maintain a plurality of forms in ail composi~e
substances, even to the extent of admitting the reai separate existence
of the forms of the elements in the mixture.
70. Thomas Aquinas, Conmentariun in Lib. II Sententiarum, d. XVIII, q. 1, a. Il solutio. Ct. also
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. LXXVI, a. IV resp.; Thomas Aquinas, ~
Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. III ad XIV; and Thomas Ac:.'j.1'las, Surrma Contra Gentites,
Lib. Il, cap. LVIII.
(
71. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, lib. l, q. LXXVI, a. IV resp.
-- 330 --
Scotus, it 8eeme, cannet be placed fully on either side of this
debate. He certainly accepte the Aristotelian and Thomist view of the
behaviour of the elements in the mixture. He, like Aquinas,72 thinks
that the elements are contained in the mixture nct lactu' but only
'virtute':
dico ergo, quod quatuor elementa manent in une mixte,

virtualiter habente formam 8ubstantialern, continentem in
virtute formas elementorum; non tamen secundum substantiam,
ut partes sui, sed propter praedictam convenientiam et
continentiam virtualem, et pro hoc videtur esse Philosophus,
qui dicit quod manent potentia et virtute. n
The fact that he only admits the presence of the elements in the
mixture 'in virtute', and nct 'in actu', provides preliminary evidence
that ScotUB is not inclined to allow for a plurality of forms in
inanimate composites. As a matter of fact, Scotus seems to admit a
plurality of souls only in animate substances.
sic in proposito, forma animae non manente, corpua rnanet, et

idee universaliter in quolibet animato, necesse est ponere
illam formam, qua corpus est corpus, aliam ab illa, qua est
animatum; non autem loquor de illa, quae est corpus, hoc est
individuum corporis, quod est genus, nam quodcurnque
individuum sua forma taliter est corpus, ut corpus est
genus, et habens corporeitatem, aed l.'~:":l.uor de corpore ut est
altera pars compositi.~
n. See, for exa~le, the following passage: "ad decinun dicendllTl quod formae elementares non Betu
sunt in mixto seeundum essentiam, licet hoc Avicenna posuerit: non en;m pessent esse in una
parte materiae; si autem essent in diversis partibus, non esset mixtio secundum totum, quae
est vera mixtio; sed esset mixtio minima, quae est mixtio ad sensum. lI (Thomas Aquh'l.o:s,
Cuaest. Un., De Anima, a. IX ~d deeimum>. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib.
1, q. LXXVI, a. IV ad quartllTl.
73. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. II, d. XV. quaest. uniea, n. 7. Cf.
also John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XV, quaest. uniea,
n. 5; John Duns Seotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XV, quaest. uniea,
n. 6; and John Duns Seotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XV, quaest. uniee, nn. 5,6.
..... 74. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 54. Cf. also
John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarun, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 39.
-- 331 --
It se~~s, then, that ScotUB adroits the existence of one ferm,
i. e. , the form of corporeity. in addition to the princiral substantial
form for living composites. His reasens for doing this will beccme
apparent as the discU&Dion progresses. It ia notable, however, that,
though he admits the existence of the ferm of corporeity in animate
substances, ScotUB nevertheless doea nat think that it ia necessary ta
posit more than one ether substantial ferro even in animate substances.
While listing the reasons generally given for limiting the number of
souls in man ta one, Scotus saya that one of them ia tenable:
quarta ratio potest fieri, et plus valet omnibus

praecedentibus. Pluralitas non est ponenda sine
necessitate, ex 1. Physicorum, sed non est necessarium
panera illas plures formas, quia perfectior continet in se
imperfectiorem virtualiter, sicut tetragonum trigonum, ex 2.
de Anima; ergo superfluum est ponere illam aliam distinctam
ab ista perfectiori continente illam.~
Although, as we will see, this is not quite scotus's final
opinion, he does, in effect, depart from the Franciscan tradition in
holding that there in no real distinction between the vegetative, the
sensitive, and the intellectual souls in man. It is reasonable to infer
from this that, presumably, he al 50 does not think a real distinction
between the sensitive and vegetative soul~ in animale is necessary.
More intereeting, however, than the tact that he denies such a necessity
in animals generally is the fact that he denies it in man. This
position, thou~h uncharacteristic of the Franciscan tradition, is
naturally implied by Scotus's beliefs in the Aristotelian nature of the
union betwee~, ~he soul and the body. As we saw, in fact, Scotus agrees
with Aquinas and with Aristotle in holding that the soul is the form of
75. John Duns Scotus, Quaest;enes ;n Libres Sententiarun, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 27.
-- 332 --
the body and not a complete substance in itself. Scotus sometimes talks
as if he thought that the relationship of the lower souls to the
intellectual soul ia analogouB the relationship between the elements and
the mixture.
Dico ergo ~~od

elementa non manent in mixte secundum
sub~Jtantia.m, mansnt ergo in mixte, sicut si diceretur
quod sensitiva et vegetativa manant in intellectiva. 76
He aiso saya that one kind of Boul ia potentially contained in the
other:
ad aliud de vegetativa et sensitiva patat, quia istae sunt

species subordinatae, et una perfecte continet aliam, taroen
dico quod trigonum non est in tetragono, niai pot~ntialiter
tantum. 77
Scotus, then, denies the real distinction between the vegetative,
the sensitive, ~nd the intellectual souls in man, but he aIse denies
that the ooly distinction necessary ia a virtual distinction posited by
Aquinas. Scotus believes that the union between the sensitive, the
vegetative, and the intellectual souls should be characterized by a
formal distinction: i.e., a distinction strenger than a mere virtual
distinction, but weaker than the real distinction posited by the
Augustinian Scheol.
This distinction is not just conceptual and is grounded in
reality, but, while it doee not apply in the order of individuals, it
76. Jo~;n Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros SententiarLlll, Lib. Il, d. XV, quaest. unica, n. 6.
Bettoni also nolds tnat Scotus agrees witn Aquinas and Aristotle in denying the real
distinction between the intellectual soul and the lower souls in man: cf. Bettoni, ~
~, 92-93.
77. John Duns Scotus, Reportata parisiensia, Lib. II, d. JII, q. II, n. 12; and cf. John Duns
Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 8.
-- 333 --
al". applies in the order of essences. Rence, because essences have their
"ll...
own being, this distinction ia based upon reality. Throagh the formaI
distinction the partial forms can almost be said to exist really or
actually in the composite as weil ae virtually in it. In fact, one can
almost s~y that, as the sensitive and vegetative souls of man, they
exist actually in the composite, but as vegetative and sensitive souls
in general, they exist in it only virtually.
This jormal distinction between the souls in man could imply, as
Gilson supposes,78 that the matter cantaine aIl the ether partial forms
and is thereby prepared to receive the intellectual soul. This
interpretation, however, doea nct seern ta be 5upported by many of the
passages just quoted. Although it is difficult to decide between the
two views, l think that the better reading of the role of the formal
distinction is the one which implies that the vegetative and the
sensitive Bouls are contained in the intellectual soul in allch a way
that they come to inform the composite with the intellectual soul.
There ia confirmation of this in Scotus:
sicut anima sensitiva tua est prius natura, quam sit

formalitas intelleetiva, et tamen contradietio est tuam
sensitivam manere sine intellectiva. Similiter forma
specifica albedinis non est res alia a natura coloris, et
tamen impossibile est, et impossibile, non obstante quod
res, a qua aecipitur genus coloris, quae est in albedine,
ait alia formalitas, eonservatur, et non forma specifiea
albedinis. Nunc autem proprietas indivisibilis quamquam sit
posteriuB natura quidditate, nunquam tamen est res alia, sed
est idem identitate eum forma specifica, quarnvis alia
formalitas. 79
78. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 490-497.
79. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. Il, d. XII, q. VIII, n. 8.
-- 334 --
Sharp expresses the sarna feelings in her treatmen~ of this matter:
whether Scotus follows Pecham and Richard in regarding the

vegetative and sensitive souls as weIl as the forma
corporeitatis and its subsidiary forma as part of the matter
of the intellective sL~1 is difficult to decide. Two
passage" seem ta suggest that he does. On the other
hand, certain ether passages imply that these lower souls
are given at the sarne time as the intellect ive form fram
which they are only fo,·mally distinct. 80
As far as Aquinas ia concerned it ie well known, and has already
been noted, that he defends the unity of the soul and that he accepts
only a virtual distinction between the vegetative, the sensitive, and
the intellectual sauls:
sic etiam anima intellectiva virtute continet sensitivam,

quia habet hoc, et adhuc amplius ~ non taroen ita quod sint
duae animae. Si autem diceretur quod anima intellectiva
differret par essentiam a sensitiva in homine, non pessat
assignari ratio unionis animae intel1ectivae ad corpus; cum
nulla operatio propria animae intellectivae sit per organum
corporale. 81
It seems, then, that, excepting the type of distinction they posit
between the intellectual soul and the lower souls in man, Aquinas and
5cotus are in general agreement that there is only one 6ubatantial form
in man and that it ia the intellectual soul. On the distinction which
obtains between the soul and its faculties, on the ether hand, we de not
find agreement between the two. Aquinas, in fact, believes that,
although there is no real distinction between the souls in man, there
80. sharp, Franciscen Philosophy at Oxford in the Xlllth Century. 314-315. The passages to which
she lS referring have already been mentioned and, in view of these and other passages we
have considered, 1 am inclined to favour the second alternative.
81. Thomas Aquinas, CUsest. Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. IIJ resp. Cf. aLso Thomas Aquinas,
Ouaest. Un •. De Anima, a. VIII ad XIV; Thomas Aquinas, Cuaest. Un.: De Anima, a. IX resp.j
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Lib. 1, q. LXXVI, a. III resp.j Thomas Aquinas, ~
Theologiae, Lib. l, q. LXXVI, a. VI ad primumj and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles,
Lib. II, cap. LVIII.
-- 335 --
ia, nevertheless, a real distinction between the soul and its faculties.
He maintains, in fact, that only in Gad are the operations part of Hia
substance ..
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia

animae ait eiua potentiai Primo quia, eum potentia et
actus dividant ens et quodlibet genus entia, oportet quod ad
idem genus referatur potentia et actuB. Et idee, si actus
non est in genere substantiae, potentia quae dicitur ad
ilIum actum, non potest esse in genere substantiae. 82
Aquinas gaes on ta expiain that the operations cf the human soul
are nct contained under the genus of substance, as they are only in the
case of God in Whom they are equal to His substance. This is not the
case for the intellectual soul of man or for any ether creature,
including the angels. Secondly, Aquinas goes on, the fact that the soul
ia not the a~e as ita activities becomes clear just by observing the
soul itself. If, in fact, the soul were essentially the sarne as its
activitiea it would be constantly exercising such activities. This, of
course, ia plainly not the case.
Scotus, on the other hand, does not believe a real distinction
between the soul and its faculties is necessary. By making appeal to
the principle that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity,
which he had already used in his denial of the real distinction between
the intellectual soul and the lower souls in man, he denies that a real
distinction ia necessary between the soul and its faculties. Tc
Aquinas'~ ~~~ument that if the soul were the immediate principle of
activity it would be in constant exercise of these activities, he
Theoi.o9i:'l~, Lib. 1, q. LXXV~{, 8. 1 resp.

82. Thomas Aquinas, SUTTri.13 Cf. aLso Thomas Aquinas,
QU8est. Un .. De Anima, 8. XII ad XV; and Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum
Mag;str; Petr; Lombard;, Lib. l, d. III, q. ~V, 8. ~I soLut;o.
-- 336 --
replies by making appeal ta the distinction between firet and second
act.
Non enim sequitur, anima secundum suam essentiam est actus;

igitur habens ipsam semper operatur, val potest operari
semper; sed bene sequitur, ergo semper est in actu, nec est
simile de dare vitam et operari, quod scilicet, siout est
principium vivendi par essentiam, ita est principium
operandi par essentiam, etCa quia anima est principium
formale, quo vivum est vivum, quia ipsa formaliter dat esse
vivum. Sed anima est principium operationis, secundum quod
reducta ad genuB causae eff icientis, et siout ars se habet
ad effectum, scilicet in genere principii effectivii est
igitur ibi aequivocatio quantum ad irnrnediationem. Uno enim
modo est sic, et alio modo non sic. Est enim anima
immediatum principium formale essendi, et immediatum
principium operandi; sed non similiter se habet ad causam
fermalem et ad effectivam; non enim oportet quod habens
fermam, ait semper in actu secundo. 83
scotua, however, is aware of the danger intrinaic te holding that
there is only a distinction of reason between the soul and its
faculties: in that case, in fact, there would be no difference between
the functioning of the hurnan soul and the functioning of God. Scotus
will conclude, therefore, that there is a formal distinction between the
soul and its faculties, as well as between the intellectual soul and the
lower souls:
similiter iste modo facile est concipere quod una potentia

non continet perfectiones omnium, nec totam perfectionem
ipsius animae, licet ait eadem rea propter distinctionem
formalem. Unde aic CCl"\tenta non continent se mutuo, quia
sunt distincta formaliter et inter se a continente primo cui
idem realiter, unde duo contenta inter se diatinguuntur, et
respectu tertii sunt idem realiter.~
83. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. Il, d. XVI, quaest. unica, n. 6.
84. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Il, d. XVI, quaest. unica, n. 19.
Cf. aLso John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones SubtiLissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum
Ar;stotells, Lib. IX, q. V, n. S.
-- 337 --
Coming back now ta our discussion of the ferro of corporeity, it ia
worth neting that, while adrnitting the existence of the ferro of
corporeity and denying the real distinction between the vegetative, the
sensitive, and the rational soul, 5COtUB at the sarne time holds that it
ia impossible for the sarne matter te be informed by more than one
aubetantial forro:
secundum sic: impossibile est eamdem materiam esse simul sub

duabus formia substantialibu8; sed si possibile ait idem
corpus simul esse in diverais lacis, sequitur oppositum
illius. 8S
Scotus of course believes, and will go on ta prove right after
this passage, that it ia possible for the sarne body te be in different
placee at the sarne time. The examples he gives, however, de not beleng
ta the realm of natural passibility. It is possible, in ether words,
that this phenomenon oeeur, as it does in the resurrection of Christ and
in transubstantiation, but only by the absolute power of Gad.
presumably, however, it is not possible that this happen naturally.
Non minus inconveniens est duo carpera esse simul, quam idem
eOlpus in duadus lacis; sed Dea est possibile primum, sicut
patet de carpore gloriaso et non glariaso; ergo per
seeundum .. B6
as. John Duns Scotus, Cuaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. X, q. II, n. 4.
86. John Duns Scot·.lS, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. X, q. II, n. S. In connection
with this issue it is interesting to note that, while in the Commentary on Boethius's De
Trinitate Aquinas denies that it is possible, by the power of God, that two material bodies
occupy t~e same place, because if this were to happen the two would become one, in the
Cuaestio:',es cuodlibetales he argues that this is not impossible by God's absolute power.
Cf. ThC'iOBs Aquinas, Expositio Super Librull Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, a. III, 1 resp.;
and Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones cUOdlibetales (Spiazzi, ed.: Romae, Taurini: Marietti,
1949). Cuodlib~t 1, q. X, a. II resp.; all subsequent citations fram this work are to this
edition. This may, in turn, mean that Aquinas may have come to place less importance on
the connec:ion between quantity and individuation.
-- 338 --
This, l think, provides evidence for suspecting that Scotus,
having denied the real distinction between the intellectual Boul and the
lower Bouls in man while nct denying a real distinction between the ferro
of corporeity and the ether forms in man, rnay nevertheless nct
characterize the ferro of corporeity as a complete substantial ferro in
the full sense of the term. He doea not, indeed, conceive the ferro of
corporeity as the sarne sort of entity which it ia believed te be by the
Augustinian tradition. B7 The ferro of corporeity according ta ScotUB ia
ooly an incomplete ferro, which i5 shown by the fact that it doea nct
remain in the body very long after the separation of the intellectual
soul. As a consequence, the principle that 'one being cornes from each
form' is denied by Scotus on the grounds that a being can be simple or
cornplex. The fact that a being ia complex does not entail that it is
net one being. According to him, then, the being of the composite ia
only one and cornes to it only through the intellectual soul:
ad primam, conceda primam propositionem, quod unius entis

unum est esse; sed secunda, qued unum esse requirit tantum
unam fermam, neganda est, concede qued formaie esse
totius compesiti est principaliter per unam ferrnam, et illa
forma est, qua totum compositum est hoc ens, iata autem est
uitima adveniens omnibus praecedentibus; et hoc modo totum
compositum c...lviditur in duas partes essentiales, in actum
prcprium, scilieet ultimam formam, qua est illud quod est,
et propriam potentiam illius actus, quae includit materiam
primarn eum omnibus forrnis praeeedentibus. 88
87. See, for example, the comments given in this connection by Bettoni (Betton;, Duns Scoto, 94);
and by Stella (Stella, l' Ilemorfismo di G. Duns Scoto, 198~205 for a general discussion of
the issues involved, and 222~229 for the specifie discussion of the form of corporeity in
Scotus) •
88.. John Duns ScotUS, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarun, lib.. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 46. Cf. John
Duns Scotus, ~uaestiones Subtilissimae super Libres Metaphysicerum Aristotelis, lib. VII,
q. XX, n. 6.
-- 339 --
Earlier we diBcussed the possibility of two interpretations of
Scotus's views regarding the manner in which the lower souls and the
ferm of corporeity come ta inform the matter. One interpretation
maintains that the lower souls as weIl as the ferro of corporeity come te
the matter befere the advent of the intellectual soul; the ether
maintains that the lower souls and the form of corpcr~ity come ta the
,"atter with the intellectual soul. It should be remarked that, while
most of the passages quoted in the context of our prpv~.ouB discussion
support the second view, the last passage quoted supports the first.
There ia, nevertheless, sorne evidence that Scotus may have said that the
partial being te which the intellectual soul gives actuality can be a
compound containing in it a number of partial forms. He rnay have held
this latter view in order to give additional force to his argument that,
although there is only one being per composite, that does not entail the
further proposition that the being needs to be a simple one and that
there can be only one forrn contained in each composite.
A third interpretation of Scotus's views on this issue, and one
which would seern to reconcile his apparently inconsistent statements,
holds that the lower souls, but not the form of corporeity, come to
inform the matter with the intellectual soul. This would mean ~hat the
lower souls, which are only formally distinct from the intellectual
soul, must come ta the matter together with the intellectual soul, while
the form of corporeity, which is really distinct from the intellectual
soul, must come to matter separately. There are, incidentally,
considerations which make it very implausible ta believe that Scatus
deems a formal distinction between the forrn of corpareity and the higher
-- 340 --
Boula te be sufficient ta account for the role performed by the ferro of
corporeity. Just as, for eJ:ample, according ta Scotus it ia nct
plausible ta hold that the ferro of corporeity can remain in the matter
long after the higher Bouls have departed because the ferro of corporeity
ia an incomplete ferm, sa aIse he iB nct likely ta argue that the ferro
of corporeity can be in the matter after the departure of the higher
souls if it ia distinct from them only through a formaI distinction.
scotus, then, if he ie nct ta fail a victim te the very sarne arguments
he uses against Aquinas's view that the quantity iB understood in the
matter baiera the ferro with which it cornes te inform that matter, must
admit that the form of corporeity, in order to be able to remain in the
matter after the higher souls have departed, must be really distinct
from them. Becauee, however, a formaI distinction has a foundation in
reality, it is possible for ScotU8 ta hold that the lower souls, which
are formally distinct parts of the intellectual soul, come ta inform the
matter with the intellectual soul, while also holding the view that
their effects become actualized at different times. As we will see
later, the organization of the matter does not, according ta Scotus,
take place at a time prior te the advent of the intellectual soul, and
the lower seuls, theugh formally distinct frem the intellectual soul,
need not be really distinct from it in order that their effects on the
matter be actualized at different times. They are, as it were, prier in
nature te ~he intellectual soul, and this is compatible with their being
formally, but not really distinct from it.
Regardless of the way the question is decided with respect to the
relationship obtaining between the intellectual soul and the lower

-- 341 --
souls, however, SCOtU8 gives particular attention ta the treatment of
the issue where the ferro of corporeity ia concerned. Scotus feela, in
fact, that the farm of carpareity p1ays a particu1ar1y praminent ra le in
praviding the an1y plausible exp1anatian for a number of natura1
phenomena. For example, ScotUB thinks it te be impossible te explain
how a body can be considered the sarne when dead and when alive and how
it can, for SOrne time after death, ratain the sarne characteristics it
had when alive, without having recouree ta the ferro of corporeity. He
aIse thinks that the ferm of corporeity provides the matter with certain
qualities which it requires ta a certain degree of perfection in order
for the inte11ectual saul ta be able ta infarm that matter.
Licet ergo intellectiva non habeat propriam repugnantiam ad

aliquam formam naturalem, tamen informando materiam,
requirit qualitateB aliquaB, et in gradu aliquo perfecto, in
quo Bi non maneant, ipBa non informabit materiam; illae
autem Bunt qualitateB conBequentes formarn priorern, sed non
necessario requisitae ad esse formae prioris in tanto gradu
in quanta requiruntur ad esse intellectivae in materia. 89
The arganizatian of the body by the form of carpareity is,
however, not prior in time to the advent of the intellectual soul, but
oceurB at the sarne time.
Organisatio primo modo dicta, scilicet, a qua corpus dicitur

organisatum, quae immediate disponit ad animarn
intellectivam, non praecedit tempore animationem etiam in
nabis, quia tune pater nullo modo generaret hominem.
Completa enim esset ejus tota actio prius duratione quarn
esset anima; i11e autem non generat hominem,. cujus actio
tata completa est prius tempore quam ait homo. 90
89. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum, lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 56.
(
90. John Duns Scotus, Quaestienes in Libres Sententiarum, Lib. III, d. Il, q. III, n. S.
-- 342 --
l already mentioned that another reason for Scotus's particular
attention ta the ferro of corporeity i5 the necessity he feels for giving
a plausible explanation both of the fact that the body is the same dead
and alive, and of the fact that the body in animare composites after
death retains aIl the observable characteristics which the living body
once possessed ..
Sic in proposito, forma animae non manante, corpus Manet, et

idee univeraliter in quolibet animato, necesee est panera
illam formam, qua corpus est corpus, aliam ab iIla, qua est
animatum; non autem loquer de iIla, quae est corpus, hoc est
individuum corporis, quod est genus, nam quodcurnque
individuum sua forma taliter est corpus, ut corpus est
genus, et habens corporeitat'?m, sed loquer de corpore, ut
est alia para compositi. 91
Aquinae's reply to this argument consists in hold~ng that the body
doea not, in fact, remain: what doea remain ia not the body, but the
corpse which is different from the body. The body and the corpee may
well be aimilar, but they receive their characteristics from different
forms: before death it is though the inherence of the intellectual soul
that the body is actual.ized, while after death it is through the
inherence ef the ferro of the cerpse. The crucial point here is that as
a direct consequence of Aquinaa's view the human body at deatt changea
species. 92 According te Aquinas evidence fer the contention that the
body is not the sarne at ail is provided by the fact that the parts of
the body cannot perform their previous functions. 93 Scatus would reply
that this is a product of the lack of animation and not of the lack of
91. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarllll, Lib. IV, d. Xl, q. III, n. 54. Ct. also
John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, Lib. IV, d. X, q. III, n. 26.
92. Cf. Landry, Duns Scot, 159.
93. Cf. Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 174.

-- 343 --
the forro of corporeity. What ScotUB ia concerned with ia t~e permanence
of the accidents: on this score he doea nat think that the arguments
produced by those who want to deny the necessity of the form of
corporeity are convincing. Following their claim that the body ia nct
the sarne dead and alive, in fact, they Beern te have no plausible
explanation of the plain fact that the accidents of the two bodies,
assuming they are two bodies, seern indeed ta be the sarne.
Scotus, from the premiss that the body is the sarne de ad and alive
because it ia in bath cases actualized by the saroe ferro of corporeity,
goe8 on te explain how the forro of corporeity remains in the body only
for a time after the separation of the intellect~al soul. This is due
ta its nature as an incomplete forme
Corruptis ergo il1ia dispositionibus in gradu il10, in ~tO

necessario requiruntur ad intellectivarn, non manet
intellectiva, et tamen illa alia forma disponens ad eam
potest manere, quia non su nt corruptae secundum gradum
necessarium ad illam formam; sed illa alia non manet in esse
perfecto et qu:,.eto, quia qualitates consequentes eam eunt
cerruptae secunaum gradum, secundum quem censequuntur eam in
esse perfecto et quieto. Et idee nullum corpus animabile
habet simpliciter esse perfectum et quietum, recedente
anima, ime statim est in continua tendentia ad reeolutienem
in sui elem9nta. 94
In this connection Gilson points out that because the form of
corporeity does not survive long after the departure of the intellectual
soul it is plausible ta wonder whether the form of cerporeity ie in the
sarne condition, after death, it was in whenit was part of the whole.
As we have seen, Scetus thinks that it ia the same ferm; according to
Gilson, however, it ia nct in the sarne condition. The crucial point
(
94. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 55.
-- 344 --
here iB that it Beeme that if the ferm of corporeity were really
distinct from the intellectual soul, not only would it be a perfectly
complete Boul in itself, but presumably it could aIse survive the
departure of the intellectual soul indefinitely. Therefore, it aeeme
reasonable ta maintain that it ia nct in the sarna condition: this,
according te Gilson would, in turn, be explained by the fact that, like
the lower souls, it is only formally distinct from the intellectual
soul. After the departure of the total being cf which it is formally a
part, it will remain in the body only for a brief period of time,
because as an incomplete being it cannat survive the separation from the
intellectual soule scotus sometimes gives the impression that he thinks
of the form of corporeity as really distinct from the intellectual soul
and the ether Bouls, but, Gilson thinks, this ia nct the case:
Duns Scot va parfois même jusqu'à parler a ce propos de

distinction réelle, pourvu qu'on entende l'expression comme
s'appliquant à l'entité de la formalité en tant que telle.
Il est en effet exact que, pour une forme, être autre qu'une
autre forme soit en être réellement une autre. La réalité
de leur distinction se reconnait à se signe, que l'une peut
être complètement conçue sans l'autre. Il ne suit pourtant
pas de là que, dans le composé, chacune de ces formes ait
son existence actuelle propre, distincte de celle qu'a la
forme du tout. 9S
It seems to me, on the other hand, that the instability of the
form of corporeity after the departure of the intellectual soul need not
be explained by holding that the form of corporeity is only formally
distinct from the intellectual soule Scotus's view, in fact, seems to
be that the form of corporeity, though really distinct from the
intellectual soul, cannot survive its departure indefinitely bacause it
95. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 496.

-- 345 --
( ia by nature an incomplete ferro which, like matter, needs the effects of
the intellectual soul to reach stability and to become a complete being.
Further evidence of this is provided by the fact that Ockham reports
Scotus's view ta have been that there ia a real distinction between the
form of corporeity and the intellectual soul. 96
We saw earlier that Scotus discusses the role played by the
parents in the production of human beings~ The necessity of a rale for
the parents i5 one of the reasons for the requirement that the ferro of
corporeity and its organizational powers should nct inform the matter at
a time prior to the infusion of the intellectual soul. In this way the
parents' role ia preserved becauee they are the cnes which produce the
forro of corporeity in the matter which will at the proper time be
informed by the intellectual soul. 97 The distinction will also make
sense of the fact that there are in the production of a human being two
main efficient causes: the parents whose agency prepares the matter for
96. Cf. William of Ockham, Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Opera Philosophic8, Vol. VII,
Quaestiones in Librum Quartum Sententiarum (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute St.
Bonaventure University, 1984), Lib. IV, q. IX, 163. Cf. also William of Ockham, Opera
Philosophies et Theologica, Opera Philosophica, Vol. V, Quaestiones in Librum Secumdum
Sententiarum (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute St. Bonaventure University, 1981), Lib.
Il, q. 1, 18.
97. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Libros Sententiarum, Lib. Ill, d. Il, q. Ill, n. 5; quoted
above. The process of generation according to Scotus presumably takes place in something
like the following manner. The form of corporeity cames to the matter as really distinct
fram the higher souls, but net at a time prier to the advent of the intellectual soul. The
intellectual soul cornes to infonm the matter together with the vegetative and the sensitive
souls which are only formallY distinct from it. If the vegetative, sensitive, and
intellectual souls come to ;nform the matter all at the same time, however, it remains for
Scotus to expiain why their e!fects do not become apparent in the matter all at the same
time as well. Scotus can explain this by holding that, while it is true that the souls
come to the matter all at the same time, they can only become active in the matter at
different times.
-- 346 --
the intellectual soul; and Gad who creates the intellectual soul and
infuses it into the organized bodYa
Aquinas's theory, on the ether hand, that there ie only one soul
in man seeme ta reduce excessively the raIe of the parents. If, in
fact, there ia only one Boul in man and no forro of corporeity, and the
soul ia created by Gad, it 8eeme that the parents have an effect only on
the matter which is going to be united to the intellectual soul.
Aquinas'B reply te this objection consists in arguing that there
ia in the production of a human being a series of successive generations
fram the seed ta the sensitive Boul in which the parents are involved. 98
This means that they not only contribute to the production of the matter
but, through the seed, they are the cause of all the successive
generations leading up to the infusion of the intellectual soul. At
that point, however, the form which is in the matter at the time
immediately preceding the infusion of the intellectual soul will be
replaced by the intellectual soul itself. The parents are, therefore,
necessary in the production, because the intellectual soul cannat be
introduced if the successive generations have not taken place.
Relinquitur ergo dicendum quod in generatione hominis vel

animalis sunt multae generationes et corruptionea sibi
invi.cem Succl;.'d.ent~::;'. Adveniente enim perfectiori forma,
deficit imperiectior. Et sic eum in embryone primo ait
anima vegetativa tantum, eum perventum fuerit ad majorern
perfectionem, tollitur forma imperfeeta, et auccedit forma
perfectior, quae est anima vegetativa et sensitiva simul; et
ultimo cedente, auecedit ultima forma completissima, quae
est anima rationalis. 99
99. Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Un. De Spiritual;bus Creaturis, a. III ad XIII. Cf. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Contra Gent;les, Lib. Il, cap. LXXXIX.
-- 347 --
( A~winas argues that the reverse process takes place after death,
and by this he attempts te explain the observable phenomenen of
decomposition:
similiter etiam ex parte corruptionis 9unt multae formae

mediae, quae sunt formae incompletae: non enim, separata
anima, corpus animalis statim resolvitur in elementa; sed
hoc fit per multas corruptiones medias, succedentibuB sibi
in materia multis formis imperfectis, sicut est forma
corporis mortui, et postmodum putrefacti, et sic inde.'OO
In the Quaestiones Disputatae and in the 8umma Contra Gentiles,
just beiere expressing his own view of the process involved in the
generation of m~n, Aquinas expresses misgivings about a view according
to which the organic body and the lower souls are naturally generated
and, when they are already in existence, the intellectual soul i5
created by the action this time of an external agent, i.e., God. This
theory, provided that the souls which are naturally generated are not
considered really distinct, but only formally distinct, resembles very
closely one of the two possible readings of scotus'S position. In the
Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas, while describing the theory, explains
that Aristotle is considered its originator by those who defend it. 10l
In this they are nct ,alone: Meyers, in fact, while discussing the issues
involved in various theories of creation, makes the following remark:
100. St. Thomas Aquinas, In libros Aristotelis De Generatione et Corruptione Expositio, Lib. 1, cap.
Ill, lect. VIII, n. 3.
101. Cf. the following passage: IIpropter quod suspicantur Aristotelem dixisse intellectun ab
extr;nseco esse, in l ibro de Generatione AnimaL hm. Il (Thomas Aquinas, SUl11na Contra
Gentiles, Lib. Il, cap. LXXXIX). The passage in Aristotle to which Aquinas refers runs
l ike this: "it remains. then, for the reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for
no bodily activity has any connection with the activity of reason." (Aristotle, ~
Generatione Animalium. II.3.736b28-29). The context of this passage 1S Aristotle's
discussion of the fact that the nutritive and sensitive souls, which require bodily organs
for their activities. do not come fram without. Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium,
Il.3.736bs-32.
-- 348 --
he opposed Aristotle's theory that the vegetative and

sensitive Bouls originate through natural generation and
that finally the rational soul ia created, because this
theory destroyed the unity of the substantial form. 10Z
Those who gencrally appeal to this theory in support of their own
views are the advocates of a plurality of souls in man. Aristotle,
however, cannat be said either ta affirm a real distinction between the
souls in man, or the creation of the intellectual Boul by Gad ai.nee he
doea nct believe in the possibility of creation. There i8 no way of
reconciling any view of creation with Aristotle's own systeM, but with
regard the firet of the points just mentioned it ia more than plausible
that Aristotle may mean te affirm, in the case of man, the natural
generation of the vegetative and sensitive souls and the advent of the
rational soul from outside, while at the sarne time denying a real
distinction among the souls in the final composite.
On his views defending the unit y of the soul in man, Aquinas ia
criticized in countless ways,103 but the most threatening attacks are
102. Meyer, Thè Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 289.
103. For example, it is maintained that because the soul is immaterial it is impossible that it
should be capable of imparting corporeity to the body. Cf. Meyer, The Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aguinas, 174; and Stella. L'llemorfismo di G. Duns Scoto, 221. Aquinas's replY to
this argument consists in saying that. while it is true that the soul does not possess
corporeity in act. it is also true that it possesses it virtually: cf., for example, Thomas
Aquinas, QUaest. Un. De Seiritualibus Creaturis. a. III ad XVI; and Thomas Aquinas, ~
Un. De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. IV ad quintum. It is also argued that the theory, far
from safeguarding the immortality of the soul, renders it problematic. Since, in fact, the
souls of animals and plants are perishable, and since on the unity view they are part of
the rational soul, it does not seem possible that the rational seul should survive the
demise of the body. Cf., for example, the argument as reported by Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas,
Quaest. Un •. De Anima., a. XIV, n. 12. His reply is that: "ad duodecirrun dicendl.n quod
anima sensibilis in brutis corruptibilis est; sed in homine, cum sit eadem in substantia
C\Jl1 anima rationali, incorruptibilis est. 1l <Thomas Aquinas, Quaest. Un •. De Anima, a. XIV
~, ad XII). This alsa means that when the resurrection of the body takes place, according to
the teachings of the Church, man's immortal souL which contains virtually in it all the
essential parts of man will be reunited to the body. This makes lt possible that
-- 349 --
those based on theological grounds. Landry lista severai ways in which
the theory of the unit y of the soul is considered dangerous te faith.
For example, ainee Aquinas's theory entails the view that Christ at
death loses the human soul which he possessed during life, it ia arqued
that because it iB an article of faith that the Ward remains united ta
his Boul visiting hell and ta his body in the sepulchre, it must be
concluded that Christ ia nct only united ta human nature, but aIse ta
the forro which he acquires after death which is of a different species
altogether. This also entails the consequence that, during the three
daya during which Christ was dead, the celebration of the Eucharist
would nct have been possible: during those three daya, in fact, because
the human soul is separated from the body through death, it is not a
human body which is present, but only something which =esembles a human
body and which is really of a different species.
It is also an article of faith that in transubstantiation, when
the words are pronounced, the bread i9 transformed inta the body of
Christ and the wine inta his blaad. The saul and divinity of Christ are
suppased ta be present in the consecrated hast, as Aquinas often
repeats, only by concomitance. According to the theory of the unity of
saul, hawever, this is net possible: because there is cnly one form in
man, in fact, the soul and the divinity of Christ cannat be present in
the Eucharist only by concomitance. The soul and divinity of Christ
must be said to be really present in the Eucharist. Finally, sorne argue
that Aquinas's theory renè.ers the veneration of the relies of saints
mere superstition. The corpse left by a saint is, in fact, not the same
numer;cally the same man be resurrected. See Thomas Aqu;nas, Quaest. Un.. De An;ma, a. XIX
ad qu;nt~.
-- 350 --
body that he had once inhabited. The corpse and the body do nct possess
the sarne substantial form and are, therefore, two distinct beings.
There i8 no reason, then, for the veneration of the relies of saints. 104
Though not a pluralist, 5cotus thinks that his own theory is not
threatened by the sarne criticisme. In fact, l think it ia arguable that
it is at least partly in order to avoid the theological problems we just
examined that Seatus does nct Bubscribe ta the drastic version of the
theory of the unity of the soul defended by Aquinas.
Like the advocates of the plurality of sO"lls in man, scotus
therefore finds fauit in Aquinas's theory and considera it theologically
dangerous. He argues, for instance, that because there ia only one Boul
in man, when transubstantiatian takes place the bread ia transformeù,
nct into the body of Christ, with the soul present by concurrence, but
either into the whole of the nature of Christ with the soul really
present in it, or inta prime matter alane. 10S 5cotU9 concludea,
therefore, that in arder te preserve the truth ef faith his own version
of the theory of the unit y of the soul must be accepted.
Ad ultimum patet, quod primus terminus istius eonversionis,

nec est materia sola, nec materia sub quantitate, quia tune
non esset transubstantiatio, sed transquantitatio, nec
materia sub modo quantitative, nec cempositum ex materia et
anima intellectiva, sed cer..~pes.'-tum ex materia et forma
quadam priori intellectiva, quae mansit eadem realiter eum
Christo vivo, et in corpore mortue, et quae rnansit tanquam
formale rei primo contentae sub Eucharistia semper, ex quo
fuit Eucharistia instituta; idee non valet. 106
104. Cf. Landry, Duns Scot, 159-160.
105. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Reoortata Parisiens;a, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, nn. 19-20.
106. Jo~" Ouns Scotus, Quaestl0nes in Libros Sententiarun, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 58 ad quintllTl.
-- 351 --
Against these accusations, Aquinas argues that the bread La nct
transformed inta prime matter alone and that the eoul iB indeed present
only by concomitance in virtue of the fact that the intellectual soul in
man cantaine the lower soula and the ferrn of corporeity potentially.107
According ta Aquinas, it iB in fact possible for the intellectual soul
at firet te give the matter the 'esse corporeum' without giving it the
'esss intellectivum'. The soul, therefore, will be present in the
sacrament only by concomitance as ie required by faith:
ex vi quidam sacramenti. est eub speciebus huius sacramenti

id in quod directe convertitur substantia pania et vini
praeexistens, prout significatur par verba formas, quae sunt
effeetiva in hoc sacramento sieut et in eeteris: puta eum
dicitur, Hoc est corpus meum, Hic est sanguis meus. Ex
naturali autem concomitantia est in hoc sacramento illud
quod realiter est coniunctum ei in quod praedicta conversio
terminatur. Si enim aliqua duo sunt re~liter coniuncta,
ubicumque est unum realiter, oportet et aliud esse:
consequens est quod divinit.as vel anima Christ i non sit in
hoc sacramento ex vi sacramenti, sed ex vi reali
concomitantia. 108
Regarding the prob1ems presented by the consecration of the
Eucharist during the period of the 'triduo' , Scotus maintains that
Aquinas's theory cannet be considered orthodox because it entails that
neither the body nor the soul of Christ are present, either really or by
concomitance. Only the prime matter is present. It follows from
Aquinas's views, then, that the consecration cannot take place during
that period.
Item, in triduo mortis anima non dabat aliquod esse materiae

corporis Christi, quia fuit separata, nec esse corporeum,
nec aliquod esse; sed in triduo, si species fuissent
108. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, lib. III, q. LXXVI, a. 1 resp. and ad primum. Cf. also
Thomas Aqufnas, Conmentarhrn in lib. IV Sententiarlll1, d. X, q. l, a. II solutio III.
-- 352 --
consacratae, fuisset vera Eucharistia; ••• igitur requiritur

.> aliqua alia forma compositi terminantis primo eam. 109
Aquinas admits that during the 'triduo' the Boul ia indeed not
present in the body of Christ:
anima vero realiter separata fuit a corpore, ut supra dictum

est. Et idee, si in i110 triduo Inertie fuisset hoc
sacrarnentum celebratum, non fuisset ibi anima, nec ex vi
sacramenti nec ex reali concomitantia. ,,0
But, continues Aquinas, answering the further accusation that
according te his theory the body of Christ de ad and alive are not the
sarne body, the hypostasia of the Ward of Gad ia o::.~~e sarne, and therefore
the body of Christ dead and alive ia indeed 'idem numero'.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia idem numero dicitur aliquid

secundum suppositum, idem autem specie est idem secundum
formam, ubicumque suppoaitum subsistit in una sola natura,
oportet qucd, sublata unitate speciei, auferatur unitaB
numeralis. Sed hypostasia Verbi Dei subsistit in duabuB
naturis. Et ideo, quamvis in aliia non remaneat corpus idem
secundum speciem humanae naturae, remanet tamen in Christo
idem numero secundum suppositum Verbi Dei. 111
According to Scotus, however, this answer is not sufficient:
nec valet in ista identitate salvanda fugere ad identitatem

materiae seu hypostasia, quia contraria possunt inesse eidem
identitate ruateriae, quando succedunt sibi invicem, et si
etiam Verbum assumpsisset lapidem, fuis set lapis idem
naturae humanae identitate hypostaais. 112
109. John Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia, lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 21.
110. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theolo9iae, Lib. III, q. LXXVI, a. l ad primum. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas.
Commentarium in lib. IV Sententiarum, d. X, q. 1, a. Il solutio 1; and Th~~ ~quinas,
SlIJII\8 Contra Gentiles, lib. IV, cap. LXIV.
111. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, lib. III, q. l, a. V ad sec~~um.
112. John Duns Scotus, Quaestlonl!s in Libros Sentent;arllJl, Lib. IV, d. XI, q. III, n. 57. For a
detailed account of ether differences between Aquinas and Scotus on vJrieus issues
concerning the Eucharist, and for an account of the doctrine accepted by the Church as
orthodox, see Armogathe, Theologia Cartesiens: L'Explication Physioue de l'Eucharistie chez
Descartes et dom Desgabets, 3-40.
-- 353 --
There ia in Scotus's system, then, no real acceptance of the
theory of the plurality of forms. The remnants of the theory of the
plurality of forma found in Scotua's system Beern ta be allowed a role
mOBtly, if not exclusively, ~ecause Beatus feela the theory necessary
for that which he considera ta be a consistent and true account of his
theological beliefs and of orthodox doctrine. Gilson remarks on the
fact that in order ta get a c:lear idea of Scotus's viewB on the
relationship between the intellectual soul and the lower souls in man it
ia necesaary ta reach Scotus's discussion of transubstantiation. 113
Although it seems easy te reconcile Scotus'a theory that the soul
iB indeed one but has, as it weret a plurality of parts, with that which
is generally considered the Platonist position, trying to do so may
imply a misunderstanding of Scotus'a intentions. His theory ia not, in
fact, incompatible with Aristotle's views and certainly tries, through
the use of the formai distinction, to capture its essence. Moreover, if
the interpretation l have offered f~r Scotus's theory about the
generation of man is correct, it seems that on that score Aristotle and
Scotus are alightly closer than Aristotle and Aquinas can be said to be.
Even if the iLlterpre'tation l have given of Scotus' s use of the formaI
distinction in the context of this discussion shouid turn out to need
sorne modification, it ie in any event clear that Scotus does not accept
an exaggerated version of the theory of the plurality of forms.
In evaluating the implic~tions of Scotus's views for the unit y of
the soul, l should like to say that if it is granted that the unity of
113. Gilson, Jean Ouns Scot, 490.

-- 354 --
the composite ia preserved with the acceptance of the actuality of
matter, l certainly don't think that it ie compromieed by hie viewe on
the composition of the human soul. l think, then, that Scotus succeeds
in preB~rving the essential unit y of the human soul while at the aame
time preserving what he considera orthodox doctrine. Without getting
into the details of matters of orthodoxy, it would appear from
Armogathe's exposition of the accepted doctrine regarding the Eucharist
that BQ far as orthodoxy ie concerned there ia really no pronouncement
against ScotUB'g views. l cao aIse say that, fram the purely
philosophical point of view, Scotus 5eemB te have the last ward on the
issues we have àiscussed.
It remains te be seen whether the actuality of matter as conceived
by Scotus cao be said te preserve the essential unit y of the composite.
l think that here the issues are 50 fundamental and the principles
appealed to by both philosophers so basic that the verdict will really
depend upon which of the two principles is considered the more
intuitive. Aquinas, stressing unit y, argues that from the union of two
things, bath of them actual, nothing can be generated which is
essentially one. Scetus, ~n the ether hand, stressing the notion of
composition, argues that a composite can only truly be called a
composite if it has at least two parts both of which must be at leaet in
sorne sense actual. l think both of these principles appeal to basic
intuitions we have about the structure of reality, but l also think
that, given scotus's notion of the type of actuality attributable to
matter, he may weil have found a way to reconcile these two apparently
opposing principles. As we have seen, Scotus's ultimate solution ta the

-- 355 --
problem of individuation aIse provides us with his solution ta the
problem of the essential unit y of the composite: individuation meaos
indivisibility and so doea unity. The 'haecceity', then, will guarantee
the easential unit y of the composite.
Item, per eadem rationem, per quam repugnat alicui dividi in

aliqua, per eamdem rationem habet unitatem 8uam positivam
!'Elpugnantem il1i divisioni, .•• "4
Aquinas, in his understandable efforts in favour of the
preservation of the essential unit y of the composite, and especially of
man, against the threats posed ta it by the pluraliste, rnay huve become
too extreme in stressing the essential unit y of the composite, thereby
denying or at least seriously compromising its ~tatus of composite
substance.
In this connection, however, it should be kept in mind that the
theory Or the plurality of forms which Aquinas is attacking is not
Scotus's moderate version. In the original theory of the plurality of
forms, the forms which are part of the complete man are themselves
~articular things, not formalities. Given, therefore, the version of
the theory he is attacking, Aquinas's interpretation of the danger to
the essential unity of man ie quite justified: it is quite implausible,
in fact, to argue that man, if seen as composed of many parts each of
which ie itself a particular thing, should be accorded a more basic
statue and a stricter notion of unity than any aggregate or than the
composite of substance and accidents. Seen in this light, Aquinas's
114. John Ouns Scotus, Reportata Par;siensia, Lib. II, d. XII, q. VI, n. 4.
-- 356 --
concern gains strength and his arguments plausibility. It ia
nevertheless true te say of Aquinas's efforts that:
in trying te maintain the absolute unit y of a thing, and the

absolute unit y of the substantial forro, with which aven
Aristotle had had difficulties, St. Thomas overstressed the
idea of unit y .115
.....
,.,
115. Meyer, The Philosoohy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 145.

-- 357 --
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It la clear from my examination of the views of Aristotle,
Aquinas, and ScotUB that the issue of the actuality of matter ia central
ta the success of my general argument. It ia important, then, te
summarize as clearly as the subject allows the main thrust of my
discussion of matter. l argued in the chapter on Aristotle that,
contrary ta general opinion, he considera matter ta be in Borne sense
actual. l also maintained that the concept of matter accepted by
Scotus, and nct the concept of matter accepted by Aquinas, ia the better
candidate for an accurate medieval characterization of the Arisotelian
notion of matter.
Because the starting point of Aristotle's discussion of matter in
the Physics is the necessity of explaining the possibility of change
against Eleatic philosophy, it doea nct make sense for Aristotle, and
cannat be his intention, ta argue that the substratum for substantial
change is a purely potential entity. He must consider matter a real,
though entirely undetermined, substratum of change. Clearly, in arder
ta be successful, the argument in the Physics requires the latter and
•
~. not the former concept of matter. The discussion of matter contained in
-- 358 --
the Hetaphysics ie rather. different and cert<:.:.in':" '{ more amenable ta an
interpretation of matter as purely potential as weIl as completely
undetermined. The Metaphysics discusses a purely logical concept of
matter: matter as the subject of predication. Significantly enough,
Aquinas's ~wn discussion of matter starte fram the Metaphysics while
Scotus'e starts from the Physics.
One could argue that the difference between these two d6~criptionB
of matter cornes nct sa much fram directIy incompatible notions of
matter, but fram the different points of view from which the concept ie
examined. The concept of matter must indeed satisfy two criteria. It
can be eeen primarily as the underlying substratum for the most basic
sorts of generations and corruptions (i.e., those which take place
between the four elements), and in this case it must be ~n sorne sense
actual. Or it can be considered, in a more general way, as a logical
construct which at any level of the scale of being stands for that which
is not yet actual but only potential. This logical concept will refer
to everything which is contained in the 'composite' other than the
substantial form. In this case matter will be purely potential witt
respect to the substantial form which it is about to acquire. Matter as
the substratum for the most basic types of change, on the other hand,
will have this characteristic of pure potentiality with respect to the
forro it ia in the process of receiving, but more importantly it will be
the real though entirely undetermined stuff which guarantees tha>o being
does not come from non-being. While l accept the notion that matter is
also the subject of predication, l cannet see how it is possible to make

-- 359 --
SRnse of Aristotle'a motivations and general outlaok on the process of
change without admitting that matter ia aiso a physical notion.
Il s'agit, rappelons-le, d'expliquer que des générations et

des corruptions soient possibles, ce qui requiert qu il Y 1
ait au moins deux termes 1 la matière et la forme. C'est

d'ailleurs la doctrine constante d'Aristote. Or, 5; la
matière n'a aucune réalité propre, c'est-à-aire
'subjective', elle n'est rien, c'est-à-dire que l'un des
deux termes de la génération disparait, et la génération
avec elle. 1
This interpretation of the concept of matter 5eemB ta be supported
in Aristotle not only by the difference between the treatment of the
topic found in the Metaphysics and that found in the Physics, but also
by Aristotle's position in the categories. 2 Aquinas's reading of
Aristotle's notion of matter, as we have seen, starts from the
Metaphysics and focuses almost exciusively on the role of matter as the
subject of predication. Scotus, starting from the Physics, firet
understands matter as existent and therefore actual, but at the sarne
time entirely undetermined and therefore potential. 3 In this way, l
think, he cornes to understand Aristotle's notion of matter more
adequately t~an Aquinas. Gilson in his book on Scotus observes that the
debate between Aquinas and Scotus on the potentiality of matter in the
final analysis amounts to nothing more than a verbal dispute. 4 If he
means by this that they are using different, but equivalent,
descriptions of the same entity, l think he is mistaken. If, on the
z. Cf. 27-29 and particularly notes n. 41 on 27 and n. 42 on 29, section 11, chapter l above.
3. Cf. LittLe, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 187.

(
-- 360 --
ether hand, he means that they are nct talking about the sarne notion of
matter and that they would agree if this were clarified he might well be
correct ..
Little's characterization of the debate la quite different and in
a way much closer ta my own. His view, as a matter of fact, la more
extreme than mine. He thinks that Aquinas basically dees net accept
Aristotle's solution of the Eleatic prablem at aIl, but prefera the
Platonic solution, and therefore adopta a notion of matter derived in
sorne meusure fram Plate.
We must now try ta show that St. Thomas had a doctrine of

non-being that \:JHS in fact, whether he knew it or nct, a
reversion ta Plato's doctrine fram Aristotle's.5
Aquinas, Little argues, emphasizes the potential aspect of matter
and its clnseness ta non-being, because non-being for Aquinas means
'non-esse' as the expression is used by Plato and not 'non-ens' as it is
used by Aristotle (respectively 'me einai' and 'me on,).6 By making
5. Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 191. Little shows Aquin~~'5 indebtedness to Plato by
arguing that Aquinas's celebrated distinction between essence and existence is of Platonic
or;g;n (cf. Little, The PLatonic Heritage of Thomism, 192), as weLl as by arguing that both
the notion of participation accepted by Aquinas and his theory of limitation of act by
potency are derived fram Plata (cf. Little, The Platonic Heritase of Thomism, 192-193).
His anaLysis leads h;m to concLude that: lltherefore non-being in the sense of l imi t is
passive potency which also, says Thomas, is the intrinsic cause of plural ity.1l (Little, The
Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 201).
6. Cf. Little, The Platon;c Heritage of Thomism, 184. Little laments the fact that both Plato and
Ariste~le use the same expression for two different concepts. His explanation of the
different uses of the term 'me on' by Plato and Aristotle is the foL Lowing: "Now we claim
that 'me on' in Plata means 'me einai', non-being or exclusion of being. But in Aristotle
it signifies being that is not yet ~ being, 'einei' which is 'mepo on', being which is only
part of what is required for a being. 1l (Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 185).
Little shows that this is the case for Aristotle through an analysis of matter quite close
ta my own (cf. Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 186·187); by showing that
Aristatle does not accept the notion of Limitation of act by potency (cf. Little, rh!
PLatonic Heritage of Thomism, 188-189); and by showing that Aristotle denies the existence
of non-being (cf. LittLe, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 189).
-- 361 --
this choiee, Little explains, Aquinas elects net only Plato's solution
of the Eleatic problem, but aIse Plato'a notion of matter. He must
thereby be said to reject, together with Aristotle's solution of the
problem, Aristotle's notion of matter which ia eseantial ta it.
Scotus, on the ether hand, by emphasizing the purely Aristotelian
version of the solutior of the Parmenidean problem, accepta Aristotle's
notion of matter and the fact that it is being but not the being which
it can become. Matter ia actual because the emphasis here ia placed on
the fact that being cannat come out of non-being in the strict sense.
Little, though he doee nct diseuse scotus, confirma this statement in
the following passage by saying that:
except that Aristotle denied the possibility of separated

matter, this concept corresponds in principle ta that of
Suat:'ez and Scotus. According ta it prime matter ia oon-
being or non-ens in the sense that it denies, or i8 distinct
from, the act of matter, form. It therefore is a denial not
of being (which it is, aince it is an existence) but of the
determination of being. It is non-beinq in the sense of
being not yet a being, aince it ia only the undel:.ermined
part of a being and it needs determination before it can
exercise its existence. But prime matter ia not non-being
in the sense of non-esse. It ia not a denial of existence,
even of further existence. On the contrary it is an
existence, though it needs another existence to be
adequately capable of existing. 7
Though Little's view of the distance between Aristotle and Aquinas
and of the latter's indebtedness to Plato for his concept of matter is
more extreme than my own, l think it is possible te reconcile the two te
a great extent by stating what has to be a logical consequence of our
two arguments. If Aquinas's solution to the Eleatic problem and his
notion of matter are derived from Plato, and the notion of matter he
7. Little, The Platon;c Heritage of Thomism, 188.

-- 362 --
thinks he finds in Aristotle's Metaphysics ia closer ta non-being than
Aristotle's own, then it ia clear that Aquinas reads into Arietotelian
matter those characteristics of matter which he borrows from Platonic
sources. The consequences of these different characterizatious of the
notion of matter are very far reaching and have been seen te have
effects on aIl aspects of these thinkers's philosophies.
Given tL~ notion of matter accepted by Aristotle, it 8eeme only
logical that he would conclude that matter can never be found in nature
without form or, as l have argued, at least without the contrarietie9~
completely undetermined being, in fact, cannat, as completely
undetermined, exist alone. Aristotle presurnably maintains the
inseparability of matter from forro or from the contrarieties as a
consequence of hie observation bath of nature and of the natural
processes of generation and corruption. Although there ia no evidence
tha~ Aristotle considers the question only from the natural point of
view, there iB also na evidence that he does nota
For Scotus and Aquinas, we have Been, the situation ia different
because for them any question has to be considered not only in terms of
that which is naturaUy poss;.ble. but also in terms of that which is
passible by God'e absolute power. The question having been put in these
terms, Scotus immediately concludee that while matter cannot be without
forro in nature, it can nevertheless be created and kept in existence
witheut ferm by Ged's abselute power. Aquinas, on the other hand,
considering the questien from both points of view, concludes that matter
~.. cannet exist witheut ferm either naturally or by God'e absolute power.
-- 363 --
Gad, in fact, creates matter but nct without forme This ia clearly a
consequence of th~ pure potentiality of matter:
non potest autern hoc esse, quod ens dividatur ab ente in

quantum est ans; nihi1 autem dividitur ab ente niai non ans.
Unde et ab hoc ente non dividitur hac ans n~s~ par hoc quod
in hoc ente includitur negatio illius entis. 8
It is quite clear in this passage that Aquinas wants to say that
what distinguishes this being fram that being ia a limit ta its
perfection: i.e., the fact that it centaine within itself the negation
of the ether being_ But we know that matter i5 Aquinas's principle of
individuation and we aIse know that Aquinas accepta the principle of
limitation of act by potency. Therefore matter ia a negation of being
(i.e., non-beingj and a limit ta its perfection (i.e., pure
potentiality): as such, matter can only exist together with that of
which it ia a limit~
Aristotle's notion of Gad and His relationship ta reality doea nct
force him to ~onsider the ~lestion from the supernatural point of view.
As a consequence, it ia only possible te speculate that Aristotle may
have thought it natural1y impossible for matter te exist separate fram
forme Given his characterization of matter, however, had he considered
the notion of an all-powerful God, he may have thought it possible, by
God's absolute power (i.e., logically possible) that matter exist
sep~rate fram form or the contrarieties. Given Aristotle's views on the
issue -- and provided that matter iB nct non-being, and that therefore
its existence without ferro doea nct entail the existence of the void
there is no reason l can Bee for him to deny the possibility of the
8. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate, q. IV, 8. 1 resp.

-- 354 --
existence of matter separate from ferm ether than the simple fact~h~t
it does not happen in nature. 9 l can only guess, then, that because of
the similarity betwee~ their concepts of matter, and given a Ch~iatian
notion of God, Aristotle would probably agree with Scotus against
Aquinas's conclusions.
Much the sarne conclusions which apply to the separability of
matter from form also apply to the intelligibility of matter. Aristotle
denies the intelligibility ef matter, certainly 'quoad nos' and pasaibly
in principle. 10 But although he says that matter in unknowable in
itself, Aristotle may simply mean to say that matter is unknawable in
itself as far as we are cancerned or as far as can be observed in
nature. 1' Aquinas quite clearly denies that matter is knowable in
itself even to Gad: he says, in fact, that in Gad there is an idea of
matter, but that this idea is not different from the idea of the
composite because "materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque
cognoscibilis est.,,'2 Scotus, on the other hand. clearly admits that
matter is in principle intelligible alth~"gh it is not intelligible for
us 'in via'. Matter has a distinct idea in cad's mind, and because Gad
can create it without farm, Gcd can know it in itself withaut form.
Nanetheleas matter ia nat k~owable 'quaad nos'.
9. For a simiLar interpretation on this point see Landry, Duns Scot, 51-52.
10. AristotLe, Metaphysics, VII.10.1036a9.
-
.<>
11. On this, cf. the simiLar thesis expressed by Gilson (Gilson, Jean Duns
12. Thomas Aquinas, St..mna Theolo9iae, Lib. 1, q. XV, a. 111 ad tertil..n.

Sco~, 440-441).
-- 365 --
Again, givon the Christian notion of an all-powerful Gad,
Aristotle's position Be8mB easier ta reconcile with Scotus's than with
Aquinas's. It ia equally true that Aquinas's position on this matter
5eeme te be easier te reconcile with Plata who thought that matter:
ia apprehended, when aIl sense iB absent, by a kind of

spuriouB reason, and ia hardly real ••• 13
The consequences of these views are indeed far reaching.
Aristotle's position Ieads him ta deny that man has knowledge of
singulars and ta affirm that knowledge and science are of that which,
abstracted from its individuating circumstances, ia universal. Aquinas,
while agreeing with Aristotle on this point, has ta turn his attention
to a far more important issue: sinee he considers matter unintelligible
in principle as well as 'quoad nos', Aquinas has ta deal with the hardly
acceptable consequence that matter in itself ia unknown to God and -- ta
the ext~nt ta ~hich they contain matter -- 80 are individuals. Aquinas
tries 'ca obviate this problem, as we have seen, by elaiming that
although Gad doss not passees an independent idea of matter, he does
nonetheless possess an idea of matter in conjunction with the idea of
the composite. It is unclear whether this salves Aquinas's prablem for
two reasan9. Firstly, it is questianable ta conclude from the fact that
Gad has an idea of the composite that Gad has any sort of idea of
matter. And secondly, it aeems unclear how one can go about reconciling
this view with the prineiple, which Aquinas accepta, that matter in the
abject known impedes intelligibility.
13. Plata, Timaeus, 5Z b•

-- 366 --
Scotus's position ia les8 pre~arious and quite a bit easier ta
reconcile with the notion ~f an all-powerful God. scotus, instead of
having ta contend with explaining why it ia impossible for an all-
powerful being ta ~~now matter and singulars, has to expIa in why it ia
impossible ~or an imperfect being ta know matter. For Scotus in any
case the central question ia nct our incapacity te know matter as much
as our incapacity in the present etate ta know aingularity:'4 these two
questions in his phiiosophy are quite separate. The probiem for him
really consists in explaining wh&t it ia about our present etate which
makes it i~pos8ible for us ta know that which in itself ia eminently
knowable, i.e., the 'haecceitas' .15
Because our knowledge, and mast importantly our scientific
knowledge, of substances arises through our knawledge of their
definition, a question which immediately cornes ta mind is whether matter
as a camponent of material substances shauld be admitted to be part of
the definition of those substances. This question is of interest to
Aristatle and ta all thase who accept the basic tenets of his
epistemology. Knowledge LS of the univers al and if knowledge ia
acquired through the definition, then the definition aiso is of the
universal. Should, then, the universal definitian of man cantain a
description of matter or refer te the material component of man?
14. This lack of an ex~lanation for our knowledge of individual essences i$ described by Pegis as an
intrinsic probtem of any realist epistemology. Cf. Pegis, IIThe Dilerrma of Seing and Unityll
15(..
15. For an account of Scotus's theory of our knowledge of singulars, see Day, Intuitive Cognition: a
Key to the Significance of Later Scholastics. For an analogous exposition of Aquinas's
account, cf. Allers, "The Intellectual Cognition of Particulars." For Scotus's account
also see Gi lson, Jean Duns Scot, 549.
-- 367 --
Plato'e answer had been in the negative and for two reasons: he
considered the soul not as the ferro of the body but as the whole man,
and he considered universals te be subsistent entities completely devoid
of matter. Aristotle wants ta accept neither of these positions. l
have argued, therefore, that he cornes te ~he conclusion that because the
ferm ie that through which the composite ie what it ia, the most proper
definition of man should only refer ta the ferro, but that because the
ferro ia necessar.ily the ferro of a certain kind of material body, matter
will be a necesBa~y, though not an essential, part of the definition of
man. If Aristotle =~t times seeme ta be reluctant ta admit this, it is
probably because he r~~lizes that allowing the definition to include
matter involves admitti~g 2n element of unintelligibility into that
which is Buppesed te provide us with the most perfect kind of knowledge
we are capable of achieving.
On the Evaluation of the place of matter in the definition of
material composites, ~oth Aquinas and Scotue agree with Aristotle that
matter has to be included in sorne way in the definition cf rnaterial
substances. For Aquinas as for Aristotle this involves the inclusion of
the unintelligible into the source of our knowledge. For 5cotus thie i5
also the case, but the incongruity is moderated by the fact that the
problem doee not arise on the side of that which ie known but on the
side of the knower and ia, in any case, a temporary situation.
The fact still remains that, though for differen~ reasons,
Aristotle and Aquinas seem to deny human beings knowledge of ~ingulars
and, in the case of material composites, partial knowledge of their
universal definition. That part of the definition which refers to

-- 368 --
matter should not, if they are consistent with their own premisee, be
entirely known ta us. The solution that bath philosophera propose ia
that the genus term in the definition refera ta the material element and
that, therefore, through the genuB term aven the material element of the
composite becomes known.
Because the definition of a being refera te its essence, it ia
clear fram what has baen argued that according ta aIl three philosophera
the essence of composite substances includes in it, though ta different
degrees, bath matter and forme
Regarding the definition of individuals, l have argued that it ia
a logical consequence of Scotus's views that singulars should be, in
sorne sense, definable. This l maintained is a consequence bath of the
fact that Scotus thinks singularity to be erninently knowable and of his
theory of individuation. scotUS'5 principle of individuation, the
'haecceitas' which in the Quesrions on the Metaphysics he considers a
ferro, even in his other writings 5eems ta have the character af a part
of an individual essence. 16 Scotus often characterizes it, in fact, by
analogy to the role of forrn in the universal definition. If it is to be
part of an individual essence it should only be expected that fer
individuals there should be something similar to an individual essence
and, hence, that there also should be semethi~g similar te an individual
definition. Although Scotus never actually says that there is a
16. It should be mentioned at this point ttat if Michael Frede is right about the fact thet
Aristotle believes in individual essences, as 1 think he 1S, this would be another theory
on which Arjstotle and Scotus would turn out to be surprisingly close. For Frede's defense
of this thesis, cf. Frede, Essays in Ancien! PhilosoPbY.
-- 369 --
definition of individuals, l have shown that there are certain passages
in which he 8eeme ta imply Bomething ta that effect.
what ia more important te my general argument than the particular
issue of individual essences ia the fact that in Scotus's system the
emphasis of the discussion doea nct shift from essence ta existence and
ta the distinction between essence and existence. In this Scotus
remains again more faithful ta Aristotle, who doea nct give any evidence
of having accepted such a distinction.'7 In Scotus's discussion, while
he accepta the distinction between essence and existence, the
distinction ia never stressed, and the role of es~ence always remains
the dominating one. His discussion remains, as it is for Aristotle, a
discussion of substance and the essence of aubBtance. 18 In Aristotle,
in fact, the forro gives actuality but more importantly it roakes the
thing tl.e kind of thing that it is. The emphasis placed by Aquinas on
the distinction between essence and existence and the fact that he gives
primacy to existence again lead him away from Aristotle. 19
In connection with this it shculd aiso be noted that Scotus's
notion of common natures may not have been entirely due to Avicenna's
17. Cf. Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 187·188.
18. Cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 455·456. Gilson also suggests tha~ the main difference between
Scotus and Aquinas with respect to the distinction between essence and existence is the
tact that in Scotus "l'essence ne diffère plus de son existerce une fois que sa cause l'a
réalisée. 11 (Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 468). On Aristotle's notion of the relationship
between essence and existence, see Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 82 and 89.
'r·
~
.~
19. On this, cf. chapter Il, section l, 123-125 above, and Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism,
192, wnere Little explains that the roots of the distinction between essence and ex~stence
are te be found in Plato. Cf. etsc M~yer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 96.
-- 370 --
influence. 20 There ia sorne evidence for the thesis that the theory lB
in part contained in Aristotle's system. 21
concerning the role of matter in the process of individuation, it
ie clear that Scotue assigna it no role at aIl. In this connection
ScotUB simply examines aIl the ways in which any theory of individuation
involving matter ia inadequate and argues that when Aristotle talks
about matter as the principle of individuation for material substance he
really meana ta rafer ta his own notion of 'haecceitas'. ScotUB'S view
ia that the principle of individuation has te he a positive perfection
and in itself individual. As l said, he often describes the
'haecceitas' by analogy te the substantial ferro: while the substantial
form determines the mater5.al ta a species, the ' haecceitas' makes the
composite individual. The 'haecceitas', as Gilson suggests, has ta be
placed in the hierarchy of essences and not of existence. 22 It is a
qualitative, net a quantitative determinaticn, and it may weIl be close
to that which Meyers suggests Aquinas, uncertain about his theory of
20. Cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 85ff.; and Gilson, "Avicenne et le Point de Départ de Scot. 1l
21. For this thesi~, cf. chapter III, section l, 219-220 above. took special notice of a passage
from Owens wh~ch clearly states that form in Aristotle is neither universal nor particular
(cf. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotellan Metapnysics: a Study in the Greek
Background of Medieval Thought, 388-389). Also note that the following passage in
Aristctle might be interpreted to mean that the unity which applies to secondary substances
in AristotLe's system 1S equivaLent ta that unit y which Scot us caLLs unit y less than
nunerical unity: "in the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of
'man' or 'animaL', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating
t~at whi~h is individuaL, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary
substa~ce i~ not an individuaL, but a cLass with a certain quaLification; for it is n~t one
and l;ll,gle as a primary substance is; the words 'man' and 'animal', are predicable of more
thell O"IE! subject. u CAristotLe, Categories, V.3 b12-17).
22. Cf. Gil~on, Jean Duns Scot, 456-465.

-- 371 --
individuation, was looking for. 23 The 'haecceitas', however, ia nct a
separate ferro which arrives ta the composite apart from the substantial
farro. The 'haecceitas' ia the "ultima realitas formae." It should be
noted at this point, that, properly speaking, Scotus, with the notion of
the 'haecceitas', may net be offering a real solution ta the problem of
individuation at aIl, but what might be called a transcendental argument
for the solution ta the problem. Because it ia nct known te us in our
pre~ent condition, the 'haecceitas', in fact, could be argued ta be just
a theoreticai entity which Scotus decided had to be introduced to
account for the fact of individuation, once it had bec-ome clear ta him
that aIl ether possible solutions were inadequate. In confirmation of
this interpretation stand both the fact that Scotus considers the
'haecceitas' a formality and not a really distinct entity which performs
the taAk of individuating, and the fact that ~e is unable to give any
further characterization of its nature.
Aquinas's theory of individuation is, as we saw, one of the weak
points in his system and, in examining the frequent changes in Aquinas's
own approach to it, it becomes quite ciear that he himseif feeis uneasy
about many of his own solutions. Because matter is in itself
unknowable, completely inùeterminate, and commen te aIl things, Aquinas
realizes that by itself it cannet serve as the principle of
individuation. On the other hand, he aiso feeis that matte:. has to be
involved in the differentiatien of material substances. He therefore
thinks that 'signated matter' shouid be the principie of individuation.
23. Cf. Meyer, The Philosop!w of St. Thomas Aguinas, 180.

-- 372 --
Because Aquinas cornes ta the conclusion that there should bg cnly
one form in each composite, however, it follows that matter cannat be
informed by another ferm, the ferm of corporeity, before the arrival of
the substantial ferro. On the ether hand, Aquinas alse thinks that
quantity should sign the matter before it can be informed ~y the
substantial ferm. In the end, therefore, he concludes that quantity,
though part of the one substantial form, should be understood in the
matter before the substantial form itself of whi,h it is part. 24
Aquinas Beeme ta have been undecided between matter signed by dete~mined
dimensions and matter signed by undetermined dimensions as the principle
of individuation. Both, however, seern unsatisfactory. Determined
dimensions seern te force Aquinas into the sarne problem which he had
criticized in Boethius's theory of individuation: the problem of the
'frozen individual'. Undeterminad dimensions, on the other hand, seem
ta be inadequate because, as Scotus argues, they remain the same in the
thing generated and in the thing corrupted. l have argued, then, that
regardless of the choice finally made by Aquinas, he does not really
come te a satisfactery solution of the problem of individuation. One of
the reasons for Aquinas's attacr~ent ta the notion of matter as the
principle of individuation is ta be faund in the fact that Aquinas,
unlike Scotus, considers that the form needs to b<. given a limit and
24. This is certainly in part a consequence of the fact that in the process of transuhs~antiation of
the bread into the ~ ~T Christ the doctrinal requirement is that the body should be
contained in the Eucharist sacramentally. but the human and divine nature of Christ shouLd
be present only by concomitance. It TS also a part of orthodox doctrine that the body of
Christ be in the Eucharist before the soul and divine nature. If it is true that Aquinas
finally chooses 'esse' as his principle of individuation, the problems caused by the fact
that sorne powers of the soul should be understood in the matter before others stilL persist
for him in the explanation of transubstantiation. For a statement to the effect that
Thomist3 as well as Aquinas always have a problem in the explanation of the cause of
dimensions ;n matter, cf. Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 75.
-- 373 --
that that limit, according to him, is the matter. The acceptance of the
notion of limitation of act by potency for Aquinas extends through the
whole scale of being to exclude only God. Every act needs to be limited
by a potentiality; and Aquinas sees in matter the principle of
limitation of material forms.
Aristotle seems to have chosen matter as the principle of
differentiation for material composites, but only in a role subordinate
to that of form. 25 The fact that matter has sorne actuality of its own
renders it prima facie more apt ta perform a partial role as the
principle of individuation than Aquinas's notion of matter. In
Aristotle, however, matter ia nct the only element necessary in the
process of individuation. Although Aristotle often says that matter is
the principle of numerical distinction between individuals, he aise
repeats several times that matter by itself is not a 'this' and that
what makes something a 'this thing here' is the forro. Aristotle also
says that specifie differentiation is always found wherever there is
nurnerical differentiation. 26
This, l argued, has te mean more than the obvious and well-known
fact that the form is that by which something belongs to a species.
After all, saying that the form makes something a 'this thing here' is
nct the most obvious and clear way of expressing membership in a
25. One of the more significant differences between the role of matter in the process of
individuation as conceived by Aquinas and by Aristotle is tnat in Aquinas it does not only
play the role of determining numerical differentiation but also the role of limiting
factor. IIHere, since illimitation is said to be the prindple of identity, it is i~lied
that limitation 1S the principle of difference and otherness. It is not a sign or
concHtion but it is otherness itself. 1I (Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 196).
26. Aristotle, MetaDhysics~ V.6.1016b31~1017a

-- 374 --
species. The form ia presupposed for numerical differentiation. Bath
matter and ferm are needed, therefore, in answerin~ questions of
intraspecific differentiation. Ferm, because it iB universal in the
mind and particular in the concrete compoBit~, will be that which makes
something a 'this thing here', i.e., that which make~ the matter the
matter of this individual. And matter, although nct in itself a 'this',
ia in itself extended and makes the ferro the ferro of this particular
matter. One could almost claim that the substance in question acquires
an individual essence by the union of matter and forme The principle of
individuation, through the role of the forro, will nct be a purely
quantitative, but rather will be bath quantitative and qualitative.
In Aristctle's picture it ia net only true that form ia necessary
for individuation within a species, but also that matter is necessary in
the ape~ific individuation of material substances. It follows i.n effect
fram Aristatle's account of the raIe matter playa in determining
essences that it is impossible to say what kind of thing a thing is
without knewing if it ia cornposed of matter and form and what kind of
matter it ia supposed te have. As l have said befere, if something ia a
herse, it will be made of a certain sort of matter and will be made of
matter neceasarily.
This is the way l think Scotus, Aquinas, and Aristotle
respectively try te anawer the metaphysical question about
individuation. In answering the epistemolagical question, i.e., what iB
it that enables us to differentiate among individuals?, l have argued
that all three philosophers agree that sorne accidental properties will
be relied upon. In the case of those which Aristotle calls attributes

-- 375 --
(. 'propter se', their recognition will immediately tell us sornething about
their Bubject because they are always found with a certain kind of
thinq. Upen my recognition that something iB a male, for example, l
will aiso know that it ia an animal. An analogous sort of process will
certainly take place at the individual level.
The choiee of matter as the principle of individuation Ieads
Aquinas, who thinks that in angels there ia no composition between ferm
and matter, ta disallow a plurality of angels within the sarne species.
Tt ia weIl known that, because Aquinas thinks that in angels there i5 no
matter, he concludes that for angels there cannat he multiplication
within the sarne species. Aquinas thinks, therefore, that each angel
contains the perfection of the whole species. Because, however, angels
cannot be considered to be purely actual, aince in that case they would
be equal to God, Aquinas thinks that in angels the composition between
essence and existence, through which their actuality i5 limited, not in
~he sphere of essence but in the sphere of existence, guarantees that
they are not equal to God. 27 The sarne lack of intraspecific
differentiation would also, of course, apply to human souls if they were
not forme of bodiese
l have argued that Scotus in ail probability denies the
composition of matter and form in angels as weIl as in the humall soul,
granting that there is no matter in angels. He nevertheless denies ~11
of the consequences which Aquinas derives from the lack of matter.
27. In his treatment of angels, again Aq~inas considers central two princ;ples wh;ch are arguably
Plato";c ;n ori9;": the principle of the lim;tat;on of act by potency and the dist;nct;on
between essence and "ex;stence.
-- 376 --
Because Scotus doea nct consider matter the principle of individuation,
he finds no difficulty in admitting numerical differentiation within the
sarne species of angels. Each member of a species of angels, like the
member of any ether species, ia individuated by his own 'haecceity'. In
this sarne way Scotus aIse acaounts for the individuation of human Bouls
after death.
It ia in looking at his aacount of the individuation of the human
soul after death that it becomes most evident that Aquinas's the ory of
individuation by 'signated matter' ia inadequate. While it ia possible,
in fact, ta claim that during life the principle of individuation for
human beings ia 'signated matter', in short their body, this claim
becomes patently implausible after death. It is still important,
however, if one holds that the soul ia irnmortal, and moreover personally
lmmartal, ta be able ta give a criterion for the individuation of the
soul after death, i.e., for the time when, because it is separated from
the body, the latter can certainly not be called upon te individuate the
soul.
Aquinas, of course, subscribes ta the belief that the soul ia
immortal, that it is personally irnmortal, and that the principle of
individuation is 'signated matter'. Thua, he has great difficulty in
showing how the ~oul can be individuated once it is not part of the
human beinq. If a proper criterion cannat be given the only solution
which seems open ta Aquinas ia to admit that at dea~h soula become like
angels and each constitute a species in its own right. This implies
both that souls change species at death and that the reunion of the soul
with its body, held as orthodox Christian doctrine, is impossible.

-- 377 --
( Aquinas, unable for philosophical and theological reasons te accept
either of these conclusions, suggests that the soul after death ia
individuated by its relationship ('commensuratic') ta the body it once
informed. l ha~~ shawn haw, because it really amounts ta individuation
by an accident (i.e., the soul's relationship ta its body), this
solution cannat be considered appropriate.
This is the part of Aquinas's system where he would be most likely
ta conclude that a theory of individuation cannat be successful if its
foundation ia made te rest upon the concept of matter. l have argued
that Aquinas's account of how Bouls are individuated after death becomes
more plausible if what he means by the 'commensuratio' of the soul ta
the bod}- ia nat simply the relationship of the soul to its material
body, but the being, i.e., the 'esse', which remains the sarne for the
soul, but which naturally cantains in it the being of the soul united to
the body. The being or 'esse' on this picture would be that which
individuates in the sense that it is that which makes actual the
particular combinat ion of saul, body, and indivi~uating accidents which
make up 'this particular human being'. When the body dies the being
which remains the being of the soul has not changed and therefore still
makes the soul, the soul of that body which it once informed. This
interpretation also makes sense of the fact that the soul, when
separated from the body, is not considered by Aquinas to be a complete
nature but only part of one. The soul after death remains the sarne
individu al because the 'being' is the sarne. It does not, however,
remain.the sarne substance because the essence is not the sarne: it now
lacks the matter which is part of the essence of the species of which
-- 378 --
the human soul ia part. Whether the 'esse' provides an adequate
solution ta the problern of individuation, it ie nct clear that Aquinas
came te adopt it in preference ta his previously chosen solution.
Both Aquinas and Scotus follow Aristotle in maintaining that the
soul is the forro of the body, and both reject the Platonic conception of
the soul as a substance quite separate fram the body and complete in its
own right. The Platonic conception of the soul entails an accidentaI
union of the soul to the body and ie considared to be a threat to the
essential unit y of man, but it presents roo incoffipatibility with the
Christian conception of the immortality of the soul. The Aristotelian
position, on the ether hand, considera the union of the soul ta the body
absolutely essential, thereby safeguarding the unity of man, but it does
constitute an apparent threat to the immortality of the soul. In
Aquinas's time, in fa~t, it was believed that there were only two
alternatives: the Boul ie either a substance or a rnaterial form. If
the soul is a substance, then the union with the body is accidental; if
it is a material ferro, then it is net irnrnortal.
l have maintained that in Scetus as well as in Aquinas the soul is
considered a part of human nature, a 'pars speciei' -- net a complete
nature in itself and therefore not a person in its own right. For
Scotus, in fact, the soul ia an 'hoc aliquid', not because i.t is a
complete substance, as was true for the Augustinian tradition before
him, but because it can survive without the body. Even in its
disernbodied state the soul retains its 'haecceitas'.
'<71~
...,.
-- 379 --
It should be noted in this connection that for Scotus the survival
o~ the soul doea nct present the Barne difficulties related ta the issue
of individuation which it causes for Aquinas. For Scc.:tus t~~e principle
of individuation ia the 'haecceitas', and because for each part of the
composite there ia a separate 'haecceitas', as there i8 for the
composite itself, there ia no special reason why the soul should nct be
able ta survive the demies of the body. It can be argued, of course,
that to the extent that Aquina~ individuates the soul through the body
the union between them ia more intimate. In ether worda, if the body
ia, in any sense r the principle of in~ividuation for the soul the
relationship of the soul to the body as its form is reflected in its
individuation. ~o the extent to which he rejects this theory of
individuation, Scotus can be argued to consider the union of the body
and the soul to be leGs intimate. It should not be inferred from this,
however, that Scotua deea net censider the soul to be the forro of the
body. Equally, it should not be concluded that because he considere the
soul individual independently of the body, he thereby considers the
union of the seul to the body ta be accidental. The independent
individuation of matter and forro by the 'haecceity', in fact, according
to Scotus applias to all composites and to all forms. It does not apply
only to man. Even material forms, for which of course there is no
question of immortality and which are quite clearly considered forms of
bodies, are individual by their own 'haeccei~y' and prior to their union
with matter.
On the issue of the plurality of forms, it is clear that Scotus
tries to reconcile the opposing views of the advocates of plurality and

-- 380 --
of the advocatea of unity. l have argued that his motivations and
gene~al premisses place him quite clearly in the Aristotelian camp. His
theoloqical concerna, however, may pull him at times further in the
direction of pl~rality than pure Aristotelianism would all~w. Aquinas,
driven by the goal of preserving the essential unit y of man, advocates
the unit y of seuls in man by claiming that there ia no real distinction
between the int~llectual soul and the lower soula, and that aIl lower
souls down te the form of ccrporeity are vir~.\.ally contained in the
rational soule
Seatus, again departing drastically from the Franciscan tradition,
agrees with Aquinas that there is only one soul in man, but that that
soul does not contain the lower souls mer.ely potentially or virtually.
The lower souls are formally distinct from the rational soul. This
amounts to agreeing with Aquinas that there is only one being in each
composite, but disagreeing with him on the further claim that one being
cornes from one forme Scotus, in fact believes that the complete
composite can be made up of a number of partial forma which are made
actual hy the advent of the final form: the rational soul in the case of
Nan. The rational soul will then contain ail the partial souls which
are g~ing to be not really, but formally distinct from it. Because the
formaI distinction, although not a distinction among 'res' but among
'realitates', is found~d in reality, Scotus feela that, while preserving
the unity of the soul in man, he can also defend a,number of theological
theses which are normally thought to require the theory of the plurality
of forms. 28
28. Cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, 490·490.

-- 381 --
While Beatus believes that the lower souls in man are formally,
but not really, distinct from the intellectual soul, he seems to think
that a real distinction ia necessary between the 'formz corporeitatis'
and the intellectual and lower souls. Scotus thinks that because the
form of corporeity in particular cao remain in the composite when no
other superior form ia present he cao give a more satisfactory account
than Aquinas cao of Traosubstantiation: of the mode of the presence of
the body, the hurnan nature and the divine nature of Christ i~ the
Eucharist; and of the problems related to the identity of the body of
Christ through His death and resurrection.
Even if it iB granted that Scotus cao preserve the essential unit y
of man through the formai distinction between the rational soul and the
lower soul, it ia still possible ta ask whether the essential unit y of
the composite ia adequately preserved in a system in which matter is
considered actual. l concluded that the solution one is apt ta give ta
this question largely depends on intuition. In the final analysis one
will either agree with Aquinas that it is impossible for something
composed ef two parts beth of which are actual ta be essentially one, or
with 5cotus in holding that it is not possible for something to be
called a composite if only one of its parts exists in its own right.
Given Scotus's notion of the actuality of matter l am inclined te
agree with him that, while it is not impossible to calI something
essentially one whose component parts are actual but related as matter
is ta form, it is impossible ta calI something composite when one of its
two components is purely potential. In Scotus's analysis, l think,
substances remain essentially basic, but their descriptions nead not be

-- 382 --
( simple. The descriptions reflect the fact that substances, though
retaining their esaential unit y, can be either simple or complexe In
the case of complex substanceD s~ch as human beings, for example, the
descriptions will be of other separate entities (even forms) which will
be really the same as, but formal:.y different from, the ultimate
actualizing forme Theae additional entities receive their actual
existence fram the final ferro, but as essences they are distinct fram
it.
In Aristotle and Sc~t~~ matter ia a 109ioa1 concept at aIl lev~ls,
ether than the levei at which change coeurs among the four elements, and
it refera te aIl the elements contained in the composite ether than the
substantial form. It is therefore open to Scotus and to Aristotle to
argue that, provided that the actuality of matter and of form is not the
same kind of actuality, both can be actual and still be united to form
something essentially one. Aristotle, l think, is using this form of
argument when he holda that the lower soula in man originate through
natural generation, a view rejected by Aquinas, but quite compatible
with Scotus's theory of the formal distinction between souls.
In the final analysis l think it should be evident from what has
been said that while Scotus generally departs from Aristotle more than
Aquinas doee in those opinions which he considere incompatible with his
own theolegical beliefs,29 nevertheless he remains closer te the spirit

-- 383 --
and often the letter of Aristot12's viewB on the notion ~f matter. 30
Thua, while Seatus clearly sees as futile any effort ta maintain with
Aristotle that matter is not separable from either form or the
contrarieties, and that matter ia in itself unintelligible aven te Gad,
he underatands correctly what Aristo~le's notion of matter s~andB for
and the principal role it ia roeant ta perform in Aristotle'e averall
picture of reality. He also interprets correctly the relationship which
obtains in Aristotle's theory of individuation between matter and forme
l think, in fact, that it ia a logical consequence of the structure of
Aristotle'a thought on that issue that the principle of individuation
should be an individu~l essen~e.
Aquinas, l think, either misunderstands or consciously rejects the
Aristotelian concept of matter and its raIe in Aristotle's system. His
may weil be a better concept of matter than that of Scotus, but it is
not the concept of matter which Aristotle defends. Unlike Scotus, on
the other hand, Aquinas agrees with Aristotle in many ways which are
ultimately unwelcome and incompatible with the Christian conception of
God. 31 Thue, for eJ<ample, Aquinas ignores Aristotle' s preoccupation
with the fact that his concept of matter should enable him to answer the
Eleatic dilemma, but seems ta agree with Aristotle that matter is
neither intelligible in itself nor separable from form in principle.
30. Cf. LittLe's generaL argument regarding the concept of matter and in particular the statement in
which, as we saw, he maintains that AristotLe's notion of matter is very close to that of
........,. Scotus and of Suarez (LittLe, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 118) .
.' ~1
4:
31. Cf. Meyer, The Phi Losophy of St. Thomas Agulnas, 12~
-- 384 --
{" 8y the proroinent role he assigns ir. his philosophy to the notion
of individual essence, by his belief that both matter and forro hav8
their own 'haecceity' bafora their union in the composite, and by his
tenet that there ie nothing common between 'haecceitates' which can
become a universal concept, ScotUB certainly prepares the way for
Ockham'a affirmation that substances and aven matter are individual by
the mere fact that they exist. Nevertheless it is undeniable that the
importance generally given ta the individua132 in Scotus's system takes
its inspiration from those passages in Aristotle which label primary
substance that which is preeminently substance and the only entity which
really· exists. 33
While bath are moderate realists, Aquinas and Scotus give g~eater
attention to different aspects of Aristotle's evaluation of the
relationship of the individual to the universal. Aquinas puts more
emphasis on the universal,34 thereby stressing the more Platonist side
of Aristctle's system and necessarily leaning towards Plato. 35 Scotus,
on the other hand, while generally accepting Aristotle's views on
universals, pute more emphasis on the notion of primary substance in
32. Cf. Gilso~. Jean Duns Scot, 476. Cf. also Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thoma~ Aguinas, 79-80.
Meyer Hays that: "Scotus continues this l ine of thought, declaring that the universal
becomts real only when it is individuated; thet this individuation is a great moment in the
life l)f the universal, making it a rruch more valuable thing. 1I (Meyer, The Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aguinas, 79).
33. Cf. Aristot(e, Metaphysics, 111.4.999 a25; Aristotle, Categories, V.2a11-15, 2bS-7, and 2b1S-17.
34. "Throughout the discussion of this question it is evident that he considered the universal the
more irrportant element. 1l (Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 76).
35. IIThe conclusions emerging frcm this asserrbly of Aristotle's errors will show St. Thomas to be a
Platonist not merely on occasion. He has not simply tacked on sorne Platonic theses ta an
( exclusively Aristotelean body of doctrine." (Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism, 231-
232). ~f. also Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aguinas, 19.
-- 385 --
Aristotle's philosophy. In this, as has been said sa many times, he
prepares the foundation for the predominance of the individual
cha~acteristic of Ockham's system.
In the end l think that Scotus preserves better than Aquinas the
spirit, and often the letter, of Aristotle's philosophy of matter,
without betraying those of his convictions deriving fram his views of a
Christian God.
-- 3B6 --
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.+.

NL·JJ9 (•. 88104Jc Canada

by Simon. Emilia MASSOBRIO

A thesis submitted to the

Copyright (c) 1991 by Simona Massobrio

Canadian Theses Service Service des thèses a:ma<liennes

Section 2 - The Potentia1ity of Prime Matter

Section 3 - Aristotle: the Inte11igibi1ity

Section 4 - Aristot1e on the Role of Matter

Section 5 - Aristot1e on the Role of Matter

CHAPTER I I ST. THOMAS AOUINAS................................. 191

Section 1 - The Potentiality of Prime Matter

Section 2 - Aquinas: the Intel1igibi1ity

Section 3 - Aquinas and the Ro1e of Matter

CHAPTER III JOHN DUNS SeOTUS.................................. 186

section 1 - The Potentiality of Prime Matter

Section 2 - Scotus: the Inte11igibility of

Section 3 - Scotus and the Role of Matter

Section 4 - 5cotus on the RaIe of Matter

CHAPTER IV SOULS, ANGELS, AND THE PLURALITY OF FORMS

Section 1 - Angela, Souls, and

section 2 - The Essential Unit y of the

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•. 357

The idea for this project was initially conceived du ring a

graduate seminar in late medieval philosophy taught by Professor Calvin

Norrnore at the University of Toronto. The study of the notions of

substance and accident in the Philosophy of William of Ockham lead me to

research and write a paper on the individuation of matter in his

philoBophical system. The paper was later read at the "International

Colloquium on the Thought and Writings of William of Ockham" in 1985 and

was published in the issues of Franciscan Studies dedicated ta the

proceedings of that conference. In the course of my research for that

paper and in reflecting ufo~ commenta made about it at the conference l

of William of Ockham on the concept of matter as well as ~y the marked

difference between their notion of matter and that of St. Thomas

Aquinaae Because aIl three philosophera, as was commer. at the time,

claimed the authority of "the Philosopher" in support of their views, l

later became interested in studying the original concept of matter as

treated by Aristotle and in comparing it to the Thomist and Scotist

interpretationse While the secondary literature on Aristatle, Aquinas,

and 5cotus is immense, l realized that no particular attention has been

devoted ta their treatment of mattere Because the concept of matter is

so basic in the systems of ail these thinkers, l decided that a detailed

l had become cOI~vinced that the generally accepted viewB on the

philoeophical orientations of Aquinas and Scotus were incorrect when

applied te th'air treatment ef matter. While it is acknowledged, in

fact, that thie ie by no means tr'le cf aIl aspects of their

philosophies, it is generally accepted that Aquinas's claim to

Aristotle's support is better founded than Scotus'S analogous claim.

More generally, the Franciscan tradition is widely believed to be closer

considered to be mo~e faithful ta Aristotle. This ie believed ta be

particularly true where their treatment ef natural philosophy ie

Franciscan tradition up te Scotus's time, it may not be true of Scotus's

treatmp-nt of matter. In addition, l had become uncertain about the

eimilarity between Aristotle's concept of matter and that of Aquinae.

Little'e clairn in The Pla~onic Heri~age of Thomism that Aristotle's

concept of matter corresponds in principle to that of Suarez and of

Scotus convinced me that these questions were both interesting and

l am grateful for the opportunity to thank those peopl~ whose

te thank Professor Jim Hankinson of the University of Texas at Austin

whoee assistance in selecting sources and whose ~,'.!idance and suggestions

in researching Aristotle were invaluable. To Professor Calvin No~more

of the University of Toronto l am grateful for teaching me so much about