Francis A. Cunningham, A THEORY ON ABSTRACTION IN ST. THOMAS ‘Yar Reverexn Francis A. Cunvtwamam, 8.1. received his M. A. from Woodstock College. He has taught at Canisius College (Buffalo) and is now teaching at Le Moyne College (Syracuse). He has previously written for Tur Monin Scnoonwan. “The text itself would not have been particularly difficult, were it not for the commentators.” That was Maldonatus’s observation on a passage in St. John.? And I suspect this may be also true of the classic passage on abstraction in St, Thomas.? We have been brought up on a watered-down version of the commentators. They do not seem to have made any distinction between abstraction and precision. And we have insisted on trying to read their total vs. formal abstrac- tion into St. Thomas’s own abstractio totius vs. formae. This had led to an imbroglio in two dimensions. 1st intention 2nd intention accidental form — ‘white’ whole nature — ‘‘man’’ (body and soul) whole supposit — ‘man’? (with individuating notes) <—> “humanity” As I see it, the commentators’ total vs. formal abstraction is nothing else but a first intention vs. a second, man vs. humanity. And these differ as St. Thomas’s abstractio vs. precisio. “Man” can signify an essence considered as a whole supposit, but “humanity” is the formal (logical) part of that essence only.* St, Thomas’s own abstractio totius vs, formae is the consideration of a whole (physical) nature including matter as well as form (for example, the body and soul of man) vs. the consideration of a mere accidental form which could not exist as such apart from a suitable subject (for example, white, snub). St, Thomas’s abstractions seem to be all first intentions (for example, man, white, snub), wheroas his ‘Phe Modsrn Schootman, xxxv, May, 1958 QAOprecisions are all seconds snubness). These are ungainly expressions admittedly. And we cannot blame the commentators for wanting to shorten them. They might have introduced their total vs. formal abstraction as a substitute for either contrast between a whole and a form, but they should not have tried to make it do service for both. There are two different kinds of wholes here which must be respected, and two different kinds of forms. An ossence considered as a whole supposit includes individual sensible matter in some sort of confused way at least (for example, “man” in “Socrates is a man”). An essence considered as a whole Physical nature includes common sensible matter (for example, (for example, humanity, whiteness, abstraction precision POSSINLM INTELLECT first intention ys, second intention essence as a whole separatio of a real esse abstractio formae of a real snub abstractio Lotius AGENT INTALLECY t abstractio of a concrete ‘‘man’’ “total abstraction” animal vs. ‘The Commentators’ essence as a formal part Ys. precisio entis sub ratione entitatis vs. precisio of snubness precisio of animality vs. precisio of an abstract ‘humanity’ “formal abstraction” Mn Joan, I, 5. 3In Boeth, de Trin., q. 6, a. 8, De Ente, cap. 8; ed. C. Boyor, sz. (Romo: Grogorian Univ., 1946), pp.19-20. 4LoM. Néyis, o., “Un livre... La 250 Philosophie de la nature, Quolques apo- ries,” Etudes ef Recherches. Philosophie (College of Oltawa), Cahier I (1986), pp. 127-56, particularly pp. 192-36.“man” or “humanity”) so long as it contains a human body as well as a soul. The individuating notes of the supposit suppressed at best have been lost utterly in this shuffle from ‘‘man"” to “humanity.” The first intention accidental forms of abstractio formae (for example, white, snub) are real beings. The second intention logical form of humanity in formal abstraction is a mere being of reason. We have tried to line up the progression of St. Thomas’s thought on a horizontal plane with that of the com- mentators on a vertical which cuts up and clear across the other. There are two different principles of division here, each equipped to touch all the bases. That is what makes it so confusing. But once grant this shift in perspective, both terminology and examples straightway fall into a consistent pattern, For instance, St. Thomas never calls humanity an abstraction. For that matter, he never seems to have called the content of these rationes or formalities— neither man nor humanity—an “abstraction.” His abstractio was reserved for the operation itself, not for Lhe fruit of that operation.’ But he never uses “humanity” as the fruit of an abstraction either. He describes that notion as the fruit of a prescinding process rather than that of any abstraction. We never confuses these two processes. And he had no reason to suppose anyone else would either. It was not until well after his death, when the Dark Ages of nominalism had begun to close down on his commentators, that the usage of abstractio was transferred imperceptibly from that of a first intention, “man,” to that of our second intention, “humanity.” Notice, this usage is three steps removed from that of St. Thomas himself. We should like to proceed in the following order: (1) the agont intellect abstracts first intention, it prescinds seconds; (2) the pos- sible intellect classifies these species into sciences; (3) the real sciences are divided according to first intentions in St. Thomas; (4) the three degrees are divided according to second intentions in the com- mentators; (5) “abstraction” comes from Aristotle’s addition and subtraction of forms; (6) the intellect abstracts from within, the senses from without; (7) metaphysical objects are really distinct from matter as in the second operation; (8) mathematical objects are logically distinct from matter as in the first operation; (9) physical objects are not distinct from matter; (10) the commentators’ total A Theory on Abstraction in St. Thomas Francis A. Cunningham, 8.3. 251