Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

ANSWER:
NO.

LUMIQUED vs. EXEVEA

FACTS:

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region
(DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position. This was because 3 complaints were filed
against him by Jeannette Obar-Zamudio for malversation through falsification of public documents, violation of
Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, and, oppression and harassment.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by
counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of
counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had
chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, alleging that he suffered a stroke. The motion was denied by the
prosecutor. Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report finding Lumiqued
liable for all the charges against him. He was dismissed by order of Ramos. He filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. Lumiqued then died. It is now his children who are contending this order. On their second motion for
reconsideration, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.

They fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They
maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor Lumiqued was entitled to counsel during the proceeding

HELD:
NO.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is
not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel.
Alba vs. Nitorreda
Facts:
The case is about an instant motion for reconsideration that has its origin in an administrative case (OBM-MIN-
ADM-94-059) filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao by private respondents against petitioner
Dr. Ramon Y. Alba in his capacity as Director III of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS)
accusing the latter of violating certain provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public
Official and Employees. After both parties failed to attend the preliminary conference scheduled by the Graft
Investigating Officer assigned to the case, a resolution dated April 28, 1995 was rendered by the Office of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713 and Dr. Alba was meted
a suspension of 30 days without pay and warned that any other instance of non-observance of the Code of
Conduct will result in graver punishment. He then assails that his right of due process was violated because he
was not permitted by the ombudsman to appeal his case.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner’s right of due process is violated
Held:
No. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in a manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The Constitutional requirement of
due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one’s case. Furthermore, since the
office of the ombudsman prescribes its rules and procedure. Thus, the petitioner, by not following the
regulations of the office of the ombudsman, loses his right to appeal the case.
Hence, the petitioner was not deprived of his right.

MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al.

FACTS: PetitionerRoxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids andAwards Committee of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of
fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committeevoted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino.
Accordingly, the contract was executed between PC-INP and TaheiCo.The COA subsequently discovered that there was a
discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG
Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against therespondents.After preliminary investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military recommended theindictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, KairanandRamirez.
Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores,Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and
Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminalinformation.Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which
was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores
andTanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnaboutas regards Roxas,
Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
ISSUE:Whether the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process.

HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no
motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondentsceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of
motions for reconsideration by thosepreviously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said
respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating
their right to due process.Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special
Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant
must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of
the proceedings.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. JOSE J. LUCAS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 127838. January 21, 1999]

Facts:
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division,
Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against
respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.
Raquel described the incident in the following manner:

While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas, Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr.
Jose Lucas, at that very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for his shoe. At that moment she felt
Mr. Lucas hand touching her thigh and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr.
Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr. Lucas.
Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan A verbal
exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her
to stumble, her both hands protected her face from smashing upon the door.

Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the office, grabbed her the second time while she
attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first time. x x x while doing all this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the
affiant, saying, labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan.

On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a summons requiring respondent to answer the
complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June 17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted
a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI, denying the charges.
On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent
guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The
Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation.
 In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On July 7, 1994, the CSC
issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA, stating thus: It is true that
the Civil Service Act does not define grave and simple misconduct.
Issue:
Whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of
simple misconduct.
Held:
Petitioner anchors its position on the view that the formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need not
be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance
of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the
offense.
We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to
due process in investigations and hearings.
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.
Of course, we do not in any way condone respondents act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainants leg.
However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is
his first offense.
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. During the incumbency of then
President Corazon C. Aquino, the President exercised legislative power in which it signed Proclamation No. 131 instituting
a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially
implement the program. When the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over the legislative power, the
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Before the effectivity
of the law, the petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions
of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in
accordance with the CARL.
Respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice
entitled Invitation to Parties to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. After
the investigations, respondent then sent a Notice of Acquisition to petitioner informing that Hacienda Palico were subject
to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL. Hacienda Banilad was also subject to
compulsory acquisition under the CARL.
Meanwhile, petitioner sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway in
which it was voluntarily offered for sale to the government before the effectivity of the CARL. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway
from agricultural to other uses. Respondent Secretary however denied petitioners withdrawal of the VOS on the ground
that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds and that the reclassification of the land would not exempt it from
agrarian reform.
Issue:
Whether the expropriation of petitioners’ properties under the CARL denies him of due process in the acquisition of its
landholdings.
Ruling:
Yes. Theexpropriation of petitioners’ properties under the CARL denies him of due process in the acquisition of its
landholdings.
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL,), the acquisition of private land may be: compulsory and
voluntary. In the acquisition of private lands, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After that,
the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty
days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of
his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of
the government and surrenders the certificate of title. If the landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the
DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. For a valid
implementation of the CAR Program, the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference is also important
as it provide steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. (kahit wala na to)
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
In the case, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled Invitation
to Parties, to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico and of Hacienda
Banilad. However, the Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of
invitation shall be sent to the interested parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to
comply with the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers
and employees.
With respect in the sending of the Notice of Acquisition, it also specifically requires that the land subject to land reform be
first identified. Petitioner Corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory
acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact or
contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Respondent DAR’s evidence also does not
show that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that
was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least
choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired compulsorily.
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
voluntary offer to sell (VOS)

GOVERNMENT OF USA vs. HON. PURGANAN, GR No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002-KEN

C. EQUAL PROTECTION

Requirements – VALID CLASSIFICATION

1. It must be based upon substantial distinctions

No valid distinctions
Mayor Antonio Villegas v. HiuChiong Tsai PaoHo
Facts:
The Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the
Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Private respondent HiuChiong Tsai PaoHo who was employed in Manila then filed a petition declaring the ordinance as
unconstitutional as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens thus, deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether the ordnance violates the equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse
it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
People vs Vera
Facts
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the
Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing
was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition.
Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera)
have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No.
4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;
that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law
makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to
apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will
be appointed – hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether Act 4221 violates the accused’s right to the equal protection of the laws
Held:
Yes. There is violation of the equal protection clause because under Act 4221, provinces were given the
option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a
probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
The equal protection clause is a restraint on all the three grand departments of the government and on
their subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision. Class legislation discriminating against some and
favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purpose of the law; it must not be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply equally to each member of the class. It is clear that the act provided a
situation that discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. Hence, it violated the accused’s right
to the equal protection of the laws.
Mario Gumabonvs Director of the Bureau of Prisons

FACTS: Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code. Their
offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Their sentence had become final and executory when theHernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme
Court. The Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion because murder, a regular
crime, is necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such complexion, the penalty must be lower than reclusion
perpetua. Gumabon asserted that a non-application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a constitutional
right, namely, the denial of equal protection. Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First Instance but
they were convicted for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted – (The law under which
they [Gumabon et al] were convicted is the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were convicted.) It had
not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow
Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such
is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have
been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of
the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime
would be made to suffer different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be
repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under
similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

PJA v. Pardo, 11/11/93

Facts: Philippine Postal Corporation implemented Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which provides the measures to withdraw
the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced then questions the validity of Sec. 35 of RA. 7354 on the ground that it is discriminatory and encroaches
on the independence of the Judiciary thus, violates of the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7354 denies the Judiciary of equal protection clause.
Ruling: Yes. RA 7354 denies the Judiciary of equal protection clause. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty
against any form of undue favouritism or hostility from the government. The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In the case, the postal service office claims
that the expense from judiciary with regards to frank mails amounts to P 73,574,864 as compared to P 90,424,175 total
volume of frank mails. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those
who do not need it very much but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). Thus, RA 7354 denies
the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made
by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and
the grantees of the franking privilege. This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It
is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
CHAVEZ vs. SANDIGAN

FACTS:

Francisco I. Chavez, found out that the Presidential Comission on Good Governance was going to enter into a
compromise agreement with the Marcos’ heirs on how to split the assets of the latter still deposited in Swiss Bank
Accounts. He invokes his constitutional right to information since the government is entering a deal that could be
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.

Issue:
Whether the guarantee of right to information is available

Held:
YES.
It is a Constitutional guarantee which he can avail of.
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
BIRAOGO v. Phil Truth Commission, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of information in our courts of law

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration ONLY as it excludes those of the other administrations,
past and present, who may be indictable.

ISSUE: Whether EO 1 violates the equal protection of laws?

HELD: Yes! Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court
finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
itsapparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined inSection 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Consti
tution, whichreads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall anyone be denied th
e equal protection of the laws.

Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.

The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is a plain and patent manifestation that the equal protection clause is indeed
violated.In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyoadministration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of pastadministrations.It is not a class of its own.
Not to include pastadministrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which theequal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminatingdifferentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other
past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the
“previous administration” only.

Valid Distinctions
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

FACTS:

Cayat, a native cordilleran, was found in possession of A-1-1gin, a prohibited liquor under Act No. 1639. Being part of a
non-christian tribe, he is prohibited from buying, possessing, or drinking such alcoholic drinks other than those native
wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make. Cayat challenges the
constitutionality of the act. One of the issues he raises is that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws. According to Cayat’s counsel, the law treat(s) them (non-Christians) with discrimination or mark(s) them as inferior
or less capable race or less entitled.

ISSUE:
Whether the act denies equal protection of the laws to non-Christian tribes.

HELD
NO.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications The classification:
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

1)Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary
or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but
upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to
the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities. This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended
to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who
at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of
the classification thus established.

2)That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native
wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of
this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the
sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

3)The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for
all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the
assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature
understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection
and security.

4)Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be
unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument
against the equality of its application.

Sison vs. Ancheta

Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly
discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to
class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution
as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue:
Whether BP135 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Held:
No, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there isa a violation
of the equal protection clause. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation.
Where the differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of
equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers
may be classified into different categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals.
Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no
practically nooverhead expense, while professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses
necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business
income.
The principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
Hence, it does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
 DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner PatricioDumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who
has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him,
and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

Issue: Whether section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

Held:Yes. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is
for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary
and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same
class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

RUFINO V. NUÑEZ petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

Facts: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.The informations were
filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a
motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds.A week later. respondent Court denied such motion.There
was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate.Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition It
is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the
due process, and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606 gives valid distinctions.

Held: No. Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
on the rest."

the Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response
to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who
may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or
a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The SC held that PD 1606 did not discriminate against persons convicted by the Sandiganbayan in giving them only the
remedy of certiorari with the SC as distinguished from those convicted by the TC, who could appeal to the IAC and even
the SC and so would have more prospect of reversal of the decision agiants them.Trial in the SAndiganbayan is
conducted by 3 justices constituting each division, and their unanimous vote is needed for a decision, which conceivably
will be more carefully reached that that of the other trial courts.

Taxicab Operators of Manila v. TheBoard of Transportation

Facts:

Respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which Phase out and replace of old
and dilapidated taxis.

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI)is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who
are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. The petitioners then filed a petition declaring the nullity of Memorandum Circular No.
77-42as it violates their right of equal protection of law because it is only being enforced in Metro Manila and directed
solely towards the taxi industry.

Issue:

Whether Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 violates the equal protection of law.

Ruling:

No. Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 did not violate the equal protection of law of the petitioners. The Board's reason for
enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected
to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. The traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The BOT Circular
only wants the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

Thus, equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification
is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means
so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

PASEI v Drilon
163 SCRA 386 (1988)

FACTS: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification; the Filipino female domestics working
abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import
a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to all members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as
may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has
been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

BAUTISTA vs. JUINIO

FACTS:
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979,was the response to the protracted oil crisis since 1974. In the LOI,
the use of private motor vehicles with H(heavy) and EH(extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays was banned from
12:0 a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the day0after the
holiday. It was then alleged by Mary Concepcion and Enrique D. Bautista that while the purpose for the issuance of the
LOI 869 is laudable, for energy conservation, the provision banning the use of H and EH vehicle is unfair, discriminatory,
amounting to an arbitrary classification and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. For them, there is no
rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely
those owned by them fall within such category.

ISSUE:
Whether the LOI violates the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

HELD:
NO.
There is a rational justification.
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental
act was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. … Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous.

It passes the rational relation test. The classification is rationally related to serve a legitimate state interest.

The LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. There
was a situation that called for a corrective measure. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at
the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did not cover other matters which could very well have been
regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President, to paraphrase Lutz v. Araneta, is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none. It is quite obvious then that no equal protection question arises.

Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654

Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly
discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to
class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution
as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue:
Whether BP135 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Held:
No, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that there isa a violation
of the equal protection clause. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must prevail. Equality and
uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation.
Where the differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of
equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers
may be classified into different categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against professionals.
Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes as there is no
practically nooverhead expense, while professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or expenses
necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the gross system of income taxation to
compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business
income.
The principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
Hence, it does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISHMAELHIMAGAN
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin
Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic
Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one
(1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall
be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the
penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should
be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec
47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
 CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR., BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, CITY TREASURER OF OLONGAPO and
MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF SUBIC, ZAMBALES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127410. January 20, 1999]
Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled An Act
Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Section 12 thereof created the
Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges, as follows:

SEC. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. -- Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the
City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby
created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province
of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and
defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended,
and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred
to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by
the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall
submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the
President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.

On June 10, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97 (EO 97), clarifying the application
of the tax and duty incentives thus:

Section 1. On Import Taxes and Duties -- Tax and duty-free importations shall apply only to raw materials, capital goods
and equipment brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into
the SSEZ, whether by business enterprises or resident individuals, are subject to taxes and duties under relevant
Philippine laws.

The exportation or removal of tax and duty-free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippine
territory shall be subject to duties and taxes under relevant Philippine laws.

Nine days after, on June 19, 1993, the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying
the area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative, viz.:

Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely
tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone].Business enterprises and individuals
(Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and
consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of
raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered
enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein

On October 26, 1994, the petitioners challenged before this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for allegedly being
violative of their right to equal protection of the laws. In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, this Court referred the matter to
the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
Incidentally, on February 1, 1995, Proclamation No. 532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated the exact
metes and bounds of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 7227.

Issue: Whether EO 97-A for allegedly being violative of their right to equal protection of the laws.
Held:No. The constitutional right to equal protection of the law is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant
to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the secured area of the Subic Special
Economic Zone and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such fenced-in territory. The Constitution
does not require absolute equality among residents. It is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions
are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations. In short, a classification based on valid and
reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause.
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the
lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective,
Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, both local and
foreign. Among such enticements are:[11] (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free
importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control,
(5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working
visas to certain foreign executives and workers.
We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of
the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from
its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big
foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for big
investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to
generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The
classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, The intent of a statute is the
law.
Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate
their industries in the so-called secured area and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we
are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such
magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time
the business activities outside the secured area are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly
any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the secured area, which is already fenced
off, to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise or smuggling.
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC
RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, FLORENCIO L. VARGAS, ROMEO I. CALUBAQUIB, AMADO T. GONZALES, SILVERIO
C. SALVANERA, ALBERTA O. QUINTO, and AURORA V. ESTABILLO,petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in Cagayan. Petitioners
seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as it is
violative of their equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its classification of persons running for office is not a valid
classification.
According to petitioners, candidates for elective office are classified into the following groups under Section 67:
(a) First classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for the same position as his present incumbency (and)
another incumbent elective official running for another position; and
(b) Second Classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for president or vice-president(and) another incumbent
elective [official] running for any other position (i.e., not his incumbency nor for president or vice president)
In the first classification, the re-electionist is given an undue advantage since he is able to use the resources, prestige,
and influence of his position. The same is not available to one seeking an office different from the one he is presently
holding.This, according to petitioners, does not equalize the playing field for all candidates.
As regards the second classification, petitioners argue that there is no basis for giving candidates for president or vice
president the special privilege of remaining in office.

Issue:
Whether equal protection is violated as there is no valid classification under Sec. 67 of Omnibus Election Code.
Ruling:
No. Equal protection is not violated as there is a valid classification. The classification embodied in Section 67 is
reasonable and based on substantial distinction. It points out that incumbents running for the same position are not
considered resigned because the intention of the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a
disruption in the delivery of essential services. Those running for different positions are considered resigned because they
are considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for other posts.
The court also cited the case of Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.in which it points out that Section 67 only seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting
short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former
position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty
and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
TELEBAP v COMELEC
289 SCRA 337

FACTS: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.(TELEBAP) is an organization of
lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881
which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be knownas the “Comelec Time” which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among thecandidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations.
For this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide
radio or television time, free of charge, during the period ofcampaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and
magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of
air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour eachday and, in
this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’srequirement that it provide at least 30 minutes
of prime time daily for such.

ISSUE: Whether Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.

HELD:All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends
considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers
and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without
merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print
media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the COMELEC.

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF AND IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners,
vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR.,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
Facts:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep.
Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on
the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section
67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides
that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have
been repealed.

Issue: Whether Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code.
Held: No.The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom
only upon stringent conditions.On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security
of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection
A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials,
as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to
treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the
certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court
to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is
anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are
similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

Quinto v. Comelec
Facts:
In preparation for the 2010 elections, the COMELEC issuedResolution No. 8678 – the Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Section 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be consideredipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Two appointive officers of the government(petitioners) who were planning to run in the 2010 elections sought
the nullification of Section 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices
and those holding elective positions.

Issue:

Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Held:

No. The equal protection clause does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification which in the case encompasses all people who hold appointive offices in the government. The
requisites of a valid classification are the following;

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

In the case, the obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare
of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral
arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.

Hence, there is a valid classification and there is no violation to the equal protection clause of the constitution.

Relative constitutionality
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. BangkoSentralngPilipinas

Facts: On 3 July 1993, RA 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP. On 8 June 2001, almost 8 years after the effectivity of RA 7653, the Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the
Office of the President, to restrain the BangkoSentralngPilipinas and the Executive Secretary from further implementing
the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Article II, Section 15(c) of
RA 7653 (Exercise of Authority) provides that "In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall ... (c) establish a
human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or
dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
BangkoSentral in accordance with sound principles of management. A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
BangkoSentral’s human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act].
Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758." The Association alleges that the
proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those
exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that
this classification is “a classic case of class legislation,” allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel’s position.

ISSUE:Whether Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be
. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."
Held: Yes.
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653
IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED
PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature’s power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where
the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.
When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been
proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any
inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing
the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational
basis” test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and
watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private
person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the
prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of
the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions
or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the
judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential
form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates.
As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the
ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin
to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld
from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are
quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who
have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free
the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the
quality of life for all.” Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent
rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a
collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not
be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many
years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting
time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court’s duty to save them from
reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),
Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

IMBONG vs. OCHOA

FACTS:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. After that, 16 petitions were filed, assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law. One of the contentions was:

Contention: The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law violated the guarantee of equal protection

HELD:
NO.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. (memorize 4 requisites of valid classification).

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. (falls under 1. substantial distinctions)

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number.

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows
that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

NOTE: poverty is a valid classification according to the ruling

However, some provisions, such as section 7 were declared unconstitutional.

2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as
Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.

Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a petition alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City
under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act,
is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2
of Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Issue:
Whether the equal protection clause is violated by imposing 1% tax on centrifugal sugar milled for export.
Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
In the case, it shows that the ordinance does not meet the requisites, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later
a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

4. It must apply equally to all members of the class

Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals
 G.R. No. 126594
September 5, 1997

FACTS: Imelda Marcos was charged for violating Central Bank Circular No. 960 which banned residents, firms,
associations and corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without permission from the Central
Bank. Several informations were filed against her. During the pendency of the cases, C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353
(Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) were issued which basically allowed residents, firms, associations
and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad but the circulars have a saving clause excepting from the
circular pending criminal actions involving violations of C.B. Circ. 960. Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the informations
filed against her based on the new circulars. The RTC denied the Motion so did the CA hence the appeal. Marcos averred
that her right to equal protection has been violated, among others, as the new circular was purposely designed to
preserve the criminal cases lodged against her.

She also averred that C.B. Circ. 960, as well as the Central Bank Act (which allowed the Central Bank to issue circulars) is
an undue delegation of legislative power because the said law allowed the Central Bank to legislate (define crimes) penal
laws and determine penalties therefor.

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional right to equal protection of laws of Imelda Marcos was violated
HELD: The Central Bank Act is the penal law which defined the crimes which allegedly were committed by Imelda Marcos.
The C.B. Circulars concerned merely spelled out the details of the offense. These circulars are mere administrative
regulations and not the penal laws itself alleged to have been violated by Marcos.

Anent the issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court said “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the aforementioned provisions
are discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the dignity of a legal argument since
they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court
correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of
the law was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce additional
evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.”

NOLASCO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8, 1995. The principal protagonists were Florentino P.
Blanco and Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes. Edgardo Nolasco was
elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes. Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco for massive vote-
buying. The COMELEC first division, after a hearing, then permanently disqualified Blanco. Blanco filed a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. It was denied by the COMELEC. It was brought to the Supreme Court by
certiorari.

According to Blanco, the order of the COMELEC en banc violated Blanco's right to equal protection of the laws by setting
him apart from other respondents facing similar disqualification suits whose cases were referred by COMELEC to the
Law Department.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Blanco’s case was singled out by the COMELEC.
(A valid classification should apply to all members of the same class.)

HELD:
NO.
It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section
2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all encompassing power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations.

The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at
that time. It deemed it wise to delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The
May 8, 1995 elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the COMELEC cannot handle.
Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and without referring it to its Law Department is
within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion.

Blanco's contention that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not the object of any invidious
discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor anybody but to
discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a manner as possible.

RegalavsSandiganbayan
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan(SB)
against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and TeodoroRegala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery
of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGGCase No.
33entitled -Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.

During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a motion to admit “Third amended
Complaint”- which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he
will reveal theidentity of the principals for whom he acted as nominee or stockholder. In their answer to the expanded
amended Complaint, ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grantthe same treatment to them as
accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco but
the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,
invoking that the Sandiganbayan gravely abusedits discretionby giving such treatment only if the petitioners shall disclose
the identity of their clients which they allege to be a violation of the attorney-client privilege and their right to the equal protection of
the laws.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the law

Held:

Yes. It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others.
Furthermore, the demand to disclose the petitioners’ clients violates the tight of attorney-privilege and right against self-
incrimination.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of statues and regulations.
In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances
would be accorded the same treatment. Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated not only as to privileges granted
but also to the liabilities imposed. Since the PCGG gave Roco such treatment, the same treatment should be given to ACCRA.

Hence, the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the law.

Others
Olivarez vsSandiganbayan

Facts: Paranaque Sanguaniang Bayan Resolution 744, approved by Mayor Olivarez 6 Oct 1922, authorized Baclaran
Credit Cooperative Inc (BCCI) to set up a manfacturer’s night (Christmas Agro-Industrial Fair saBaclaran) during the
Christmas fiesta celebration, at Baclaran for 60 days, (11 Nov 92 to 15 Feb 93) for which they will use a portion of the
service road of Roxas Boulevard.
Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to issue the permit
unless BCCI gives money to the latter.

On 15 Dec 1992, BCCI charged Olivarez with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably
refusing to issue a mayor’s permit deapite request and follow ups to implement SB Resolution 744.

After preliminary investigations and pleadings before the Sandiganbayan, the case was remanded to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, the Ombudsman found Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted benefit though manifest
impartiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to apply for a business permit.

Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial/inaction over BCCI’s license application
Held: Yes,Olivarez issued a permit to an unidentified Baclaran-based vendor’s association by the mere expedient of an
executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit.
Worse, Olivarez failed to show that BCCI and the unidentified association were not similarly situated as to give at least a
semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which the said executive order was issued.

There was nothing to prevent Ollivarez from referring the BCCI letter-application to the licensing department, but which
paradoxically, he refused.

Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of
activities for any charitable or welfare purpose. Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-
application of BCCI.