Você está na página 1de 4

Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections Pimentel vs.

Aguirre

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement
his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2)
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998,
was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from
LGU. Issues: 1. Whether or not the president
Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction
legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy 2. Whether Section 4 of the same
eye of the law. issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises
of the President's power of general supervision over local governments
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two
however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s Held: 1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent
officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and
filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify
economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the
them from office. Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors,
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action. and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate
issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit,
judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but
the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. x x x."

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public current one.
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to
those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues
of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that
persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being
merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized
service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged as an exercise of the power of control.
65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is
not a retiree. 2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the
term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR# 183591, October 14, 2008 MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), etc. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, etc.

Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP- FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain
MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era and under the
This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds,
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c)
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.
and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment
Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing.
of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut
the Court? Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the
coconut farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the
Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent,
effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be
the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a
and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly
present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court. and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the
shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an corporate identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in
assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name from First United Bank United
and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,
justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local
state of facts. market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order
sought to establish aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.A committee was created to
great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and manage the fund under this program.A majority vote of its members could engage the
not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.
existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on
supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an
not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law. irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to
provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other
Arturo Tolentino vs Commission on Elections (1971) agri-related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds
initial capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
41 SCRA 702 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Doctrine of Proper approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated
Submission UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund.
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning The Committee would designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often
only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.
of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo
Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite. To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper. exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those shares.
submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare
here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On
ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper April 24, 2001 the other sets of petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R.
“frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea 147811 to nullify Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468
yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would also for being unconstitutional.
be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This
is the “Doctrine of Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the
Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the
same time, NOT piecemeal
ISSUE: Are the coco-levy funds public funds? On another point, in stating that the coco-levy fund shall not be construed or
Are (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c) interpreted, under any law or regulation, as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of
E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 unconstitutional? the general funds of the national government,P.D.s 961 and 1468 seek to remove
Have petitioners legal standing to bring the same to court? such fund from COA scrutiny.

HELD: Coco-levy funds are public funds. The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy This is also the fault of President Estradas E.O. 312 which deals with P1 billion to be
funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper governmental purpose.They generated out of the sale of coco-fund acquired assets.E.O. 313 has a substantially
were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for the benefit of identical provision governing the management and disposition of the Coconut Trust
the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the Fund capitalized with the substantial SMC shares of stock that the coco-fund acquired.
funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut
levies recognize their public character. But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s755,961 and 1468 as well
as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the assets acquired
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article IX-D, Section 2(1) of the
taxes and can only be used for public purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional 1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine
contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty uses of government money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene
for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring of the Commission on Audit),
were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were which has the force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such funds
collected and managed by the PCA,an independent government corporation directly should be shielded from COA review and audit.The PCA, which implements the coco-
under the President.And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent levy laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled
laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the exaction. corporation subject to COA review and audit.

R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund
butto provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and,
coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look, E.O. 313 strays from the
power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of
economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other food areas.
farmers and farm workers.
Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs thatall
Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
made clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned fund and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other agriculturally-related programs
government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury. is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
*** industry and its farmers.
The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the
Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of theCCS previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O.
Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit 312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to administer,
portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided, manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it
the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut
considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of Trust Fund Committee.
the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests the management and
In any event, such declaration is void.There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired
person is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or assets into a Committee of five members.
the concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to exercise all attributes
ofownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume, In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy
and dispose or alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without legislative
these rights in favor of others.But in the case of the coconut farmers, they could not, authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned above.An
individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a
to them. statute enacted by Congress.
***
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these petitions.The petitioner
1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden of the
taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be coco-levies attaches.It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were imposed.
declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct
group of persons. The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers.The Court
recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.This so-called taxpayers suit is based on
of the government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers,do not the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra that farmers unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.
produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The
concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are The petition in G.R.147036-37 is granted; The petition in G.R. 147811 is partially
victims of social injustice and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their granted; the following are declared void: a) E.O. 312; and b)E.O. 313.
earnings.
Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 have been
previously unconstitutional.
Philippine Coconut v. Republic- 663 SCRA 514 [2012] Enrique Garcia vs Executive Secretary (1992)

FACTS: The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance 211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
of several presidential decrees (“P.Ds.”) purportedly designed to improve the
coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
particularly P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468. Charged with the duty of collecting 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
and administering the Fund was PCA. Later, PCA entered into an Agreement imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
Farmers of the Philippines. Under paragraph 8 of the second agreement, board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the FUB (First United Bank) shares imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty
purchased to such “coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5%
receipts” on equitable basis. duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at
9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the
Corazon C. Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten Constitution which provides:
wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their
nominees and associates. The PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
recovery suit against petitioners. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase. Petitioners
COCOFED et al. and Ursua uniformly scored the Sandiganbayan for abusing
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
its power of judicial review and wrongly encroaching into the exclusive
bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing
domain of Congress when it declared certain provisions of the coconut levy
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
laws and PCA administrative issuances as unconstitutional.
generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether the coconut farmers may own the coconut levy fund which
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
was reclassified into private fund through P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of


HELD: NO. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by judicial fiat the
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
conversion of special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private
be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
individuals.
Congress of the Philippines.

To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a


Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in
accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance,
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government. export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
If only to stress the point, P.D. No. 1234 expressly stated that coconut levies framework of the national development program of the Government.
are special funds to be remitted to the Treasury in the General Fund of the
State, but treated as Special Accounts. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.