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SUPREM IA
OF BRITISH
U COLUMB
ER REGISTRY
VA O NC V
S. 1 893 9 5
AuG 2 9 MB No.
Vancouver Registry
Between
Plaintiff
and
Defendants
This action has been started by the plaintiff(s) for the relief set out in Part 2 below.
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(a) file a response to civil claim in Form 2 in the above-named registry of this
court within the time for response to civil claim described below, and
(b) serve a copy of the filed response to civil claim on the plaintiff. If
(c) file a response to civil claim in Form 2 and a counterclaim in Form 3 in the
above-named registry of this court within the time for response to civil
claim described below, and
(d) serve a copy of the filed response to civil claim and counterclaim on the
plaintiff and on any new parties named in the counterclaim.
JUDGMENT MAY BE PRONOUNCED AGAINST YOU IF YOU FAIL to file the response to
civil claim within the time for response to civil claim described below.
(a) if you were served with the notice of civil claim anywhere in Canada,
within 21 days after that service,
(b) if you were served the notice of civil claim anywhere in the United States
of America, within 35 days after that service,
(c) if you were served with the notice of civil claim anywhere else, within 49
days after that service, or
(d) if the time for response to civil claim has been set by order of the court,
within that time.
1. The plaintiff is Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British
Columbia. Through the Minister of Health, the Ministry of Health of the Province of
British Columbia oversees British Columbia's health system. Through the Minister of
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Health, the Ministry of Health has overall responsibility for ensuring that quality,
appropriate, cost-effective and timely health services are available in British Columbia. In
the course of the Minister of Health's mandate, the Ministry of Health supports and funds
the activities of all regional health authorities and the Provincial Health Services Authority
in British Columbia, including all public health programs and services, and funds and
operates the provincially funded drug benefit plans in British Columbia.
2. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia also
oversees and funds all other ministries and agencies in the Province of British
Columbia.
3. The plaintiff spends billions of dollars each year to fund healthcare services,
including a provincial medical insurance plan, pharmaceutical care, drug benefit plans and
other services to residents of British Columbia, including (but not limited to) medically
necessary physician services, hospitalization, and other medical treatment costs for
prevention as well as acute and chronic conditions. The amounts spent by the plaintiff to
fund health services are in large part derived from taxpayer contributions.
The Defendants
4. The Defendants manufacture, market, distribute, and sell Opioid Drugs or Opioid
Products (individually or collectively, "Opioids") in Canada, including in British Columbia.
"Opioid Drugs" are a class of drugs that are defined by a chemical compound that is
naturally found in the opium poppy plant or which are synthetically made using the same
chemical structure, and include (but are not limited to) Butorphanol, Fentanyl,
Hydrocodone, Hydromorphone, Meperidine, Methadone, Morphine, Normethadone,
Opium, Oxycodone, Oxymorphone, Pentazocine, Tapentadol, and Tramadol. "Opioid
Products" are products that contain any Opioid Drugs. A "controlled release" Opioid
Product formulation is a system that delivers an agent at a controlled rate for an
extended time. Different terms such as extended-release (ER, XR, XL), sustained-
release (SR), time-release (TR), long-acting (LA), sustained-action (SA) and controlled
delivery (CD) may also be used to describe a controlled release formulation.
4
5. The Manufacturer Defendants (as defined below in paragraph 54) marketed and
promoted Opioids in Canada as less addictive than was actually known to the
Manufacturer Defendants and for conditions the Manufacturer Defendants knew the
drugs were not effective in treating. Such marketing and promotion efforts by the
Manufacturer Defendants resulted in an increase in prescription and use of all Opioids,
including long and short-acting Opioids.
6. The Distributor Defendants (as defined below in paragraph 76) delivered the
Opioids manufactured and marketed by the Manufacturer Defendants to pharmacies and
hospitals in Canada in quantities that they knew or should have known exceeded any
legitimate market. Such distribution efforts by the Distributor Defendants intensified the
crisis of Opioid abuse, addiction and death in Canada. Where a particular entity within a
corporate family of Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct, it did so on behalf of all entities
within that corporate family.
Manufacturer Defendants
8. Apotex Inc. is a Canadian company. During the Class Period (as defined below in
paragraph 77), Apotex Inc. manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
10. The businesses of each of the Defendants Apotex Inc. and Apotex
Pharmaceutical Holdings, Inc. (collectively, "Apotex") are inextricably interwoven with
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that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture,
marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
11. Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada is a Canadian company. During the Class Period,
Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada manufactured, marketed and sold Opioids in Canada.
13. The businesses of each of the Defendants Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada and
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (collectively, "Bristol-Myers") are inextricably interwoven
with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the
manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
15. Endo USA is an American company. During the Class Period, Endo USA, directly or
through its subsidiaries or affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in
Canada.
16. Endo International is an Irish company, with its principal place of business in
Dublin, Ireland. Paladin Labs and Endo USA are subsidiaries of Endo International.
During the Class Period, Endo International, directly or through its subsidiaries or
affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
17. The businesses of each of the Defendants Paladin Labs, Endo USA and Endo
International (collectively, "Endo") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and
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each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Opioids in Canada.
20. The businesses of each of the Defendants Janssen Inc. and Johnson & Johnson
(collectively, "Janssen") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the
agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in
Canada.
23. The businesses of each of the Defendants Pharmascience Inc. and Joddes
Limited (collectively, "Pharmascience") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and
each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Opioids in Canada.
24. Pro Doc Limitee is a Canadian company. During the Class Period, Pro Doc
Limitee manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
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25. The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. ("Jean Coutu") is a Canadian company. Pro
Doc Limitee is a subsidiary of Jean Coutu. During the Class Period, Jean Coutu, directly or
through its subsidiaries or affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in
Canada.
26. The businesses of each of the Defendants Pro Doc Limitee and Jean Coutu are
inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the
purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
27. Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC is a Canadian company. During the Class Period,
Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
29. The businesses of each of the Defendants Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC and
Mylan N.V. (collectively, "Mylan") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and
each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Opioids in Canada.
30. Purdue Pharma Inc. is a Canadian company. During the Class Period, Purdue
Pharma Inc. manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
31. Purdue Pharma L.P. is an American company. During the Class Period, Purdue
Pharma L.P. directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and
sold Opioids in Canada.
33. Purdue Frederick Inc. is a Canadian company. During the Class Period, Purdue
Frederick Inc., directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and
sold Opioids in Canada.
34. The businesses of each of the Defendants Purdue Pharma Inc., Purdue Pharma
L.P., Purdue Frederick Company and Purdue Frederick Inc. (collectively, "Purdue") are
inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the
purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
35. Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. is a Canadian company. During the Class
Period, Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. manufactured, marketed, and sold
Opioids in Canada.
37. The businesses of each of the Defendants Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc.
and Sun (collectively, "Ranbaxy") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each
is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Opioids in Canada.
38. Hikma Labs Inc. (formerly known as Roxane Laboratories Inc.) is an American
company. During the Class Period, Hikma Labs Inc. directly or through its subsidiaries or
affiliates, manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
40. Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC is a Jordanian company. During the Class Period,
Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC, directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates,
manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
41. The businesses of each of the Defendants Hikma Labs Inc., West-Ward
Columbus Inc., and Hikma Pharmaceuticals PLC (collectively, "Roxane") are
inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the
purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
Sanis
42. Sanis Health Inc. ("Sanis") is a Canadian company. During the Class Period,
Sanis manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
43. Sandoz Canada Inc. is a Canadian company. During the Class Period, Sandoz
Canada Inc. manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
45. The businesses of each of the Defendants Sandoz Canada Inc. and Sandoz
International GmbH (collectively, "Sandoz") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other
and each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Opioids in Canada.
46. Teva Canada Limited is a Canadian company. During the Class Period, Teva
Canada Limited manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
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48. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., ("Teva USA") is an American company. During the
Class Period, Teva USA, directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates,
manufactured, marketed, and sold Opioids in Canada.
50. The businesses of each of the Defendants Teva Canada Limited, Actavis
Pharma Company, Teva USA and Teva Pharmaceutical (collectively, "Teva") are
inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the
purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
51. Valeant Canada LP/ Valeant Canada S.E.C. ("Valeant Canada") is a Canadian
company. During the Class Period, Valeant Canada manufactured, marketed, and sold
Opioids in Canada.
53. The businesses of each of the Defendants Valeant Canada and Bausch
(collectively, "Valeant") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the
agent of the other for the purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in
Canada.
54. Apotex, Bristol-Myers, Endo, Janssen, Pharmascience, Pro Doc, Jean Coutu,
Mylan, Purdue, Ranbaxy, Roxane, Sanis, Sandoz, Teva, and Valeant (collectively, the
"Manufacturer Defendants") do now or have at some point in time during the Class
Period manufactured, marketed and sold in Canada prescription pain medications that
contained the Opioid Drugs oxycodone, fentanyl, morphine, or hydromorphone. These
Opioid Products include brand-name drugs such as OxyContin, OxyNeo, and Percocet, as
well as their generic counterparts.
Distributor Defendants
Gamma
Imperial Distributors
57. The Defendant, Kohl & Frisch Limited, is a Canadian company. During the Class
Period, Kohl & Frisch Limited distributed Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other
dispensaries across Canada.
58. On or about March 28, 2013, Kohl & Frisch Limited acquired AmerisourceBergen
Canada Corporation ("Amerisource"). During the Class Period, Amerisource distributed
Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
59. The Defendant, Kohl & Frisch Distribution Inc., is a Canadian company. During the
Class Period, Kohl & Frisch Distribution Inc. distributed Opioids to pharmacies,
hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
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60. The businesses of each of the Defendants Kohl & Frisch Limited, Amerisource, and
Kohl & Frisch Distribution Inc.(collectively "Kohl & Frisch"), are inextricably
interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the
distribution of Opioids in Canada.
61. The Defendant, McKesson Canada Corporation, is a Canadian company. During the
Class Period, McKesson Canada Corporation distributed Opioids to pharmacies,
hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
63. The businesses of each of the Defendants McKesson Canada Corporation and
McKesson Corporation (collectively, "McKesson") are inextricably interwoven with that of
the other and each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the distribution of Opioids
in Canada.
Jean Coutu
64. During the Class Period, Jean Coutu (as defined above in paragraph 25)
distributed Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
Nu-Quest
Abbott
67. The Defendant, Procurity Inc. is a Canadian Company. During the Class Period,
Procurity Inc. distributed Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other dispensaries
across Canada.
68. Procurity Inc. was formerly known as United Pharmacists Manitoba, Ltd. In 2003, it
became Procurity Pharmacy Services, Inc.
69. During the Class Period, Procurity Pharmacy Services, Inc. and United
Pharmacists Manitoba, Ltd. directly or through their subsidiaries or affiliates, distributed
Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
70. The businesses of each of the Defendants Procurity Inc., Procurity Pharmacy
Services, Inc., and United Pharmacists Manitoba, Ltd. (collectively, "Procurity") are
inextricably interwoven with that of the other and each is the agent of the other for the
purposes of the manufacture, marketing, and sale of Opioids in Canada.
uniPHARM
LPG
73. The Defendant, Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., is a Canadian company. During the
Class Period, Shoppers Drug Mart Inc. distributed Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and
other dispensaries across Canada.
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75. The businesses of each of the Defendants Shoppers Drug Mart Inc. and Loblaws
(collectively, "Shoppers Drug Mart") are inextricably interwoven with that of the other and
each is the agent of the other for the purposes of the distribution of Opioids in Canada.
76. The Defendants, Gamma, Imperial Distributors, Kohl & Frisch, McKesson, Jean
Coutu, Nu-Quest, Abbott, Procurity, uniPHARM, LPG and Shoppers Drug Mart
(collectively, the "Distributor Defendants", together with the Manufacturer Defendants, the
"Defendants") do now distribute or have at some point in time during the Class Period
distributed Opioids to pharmacies, hospitals and other dispensaries across Canada.
77. This action is brought on behalf of members of a class consisting of the plaintiff and
all federal, provincial and territorial governments and agencies (collectively, the "Class
Members") that, during the period from 1996 to the present (the "Class Period"), paid
healthcare, pharmaceutical and treatment costs related to Opioids.
78. The Class Period began in 1996, when Purdue first introduced and began to
market OxyContin in Canada, as further described below. The plaintiff asserts that the
Class Period definition for the purpose of this proposed class proceeding is 1996 to
present day.
Introduction
79. Prescription Opioids are powerful narcotics that work by binding to receptors on the
spinal cord and in the brain, lessening the perception of pain. In addition to pain
controlling effects, Opioids can also induce an addictive, euphoric high.
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80. With continued use, patients grow tolerant to Opioids and require progressively
higher doses over time. This increases the risks of withdrawal, addiction and overdose. At
higher doses, Opioids can slow a user's breathing, causing potentially fatal
respiratory depression. Patients who delay or discontinue long-term Opioid use often
experience extended withdrawal symptoms including nausea, muscle pain, depression,
anxiety, diarrhea, vomiting, restlessness, and chills.
81. Until the mid-1990s, prescription Opioids were not widely used because they
were thought to be too addictive to treat chronic pain conditions which would require
long-term use of such drugs. Opioids were prescribed primarily for use in treatment of
palliative conditions or for short-term acute pain, which required brief use.
83. As described in greater detail below, Purdue and the other Manufacturer
Defendants subsequently developed and promoted a narrative that pain was
undertreated and should be made a higher priority by healthcare practitioners. At the
same time, the Manufacturer Defendants began vigorously marketing long -acting
Opioids as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion and less likely to cause
tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications. The Manufacturer Defendants
promoted these Opioids as safe, effective and appropriate for long-term use for routine pain
conditions.
84. For example, a 1996 Purdue press release on OxyContin stated that the "fear of
addiction is greatly exaggerated" and "largely unfounded" and "there is very little risk of
addiction."1
1 The Los Angeles Times, "OxyContin Press Release, 1996," The Los Angeles Times (5 May, 2016)
online: The Los Angeles Times <http://documents.latimes.com/oxycontin-press-release-1996/>.
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85. By 1998, certain medical professionals were ringing alarm bells over concerns of
prescription Opioid Products on the black market.2 While the Manufacturer Defendants
were arguing that controlled-release Opioids were less desirable as drugs of abuse than
immediate-release Opioids, reports of the high street price of controlled-release Opioids
clearly indicated that these drugs were coveted on the street. Findings also confirmed
anecdotal observations that legally obtained Opioids were being illegally sold on the
streets of Vancouver.
86. The marketing efforts of the Manufacturer Defendants targeted family physicians
who were the most likely to see patients with chronic pain conditions and least likely to
have the training necessary to be in a position to verify the Manufacturer Defendants'
marketing representations about the safety and effectiveness of Opioids.
87. Specifically, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, pharmaceutical companies,
including the Manufacturer Defendants, spent hundreds of millions of dollars to
"educate" doctors on the use of Opioids for treating chronic pain over the long term and
stated that the risk of addiction was less than one percent. Purdue, the company behind
OxyContin, had a yearly promotional budget of $14 million in Canada for its Opioid
Products.3 In 2016, Purdue gave Canadian doctors more than $2 million as part of
marketing efforts — double the amount per capita that the drug company gave to
prescribers in the US.4
2 Brian Goldman, MD, The News on the Street: Prescription Drugs on the Black Market" (1998) 195.2
Can Med Assoc J at 149, online: (http://www.cmaj.ca/content/cmaj/159/2/149.full.pdf).
3 The Council of Canadians, A Prescription for Better Medicine: Why Canadians need a national
pharmacare program (18 October 2016), online: The Council of Canadians
<https://canadians.org/pharmacare-report>.
Jesse McLean, "Why did the maker of OxyContin pay Canadian doctors nearly three-and-a-half times
more money per capita than it doled out to U.S. Prescribers?" The Star (3 May 2018) online: The Star
<https://www.thestarcom/news/inyestigations/2018/05/03/why-did-the-maker-of-oxycontin-pay-canadian-
doctors-nearly-three-and-a-half-times-more-money-per-capita-than-it-doled-out-to-us-prescribers.html>.
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89. Further, inaccuracies and false claims were disseminated in print advertisements in
medical journals, such as the Canadian Medical Association Journal, which is mailed to
almost every physician in Canada.6
90. The aggressive marketing efforts of the Manufacturer Defendants were incredibly
successful. By the mid-2000s, the attitudes of healthcare professionals toward
prescribing Opioids had changed and there was a dramatic increase in prescriptions of both
long-acting and short-acting Opioids in Canada, including for treatment of chronic pain.
92. Of the 3,987 Canadians who died of an apparent Opioid overdose in 2017, 1,399
were British Columbia residents. British Columbia has the highest rate of apparent
5 Sheryl Ubelacker, "Pain course revised over concerns about drug company influence," The Globe and
Mail (December 23, 2010, updated April 28, 2018) online: The Globe and Mail
<https://www.theglobeand mail .com/news/national/pain-course-revised-over-concerns-about-drug-
com pany-influence/article1321037/>. See also The Council of Canadians, A Prescription for Better
Medicine: Why Canadians need a national pharmacare program (18 October 2016), online: The Council
of Canadians <https://canadians.org/pharmacare-report>.
6 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Minutes of Proceedings and
Opioid related deaths of any province in Canada, at a rate of 20.5 per 100,000
population in 2016, and 29 per 100,000 population in 2017.8
93. In 2017, Opioid poisonings resulted in more than 17 hospitalizations per day in
Canada.9 British Columbia has the highest provincial age-adjusted rate of
hospitalization due to Opioid poisoning, at a rate of 29.3 per 100,000 population.1° This
represents an increase of 5.1 hospitalizations in British Columbia since 2016.
94. Between 2007-2008 and 2016-2017, the rate of hospitalizations due to Opioid
poisoning increased 53%, with more than 40% of the increase occurring over the past 3 yea
rs.11
95. Comprehensive data on emergency department visits, available for Ontario and
Alberta, indicate a substantial increase in visits due to Opioid poisoning. In the year
2010-2011, emergency department visits for Opioid poisoning occurred at a rate of 14.2 and
17.8 per 100,000 population in Ontario and Alberta, respectively. In the year 2014-
2015 these rates increased to a rate of 17.4 and 27.3 per 100,000 population,
respectively.12
96. Between 2000 and 2012, there has been a five-fold increase in the prevalence of
neonatal abstinence syndrome ("NAS") in Canada and other western countries. NAS
affects infants who were exposed to Opioids in utero, causing physical dependence on
8 Government of Canada, National report: Apparent opioid-related deaths in Canada (released June
2018) <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/publications/healthy-living/national-report-
apparent-opioid-related-deaths-released-june-2018.html>.
9 According to the Canadian Institute for Health Information, in 2017 the number was 17 Canadians per day,
with British Columbia accounting for 29.3, behind the Northwest Territories (33.7) and Yukon
Territory (31.8).
10 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, Hospitalizations and
Emergency Department Visits Due to Opioid Poisoning in Canada (2016) online: Canadian Institute for Health
Information
<https://secure.cihi.cagree_products/Opioid°/020Poisoning%20Reporr/020%20EN.pdf>.
11 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Opioid-Related Harms in Canada (2017) online: Canadian
Institute for Health Information <https://secure.cihi.cagree_products/opioid-harms-chart-book-en.pdf>.
12 Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, Canadian Drug Summary, Prescription Opioids
Opioids, and often leads to withdrawal symptoms after birth. One article, citing numbers
provided by the Canadian Institute for Health Information, reported 1,744
hospitalizations for NAS in 2015-2016, a 20% increase from 2012-2013.13
97. Overall costs of Opioid use include healthcare costs, low productivity costs,
criminal justice costs, and other direct costs.
98. Canada's Chief Public Health Officer has called the state of Opioid addiction a
"major public health crisis".14
100. Opioids had historically been primarily used for treatment of terminal cancer
patients. In order to broaden the market for Opioid prescriptions, the Manufacturer
Defendants spent hundreds of millions of dollars on promotional activities and materials that
denied or downplayed the risk of addiction and overstated benefits of Opioid use. The
Manufacturer Defendants created marketing and educational materials that appeared
to contain credible scientific evidence. These materials were regularly distributed to
healthcare professionals to promote and nurture a narrative that Opioids should be much
more widely used.
101. Paid advertisements were placed in medical journals, such as the Canadian
Medical Association Journal, by the Manufacturer Defendants. These advertisements
13 Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, Canadian Drug Summary, Prescription Opioids
marketed Opioids as a safer alternative to other pain medications and appropriate for
anyone who needed long-term pain relief.
102. For example, an advertisement for the Opioid Product OxyContin in the
Canadian Medical Association Journal published in 2001, included a photograph of a fit
looking jogger, with the tag line "one to start and stay with".15 Another full-page
advertisement in the same journal depicted a runner climbing stairs next to the slogan
"When you know... acetaminophen will not be enough — Take the next step in pain
relief".16
103. The Manufacturer Defendants funded patient advocacy groups, which produced
educational materials containing information that appeared independent and reliable, but
was in fact false and misleading. Groups such as the Canadian Pain Coalition, the Chronic
Pain Association of Canada, and People in Pain Network received funding from the
Manufacturer Defendants.
106. The Manufacturer Defendants took healthcare professionals out for expensive
meals and on all-expenses-paid trips to medical conferences that promoted the use of
15
Tom Blackwell, The Selling of OxyContin," National Post (November 12, 2011) online: National Post
<https://nationalpost.cominews/canada/the-selling-of-oxycontin>.
16
Grant Robertson and Karen Howlett, "How a little-known patent sparked Canada's opioid crisis," The
Globe and Mail (December 30, 2016, last updated May 19, 2017) online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.cominews/investigations/oxycontin/article33448409/>.
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Opioids. The Manufacturer Defendants routinely paid Canadian doctors to attend drug
industry meetings and become members of industry advisory boards.
108. The pattern of false and deceptive marketing by the Manufacturer Defendants
contained misrepresentations, as further explained at paragraphs 112 - 133, such as:
(a) patients using Opioids for pain would experience improvement to function
and quality of life without adverse effects;
(b) patients using Opioids for pain generally would not become addicted and
that doctors could use screening tools to exclude patients who might;
(d) Opioid use relieved pain when used long-term without significant risk;
(g) Opioids could be taken in higher and higher doses without increased risk
to patients; and
(h) abuse-deterrent Opioid formulations were safer and lowered the potential
of abuse
109. The Manufacturer Defendants knew or ought to have known that their
representations regarding the risks and benefits of Opioids were not supported by or
were contrary to scientific evidence. The Manufacturer Defendants also knew that
doctors and patients rely heavily on educational materials, such as treatment guidelines,
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continuing medical education seminars, articles and websites to inform their treatment
decisions.
112. The Manufacturer Defendants claimed that long-term Opioid use would improve
patients' function and quality of life. The Manufacturer Defendants reinforced this
message by creating and sponsoring materials that were distributed or made available to
prescribers. These claims were unsupported by clinical evidence.
113. The Manufacturer Defendants generated marketing materials that omitted known
risks of chronic Opioid therapy and emphasized or exaggerated risks of competing
products so that prescribers and patients would be more likely to choose Opioids over
other therapies such as over-the-counter acetaminophen or nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs, like ibuprofen (NSAIDs). These claims were not supported by
scientific evidence.
114. Through their marketing efforts, the Manufacturer Defendants were able to
persuade healthcare professionals any risk of addiction to Opioids could be alleviated by
careful supervision by doctors and use of Opioids by appropriate patients. The risks of
Opioid abuse and addiction were presented by the Manufacturer Defendants as modest,
manageable, and limited to illegitimate patients, as opposed to those with genuine pain.
stigmatize patients as addicts, when they were in fact experiencing unrelieved pain.
Pseudoaddiction generally stopped once the pain was relieved, often through an
increase in Opioid dosage.
117. There are no scientific studies to back up the theory of pseudoaddiction. This
concept was created by the Manufacturer Defendants to encourage healthcare
professionals to misinterpret signs of addiction in patients as untreated pain to be
addressed with more Opioids.
118. The Manufacturer Defendants promoted misleading messages regarding the ease
of patients' withdrawal from Opioids. These misrepresentations were made with the
expectation that healthcare professionals would be more willing to start patients on chronic
Opioid therapy if withdrawal was not problematic.
119. The Manufacturer Defendants asserted that long-acting Opioids were less likely to
cause withdrawal symptoms than other pain medications. The Manufacturer
Defendants also claimed that while patients may become "physically" dependent on
Opioids, this dependence can be easily addressed by gradually decreasing dosages to
avoid the adverse effects of withdrawal. The Manufacturer Defendants failed to disclose the
actual symptoms of withdrawal from Opioids which include nausea, muscle pain,
depression, anxiety, diarrhea, vomiting, restlessness, and chills and can continue long
after use is discontinued. These symptoms make it less likely that patients will be able to
stop using Opioids.
120. To convince prescribers and patients that Opioids should be used to treat chronic
pain, the Manufacturer Defendants touted significant upsides to long-term Opioid use,
which falsely and misleadingly suggested that these benefits were supported by
scientific evidence.
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121. The Manufacturer Defendants also published misleading studies to enhance the
perception that Opioids provide effective long-term treatment for chronic pain
conditions.
125. The Manufacturer Defendants told healthcare professionals that the solution to
patients experiencing loss of pain control prior to their next scheduled dose (referred to as
"end-of-dose failure") was not more frequent dosing, but higher dosing, which poses
greater risks to patients. When patients experience end-of-dose failure, they begin to
experience withdrawal symptoms, including an intense craving for Opioids which is
followed by a euphoric rush with the next dose. This cycle promotes addiction. Many
patients will exacerbate this cycle by taking their next dose ahead of schedule or taking a
dose of another short-acting Opioid, increasing the overall amount of Opioids they are
taking. Supplementing long-acting Opioids with short-acting Opioids to alleviate end-of-
-26-
126. The Manufacturer Defendants also instructed doctors who complained about the
duration of long-acting Opioids to prescribe stronger but not more frequent doses,
putting patients at greater risk of addiction, overdose and death.
130. Using Opioids for more than a short time leads to tolerance, requiring
increasingly high doses to achieve pain relief. The Manufacturer Defendants sought to
encourage healthcare professionals to prescribe higher doses rather than prescribe
long-acting Opioids more frequently than twice a day, despite knowing that these long-
acting Opioids frequently did not provide 12 hours of relief. This advice ensured that
-27-
doctors maintained patients on Opioids even at high doses and was not supported by
scientific evidence.
131. In 2012, Purdue removed OxyContin from the Canadian market. This was just
before the OxyContin patent was set to expire and generic versions could be marketed in
Canada. Purdue replaced OxyContin with OxyNeo which had an abuse-deterrent
formulation ("ADF"). OxyNeo is harder to crush or chew and was marketed as safer and
with less abuse potential than other long-acting Opioids. Purdue claimed that ADF
Opioids prevent tampering and that its ADF products could not be crushed or snorted.
Purdue held out to healthcare professionals that ADF products would reduce Opioid
abuse and diversion.
132. Purdue knew that the ADF features of their Opioids could be easily defeated, did not
affect oral use, which is the most common means of abuse. Purdue's misleading claims
reassured healthcare professionals who were concerned about addiction that they not
only could continue to prescribe Opioids, but in fact needed to switch to Purdue-brand
Opioids, thus preserving and expanding the market for OxyNeo.
133. Purdue knew or ought to have known that reformulated ADF OxyNeo is not more
tamper resistant than other long-acting Opioids and is still regularly tampered with and
abused.
134. During the Class Period, the Distributor Defendants delivered the Opioids
manufactured and marketed by the Manufacturer Defendants to pharmacies and
hospitals in Canada. The Distributor Defendants have supplied Opioids in quantities that
they knew or should have known exceeded any legitimate market, deepening the crisis of
Opioid abuse, addiction and death in Canada.
135. By supplying the market with more Opioids than could be used for legitimate
medical purposes and failing to report loss and/or theft of Opioids, the Distributor
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Defendants and the Manufacturer Defendants created, increased and failed to prevent a
foreseeable risk of harm to the Class Members.
136. The Defendants knew or ought to have known there was a suspicious rise in
distribution of Opioids to retailers in Canada. The Defendants were in a unique position, as
they had extensive data on the extent of manufacturing and sales of Opioids in Canada.
However, the Defendants failed to do anything about suspicious orders of Opioids or to
prevent or reduce distribution.
137. On May 10, 2007, the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of
Virginia announced that Purdue plead guilty to misleading marketing in the United
States. Purdue paid $600 million in criminal and civil settlements. Three executives
pleaded guilty as individuals to the criminal misbranding and were fined $34.5 million.
138. As part of the plea agreement, an Agreed Statement of Facts was issued and
signed by Purdue executives. The Agreed Statement of Facts states that "Purdue
supervisors and employees, with the intent to defraud or mislead, marketed and
promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion, and less
likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications..."
Damages
139. As a result of the Opioid epidemic caused by the Defendants' conduct described
above, the plaintiff and the Class Members have suffered damage in the amount of the
substantial expense in paying for Opioid prescriptions and other healthcare costs
related to the use of Opioids, including but not limited to:
(a) secondary effect medications resulting from side effects of Opioid use,
such as medications for constipation and lack of sleep;
(d) the cost of harm reduction services and programs, including overdose
prevention sites, the distribution of Naloxone and the Take Home
Naloxone Program;
(g) associated medical costs for co-morbidities arising from use of Opioids,
such as treatment of Hepatitis C and AIDS;
140. The plaintiff and the Class Members bring this action against the Defendants
pursuant to the provisions of statutes including, but not limited to, section 8 of the Health
Care Costs Recovery Act, SBC 2008, c 27 and parallel legislation in other provinces, to
recover:
(a) the present value of the total expenditure by the Class Members for health
care benefits provided for their respective residents resulting from Opioid
use, side effects and/or addiction; and
(b) the present value of the estimated total expenditure by the Class Members
for health care benefits that could reasonably be expected to be provided for
their respective residents resulting from Opioid use, side effects and/or
addiction.
141. The plaintiff pleads that the Defendants' conduct as particularized in paragraphs
79-136 was high-handed, outrageous, reckless, wanton, entirely without care,
deliberate, callous, disgraceful, wilful, and in disregard of the plaintiff's rights and the
- 30 -
rights of each Class Member and, as such, renders the Defendants jointly and severally
liable to pay punitive damages.
142. The plaintiff, on its own behalf, and on behalf of the Class Members, claims
against the Defendants:
(d) a declaration that the Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of
the Class Members and that the Defendants account for, disgorge and
make restitution for their enrichment;
(k) such further and other relief as to this Honourable Court may deem just.
143. The plaintiff pleads and relies upon the Class Proceedings Act, RSBC, 1996 c
50, the Health Care Costs Recovery Act, SBC 2008, c 27 and equivalent provincial or
territorial cost recovery legislation across Canada, the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c 34,
and the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, RSBC 2003, c. 28 (the
"CJPTA").
Causes of Action
145. By making the Opioids Misrepresentations to the public the Defendants breached s 52
of the Competition Act, and thereby committed an unlawful act because the Opioids
Misrepresentations:
(a) were made for the purpose of promoting the business interests of the
Manufacturer Defendants;
146. The plaintiff and Class Members suffered damages as a result of the Defendants'
unlawful breach of s 52 of the Competition Act and seek those damages, as well as their
costs of investigation, pursuant to s 36 of the Competition Act.
- 32 -
149. The Manufacturer Defendants made the Opioids Misrepresentations to the public at
large as the core of a uniform and consistent sales, advertising and marketing
campaign.
150. The Opioids Misrepresentations caused the plaintiff and the Class Members to
suffer a loss, including the total amount paid for Opioids prescriptions and healthcare
costs related to the use of Opioids.
151. At all material times, the Manufacturer Defendants owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff and the Class Members. The Manufacturer Defendants had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in manufacturing, marketing and selling Opioids.
152. The plaintiff alleges that the Manufacturer Defendants were negligent in the
development, manufacture, marketing and sale of Opioids in Canada and that the
Manufacturer Defendants knew at all material times that the Opioids Misrepresentations
were false, or were reckless as to whether the Opioids Misrepresentations were true or
false.
153. The Manufacturer Defendants breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff and
Class Members and the harm they created, including the increase of health care costs due
to addiction, overdoses and related illnesses, was foreseeable.
154. The Manufacturer Defendants knew or ought to have known that Opioids pose
serious health risks, including addiction, which risks were not disclosed.
- 33 -
(a) asserting false statements and omitting material facts regarding the
benefits of and evidence for the use of Opioids for chronic pain, while
understating their very serious risks, including the risk of addiction. These
false statements include but are not limited to the Opioid
Misrepresentations;
(b) marketing and promoting Opioids for the treatment of long-term pain
without any or adequate research proving that such use is safe and
effective, and/or that the benefits of such use outweigh the risks;
(c) failing to monitor feedback from the market, including reports as early as
in or around 1997-1998 that Opioids were being abused and were
associated with the high risk of addiction;
(d) failing to warn doctors and the general public about the risks associated
with Opioid use, even after it became apparent that the Opioid
Misrepresentations were false and misleading;
(e) failing to conduct the necessary research and testing to determine the
risks associated with Opioid use, particularly for the treatment of long-term
pain;
-34-
(f) failing to conduct follow up testing or monitor Opioid use once Opioids
began to be consistently prescribed for long-term pain;
(i) knowingly misstating research findings, knowing that the plaintiff and its'
residents would rely on their misrepresentations and omissions, and
knowing that such reliance would cause the plaintiff to suffer damages.
158. The Distributor Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
distribution and sale of Opioids.
159. The Distributor Defendants breached the standard of care owed to the plaintiff and
Class Members and the harm they created was foreseeable.
160. The Distributor Defendants breached the standard of care expected in the
circumstances, and were therefore negligent in the distribution of Opioids in Canada.
Such negligence includes but is not limited to:
(a) failing to exercise proper judgment in reporting the loss and/or theft of
units;
(b) failing to provide effective controls and procedures to guard against theft
and diversion of Opioids;
- 35 -
(d) failing to report orders from customers which deviated from previous order
patterns or ordering methods, which they knew or ought to have known
could lead to the diversion of Opioids;
(f) failing to acquire or utilize special knowledge or skills that relate to the
dangerous activity of selling opioids in order to prevent or ameliorate such
significant dangers; and,
161. Reasonably prudent Distributors would know that failing to report suspicious
orders would exacerbate problems of diversion and non-medical use of Opioids.
162. The foreseeable harm from a breach of these duties includes, but is not limited to,
the sale, use, abuse and diversion of Opioids.
163. The foreseeable harm from a breach of these duties includes, but is not limited to,
abuse, addiction, and mortality in the plaintiffs and the Class Members' communities.
164. Further, and in the alternative, the plaintiff waives any tort pleaded above, and
pleads that it and the Class Members are entitled to claim and recover based on
equitable and restitutionary principles.
165. As an expected and intended result of their unlawful conduct, the Manufacturer
Defendants have profited and benefited from Opioid purchases made by the plaintiff and
the Class Members.
166. In exchange for the Opioid purchases, at the time the plaintiff and the Class
Members made these payments, the plaintiff and the Class Members expected that the
- 36 -
Manufacturer Defendants had provided all of the necessary and accurate information and
had not misrepresented any material facts.
167. By illegally and deceptively promoting Opioids, directly, through their control of
third parties, and by acting in concert with third parties, the Manufacturer Defendants
have been unjustly enriched by the receipt of the revenue from the sale of Opioids.
168. The plaintiff and the Class Members have suffered a corresponding deprivation in
the amount of the cost of Opioids purchased from the Manufacturer Defendants.
Because of their deceptive promotion of Opioids, the Manufacturer Defendants obtained
enrichment that they would not otherwise have obtained.
169. Since the revenue from the sale of Opioids that was received by the
Manufacturer Defendants from the plaintiff and the Class Members resulted from the
Manufacturer Defendants' wrongful and unlawful acts, there is and can be no juridical
reason justifying the Manufacturer Defendants retaining any part of it. In particular, there is
no contract, disposition of law, donative intent or other valid legal obligation that
justifies the enrichment.
170. The Manufacturer Defendants must disgorge its unjustly acquired profits and
other monetary benefits resulting from its unlawful conduct and provide restitution to the
plaintiff and the Class Members.
Fraudulent Concealment
171. The Defendants intentionally and fraudulently concealed the existence of their
unlawful conduct from the public, including the plaintiff and the Class Members. The
Defendants represented to the plaintiff, the Class Members, and the general public that the
Opioids Misrepresentations were true and accurate, thereby misleading the plaintiff and the
Class Members. The affirmative acts of the Defendants alleged herein were fraudulently
concealed and carried out in a manner that precluded detection.
172. Because the Defendants' conduct was kept secret, the plaintiff and the Class
Members were unaware of the Defendants' unlawful conduct.
-37-
Jurisdiction
173. There is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts
alleged in this proceeding. The plaintiff and the Class Members plead and rely upon the
CJPTA in respect of the Defendants. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, a
real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts alleged in this
proceeding exists pursuant to sections 10 (f) — (i) of the CJPTA because this proceeding:
Date: 29/Aug/2018
Signature of lawyer
Alvfor plaintiff
Reidar M. Mogerman
Signature of lawye
Fri/ for plaintiff
Luciana P. Brasil
There is a real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts
alleged in this proceeding and the plaintiff and other Class Members plead and rely
upon the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act RSBC 2003 Ch 28 (the
"CJPTA") in respect of these defendants. Without limiting the foregoing, a real and
substantial connection between British Columbia and the facts alleged in this
proceeding exists pursuant to ss10 (f) — (i) of the CJPTA because this proceeding:
(1) Unless all parties of record consent or the court otherwise orders,
each party of record to an action must, within 35 days after the end of
the pleading period,
APPENDIX
This proposed class action claim involves allegations regarding the marketing and
distribution of certain drugs in Canada, causing harm to Canadian provincial and
territorial governments.
❑ another cause
A dispute concerning:
❑ construction defects
personal property
El investment losses
El an employment relationship
❑ a class action
❑ maritime law
❑ aboriginal law
❑ constitutional law
❑ conflict of laws
❑ do not know
6. The Health Administration Act, RSS 1978, c H-0.0001 (formerly known as the
Department of Health Act).
15. Hospital and Diagnostic Services Insurance Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-8.
17. Medical Care and Hospital Insurance Act, SNL 2016, c M-5.01.
18. Hospital Insurance and Health and Social Services Administration Act, RSNWT
1988, c T-3.
19. Hospital Insurance and Health and Social Services Administration Act, RSNWT
(Nu) 1988, c T-3.