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Introduction
The Philippine government has three branches: the executive, the
legislative and the judiciary. Aside from the three branches, the 1987
Constitution also created the three independent commissions through Article
IX which perform the vital functions of the government. These are the Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit.
They are considered independent because the members are prohibited to hold
other office or employment during their tenure, the salary of the Chairman
and the Commissioners is fixed by law and will not be decreased during their
tenure, they are given the power to appoint their officials and employees, they
enjoy fiscal autonomy, and they may promulgate their own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or any of its offices. The independence of
these commissions is necessary to be protected against politically motivated
influence and pressure.
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the successor shall fulfill only the unexpired term of the predecessor. No
Member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Qualifications
The Chairman and the two Commissioners of the Civil Service
Commission shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for
public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
Purpose
The main objective of the Civil Service Commission is to establish and
promote professionalism and efficiency in public service. (Bernas, 2009)
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conformity with law and to take corrective action when necessary. (Bernas,
2009)
Scope
The Civil Service Commission embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government and government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters.
The Commission on Election is an administrative agency which possess
executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative powers. It has been given
judicial power as sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective local officials. (Bernas, 2009)
• It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize
a management climate conducive to public accountability.
• It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.
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• Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
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To settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
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economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the COMELEC. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments
to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
The Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
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law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
The issue of the case was whether or not Atty. Christian Monsod
qualified with the requirement of 10 year practice of law. The Court has held
that it must interpret the law according to its spirit and not on its letter, thus,
dismissing the petition of Cayetano.
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first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place,
even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall does not justify non-
compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy
should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations
over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a
small portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme
circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements
of such agencies.
The Court has held that the act of DBM withholding the subject funds
from CSC due to revenue shortfall is unconstitutional. DBM wass directed to
release to CSC the amount of ₱5,807,392.30 representing the unreleased
balance of petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General
Appropriations Act for FY 2002.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the
members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the
senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the
Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is
necessary.
The Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in
the case of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is
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provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found
in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement,
however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made
by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons
of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the
COMELEC. . It may also be an overstatement to suggest that the operations
of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if
the President of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting
Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem.
The court has held that the designation by the President of the
Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is unconstitutional, and the respondent was ordered
to desist from serving as such without prejudice to the incumbent Associate
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same
position if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending
the appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
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The TLRC Executive Committee created a Provident Fund the primary
purpose of which was to augment the retirement benefits of the officers and
employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided additional benefits 5
to its members, in accordance with the policies and guidelines approved by
the Board of Trustees. The Fund's sources of capital were from contributions
of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary and TLRC's or
the government's counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the member's gross
monthly salary, earnings of the fund and others.
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not
reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only
when the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, may
this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, a petition
for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under
Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any
order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit.
The Supreme Court found that the Commission on Audit did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the
government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. As
correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision, the government contributions
were made on the condition that the same would be used to augment the
retirement and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the purpose was
not attained due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then the employees
are not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its counterpart
contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of
public funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were
appropriated. The Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis.
Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
The Court had denied the petition had affirmed the decision of the
Commission on Audit.
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Article IX-C Section 2 paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that:
The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
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after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal
hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a
memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957,
the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for
reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2,
1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nation-wide circulation.
The issue is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and
jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to
imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the
publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which,
according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said
Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination
and to degrade and undermine the function of the Commission and its
members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body.
Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote,
all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination
of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election
inspectors and of other election officials.
The Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection
with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for
contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense,
the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within
the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an
independent administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come
under its jurisdiction.
It has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election
which might not have been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves
upon other agencies of the Government (Nacionalista Party vs. Commission
on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it have the power
to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such
devolves upon the courts or the electoral tribunals; it does not also have the
power to order a recounting of the votes before the proclamation of election
even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is a function of our
courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does
it have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a
candidate had been proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94
Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court has held that the Commission
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has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its purpose
is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103
Phil., 136).
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power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
The Court has held that the Commission on Elections has no power nor
authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to
discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge
under consideration. The petition was granted. Commission on Elections was
hereby enjoined from proceeding with the case set forth in its resolution of
June 20, 1957.
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Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that
neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense.
Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, in its resolution of August 13,
1982, asserts its jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 5054 on the authority of
Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which mandated the creation by
the Batasan Pambansa of a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices, and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned and controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the connected
authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without
compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this
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power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the
people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to
their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and
its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute
and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their
office, as contra-distinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said
authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance
under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as may be
determined by law [Sec. 5, Art. XIII]; while the Office of the Tanodbayan
shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office. [Sec. 6, Art.
XIII] The clause, "as may be determined by law" is imbued with grave import.
It called for a legislation that would define and delineate the power and
jurisdiction of both the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact
had been provided for in Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and 1607, creating
the said entities. It is, however, to be noted that it is phased in terms so broad
and general that it cannot be legitimately construed to vest said entity with
exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officers in
relation to their office.
As aptly observed by the COMELEC as well as the Solicitor General,
splitting the jurisdiction over election offenses would serve no beneficial
purpose but would rather spawn much controversy and complaints about
unequal protection, about inconsistent decisions which are not conducive to a
fair and speedy administration of justice.
The Court has held that the Commission on Elections shall conduct the
investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, prosecute the complaint against
petitioner before the proper court of first instance.
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