Int Environ Agreements (2012) 12:41–61

DOI 10.1007/s10784-010-9132-8

ORIGINAL PAPER

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals

of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution
in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

John C. Cole

Accepted: 17 August 2010 / Published online: 5 September 2010

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto

Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals
regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related
matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the
CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Devel-
opment Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks
preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to
pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh
Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised
achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with
the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap
obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership
position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a
whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the
North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative
means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable
development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the
CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would
arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal
advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-
Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted
through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Mar-
rakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy

J. C. Cole (&)
Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, School of Geography and the Environment,
South Parks Rd., Oxford OX1 3QY, UK
e-mail: john.cole@linacre.oxon.org

Present Address:
J. C. Cole
Smith School of Enterprise and Environment, University of Oxford,
Hayes House, 75 George Street, Oxford OX1 2BQ, UK

123
42 J. C. Cole

goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more
nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor
mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced
policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the
CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.

Keywords Brazilian proposal
CDM
Clean development fund
Clean development

mechanism
Climate change
Kyoto protocol
Sustainable development

1 Introduction and background

The Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has triggered a flow of billions
of Euros from the developed countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, a subset of
the countries listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), and commonly referred to as the Annex I countries, to the remaining
Kyoto Protocol parties (the developing countries). This article considers the genesis of the
CDM in the context of its history and underlying policymaking goals. Of particular interest
is the 1997 Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, which through negotiations
evolved into the CDM. This focuses the resulting analysis on the political interests and
policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects—the Brazilian Ministry of External
Affairs (Itamaraty) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT)—viewed through
the lens of Brazil’s environment-development discourses. It contrasts the CDM architects’
underlying policy goals (in 1997) with the corresponding goals advocated by the academic
literature, the international policymaking community, and the Brazilian delegation to the
fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen.
While much has been written on the CDM appraising whether it meets its twin
objectives of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions and sustainable development
(Ellis et al. 2007; Headon 2009; Liverman 2009; Sutter and Parreño 2007; Wara 2007;
Wara and Victor 2008), critical inquiry into the policymaking process underlying its
emergence in the negotiations at the UNFCCC COP-3 in Kyoto is lacking. This article
begins to address this lacuna through critical consideration of the goals pursued by the
Brazilian delegation to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and their negotiating counterparties
in the creation of the Brazilian Proposal and, eventually, the successful negotiation of the
CDM and the Marrakesh Accords.
The Brazilian Proposal1 sought to impose quantified emissions limitation and reduction
objectives—binding emission caps on the Annex I countries’ GHG emissions—on the
basis of historical responsibility, rather than on the basis of each country’s current emis-
sions. The Brazilian Proposal calculated historical responsibility on the basis of each
country’s contribution to global temperature increase from 1840 to the present. This cal-
culation resulted in the developing countries’ projected contribution to climate change
surpassing the Annex I countries’ contribution in 2147 rather than 2037 (La Rovere 2002).2

1
Officially entitled Proposed Elements of a Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Presented by Brazil in Response to the Berlin Mandate, dated 28 May 1997.
2
Based on a comparison between the Brazilian Proposal and the IS92a emission scenario, a mid-range
scenario involving a population increase to 11.3 billion by 2100, 2.3% annual economic growth and a mix of
conventional and renewable energy sources, with the only emission reductions arising from ratified inter-
national agreements and national policies enacted into law.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 43

The Brazilian Proposal included a Clean Development Fund, which was to be funded by
fines paid by Annex I countries that exceeded their emissions caps. The proceeds of the
Clean Development Fund were to be distributed among GHG emission reduction projects
in developing countries, with preference given to countries with greater projected
(1990–2010) GHG emissions.
A critical examination of the policy factors underlying the CDM in the context of the
Brazilian Proposal’s policymaking objectives provides an historical focus for the emerging
bodies of literature regarding appropriate sustainable development benefits from CDM
projects and geographic distribution of CDM projects among developing countries. The
CDM is the only portion of the Brazilian Proposal included in the final Kyoto Protocol.
Emissions caps in the Kyoto Protocol were not determined per the Brazilian Proposal,
although it provided a strong scientific basis for the developing countries’ successful
argument that emissions caps should not extend to developing countries.
This article analyses the policymaking process underlying the Brazilian Proposal on the
basis of interviews conducted in 2007–2008 with 18 Brazilian bureaucrats active in Bra-
zil’s climate policy, including 13 members of the Brazilian delegation to the international
climate negotiations during that same period, some of whom were long-term members of
the Brazilian delegation and key architects and proponents of the Brazilian Proposal and
Brazil’s climate policy goals in Kyoto and Marrakesh. Follow-up discussions were held in
the aftermath of Copenhagen to address Brazil’s emerging, highly nuanced position. This
research was conducted in the course of broader research into Brazil’s climate policy,
specifically focussing on the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM. Interviewees are anonymised to
maintain confidentiality and to ensure the integrity of data gathered from active partici-
pants in the ongoing international climate negotiations.
This article concludes that the CDM has largely achieved its architects’ policymaking
goals, which are merely a subset of the goals discussed more recently in the academic
literature, leaving pursuit of wider sustainable development concepts in the areas of eco-
nomic, social and non-GHG-related environmental development to government pro-
grammes outside the CDM framework. It argues that the goals underlying the broader
conception of sustainable development were not achieved, in part, because they were not
originally intended by the CDM’s architects, who tailored the CDM to pursue their narrow
conception of sustainable development. Pursuit of additional goals will require a different
or more refined, nuanced mechanism that specifically targets those corresponding goals.

2 Factual setting surrounding the formulation of the Brazilian proposal

From its initial recognition of the need to mitigate GHG emissions through to the
2008–2009 period, Brazil was steadfast in opposing emissions caps for developing
countries (Höhne et al. 2006; Johnson 2001). The impetus for the Brazilian Proposal arose
in late 1996, concurrent with preparations for the Kyoto negotiations, when Jonathan
Pershing of the US delegation to the international climate negotiations made a presentation
claiming that developing country emissions would surpass the emissions of the developed
countries around 2025. Subsequently, Professor Bert Bolin, then president of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), made a similar presentation. This caused
the Brazilian delegation to assume that similar claims would be made in the Kyoto
negotiations.
The Brazilian Proposal was designed as a counter-proposal to refute these claims. MCT
techno-bureaucrats developed the Brazilian Proposal as a scientific argument apportioning

123
44 J. C. Cole

liability for climate change on historical actions, not current emissions. In doing so, they
were driven by the view that a focus on current emissions nullifies past actions, telling only
half the story as it omits any consideration of historical responsibility for the then-current
atmospheric GHG concentration.
The resulting effort constituted the development of technical, scientific criteria defining
the relative contributions of individual countries to climate change in terms of temperature
increase, as set forth in the Brazilian Proposal. This effort began in December 1996, and
continued until the deadline for presentation materials of 30 May 1997, nearly 6 months in
total.
The Brazilian Proposal also considered other inputs, but these were confined to inputs
arising in the multilateral context, not from participation by other Brazilian government
ministries or non-government actors. The domestic views that were not addressed are
considered in Sect. 3.1.4. At the multilateral level, one significant impact arose from a
discussion with a member of the Philippines delegation, in the corridor during preparatory
talks for the Kyoto negotiations, raising concerns a straightforward protocol simply
comprising emissions caps would be troublesome if agreed commitments were not uni-
formly fulfilled, especially in the absence of some enforcement or reprisal mechanism.
This concern led to the Brazilian Proposal’s inclusion of the Clean Development Fund. The
channelling of development monies from Annex I countries to developing countries was
merely a by-product of this enforcement intent, originally framed as a remedy for the
effects of the Annex I countries not meeting their emissions caps. Specifically, the Bra-
zilian Proposal provided that any country exceeding its emissions caps compensate by
contributing US$10/tonne of CO2 equivalent into the Clean Development Fund, to be
distributed by the UNFCCC to fund GHG emission reductions projects on the basis of
applications made by individual developing countries, with preference given to developing
countries with a larger relative contribution to climate change (Figueres 2004; Grubb et al.
1999; Johnson 2001; Miguez 2005; Oberthür and Ott 1999). Interviews with the architects
of the Brazilian Proposal indicated that this was premised on the position that mitigation of
GHG emissions, by definition, required the pre-existence of GHG emissions, so developing
countries with greater relative projected GHG emissions thereby deserved greater funding.
The Brazilian negotiators interviewed recalled that the US opposed the Clean Devel-
opment Fund on two bases: the concept of penalties in international treaties, and the US
taxpayer having any responsibility for non-compliance as, ultimately, private companies
would be responsible. To resolve these issues, a meeting was scheduled for November
1997 between three members of the US delegation and three members of the Brazilian
delegation. These negotiations extended into the Kyoto negotiations and expanded beyond
the US and Brazil to include other members of the G-77 and China in the context of an
informal contact group chaired by Brazil under the auspices of the Committee of the
Whole (Werksman 1998). Simultaneously, the Brazilian delegation continued to build
consensus around the Brazilian Proposal among the G-77 and China. In these US-Brazil
negotiations the Brazilians agreed to remove the points to which the US objected, by
converting references to fines into references to contributions to meeting emissions caps,
which the Brazilian negotiators viewed as a distinction without any real underlying
difference.
To address the issue of government rather than private contributions, the US proposed
the concept of the CDM market mechanism with the intent of shifting the resulting
financial obligations to private companies. The resulting CDM also met both the US
objective of involving developing countries, and the Brazilian objective of doing so
without obligations, only incentives.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 45

Interviewees identified ancillary Brazilian objectives, as well, including the need to

achieve consensus among the G-77 and China. This necessitated some mechanism bene-
fitting developing countries likely to suffer from climate change that have not contributed
to GHG emissions in any meaningful way, as discussed in Sect. 5.

3 Political interests of the Brazilian proposal’s architects in the context

of Brazil’s underlying national environment-development discourses

3.1 Brazilian government and other actors involved in formulation

of the Brazilian proposal

Interviewees unanimously asserted that the policy impetus underlying the Brazilian Pro-
posal arose from a reaction to an emerging political imperative in the context of short,
looming deadlines. The Brazilian Proposal was thus a defensive negotiating manoeuvre,
and fully accounted for the political interests (in 1997) of the Brazilian ministries charged
with the international climate negotiations: MCT and Itamaraty.
Itamaraty led the Brazilian delegation to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, but relied
heavily on MCT scientists’ analysis of the corresponding scientific and related policy
issues. This arose, in part, because in 1997 Brazil addressed climate change as a scientific
(rather than environmental) issue. Treating climate change as a scientific issue contained
Brazil’s climate policy within a small group of Itamaraty diplomats and MCT scientists
and techno-bureaucrats, focussing some aspects of the resulting analysis on MCT’s and
Itamaraty’s political interests.

3.1.1 MCT political interests

MCT was established in 1985, concurrent with Brazil’s transition to democracy from the
1964 to 1985 military dictatorship. MCT argued in favour of Brazilian government action
on climate change from the late 1980s, when MCT first alerted the Brazilian government to
the climate change issue, strongly advocating the appointment of technically competent
bureaucrats to represent Brazil’s interests.
Schwartzman (1994) concluded that, post-democratisation, the scientific community no
longer enjoyed the priority status it enjoyed during the 1964–1985 military dictatorship, as
MCT was competing in economic, social and environmental terms for its funding requests.
MCT’s climate change-related political interests were thus interwoven with MCT’s desire
to garner a leading role, beside Itamaraty, in the multilateral climate negotiations. This
would provide MCT with additional access to resources, including financing, and would
assist it to maintain its relevance and entrench its position within the Brazilian bureaucracy.
Outside of its climate change programmes MCT had not consistently met expectations.
In the 1985–1989 period MCT was perceived as a vehicle to promote the interests of the
scientific sector, engaging in the same political behaviour to promote those interests as
other Brazilian ministries or bureaucracies (Schwartzman 1994). In 1989, MCT disap-
peared briefly, absorbed into the Ministry of Industry and Trade, before becoming the
Special Secretary for Science and Technology directly under the President, re-emerging as
a full-fledged ministry again in December 1989, only to be reduced to the status of a
Secretariat by President Collor’s 1990 administrative reforms. In 1992 President Franco
published a provisional measure restoring MCT to the status of a full ministry, a status it
has since retained.

123
46 J. C. Cole

3.1.2 Itamaraty political interests

Itamaraty is a powerful actor within the Brazilian bureaucracy, although historically less
powerful than the military and the leading domestic policy ministries, comprising the
Ministry of Planning, Budgeting and Management, the Ministry of Finance, and the
Ministry of Mines and Energy (Schneider 1977). Itamaraty is perceived as highly pro-
fessional with significant bureaucratic autonomy, holding a near monopoly on Brazil’s
external relations, subject to recurring bouts of presidential diplomacy (Cason and Power
2006; MacLachlan 2003). MCT’s inclusion in the international climate negotiations evi-
dences that Brazilian foreign policy positions are becoming pluralised across a broad range
of topic areas and areas of expertise (Souza 2001).
When environmental matters first arose in the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, the Brazilian economic ministries feared these
issues would isolate Brazil, forcing Brazil to defend itself and its development. At
Stockholm, Itamaraty instead took the position that developing countries attending to
environmental matters in response to multilateral pressure could result in a new form of
imperialist domination arising from rules imposed by the developed, industrialised coun-
tries regarding conservation and pollution in the developing countries (Cason and Power
2006; Lago 2004). Itamaraty’s principal foci have thus remained largely unchanged since
Stockholm: to maintain its elite status in Brazil’s foreign relations, Itamaraty stridently
seeks to achieve Brazil’s national goals in the context of Brazil’s, and Itamaraty’s, goals of
multilateralism by exhibiting leadership among the G-77 and China. Similarly, Itamaraty’s
political interests include retaining the high-profile position it has held in international
environmental negotiations since Stockholm.

3.1.3 Resulting Brazilian government actor network

In the Kyoto negotiations MCT and Itamaraty were together committed to the principle
that global GHG emissions mitigation was required to avoid dangerous interference with
the climate system, and that this effort needed to be led by the Annex I countries, thus
preserving the developing countries’ ability to pursue their economic growth objectives
unfettered by emissions caps. In the resulting Kyoto negotiations, MCT provided Itamaraty
with robust scientific arguments supporting these positions. Some observers of the Bra-
zilian delegation to the international climate change negotiations consider Itamaraty’s
adoption of these policy positions to be critical as Itamaraty, through its dominance in
Brazil’s foreign relations and its control of Brazil’s position in the international climate
negotiations, has historically been empowered to determine Brazil’s climate policy. The
result was that, in the 1996–1997 period, MCT scientists were motivated to prepare the
Brazilian Proposal such that it would be acceptable to, and support, Itamaraty. The highly
technical nature of the Brazilian Proposal was a reflection of the technical focus of its
creators, principally MCT techno-bureaucrats, and evidence of MCT entrenching its
position at the forefront of Brazil’s climate policy.
MCT’s political interests were not the exclusive factor that led to the highly technical
nature of the Brazilian Proposal. The choice of a purely scientific basis was also quite
clever from a diplomatic negotiations perspective as it created a scientific analytical
framework for the negotiations, thereby avoiding (or forestalling) purely political nego-
tiations on emissions caps.3 This represented a marked shift from Itamaraty’s approach to

3
The author acknowledges André Tavares’ contribution to the formulation of this analysis.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 47

the 1992 climate negotiations surrounding the UN Conference on Environment and

Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (the Earth Summit), where Itamaraty
attempted to downplay scientific issues to focus on political and economic issues. Inter-
views with Brazilian climate negotiators confirm that this shift toward a scientific, ana-
lytical basis for Brazil’s position comprised a component of Brazil’s strategy for the 1997
climate negotiations.
This strategy also insulated Brazil’s inability (in 1997) to curb deforestation effectively.
This precluded acceptance of any binding emissions caps, especially in light of Brazil’s
unique carbon footprint whereby 80% of emissions arise directly or indirectly from agri-
culture—nearly half from deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado—and only 17% arising
from burning fossil fuels (Nobre 2008; Viola 2009).
The Kyoto negotiations occurred in the midst of Brazil’s 1990s financial crisis, after
Brazilians’ unbridled enthusiasm for environmental issues had peaked at the Earth Summit,
when Brazilian policymakers demanded pragmatic solutions to environmental problems
(Becker and Miranda 1997; Ferreira 1997, 1999; Herculano 2000; Hochstetler and Keck
2007; Svirsky and Capobianco 1997; Vieira 1998). These financial woes drove Brazil’s
perception of its national interests at Kyoto as comprising: (1) affirmation of a fundamental
right to development, (2) promotion of global development within a sustainability context
that aligned with Brazil’s emerging socio-environmental discourse, (3) promotion of
international funding for developing country GHG emission reductions projects, (4) Brazil
undertaking a leadership role in the multilateral environmental negotiations, and (5) to
block multilateral forest governance to avoid international questioning to Amazonian
deforestation (Viola 2004).

3.1.4 Other actors

The inclusion of only Itamaraty and MCT officials on the team that developed the Bra-
zilian Proposal and, ultimately, negotiated the CDM contrasts sharply with the broad-based
delegation Brazil sent to Copenhagen, which included officials from a variety of Brazilian
government ministries, as well as NGO observers. This section considers two constitu-
encies involved in Brazilian climate policy post-Kyoto: the Brazilian Ministry of Envi-
ronment (MMA), in the context of its advocacy of socio-environmentalism, and domestic
NGOs, in the context of their role in Brazilian environmental policymaking.
MMA’s political interests are intertwined with its goals involving enforcement of
Brazil’s environmental laws and regulations. MMA’s climate change agenda overlaps with
the Itamaraty-MCT agendae, but also encompasses social considerations arising from
Brazil’s socio-environmentalism discourse, linking climate change science, mitigation and
adaptation with social issues, including poverty reduction to decrease vulnerability. MMA
increased its climate change involvement, including pursuit of socio-environmentalism,
under Environment Minister Marina Silva (2003–2008). During this period MMA also
sought a more active role in the Brazilian climate change policymaking structure, bringing
it into conflict with MCT.
In terms of the CDM, MMA’s differences with Itamaraty-MCT encompass priorities
and conceptual interpretations of CDM-related sustainable development. MMA officials
advocate Itamaraty-MCT’s priority of ensuring the efficacy of claimed GHG emission
reductions, but also seek to extract additional social sustainable development benefits from
CDM projects. MMA’s general, national vision pursues a comprehensive environmental
regulatory system that aligns with its socio-environmentalist orientation, encompassing
GHG emission reductions, implemented nationally. Specifically, MMA promotes CDM

123
48 J. C. Cole

projects in sectors involving environmental issues that were previously not well developed,
including biogas, landfills and waste management.
Conversely, the inclusion of NGO observers on the Brazilian delegation to the multi-
lateral climate negotiations has increased both transparency and links with a broader group
of government officials and ministries. Brazilian environmental NGOs largely focus on the
same issues as international NGOs (Guedes 2003). Brazilian NGOs jointly pursue sus-
tainable development with a variety of stakeholder groups, including government, aca-
demia, business, multilateral institutions and community movements (Ferreira 1999;
Ferreira and Ferreira 1995; Mattos and Drummond 2005). This results in Brazilian envi-
ronmental NGOs treading the margin between the roles of social actor and political activist
(Ferreira 1997).
Increasing NGO access to the inner workings of the Brazilian delegation to the mul-
tilateral climate negotiations enables them to exert influence on the formulation and
implementation of Brazilian government policy. The contrast—and interplay—between
Brazilian domestic NGOs and Brazilian social movements is instructive (Gohn 2001, 2002;
Herculano 2000). Brazilian NGOs largely comprise institutionalised entities that exert
influence through dialogue with the state, while social movements tend to be fluid social
groups addressing specific issues or episodes, often advised and supported by NGOs
(Herculano 2000). This empowers NGO leaders to act as subordinates to advance a radical
reformism, yet seeing themselves as an elite vanguard and identifying in many respects
with the ruling elite (Herculano 2000, 2006). As a result, NGO activities—although far
from mass movements—have resonance with Brazilian bureaucrats and officials because
their supporters are educated, high profile opinion leaders (Herculano 1992).

3.2 Brazilian national environment-development discourses

The MCT and Itamaraty architects of the Brazilian Proposal pursued their political
interests and these policy goals in the context of their own worldview, in part defined by
the corresponding Brazilian environment-development discourses from the military dic-
tatorship era and subsequent period of re-democratisation. Brazil’s 1964–1985 military
dictatorship perpetuated national environment-development discourses promoting an
aggressive development agenda targeting a first-world level of industrial development
(referred to in this article as ‘developmentalism’), national security and sovereignty. The
subsequent re-democratisation movement that succeeded in restoring democracy to Brazil
in 1985 arose from grassroots discourses of citizenship, including environment-develop-
ment discourse strains of social inclusion and environmentalism. These democratisation-
related discourses did not replace the military dictatorship-era discourses, rather became
integrated within them, resulting in a strident developmentalism discourse supportive of
Brazil’s developmentalist objectives alongside Brazil’s policy goals of social inclusion,
environmentalism, national security and sovereignty. The Brazilian Proposal evidences
these discourses’ state of evolution in 1997 from the perspective of Itamaraty and MCT.
Before considering the other components of these discourses, which did not factor heavily
in Itamaraty and MCT’s analysis but have impacted the post-1997 evolution of Brazil’s
position in the multilateral climate negotiations, it is useful to explore the interplay
between these national discourses, Itamaraty and MCT’s political interests and the Bra-
zilian Proposal. Of these, one discourse strain predominated: avoiding climate-related
fetters impeding Brazil’s pursuit of its developmentalist agenda, which by 1997 embraced
social inclusion. As a result, Itamaraty and MCT’s ultimate objective at Kyoto was to see
the Annex I countries address climate change through substantive emissions caps, yet

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 49

forestall the date Brazil (and developing countries more generally) eventually commits to
emissions caps. Achieving this required that the Brazilian Proposal impede the Annex I
countries from successfully arguing that emissions caps should be allocated on the basis of
current emissions, enabling pursuit of Brazil’s broader developmentalist objectives.
This contrasts with the environmentalism pursued by the MMA and Brazilian NGOs,
which each focus on issues arising from Brazil’s socio-environmental discourse and limit
development objectives to socially inclusive development (Ferreira 1997, 1998; Viola
1992, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2009). These differences must be seen in light of Brazil’s overall
process of re-democratisation in the context of Brazil’s concurrent shift from a develop-
mentalist state to a market-oriented economy (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Neither shift
impacted Brazil’s profound economic inequities (Acselrad 2000; Hochstetler and Keck
2007). The eventual change to democracy was negotiated by the elites, and the resulting
bureaucracy comprised a mixture of those elites and new agents of change. In this envi-
ronment, bureaucratic decisions were initially driven by the agenda of the institutional
actors involved in any particular matter (Lemos and Looye 2003). Upon democratisation,
agents of change tended to be more successful if they garnered support from public
movements—outside the bureaucracy and the state—willing to push for corresponding
policy changes (Lemos 1998).
Many of these agents of change sought, and continue to seek, to further socio-envi-
ronmental discourses, which arose in earnest in the mid-1980s from attempts to integrate
environmental issues within the sectors of the democracy movement advocating Brazilian
social issues, including the broad movement for democracy and social justice issues
(Ferreira 1996; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Ribeiro 2010). These issues were conflated and
further combined with issues of local participation, resulting in calls for a new citizenship
addressing social, environmental and participation issues (Ferreira and Ferreira 1995;
Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Advocates conjoined environmental degradation and social
justice to reach out to economically and socially excluded sectors of Brazil’s population by
patterning a discourse wherein poverty and environmental degradations arose from the
same causal story (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). This contrasted directly with discourses of
the military dictatorship period, which the military imposed from within the realm of the
state, largely to avoid inflated demands and the generalisation of populist policies (Lemos
and Looye 2003; Santos and Paixão 1989; Schmitter 1971). Instead, pursuit of socio-
environmentalism grew from local efforts to a national movement in the late 1980s, which
triggered engagement at the international level, as well, as international NGOs established
presences in Brazil in response to Brazil’s perceived complacency on deforestation
(Hochstetler and Keck 2007).

4 The policymaking vision of the Brazilian proposal’s architects

The interviews underlying this research clearly identify preservation of Brazil’s develop-
mentalist ambitions in the context of social inclusion as a principal Brazilian Proposal
objective. In those interviews, architects of the Brazilian Proposal were adamant that this
was a driving force behind their development of the Brazilian Proposal in 1996–1997, and
their pursuit of the CDM in negotiations with the US.
The Brazilian Proposal as written outlined a framework for allocating the burdens and
responsibilities of climate change. Notwithstanding that it did not mention Brazil specif-
ically, the impact of the potential application of the Brazilian Proposal correlated directly
with Brazil’s environment-development discourses by preserving a space for the

123
50 J. C. Cole

advancement of a revised Brazilian developmentalist model addressing social inclusion.

From a multilateral policy perspective the Brazilian Proposal addressed Brazil’s broader
concerns regarding unequal geographic development between the Annex I countries and
developing countries. The Itamaraty-MCT position in 1997 was fairly straightforward,
resulting in a policymaking strategy of decoupling GHG emissions growth from economic
development, thereby preserving Brazil’s developmentalist agenda, but in the context of
(overall) decreased emissions growth. One lead architect of the Brazilian Proposal illus-
trated the core of this revised developmentalist agenda with a standard logistic sigmoid
function curve, arguing that under business as usual conditions developing country GHG
emissions and economic development co-vary along the curve. Through the provision of
enabling technology, financing and resources, the intent was to enable developing countries
to maintain their levels of economic growth, but decouple GHG emissions growth from
GDP growth.
This model assumed that Annex I countries have largely reached the top of the curve
while the developing countries are at various stages moving up the curve. Figure 1
illustrates this, with the solid line representing the co-varying GHG emissions growth and
economic growth (GDP), and the broken line representing the inflection of the curve
downward for suppressed GHG emissions growth on the basis of the transfer of financial
and technological support to developing countries.
The interviewees argued that Brazil’s policy in the Kyoto negotiations, and in the
Brazilian Proposal, arose from the view that this inflection of GHG emissions growth and
resulting decoupling of GHG emissions growth and GDP growth was the appropriate
emissions mitigation path for many developing countries, not emissions caps. This position
was supported by arguments that asserted the need to employ infrastructure and technol-
ogies to enable this decrease in the rate of GHG emissions increase, while achieving the
same level of economic development, equating economic development with poverty
reduction. This reflected the position of many developing countries that poverty is a key
issue. The Brazilian climate negotiators interviewed framed this in the context of the need
to expand electricity generation and transmission infrastructure to all sectors of the pop-
ulation, thereby reducing poverty and reaching other social goals previously attained by

Fig. 1 Illustration of the decoupling of developing country GHG emissions growth from economic growth
(in terms of national GDP) through funding of low-carbon infrastructure pursued by the 1997 Brazilian
Proposal (source: J.D.G. Miguez sketch prepared in course of interview with author)

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 51

Annex I countries, arguing that any mechanism for global regulatory cooperation on
mitigating GHG emissions must allow the developing countries to sustain increases in
GHG emissions growth corresponding to these activities. Thus, instead of pursuing poverty
reduction and social goals directly, the CDM’s Brazilian architects pursued economic
growth in order to leave a space for developing country governments to pursue these or
other government priorities.

5 Sustainable development and the CDM

The vision of the architects of the Clean Development Fund/CDM focused narrowly on the
mere existence of the CDM project, contemplating that the CDM project’s existence,
alone, would comprise sufficient sustainable development to achieve the CDM’s sustain-
able development goal.4 In interviews, the Brazilian architects of the Clean Development
Fund/CDM asserted that they pursued this vision when they included sustainable devel-
opment as a CDM objective. This narrow view of CDM-related sustainable development
contrasts with the bulk of the ensuing academic literature, which advocates broader notions
of sustainable development (Halsnaes 2002; Olsen 2007; Paulsson 2009). Although no
agreed definition of sustainable development exists (in the CDM context or otherwise), the
broad conception of sustainable development advocated by the academic literature posits
that sustainable development comprises a combination of three broad constituent factors:
environmental (including reduction of GHG, conservation of local resources, improved
health and reduced pressure on local environments), economic (financial returns to local
entities, a positive balance of payments and technology transfer) and social (poverty
alleviation, equity and quality of life issues) (Amous 2004; Halsnaes 2002; Holland 2001;
Kolshus et al. 2001; Najam et al. 2003; Olhoff et al. 2004; Olsen 2007). The resulting
misalignment between the CDM’s Brazilian architects’ narrow conception of sustainable
development and more traditional conceptions of sustainable development is not unique to
the CDM (Roberts and Parks 2007). The academic literature acknowledges that the CDM
was designed to provide the Annex I countries with alternative emission reductions options
while transferring flows of technology and capital to developing countries to enable more
sustainable, less GHG emissions-intensive development by delinking economic growth,
energy intensity and carbon output (Figueres 2004; UNDP 2006); however, it largely
considers CDM-related sustainable development to arise from more than the mere exis-
tence of the CDM project (Boyd et al. 2009; Olsen 2007; Paulsson 2009).
To operationalise this broader conception of CDM-related sustainable development, this
existing academic literature argues that identification of an appropriate sustainable
development assessment methodology has thus become a critical analytical threshold for
host country governments. This literature advances a variety of options, with the primary
distinctions arising from the choice of criteria to measure sustainable development, the
weighting of those criteria and the characterisation and analysis of sustainable develop-
ment as an ancillary benefit or a core objective (Anagnostopoulos et al. 2004; Begg and
van der Horst 2003; Fichtner et al. 2002; Halsnaes 2002; Huq 2002; Kolshus et al. 2001;
Olhoff et al. 2004; Olsen 2007; Sutter 2003). In contrast with the Brazilian CDM archi-
tects’ narrow view of CDM-related sustainable development, focused principally on GHG
emission reductions, this broader view raises a plethora of ancillary issues regarding the
need for resilient political institutions, effective regulation and an effective legal regime in

4
Kyoto Protocol Art. 12.2.

123
52 J. C. Cole

order to implement any criteria successfully (Holland 2001). This article argues that the
goals underlying the broader conception of sustainable development were not achieved, in
part, because they were not originally intended by the CDM’s architects, who believed that
the mere existence of a project mitigating GHG emissions below an appropriate baseline
comprised sufficient sustainable development, and designed the CDM accordingly. This
does not mean that Brazil ignored the interests of other developing countries. On the
contrary, Brazil supported the inclusion of a sustainable development prong to ensure that
developing countries could implement their priorities; however, the timeframe between
Brazil’s agreement with the US on the CDM and the Kyoto negotiations was such that it
was not possible to canvass the positions of other developing countries extensively outside
the informal working group chaired by Brazil under the Committee on the Whole at the
Kyoto conference of parties. In interviews the Brazilian CDM architects recalled that they
addressed their objective of achieving consensus among the G-77 and China by designing
the CDM to be a mechanism benefitting developing countries that had not contributed to
climate change in any meaningful way, but will nevertheless suffer its the consequences,
both in terms of mitigation and adaptation. The Brazilian Proposal had addressed adap-
tation through the adaptation fund. The CDM was intended to provide technology and
financing to support developing country mitigation efforts, in response to these priorities
voiced by the developing countries throughout this consensus building process and the
corresponding negotiations.
Similarly, the existing academic literature raises concerns regarding the unequal geo-
graphic distribution of CDM projects, with projects concentrated in a few Asian and Latin
American countries (Boyd et al. 2007; Michaelowa 2005; Paulsson 2009). To correct this,
a variety of solutions have been considered, ranging from local country capacity building
to encouragement of unilateral CDM in countries that lack sizeable CDM investment to a
discounting of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) values for projects in countries where
CDM projects are currently concentrated (Ellis and Kamel 2007; Jahn et al. 2003;
Schneider 2009; Silayan 2005). This contrasts with the original policymaking intent,
described above in Sect. 2, that the Clean Development Fund/CDM investment be
apportioned in accordance with historical responsibility, whereby countries with greater
historical responsibility receive a greater share of Clean Development Fund/CDM proceeds
on the theory that GHG emissions mitigation requires that this investment flow to devel-
oping countries with existing substantial GHG emissions.

6 Comparison of Brazil’s original intent and various subsequent objectives

Critical consideration of the policymaking process that resulted in the CDM highlights
three primary policymaking goals pursued by the Brazilian Proposal. Issues regarding
CDM-related sustainable development and geographic distribution of CDM projects
comprised secondary considerations and are considered, in turn, below. The first Brazilian
Proposal policymaking goal entailed formulating a substantive response addressing the
dangers posed by climate change through effective multilateral mitigation of GHG
emissions, which responded to MCT and Itamaraty’s view that mitigation of GHG emis-
sions was urgently required. The second, related, policy goal involved derailing the US/
IPCC initiative to allocate the resulting emission caps in accordance with current emissions
by creating historical responsibility as an alternative, scientific basis for allocating emis-
sions caps, and a basis upon which Brazil could build a consensus—and solidarity—among
developing countries. This effectively insulated the developing countries from emissions

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 53

caps, providing a strong, scientific argument that emissions caps were only appropriate for
Annex I countries. By avoiding the imposition of mitigation obligations on developing
countries (notwithstanding that the Annex I countries’ resulting mitigation obligations
were not in accordance with historical responsibility), the Brazilian Proposal protected
Itamaraty/MCT’s goal of global GHG mitigation through emissions caps on Annex I
countries in tandem with continued pursuit of Brazil’s developmentalist objectives in
accordance with the vision pursued by the CDM’s Brazilian architects, as described in
Sect. 4. Effective achievement of these two goals required that Annex I countries comply
with their emissions caps, embedding a very real enforcement objective. Brazil’s third
policy goal underlying the Brazilian Proposal was to evidence continued leadership in the
international climate negotiations, in part through the formulation of an intellectually and
analytically sound proposal that allowed Brazil to negotiate on an equal footing with
developed countries with the full support of the G-77 and China.
Only one of these policy goals—evidencing leadership in the multilateral environmental
negotiations—corresponds directly with Viola’s (2004) assessment of Brazil’s perception
of its national interests in the Kyoto negotiations, notwithstanding that the CDM is
structured to underscore two other categories identified by Viola: the right to development
and the need for Annex I country funding.
These three policy goals aligned fully with—and furthered—Itamaraty’s interests. They
were pursued in a manner suiting MCT’s interests in three respects. Firstly, the technical
nature of the Brazilian Proposal reflected MCT’s political interest in the perpetuation of a
highly scientific proposal, ensuring MCT’s ongoing climate policy role. Secondly, the
Brazilian Proposal perpetuated Brazilian scientists’ pursuit of international recognition of
their perspective, which views climate change and related matters through the lens of the
divide between Annex I countries and developing countries (Gavronski and Sampaio 2007;
Lahsen 2004). Thirdly, it underscored MCT’s claim that Brazilian climate policy must be
undertaken by scientists and techno-bureaucrats.
Brazil’s goals for the Brazilian Proposal did not extend beyond these limited policy-
making objectives. In discussing these goals, interviewees asserted that MCT and ltamaraty
never truly expected the Brazilian Proposal would be fully implemented as a means to
allocate emission caps at Kyoto. Instead, Itamaraty and MCT intended that the Brazilian
Proposal provide a basis for consensus building and solidarity among developing countries
that would lead to a common position in order to extract substantive concessions from the
Annex I countries in the form of emission caps.
Focussing specifically on the CDM, this research clearly indicates that Brazil’s original
policymaking intent underlying the Clean Development Fund involved the creation of a
mechanism to coerce the Annex I countries’ compliance with their resulting emission caps
in order to achieve Brazil’s first goal of effective mitigation led by the Annex I Countries.
Interviews indicate that, once a fund structure was developed, a secondary policy objective
emerged, wherein consensus building around the Brazilian Proposal and solidarity among
developing countries was enhanced as developing countries not only would avoid emission
caps, but the Clean Development Fund would provide needed transfers of funds from
Annex I countries.
The establishment of a fund as an enforcement tool both recognised the international
community’s inherent inability to enforce obligations under international law and
attempted to coerce compliance by providing an alternative path to compliance for
countries that are unable—or unwilling—to fulfil their emission caps-related obligations.
This alternative basis for compliance was achieved by providing a mechanism that
quantified the liability for non-compliance with emissions caps thereby allowing an Annex

123
54 J. C. Cole

I country to comply with its overall treaty obligations by paying this quantified liability
into a fund. This implies an underlying policy intent that both addressed the Philippine
delegation’s enunciated concern that a failure of emissions cap obligations to be uniformly
fulfilled would be problematic and addressed the Annex I countries’ need for flexibility in
achieving their emissions caps. Although this did not resolve the inherent lack of
enforcement mechanisms for international law obligations, the attempt to coerce compli-
ance through provision of alternative bases for compliance created a more realistic
framework for global regulatory cooperation than a framework based exclusively on
emissions caps.
Similarly, issues regarding the geographic distribution of CDM projects and sustainable
development benefits arising from CDM projects were not primary considerations for the
CDM’s Brazilian architects, rather arose as secondary issues in the pursuit of an effective
enforcement mechanism. As noted previously, the original intent of the Brazilian Pro-
posal’s architects was that Clean Development Fund monies be distributed among
developing countries proportionately with their projected 1990–2010 GHG emissions in
order to provide effective mitigation of existing sources of GHG emissions. Interviews
confirmed that this intent persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund
into the CDM. As a result, the original policymaking intent was for CDM projects to be
concentrated in the more economically developed developing countries in order to mitigate
existing GHG emissions. This was expressed clearly in the Brazilian Proposal, most
pointedly in Annex A8.1, which listed the targeted distribution of Clean Development
Fund monies on a country-by-country basis. Table 1 indicates that the CDM has largely
achieved this original policy intent notwithstanding that it largely results in the exclusion
of less- and least-developed countries. Table 1 compares (a) the projected distributions of
the Clean Development Fund,5 with (b) the percentage distribution of CDM projects at 1
January 2010, and (c) the percentage distribution of projected 2012 CERs at 1 January
2010.6 This indicates that the policy rationale employed by the CDM’s Brazilian archi-
tects—whereby CDM projects are concentrated in countries proportionately to projected
GHG emissions—has been achieved. This policy rationale privileges the scientific con-
clusion necessitating GHG emissions reductions over the various socio-economic and
international development factors underlying the drive for greater geographic distribution
of CDM projects.
Finally, and most importantly in terms of reconciling the CDM’s original policymaking
intent with the existing literature, this article’s exploration of the policymaking goals
underlying the Clean Development Fund and its evolution into the CDM provides a
framework for interpreting Kyoto Protocol Section 12.2’s designation of the CDM’s twin
objectives of GHG emission reductions and sustainable development. Its findings contrast
sharply with the existing literature, indicating that the conception of sustainable devel-
opment pursued by the CDM’s Brazilian architects was, in fact, the revised development
model illustrated in Fig. 1, advancing the view that the existence of the project, itself,
rather than any additional community benefits, jobs or other extra benefits, would satisfy
the Kyoto Protocol’s sustainable development goal. This suggests that a narrower view of
5
As contained in Brazilian Proposal Annex A8.1, entitled Fund distribution among non-Annex I Parties
according to relative contribution to climate change with respect to 1990-2010 CO2 emissions (IS92a
scenario, including 1990 concentration), in the column entitled ‘Brazilian Proposal: % of CDF proceeds’.
6
1 January 2010 data calculated on the basis of the UNEP Risø CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, 1
January 2010. Retrieved 29 January 2010: www.uneprisoe.org. Table 1 constitutes an extract of these
materials, listing each country that exceeds 1.00% in any of the three columns. The author acknowledges the
contribution of J.D.G. Miguez in structuring this analysis.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 55

Table 1 Comparison of projected distribution of clean development fund proceeds as per Annex A8.1 to
the Brazilian Proposal with data at 1 January 2010 from the CDM pipeline regarding distribution of CDM
projects on the basis of the number of projects and the projected 2012 CERs (each in percentage of global
total)
Country Brazilian Proposal: % Actual % of Actual %
of CDF proceeds CDM Projects of CERs

China 32.30% 39.73% 54.63

India 9.47 25.30 16.01
Venezuelaa 5.04 N/A N/A
Mexico 4.98 3.40 2.31
Kazakhstanb 4.70 N/A N/A
Brazil 3.43 7.24 6.07
Uzbekistan 3.21 0.23 0.30
Argentina 3.08 0.60 1.06
Iran 2.64 0.60 0.07
Republic of Korea 2.34 1.49 3.78
Dem. People’s Republic of Korea 2.23 0.00 0.00
Indonesia 2.00 2.01 1.58
Saudi Arabia 1.97 0.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 1.47 0.10 0.05
Egypt 1.27 0.27 0.61
Colombia 1.04 1.00 0.67
Chile 0.83 1.43 1.27
Thailand 0.80 2.43 0.95
Philippines 0.70 1.51 0.45
Malaysia 0.69 2.65 1.24
Viet Nam 0.45 1.78 0.84
Remainder of developing countries 15.47 8.23 8.11
a
Per the UNFCCC website, Venezuela has not appointed a Designated National Authority, a pre-requisite
to CDM participation
b
Kazakhstan did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol

CDM-related sustainable development is more compatible with the CDM’s original (1997)
intent—and Brazil’s original intent for the Clean Development Fund—than considered or
advanced in the literature.
Notwithstanding these contrasts, there are points of similarity between the narrow and
broad conceptions of CDM-related sustainable development. For example, they converge
in that both theorise the CDM as providing the Annex I countries alternative GHG miti-
gation options while transferring technology and financing to developing countries to
pursue a concept of sustainable development involving GHG emissions mitigation. Sim-
ilarly, they each preserve host country sovereignty to determine the sustainable develop-
ment to be pursued. Where they diverge is the narrow conception’s exclusive focus on
GHG mitigation, leaving the pursuit of wider sustainable development concepts in the
areas of economic, social and non-GHG-related environmental development to govern-
ment programmes outside the CDM framework. Thus, the narrow conception does not
shun these other sustainable development goals, rather—as asserted by the Brazilian
architects of the Clean Development Fund and the CDM—attempts to create a framework

123
56 J. C. Cole

of GHG mitigation infrastructure within which host country governments may pursue other
economic, social and environmental development goals in the context of decoupled eco-
nomic growth and GHG emissions growth.
In assessing the performance of the CDM, the literature must acknowledge this narrow
conception as an option some CDM host countries may have pursued, thereby recognising
the original policymaking intent underlying the Clean Development Fund/CDM. The
existing literature supports this contention. Olsen’s (2007) conclusion that, on the basis of
nearly 200 studies, left to market forces, CDM does not make any real sustainable
development contribution presumes the pursuit of a broad conception of CDM-related
sustainable development, yet implies that host country governments are employing the
narrower conception of CDM-related sustainable development envisioned by the Brazilian
architects of the Clean Development Fund and the resulting CDM. The fact that the current
CDM has, in part, deployed the narrow conception of CDM-related sustainable develop-
ment is further supported by Halvorssen’s (2005) conclusion that project developers pursue
GHG emission reductions at the expense of (presumably a broader conception of) CDM-
related sustainable development. Figueres’ (2004) conclusion that host country approval of
CDM projects—which pursuant to §40(a) of the Marrakesh Accords entails a written
confirmation by the host country Designated National Authority that the project advances
host country sustainable development—amounts to no more than host country approval
that the proposed project complies with existing host country environmental legislation
lends further support to arguments that the narrow conception of CDM-related sustainable
development has been operationalised by at least some host countries. Each of these studies
argued the occurrence of a failure of the broader conception of CDM-related sustainable
development, not the operationalisation of the narrow conception of CDM-related sus-
tainable development, which this article argues comprised the underlying vision and pol-
icymaking goal of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. As the CDM’s architects designed the
CDM to target these narrow goals, this literature chronicles instances where the broader
goals advocated by the academic literature were neither pursued nor achieved.
As each CDM project host country is empowered to formulate its own sustainable
development criteria for CDM projects, this finding does not undercut any national CDM
criteria or question the imposition of greater sustainable development requirements by
specific host countries. It does, however, argue that the metrics by which the academic
literature and policymaking community evaluate national CDM sustainable development
criteria should consider the possibility that the mere existence of a CDM project that
provides the decoupling of emissions growth from economic growth illustrated in Fig. 1
constitutes sufficient sustainable development from the CDM host country’s perspective.
The architects of the CDM specifically contemplated this narrow approach to sustainable
development. This narrow approach does not render the CDM’s sustainable development
objective superfluous, but rather narrows the CDM’s emission reductions objective to
comprise sustainable development-related activities exclusively. In interviews the CDM’s
Brazilian architects left room for other developing countries to apply their own sustainable
development criteria, acknowledging that sustainable development in Brazil is likely quite
different from sustainable development elsewhere and arguing that principles of sover-
eignty dictate that each country be empowered to determine what development is appro-
priate within its borders.
The resulting conclusion that the CDM has met its Brazilian architects’ policymaking
objectives challenges the views of advocates of a broader conception of sustainable
development—often extending beyond the existence of the project itself—and greater
geographic distribution of CDM projects. The CDM’s failure to meet these different,

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 57

additional, refined or more nuanced policymaking objectives should cause the proponents
of broader conceptions of CDM-related sustainable development and broader geographic
distribution to engage in a renewed policymaking debate in order to develop multilateral
consensus regarding these broader goals with a view to aligning any post-2012 CDM, or
any successor mechanism, to them. Ultimately, CERs are nothing more than policy
instruments. As policy instruments, they should be tailored to meet a broad set of the
international community’s policymaking goals arising from a proper multilateral policy-
making process.
The evolution of Brazil’s position in the multilateral climate negotiations provides
strong support for reconsideration of the CDM’s policy objectives. From Kyoto to
Copenhagen Brazil’s climate policy evolved from a defensive posture—where Brazil
defended its development, specifically the right to development and to make domestic
choices regarding environmental sustainability measures, the need for Annex I country
funding of any GHG mitigation measures, a desire to lead developing countries in mul-
tilateral environmental negotiations, and the need to thwart international action on
deforestation (Barros-Platiau 2006; Lago 2004; Viola 2002, 2004, 2009)—to a more
nuanced pursuit of Brazil’s national interests, including through exploitation of Brazil’s
clean development experience and expertise through trade and economic development, as
evidenced by the Copenhagen Accord (Nobre 2008; Tollefson 2009; Viola 2009). This
recognised Brazil’s vulnerability to climate change, Brazil’s very real potential for GHG
emissions mitigation and the distinct advantages to Brazil of becoming a leader in a global
low-carbon economy (Ioris 2007; Nobre 2008; Tollefson 2009; Viola 2009).
This shift evolved alongside a broadening of the ministerial spheres influencing Brazil’s
climate policy from Itamaraty and MCT at Kyoto to a host of ministries—and Presidential
diplomacy—at Copenhagen. Thus, the Brazilian delegation’s scientific focus at Kyoto was
displaced by a wide range of views—including the MMA’s adherence to socio-environ-
mentalism and the policymaking efforts of NGO observers—in the formulation of Brazil’s
position at Copenhagen. A complex set of factors supported this evolution. Internationally,
these included the procedural dynamics imposed by the Bali Action Plan in the run-up to
Copenhagen (Bodansky 2010; Viola 2009). Domestically, Brazil’s high level of public
engagement on the climate change issue rendered a host of complex climate policy options
politically acceptable (Langevin 2009; Leis and Viola 2008; PewResearchCenter 2009;
Viola 2009). In addition to the Copenhagen Accord, these factors enabled new Brazilian
domestic legislation targeting climate change and deforestation, including legislatively
mandated voluntary GHG emission reductions (based on 2010 GHG emissions) of between
36.1 and 38.9% by 2020, pending a decree allocating the emission reductions among
sectors.7 In this context, reconsideration of the CDM’s underlying policy objectives would
be in Brazil’s interest as it would enable the development of a post-2012 CDM, or any
successor mechanism, specifically targeting Brazil’s evolving climate policy objectives.

7 Conclusion

The CDM’s Brazilian architects intended that the CDM coerce Annex I countries’ com-
pliance with their emissions caps through provision of an alternative basis for compliance,
as there is no formal enforcement mechanism for international law obligations. The

7
Article 12, Polı´tica Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima [National Policy on Climate Change], Lei N°
12.187, de 29 de dezembro de 2009.

123
58 J. C. Cole

designation of sustainable development as a CDM objective reflected the Brazilian CDM

architects’ vision that the CDM would foster projects that would reduce developing
country GHG emissions, thereby enabling a decoupling of GHG emissions growth from
economic growth. As such, sustainable development was not necessarily intended to
extend beyond the mere existence of the CDM project.
The CDM has achieved these narrow objectives. Some literature assesses the CDM’s
sustainable development performance against broader and additional criteria that extend
beyond the mere existence of the CDM project, determining that the CDM has failed to
achieve the corresponding sustainable development objectives. The CDM has not achieved
these objectives, in part, because it was not designed to do so.
As the multilateral climate negotiations move toward a post-2012 climate regime, any
amended CDM, or successor to the CDM, should carefully reappraise appropriate CDM-
related sustainable development benefits, and any successor or amended CDM should be
tailored to pursue those objectives. This should reflect the evolution of climate policy at
various domestic and multilateral scales. The development of Brazil’s climate policy from
Kyoto to Copenhagen illustrates this evolution at the domestic Brazilian scale.

Acknowledgments I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments on earlier drafts and incarnations
of this paper received from Diana Liverman, Dave Frame, Timmons Roberts, Nate Hultman, Katharine
Wilkinson, Joel Scriven, Carlos Sayao, Harro van Asselt, Otavio Sayao, Eduardo Ferreira, Elizabeth Cole
and two anonymous reviewers. All mistakes remain my responsibility.

References

Acselrad, H. (2000). Sustentabilidade, Espaço e Tempo. In S. C. Herculano (Ed.), Meio ambiente: questões
conceituais. Niterói: UFF/PGCA.
Amous, S. (2004). The UNEP CDM sustainable development impacts guidebook.
Anagnostopoulos, K., Flamos, A., Kagiannas, A. G., & Psarras, J. (2004). The impact of clean development
mechanism in achieving sustainable development. International Journal of Environment and Pollution,
21(1), 1–23.
Barros-Platiau, A. F. (2006). A Polı́tica Externa Ambiental: do Desenvolvimentismo ao Desenvolvimento
Sustentável. In H. D. O. Altemani & A. C. Lessa (Eds.), Relações Internacionais do Brasil, Temas e
Agendas. São Paulo: Saraiva.
Becker, B. K., & Miranda, M. (Eds.). (1997). A geografia polı´tica do desenvolvimento sustentável. Rio de
Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ.
Begg, K., & van der Horst, D. (2003). Encouraging CDM energy projects to aid poverty alleviation: Final
report of project R8037 under the DFID KAR programme. University of Surrey, Surrey.
Bodansky, D. (2010). The Copenhagen climate change conference —A post-mortem. American Journal of
International Law, 104. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553167
Boyd, E., Hultman, N. E., Roberts, J. T., Corbera, E., Cole, J. C., Bozmoski, A., et al. (2009). Reforming the
CDM for sustainable development: Lessons learned and policy futures. Environmental Science and
Policy, 12(7), 820–831.
Boyd, E., Hultman, N., Roberts, T., Corbera, E., Ebeling, J., Liverman, D. M., et al. (2007). The clean
development mechanism: An assessment of current practice and future approaches for policy. Tyndall
Working Paper.
Cason, J., & Power, T. J. (2006). Presidentialization, pluralization, and the rollback of Itamaraty:
Explaining change in Brazilian foreign policy making from Cardoso to Lula. Paper presented at the
regional powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East.
Ellis, J., & Kamel, S. (2007). Overcoming barriers to clean development mechanism projects. Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); International Energy Agency
(IEA).
Ellis, J., Winkler, H., Corfee-Morlot, J., & Gagnon-Lebrun, F. (2007). CDM: Taking stock and looking
forward. Energy Policy, 35(1), 15–28.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 59

Ferreira, L. d. C., & Ferreira, L. (1995). Limites ecossistêmicos: novos dilemas e desafios para o estado e
para a sociedade. In D. J. Hogan & P. F. Vieira (Eds.), Dilemas Socioambientais e Desenvolimento
Sustentável. Campinas: Editora Unicamp: Coleção Momento.
Ferreira, L. (1996). Os Ambientalistas, os Direitos Sociais e o Universo da Cidadania. In E. Viola & L. D. C.
Ferreira (Eds.), Incertezas de Sustentabilidade na Globalização. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.
Ferreira, L. (1997). Confronto e legitimação: o ambientalismo brasileiro nos anos de 1990. In J. P. R.
Capobianco (Ed.), Ambientalismo no Brasil: passado, presente e futuro. São Paulo: Instituto
Socioambiental.
Ferreira, L. D. C. (1998). A Questão Ambiental: Sustentabilidade e Polı´ticas Públicas no Brasil. São Paulo:
Boitempo.
Ferreira, L. (1999). Conflitos sociais contemporâneos: considerações sobre o ambientalismo brasileiro.
Ambiente & Sociedade, 5(July/Dec. 1999).
Fichtner, W., Graehl, S., & Rentz, O. (2002). International cooperation to support climate change mitigation
and sustainable development. International Journal of Environment and Pollution, 18(1), 33–55.
Figueres, C. (2004). Institutional capacity to integrate economic development and climate change consid-
erations: An assessment of DNAs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: Inter
American Development Bank.
Gavronski, J. D., & Sampaio, C. H. (2007). Thermal and renewable sources to sustain the growth of the
Brazilian electric system. Utilities Policy, 15, 278.
Gohn, M. D. G. (2001). História dos Movimentos e Lutas Sociais. São Paulo: Edições Loyola.
Gohn, M. D. G. (2002). Teorias dos Movimentos Sociais. São Paulo: Edições Loyola.
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C., & Brack, D. (1999). The Kyoto protocol: A guide and assessment. London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs.
Guedes, A. L. (2003). Empresas transnacionais e questões ambientais: a abordagem do realismo crı́tico.
Revista de Sociologia e Polı´tica (20), 25–42.
Halsnaes, K. (2002). A review of the literature on climate change and sustainable development. In A.
Markandya & K. Halsnaes (Eds.), Climate change & sustainable development: Prospects for devel-
oping countries. London: Earthscan.
Headon, S. (2009). Whose sustainable development? Sustainable development under the Kyoto protocol, the
‘‘coldplay effect’’, and the CDM gold standard. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law
and Policy, 20, 127–156.
Halvorssen, A. M. (2005). The kyoto protocol and developing countries—the clean development mecha-
nism. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 16, 353.
Herculano, S. C. (1992). Do desenvolvimento (in)suportável á sociedade feliz. In M. Goldenberg (Ed.),
Ecologia, cieˆncia e polı´tica. Rio de Janeiro: Revan.
Herculano, S. C. (2000). ONGs e Movimentos Sociais: A Questão de Novos Sujeitos Polı́ticos para a
Sustentabilidade. In S. C. Herculano (Ed.), Meio ambiente: questões conceituais. Niterói: UFF/PGCA.
Herculano, S. C. (2006). O Clamor por Justiça Ambiental e Contra o Racismo Ambiental. Revista de Gestão
Integrada em Saúde do Trabalho e Meio Ambiente, 3(1, Artigo 2), 1–20.
Hochstetler, K., & Keck, M. E. (2007). Greening Brazil: Environmental activism in state and society.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Höhne, N., Meira Filho, G., Marcovitch, J., Yamin, F., & Moltmann, S. (2006). Background paper 1:
History and status of the international climate change negotiations on a future climate agreement.
Paper presented at the Basic Workshop: Future International Climate Policy.
Holland, A. (2001). Sustainability. In D. Jamieson (Ed.), A companion to environmental philosophy. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Huq, S. (2002). Applying sustainable development criteria to CDM projects: PCF experience. PCFplus
Report, 10.
Ioris, A. A. R. (2007). The troubled waters of Brazil: Nature commodification and social exclusion. Cap-
italism Nature Socialism, 18(1), 28–50.
Jahn, M., Michaelowa, A., Raubenheimer, S., & Liptow, H. (2003). Unilateral CDM—Chances and pitfalls.
Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit.
Johnson, K. (2001). Brazil and the politics of the climate change negotiations. The Journal of Environment
& Development, 10(2), 178.
Kolshus, H. H., Vevatne, J., Torvanger, A., & Aunan, K. (2001). Can the clean development mechanism
attain both cost-effectiveness and sustainable development objectives. Center for International Climate
and Environmental Research-Oslo (CICERO) Working Paper, 8.
La Rovere, E. L. (2002). Climate change and sustainable development strategies: A Brazilian perspective.
Paris: OECD.

123
60 J. C. Cole

Lago, A. C. D. (2004). Estocolmo, Rio de Janeiro, Johanesburgo: A Evolução do Discurso Brasileiro nas
Conferências Ambientais das Nações Unidas. Instituto Rio Branco/MRE.
Lahsen, M. (2004). Transnational locals: Brazilian experiences of the climate regime. In S. Jasanoff & M.
Martello (Eds.), Earthly politics: Local and global in environmental governance. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Langevin, M. S. (2009). Thinking Copenhagen: The cognitive dimension of climate change policy making
in Brazil and the United States. Universitas: Relações Internacionais Brasilia, 7(1), 9–37.
Leis, H., & Viola, E. (2008). America del Sur en el Mundo de las Democracias de Mercado. Buenos Aires:
Homo Sapiens/Cadal.
Lemos, M. C. (1998). The politics of pollution control in Brazil: State actors and social movements cleaning
up Cubatão. World Development, 26, 75–87.
Lemos, M. C., & Looye, J. W. (2003). Looking for sustainability: Environmental coalitions across the state-
society divide. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 22(3), 350–370.
Liverman, D. M. (2009). The geopolitics of climate change: Avoiding determinism, fostering sustainable
development. Climatic Change, 96, 7–11.
MacLachlan, C. M. (2003). A history of modern Brazil: The past against the future. Wilmington: Scholarly
Resources Inc.
Mattos, S. M. D. S. N., & Drummond, J. A. (2005). O terceiro setor como executor de polı́ticas públicas:
ONG’s ambientalistas na baı́a de Guanabara (1990–2001). Revista de Sociologia e Polı´tica, Curitiba,
24(jun. 2005), 177–192.
Michaelowa, A. (2005). CDM: Current status and possibilities for reform. HWWI Research Paper, 3.
Miguez, J. D. G. (2005). Host country approval processes & project opportunities: The Brazilian DNA
perspective. Paper presented at the Japan Carbon Investors Forum, Tokyo.
Najam, A., Rahman, A. A., Huq, S., & Sokona, Y. (2003). Integrating sustainable development into the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Policy, 3(S1),
S9–S17.
Nobre, C. A. (2008). Mudanças climáticas e o Brasil—Contextualização. Parcerias Estratégicas,
27(December 2008), 7–17.
Oberthür, S., & Ott, H. (1999). The Kyoto protocol: International climate policy for the 21st century. Berlin:
Springer.
Olhoff, A., Markandya, A., Halsnaes, K., & Taylor, T. (2004). CDM sustainable development impacts.
UNEP.
Olsen, K. H. (2007). The clean development mechanism’s contribution to sustainable development: A
review of the literature. Climatic Change, 84(1), 59–73.
Paulsson, E. (2009). A review of the CDM Literature: From fine-tuning to critical scrutiny? International
Environmental Agreements, 9, 63–80.
PewResearchCenter. (2009). Confidence in Obama lifts US image around the world. Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center.
Ribeiro, W. C. (2010). Teorias socioambientais: em busca de uma nova sociedade. Estudos Avançados,
24(68), 9–13.
Roberts, J. T., & Parks, B. C. (2007). A climate of injustice: Global inequality, north-south politics, and
climate policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Santos, M. H. D. C., & Paixão, A. L. (1989). O Álcool Combustı́vel e a Pecuária de Corte: Fragmentação e
Porosidade no Estado Burocrático-Autoritário. In A. Moura (Ed.), O Estado e as Polı´ticas Públicas na
Transição Democrática. Rio de Janeiro: Vértice.
Schmitter, P. (1971). Interest conflict and political change in Brazil. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Schneider, R. M. (1977). Brazil: Foreign relations of a future world power. Boulder: Westview Press.
Schneider, L. (2009). A clean development mechanism with global atmospheric benefits for a post-2012
climate regime. International Environmental Agreements, 9, 95–111.
Schwartzman, S. (1994). Brazil: Scientists and the state–evolving models and the ‘‘great leap forward’’. In
E. Solingen (Ed.), Scientists and the state: Domestic structures and the international context. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Silayan, A. (2005). Equitable distribution of CDM projects among developing countries. Hamburg: Ham-
burg Institute of International Economics.
Souza, A. D. (2001). A agenda internacional do Brasil: um estudo sobre a comunidade brasileira de polı´tica
externa. Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais.
Sutter, C. (2003). Sustainability check-up for CDM projects: How to assess the sustainability of interna-
tional projects under the Kyoto protocol. Berlin: Wissenschafterlicher Verlag.

123
Original policymaking goals of the CDM 61

Sutter, C., & Parreño, J. C. (2007). Does the current clean development mechanism (CDM) deliver its
sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects. Climatic Change,
84(1), 75–90.
Svirsky, E., & Capobianco, J. P. R. (Eds.). (1997). Ambientalismo no Brasil: Passado, Presente e Futuro.
São Paulo: Instituto Socioambiental/Secretaria do Meio Ambiente do Estado de São Paulo.
Tollefson, J. (2009). Brazil mulls major climate action. Nature, 462(7269), 18.
UNDP (2006). The clean development mechanism: An assessment of progress. United Nations Development
Programme.
Vieira, P. F. (1998). Social sciences and environment in Brazil: A state-of-the-art-report. Working Papers.
Viola, E. (1992). O movimento ambientalista no Brasil (1971–1991): da denúncia e conscientização pública
para a institucionalização e o desenvolvimento sustentável. In M. Goldenberg (Ed.), Ecologia, cieˆncia
e polı´tica. Rio de Janeiro: Revan.
Viola, E. (1996). A Multidimensionalidade da Globalização, as Novas Forças Sociais Transnacionais e seu
Impacto na Polı́tica Ambiental do Brasil 1989–1995. In E. Viola & L. D. C. Ferreira (Eds.), Incertezas
de Sustentabilidade na Globalização. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.
Viola, E. (1997). The environmental movement in Brazil: Institutionalization, sustainable development and
crisis of governance since 1987. In G. J. MacDonald, D. L. Nielson, & M. A. Stern (Eds.), Latin
American environmental policy in international perspective (pp. 88–112). Boulder: Westview.
Viola, E. (2002). O Regime Internacional de Mudança Climática e o Brasil. Revista Brasileira de Cieˆncias
Sociais, 17(50), 25–46.
Viola, E. (2004). Brazil in the context of global governance politics and climate change, 1989–2003.
Ambiente & Sociedade, 7, 27–46.
Viola, E. (2009). O Brasil na Arena Internacional da Mitigação da Mudança Climática. Rio de Janeiro:
CINDES—Centro de Estudoes de Integração e Desenvolvimento.
Wara, M. (2007). Is the global carbon market working? Nature, 445(8), 595–596.
Wara, M., & Victor, D. G. (2008). A realistic policy on international carbon offsets. Program on Energy and
Sustainable Development Working Paper, 74.
Werksman, J. (1998). The clean development mechanism: Unwrapping the ‘Kyoto surprise’. Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law, 7(2), 147–158.

123