ARTICLE 857.
substitution under the Civil Code, is
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN
Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, Administrator of the
Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin
(CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina A. Magno;
Testate Estate of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the
late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB,
administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo
Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo
Catedral, Salvador Guzman,
Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido,
Purificacion Coronado, Graciano
Lucero, Ariteo Thomas Jamir,
Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito
Iyulores, Esperidion Partisala,
Winifredo Espada, Rosario
Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon,
Santiago Pacaonsis, and Avelina A.
Magno, appellees, Western Institute
of Technology, Inc., movant-
appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
*This case has the length of a PIL
case. Court admitted several times
that it was clueless as to some facts
so it copied into the decision entire
pleadings. (!!!) Plus, PCIB raised 78
assignment of errors! We’ll probably
read the case again in Spec Pro.
Short version: The Hodges lived in
the Philippines for almost half a
century and died leaving substantial
properties in Iloilo and in the US.
The missus died 5 years before the
husband, providing in her will that
while her estate would go to him,
upon his death, the remainder
should pass to her siblings. (They
were childless.) The court held that
this testamentary provision, while
probably ineffectual as a as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to
not actually a substitution, but is a
valid and simultaneous institution of
heirs, though the passing of title to
the inheritance to the others (the
siblings) was made to depend on a
resolutory condition (the husband’s
death). Case was remanded to the
trial court for the determination of
the proper application of the renvoi
principle (conflict of laws between
Philippines and Texas law), and the
proper distribution of Linnie’s,
Charles’, and their conjugal estates.
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie
Jane Hodges were originally from
Texas, USA. During their marriage,
they had acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties
in the Philippines and in Oklahoma
and Texas in the US. They both
lived, worked and were domiciled in
Iloilo City for around 50 years.
Before her death, Linnie Jane
executed a will leaving her estate,
less her debts and funeral
expenses, to her husband Charles.
Should Charles die, the will
provided that the remainder of her
estate go to her brothers and
sisters, share and share alike.
Should any of the brothers and
sisters die before the husband,
Linnie willed that the heirs of the
said sibling be substituted in the
deceased’s sibling’s place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the
will to probate court, and was
appointed Executor, then later,
Special Administrator. He moved to
be allowed to continue
administering the family business,
1
engage in sales, conveyances,
leases, mortgages and other
necessary transactions. He also
filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records,
and income tax returns for the
estate. Charles named seven
brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane
as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard,
Aline, David, Sadie, Era and
Nimroy), but the order admitting the
will to probate unfortunately omitted
one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?)
Higdon, so Charles filed a verified
motion to have Roy’s name
included.
As an executor, he was bound to
file tax returns for the estate he was
administering under American law.
He did file such as estate tax return
on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M"
of such return, he answered "Yes"
to the question as to whether he
was contemplating "renouncing the
will". On the question as to what
property interests passed to him as
the surviving spouse, he answered:
“None, except for purposes of
administering the Estate,
paying debts, taxes and other
legal charges. It is the
intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining
property and interests of the
deceased in their Community
estate to the devisees and
legatees named in the will
when the debts, liabilities,
taxes and expenses of
administration are finally
determined and paid.”
Charles died in Iloilo in December
1962 without having liquidated
Linnie’s estate, which includes her
share in the conjugal partnership. A
longtime employee of the Hodges,
Avelina Magno, was appointed
Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate)
and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles’). Magno was appointed,
but later Harold Davies
(representative of Charles’ heirs in
the US) was designated Co-Special
Administrator, who was then
replaced by one Joe Hodges,
Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol
was also appointed as co-
administrator, and an order of
probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already
very much confused about the gaps
in the facts, convinced that the
parties representing both estates
had cooked up a modus operandi to
settle money matters (a settlement
with records the Court never saw)—
which, however, went awry, with
more and more heirs from the US
flocking to the Iloilo shores, and
lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas!
Manglapuses!) filing their respective
claims for retainer fees. Much much
later, PCIB became the
administrator of Charles’ estate,
asserting a claim to all of his estate,
including those properties/assets
that passed to him upon Linnie
Jane’s death. Avelina naturally
opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other
heirs (the HIGDONS) would be
prejudiced, so she continued acting
2
in her capacity as administrator
(entering into sales and other such
conveyances). For these acts, the
PCIB dismissed her as an
employee of Charles’ estate, to
which she responded by locking up
the premises being used by PCIB
as offices, which were among the
estate’s properties.
PCIB’s Claims
Linnie Jane’s will should be
governed by Philippine Law, with
respect to the order of succession,
the amount of successional rights,
and the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions.
 Linnie intended Philippine
laws to govern her Will.
 Article 16, CC, provides that
"the national law of the
person whose succession is
under consideration,
whatever may be the nature
of the property and
regardless of the country
wherein said property may be
found", shall prevail.
However, the Conflict of Law
of Texas, which is the
"national law" of the testatrix,
Linnie Jane Hodges, provide
that the domiciliary law
(Philippine law) should
govern the testamentary
dispositions and successional
rights over movables, and the
law of the situs of the
property (also Philippine law
as to properties located in the
Philippines) as regards
immovables.
 Thus applying the "Renvoi
Doctrine", as approved and
applied in the Christensen
case (1963), Philippine law
should apply.
 Under Philippine and Texas
law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses
shall, upon dissolution, be
divided equally between
them. Thus, upon Linnie’s
death, ½ of the entirety of the
assets of the Hodges
spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained
automatically to Charles, not
by way of inheritance, but in
his own right as partner in the
conjugal partnership.
 The other one-half (1/2)
portion forming part of
Linnie’s estate, cannot, under
a clear and specific provision
of her Will, be enhanced or
increased by income,
earnings, rents, or
emoluments accruing after
her death. “All rents,
emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to
him (C. N. Hodges) and he is
further authorized to use any
part of the principal of said
estate as he may need or
desire."
 Articles 900, 995 and 1001
provide that the surviving
spouse of a deceased
leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a
matter of right and by way of
irrevocable legitime, to at
least one-half (1/2) of the
estate of the deceased, and
no testamentary disposition
by the deceased can legally
3
 and validly affect this right of
the surviving spouse. In fact,
her husband is entitled to
said one-half (1/2) portion of
her estate by way of legitime.
(Article 886)
 Clearly, therefore,
immediately upon the death
of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges was the owner of at
least 3/4 or 75% percent of
all of the conjugal assets of
the spouses, 50% by way of
conjugal partnership share
and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus
all "rents, emoluments and
income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the
moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death.
 In his capacity as sole heir
and successor to Linnie’s
estate, Charles appropriated
to himself the entirety of her
estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business
and performed all acts in
connection with the entirety
of the conjugal estate, in his
own name alone, just as he
had been operating,
engaging and doing while the
late Linnie Jane Hodges was
still alive. Upon his death on
December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal
assets were in his sole
possession and control, and
registered in his name alone,
not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said
assets.
 As the sole and exclusive
heir, Charles did not need to
liquidate the estate. Neither
was there any asset left to
Linnie’s estate at the time of
Charles’ death, though
Linnie’s estate may have
referred to “all of the rest,
residue and remainder of my
estate” which would go to her
siblings in the event of
Charles death. The provision
is thus void and invalid at
least as to Philippine assets.
 There are generally only two
kinds of substitution provided
for and authorized by our
Civil Code (Articles 857-870),
namely, (1) simple or
common substitution,
sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article
859), and (2) fideicommissary
substitution (Article 863). All
other substitutions are merely
variations of these. The
substitution provided for by
paragraph four of the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution,
because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N.
Hodges as the first heir
designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute
heirs. At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitutio
n. However, in order that
a vulgar orsimple substitution
can be valid, three alternative
conditions must be present,
namely, that the first
designated heir (1) should die
before the testator; or (2)
should not wish to accept the
inheritance; or (3) should be
incapacitated to do so. None
of these conditions apply to
4
 C. N. Hodges, and, therefore,
the substitution provided for
by the above-quoted
provision of the Will is not
authorized by the Code, and,
therefore, it is void. Manresa
even said, “when another heir
is designated to inherit upon
the death of a first heir, the
second designation can have
effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the
testator, whether or not that
was the true intention of said
testator.”
 The remedy of the Higdons,
then, who are claiming
dubious rights to ¼ of the
conjugal estate of the
Hodges, is to file a claim
against the estate of Charles.
 It also follows that the
conveyances executed by
Avelina, claiming to be
merely in continuation of the
Hodges’ businesses, and
which corresponding deeds
of sale were confirmed by the
probate court, are null and
void and should be subject to
reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs
wanted to have Avelina removed
from her capacity as administrator,
but the lower court reversed its
earlier grant of the motion, on
account of a previous injunction it
issued.)
 Linnie Jane merely gave
Charles a life-estate or a
usufruct over all her estate,
and gave a vested
remainder-estate or the
naked title over the same
estate, to her relatives.
 After Linnie’s death, Charles,
as administrator and executor
of the will, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and
written declarations and
sworn public statements,
renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and
usufruct.
 Since there was no
separation or segregation of
the interests of Linnie and
Charles in the combined
conjugal estate, as there has
been no such separation or
segregation, and because of
Charles’ repudiation, both
interests have continually
earned exactly the same
amount of rents, emoluments
and income.
Issue:
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of
her siblings void? – NO
2. How should the estate be
partitioned/liquidated? – REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIB’s
contention that Linnie’s
testamentary substitution, when
viewed as a substitution, may not
be given effect, is correct. Indeed,
legally speaking, Linnie’s will
provides neither for a simple or
vulgar substitution under Article 859
of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under
Article 863 thereof. There is no
vulgar substitution because there is
no provision for either (1)
predecease of the testator by the
5
designated heir or (2) refusal or (3)
incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article
859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein
because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for
anyone else. But from these
premises, it is not correct to jump to
the conclusion, as PCIB does, that
the testamentary dispositions in
question are therefore inoperative
and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies
simply in the fact that it views the
said disposition exclusively in the
light of substitutions covered by the
Civil Code section on that subject,
(Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book
III) when it is obvious that
substitution occurs only when
another heir is appointed in a will
"so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted," (Article 857)
and, in the present case, no such
possible default is contemplated.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs.
Hodges are not substitutes for
Hodges because, under her will,
they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not
inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance;
rather, therefore, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject, however, to
certain conditions, partially
resolutory insofar as Hodges was
concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law. It is
partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole
of her estate to be owned and
enjoyed by him as universal and
sole heir with absolute dominion
over them only during his lifetime,
which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself, he was
not free to do so mortis causa, and
all his rights to what might remain
upon his death would cease entirely
upon the occurrence of that
contingency, inasmuch as the right
of his brothers and sisters-in-law to
the inheritance, although vested
already upon the death of Mrs.
Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the
occurrence of the death of Hodges
in the event of actual existence of
any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelina’s view,
however, it was not the usufruct
alone of Linnie’s estate, as
contemplated in Article 869, that
she bequeathed to Charles during
his lifetime, but the full ownership
thereof, although the same was to
last also during his lifetime only,
even as there was no restriction
whatsoever against his disposing or
conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than
himself. The Court saw no legal
impediment to this kind of
institution, except that it cannot
apply to the legitime of Charles as
the surviving spouse, consisting of
one-half of the estate, considering
that Linnie had no surviving
6
ascendants nor descendants. (Arts.
872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and
accounting strongly negate PCIB’s
claims that he had adjudicated to
himself all of Linnie’s estate. While
he may have used language like
“herein executor (being) the only
devisee or legatee of the deceased,
in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated… there
is no other person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of
examining herein account to be
given notice,” he would’ve known
that doing so would impute bad
faith unto him. Also, in his very
motions, Hodges asserted the
rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He
even moved to include Roy’s name
included in the probate court’s
order, lest Roy’s heirs think that
they had been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own
way, the separate identity of his
wife’s estate from his own share of
the conjugal partnership up to the
time of his death, more than 5 years
after that of his wife. He never
considered the whole estate as a
single one belonging exclusively to
himself. The only conclusion one
can gather from this is that he could
have been preparing the basis for
the eventual transmission of his
wife's estate, or, at least, so much
thereof as he would not have been
able to dispose of during his
lifetime, to her brothers and sisters
in accordance with her expressed
desire, as intimated in his tax return
in the US. And assuming that he did
pay the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes in the Philippines
on the basis of his being sole heir,
such payment is not necessarily
inconsistent with his recognition of
the rights of his co-heirs. The Court
thus viewed that under the peculiar
provisions of his wife's will, and for
purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to
be considered as her sole heir,
pending the actual transmission of
the remaining portion of her estate
to her other heirs, upon the
eventuality of his death, and
whatever adjustment might be
warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that
could well be taken care of by the
internal revenue authorities in due
time. The Court also considered as
basis of Charles’ intentions several
questionnaires in solemn forms in
filing estate taxes abroad, though
they have not been introduced in
evidence (!!!), only referred to
several times by the parties.
It is obvious, though, that Charles’
procrastinating in settling Linnie’s
estate, and his sole administration
of it, commingled his and his co-
heirs interests, making it difficult to
properly make an accounting of
their shares. PCIB, then, cannot
administer the properties on its
own. What would be just and proper
is for both administrators of the two
estates to act conjointly until after
said estates have been segregated
from each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement
as to how Article 16 of the Civil
Code should be applied. On the
one hand, PCIB claimed that
inasmuch as Linnie was a resident
7
of the Philippines at the time of her
death, under said Article 16,
construed in relation to the pertinent
laws of Texas and the principle
of renvoi, what should be applied
here should be the rules of
succession under the Civil Code,
and, therefore, her estate could
consist of no more than one-fourth
of the said conjugal properties, the
other fourth being, as already
explained, the legitime of her
husband (Art. 900) which she could
not have disposed of nor burdened
with any condition (Art. 872). On the
other hand, Avelina denied that
Linnie died a resident of the
Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to
change her original residence of
birth in Texas, United States of
America, and contends that,
anyway, regardless of the question
of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas,
under said Article 16 of the Civil
Code, the distribution of her estate
is subject to the laws of said State
which, according to her, do not
provide for any legitime, hence,
Linnie’s brothers and sisters are
entitled to the remainder of the
whole of her share of the conjugal
partnership properties consisting of
one-half thereof. Avelina further
maintained that, in any event,
Charles had renounced his rights
under the will in favor of his co-
heirs, as allegedly proven by the
documents touching on the point
already mentioned earlier, the
genuineness and legal significance
of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the
claims, though, for neither the
evidence submitted by the parties
appeared to be adequate enough
for it to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution.
No clear and reliable proof of what
in fact the possibly applicable laws
of Texas are, was presented
(Remember judicial notice in case
of foreign laws?). Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied
upon by Avelina is disputed. In
Justice, therefore, to all the parties
concerned, these and all other
relevant matters should first be
threshed out fully in the trial court in
the proceedings thereafter to be
held for the purpose of ascertaining
and adjudicating and/or distributing
the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her
heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will.
Linnie’s estate is the remainder of
1/4 of the conjugal partnership
properties, considering that even
PCIB did not maintain that the
application of the laws of Texas
would result in the other heirs of
Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything
under her will. And since PCIB's
representations in regard to the
laws of Texas virtually constitute
admissions of fact which the other
parties and the Court are being
made to rely and act upon, PCIB is
not permitted to contradict them or
subsequently take a position
contradictory to or inconsistent with
them.
The only question that remains to
be settled in the remand to the
court below are:
8
(1) whether or not the applicable
laws of Texas do provide in effect
for more, such as, when there is no
legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has
validly waived his whole inheritance
from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it
was brought out by some members
of the Court that to avoid or, at
least, minimize further protracted
legal controversies between the
respective heirs of the Hodges
spouses, it is imperative to
elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made
by Charles after Linnie’s death,
from the mass of the unpartitioned
estates without any express
indication in the pertinent
documents as to whether his
intention is to dispose of part of his
inheritance from his wife or part of
his own share of the conjugal estate
as well as of those made by PCIB
after the death of Hodges. After a
long discussion, the consensus
arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions
made gratuitously in favor of third
parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or
foundations, shall be considered as
intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges'
inheritance from his wife, it
appearing from the tenor of his
motions of May 27 and December
11, 1957 that in asking for general
authority to make sales or other
disposals of properties under the
jurisdiction of the court, which
include his own share of the
conjugal estate, he was not
invoking particularly his right over
his own share, but rather his right to
dispose of any part of his
inheritance pursuant to the will of
his wife;
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the
proceeds of such sales or the
properties taken in by virtue of such
exchanges, shall be considered as
merely the products of "physical
changes" of the properties of her
estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make,
provided that whatever of said
products should remain with the
estate at the time of the death of
Hodges should go to her brothers
and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB
after the death of Hodges must
naturally be deemed as covering
only the properties belonging to his
estate considering that being only
the administrator of the estate of
Hodges, PCIB could not have
disposed of properties belonging to
the estate of his wife. Neither could
such dispositions be considered as
involving conjugal properties, for
the simple reason that the conjugal
partnership automatically ceased
when Linnie died, and by the
peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her
share descended also automatically
upon the death of Hodges to her
brothers and sisters, thus outside of
the scope of PCIB's administration.
Accordingly, these constructions of
Linnie’s will should be adhered to
by the trial court in its final order of
adjudication and distribution and/or
partition of the two estates in
question.
9

Disposition
Remand for determination of proper
application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi),
and of Charles’ alleged renunciation
of his ineritance under Linnie’s will.
Avelina remains to be the
administrator of Linnie’s estate. The
said estate consists of ¼ of the
community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of Linnie’s
death on May 23, 1957, minus
whatever the husband had already
gratuitously disposed of in favor of
third persons from said date until
his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative
dispositions, the proceeds thereof
shall continue to be part of the
wife's estate, unless subsequently
disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and
second, that should the purported
renunciation be declared legally
effective, no deductions whatsoever
are to be made from said estate.
PCIB and Avelina should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never
independently from each other, as
administrators.
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Fernando—concurred with
procedural aspect of the decision.
Teehankee—agreed with most
parts but had substantial
differences in the reasoning:
C. N. Hodges could not validly
make gratuitous dispositions of any
part or all of his wife's estate —
"completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself" in the
language of the main opinion —
and thereby render ineffectual and
nugatory her institution of her
brothers and sisters as her
designated heirs to succeed to
her whole estate "at the death of
(her) husband."
If according to the main opinion,
Hodges could not make such
gratuitous "complete and absolute
dispositions" of his wife Linnie's
estate "mortis causa," it would
seem that by the same token and
rationale he was likewise
proscribed by the will from making
such dispositions of Linnie's
estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions
of renvoi and renunciation should
be
resolved preferentially and expediti
ously by the probate court ahead of
the partition and segregation of
the minimum one-fourth of the
conjugal or community properties
constituting Linnie Jane
Hodges' separate estate, which
task considering that it is now
seventeen (17) years since Linnie
Jane Hodges' death and her
conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges
has remained unliquidated up to
now might take a similar number of
years to unravel with the numerous
items, transactions and details of
the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-
fourth would not be final, since if the
two prejudicial questions
of renvoi and renunciation were
resolved favorably to Linnie's estate
meaning to say that if it should be
held that C. N. Hodges is not
entitled to any legitime of her estate
10
and at any rate he had totally
renounced his inheritance under the
will), then Linnie's estate would
consist not only of the minimum
one-fourth but one-half of the
conjugal or community properties of
the Hodges spouses, which would
require again the partition and
segregation of still another one-
fourth of said properties
to complete Linnie's separate estat
e.
Justice Teehankee also drew up
suggested guidelines for application
in the probate court. Please see
original case.
should eventually be declared
entitled to a legitime, then the
disposition made by Linnie Hodges
in favor of her collateral relatives
would be valid only as to one-half of
her share, or one-fourth of the
conjugal properties, since the
remainder, which constitutes such
legitime, would necessarily go to
her husband in absolute ownership,
unburdened by any substitution,
term or condition, resolutory or
otherwise. And until the estate is
finally settled and adjudicated to the
heirs who may be found entitled to
it, the administration must continue
to cover Linnie's entire conjugal
share.

Makalintal, CJ. –
Regardless of whether or not C. N.
Hodges was entitled to a legitime in
his deceased wife's estate — which
question, still to be decided by the
said probate court, may depend
upon what is the law of Texas and
upon its applicability in the present
case — the said estate consists of
one-half, not one-fourth, of the
conjugal properties. There is neither
a minimum of one-fourth nor a
maximum beyond that. It is
important to bear this in mind
because the estate of Linnie
Hodges consists of her share in the
conjugal properties, is still under
administration and until now has not
been distributed by order of the
court.

The reference in both the main and

separate opinions to a one-fourth
portion of the conjugal properties as
Linnie Hodges’ minimum share is a
misnomer and is evidently meant
only to indicate that if her husband

11
 ARTICLE 859.
JOHNNY S.
RABADILLA,[1] petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND MARIA
[2]
MARLENA COSCOLUELL
A Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondent
s.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of
the decision of the Court of
Appeals,[3] dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in
Bacolod City, and ordered
the defendants-
appellees (including herein
petitioner), as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of
Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as
follows:
In a Codicil appended to the
Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of 511, 855 square
meters of that parcel of land
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of
the Bacolod Cadastre. The
said Codicil, which was duly
probated and admitted in
Special Proceedings No.
4046 before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the
following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and
bequeath the following
property owned by me
to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P.
Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10942),
which is registered in
my name according to
the records of the
Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge
Rabadilla die ahead of
me, the
aforementioned
property and the rights
which I shall set forth
hereinbelow, shall be
inherited and
acknowledged by the
children and spouse of
Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my
command, in this my
addition (Codicil), that
should I die and Jorge
12
Rabadilla shall have SIXTH
already received the
ownership of the said I command, in this my
Lot No. 1392 of the addition (Codicil) that
Bacolod Cadastre, the Lot No. 1392, in the
covered by Transfer event that the one to
Certificate of Title No. whom I have left and
RT-4002 (10942), and bequeathed, and his
also at the time that the heir shall later sell,
lease of Balbinito G. lease, mortgage this
Guanzon of the said lot said Lot, the buyer,
shall expire, Jorge lessee, mortgagee,
Rabadilla shall have shall have also the
the obligation until he obligation to respect
dies, every year to give and deliver yearly ONE
to Maria Marlina HUNDRED (100)
Coscolluela y Belleza, piculs of sugar to Maria
Seventy (75) (sic) Marlina Coscolluela y
piculs of Export sugar Belleza, on each
and Twenty Five (25) month of December,
piculs of Domestic SEVENTY FIVE (75)
sugar, until the said piculs of Export and
Maria Marlina TWENTY FIVE (25)
Coscolluela y Belleza piculs of Domestic,
dies. until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should
FIFTH the buyer, lessee or
the mortgagee of this
(a) Should Jorge lot, not have respected
Rabadilla die, his heir my command in this
to whom he shall give my addition (Codicil),
Lot No. 1392 of the Maria Marlina
Bacolod Cadastre, Coscolluela y Belleza,
covered by Transfer shall immediately seize
Certificate of Title No. this Lot No. 1392 from
RT-4002 (10492), shall my heir and the latter's
have the obligation to heirs, and shall turn it
still give yearly, the over to my near
sugar as specified in desendants, (sic) and
the Fourth paragraph the latter shall then
of his testament, to have the obligation to
Maria Marlina give the ONE
Coscolluela y Belleza HUNDRED (100)
on the month of piculs of sugar until
December of each Maria Marlina shall die.
year. I further command in

13
 this my addition
(Codicil) that my heir
and his heirs of this Lot
No. 1392, that they will
obey and follow that
should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage,
they cannot negotiate
with others than my
near descendants and
my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil,
Lot No. 1392 was transferred
to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44498
thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in
1983 and was survived by his
wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora,
Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y comply with the 6th
Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5588, before
Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned
heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
to enforce the provisions of
subject Codicil. The
Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the
conditions of the Codicil, in
that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was
mortgaged to the
Philippine National
Bank and the Republic
Planters Bank in
disregard of the
testatrix's specific
instruction to sell,
lease, or mortgage
only to the near
descendants and sister
of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs
failed to comply with
their obligation to
deliver one hundred
(100) piculs of sugar
(75 piculs export sugar
and 25 piculs domestic
sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza from sugar
crop years 1985 up to
the filing of the
complaint as mandated
by the Codicil, despite
repeated demands for
compliance.
3. The banks failed to
paragraph of the
Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale,
lease, or mortgage of
the property, the buyer,
lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver
100 piculs of sugar per
crop year to herein
private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that
judgment be rendered
ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392
to the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza, the
14
cancellation of TCT No. 25 piculs
44498 in the name of the of 'B'
deceased, Dr. Jorge sugar, or
Rabadilla, and the issuance then
of a new certificate of title in existing in
the names of the surviving any of our
heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. names,
Mary Rose
On February 26, 1990, the Rabadilla
defendant-heirs were y Azurin or
declared in default but on Alan
March 28, 1990 the Order of Azurin,
Default was lifted, with during
respect to defendant Johnny December
S. Rabadilla, who filed his of each
Answer, accordingly. sugar crop
year, in
During the pre-trial, the Azucar
parties admitted that: Sugar
Central;
On November 15, 1998, the and, this is
plaintiff (private considered
respondent) and a certain complianc
Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the e of the
herein petitioner who was annuity as
lessee of the property and mentioned
acting as attorney-in-fact of , and in
defendant-heirs, arrived at an the same
amicable settlement and manner
entered into a Memorandum will
of Agreement on the complianc
obligation to deliver one e of the
hundred piculs of sugar, to annuity be
the following effect: in the next
succeedin
"That for crop year g crop
1988-89, the annuity years.
mentioned in Entry No.
49074 of TCT No. That the annuity above
44489 will be delivered stated for crop year
not later than January 1985-86, 1986-87, and
of 1989, more 1987-88, will be
specifically, to wit: complied in cash
equivalent of the
75 piculs number of piculs as
of 'A' mentioned therein and
sugar, and
15
 which is as herein
agreed upon, taking
into consideration the
composite price of
sugar during each
sugar crop year, which
is in the total amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS
(P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned
amount will be paid or
delivered on a staggered
cash installment, payable on
or before the end of
December of every sugar
crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of
crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of
crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of
crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX
THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of
crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no
compliance with the aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of
50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop
year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the
Regional Trial Court came
out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the
light of the aforegoing
findings, the Court
finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no
cause of action against
the defendants has as
yet arose in favor of
plaintiff. While there
maybe the non-
performance of the
command as
mandated exaction
from them simply
because they are the
children of Jorge
Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot
in question, does not
warrant the filing of the
present complaint. The
remedy at bar must
fall. Incidentally, being
in the category as
creditor of the left
estate, it is opined that
plaintiff may initiate the
intestate proceedings,
if only to establish the
heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order
to give full meaning
16
 and semblance to her of Aleja Belleza in case
claim under the Codicil. of such non-
compliance, this Court
In the light of the deems it proper to
aforegoing findings, the order the
Complaint being reconveyance of title
prematurely filed is over Lot No. 1392 from
DISMISSED without the estates of Jorge
prejudice. Rabadilla to the estate
of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[6] However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute
On appeal by plaintiff, the separate proceedings
First Division of the Court of to re-open Aleja
Appeals reversed the Belleza's estate,
decision of the trial court; secure the
ratiocinating and ordering appointment of an
thus: administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392
"Therefore, the to Aleja Belleza's legal
evidence on record heirs in order to
having established enforce her right,
plaintiff-appellant's reserved to her by the
right to receive 100 codicil, to receive her
piculs of sugar legacy of 100 piculs of
annually out of the sugar per year out of
produce of Lot No. the produce of Lot No.
1392; defendants- 1392 until she dies.
appellee's obligation
under Aleja Belleza's Accordingly, the
codicil, as heirs of the decision appealed from
modal heir, Jorge is SET ASIDE and
Rabadilla, to deliver another one entered
such amount of sugar ordering defendants-
to plaintiff-appellant; appellees, as heirs of
defendants-appellee's Jorge Rabadilla, to
admitted non- reconvey title over Lot
compliance with said No. 1392, together with
obligation since 1985; its fruits and interests,
and, the punitive to the estate of Aleja
consequences Belleza.
enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil SO ORDERED."[7]
Code, of seizure of Lot
No. 1392 and its Dissatisfied with the
reversion to the estate aforesaid disposition by the

17
Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this
Court via the present petition,
contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the
estate of the testatrix Aleja
Belleza on the basis of
paragraph 6 of the Codicil,
and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview
of Article 882 of the New Civil
Code.
The petition is not impressed
with merit.
Petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in
resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882
of the New Civil Code on
modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue
raised which is the absence
or prematurity of the cause of
action. Petitioner maintains
that Article 882 does not find
application as there was no
modal institution and the
testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be
substituted by the testatrix's
"near descendants" should
the obligation to deliver the
fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied
with. And since the testatrix
died single and without issue,
there can be no valid
substitution and such
testamentary provision
cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes
further that there can be no
valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted
heirs are not definite, as the
substituted heirs are merely
referred to as "near
descendants" without a
definite identity or reference
as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore,
under Articles 843[8] and
845[9] of the New Civil Code,
the substitution should be
deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner
are untenable. Contrary to his
supposition that the Court of
Appeals deviated from the
issue posed before it, which
was the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of prematurity of
cause of action, there was no
such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the
private respondent had a
cause of action against the
petitioner. The disquisition
made on modal institution
was, precisely, to stress that
the private respondent had a
legally demandable right
against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil;
on which issue the Court of
Appeals ruled in accordance
with law.
It is a general rule under the
law on succession that
successional rights are
18
transmitted from the moment
of death of the
[10]
decedent and compulsory
heirs are called to succeed
by operation of law. The
legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and
the widow or widower, are
compulsory heirs.[11] Thus,
the petitioner, his mother and
sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded
the latter by operation of law,
without need of further
proceedings, and the
successional rights were
transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New
Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by
his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of
subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not
extinguished by death also
form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, were
likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his
death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix
Aleja Belleza devised Lot No.
1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that
the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon
the death of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights
and title over the said
property, and they also
assumed his (decedent's)
obligation to deliver the fruits
of the lot involved to herein
private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted
heir reciprocally corresponds
to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct,
the fulfillment or performance
of which is now being
demanded by the latter
through the institution of the
case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a
cause of action against
petitioner and the trial court
erred in dismissing the
complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that
Article 882 of the New Civil
Code on modal institutions is
not applicable because what
the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's
near descendants should
there be noncompliance with
the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private
respondent.
19
Again, the contention is
without merit.
Substitution is the
designation by the testator of
a person or persons to take
the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case
the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in
a simple substitution,[12] or (2)
leave his/her property to one
person with the express
charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or
others, as in a Thus, a very important
fideicommissary
substitution.[13] The Codicil
sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the
second heir takes the
inheritance in default of the
first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.[14] In the case
under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil
do not provide that should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla default due
to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's
near descendants would
substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or
his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the
Codicil, the property referred
to shall be seized and turned
over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution
here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution,
the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve
the property and to
transmit the same later to
the second heir.[15] In the
case under consideration, the
instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to
alienate the property
provided the negotiation is
with the near descendants or
the sister of the testatrix.
element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing
upon the first heir the
preservation of the property
and its transmission to the
second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his
will, there is no
fideicommissary
substitution."[16] Also, the
near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will
only pass to them should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of
a fideicommissary
20
substitution is also missing heirs give security for
here. Under Article 863, the compliance with the
second heir or the wishes of the testator
fideicommissary to whom the and for the return of
property is transmitted must anything he or they
not be beyond one degree may receive, together
from the first heir or the with its fruits and
fiduciary. A fideicommissary interests, if he or they
substitution is therefore, void should disregard this
if the first heir is not related obligation.
by first degree to the second
heir.[17] In the case under Art. 883. When without
scrutiny, the near the fault of the heir, an
descendants are not at all institution referred to in
related to the instituted heir, the preceding article
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. cannot take effect in
the exact manner
The Court of Appeals erred stated by the testator, it
not in ruling that the shall be complied with
institution of Dr. Jorge in a manner most
Rabadilla under subject analogous to and in
Codicil is in the nature of a conformity with his
modal institution and wishes.
therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the The institution of an heir in
provision of law in point. the manner prescribed in
Articles 882 and 883 of the Article 882 is what is known
New Civil Code provide: in the law of succession as
an institucion sub modo or a
Art. 882. The modal institution. In a modal
statement of the object institution, the testator states
of the institution or the (1) the object of the
application of the institution, (2) the purpose or
property left by the application of the property left
testator, or the charge by the testator, or (3) the
imposed on him, shall charge imposed by the
not be considered as a testator upon the heir.[18] A
condition unless it "mode" imposes an obligation
appears that such was upon the heir or legatee but it
his intention. does not affect the efficacy of
his rights to the
That which has been succession.[19] On the other
left in this manner may hand, in a conditional
be claimed at once testamentary disposition, the
provided that the condition must happen or be
instituted heir or his fulfilled in order for the heir to

21
be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition
suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not
suspend.[20] To some extent,
it is similar to a resolutory
condition.[21]
From the provisions of the
Codicil litigated upon, it can
be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that
subject property be inherited
by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that
the testatrix imposed an
obligation on the said
instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during
the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not
make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity
of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the
performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though,
that should the obligation be
not complied with, the
property shall be turned over
to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in
nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted
heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary
dispositions are generally
acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should
not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from
the Will itself that such was
the intention of the testator.
In case of doubt, the
institution should be
considered as modal and not
conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in
the other contention of
petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of
usufruct but not the right to
seize the property itself from
the instituted heir because
the right to seize was
expressly limited to violations
by the buyer, lessee or
mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills,
when an uncertainty arises
on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will,
taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it
was made.[23] Such
construction as will sustain
and uphold the Will in all its
parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that
the instituted heir is under
obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar
yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted
22
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
heirs, and their buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee should they
sell, lease, mortgage or
otherwise negotiate the
property involved. The Codicil
further provides that in the
event that the obligation to
deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the
property and turn it over to
the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-
performance of the said
obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the
property and reversion
thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said
obligation is clearly imposed
by the testatrix, not only on
the instituted heir but also on
his successors-in-interest,
the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-
fulfillment of said obligation
should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is
petitioner's submission that
by virtue of the amicable
settlement, the said
obligation imposed by the
Codicil has been assumed by
the lessee, and whatever
obligation petitioner had
become the obligation of the
lessee; that petitioner is
deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation
through the consummated
settlement between the
lessee and the private
respondent, and having
consummated a settlement
with the petitioner, the
recourse of the private
respondent is the fulfillment
of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not
the seizure of subject
property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is
a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of
his property, to take effect
after his death.[25] Since the
Will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how
his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly
followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a
compromise agreement
which would thereby defeat
the very purpose of making a
Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
23
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, INVENTARIO
1982
Una sexta
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE parte (1/6)
EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA proindiviso
LUISA PALACIOS, de un te
Administratrix, petitioner-
appellee, rreno, con sus mejoras
vs. y edificaciones,
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE situadoen
RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors,
JORGE and ROBERTO la Escolta,
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- Manila..........................
appellants. ...................................
P500,000.00

Una sexta
ABAD SANTOS, J.: parte (1/6)
proindiviso
The main issue in this appeal is the de dos
manner of partitioning the testate
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez parcelas de terreno
among the principal beneficiaries, situadas en Antipolo,
namely: his widow Marcelle Rizal...................
Demoron de Ramirez; his two 658.34
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez; and his companion Cuatrocien
Wanda de Wrobleski. tos
noventa y
The task is not trouble-free because uno (491)
the widow Marcelle is a French who acciones
lives in Paris, while the companion
Wanda is an Austrian who lives in de la 'Central
Spain. Moreover, the testator Azucarera de la
provided for substitutions. Carlota a P17.00

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino por accion

national, died in Spain on .....................................
December 11, 1964, with only his .....................................
widow as compulsory heir. His will ......8,347.00
was admitted to probate by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Diez mil
Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria ochociento
Luisa Palacios was appointed s seize
administratrix of the estate. In due (10,806)
time she submitted an inventory of acciones
the estate as follows:

24
de la 'Central Luzon P507,976.
Milling Co.', disuelta y 97
en
The testamentary dispositions are
liquidacion a P0.15 por as follows:
accion
..................................... A.—En nuda
.........1,620.90 propiedad, a D.
Roberto y D. Jorge
Cuenta de Ramirez, ambas
Ahorros en menores de edad,
el residentes en Manila,
Philippine I.F., calle 'Alright, No.
Trust 1818, Malate, hijos de
su sobrino D. Jose Ma.
Co................................ Ramirez, con
..................................... sustitucion vulgar a
......................... favor de sus
2,350.73 respectivos
descendientes, y, en
TOTAL...... su defecto, con
................. sustitucion vulgar
................. reciprocal entre
................. ambos.
.....
P512,976. El precedente legado
97 en nuda propiedad de
la participacion indivisa
MENOS: de la finca Santa Cruz
Building, lo ordena el
Deuda al testador a favor de los
Banco de legatarios nombrados,
las Islas en atencion a que
Filipinas, dicha propiedad fue
garan- creacion del querido
padre del otorgante y
tizada con prenda de por ser aquellos
las acciones de La continuadores del
Carlota ......... P apellido Ramirez,
5,000,00
B.—Y en usufructo a
VALOR saber: —
LIQUIDO..
................. a. En cuanto a una
................. tercera parte, a favor
....... de la esposa del
testador, Da. Marcelle
25
Ramirez, domiciliada objeto delegado, sin
en IE PECO, calle del intervencion alguna de
General Gallieni No. los titulares
33, Seine Francia, con fideicomisaarios.
sustitucion vulgar u
fideicomisaria a favor On June 23, 1966, the
de Da. Wanda de administratrix submitted a project of
Wrobleski, de Palma partition as follows: the property of
de Mallorca, Son the deceased is to be divided into
Rapina Avenida de los two parts. One part shall go to the
Reyes 13, widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the
b.—Y en cuanto a las other part or "free portion" shall go
dos terceras partes to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
restantes, a favor de la nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one
nombrada Da. Wanda third (1/3) of the free portion is
de Nrobleski con charged with the widow's usufruct
sustitucion vulgar v and the remaining two-thirds (2/3)
fideicomisaria a with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
saber:—
Jorge and Roberto opposed the
En cuanto a la mitad project of partition on the grounds:
de dichas dos terceras (a) that the provisions for vulgar
partes, a favor de D. substitution in favor of Wanda de
Juan Pablo Jankowski, Wrobleski with respect to the
de Son Rapina Palma widow's usufruct and in favor of
de Mallorca; y Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
encuanto a la mitad V. Ramirez, with respect to
restante, a favor de su Wanda's usufruct are invalid
sobrino, D. Horace V. because the first heirs Marcelle and
Ramirez, San Luis Wanda) survived the testator; (b)
Building, Florida St. that the provisions for
Ermita, Manila, I.F. fideicommissary substitutions are
also invalid because the first heirs
A pesar de las are not related to the second heirs
sustituciones or substitutes within the first
fideiconiisarias degree, as provided in Article 863
precedentemente of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant
ordinadas, las of a usufruct over real property in
usufiructuarias the Philippines in favor of Wanda
nombradas Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
conjuntamente con los Section 5, Article III of the
nudo propietarios, Philippine Constitution; and that (d)
podran en cualquier the proposed partition of the
memento vender a testator's interest in the Santa Cruz
tercero los bienes (Escolta) Building between the

26
widow Marcelle and the appellants,
violates the testator's express win
to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 3, 1967. It is
this order which Jorge and Roberto
have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the
legality of giving Marcelle one-half
of the estate in full ownership. They
admit that the testator's dispositions
impaired his widow's legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil
Code "If the only survivor is the
widow or widower, she or he shall
be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the
deceased, she is entitled to one-
half of his estate over which he
could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever.
(Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the
free portion which the appellants
question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a
quo approved the usufruct in favor
of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor
of one-third of the estate. The
court a quo erred for Marcelle who
is entitled to one-half of the estate
"en pleno dominio" as her legitime
and which is more than what she is
given under the will is not entitled to
have any additional share in the
estate. To give Marcelle more than
her legitime will run counter to the
testator's intention for as stated
above his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to
favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that
"Substitution is the appoint-
judgment of another heir so that he
may enter into the inheritance in
default of the heir originally
instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code.
And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or
common, brief or compendious,
reciprocal, and fideicommissary
(Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to
Tolentino, "Although the Code
enumerates four classes, there are
really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are
merely variations of these two."
(111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil
Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator
may designate one or
more persons to
substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case
such heir or heirs
should die before him,
or should not wish, or
should be
incapacitated to accept
the inheritance.
A simple substitution,
without a statement of
the cases to which it
refers, shall comprise
the three mentioned in
the preceding
27
 paragraph, unless the
testator has otherwise
provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is
described in the Civil Code as
follows:
ART. 863. A sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
fideicommissary
substitution by virtue of
which the fiduciary or
first heir instituted is
entrusted with the
obligation to preserve
and to transmit to a
second heir the whole
or part of inheritance,
shall be valid and shall
take effect, provided
such substitution does
not go beyond one
degree from the heir
originally instituted,
and provided further
that the fiduciary or first
heir and the second
heir are living at time of
the death of the
testator.
It will be noted that the testator
provided for a vulgar substitution in
respect of the legacies of Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants,
thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor
de sus respectivos descendientes,
y, en su defecto, con substitution
vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the
legality of the substitution so
provided. The appellants question
the sustitucion vulgar y What is meant by "one degree"
fideicomisaria a favor de Da.
Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection
with the one-third usufruct over the
estate given to the widow Marcelle
However, this question has become
moot because as We have ruled
above, the widow is not entitled to
any usufruct.
The appellants also question the
connection with Wanda's usufruct
over two thirds of the estate in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in
its vulgar aspect as void because
Wanda survived the testator or
stated differently because she did
not predecease the testator. But
dying before the testator is not the
only case for vulgar substitution for
it also includes refusal or incapacity
to accept the inheritance as
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil
Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar
substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its
fideicommissary aspect, the
appellants are correct in their claim
that it is void for the following
reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez)
are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the
Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted."
from the first heir is explained by
Tolentino as follows:
28
Scaevola Maura, and (b) There is no absolute duty
Traviesas construe imposed on Wanda to transmit the
"degree" as usufruct to the substitutes as
designation, required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the
substitution, or Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
transmission. The admits "that the testator contradicts
Supreme Court of the establishment of a
Spain has decidedly fideicommissary substitution when
adopted this he permits the properties subject of
construction. From this the usufruct to be sold upon mutual
point of view, there can agreement of the usufructuaries
be only one and the naked owners." (Brief, p.
tranmission or 26.)
substitution, and the
substitute need not be 3. The usufruct of Wanda.
related to the first heir.
Manresa, Morell and The appellants claim that the
Sanchez Roman, usufruct over real properties of the
however, construe the estate in favor of Wanda is void
word "degree" as because it violates the
generation, and the constitutional prohibition against the
present Code has acquisition of lands by aliens.
obviously followed this
interpretation. by The 1935 Constitution which is
providing that the controlling provides as follows:
substitution shall not
go beyond one degree SEC. 5. Save in cases
"from the heir originally of hereditary
instituted." The Code succession, no private
thus clearly indicates agricultural land shall
that the second heir be transferred or
must be related to and assigned except to
be one generation from individuals,
the first heir. corporations, or
associations qualified
From this, it follows to acquire or hold lands
that the of the public domain in
fideicommissary can the Philippines. (Art.
only be either a child or XIII.)
a parent of the first
heir. These are the The court a quo upheld the validity
only relatives who are of the usufruct given to Wanda on
one generation or the ground that the Constitution
degree from the covers not only succession by
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. operation of law but also
193-194.) testamentary succession. We are of
the opinion that the Constitutional
29
provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not
extend to testamentary succession
for otherwise the prohibition will be
for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to
a Philippine landowner in exchange
for a devise of a piece of land.
ARTICLE 863.
Testate Estate 0f Jose Eugenio
Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez (G.R.
No. L-27952, February 15, 1982)
PCIB vs. Escolin(56 SCRA 266)
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000)

This opinion notwithstanding, We

uphold the usufruct in favor of
Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a
real right, does not vest title to the
land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow

as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the

free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski
with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered

supersedes that of the court a quo.
No special pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

30
 ARTICLE 871
G.R. No. L-3891 December 19,
1907
ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA
SANTA, respondent-appellee.
Agoncillo and Ilustre, for appellant.
Agustin Alvares, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The will of Consuelo Morente
contains the following
clauses:lawphil.net
1. I hereby order that all real
estate which may belong to
me shall pass to my
husband, Gumersindo de la
Santa.
2. That my said husband
shall not leave my brothers
after my death, and that he
shall not marry anyone;
should my said husband
have children by anyone, he
shall not convey any portion
of the property left by me,
except the one-third part
thereof and the two
remaining thirds shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente
or his children should he
have any.
3. After my death I direct my
husband to dwell in
the camarin in which the
bakery is located, which is
one of the properties
belonging to me.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la
Santa, married again within four
months of the death of the testatrix.
Elena Morente, a sister of the
deceased, filed a petition in the
proceeding relating to the probate
of the will of Consuelo Morente
pending in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tayabas
in which she alleged the second
marriage of Gumersindo de la
Santa and asked that the legacy to
him above-mentioned be annulled.
Objection was made in the court
below by the husband to the
procedure followed by the
petitioner. The court below,
however, held that the proceeding
was proper and from that holding
the husband did not appeal. From
the judgment of the court below, the
petitioner, Elena Morente,
appealed.
In its judgment the court denied the
petition. It was said, however, in the
decision, as we understand it, that
the husband having married, he
had the right to the use of all the
property during his life and that at
his death two-thirds thereof would
pass to Vicente, a brother of the
testatrix, and one-third thereof
could be disposed of by the
husband. The construction given to
the will by the court below is not
accepted by the appellant. She
claims that by the mere act of
marriage the husband at once lost
all rights acquired by the will. It is
neither alleged nor proven that any
31
children have been born to the
husband since the death of the
testatrix. lawphil.net
Article 790 of the Civil Code
provides that testamentary
provisions may be made conditional
and article 793 provides that a
prohibition against another
marriage may in certain cases be
validly imposed upon the widow or
widower. But the question in this
case is, Did the testatrix intend to
impose a condition upon the
absolute gift which is contained in
the first clauses of the will? It is to
be observed that by the second
clause she directs that her husband
shall not leave her sisters. It is
provided in the third clause that he
must continue to live in a certain
building. It is provided in the second
clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is
attached the condition that if he fails
to comply with them he shall lose
the legacy given to him by the first
clause of the will. It is nowhere
expressly said that if he does leave
the testatrix's sisters, or does not
continue to dwell in the building
mentioned in the will he shall forfeit
the property given him in the first
clause; nor is it anywhere expressly
said that if he marries again he
shall incur such a loss. But it is
expressly provided that if one event
does happen the disposition of the
property contained in the first
clause of the will shall be changed.
It is said that if he has children by
anyone, two-thirds of that property
shall pass to Vicente, the brother of
the testatrix.
We are bound to construe the will
with reference to all the clauses
contained therein, and with
reference to such surrounding
circumstances as duly appear in the
case, and after such consideration
we can not say that it was the
intention of the testatrix that if her
husband married again he should
forfeit the legacy above mentioned.
In other words, there being no
express condition attached to that
legacy in reference to the second
marriage, we can not say that any
condition can be implied from the
context of the will. In the case of
Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vano (8
Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the
legacy contained in the will therein
mentioned was not conditional. It is
true that case arose under article
797 of the Civil Code, which
perhaps is not strictly applicable to
this case, but we think that it may
be argued from what is said in
article 797 that, in order to make a
testamentary provision conditional,
such condition must fairly appear
from the language used in the will.
Whether the children mentioned in
the second clause of the will are
natural children or legitimate
children we do not decide, for no
such question is before us, the
contingency mentioned in that part
of the clause not having arisen, and
we limit ourselves to saying merely
that by the subsequent marriage of
the husband he did not forfeit the
legacy given to him by the first part
of the will. That was the only
question before the court below. the
judgment of that court, denying the
petition, is accordingly affirmed,
32
with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

33
 ART 1183
G.R. No. L-22595
November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G.
Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-
appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for
appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this
estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-
appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of
partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the
approval of the purchase made by
the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the
declaration that the Turkish laws
are impertinent to this cause, and
the failure not to postpone the
approval of the scheme of partition
and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested
in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based
on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as
being in violation or article 10 of the
Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and
testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of
succession as well as to the
amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law
of the person whose
succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature
of the property or the country
in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did
not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as
he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence
of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.,
472.)
It has not been proved in these
proceedings what the Turkish laws
34
are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in
not having deferred the approval of
the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish
laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor
another opportunity to prove such
laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary with the trial court,
and, taking into consideration that
the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent
evidence, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in
this particular. There is, therefore,
no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph
G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary
to our laws in force, must be
complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the
scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of
error which deals with the exclusion
of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the
persons designated as such in will,
it must be taken into consideration
that such exclusion is based on the
last part of the second clause of the
will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state
that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been
conferred upon me by
conquest and not by free
choice, nor by nationality
and, on the other hand,
having resided for a
considerable length of time in
the Philippine Islands where I
succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that
the distribution of my property
and everything in connection
with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine
islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply
with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will
is conditional, and the condition is
that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed
were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented
from receiving his legacy.
35
The fact is, however, that the said that the distribution of this estate be
condition is void, being contrary to made in such a manner as to
law, for article 792 of the civil Code include the herein appellant Andre
provides the following: Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted
Impossible conditions and by the judicial administrator is
those contrary to law or good approved in all other respects,
morals shall be considered without any pronouncement as to
as not imposed and shall not costs.
prejudice the heir or legatee
in any manner whatsoever, So ordered.
even should the testator
otherwise provide.
ARTICLE 882.
And said condition is contrary to law Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000)
because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil
Code above quoted, such national
law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of

the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the

second clause of the will regarding
the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being
contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said

will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed

from are modified and it is directed

36

ARTICLE 887.
G.R. No. 104376 February 23,
1994
ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO,
represented by her mother,
LEONCIA DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for
petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private
respondent.
NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was
commanded to go forth, be fertile,
multiply and fill the earth. Others did
not heed the sequence of this
command because they multiply
first and then go. Corollarily, it is
now commonplace for an
abandoned illegitimate offspring to
sue his father for recognition and
support.
The antecedent facts are narrated
in the trial court's decision, as
follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio
G. Ilano while she was working as
secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata.
Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions,
she and petitioner took lunch
together. In less that a year's time,
she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then
managing a business of her own as
Namarco distributor, met petitioner
again who was engaged in the
same business and they renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he
would give her his unsold allocation
of goods. Later, he courted her
more than four years. Their
relationship became intimate and
with his promise of marriage, they
eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in
April, 1962. They stayed at La
Mesa Apartment, located behind
the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office, of which he is the
president and general manager. He
came home to her three or four
times a week.
The apartment was procured by
Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge
of the Filipinas Telephone
Company branch office. He also
took care of the marketing and paid
rentals, lights and water
bills.1 Unable to speak the local
dialect, Leoncia was provided also
by Melencio with a maid by the
name of Nena. Petitioner used to
give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was
conceiving at that time, was fetched
by petitioner and they transferred to
San Juan St., Pasay City. In
October, 1962, she delivered a still-
born female child at the Manila
Sanitarium. The death certificate
was signed by
petitioner.2 Thereafter, while they
were living at Highway 54, Makati,
private respondent Merceditas S.
Ilano was born on December 30,
1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium.
37
Her birth was recorded as
Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los
Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano.3 Leoncia submitted receipts
issued by the Manila Sanitarium to
show that she was confined there
from December 30, 1963 until
January 2, 1964 under the name of
Mrs. Leoncia Ilano.4
The support by petitioner for
Leoncia and Merceditas was
sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of
Leoncia)5 or thru Merceditas
6
herself; and sometimes in the form
of a check like Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532,7 the
signature appearing thereon having
been identified by Leoncia as that
of petitioner because he often gives
her checks which he issues at
home and saw him sign the
checks.8 Both petitioner and his
daughter admitted that the check
and the signature are those of the
former.9
During the time that petitioner and
Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, he showed concern as the
father of Merceditas. When
Merceditas was in Grade I at the St.
Joseph Parochial School, he signed
her Report Card for the fourth and
fifth grading periods10 as her parent.
Those signatures were both
identified by Leoncia and
Merceditas because he signed
them in their residence in their
presence and of Elynia.11 Since
Merceditas started to have
discernment, he was already the
one whom she recognized as her
Daddy.12 He treated her as a father
would to his child. He would bring
home candies, toys, and anything a
child enjoys. He would take her for
a drive, eat at restaurants, and
even cuddle her to sleep.13
When petitioner ran as a candidate
in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he
gave Leoncia his picture with the
following dedication: "To Nene, with
best regards, Temiong."14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia
Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived
with Leoncia and petitioner. She
accompanied her aunt when she
started having labor pains in the
morning of December 30, 1963.
Petitioner arrived after five o'clock
in the afternoon. When the nurse
came to inquire about the child,
Leoncia was still unconscious so it
was from petitioner that the nurse
sought the information. Inasmuch
as it was already past seven o'clock
in the evening, the nurse promised
to return the following morning for
his signature. However, he left an
instruction to give birth certificate to
Leoncia for her signature, as he
was leaving early the following
morning.
Prior to the birth of Merceditas,
Elynia used to accompany her aunt
and sometimes with petitioner in his
car to the Manila Sanitarium for
prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go
to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta.
Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions
to get money as support and
sometimes he would send notes of
explanation if he cannot come
which she in turn gave to her
38
aunt.15 They stayed at 112 Arellano
St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966
before they finally transferred to
Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived
with them up to June, 1971 when
he stopped coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and
complete denial of any relationship
with Leoncia and Merceditas. He
disowned the handwritten answers
and signatures opposite column 16
of the death certificate of a female
child surnamed Ilano, although in
column 13 thereof opposite father's
name the typewritten name,
Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also
denied the following: all the notes
alleged to have been received from
him by Elynia for delivery to
Leoncia; the signatures appearing
in Merceditas' Report Card; and
being the source of a photo of
himself with a handwritten
dedication. He admitted that Manila
Banking Corporation Check No.
81532 including the signature is his.
He was sick on December 30, 1963
and was hospitalized on January 7,
1964.16 He does not understand
why this case was filed against
him.17
Melencio admitted that he was the
one who procured the apartment for
Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid
the rentals and bought the
necessities therefor. He and
Leoncia lived together and shared
the same bed. They later
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay
City and to Highway 54, Makati. He
stopped visiting her in March or
April, 1963 because he planned to
get married with another which he
eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually
delivered to the apartment fishes
ordered by Melencio which were
received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of
petitioner, does not know Leoncia;
neither has she been brought to
their family home in Imus, Cavite.
On December 30, 1963, her father
was at their home because he got
sick on December 25, 1963 and
was advised to have a complete
bed rest. Her father was
hospitalized on January 7, 1964.
She denied that her father was at
the Manila Sanitarium on December
30, 1963; that he fetched a certain
woman on January 2, 1964, at the
Manila Sanitarium because he was
at their home at that time; and that
her father lived with a certain
woman in 1963 up to June, 1971
because all this time he was living
with them in Imus, Cavite. He was
working and reporting to the office
everyday and when he goes to
Guagua or Manila on business, her
mother or brother goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife,
further corroborated the previous
testimonies about petitioner's
sickness on December 30, 1963
and hospitalization on January 7,
1964. It could not be true that her
husband, during the years 1963 to
1968, lived three (3) times a week
with a certain Leoncia de los
Santos because her husband never
slept out of their house and that in
his capacity as President and
Chairman of the Board of the
Filipinas Telephone Company he
does not go to Guagua even once a
39
year because they have a branch WHEREFORE, the
manager, Melencio Reyes. Decision appealed
from is REVERSED
After weighing the contradictory and judgment is hereby
testimonies and evidence of the rendered declaring
parties, the trial court was not fully plaintiff MERCEDITAS
satisfied that petitioner is the father S. ILANO as the duly
of Merceditas, on the basis of the acknowledged and
following: recognized illegitimate
child of defendant
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not ARTEMIO G. ILANO
in cohabitation during the period of with all the right
Merceditas' conception; appurtenant to such
status.
2) testimony of Melencio that he
frequented the apartment where Defendant is directed
Leoncia was living, took care of all to pay the plaintiff
the bills and shared the same bed support in arrears at
with her; the rate of EIGHT
HUNDRED (P800.00)
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas PESOS a month from
was not signed by petitioner; the date of the filing of
the complaint on
4) petitioner denied his signature in August 16, 1972 up to
the monthly report card of August 15, 1975; ONE
Merceditas; and THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS a
5) there is no clear and sufficient month from August 16,
showing that support was given by 1975 to August 15,
petitioner to Merceditas. 1978; ONE
THOUSAND THREE
Thus it rendered judgment on April HUNDRED
24, 1981 dismissing the (P1,300.00) PESOS a
18
complaint. month from August 16,
1978 to August 15,
Fortunately for private respondent,
1981; and ONE
respondent Court of Appeals did
THOUSAND FIVE
not share the same view as the trial
HUNDRED
court. A review of the testimonial
(P1,500.00) a month
and documentary evidenced
from August 16, 1981
adduced by private respondent led
up to the time she
respondent court to the firm
reached the age of
conclusion that petitioner is her
majority on December
father, entitling her to support. The
30, 1984.
dispositive portion of its decision
dated December 17, 1991 reads:

40
 Defendant is further
ordered to pay the
plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus the
costs.
SO ORDERED.19
The motion for reconsideration was
denied in the resolution dated
February 26, 1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following
pertinent errors allegedly committed
by respondent court:
1) in awarding "back support" even
in the absence of recognition or of a
judgment declaring petitioner father
of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous
child cannot file an action for
recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance
manifestly against established
decisions of this Court.
Petitioner argues that since the
complaint against him has been
dismissed by the trial court,
therefore was absolutely no
obligation on his part to give
support to Merceditas. It would
have been only from the date of the
judgment of the trial court that
support should have commenced, if
so granted. Under the law in force
when the complaint was filed, an
adulterous child cannot maintain an
action for compulsory recognition.
In order that the birth certificate
may constitute a voluntary
recognition, it must be signed by
the father. Equivocal act, such as
signing under the caption "parent"
in the report card, is not sufficient.
Merceditas has never been to the
family home of petitioner at Imus,
Cavite; nor introduced to his family;
nor brought around town by him,
treated as his child, introduced to
other people as his child, led people
to believe that she was part of his
family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions
of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock
were generally classified into two
groups: (1) Natural, whether actual
or by fiction, were those born
outside of lawful wedlock of parents
who, at the time of conception of
the child, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each
other (Article 119, old Civil Code;
Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2)
Spurious, whether incestuous, were
disqualified to marry each other on
account of certain legal
21
impediments. Since petitioner had
a subsisting marriage to another at
the time Merceditas was
22
conceived, she is a spurious child.
In this regard, Article 287 of the
Civil Code provides that illegitimate
children other than natural in
accordance with Article 26923 and
other than natural children by legal
fiction are entitled to support and
such successional rights as are
granted in the Civil Code. The Civil
Code has given these rights to
them because the transgressions of
social conventions committed by
41
the parents should not be visited
upon them. They were born with a
social handicap and the law should
help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through
the misdeeds of their
24
parents. However, before Article
287 can be availed of, there must
first be a recognition of
25
paternity either voluntarily or by
court action. This arises from the
legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child
has no rights from his parents or to
their estate because his rights
spring not from the filiation or blood
relationship but from his
acknowledgment by the parent. In
other words, the rights of an
illegitimate child arose not because
he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law,
he had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a Article 289 of the Civil Code which
26
child. The relevant law on the
matter is Article 283 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 283. In any of the
following cases, the
father is obliged to
recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape,
abduction or seduction,
when the period of the
offense coincides more
or less with that of the
conception;
(2) When the child is in
continuos possession
of status of a child of
the alleged father by
the direct acts of the
latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was
conceived during the
time when the mother
cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) When the child has
in his favor any
evidence or proof that
the defendant is his
father.
While the aforementioned provision
speaks of the obligation of the
father to recognize the child as
his natural child, for the purpose of
the present case, petitioner is
obliged to recognize Merceditas as
his spurious child. This provision
should be read in conjunction with
provides:
Art. 289. Investigation
of the paternity or
maternity of (other
illegitimate) children . .
. under the
circumstances
specified in articles 283
and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial
court, respondent court found, as it
is likewise our finding, that private
respondent's evidence to establish
her filiation with and the paternity of
petitioner is too overwhelming to be
ignored or brushed aside by the
highly improbable and fatally flawed
testimony of Melencio and the
inherently weak denials of
petitioner:
42
Significantly, the
Court a quo believed
that plaintiff's mother
and defendant carried
an intimate relations. It
nonetheless was not
satisfied that defendant
is the father of the
plaintiff because it is
not convinced that her
mother and defendant
were in cohabitation
during the period of her
conception, and took
into account the
testimony of Melencio
S. Reyes who
frequented the
apartment where
Leoncia de los Santos
was living and who
positively testified that
he took care of all the
bills and that he shared
the same bed with
plaintiffs mother.
The court a
quo completely ignored
the fact that the
apartment at Guagua
was rented by the
defendant, and that
Melencio Reyes, who
was a mere employee
and godson of the
defendant with a gives to Leoncia the
monthly salary of
P560.00 was a mere
subaltern of the latter,
and only frequented
the place upon
instruction of the
defendant to take care
of the needs of the
plaintiff.
As pointed out by
appellant, Leoncia and
Artemio stayed in an
apartment at the back
of the Guagua
Telephone System
owned by and of which
Artemio was the
General Manager
(TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73)
and Melencio was the
Officer-in-Charge in the
absence of Artemio
whose residence and
main office was in
Cavite. There, for the
first time, Leoncia met
Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-
4, 1/25/74). The
apartment in Guagua
was rented in the name
of Melencio. As
Leoncia does not
speak the Pampango
dialect (TSN, p. 50,
8/18/73), Artemio gave
Leoncia the instruction
to call upon Melencio
for whatever Leoncia
needs (TSN, pp. 11-12,
1/25/74). Thus, it was
Melencio who procured
all the supplies and
services needed in the
apartment for which
procurement Melencio
corresponding receipts
of payment for
liquidation of cash
advances Artemio or
the Guagua Telephone
System or Leoncia
herself, gives to
Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1
to 14; TSN, p. 32,
43
8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 reference, among the
and 14, 1/25/74). notes identified by
Leoncia as having
At the Guagua come from defendant
apartment, Artemio were the following:
would visit Leoncia
three of four times a Exh. "F-1"
week and sleeps there
(TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). "Dear Ne,
Artemio was giving
Leoncia an allowance Magsimula akong
of P700.00 a month makausap ni Gracing
(TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73). ay nagkaroon ako ng
diferencia sa paa at
Leoncia got pregnant ngayon ay masakit pa.
and Artemio found it
difficult to commute Si Miling ay ngayon
between Cavite and lamang nakarating dito
Guagua so that in June kung hindi ka aalis
1962, Artemio diyan ay si Miling na
transferred Leoncia to lamang ang utusan mo
Calle San Juan, Pasay sa Makati kung may
City (TSN, pp. 19-20, kailangan ka dian.
7/18/73) where they
were known as
husband and wife (id.
p. 41). In leaving
Guagua for San Juan,
Pasay City, Leoncia
was fetched by Artemio
in a car driven by "Mayroon akong
Artemio himself. (pp. 9- nakitang bahay na
11, Appellant's Brief) mayayari malapit sa
municipio ng Makati.
Even as Artemio and Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung
Leoncia lived and papayag ka.
transferred to several
places heretofore Sabihin mo kay Miling
mentioned, Melencio kung hindi ka aalis
continued to be a diyan bukas ay
trusted man Friday of pupunta ako.
Artemio who would
deliver notes (Exhs. Walang makitang
"F", "F-1" and "F-3") bahay sa San Juan.
and money from
Artemio to Leoncia. For

44
 kong makarating dian
sa Jueves.

Exh. "F-2"

"Ne, sa Viernes ay
pupunta ako dian
marami akong
ginagawa. The address "Ne" in
the beginning of these
notes refer to Leoncia
whose nickname is
"Nene" but which
Artemio shortens to
"Ne". Miling is the
nickname of Melencio.
Exh. "F-3" The "Gracing"
mentioned in Exh. "F-
"Ne, si Miling ay bukas 1" refers to Gracia
pupunta dito ay sa delos Santos, a sister-
tanghali ay pupunta in-law of Leoncia who
ako diyan (11:30 am). was with Artemio when
Wala akong pera Leoncia was removed
ngayon kaya bukas na, from the hospital
sigurado yon. during the birth of
Merceditas. (pp. 17-19,
Appellant's Brief).
These tiny bits of
evidence when pieced
together ineluctably
gives lie to defendants'
diversionary defense
Exh. "F-4" that it was with
Melencio S. Reyes with
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka whom the mother lived
na at hindi ako with during her period
nakapaglalakad gawa of conception.
ng mataas ang dugo,
kaya minsan-minsan The attempt of
lamang ako makapunta Melencio S. Reyes to
sa oficena. show that he was the
lover of Leoncia being
Ibigay mo ang bayad in the apartment and
sa bahay sa Sabado sharing the same
ng umaga, pipilitin bedroom and the same

45
bed hardly inspires Leoncia, nor how long
belief. they stayed there
belying his pretense
xxx xxx xxx (sic) of an intimate
relationship with
Undoubtedly, the role 27
plaintiffs mother.
played by Melencio S.
Reyes in the Having discredited the testimonies
relationship between of petitioner and Melencio,
Leoncia and appellant respondent court then applied
(sic) was that of a man paragraph (2) of Article 283:
Friday although
appellant (sic) would The court a quo did not
not trust him to the hilt likewise consider the
and unwittingly evidences as sufficient
required him to submit to establish that
to Leoncia an plaintiff was in
accounting of his continuous possession
expenditures of status of a child in
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) view of the denial by
for cash advances appellee of his
given to him by paternity, and there is
Leoncia, Artemio or no clear and sufficient
Guagua Telephone evidence that the
System which would support was really
not have been the given to plaintiff's
case, if it were true that mother. The belated
there was an intimate denial of paternity after
relationship between the action has been
him and plaintiff's filed against the
mother. putative father is not
the denial that would
Evidently, following the destroy the paternity of
instruction of his the child which had
employer and already been
Godfather, Melencio recognized by
foisted on the court a defendant by various
quothe impression that positive acts clearly
he was the lover and evidencing that he is
paramour of Leoncia plaintiff's father. A
but since there was recognition once validly
really no such made is irrevocable. It
relationship, he could cannot be withdrawn. A
not state the place in mere change of mind
San Juan or Highway would be incompatible
54 where he took with the stability of the

46
civil status of person, ed., pp. 269-270 citing
the permanence of Coquia vs. Coquia, CA
which affects public 50, O.G. 3701) There
interest. Even when must be a showing of
the act in which it is the permanent
made should be intention of the
revocable, the supposed father to
revocation of such act consider the child as
will not revoke the his own, by continuous
recognition itself (1 and clear manifestation
Tolentino, pp. 579-580, of paternal affection
1983 Ed.). and care. (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the
To be sure, to establish Philippines, Vol. 1,
"the open and 1983 ed., p. 602).
continuous possession (Mendoza vs. Court of
of the status of an Appeals, G.R. No.
illegitimate child," it is 86302, September 24,
necessary to comply 1991.)
with certain
jurisprudential It was Artemio who
requirements. made arrangement for
"Continuous" does not, the delivery of
however, mean that Merceditas (sic) at the
the concession of Manila Sanitarium and
status shall continue Hospital. Prior to the
forever but only that it delivery, Leoncia
shall not be of an underwent prenatal
intermittent character examination by
while it continues (De Artemio (TSN, p. 33,
Jesus v. Syquia, 58 5/17/74). After delivery,
Phil. 866). The they went home to their
possession of such residence at EDSA in a
status means that the car owned and driven
father has treated the by Artemio himself (id.
child as his own, p. 36).
directly and not
through other, Merceditas (sic) bore
spontaneously and the surname of "Ilano"
without concealment since birth without any
though without publicity objection on the part of
(since the relation is Artemio, the fact that
illegitimate) (J.B.L. since Merceditas (sic)
Reyes and R.C. Puno, had her discernment
Outline of Philippine she had always known
Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 and called Artemio as

47
her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. and sometimes in the
28-29, 10/18/74); the form of a check as the
fact that each time Manila Banking
Artemio was at home, Corporation Check No.
he would play with 81532 (Exh. "G") and
Merceditas (sic), take the signature
her for a ride or appearing therein
restaurants to eat, and which was identified by
sometimes sleeping Leoncia as that of
with Merceditas (sic) Artemio because
(id. p. 34) and does all Artemio often gives her
what a father should do checks and Artemio
for his child — bringing would write the check
home goodies, at home and saw
candies, toys and Artemio sign the check
whatever he can bring (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73).
her which a child Both Artemio and Nilda
enjoys which Artemio admitted that the check
gives Merceditas (sic) and signature were
(TSN, pp. 38-39, those of Artemio (TSN,
5/17/74) are positive p. 53, 10/17/77;
evidence that TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
Merceditas (sic) is the
child of Artemio and During the time that
recognized by Artemio Artemio and Leoncia
as such. Special were living as husband
attention is called to and wife, Artemio has
Exh. "E-7" where shown concern as the
Artemio was telling father of Merceditas
Leoncia the need for a (sic). When Merceditas
"frog test" to know the (sic) was in Grade 1 at
status of Leoncia. the St. Joseph
Parochial School,
Plaintiff pointed out Artemio signed the
that the support by Report Card of
Artemio for Leoncia Merceditas (sic) (Exh.
and Merceditas (sic) "H") for the fourth and
was sometimes in the fifth grading period(s)
form of cash personally (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2")
delivered to her by as the parent of
Artemio, thru Melencio, Merceditas (sic). Those
thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" signatures of Artemio
and "E-3", were both identified by
and "D-6"), or thru Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) herself Merceditas (sic)
(TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) because Artemio

48
signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence
in the presence of
Leoncia, Merceditas
(sic) and of Elynia
(TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73;
TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . .
. defendant, who claims
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a
candidate in the
Provincial Board of
Cavite, Artemio gave
Leoncia his picture with
the following
dedication: "To Nene,
with best regards,
Temiong". (Exh. "I").
(pp. 19-20, Appellant's
Brief)
It is difficult to believe
that plaintiffs mother,
who is a mere
dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically
conceived of a plan to
make it appear that
to be a total stranger to
be a total stranger, was
the father of her child,
and in the process
falsified the latter's
signatures and
28
handwriting.
Granting ex gratia argument that
private respondent's evidence is not
sufficient proof of continuos
possession of status of a spurious
child, respondent court applied next
paragraph (4) of Article 283:

The mere denial by . . . plaintiffs testimonial

defendant of his and documentary
signature is not evidence . . . (is) too
sufficient to offset the replete with details that
totality of the evidence are coherent, logical
indubitably showing and natural which
that the signature cannot be categorized
thereon belongs to as mere fabrications of
him. The entry in the an inventive and
Certificate of Live Birth malicious mind of
that Leoncia and which Leoncia de los
Artemio was falsely Santos was not shown
stated therein as to possess.
married does not mean
that Leoncia is not The natural, logical and
appellee's daughter. coherent evidence of
This particular entry plaintiff from the
was caused to be genesis of the
made by Artemio relationship between
himself in order to Leoncia and appellee,
avoid embarrassment. their living together as
circumstances of
plaintiff's birth, the acts

49
of appellee in
recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find
ample support from the
testimonial and
documentary evidence
which leaves no room
to reasonably doubt his
paternity which may
not be infirmed by his
belated denials.
Notably, the court a
quo did not consider
plaintiff's evidence as
lacking in credibility but
did not deem as
convincing proof that
defendant is the father
since the Certificate of
Live Birth was not
signed by appellee and
since the monthly
report card is not
sufficient to establish
recognition,
considering the denial
of the defendant of his
signature appearing
thereon.
While defendant's
signature does not
appear in the
Certificate of Live Birth,
the evidence
indubitably disclose(s)
that Leoncia gave birth
on December 30, 1963
to Merceditas (sic) at
4:27 p.m. at the Manila
Sanitarium. Artemio
arrived at about 5:00
(TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74).
At about 7:00 p.m., a
nurse came (id. p. 26)
who made inquiries
about the biodata of
the born child. The
inquiries were directed
to Artemio in the
presence of Elynia who
heard the answers of
Artemio which the
nurse took down in a
sheet of paper (id. p.
28). The inquiries were
about the name of the
father, mother and
child. After the
interview the nurse told
them that the
information has to be
recorded in the formal
form and has to be
signed by Artemio (id.
p. 30) but because
there is no office, as it
was past 7:00 p.m., the
nurse would just return
in the morning for
Artemio's signature.
Artemio gave the
instruction to the nurse
to give the biodata to
Leoncia for her
signature as he was
leaving very early the
following morning as in
fact Artemio left at 5:00
a.m. of December 31,
1963 (id. p. 33).
Artemio stayed in the
hospital in the evening
of December 30, 1963
(id. p. 26). As pointed
out in Castro vs. Court
of Appeals, 173 SCRA
656:
The ruling
in Roces
50
vs. Local building
Civil and gave
Registrar all the data
of about his
Manila (10 daughter's
2 Phil. birth. . . .
1050
[1958] . . . the totality of the
and Bercil evidence, as pointed to
es above, is more than
v. Govern sufficient to establish
ment beyond reasonable
Service doubt that appellee is
Insurance the father of the
System (1 plaintiff Merceditas
28 SCRA (sic) Ilano.
53 [1984]
that if the As elucidated
father did in Mendoza vs. Court
not sign in of Appeals, Supra:
the birth
certificate, xxx xxx xxx
the placing
of his . . . although Teopista
name by has failed to show that
the she was in open and
mother, continuous possession
doctor, of the status of an
register, or illegitimate child of
other Casimiro, we find that
person is she has nevertheless
incompete established that status
nt by another method.
evidence
of What both the trial
paternity court and the
does not respondent did not
apply to take into account is
this case that an illegitimate child
because it is allowed to establish
was his claimed affiliation
Eustaquio by "any other means
himself allowed by the Rules of
who went Court and special
to the laws," according to the
municipal Civil Code, . . . Such
evidence may consist
51
 of his baptismal has a right to recover
certificate, a judicial the same needs it for
admission, a family maintenance, but it
Bible in which his shall not be paid
name has been except from the date of
entered, common judicial or extrajudicial
reputation respecting demand. (Article 203,
his pedigree, Family Code of the
admission by silence, Philippines.)
the testimonies of
witnesses, and other The complaint in this
kinds of proof case was filed on
admissible under Rule August 14, 1972.
130 of the Rules of Plaintiff, having been
Court.29 born on December 30,
1963, was about nine
The last paragraph of Article 283 (9) years old at the
contains a blanket provision that time and was already
practically covers all the other of school age spending
cases in the preceding paragraphs. about P400.00 to
"Any other evidence or proof" that P500.00 a month for
the defendant is the father is broad her school expenses
enough to render unnecessary the alone, while defendant
other paragraphs of this article. was earning about
When the evidence submitted in the P10,000.00 a month.
action for compulsory recognition is She attained the age of
not sufficient to meet requirements majority on December
of the first three paragraphs, it may 30, 1984 (Article
still be enough under the last 234, Supra). She is
paragraph.30 This paragraph therefore entitled to
permits hearsay and reputation support in arrears for a
evidence, as provided in the Rules period of twelve (12)
of Court, with respect to illegitimate years, four (4) months
filiation.31 and fourteen (14) days,
which is hereby fixed at
As a necessary consequence of the P800.00 a month for
finding that private respondent is the first three (3) years;
the spurious child of petitioner, she and considering the
is entitled to support. In awarding declining value of the
support to her, respondent court peso as well as her
took into account the following: needs as she grows
older, at a graduated
The obligation to give increase of P1,000.00
support shall be a month for the next
demandable from the three (3) years;
time the person who P1,300.00 a month for

52
 the succeeding three
(3) years; and
P1,500.00 a month for
the last three (3) years,
four (4) months and
fourteen (14) days until
she attained the age of
majority.

This being an action for

legal support, the
award of attorney's
fees is appropriate
under Article 2208 (6)
of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the court
deems it just and
equitable under the
given facts and
circumstances that
attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation
should be recovered.32

We concur with the foregoing

disposition, in the absence of proof
that it was arrived at arbitrarily.

The other allegation of petitioner

that the appeal was prosecuted
almost ten years after the decision
of the trial court was rendered does
not deserve any consideration
because it appears that it is being
raised for the first time in this
petition.33

WHEREFORE, the petition is

hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
December 17, 1991 and its
resolution dated February 26, 1992
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

53
G.R. No. 76873 October 26, 1989
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO,
APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO &
DOMINADOR, all surnamed
UYGUANGCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge
SENEN PENARANDA and
GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents.
Constantino G. Jaraula for
petitioners.
Anthony Santos for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not
the status of the private respondent,
who has been excluded from the
family and inheritance of the
petitioners. What we are asked to
decide is whether he should be
allowed to prove that he is an
illegitimate child of his claimed
father, who is already dead, in the
absence of the documentary
evidence required by the Civil
Code.
The trial court said he could and
was sustained by the respondent
Court of Appeals.1 The latter court
held that the trial judge had not
committed any grave abuse of
discretion or acted without
jurisdiction in allowing the private
respondent to prove his filiation.
Moreover, the proper remedy was
an ordinary appeal and not a
petition for prohibition. The
petitioners ask for a reversal of
these rulings on the ground that
they are not in accordance with law
and jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died
intestate in 1975, leaving his wife,
Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and
considerable properties which they
divided among
2
themselves. Claiming to be an
illegitimate son of the deceased
Apolinario, and having been left out
in the extrajudicial settlement of his
estate, Graciano Bacjao
Uyguangco filed a complaint for
partition against all the petitioners. 3
Graciano alleged that he was born
in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco
and Anastacia Bacjao and that at
the age of 15 he moved to his
father's hometown at Medina,
Misamis Oriental, at the latter's
urging and also of Dorotea and his
half-brothers. Here he received
support from his father while he
was studying at the Medina High
School, where he eventually
graduated. He was also assigned
by his father, without objection from
the rest of the family, as
storekeeper at the Uyguangco store
in Mananom from 1967 to 1973.4
In the course of his presentation of
evidence at the trial, the petitioners
elicited an admission from Graciano
that he had none of the documents
mentioned in Article 278 to show
that he was the illegitimate son of
Apolinario Uyguangco.5 These are
"the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record,
or (in) any authentic writing." The
petitioners thereupon moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground
54
that the private respondent could no In this case, the action
longer prove his alleged filiation must be commenced
under the applicable provisions of within four years from
the Civil Code.6 the finding of the
document.
Specifically, the petitioners argued
that the only evidence allowed As earlier related, the motion to
under Article 278 to prove the dismiss was denied, prompting the
private respondent's claim was not petitioners to seek relief in vain
available to him as he himself had from the respondent court. In the
admitted. Neither could he now case now before us, the petitioners
resort to the provisions of Article reiterate and emphasize their
285 because he was already an position that allowing the trial to
adult when his alleged father died in proceed would only be a waste of
1975, and his claim did not come time and effort. They argue that the
under the exceptions. The said complaint for partition is actually an
article provides as follows: action for recognition as an
illegitimate child, which, being
ART. 285. The action already barred, is a clear attempt to
for the recognition of circumvent the said provisions. The
natural children may be private respondent insists, on the
brought only during the other hand, that he has a right to
lifetime of the show under Article 283 that he is "in
presumed parents, continuous possession of the status
except in the following of a child of his alleged father by
cases: the direct acts of the latter or of his
family."
(1) If the father or
mother died during the We find that this case must be
minority of the child, in decided under a new if not entirely
which case the latter dissimilar set of rules because the
may file the action parties have been overtaken by
before the expiration of events, to use the popular phrase.
four years from the The Civil Code provisions they
attainment of his invoke have been superseded, or at
majority; least modified, by the
corresponding articles in the Family
(2) If after the death of Code, which became effective on
the father or of the August 3,1988.
mother a document
should appear of which Under the Family Code, it is
nothing had been provided that:
heard and in which
either or both parents Art. 175. Illegitimate
recognize the child. children may establish
their illegitimate filiation

55
 in the same way and the
on the same evidence legitimate
as legitimate children. filiation
shall be
The following provision is therefore proved by:
also available to the private
respondent in proving his (1) The
illegitimate filiation: open and
continuous
Art. 172. The filiation of possessio
legitimate children is n of the
established by any of status of a
the following: legitimate
child; or
(1) The
record of (2) Any
birth other
appearing means
in the civil allowed by
register or the Rules
a final of Court
judgment; and
or special
laws.
(2) An
admission While the private respondent has
of admitted that he has none of the
legitimate documents mentioned in the first
filiation in paragraph (which are practically the
a public same documents mentioned in
document Article 278 of the Civil Code except
or a for the "private handwritten
private instrument signed by the parent
handwritte himself'''), he insists that he has
n nevertheless been "in open and
instrument continuous possession of the status
and signed of an illegitimate child," which is
by the now also admissible as evidence of
parent filiation.
concerned
. Thus, he claims that he lived with
his father from 1967 until 1973,
In the receiving support from him during
absence of that time; that he has been using
the the surname Uyguangco without
foregoing objection from his father and the
evidence,
56
petitioners as shown in his high
school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by
Dorotea Uyguangco, and another
one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he
has shared in the profits of the
copra business of the Uyguangcos,
which is a strictly family business;
that he was a director, together with
the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons
Development Corporation, a family
corporation; and that in the
addendum to the original
extrajudicial settlement concluded
by the petitioners he was given a
share in his deceased father's
estate.7
It must be added that the
illegitimate child is now also allowed
to establish his claimed filiation by
"any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws,"
like his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.8
The problem of the private
respondent, however, is that, since
he seeks to prove his filiation under
the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code, his action is
now barred because of his alleged
father's death in 1975. The second
paragraph of this Article 175 reads
as follows:
The action must be
brought within the
same period specified
in Article 173, except
when the action is
based on the second
paragraph of Article
172, in which case the
action may be
brought during the
lifetime of the alleged
parent. (Italics
supplied.)
It is clear that the private
respondent can no longer be
allowed at this time to introduce
evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child or prove his
alleged filiation through any of the
means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario
Uyguangco is already dead and can
no longer be heard on the claim of
his alleged son's illegitimate
filiation.
In her Handbook on the Family
Code of the Philippines, Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the
rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a
truism that unlike legitimate children
who are publicly recognized,
illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being
aware of their existence. Who then
can be sure of their filiation but the
parents themselves? But suppose
the child claiming to be the
illegitimate child of a certain person
is not really the child of the latter?
The putative parent should thus be
given the opportunity to affirm or
deny the child's filiation, and this,
he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead."9
57
Finally, it must be observed that the the said complaint, where the issue
provisions invoked by the parties of Graciano's filiation is being
are among those affected by the raised only collaterally. The
following articles in the Family complaint is indeed a circumvention
Code: of Article 172, which allows proof of
the illegitimate child's filiation under
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, the second paragraph thereof only
V, VI VII, VIII, IX, XI during the lifetime of the alleged
and XV of Book I of parent.
Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as Considering that the private
the Civil Code of the respondent has, as we see it,
Philippines, as established at least prima
amended, and Articles facie proof of his alleged filiation,
17,18,19, 27, 28, 29, we find it regrettable that his action
30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and should be barred under the said
42 of Presidential article. But that is the law and we
Decree No. 603, have no choice but to apply it. Even
otherwise known as so, the Court expresses the hope
the Child and Youth that the parties will arrive at some
Welfare Code, as kind of rapprochement, based on
amended, and all laws, fraternal and moral ties if not the
decrees, executive strict language of the law, that will
orders, proclamations, allow the private respondent an
rules and regulations, equitable share in the disputed
or parts thereof, estate. Blood should tell.
inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED, and Civil Case No.
Art. 256. This Code 9067 in the Regional Trial Court of
shall have retroactive Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is
effect insofar as it does hereby DISMISSED. It is so
not prejudice or impair ordered.
vested or acquired
rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or
other laws.

Graciano's complaint is based on

his contention that he is the
illegitimate child of Apolinario
Uyguangco, whose estate is the
subject of the partition sought. If
this claim can no longer be proved
in an action for recognition, with
more reason should it be rejected in

58
 ARTICLE 888. residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue,
Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-
[G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001] 32740 and T-117160. When
Gregorio was confined in a hospital
in 1990, he confided to his daughter
Aida that the certificates of title of
REGINA FRANCISCO AND his property were in the possession
ZENAIDA of Regina Francisco and Zenaida
PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. Pascual.
AIDA FRANCISCO-
ALFONSO, respondent. After Gregorio died on July 20,
1990,[3] Aida inquired about the
DECISION certificates of title from her half
sisters. They informed her that
PARDO, J.: Gregorio had sold the land to them
on August 15, 1983. After
May a legitimate daughter be verification, Aida
deprived of her share in the estate learned that there was indeed a
of her deceased father by a deed of absolute sale in favor of
simulated contract transferring the Regina Francisco and Zenaida
property of her father to his Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983,
illegitimate children? Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa
The case before the Court is an Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for
appeal via certiorari from the P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels
decision of the Court of of land to Regina Francisco and
[1]
Appeals declaring void the deed Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the
of sale of two parcels of land sale, the Register of Deeds of
conveyed to petitioners who are Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585
illegitimate children of the deceased to Regina Francisco and TCT T-
to the exclusion of respondent, his 59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.[4]
sole legitimate daughter. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with
The facts [2]
are: the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
complaint against petitioners for
Respondent Aida Francisco- annulment of sale with
Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only [5]
damages. She alleged that the
daughter of spouses Gregorio signature of her late father,
Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, Gregorio Francisco, on
who are now both deceased. the Kasulatan sa Ganap na
Petitioners, on the other hand, Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was
are daughters of the late Gregorio a forgery.
Francisco with his common law wife In their joint answer to the
Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot complaint, petitioners denied the
seven (7) children. alleged forgery or simulation of the
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter deed of sale. After due
Gregorio) owned two parcels of proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the

59
trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the
evidence adduced and the law
applicable thereon, the Court
hereby renders judgment:
a) sustaining the validity of the
Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan
(Exh.G) executed on 15 August
1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco
in favor of the defendants;
b) affirming the validity of the
Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-
59.585 (Exh. I) issued to defendant
Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386
(Exh. H) issued to defendant
Zenaida Pascual; and
c) dismissing the complaint as well
as the defendants counterclaim for
damages and attorneys fees for
lack of merit. [6]
In time[7], respondent Alfonso
appealed to the Court of Appeals.[8]
After due proceedings, on April
30, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision reversing
that of the trial court, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another rendered as follows:
1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na
Bilihan dated August 15, 1983
(Exhibit G) is declared null and void
from the beginning and TCT Nos.
T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M),
both of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in
the names of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are
annulled and cancelled;
2. The Register of Deeds of
Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is
ordered to cancel the
aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585
(M) and T-59.586 (M) and to
reinstate Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-132740 and T-117160
both in the name of Gregorio
Francisco.
3. Defendants-appellees Regina
Francisco and Zenaida Pascual
jointly and solidarily are ordered to
pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the
amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
4. The counterclaim of defendants-
appellees is dismissed for lack of
merit.
Costs of suit against said
defendants-appellees. [9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
The main issue raised is
whether the Supreme Court may
review the factual findings of the
appellate court. The jurisdiction of
this Court in cases brought before it
from the Court of Appeals under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited to review of pure
errors of law. It is not the function of
this Court to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again, unless
there is a showing that the findings
of the lower court are totally devoid
of support or are glaringly
60
erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.[11]
The findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court,[12] unless
the case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions to the
rule.[13]
Petitioner has failed to prove
that the case falls within the
exceptions.[14]
We affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals because:
First: The kasulatan was
simulated. There was no
consideration for the contract of
sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family
friend of the Franciscos, testified
that Zenaida Pascual and
Regina Francisco did not have any
source of income in 1983, when
they bought the property, until the
time when Felicitas testified in
1991.[15]
As proof of income, however,
Zenaida Pascual testified that she
was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in
Mayon Night Club as well as buying
and selling RTW (Ready to Wear)
items in August of 1983 and prior
thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid
her father the amount of
P10,000.00. She did not withdraw
money from her bank account at
the Rural Bank of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, to pay for the
property. She had personal savings
other than those deposited in the
bank. Her gross earnings from the
RTW for three years was
P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00
a night at the club.[16]
Regina Francisco, on the other
hand, was a market vendor,
selling nilugaw, earning a net
income of P300.00 a day in
1983. She bought the property from
the deceased for
[17]
P15,000.00. She had no other
source of income.
We find it incredible that
engaging in buy and sell could raise
the amount of P10,000.00, or that
earnings in selling goto could save
enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash
for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners
were incredible considering their
inconsistent statements as to
whether there was consideration for
the sale and also as to whether the
property was bought below or
above its supposed market
value. They could not even present
a single witness to
the kasulatan that would prove
receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or
consideration for the sale, the same
was a simulation and hence, null
and void.[18]
Second: Even if
the kasulatan was not simulated, it
still violated the Civil
Code[19] provisions insofar as the
transaction affected respondents
legitime. The sale was executed in
1983, when the applicable law was
the Civil Code, not the Family
Code.
Obviously, the sale was
Gregorios way to transfer the
61
property to his illegitimate CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in
daughters[20] at the expense of his toto.
legitimate daughter. The sale was
No costs.
executed to prevent respondent
Alfonso from claiming her legitime SO ORDERED.
and rightful share in said
property. Before his death, Gregorio
had a change of heart and informed
his daughter about the titles to the
property.
According to Article 888, Civil
Code:

The legitime of legitimate children

and descendants consists of one-
half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the

remaining half subject to the rights
of illegitimate children and of the
surviving spouse as hereinafter
provided.

Gregorio Francisco did not own

any other property. If indeed the
parcels of land involved were the
only property left by their father, the
sale in fact would deprive
respondent of her share in her
fathers estate. By law, she is
entitled to half of the estate of her
father as his only legitimate child.[21]
The legal heirs of the late
Gregorio Francisco must be
determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement
of the estate. His compulsory heir
can not be deprived of her share in
the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.

62
 ARTICLE 891. Consolacion de la Torre and his
son Juanito Frias Chua of the
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, second marriage and sons Ignacio
DOMINADOR CHUA and Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua
REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners, of his first marriage. In Intestate
vs. Proceeding No. 4816, the lower
THE COURT OF FIRST court issued an order dated
INSTANCE OF NEGROS January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating,
OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and among others, the one-half (1/2,)
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
capacity as Administratrix of the of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias
Intestate Estate of Consolacion Chua's widow, Consolacion de la
de la Torre, respondents. Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399
in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo son in the second marriage;
Blanca for private respondent. P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias
chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners. Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the
first marriage. By virtue of said
adjudication, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated
April 28, 1932 was issued by the
MARTIN, J.: Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre and
Petition for review of the decision of Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-
the respondent Court which indiviso of Lot No. 399.
dismissed the complaint of
petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839- On February 27, 1952, Juanito
A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et Frias Chua of the second marriage
al. vs. Susana de la Torre, died intestate without any issue.
Administratrix of the Intestate After his death, his mother
Estate of Consolacion de la Torre" Consolacion de la Torre succeeded
to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No.
It appears that in the first marriage 399. In a week's time or on March
of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre
Militar alias Sy Quio he sired three executed a declaration of heirship
children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo adjudicating in her favor the pro-
and Manuel, all surnamed Frias indiviso share of her son Juanito as
Chua. When Patricia S. Militar died, a result of which Transfer
Jose Frias Chua contracted a Certificate of Title No. 31796
second marriage with Consolacion covering the whole Lot No. 399 was
de la Torre with whom he had a issued in her name. Then on March
child by the name of Juanita Frias 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre
Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died died intestate leaving no direct heir
without leaving any issue. Then in either in the descending or
1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow

63
ascending line except her brother
and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre", docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias
Chua, of the first marriage and
dominador and Remedios Chua,
the supposed legitimate children of
the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua,
also of the first marriage filed the
complaint a quo 3 (subseqently
segregated as a distinct suit and
docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A)
on May 11, 1966 before the
respondent Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, Branch V,
praying that the one-half (1/2)
portion of Lot No. 399 which
formerly belonged to Juanito Frias
but which passed to Consolacion
de la Torre upon the latter's death,
be declaredas a reservable
property for the reason that the lot
in questionn was subject to reserval
troncal pursuant to Article 981 of
the New Civil Code, Private
respondent as administratrix of the
estate of individually the complaint
of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent
Court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva
troncal under the New Civil Code
provides:
ART. 891. The
ascendant who
inheritts from his
descendant any
property which the
latter may have
acquired by gratuitous
title from another
ascendat, or a brother
or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property
as he may have
acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within
the third degree and
belong to the line from
which said property
came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision,
in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites
must exist, to wit: (1) that the
property was acquired by a
descendant from an asscendant or
from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of
law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property
came. 5 In the case before Us, all of
the foregoing requisites are
present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the
second marriage died intestate in
1952; he died withour leaving any
issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share
of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his
mother, Consolacion de la Torre
died, Juannnito Frias Chua who
died intestate had relatives within
the third degree. These relatives
are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios
Chua, the suppose legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo
64
Frias Chua, who are the petitioners
herein.
The crux of the problem in instant
petition is focused on the first
requisit of reserva troncal —
whether the property in question
was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua
from his father Jose Frias Chua,
gratuitously or not. In resolving this
point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh.
"3", which is part of
Exh. "D", that the
property in question
was not acquired by
Consolacion de la
Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but
for a consideration,
namely, that the
legatees were to pay
the interest and cost
and other fees
resulting from Civil
Case No. 5300 of this
Court. As such it is
undeniable that the lot
in question is not
subject tot a reserva
troncal, under Art. 891
of the New Civil Code,
and as such the
plaintiff's complaint
must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the
respondent Court's conclusion that
the lot in question is not subject to
a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of
the New Civil Code. It is, As
explained by Manresa which this
Court quoted with approval
in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil.
186, "The transmission is gratuitous
or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the
property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be
made gratuitously, or by an act of
mere liberality of the person making
it, without imposing any obligation
on the part of the recipient; and that
the person receiving the property
gives or does nothing in return; or,
as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, 6 "the essential thing
is that the person who transmits it
does so gratuitously, from pure
generosity, without requiring from
the transferee any prestation." It is
evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in
question to Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage upon the
death of his father Jose Frias Chua
was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore
gratuitous. It is true that there is the
order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No.
4816 which estates in express
terms;
2. — Se adjudicada
pro el presente a favor
de Consolacion de la
Torre, viuda, mayor de
edad, y de su hiju,
Juanito Frias Chua,
menor de edad, todos
residente de San
Enrique, Negros
Occidental, I.F.,como
herederos del finado
Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiadades:
14483
65
 La parcela de terrenno troncal under Art, 891 of the New
concida por Lote No. Civil Code.
399 del Catsatro de la
Carlota, Negros It is contented that the distribution
Occidental, de 191.954 of the shares of the estate of Jose
metros cuadddrados y Frias Chua to the respondent heirs
cubierto por el or legatees was agreed upon by the
Certificado de Titulo heirs in their project of partition
No. 11759, en partes based on the last will and testament
equales pro- of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners
indiviso; por con la claim that the supposed Last Will
obligscion de pagar a and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
las Standard Oil Co. of was never probated. The fact that
New York la deuda de the will was not probated was
P3971.20, sus admitted in paragraph 6 of the
intereses, costas y respondents' answer. 7 There is
demas gastos nothing mentioned in the decision
resultantes del asunto of the trial court in Civil Case No.
civil No. 5300de este 7839 A which is the subject of the
jusgado present appeal nor in the order of
January 15, 1931 of the trial court in
But the obligation of paying the the Testate Estate Proceeding No.
Standard Oil Co. of New York the 4816 nor in the private respondent's
amount of P3,971.20 is imposed brief, that the Last Will and
upon Consolacion de la Torre and Testament of Jose Frias Chua
Juanito Frias Chua not personally has ever been probated. With the
by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in foregoing, it is easy to deduce that
his last will and testament but by an if the Last Will and Testament has
order of the court in the Testate in fact been probated there would
Proceeding No.4816 dated January have been no need for the
15, 1931. As long as the testamentary heirs to prepare a
transmission of the property to the project of partition among
heirs is free from any condition themselves. The very will itself
imposed by the deceased himself could be made the basis for the
and the property is given out of adjudication of the estate as in fact
pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it they did in their project of partition
does not matter if later the court with Juanito Frias Chua getting
orders one of the heirs, in this case one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance
Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the as a sone of the deceased Jose
Standare oil co. of New York the Frias Chua by the latter's second
amount of P3,971.20. This does not marriage.
change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. According to the record, Juanito
This being the case the lot in Frias Chua died on February 27,
question is subject to reserva 1952 without any issue. After his
death his mother Consolation de la

66
Torre succeeded to his one-half portion, of said lot. Without
pro-indiviso share of Lot 399. This pronouncement as to costs.
was, however, subject to the
condition that the property was SO ORDERED.
reservable in character under Art.
891 of the Civil Code in favor of
relatives within the third degree of
Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are
the petitioner herein.

It is claimed that the complaint of

petitioners to recover the one-half
portion of Lot 399 which originally
belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has
already prescribed when it was filed
on May 11, 1966. We do not
believe so. It must be remembered
that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees did not arise
until the time the reservor,
Consolacion de la Torre, died in
March 1966. When the petitioners
therefore filed their complaint to
recover the one-half (1/2) portion of
Lot 399, they were very much in
time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,

the decision appealed from is
hereby set aside. The petitioners
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador
Chua and Remedios Chua are
declared owners of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot 399; and the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31796
covering Lot No. 399 issued in the
name of Consolacion de la Torre
and to issue a new Certificate of
Title in the names of Consolacion
de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion;
Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided
portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided

67
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981 damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the
BEATRIZ L. properties which her mother
GONZALES, petitioner, Filomena Races inherited in 1943
vs. from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF No. 73335). The facts are as
MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. follows:
LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the
TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE son of Benito Legarda y Tuason,
LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He
FERNANDEZ, CARMEN was survived by his widow,
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, Filomena Races, and their seven
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y children: four daughters named
HERNANDEZ, CARMEN Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, Filomena and three sons named
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y Benito, Alejandro and Jose.
HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA
Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA On July 12, 1939, the real
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME properties left by Benito Legarda y
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO Tuason were partitioned in three
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, equal portions by his daughters,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of
LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA his deceased son Benito Legarda y
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. De la Paz who were represented by
ANTONIA LEGARDA Y Benito F. Legarda.
LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO Filomena Legarda y Races died
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, intestate and without issue on
BENITO LEGARDA Y March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
LOBREGAT, EDUARDO was her mother, Filomena Races
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, Vda. de Legarda.
TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the
ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12,
ROCES DE 1947 an affidavit adjudicating
LEGARDA, respondents. extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena
Legarda. The said properties
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët consist of the
following: 1äwphï1.ñët
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed
from the decision of the Court of (a) Savings deposit in
First Instance of Manila, dismissing the National City Bank
her complaint for partition, of New York with a
accounting, reconveyance and credit balance of
P3,699.63.
68
(b) 1,429 shares of the 181 San Rafael
Benguet Consolidated describe in TCT Nos.
Mining Company and a 50495 and 48161 of
1/7 interest in certain the Manila registry of
shares of the San deeds;
Miguel Brewery,
Tuason & Legarda, 1/7th of the property
Ltd., Philippine described in TCT No.
Guaranty Company, 48163 of the Manila
Insular Life Assurance registry of deeds
Company and (Streets);
the Manila Times.
l/21st of the properties
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos.
described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of
80226, 80237 to 80243 the Manila registry of
(7 titles), 80260, 80261 deeds (Streets and
and 57512 of the Estero):
Manila registry of
deeds. 2/21st of the property
described in TCT No.
1/21st of the properties 13458 of tile registry of
covered by TCT Nos. deeds of T0ayabas.
48164, 84714, 48201,
48202, 48205, 48203, These are the properties in litigation
48206, 48160 and in this case. As a result of the
48192 of the Manila affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
registry of deeds; Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-
1/21st of the property owner of the properties
described in TCT No. held proindiviso by her other six
4475 of the registry of children.
deeds of Rizal, now
Quezon City; 1/14th of Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953
the property described executed two handwritten Identical
in TCT No. 966 of the documents wherein she disposed of
registry of deeds of the properties, which she inherited
Baguio; from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito,
1/7th of the lot and Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
improvements at 127 grandchildren in all). The document
Aviles described in reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of A mis hijos :
deeds; 1/7th of the lots
and improvements at Dispongo que se
reparta a todos mis

69
 nietos hijos de Ben, Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Mandu y Pepito, los Testate Estate of Filomena Races
bienes que he Vda. de Legarda. The decree of
heredado de mi difunta probate was affirmed by the Court
hija Filomena y of Appeals in Legarda vs.
tambien los acciones Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R,
de la Destileria La July 30,1976.
Rosario' recientemente
comprada a los In the testate proceeding, Beatriz
hermanos Values Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of
Legarda. the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968
a motion to exclude from the
De los bienes de mi inventory of her mother's estate the
hija Filomena se properties which she inherited from
deducira un tote de her deceased daughter, Filomena,
terreno que yo he on the ground that said properties
0donada a las Hijas de are reservable properties which
Jesus, en Guipit should be inherited by Filomena
Legarda's three sisters and three
La case No. 181 San brothers and not by the children of
Rafael, la cede a mi Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
hijo Mandu solo la surnamed Legarda. That motion
casa; proque ella esta was opposed by the administrator,
construida sobre Benito F. Legarda.
terreno de los
hermanos Legarda Without awaiting the resolution on
Races. that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on
June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil
DA action against her brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces and her
6 Marzo 1953 mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said
During the period from July, 1958 to properties are reservable properties
February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and which Mrs. Legarda could not
her six surviving children partitioned bequeath in her holographic will to
the properties consisting of the one- her grandchildren to the exclusion
third share in the estate of Benito of her three daughters and her
Legarda y Tuason which the three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal,
children inherited in representation 100 Phil. 1085).
of their father, Benito Legarda y De
la Paz. As already stated, the lower court
dismissed the action of Mrs.
Mrs. Legarda died on September Gonzales. ln this appeal under
22, 1967. Her will was admitted to Republic Act No. 5440 she
probate as a holographic will in the contends in her six assignments of
order dated July 16, 1968 of the error that the lower court erred in
Court of First Instance of Manila in

70
not regarding the properties in
question as reservable properties
under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-
appellees in their six counter-
assignments of error contend that
the lower court erred in not holding
that Mrs. Legarda acquired the
estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her
conjugal and hereditary shares in
the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not
holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived
her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is
barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the
private respondents as to the
timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed
matter. This Court in its resolution
of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and
gave due course to the petition for
review.
In an appeal under Republic Act
No. 5440 only legal issues can be
raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated
facts the lower court resolved only
the issue of whether the properties
in question are subject to reserva
troncal that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the
defendants-appellees, particularly
those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal.
As the trial court did not pass upon
those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this
Court.
The question is whether the
disputed properties are reservable
properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and
whether Filomena Races Vda. de
Legarda could dispose of them in
his will in favor of her grandchildren
to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to
convey mortis causa what she
inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within
the third degree and to bypass the
reservees in the second degree or
should that inheritance
automatically go to the reservees in
the second degree, the six children
of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is
not a novel issue or a question of
first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480. Before discussing the
applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and
other pertinent rulings, it may be
useful to make a brief discourse on
the nature of reserve troncal, also
called lineal, familiar, extraordinaria
o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were
spent by the parties in their five
briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together
with the reserva
viudal and reversion legal, was
abolished by the Code Commission
to prevent the decedent's estate
from being entailed, to eliminate the
uncertainty in ownership caused by
71
the reservation (which uncertainty dentro del tercer grade
impedes the improvement of the y pertenezcan a la
reservable property) and to linea de donde los
discourage the confinement of bienes proceden
property within a certain family for
generations which situation ART. 891. The
allegedly leads to economic ascendant who inherits
oligarchy, and is incompatible with from his descendant
the socialization of ownership. any property which the
latter may have
The Code Commission regarded acquired by gratuitous
the reservas as remnants of title from another
feudalism which fomented agrarian ascendant, or a brother
unrest. Moreover, or sister, is obliged to
the reserves, insofar as they reserve such property
penalize legitimate relationship, is as he may have
considered unjust and inequitable. acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of
However, the lawmaking body, not relatives who are within
agreeing entirely with the Code the third degree and
Commission, restored the reserve who belong to the line
troncal, a legal institution which, from which said
according to Manresa and Castan property came.
Tobenas has provoked questions
and doubts that are difficult to In reserve troncal (1) a descendant
resolve. inherited or acquired by gratuitous
title property from an ascendant or
Reserva troncal is provided for in from a brother or sister; (2) the
article 811 of the Spanish Civil same property is inherited by
Code, now article 891, which another ascendant or is acquired by
reads: 1äwphï1.ñët him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said
ART. 811. El ascendant should reserve the said
ascendiente que property for the benefit of relatives
heredare de su who are within the third degree from
descendiente bienes the deceased descendant
que este hubiese (prepositus) and who belong to the
adquirido por titulo line from which the said property
lucrative de otro came.
ascendiente, o de un
hermano, se halla So, three transmissions are
obligado a reservas los involved: (I) a first transmission by
que hubiere adquirido lucrative title (inheritance or
por ministerio de la ley donation) from an ascendant or
en favor de los brother or sister to the deceased
parientes que eaten descendant; (2) a posterior

72
transmission, by operation of law
(intestate succession or legitime)
from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserve) in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third
transmissions of the same property
(in consequence of the reservation)
from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives
within the third degree from the
deceased descendant belonging to
the line of the first ascendant,
brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed.,
pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions
there is no reserve. Thus, where
one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her
properties were inherited by her
son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death
of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the
exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the
meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs.
Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve
troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who
received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is
within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to
the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the
reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers
and sisters (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua
vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-29901,
August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).
Fourth degree relatives are not
included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72
Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to
avoid "el peligro de que bienes
poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo
gratuito a manos extrañas por el
azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un
azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes
que sin aquel hubieran quedado en
ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho
Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203;
Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil.
1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is
found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan
inherited two parcels of land from
his father Victorians. Pedro died in
1902, single and without issue. His
mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited
from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was
reservable property in the hands of
Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan,
the paternal uncles of Pedro
73
Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the
Torrens system in her name but the
fact that the land was reservable
property in favor of her two
brothers-in-law, should they survive
her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that
Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906.
Her one-half share of a parcel of
conjugal land was inherited by her
daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When
Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her
father, Anacleto Mañalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942,
survived by his second wife and
their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was
reservable property in the hands of
Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona
Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters
of Maria and materna aunts of
Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to
the line from which said one-half
portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac
114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva
troncal are found in Florentino vs
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo,
41 Phil. 915; Maghirang
and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil.
601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil.
322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs.
Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the
descendant, or the one at the end
of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property
last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs.
Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia
Abordo inherited property from her
mother, Basilia Cabardo. When
Cornelia died, her estate passed to
her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his
hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of
Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a
maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was
her nearest relative within the third
degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are
in the fourth degree and are not
reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because
representation is confined to
relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480).
Within the third degree, the nearest
relatives exclude the more remote
subject to the rule of representation.
But the representative should be
within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates
legitimate relationship. illegitimate
relationship and relationship by
affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo
lucrativo refers to a transmission
wherein the recipient gives nothing
74
in return such as donacion and
succession (Cabardo vs.
Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th
Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of
the ascendant obliged to reserve
and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line
from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil.
349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property
but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The
transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees
at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the
reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46
Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been
compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the
reservable property is subject to a
resolutory condition, meaning that if
at the time of the reservor's death,
there are reservees, the transferee
of the property should deliver it to
the reservees. lf there are no
reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's
title would become absolute.
(Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944;
Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves
has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right
would disappear if he predeceased
the reservor. lt would become
absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any
conveyance made by the reservor
but he can require that the
reservable character of the property
be recognized by the purchaser
(Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295,
312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil.
944).
There is a holding that the
renunciation of the reservee's right
to the reservable property is illegal
for being a contract regarding future
inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs.
Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the
reservee's right is a real right which
he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that
the alienation shall transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the
75
reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët
The reservatario receiv
es the property as a
conditional heir of the
descendant
(prepositus) said
property merely
reverting to the line of
origin from which it had
temporarily and
accidentally stayed
during
the reservista's lifetime.
The authorities are all
agreed that there being
reservatarios that
survive the reservists,
the latter must be
deemed to have
enjoyed no more than
a than interest in the
reservable property.
(J. J. B. L. Reyes in
Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during
the reservista's lifetime,
the reservatarios, who
are the ultimate
acquirers of the
property, can already
assert the right to
prevent
the reservista from
doing anything that
might frustrate their
reversionary right, and,
for this purpose, they
can compel the
annotation of their right
in the registry of
property even while the
(reservista) is alive
(Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168,
199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is
incompatible with the
mere expectancy that
corresponds to the
natural heirs of the
reservista lt is likewise
clear that the
reservable property is
no part of the estate of
the reservista who may
not dispose of them (it)
by will, so long as there
are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs.
Gerona, 58 Phil. 226,
237).
The latter, therefore,
do not inherit from
the reservista but from
the descendant
(prepositus) of whom
the reservatarios are
the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition
that they must survive
the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol.
VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa,
Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310,
cited by J. J.B.L.
Reyes in Padura vs.
Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958,
104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death,
the reservatario nearest to
the prepositus becomes,
76
"automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable
property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in
question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands
of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she
was a reservor. The reservation
became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda
were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is
whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor,
could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to
the reservees within the third
degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in
the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is
already res judicata or cosa
juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could
not convey in her holographic will to
her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she
had inherited from her daughter
Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her
estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of
the reservable properties as long as
the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in
the Cano and Padura cases, the
reservees inherit the reservable
properties from the prepositus, not
from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the
reservable properties should be
inherited by all the nearest relatives
within the third degree from
the prepositus who in this case are
the six children of Mrs. Legarda.
She could not select the reservees
to whom the reservable property
should be given and deprive the
other reservees of their share
therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to
make a testamentary disposition of
the reservable properties in favor of
the reservees in the third
degree and, consequently, to ignore
the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation
of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this
case is governed by the doctrine
of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was
ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët
Reservable property
left, through a will or
otherwise, by the death
of ascendant
(reservista) together
with his own property
in favor of another of
his descendants as
forced heir, forms no
part of the latter's
lawful inheritance nor
of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said
property continued to
be reservable, the heir
77
 receiving the same as
an inheritance from his
ascendant has the
strict obligation of its
delivery to the
relatives, within the
third degree, of the
predecessor in interest
(prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of
the heir to an aliquot
part of the property, if
he has at the same
time the right of
a reservatario (reserve
s).
ln the Florentino case, it appears
that Apolonio Florentino II and his
second wife Severina Faz de Leon
begot two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III. These two inherited
properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her
daughter Mercedes as heiress to all
her properties, including those
coming from her deceased husband
through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by
Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia
Faz de Leon and the descendants
of the deceased children of his first
marriage, sued Mercedes
Florentino for the recovery of their
share in the reservable properties,
which Severina de Leon had
inherited from Apolonio III which the
latter had inherited from his father
Apolonio II and which Severina
willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said
properties, as reservable
properties, could not be disposed of
in Severina's will in favor of
Mercedes only. That theory was
sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties,
being reservable properties, did not
form part of Severina's estate and
could not be inherited from her by
her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees,
Mercedes was entitled, as a
reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths
portions were adjudicated to the
other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et
non quieta movere, we are bound
to follow in this case the doctrine of
the Florentino case. That doctrine
means that as long as during the
reservor's lifetime and upon his
death there are relatives within the
third degree of
the prepositus regardless of
whether those reservees are
common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from
whom the property came, the
property retains its reservable
character. The property should go
to the nearest reservees. The
reservor cannot, by means of his
will, choose the reserves to whom
the reservable property should be
awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez
Roman that there is no reserva
troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the
common descendants of the
78
predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to
reserve is irrelevant and sans
binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees
herein that the properties in
question are not reservable
properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the
paternal line have survived and that
when Mrs. Legarda willed the said
properties to her sixteen
grandchildren, who are third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda and
who belong to the paternal line, the
reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by
some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have
remained therein".
That same contention was
advanced in the Florentino case
where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her
daughter, a full-blood sister of
the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of
the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this
Court held that the reservable
property bequeathed by the
reservor to her daughter does not
form part of the reservor's estate
nor of the daughter's estate but
should be given to all the seven
reservees or nearest relatives of the
prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true
that by giving the reservable
property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of
strangers, nevertheless, it is
likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the
reservees and there is no reason
founded upon law and justice why
the other reservees should be
deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case,
it results that Mrs. Legarda could
not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the
disposition is in favor of the
relatives within the third degree
from Filomena Legarda. The said
properties, by operation of Article
891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's
six children as reservees within the
second degree from Filomena
Legarda.
It should be repeated that the
reservees do not inherit from the
reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis
causa subject to the condition that
they must survive the reservor
(Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
The trial court said that the disputed
properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence
of third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda at the time of the
death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda,
belonging to the Legarda family,
"except third-degree relatives who
pertain to both" the Legarda and
Races lines.
79
That holding is erroneous. The
reservation could have been
extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legarda's death. Since at the time
of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the
second and third degrees, the
disputed properties did not lose
their reservable character. The
disposition of the said properties
should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva
troncal and not in accordance with
the reservor's holographic will. The
said properties did not form part of
Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's

decision is reversed and set aside.
lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena
Roces Vda. de Legarda from her
daughter Filomena Legarda, with all
the fruits and accessions thereof,
are reservable properties which
belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all
surnamed Legarda y Roces, as
reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who
died in 1969 and 1973,
respectively, should pertain to their
respective heirs. Costs against the
private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

80
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24,
1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA,
MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS
TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO,
PRIMO TONGKO and
GODOFREDO
CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the
application of Article 891 of the Civil
Code on reserva troncal, was
submitted for judgment in the lower
court by all the parties on the
following "Stipulation of Facts and
Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho and the plaintiffs,
Francisco Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, are legitimate relatives,
plaintiffs being said
defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs
and defendant Dalisay D.
Tongo-Camacho have as a
common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a
sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant.
The family relationship of the
parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A'
and made an integral part of
this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana
Tioco during her lifetime
gratuitously donated four (4)
parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister
of plaintiffs), which parcels of
land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. A-64165, 64166 and
64167 of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila, copies of which are
attached to this stipulation as
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia
Tioco died intestate in l9l5,
survived by her husband,
Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay
D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned
four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two
children in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928,
Balbino Tioco died intestate,
survived by his legitimate
children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs)
and legitimate grandchildren
Faustino Dizon and Trinidad
Dizon. In the partition of his
estate, three (3) parcels of land
now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 16545
and 16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as
Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were
81
adjudicated as the inheritance
of the late Toribia Tioco, but as
she had predeceased her
father, Balbino Tioco, the said
three (3) parcels of land
devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937,
Faustino Dizon died intestate,
single and without issue,
leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land above-
mentioned to his father,
Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the
said property subject to a
reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the
Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and
'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
intestate, and her rights and
interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were
inherited by her only legitimate
child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to
the usufructuary right of her
surviving husband, defendant
Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June
14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died
intestate, survived his only
legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.
9. The parties agree that
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho now owns one-half
(1/2) of all the seven (7)
parcels of land
abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho also claims,
upon legal advice, the other
half of the said seven (7)
parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of
the reserva troncal imposed
thereon upon the death of
Faustino Dizon and under the
laws on intestate succession;
but the plaintiffs, also upon
legal advice, oppose her said
claim because they claim
three-fourths (3/4) of the one-
half pro-indiviso interest in said
parcel of land, which interest
was inherited by Eustacio
Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or
three-eights (3/8) of the said
parcels of land, by virtue of
their being also third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree
to submit for judicial
determination in this case the
legal issue of whether
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the
whole of the seven (7) parcels
of land in question, or whether
the plaintiffs, as third degree
relatives of Faustino Dizon are
reservatarios (together with
said defendant) of the one-half
pro-indiviso share therein
which was inherited by
82
 Eustacio Dizon from his son
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-
half pro-indiviso share, or three
eights (3/8) of said seven (7)
parcels of land, and, therefore,
to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay
P. Tongko Camacho from the
tenants of said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or
real estate taxes
corresponding to plaintiffs'
share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the
parties are close blood
relatives and have acted upon
legal advice in pursuing their
respective claims, and in order
to restore and preserve
harmony in their family
relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other
for damages (other than legal
interest on plaintiffs' sore in the
rentals which this Honorable
Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation which
shall be borne by the
respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower
Court declared the plaintiffs
Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and
Nicolas Tioco, as well as the
defendant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the
seven parcels of land in dispute, in
equal proportions, rendering
judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the
legal question submitted by the
parties, the court holds that
plaintiffs Francisca Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4)
of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
shares or three-eights (3/8) of
the seven (7) parcels of land
involved in this action.
Consequently, they are,
likewise, entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and
to be collected by the defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from
the tenants of the said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or
real estate taxes corresponding
to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
and inasmuch as the parties
expressly waived all their claims
against each other for damages
including attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation other than
the legal interests on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals, the court
renders judgment adjudging the
plaintiffs entitled to three-eights
(3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of
land described in Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165,
T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and
T-16554 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila. The defendant
Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is
hereby ordered to make an
accounting of all rents received
by her on the properties involved
in this action for the purpose of
determining the legal interests
which should be paid to the
plaintiffs on their shares in the
rentals of the property in
question.
83
 SO ORDERED. 2 the praepositus in the line of origin,
four of whole blood and seven of
Not satisfied, the defendant half blood, and the claim was also
appealed to this Court. made that all eleven were entitled
to the reversionary property in
The issue raised is whether, as equal shares. This Court, speaking
contended by the plaintiffs- through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
appellees and ruled by the lower declared the principles of intestacy
Court, all relatives of to be controlling, and ruled that the
thepraepositus within the third nephews and nieces of whole blood
degree in the appropriate line were each entitled to a share
succeed without distinction to the double that of each of the nephews
reservable property upon the death and nieces of half blood in
of the reservista, as seems to be accordance with Article 1006 of the
implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, Civil Code. Said the Court:
which reads:
The issue in this appeal may be
Art. 891. The formulated as follows: In a case
ascendant who inherits of reserva troncal, where the
from his descendant only reservatarios (reservees)
any property which the surviving the reservista, and
latter may have belonging to the fine of origin,
acquired by gratuitous are nephews of the descendant
title from another (prepositus), but some are
ascendant, or a brother nephews of the half blood and
or sister, is obliged to the others are nephews of the
reserve such property whole blood, should the
as he may have reserved properties be
acquired by operation apportioned among
of law for the benefit of them equally, or should the
relatives who are within nephews of the whole blood take
the third degree and a share twice as large as that of
who belong to the line the nephews of the half blood?
from which said
property came. (811), xxx xxx xxx

or, as asserted by the defendant- The case is one of first

appellant, the rights of said relatives
are subject to, and should be
determined by, the rules on
intestate succession.
That question has already been
answered in Padura vs.
3
Baldovino, where
the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of
impression and has divided the
Spanish commentators on the
subject. After mature reflection,
we have concluded that the
position of the appellants is
correct. The reserva troncal is a
special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the
reservable property to the third
84
degree relatives belonging to the
line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the
reserva is accomplished once
the property has devolved to the
specified relatives of the line of
origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for
its application. In the relations
between one reservatario and
another of the same degree
there is no call for applying Art.
891 any longer; wherefore, the
respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be
governed by the ordinary rules
of intestate succession. In this
spirit the jurisprudence of this
Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of
the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass,
not to all the reservatarios as a
class but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more
remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490;
T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de
los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third
degree of relationship from the
descendant (prepositus), the
right of representation operates
in favor of nephews (Florentino
vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed
by law in legitimate succession
when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatarios
over the property which the
reservista (person holding it
subject to reservation) should
return to him, excludes that of
the one more remote. The right
of representation cannot be
alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not
among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in Article 811 is in
the highest degree personal and
for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are
within the third degree of the
person from whom the
reservable property came.
Therefore, relatives of the fourth
and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said
relative to the right of
representation on the part of one
alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within
the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there
is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are
within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased
person from whom the
reservable property came. ... .
85
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40
Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis
supplied) See also Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and de
Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of
representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and
nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of
the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right
of representation of nephews
are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate
collaterals of the whole blood
should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva
troncal merely determines the
group of
relatives reservatarios to whom
the property should be returned;
but within that group, the
individual right to the property
should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened
by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional
case, its application should be
limited to what is strictly needed
to accomplish the purpose of the
law. As expressed by Manresa
in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th
Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero
estado excepcional del derecho,
no debe ampliarse, sino mas
bien restringirse, el alcance del
precepto, manteniendo la
excepcion mientras fuere
necesaria y estuviese realmente
contenida en la disposicion, y
aplicando las reglas generales y
fundamentales del Codigo en
materia de sucesi6n, en
aquehos extremes no resueltos
de un modo expreso, y que
quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de accion de la reserva que se
crea.
The restrictive interpretation is
the more imperative in view of
the new Civil Code's hostility to
successional reservas and
reversions, as exemplified by the
suppression of the reserva
viudal and the reversion legal of
the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and
968-980).
Reversion of the reservable
property being governed by the
rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held
without any right thereto because,
as aunt and uncles, respectively, of
Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the
succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they
are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. To this effect
is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts.
1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was
correct when it held that, in
case of intestacy nephews and
nieces of the de cujus exclude
all other collaterals (aunts and
86
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from
the succession. This is readily
apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines,
that provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and
sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitle to one-half
of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only
survivors be brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and
sisters survive together with
nephews and nieces who are
the children of the decedent's
brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit
per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be
neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers and sisters,
the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009),
the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to
the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also
and more clearly the case
under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in
force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of
1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of
brothers or sisters and of
nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the
whole blood or not, the
surviving spouse, if not
separated by a final decree of
divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be
neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters,
nor a surviving spouse, the
other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate of
deceased.
The latter shall succeed without
distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of the
whole blood.
It will be seen that under the
preceding articles, brothers and
sisters and nephews and nieces
inheritedab intestato ahead of
the surviving spouse, while
other collaterals succeeded
only after the widower or widow.
The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the
spouse on a par with the
nephews and nieces and
brothers and sisters of the
deceased, but without altering
the preferred position of the
latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so
rule, that under our laws of
87
 succession, a decedent's
uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the
observation, also made
in Padura, supra, that as to the
reservable property,
thereservatarios do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the
reservable property is no part of
the estate of the reservista, who
may not dispose of it by will, as
long as there
are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
237). The latter, therefore, do
not inherit from the reservista,
but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the
heirs mortis causa, subject to
the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6,
6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs,
Director of Lands 5, where it was
ruled that intestacy proceedings to
determine the right of
a reservatario are not necessary
where the final decree of the land
court ordering issuance of title in
the name of the reservista over
property subject to reserva
troncal Identifies
the reservatario and there are no
other claimants to the latter's rights
as such:
The contention that an intestacy
proceeding is still necessary
rests upon the assumption that
thereservatario win succeed in,
or inherit, the reservable property
from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis
causa nor is the reservable
property part of
thereservista's estate;
the reservatario receives the
property as a conditional heir of
the descendant (prepositus), said
property merely reverting to the
line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally
strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that
there being reservatarios that
survive the reservista, the matter
must be deemed to have enjoyed
no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.
It is a consequence of these
principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario ne
arest to the prepositus (the
appellee in this case)
becomes, automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already
stated, that property is no part of
the estate of the reservista, and
does not even answer for the
debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property
passed directly from
the praepositus, there is no doubt
that the plaintiffs-appellees would
88
have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules
of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should
obtain simply because "the
transmission of the property was
delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took
a "detour" through an ascendant-
thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission
to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by

virtue of the rulings already cited,
the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
entirety of the reversionary property
to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-
appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed

judgment of the lower Court is
reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs
against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

89
G.R. No. L-12957 March
24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-
appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for
defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action
below to secure judgment (1)
declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of appellees, the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia
spouses to reconvey to appellants
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of
Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental
Negros; and (3) ordering all the
appellees to pay, jointly and
severally, to appellants the sum of
P500.00 as damages, plus the
costs of suit. In their answer
appellees disclaimed any
knowledge or information regarding
the sale allegedly made on April 20,
1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellants and alleged that, if such
sale was made, the same was void
on the ground that Andrea Gutang
had no right to dispose of the
property subject matter thereof.
They further alleged that said
property had never been in
possession of appellants, the truth
being that appellees, as owners,
had been in continuous possession
thereof since the death of Francisco
Yaeso. By way of affirmative
defense and counterclaim, they
further alleged that on July 30,
1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso,
as the only surviving heirs of
Francisco Yaeso, executed a public
instrument of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes, the said sale having been
registered together with an affidavit
of adjudication executed by Paulina
and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as
sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid
deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession
of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus
joined, the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring (1)
that the sale of Lot No. 3368
made by Andrea Gutang to
the plaintiff spouses
Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and
the reconveyance prayed for
by them is denied; (2) that
the sale made by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso in favor of
defendants Fidel Esparcia
and Paulina Sienes involving
the same lot is also void, and
they have no valid title
thereto; and (3) that the
reservable property in
question is part of and must
be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, the lone
surviving relative and heir of
Francisco Yaeso at the death
of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No
90
 pronouncement as to the
costs.
From the above decision the Sienes
spouse interposed the present
appeal, their principal contentions
being, firstly, that the lower court
erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was
a reservable property; secondly, in
annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their
favor; and lastly, in holding that
Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was
entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the
following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to
Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife,
Teresa Ruales, he had four children
named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina
and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an
only son named Francisco.
According to the cadastral records
of Ayuquitan, the properties left by
Saturnino upon his death — the
date of which does not clearly
appear of record — were left to his
children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot
3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern
portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368
(western portion) to Francisco. As a
result of the cadastral proceedings,
Original Certificate of Title No.
10275 covering Lot 3368 was
issued in the name of Francisco.
Because Francisco was a minor at
the time, his mother administered
the property for him, declared it in
her name for taxation purposes
(Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-
2). When Francisco died on May
29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his
mother, as his sole heir, executed
the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE
whereby, among other things, for
and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00 she sold the property in
question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded
from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of Original Certificate of
Title No. 10275 — which was in
their possession — the latter
refused, thus giving rise to the filing
of the corresponding motion in the
cadastral record No. 507. The
same, however, was denied (Exhs.
8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on
July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina
Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of
Francisco, and who as such had
declared the property in their name,
on January 1, 1951 executed a
deed of sale in favor of the spouses
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes
(Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in
their name for tax purposes and
thereafter secured the issuance in
their name of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear
upon the facts already stated, that
the land in question was reservable
property. Francisco Yaeso inherited
it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Francisco's
death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in
turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang.
91
The latter was, therefore, under
obligation to reserve it for the
benefit of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any
survived her. The record discloses
in this connection that Andrea
Gutang died on December 13,
1951, the lone reservee surviving
her being Cipriana Yaeso who died
only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable
property, the weight of opinion is
that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1)
the death of the ascendant obliged
to reserve and (2) the survival, at
the time of his death, of relatives
within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property
came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6
Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court
has held in connection with this
matter that the reservista has the
legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; that he is like a
life usufructuary of the reservable
property; that he may alienate the
same but subject to reservation,
said alienation transmitting only the
revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee
being revoked or resolved by the
survival of reservatarios at the time
of the death of the reservista
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295;
Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480; and Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang
in favor of appellees was, therefore,
subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire
ownership, by virtue of the
alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any
person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana
Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion
becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in
favor of appellants became of no
legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear
that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor
of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes was subject to a
similar resolutory condition. The
reserve instituted by law in favor of
the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose
of, albeit conditionally, the condition
being that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee
only if and when the reservee
survives the person obliged to
reserve. In the present case,
Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when
Andrea Gutang, the person obliged
to reserve, died. Thus the former
became the absolute owner of the
reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the
sale made by her and her sister
prior to this event, became effective
because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not
92
now in a position to reverse the
appealed decision, in so far as it
orders the reversion of the property
in question to the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, because the vendees — the
Esparcia spouses did — not appeal
therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the appealed

decision — as above modified — is
affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in
equity the Esparcia spouses may
have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the
property in question.

93
G.R. No. 176422 March
20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own
capacity and as Attorney-in-fact
of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,
DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all
surnamed MENDOZA,
REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY
BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS
and ELVIRA
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS
SANTOS, substituted by her
heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS
SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO,
LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS,
ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA.
DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS
SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA
P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE
HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS
SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M.
MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging
to the line from which the property
originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives
of the inheriting ascendant.1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant
case are three parcels of land
located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1)
Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749
square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with
an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot
No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq
m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are
presently in the name of respondent
Julia Delos Santos5(respondent).
Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand,
is also in the name of respondent
but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of
the property from petitioner Maria
Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of
Placido Mendoza (Placido) and
Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Placido and Dominga had four
children: Antonio, Exequiel, married
to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin.
Petitioners Maria, Deogracias,
Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and
Ricardo are the children of Antonio.
Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes,
Elvira and Fortunato, on the other
hand, are Valentin’s children.
Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and
Dominga’s properties that were
subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to
Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor
and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonor’s death, her share went to
Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They
claimed that after Gregoria’s death,
respondent, who is Leonor’s sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir
of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties
should have been reserved by
respondent in their behalf and must
now revert back to them, applying
94
Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any
obligation to reserve the properties
as these did not originate from
petitioners’ familial line and were
not originally owned by Placido and
Dominga. According to respondent,
the properties were bought by
Exequiel and Antonio from a certain
Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It appears,
however, that it was only Exequiel
who was in possession of the
properties.6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found
merit in petitioners’ claim and
granted their action for Recovery of
Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance. In its Decision
dated November 4, 2002, the RTC
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the
foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Ordering respondents
(heirs of Julia Policarpio) to
reconvey the three (3)
parcels of land subject of this
action in the name of the
plaintiffs enumerated in the
complaint including
intervenor Maria Cecilia M.
Mendoza except one-half of
the property described in the
old title, TCT No. T-
124852(M) which belongs to
Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan to cancel
the titles in the name of Julia
Policarpio, TCT No. T-
149033(M), T-183631(M) and
T-149035(M) and reconvey
the same to the enumerated
plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to
claims for attorney’s fees and
damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed and set aside the
RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the CA
Decision dated November 16, 2006
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the November 4, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. 609-M-92 is hereby
DISMISSED. Costs against the
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied
the same per Resolution9 dated
January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA
ruled that petitioners failed to
establish that Placido and Dominga
owned the properties in
10
dispute. The CA also ruled that
even assuming that Placido and
Dominga previously owned the
properties, it still cannot be subject
to reserva troncal as neither
95
Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga nor did Gregoria
11
predecease Exequiel.
Now before the Court, petitioners
argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES
ARE NOT RESERVABLE
PROPERTIES, COMING AS
THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS
DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO
THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE
OF THE LAW ON RESERVA
TRONCAL.12
Petitioners take exception to the
ruling of the CA, contending that it
is sufficient that the properties
came from the paternal line of
Gregoria for it to be subject to
reserva troncal. They also claim the
properties in representation of their
own predecessors, Antonio and
Valentin, who were the brothers of
Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The general rule in
this regard is that it should raise
only questions of law. There are,
however, admitted exceptions to
this rule, one of which is when the
CA’s findings are contrary to those
of the trial court.14 This being the
case in the petition at hand, the
Court must now look into the
differing findings and conclusion of
the RTC and the CA on the two
issues that arise – one, whether the
properties in dispute are reservable
properties and two, whether
petitioners are entitled to a
reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is
provided in Article 891 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who
inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from
which said property came.
(Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of
transmission in reserva troncal. The
first transmission is by gratuitous
title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus.
The second transmission is by
operation of law from the prepositus
to the other ascendant or reservor,
96
also called the reservista. The third
and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives
within the third degree from which
the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the
present case, Article 891 on
reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is
that it proceeded from the
erroneous premise that Placido is
the ascendant contemplated in
Article 891 of the Civil Code. From
thence, it sought to trace the origin
of the subject properties back to
Placido and Dominga, determine
whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva
troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother
or sister from whom the
property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or
prepositus (propositus) who
received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista),
the other ascendant who
obtained the property from
the prepositus by operation of
law; and
(4) The reservee
(reservatario) who is within
the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs
to the (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and
for whom the property should
be reserved by the
reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the
ownership of the properties should
be reckoned only from Exequiel’s
as he is the ascendant from where
the first transmission occurred, or
from whom Gregoria inherited the
properties in dispute. The law does
not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of
the property.17It was also immaterial
for the CA to determine whether
Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is
pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant
from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the
other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from
Exequiel by gratuitous title.
97
Moreover, Article 891 simply
requires that the property should
have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative
title. A transmission is gratuitous or
by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return.18
At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case
is that the properties in dispute
were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria (descendant/prepositus)
acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person
obliged to reserve the property
should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of
the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregoria’s
ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s
collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code
provides for the series of degrees
among ascendants and
descendants, and those who are
not ascendants and descendants
but come from a common ancestor,
viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms
a line, which may be either direct or
collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is
that constituted by the series of
degrees among ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted
by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants
and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her
parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents
and so on. On the other hand,
Gregoria’s descendants, if she had
one, would be her children,
grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s
ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral
relatives. In determining the
collateral line of relationship, ascent
is made to the common ancestor
and then descent to the relative
from whom the computation is
made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria,
ascent is to be made from Gregoria
to her mother Leonor (one
line/degree), then to the common
ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s
parents (second line/degree), and
then descent to Julia, her aunt (third
line/degree). Thus, Julia is
Gregoria’s collateral relative within
the third degree and not her
ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person
from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at
98
the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the
property last revolved by
19
descent. It is Gregoria in this
case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s
fourth degree relatives, being her
first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree
relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.20
They cannot even claim
representation of their
predecessors Antonio and Valentin
as Article 891 grants a personal
right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to
represent their ascendants (fathers
and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus
and relatives within the third
degree.21 In Florentino v.
22
Florentino, the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by
law in legitimate succession, when
there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative,
called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation
cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third
degree belong to the line from
which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in Article 811 now
Article 891 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive
benefit of the designated persons
who are the relatives, within the
third degree, of the person from
whom the reservable property
came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does
not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the
third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the
reservable property came. x x
x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring
ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that
while it may appear that the
properties are reservable in
character, petitioners cannot benefit
from reserva troncal. First, because
Julia, who now holds the properties
in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of
Article 891 of the Civil Code and
second, because petitioners are not
Gregoria’s relatives within the third
degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition
that the complaint filed with the
RTC should be dismissed, only on
this point, is correct. If at all, what
should apply in the distribution of
Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code, which
provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants,
99
illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither
brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to
the estate.
The latter shall succeed without
distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the
proper position to determine the
proper distribution of Gregoria’s
estate at this point as the cause of
action relied upon by petitioners in
their complaint filed with the RTC is
based solely on reserva troncal.
Further, any determination would
necessarily entail reception of
evidence on Gregoria’s entire
estate and the heirs entitled thereto,
which is best accomplished in an
action filed specifically for that
purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes
note of a palpable error in the
RTC’s disposition of the case. In
upholding the right of petitioners
over the properties, the RTC
ordered the reconveyance of the
properties to petitioners and the
transfer of the titles in their names.
What the RTC should have done,
assuming for argument’s sake that
reserva troncal is applicable, is
have the reservable nature of the
property registered on respondent’s
titles. In fact, respondent, as
reservista, has the duty to reserve
and to annotate the reservable
character of the property on the
title.24 In reserva troncal, the
reservista who inherits from a
prepositus, whether by the latter’s
wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance by virtue of
a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of
ownership belong to him
25
exclusively.
The reservor has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property
but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional
ownership of the reservor. The
transferee’s rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees
at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the
reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes
place or is extinguished,27 that a
reservatario becomes, by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable
property.28 In any event, the
foregoing discussion does not
detract from the fact that petitioners
are not entitled to a reservation of
the properties in dispute.
100
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated
November 16, 2006 and Resolution
dated January 17, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed
the Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are
AFFIRMED. This Decision is
without prejudice to any civil action
that the heirs of Gregoria

Mendoza may file for the settlement

of her estate or for the
determination of ownership of the
properties in question.

SO ORDERED.

101
 ARTICLE 898. rec.).On May 19, 1973, the parties
[G.R. No. L-37903. March 30, submitted the following stipulation
1977.] of facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

GERTRUDES L. DEL "OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner

ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. is the legitimate mother of the late
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
MARILOU DEL
ROSARIO, Respondents. "PETITIONER admits that oppositor
DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO
Dante P. Mercado for Petitioner. is the legitimate surviving wife of
the deceased FELIX L. DEL
Laig, Ruiz & Associates ROSARIO.
for Respondents.
"PETITIONER admits that
MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the
DECISION legally adopted child of the late
FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and
DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO
MAKASIAR, J.: CONANAN.

"THAT THE PARTIES admit that

Review of the order of Court of First the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO
Instance of Rizal dated June 21, died last September 12, 1969 at
1973, dismissing petitioner’s Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and
petition for settlement and partition within the jurisdiction of the
of estate. Honorable Court.

On November 13, 1972, petitioner "That the only surviving nearest

filed with the court below the above-
said petition, subject of which is the
estate left by her late son, Felix L.
del Rosario, who died in a plane
crash on September 12, 1969 at
Antipolo, Rizal (Partial Joint
Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p.
6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents
filed their opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo,
pursuant to a verbal agreement
forged between the parties, issued
an order requiring them to come up
with a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9,
relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO are the petitioner and
oppositors DOROTEO O.
CONANAN and MARILOU DEL
ROSARIO.
"Parties admit to pay their
respective counsel in the amount to
be determined by the court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that
on the basis of the facts stipulated,
the Court declare the heirs of the
deceased" (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court

102
issued the challenged order,
pertinent portions of which
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A perusal of the petition shows that
the instant case was filed under the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which
reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘Whenever the gross value of the
estate of a deceased person,
whether he died testate or intestate,
does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to
appear to the Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of the
estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing
which shall be held not less than
one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last
publication of a notice which shall
be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in
the province, and after such other
notice to interested persons as the
court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the
appointment of an executor or
administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the
will, if any there is, to determine
who are the persons legally entitled
to participate in the estate, and to
apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of
the estate as the court shall then
find to be due; and such persons, in
their own right, if they are of lawful
age and legal capacity, or by their
guardians or trustees legally
appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be
entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the
estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make
such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the
proceedings, and all orders and
judgment made or rendered in the
course thereof shall be recorded in
the office of the clerk, and the order
of partition or award, if it involves
real estate, shall be recorded in the
proper registrar’s office.
"While it may be true that a petition
for summary settlement is allowed
under the aforequoted provision of
the rules, the same rule specifically
limits the action to estates the gross
value of which does not exceed
P10,000.00. The instant petition,
however, clearly alleges that the
value of the real properties alone
left by the deceased Felix del
Rosario amounts to P33,000.00
which is obviously over and above
the value of the estate allowed
under the rules. The action taker.
by the petitioner (cannot be)
construed as one filed under an
intestate proceeding as the
requirements provided by law for
the same has not been complied
with. Based on the foregoing
observation alone, the petition must
perforce be dismissed.
"But granting arguendo that this
Court may consider the petition as
an exercise (of) the powers of a
probate Court in determining and
declaring the heirs of the deceased
as prayed for in the aforequoted
partial joint stipulation of facts, the
law on intestate succession is clear
that an adopted child concurring
103
with the surviving spouse of the
adopter excludes the legitimate
ascendants from succession. . . . .
"The contention of the petitioner
that Article 343 is applicable in the
instant case finds no basis for the
said article is applicable in cases
where there are no other concurring
intestate heirs of the adopted child.
. . . .
"Based on the foregoing, therefore,
the petitioner not being included as
intestate heir of the deceased
cannot be considered as a co-
owner of or have any right over the
properties sought to be partitioned
and under the provisions of Section
1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, such action must be
commenced or instituted by the
party in interest.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing findings, the Court hereby
DISMISSES THE PETITION
WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS
TO COSTS" (pp. 10-12, rec.).
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal, record on appeal
and appeal bond (see respondents’
comments, p. 18, rec.).
I petitioner — WE deem it essential,
WE rule that on purely jurisdictional
consideration, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
Indeed, in a litany of precedents
dating as far back as the 1938 case
of Utulo v. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia
(66 Phil. 302) and reaffirmed in
Asuncion and Castro v. De la Cruz
(No. L-7855, November 23, 1955,
97 Phil. 910) and Gutierrez v. Cruz
(G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968,
24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly held
that for the court to acquire
jurisdiction in a petition for summary
settlement of estate under the rules,
the requirement that the amount of
the estate involved should not
exceed P10,000.00 (P6,000.00
under the old rules) is jurisdictional.
In the instant case, both parties
jointly affirmed that the value of the
realty left by the deceased Felix del
Rosario is in the aggregate amount
of P33,000.00 which, as the court a
quo correctly found, is obviously
"over and above the value allowed
under the rules."cralaw virtua1aw
library
II
However, by virtue of the
transcendental implications of the
holding of the court a quo, in the
sense that once wholly sustained,
said holding would preclude
petitioner from re-filling the proper
action — a consequence which, on
the grounds of equity and fair play,
WE cannot allow to befall on
for the guidance of the parties,
especially herein petitioner, to point
out the demerits of the appealed
verdict.
A couple of important issues are
posed for our consideration, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
104
1. Which of the following articles of
the New Civil Code will apply,
Article 343 on the one hand, or
Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the
other; and
2. Whether the material data rule
enunciated by Rule 41, Section 6 of
the New Rules of Court should be
followed, ex cathedra, in the
present case.
A and by an adopted person, the
The lower court found the following
provisions of the New Civil Code
germane to the instant
case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 341. The adoption
shall:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Give to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he was
a legitimate child of the adopter;
"(2) Dissolve the authority vested in
the parents by nature;
"(3) Make the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter;
"(4) Entitle the adopted person to
use the adopter’s surname."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Art. 978. Succession pertains, in
the first place, to the descending
direct line."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Art. 979. Legitimate children and
their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from
different marriages."cralaw
virtua1aw library
WE opine that the governing
provision is the hereinafter quoted
Article 343 of the New Civil Code, in
relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of
said law, which directs
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 343. If the adopter is survived
by legitimate parents or ascendants
latter shall not have more
successional rights than an
acknowledged natural child."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is
qualification to Article 341 which
gives an adopted child the same
rights and duties as though he were
a legitimate child. The reason for
this is that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(I)t is unjust to exclude the
adopter’s parents from the
inheritance in favor of an adopted
person" (Report of the Code
Commissioner, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more
successional rights to the adopted,
who is only related artificially by
fiction of law to the deceased, than
those who are naturally related to
him by blood in the direct ascending
line.
The applicability of Article 343 does
not exclude the surviving parent of
the deceased adopter, not only
because a contrary view would
defeat the intent of the framers of
the law, but also because in
intestate succession, where
105
legitimate parents or ascendants
concur with the surviving spouse of
the deceased, the latter does not
necessarily exclude the former from
the inheritance. This is affirmed by
Article 898 of the New Civil Code
which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If the testator leaves no legitimate
descendants, but leaves legitimate
ascendants, the surviving spouse
shall have a right to one-fourth
(only) of the hereditary estate.
"Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants,
the surviving spouse and
illegitimate children are left, the
ascendants shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance, and the
other half shall be divided between
the surviving spouse and the
illegitimate children so that such
widow or widower shall have one-
fourth of the estate, the illegitimate
children the other fourth."cralaw
virtua1aw library

"This fourth shall be taken from the B

free portion."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Anent the other
Article 343 does not require that the issue, Respondents, in their
concurring heirs should be the comment of June 29, 1973,
adopted child and the legitimate emphasize that the petitioner’s
parents or ascendants only. The record on appeal violates the
language of the law is clear, and a material data rule in that.
contrary view cannot be presumed.
"It does not state when the notice of
It is, thus, OUR view that Article appeal and appeal bond were filed
343 should be made to apply, with the lower court in disregard of
consonant with the cardinal rule in the requirement of Section 6, Rule
statutory construction that all the 41 of the Rules of Court that the
provisions of the New Civil Code record on appeal must contain such
must be reconciled and given data as will show that the appeal
effect. was perfected on time."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under Article 343, an adopted child
surviving with legitimate parents of Recent jurisprudence has
the deceased adopter, has the construed liberally the material data
same successional rights as an rule, whenever circumstances and
acknowledged natural child, which substantial justice warrant.
is comprehended in the term
"illegitimate children." The cases of Berkenkotter v. Court
Consequently, the respective of Appeals, No. L-36629,
shares of the surviving spouses September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA
ascendant and adopted child 228) and Villanueva v. Court of
should be determined by Article Appeals (No. L-29719, November
1000 of the New Civil Code, which 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are
reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary particularly in point.

106

In Villanueva, WE
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The deviation from the rigid rule
adopted in the case of Government
of the Philippines v. Antonio, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-23736, October 19,
1965, is due to our realization that
after all what is of vital importance
in the requirement of Section 6,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that
the Record on Appeal shall show
that the appeal was really perfected
within the reglementary period. If it
could he ascertained from the
record of the case that the appeal
was perfected within the
reglementary period, although such
fact did not evidently appear on the
face of the record on appeal, the
defect or deficiency is not fatal.
"If the appellate court is convinced
that the appeal was perfected on
time, it should not throw out but
assume jurisdiction over it. After all,
that procedural requirement is only
intended to enable the appellate
court to determine if the appeal is
still within its jurisdiction and
nothing more" (Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals, 68 SCRA
220, Emphasis supplied).
From the docket and process slip of
this case, it is shown that the date
of notice of the Court of First
Instance decision is July 3, 1973
and that the expiry date to file
petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court is December 14,
1973. Petitioner filed her notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on
appeal on July 10, 1973 — or still
very much within the reglementary
period to perfect an appeal. And
although this is not mentioned in
the record on appeal, it is,
nevertheless, a fact of record, the
veracity of which this COURT does
not doubt.
Perforce, there being substantial
compliance with the requirement of
the Rules of Court, WE resolve this
issue in favor of
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The liberal interpretation of the
material data rule aimed at serving
the ends of substantial justice has
found amplification in the recent
cases of Pimentel, Et. Al. v. Court
of Appeals, Et Al., L-39423 and L-
39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
475; Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, Et
Al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67
SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel
R. Luna v. Court of Appeals,
Capati, Et Al., L-37123, October 30,
1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.
WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT
PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER’S
FILING THE APPROPRIATE
ACTION IN A COMPETENT
COURT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
107
 ART. 912
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-
RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V.
DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON,
JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA
DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga
approving the Executrix-appellee's
project of partition instead of
Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
counter-project of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix,
Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in
Angeles, Pampanga, and was
survived by seven compulsory
heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V.
Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina
Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon,
and a legitimate granddaughter
named Lilia Dizon, who is the only
legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate
son of the said decedent. Six of
these seven compulsory heirs
(except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last
will executed on February 2, 1960
and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her
will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo
Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided,
distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small
parcels of land appraised at
P5,849.60, household furniture
valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit
in the sum of P409.95 and ten
shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at
P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due
course commenced2 and by order
dated March 13, 1961, the last will
and testament of the decedent was
duly allowed and admitted to
probate, and the appellee Marina
Dizon-Rivera was appointed
executrix of the testatrix' estate,
and upon her filing her bond and
oath of office, letters testamentary
were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her
inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido
Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga
was appointed commissioner to
appraise the properties of the
estate. He filed in due course his
report of appraisal and the same
was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon
joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of
the testatrix at the time of her death
thus had a total appraised value of
108
P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of Francisco Rivera,
each of the seven compulsory heirs Agripina Ayson, Dioli or
amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of Jolly
the half of the estate reserved for Jimenez, Laureano
the legitime of legitimate children Tiamzon
and descendants).4 In her will, the ................. 72,540.00
testatrix "commanded that her Total Value
property be divided" in accordance ......................
with her testamentary disposition, P1,801,960.01
whereby she devised and
bequeathed specific real properties The executrix filed her project of
comprising practically the entire partition dated February 5, 1964, in
bulk of her estate among her six substance adjudicating the estate
children and eight grandchildren. as follows:
The appraised values of the real
properties thus respectively devised (1) with the figure of
by the testatrix to the beneficiaries P129,254.96 as legitime for a
named in her will, are as follows: basis Marina (exacultrix-
appellee) and Tomas
1. Estela Dizon (appellant) are admittedly
..................................... considered to have received
.. P 98,474.80 in the will more than their
2. Angelina Dizon respective legitime, while the
.................................. rest of the appellants, namely,
106,307.06 Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
3. Bernardita Dizon Josefina and Lilia received
.................................. less than their respective
51,968.17 legitime;
4. Josefina Dizon
..................................... (2) thus, to each of the latter
. 52,056.39 are adjudicated the properties
5. Tomas Dizon respectively given them in the
..................................... will, plus cash and/or
.. 131,987.41 properties, to complete their
6. Lilia Dizon respective legitimes to
..................................... P129,254.96; (3) on the other
......... 72,182.47 hand, Marina and Tomas are
7. Marina Dizon adjudicated the properties that
..................................... they received in the will less
1,148,063.71 the cash and/or properties
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. necessary to complete the
..................................... prejudiced legitime mentioned
. 69,280.00 in number 2 above;
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert
Garcia, (4) the adjudications made in
Cayetano Dizon, the will in favor of the

109
 grandchildren remain of the respective heirs and devisees
untouched.<äre||anº•1àw> totalling one-half thereof as follows:

On the other hand oppositors 1. Estela Dizon

submitted their own counter- ........................................... P
project of partition dated 49,485.56
February 14, 1964, wherein 2. Angelina Dizon
they proposed the distribution .........................................
of the estate on the following 53,421.42
basis: 3. Bernardita Dizon
.......................................
(a) all the testamentary 26,115.04
dispositions were 4. Josefina Dizon
proportionally reduced to the ..........................................
value of one-half (½) of the 26,159.38
entire estate, the value of the 5. Tomas V. Dizon
said one-half (½) amounting .........................................
to P905,534.78; (b) the shares 65,874.04
of the Oppositors-Appellants 6. Lilia Dizon
should consist of their ................................................
legitime, plus the devises in .. 36,273.13
their favor proportionally 7. Marina Dizon
reduced; (c) in payment of the ...........................................
total shares of the appellants 576,938.82
in the entire estate, the 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr.
properties devised to them .........................................
plus other properties left by 34,814.50
the Testatrix and/or cash are 9. Grandchildren Gilbert
adjudicated to them; and (d) Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
to the grandchildren who are
not compulsory heirs are T o t a l
adjudicated the properties ................................................
respectively devised to them ... P905,534.78
subject to reimbursement by
Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the while the other half of the estate
sums by which the devise in (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
their favor should be constituting the legitime of the
proportionally reduced. executrix-appellee and oppositors-
appellants, to be divided among
Under the oppositors' counter- them in seven equal parts of
project of partition, the testamentary P129,362.11 as their respective
disposition made by the testatrix of legitimes.
practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, The lower court, after hearing,
were proposed to be reduced to the sustained and approved the
amounts set forth after the names executrix' project of partition, ruling

110
that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the
New Civil Code specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired
or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied. While it is
true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two
projects of partition, it is observed
that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or
portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime.
The proposition of the oppositors, if
upheld, will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy, which is in
controversion of Article 791 of the
New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain
heirs in her will for reasons of her
own, cannot be doubted. This is
legally permissible within the
limitation of the law, as aforecited."
With reference to the payment in
cash of some P230,552.38,
principally by the executrix as the
largest beneficiary of the will to be
paid to her five co-heirs, the
oppositors (excluding Tomas
Dizon), to complete their impaired
legitimes, the lower court ruled that
"(T)he payment in cash so as to
make the proper adjustment to
meet with the requirements of the
law in respect to legitimes which
have been impaired is, in our
opinion, a practical and valid
solution in order to give effect to the
last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of
approval, oppositors-appellants
have filed this appeal, and raise
anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary
dispositions made in the testatrix'
will are in the nature of devises
imputable to the free portion of her
estate, and therefore subject to
reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are
entitled to the devise plus their
legitime under Article 1063, or
merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of
the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be
compelled to accept payment in
cash on account of their legitime,
instead of some of the real
properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided
against them in the proceedings
below.
The issues raised present a matter
of determining the avowed intention
of the testatrix which is "the life and
soul of a will."5 In consonance
therewith, our Civil Code included
the new provisions found in Articles
788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a
testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which
the disposition is to be operative
shall be preferred" and "(T)he
words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to
every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a
will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs.
Juico6 for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule
111
123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
overturned the lower court's
decision and stressed that "the
intention and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention
constitute the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments, and to
paraphrase an early decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in
his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively
be faithfully obeyed and complied
with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither
these interested parties nor the
courts may substitute their own
criterion for the testator's will.
Guided and restricted by these
fundamental premises, the Court
finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is
the fact that the testatrix'
testamentary disposition was in the
nature of a partition of her estate by
will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will, after commanding that
upon her death all her obligations
as well as the expenses of her last
illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be
paid, she expressly provided that "it
is my wish and I command that my
property be divided" in accordance
with the dispositions immediately
thereafter following, whereby she
specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular
heir among her seven compulsory
heirs and seven other grandchildren
to whom she bequeathed the same.
This was a valid partition 10 of her
estate, as contemplated and
authorized in the first paragraph of
Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar
as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs." This right
of a testator to partition his estate is
subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime.
The Civil Code thus provides the
safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir
to whom the testator has left by
any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand
that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary
dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied
with in the executrix-appellee's
project of partition, wherein the
five oppositors-appellants
112
 namely Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia,
were adjudicated the
properties respectively
distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will,
and the differential to complete
their respective legitimes of
P129,362.11 each were taken
from the cash and/or properties
of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-
appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the
testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition
his estate by will was recognized
even in Article 1056 of the old Civil
Code which has been reproduced
now as Article 1080 of the present
Civil Code. The only amendment in
the provision was that Article 1080
"now permits any person (not a
testator, as under the old law) to
partition his estate by act inter
vivos." 11 This was intended to
repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter
vivos, he must first make a will with
all the formalities provided by law.
Authoritative commentators doubt
the efficacy of the
13
amendment but the question
does not here concern us, for this is
a clear case of partition by will, duly
admitted to probate, which perforce
must be given full validity and
effect. Aside from the provisions of
Articles 906 and 907 above quoted,
other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of
partition as approved by the lower
court rather than the counter-project
of partition proposed by oppositors-
appellants whereby they would
reduce the testamentary disposition
or partition made by the testatrix to
one-half and limit the same, which
they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of
the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of
the estate to payment of the
legitimes of the seven compulsory
heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a
distribution by intestacy and pro
tanto nullify the testatrix' will,
contrary to Article 791 of the Civil
Code. It would further run counter
to the provisions of Article 1091 of
the Civil Code that "(A) partition
legally made confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court
upheld the distribution made in the
will of the deceased testator Pedro
Teves of two large coconut
plantations in favor of his daughter,
Concepcion, as against adverse
claims of other compulsory heirs, as
being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the
Civil Code. In upholding the sale
made by Concepcion to a stranger
of the plantations thus partitioned in
her favor in the deceased's will
which was being questioned by the
other compulsory heirs, the Court
ruled that "Concepcion Teves by
operation of law, became the
absolute owner of said lots because
'A partition legally made confers
113
upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091,
New Civil Code), from the death of
her ancestors, subject to rights and
obligations of the latter, and, she
can not be deprived of her rights
thereto except by the methods
provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659,
and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion
Teves could, as she did, sell the
lots in question as part of her share
of the proposed partition of the
properties, especially when, as in
the present case, the sale has been
expressly recognized by herself and
her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors'
contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the
nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of
the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her
real properties to the respective
heirs. From this erroneous premise,
they proceed to the equally
erroneous conclusion that "the
legitime of the compulsory heirs
passes to them by operation of law
and that the testator can only
dispose of the free portion, that is,
the remainder of the estate after
deducting the legitime of the
compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in
the nature of institution of heirs or of
devises or legacies, have to be
taken from the remainder of the
testator's estate constituting the
free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for
the adjudications and assignments
in the testatrix' will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot
be considered all devises, for it
clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the
disposition by the testatrix of her
whole estate (save for some small
properties of little value already
noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was
to partition her whole estate through
her will. The repeated use of the
words "I bequeath" in her
testamentary dispositions acquire
no legal significance, such as to
convert the same into devises to be
taken solely from the free one-half
disposable portion of the estate.
Furthermore, the testatrix' intent
that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on
account of the respective legitimes
of the compulsory heirs is expressly
borne out in the fourth paragraph of
her will, immediately following her
testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise:
"FOURTH: I likewise command that
in case any of those I named as my
heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced
heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said
deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily
are in error. The testamentary
dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, do not have to be taken only
from the free portion of the estate,
as contended, for the second
paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil
114
Code precisely provides that "(O)ne
who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the
legitime of said heirs." And even
going by oppositors' own theory of
bequests, the second paragraph of
Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-
appellee, who admittedly was
favored by the testatrix with the
large bulk of her estate in providing
that "(T)he devisee who is entitled
to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does
not exceed that of the disposable
portion and of the share pertaining
to him as legitime." For "diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason
for making a testament; otherwise,
the decedent might as well die
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of
course, the dispositions by the
testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article
1080 of the Civil Code and of the
other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament,
have to be respected insofar as
they do not prejudice the legitime of
the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063
of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left
by will is not deemed subject to
collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime
shall in any case remain
unimpaired" and invoking of the
construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed
subject to collation' in this article
really means not imputable to or
chargeable against the legitime",
while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate
case, has no application in the
present case. Here, we have a case
of a distribution and partition of the
entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any
previous donations during her
lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime
of each heir nor having left merely
some properties by will which would
call for the application of Articles
1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here
determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the
decisive issue raised by oppositors-
appellants, the secondary issues
are likewise necessarily resolved.
Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under
Article 906 of the Civil Code and
this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and
they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining
portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-
appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally
insist on their legitime being
completed with real properties of
the estate instead of being paid in
cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not
available for the purpose, as the
testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs,
and the heirs are called upon, as far
as feasible to comply with and give
effect to the intention of the testatrix
115
as solemnized in her will, by partition." The payment in cash by
implementing her manifest wish of way of making the proper
transmitting the real properties adjustments in order to meet the
intact to her named beneficiaries, requirements of the law on non-
principally the executrix-appellee. impairment of legitimes as well as
The appraisal report of the to give effect to the last will of the
properties of the estate as filed by testatrix has invariably been availed
the commissioner appointed by the of and sanctioned. 21That her co-
lower court was approved in oppositors would receive their cash
toto upon joint petition of the differentials only now when the
parties, and hence, there cannot be value of the currency has declined
said to be any question — and further, whereas they could have
none is presented — as to fairness received them earlier, like
of the valuation thereof or that the Bernardita, at the time of approval
legitime of the heirs in terms of of the project of partition and when
cash has been understated. The the peso's purchasing value was
plaint of oppositors that the higher, is due to their own decision
purchasing value of the Philippine of pursuing the present appeal.
peso has greatly declined since the
testatrix' death in January, 1961 ACCORDINGLY, the orders
provides no legal basis or appealed from are hereby affirmed.
justification for overturning the Without cost.
wishes and intent of the testatrix.
The transmission of rights to the
succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and
accordingly, the value thereof must
be reckoned as of then, as
otherwise, estates would never be
settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the
currency and properties of the
estate. There is evidence in the
record that prior to November 25,
1964, one of the oppositors,
Bernardita, accepted the sum of
P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties'
manifestation, 20 "does not in any
way affect the adjudication made to
her in the projects of partition of
either party as the same is a mere
advance of the cash that she
should receive in both projects of

116
 ART 916 Decision[2] and July 8, 2010
SECOND DIVISION [3]
Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99856. The
RAMON S. CHING G.R. No.
dispositive portion of the assailed
AND PO WING 192828
PROPERTIES, Decision reads:
INC., Present:
Petitioners, WHEREFORE, in view
CARPIO, J., of all the foregoing
Chairperson, premises, judgment is
- versus - BRION, hereby rendered by
PEREZ, us DENYING the
ARANAL- petition filed in this
HON. JANSEN R. SERENO, case
RODRIGUEZ, in his and and AFFIRMING the
capacity as REYES, JJ. assailed Orders dated
Presiding Judge of March 15, 2007 and
the Regional Trial May 16, 2007 issued
Court of Manila, by the respondent
Branch 6, JOSEPH Promulgated: Judge of the Regional
CHENG, JAIME Trial Court (RTC),
CHENG, November Branch 6, in Manila in
MERCEDES IGNE 28, 2011 Civil Case No. 02-
AND LUCINA 105251.[4]
SANTOS,
substituted by her
son, EDUARDO S. The assailed Resolution
BALAJADIA, denied the petitioners' Motion for
Respondents.
Reconsideration.

x--------------------------------------------------
The Factual Antecedents
----------------------------------x

Sometime between
RESOLUTION
November 25, 2002 and December
3, 2002,[5] the respondents filed a
REYES, J.:
Complaint[6] against the petitioners
and Stronghold Insurance
The Case
Company, Global Business Bank,
Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu
Before us is a Petition for
Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources
Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule
Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds
45 of the Rules of Court assailing
of Manila and Malabon, and all
the December 14, 2009

117
persons claiming rights or titles
from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and
his successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as
one for "Disinheritance, Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver,
Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title with
Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a]
Temporary Restraining Order and
[a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction,"
was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC).
In the Complaint, the
respondents alleged the following
as causes of action:
First Cause of Action. They
are the heirs of Lim San, also
known as Antonio Ching / Tiong
Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy
(Antonio). Respondents Joseph
Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng
(Jaime) are allegedly the children of
Antonio with his common-law wife,
respondent Mercedes Igne
(Mercedes). Respondent Lucina
Santos (Lucina) claimed that she
was also a common-law wife of
Antonio. The respondents averred
that Ramon misrepresented himself
as Antonio's and Lucina's son when
in truth and in fact, he was adopted
and his birth certificate was merely
simulated. On July 18, 1996,
Antonio died of a stab wound.
Police investigators identified
Ramon as the prime suspect and
he now stands as the lone accused
in a criminal case for murder filed
against him. Warrants of arrest
issued against
him have remained unserved as he
is at large. From the foregoing
circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 919[7] of the New
Civil Code (NCC), the respondents
concluded that Ramon can be
legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share
from the estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action.
On August 26, 1996, prior to the
conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as
the prime suspect in the murder of
Antonio, the former made an
inventory of the latter's estate.
Ramon misrepresented that there
were only six real estate properties
left by Antonio. The respondents
alleged that Ramon had illegally
transferred to his name the titles to
the said properties. Further, there
are two other parcels of land, cash
and jewelries, plus properties in
Hongkong, which were in Ramon's
possession.
118
 Third Cause of Action.
Mercedes, being of low educational
attainment, was sweet-talked by
Ramon into surrendering to him a
Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global
Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit
of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
Antonio, and the certificates of title
covering two condominium units in
Binondo which were purchased by
Antonio using his own money but
which were registered in Ramon's
name. Ramon also fraudulently
misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime
and Mercedes that they will
promptly receive their complete
shares, exclusive of the stocks in
Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing),
from the estate of Antonio. Exerting
undue influence, Ramon had
convinced them to execute an
Agreement[8] and a Waiver[9] on
August 20, 1996. The terms and
conditions stipulated in the
Agreement and Waiver,
specifically, on the payment by
Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and
Mercedes of the amount
of P22,000,000.00, were not
complied with. Further, Lucina was
not informed of the execution of the
said instruments and had not
received any amount from Ramon.
Hence, the instruments are null and
void.
Fourth Cause of Action.
Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po
Wing, which constitute 60% of the
latter's total capital stock, were
illegally transferred by Ramon to his
own name through a forged
document of sale executed after
Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-
storey building in Binondo. Ramon's
claim that he bought the stocks
from Antonio before the latter died
is baseless. Further, Lucina's
shares in Po Wing had also
banished into thin air through
Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On
October 29, 1996, Ramon executed
an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate[10] adjudicating
solely to himself Antonio's entire
estate to the prejudice of the
respondents. By virtue of the said
instrument, new Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering
eight real properties owned by
Antonio were issued in Ramon's
name. Relative to the Po Wing
shares, the Register of Deeds of
Manila had required Ramon to post
a Surety Bond conditioned to
answer for whatever claims which
may eventually surface in
connection with the said stocks. Co-
defendant Stronghold Insurance
Company issued the bond in
Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of
Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two
119
parcels of land in Navotas to co- defendant
defendant Asia Atlantic Business RAMON
CHING
Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of who
land, which was part of Antonio's murdered
estate, was sold by Ramon to co- his father
defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an ANTONIO
CHING
unreasonably low price. By reason
disqualifie
of Ramon's lack of authority to d as heir
dispose of any part of Antonio's and from
estate, the conveyances are null inheriting
and void ab initio. to (sic) the
estate of
his father;
Since Ramon is at large, his
wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now b.)
manages Antonio's estate. She has Declaring
no intent to convey to the the nullity
of the
respondents their shares in the
defendant
estate of Antonio. RAMON
CHING
The respondents thus prayed transfer
for the following in their Complaint: (sic) of the
six [6]
parcels of
1. x x x a temporary
land from
restraining order be
the name
issued restraining the
of his
defendant RAMON
father
CHING and/or his
ANTONIO
attorney-in-fact Belen
CHING to
Dy Tan Ching from
his name
disposing, selling or
covered by
alienating any property
TCT No. x
that belongs to the
x x;
estate of the deceased
ANTONIO CHING;
c.)
Declaring
xxx
the nullity
of the
4. x x x
AGREEM
ENT and
a.)
WAIVER
Declaring
executed
that the

120
by document
plaintiffs x purporting
x x in favor the
of x x x transfer
RAMON thereof;
CHING for
being e.)
patently Declaring
immoral, the nullity
invalid, and to
illegal, have no
simulated force and
and (sic) effect the
sham; AFFIDAVI
T OF
d.) SETTLEM
Declaring ENT OF
the nullity ESTATE
of the executed
transfer of by x x x
the shares RAMON
of stocks CHING for
at (sic) PO being
WING contrary to
from the law and
names of existing
ANTONIO jurisprude
CHING nce;
and
LUCINA f.) Declarin
SANTOS g the
to the nullity of
defendant the DEED
ANTONIO OF SALES
CHING's (sic)
name for executed
having by x x x
been RAMON
illegally CHING (i)
procured over two
through (2) parcels
the of land x x
falsificatio x to
n of their defendant
signatures ASIA
in the ATLANTIC

121
 BUSINES to the existence of a Certificate of
S Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA)
VENTURE
S, Inc.; in the amount of P4,000,000.00
and (ii) originally issued by PhilBank to
one (1) Antonio. The respondents prayed
parcel of that they be declared as the rightful
land x x x
owners of the CPPA and that it be
sold to x x
x ELENA immediately released to them.
TIU DEL Alternatively, the respondents
PILAR for prayed for the issuance of a hold
having order relative to the CPPA to
illegally
preserve it during the pendency of
procured
the the case.
ownership
and titles On April 22, 2005, the
of the petitioners filed their Consolidated
above
Answer with Counterclaim.[15]
properties;

x x x.[11] On October 28, 2005, the

RTC issued an Order[16] admitting
the respondents' Amended
The petitioners filed with the Complaint. The RTC stressed that
RTC a Motion to Dismiss[12] alleging Metrobank had already filed
forum shopping, litis pendentia, res Manifestations admitting that as
judicata and the respondents as not successor-in-interest of Global
being the real parties in interest. Bank, it now possesses custody of
Antonio's deposits. Metrobank
On July 30, 2004, the RTC expressed willingness to abide by
issued an Omnibus any court order as regards the
[13]
Order denying the petitioners' disposition of Antonio's deposits.
Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration filed to assail the
The respondents filed an aforecited Order was denied by the
Amended Complaint[14] dated April RTC on May 3, 2006.
7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as
the successor-in-interest of co- On May 29, 2006, the
defendant Global Bank. The petitioners filed their Consolidated
Amended Complaint also added
a seventh cause of action relative
122
Answer with Counterclaim to the properties described
in the Complaint
respondents' Amended Complaint.
which can be
properly settled in an
On August 11, 2006, the RTC ordinary civil
issued a pre-trial order.[17] action. And as pointed
out by the defendants,
the action seeks to
On January 18, 2007, the
declare the nullity of
petitioners filed a Motion to the Agreement,
Dismiss[18] the respondents' Waiver, Affidavit of
Amended Complaint on the alleged Extra-Judicial
ground of the RTC's lack of Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale,
jurisdiction over the subject matter
Transfer Certificates of
of the Complaint. The petitioners Title, which were all
argued that since the allegedly executed by
Amended Complaint sought the defendant Ramon
release of the CPPA to the Ching to defraud the
plaintiffs. The relief of
respondents, the latter's declaration
establishing the
as heirs of Antonio, and the status of the plaintiffs
propriety of Ramon's disinheritance, which could have
the suit partakes of the nature of a translated this action
special proceeding and not an into a special
proceeding was
ordinary action for declaration of
nowhere stated in the
nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains Amended
to a probate or intestate court and Complaint. With
not to the RTC acting as an regard [to] the prayer
ordinary court. to declare the
plaintiffs as the
rightful owner[s] of
On March 15, 2007, the RTC the CPPA and that
issued an Order[19] denying the the same be
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on immediately released
grounds: to them, in itself
poses an issue of
ownership which
In the case at
must be proved by
bar, an examination
plaintiffs by
of the Complaint
substantial
would disclose that
evidence. And as
the action delves
emphasized by the
mainly on the
plaintiffs, the Amended
question of
Complaint was
ownership of the

123
 intended to implead No. 99856, raised the issue of
Metrobank as a co- whether or not the RTC gravely
defendant.
abused its discretion when it denied
As regards the issue of the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss
disinheritance, the despite the fact that the Amended
court notes that during Complaint sought to establish the
the Pre-trial of this
status or rights of the respondents
case, one of the issues
raised by the which subjects are within the ambit
defendants Ramon of a special proceeding.
Ching and Po Wing
Properties is: Whether On December 14, 2009, the
or not there can be
CA rendered the now assailed
disinheritance in
intestate succession? Decision[21] denying the petition
Whether or not for certiorari on grounds:
defendant Ramon
Ching can be legally Our in-depth
disinherited from the assessment of the
estate of his father? To condensed allegations
the mind of the supporting the causes
Court, the issue of of action of the
disinheritance, which amended complaint
is one of the causes induced us to infer
of action in the that nothing in the
Complaint, can be said complaint shows
fully settled after a that the action of the
trial on the merits. private respondents
And at this stage, it should be threshed
has not been out in a special
sufficiently proceeding, it
established whether appearing that their
or not there is a allegations were
will.[20] (Emphasis substantially for the
supplied.) enforcement of their
rights against the
alleged fraudulent
The above Order, and a acts committed by
subsequent Order dated May 16, the petitioner Ramon
Ching. The private
2007 denying the petitioners' respondents also
Motion for Reconsideration, instituted the said
became the subjects of a petition amended complaint
for certiorari filed with the CA. The in order to protect
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP them from the

124
consequence of the over the subject
fraudulent acts of matter is determined
Ramon Ching by by the allegations of
seeking to disqualify the complaint without
Ramon Ching from regard to whether or
inheriting from not the private
Antonio Ching as respondents
well as to enjoin him (plaintiffs) are
from disposing or entitled to recover
alienating the subject upon all or some of
properties, including the causes of action
the P4 Million deposit asserted therein. In
with Metrobank. The this regard, the
intestate or probate jurisdiction of the
court has no court does not
jurisdiction to depend upon the
adjudicate such issues, defenses pleaded in
which must be the answer or in the
submitted to the court motion to dismiss,
in the exercise of its lest the question of
general jurisdiction as jurisdiction would
a regional trial almost entirely
court. Furthermore, w depend upon the
e agree with the trial petitioners
court that the probate (defendants).[22] Henc
court could not take e, we focus our
cognizance of the resolution on the issue
prayer to disinherit of jurisdiction on the
Ramon Ching, given allegations in the
the undisputed fact amended complaint
that there was no will and not on the
to be contested in a defenses pleaded in
probate court. the motion to dismiss
or in the subsequent
The petition at bench pleadings of the
apparently cavils the petitioners.
subject amended
complaint and In fine, under the
complicates the issue circumstances of the
of jurisdiction by present case, there
reiterating the grounds being no compelling
or defenses set up in reason to still subject
the petitioners' earlier the action of the
pleadings. petitioners in a
Notwithstanding, the ju special proceeding
risdiction of the court since the nullification

125
 of the subject (A) FILIATIONS WITH
documents could be
ANTONIO OF
achieved in the civil
case, the lower court RAMON, JAIME AND
should proceed to JOSEPH; (B) RIGHTS
evaluate the evidence OF COMMON-LAW
of the parties and WIVES, LUCINA AND
render a decision
MERCEDES, TO BE
thereon upon the
issues that it defined CONSIDERED AS
during the pre-trial in HEIRS OF ANTONIO;
Civil Case No. 02- (C) DETERMINATION
105251.[23] (emphasis OF THE EXTENT OF
supplied)
ANTONIO'S ESTATE;
AND (D) OTHER
The petitioners' Motion for MATTERS WHICH
Reconsideration was denied by the CAN ONLY BE
CA through a Resolution[24] issued RESOLVED IN A
on July 8, 2010. SPECIAL
PROCEEDING AND
The Issue NOT IN AN
ORDINARY CIVIL
The instant Petition for Review ACTION.
on Certiorari[25] is anchored on the
issue of: The petitioners argue that
only a probate court has the
WHETHER OR NOT authority to determine (a) who are
THE RTC SHOULD the heirs of a decedent; (b) the
HAVE GRANTED THE validity of a waiver of hereditary
MOTION TO DISMISS rights; (c) the status of each heir;
FILED BY THE and (d) whether the property in the
PETITIONERS ON inventory is conjugal or the
THE ALLEGED exclusive property of the deceased
GROUND OF THE spouse.[26] Further, the extent of
RTC'S LACK OF Antonio's estate, the status of the
JURISDICTION OVER contending parties and the
THE SUBJECT respondents' alleged entitlement as
MATTER OF THE heirs to receive the proceeds of
AMENDED Antonio's CPPA now in Metrobank's
COMPLAINT, TO WIT, custody are matters which are more

126
appropriately the subjects of a
special proceeding and not of an
ordinary civil action.
The respondents
[27]
opposed the instant petition
claiming that the petitioners are
engaged in forum shopping.
Specifically, G.R.
[28] [29]
175507 and 183840, both
involving the contending parties in
the instant petition were filed by the
petitioners and are currently
pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,[30] the SC
declared that whether a particular
matter should be resolved by the
RTC in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of
procedure. Besides, the petitioners,
having validly submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the RTC and
having actively participated in the
trial of the case, are already
estopped from challenging the
RTC's jurisdiction over
respondents' Complaint
[31]
Amended Complaint.
The Court's Ruling
We resolve to deny
instant petition.
The petitioners failed to
comply with a lawful order of this
Court directing them to file their
reply to the respondents'
Comment/Opposition to the instant
Petition. While the prescribed
period to comply expired on March
15, 2011, the petitioners filed their
Manifestation that they will no
longer file a reply only on October
Nos. 10, 2011 or after the lapse of
almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors
were committed by the RTC and
the CA when they both ruled that
the denial of the petitioners' second
motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the
procedural allegations of the
respondents that the petitioners
engaged in forum shopping and are
already estopped from questioning
the RTC's jurisdiction after having
validly submitted to it when the
latter participated in the
proceedings, the denial of the
the instant Petition is still in
and order. Although the respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought, among others, the
disinheritance of Ramon and the
release in favor of the respondents
the of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case
No. 02-105251 remains to be an
ordinary civil action, and not a
127
special proceeding pertaining to a
settlement court.
An action for reconveyance
and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of
Court.[32] A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.[33] It is distinguished
from an ordinary civil action where
a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.[34] To initiate a special
proceeding, a petition and not a
complaint should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the
NCC, disinheritance can be
effected only through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. This Court agrees with
the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and
Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or
any instrument supposedly effecting
the disposition of Antonio's estate
was ever mentioned. Hence,
despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-
105251 does not partake of the
nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue
that the prayers in the Amended
Complaint, seeking the release in
favor of the respondents of the
CPPA under Metrobank's custody
and the nullification of the
instruments subject of the
complaint, necessarily require the
determination of the respondents'
status as Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what
the respondents prayed for was that
they be declared as the rightful
owners of the CPPA which was in
Mercedes' possession prior to the
execution of the Agreement and
Waiver. The respondents also
prayed for the alternative relief of
securing the issuance by the RTC
of a hold order relative to the CPPA
to preserve Antonio's deposits with
Metrobank during the pendency of
the case. It can thus be said that
the respondents' prayer relative to
the CPPA was premised on
Mercedes' prior possession of and
their alleged collective ownership of
the same, and not on the
declaration of their status as
Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has
128
to be emphasized that the plaintiff is entitled to
respondents were parties to the recover upon all or
some of the claims
execution of the Agreement[35] and asserted therein. As a
Waiver[36] prayed to be nullified. necessary
Hence, even without the necessity consequence, the
of being declared as heirs of jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to
Antonio, the respondents have the
depend upon the
standing to seek for the nullification defenses set up in the
of the instruments in the light of answer or upon the
their claims that there was no motion to dismiss, for
consideration for their execution, otherwise, the question
of jurisdiction would
and that Ramon exercised undue
almost entirely depend
influence and committed fraud upon the defendant.
against them. Consequently, the What determines the
respondents then claimed that the jurisdiction of the court
Affidavit of Extra-Judicial is the nature of the
action pleaded as
Settlement of Antonios estate
appearing from the
executed by Ramon, and the TCTs allegations in the
issued upon the authority of the complaint. The
said affidavit, are null and void as averments in the
well. Ramon's averment that a complaint and the
character of the relief
resolution of the issues raised shall
sought are the matters
first require a declaration of the to be consulted.
respondents' status as heirs is a
mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall In sum, this Court agrees with
properly exercise jurisdiction. the CA that the nullification of the
documents subject of Civil Case
In Marjorie Cadimas v. No. 02-105251 could be achieved
Marites Carrion and Gemma in an ordinary civil action, which in
Hugo,[37] the Court declared: this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the
It is an elementary rule supposedly fraudulent acts of
of procedural law that Ramon. In the event that the RTC
jurisdiction of the court
will find grounds to grant the reliefs
over the subject matter
is determined by the prayed for by the respondents, the
allegations of the only consequence will be the
complaint irrespective reversion of the properties subject
of whether or not the

129
of the dispute to the estate of Comment/Opposition to the instant
Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251 petition are NOTED.
was not instituted to conclusively
resolve the issues relating to the
administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's SO ORDERED.
estate, hence, not the proper
subject of a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person under Rules 73-
91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an

ordinary civil action before the RTC
may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding
should thereafter still follow, if their
intent is to recover from Ramon the
properties alleged to have been
illegally transferred in his name. Be
that as it may, the RTC, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction,
cannot be restrained from taking
cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint
as the issues raised and the
prayers indicated therein are
matters which need not be threshed
out in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant

petition is DENIED. The petitioners'
(a) Opposition to the respondents'
Motion to Admit Substitution of
Party;[38] and (b)
[39]
Manifestation through counsel
that they will no longer file a reply to
the respondents'

130
 ART 919
G.R. No. 7890 September
29, 1914
FILOMENA PECSON, as
administratix of the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson,
et al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSARIO
MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that
some time prior to the 17th day of
September, 1910, the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson was
presented to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay
for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an
attorney at law, opposed the
legislation of the will on the ground
that it had not been authorized nor
signed by the deceased, in
accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure. After
hearing the respective parties, the
Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge,
found that the will had been signed
and executed in accordance with
the provisions of law, and denied
the opposition on the 17th day of
September, 1910.
On the 18th day of September,
1910, the said Tomas Lorayes,
representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a
motion in the words following:
1. That Rosario Mediavillo is
and Joaquin Mediavillo was a
legitimate child of the
deceased Teresa Pecson,
who also was a daughter of
the testator, Florencio
Pecson, and therefore the
first mentioned is and the
second was a grandchild of
the latter.
2. That the said
granddaughter, Rosario
Mediavillo y Pecson, was
disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator
Florencio Pecson, according
to clause 3 of the will,
because she failed to show
him due respect and on a
certain occasion raised her
hand against him.
3. That the interested party
did not commit such an act,
and if perhaps she did, it was
due to the derangement of
her mental faculties which
occurred a long time ago and
from which she now suffers in
periodical attacks.
By reason of all the foregoing
and because the disinheriting
clause 3 of the will is
unfounded, the undersigned
prays the court to annul the
said clause and to make the
testator's died without
succession, but is
represented now by his
father, Basiliso Mediavillo),
participants in the estate left
by their grandfather; and,
finally, that the court grant
such other relief as it may
deem just and equitable.
After a consideration of the
question presented by said motion,
the lower court, on the 22d day of
131
September, 1911, rendered the
following decision:
This case has come up to-
day for a hearing on the
declaration of heirs of the
decease Florencio Pecson,
who died in Daraga, about
the year 1910.
From the evidence it appears
that the deceased had eight
children by his wife Nicolasa
Manjares, likewise deceased,
which children are those
named Emerenciano, Teresa,
Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino,
Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto,
all surnamed Pecson. It also
appears that Rufino Pecson
absented himself from these
Islands twenty-five years ago,
going to Australia, and that
nothing has been heard of
him for the past twenty years.
The said Rufino Pecson left
no children in the Philippines
and was unmarried when he
emigrated. As nothing has
been heard of him for twenty
years, it is presumed that he
died and it is held that the
part of this estate to which he
was entitled must be divided
among the other heirs.
It also appears from the
evidence that Teresa Pecson
married Basiliso Mediavillo,
by whom she had two
children, Joaquin and
Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa
also died, leaving these two
children and her husband,
Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son
Joaquin died, unmarried and
childless, before the death of
the testator, Florencio
Pecson. Rosario is the only
living daughter of Teresa and
the latter's husband, Basiliso
Mediavillo, is also living. The
evidence shows that this girl
Rosario became insane in
1895, when she went to
Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been
proved that it was previous to
this date that she disobeyed
her grandfather and raised
her hand against him, and, as
the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. This court
understands that this
Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly
afterwards became insane,
was not responsible for her
acts and should not have
been disinherited by her
grandfather.
The court therefore decrees
that this part of the will is
contrary to law and sets it
aside as being of no force or
value whatever. The court
further holds that Rosario
Mediavillo, the daughter of
Teresa Pecson, is the heiress
of the one-half of the share of
this estate pertaining to the
said Teresa, and that her
father, as the heir of his son
Joaquin, also Teresa's son, is
the heris of the other one-half
of the said share pertaining to
Teresa — that is, of the one-
seventh of this estate that
pertains to the latter.
Moreover, the court decrees
132
 that, besides the two heirs
just above mentioned,
Emerciano, Filomena,
Asuncion, Zoila, Emiliano,
and Perfecto, surnamed
Pecson, and the children of
Teresa, are also heirs of the
estate of Florencio Pecson.
From the decision the plaintiff
appealed to this court and made the
following assignments of error:
FIRST ERROR
The lower court erred in
finding that the part of the will
which disinherits Rosario
Mediavillo is contrary to law,
and in setting it aside as
being of no force or value
whatever.
SECOND ERROR
The lower court erred by
decreeing that Basaliso
Mediavillo, the father of
Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir
by representation of the one-
half of the one seventh of this
estate pertaining to Joaquin
Mediavillo.
With reference to the first
assignment of error it may be said
that from the record it appears that
during the lifetime of Florencio
Pecson he had been married to
Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he
had eight children, named
Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila,
Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto,
Rufino and Teresa Pecson; that
before the death of Florencio
Pecson he executed and delivered
the will in question. The will made
no provision for the said Rufino
Pecson, neither was there any
provision in the will for the said
Teresa. All of the other children
were named as heirs in said will. It
appears that Teresa had been
married with one Basiliso
Mediavillo, and that some time
before the making of the will in
question she died, leaving her
husband and two children, Joaquin
Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo,
as her heirs. It also appears from
the record that Joaquin Mediavillo
died without heirs, leaving as the
only heirs of the said Teresa
Pecson, her husband, Basilio
Mediavillo and the said Rosario
Mediavillo. The said Joaquin
Mediavillo died before his
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and
probably before the will in question
was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited
Rosario Mediavillo in the following
language:
I declare that one of my
daughters, named Teresa,
now deceased, left a
legitimate daughter named
Rosario Mediavillo. I also
declare that I disinherit my
granddaughter, the said
Rosario Mediavillo, because
she was grossly disrespectful
to me and because on one
occasion, when it was I do
not remember, she raised her
hand against me. Therefore,
it is my will that the said
Rosario Mediavillo shall have
no share in my property.
133
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo,
in the motion which she presented
and which is copied above, alleges
that she was disinherited without
case. Upon a consideration of that
question, the lower court found that
she had been disinherited without
cause and annulled said paragraph
3 of the will. That order of the lower
court constitutes the error
complained of by the appellant in
her first assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3
above quoted, it will be seen that
Florencio Pecson disinherited the
said Rosario Mediavillo "because
she was grossly disrespectful to me
and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she
raised her hand against me.
Therefore it is my will that she, the
said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have
no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof the
question of the responsibility of the
said Rosario Mediavillo at the time
she offered the offense to her
grandfather, Florencio Pecson.
After hearing the proof, the lower
court reached the following
conclusion:
The evidence shows that this
girl Rosario became insane in
1895, when she went to
Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been
proved that it was previous to
this date that she disobeyed
her grandfather and raised
her hand against him, and, as
the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. This court
understands that this
Rosario, who was then 14
years of age, and who shortly
afterwards became insane,
was not responsible for her
acts and should not have
been disinherited by her
grandfather.
The first assignment of error
presents the question whether or
not the courts, when a parent
disinherits his children, may inquire
into the cause of the disinheritance
and decide that there was or was
not ground for such disinheritance.
The Civil Code (art. 848) provides
that disinheritance shall only take
place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. In
accordance with the provisions of
that article (848) we find that
articles 756 and 853 provide the
cases or causes for disinheritance;
or, in other words, the cases or
causes in which the ancestors may
by will disinherit their heirs. Article
849 of the Civil Code provides that
the disinheritance can only be
effected by the testament, in which
shall be mentioned the legal
grounds or causes for such
disinheritance. If it is true that heirs
can be disinherited only by will, and
for causes mentioned in the Civil
Code, it would seen to follow that
the courts might properly inquire
whether the disinheritance has
been made properly and for the
causes provided for by law. The
right of the courts to inquire into the
causes and whether there was
sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be
supported by express provisions of
the Civil Code. Article 850 provides
134
that "the proof of the truthfulness of
the reason for disinheritance shall
be established by the heirs of the
testator, should the disinherited
person deny it." It would appear
then that if the person disinherited
should deny the truthfulness of the
cause of disinheritance, he might
be permitted to support his
allegation by proof. The right of the
court to inquire whether or not the
disinheritance was made for just
cause is also sustained by the
provisions of article 851, which in
part provides that:
Disinheritance made without
statement of the reason, or
for a cause the truth of which,
if contradicted, should not be
proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so
far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-
quoted provisions, that the courts
may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was
attempted in the present case, and
if they find that the disinheritance
was without cause, that part of the
testament or will may be
pronounced null and void. It
remains, however, to be seen
whether the evidence adduced
during the trial of the present cause
was sufficient to show that the
disinheritance made in paragraph 3
of the will was made for just cause.
It appears from the record that
when Rosario Mediavillo was about
14 years of age, she had received
some attentions from a young man
— that she had received a letter
from him — and that her
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took
occasion to talk to her about the
relations between her and the said
young man; that it was upon that
occasion when, it is alleged, the
disobedience and disrespect were
shown to her grandfather, and that
was the cause for her
disinheritance by her grandfather.
The record shows that very soon
after said event she lost the use of
her mental powers and that she has
never regained them, except for
very brief periods, up to the present
time. The lower court, taking into
consideration her tender years, and
the fact that she very soon
thereafter lost the use of her mental
faculties, reached the conclusion
that she was probably not
responsible for the disrespect and
disobedience shown to her
grandfather in the year 1894 or
1895.
After a careful consideration of the
record, we are inclined to believe
that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court and
that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court that
he did not commit the error
complained of in the first
assignment of error.
With reference to the second
assignment of error, it will be
remembered that Teresa Pecson,
the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at
the time of her death left two
children, Rosario and Joaquin, and
her husband Basiliso Mediavillo,
and that said Joaquin Mediavillo
died without heirs. The lower court
gave one-half of the inheritance of
the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario
135
Mediavillo and the share that would
have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo,
and the share that would have gone
to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father
Basiliso Mediavillo. In that
conclusion of the lower court we
think error was committed. The
appellant relies upon the provisions
of article 925 of the Civil Code, in
his contention that the lower court
committed an error. Article 925
provides that:
The right of representation
shall always take place in the
direct descending line, but
never in the ascending. In
collateral lines, it shall take
place only in favor of the
children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole
or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the
conclusions of the lower court, cites
articles 935 and 936 of the Civil
Code. Article 935 provides that:
In the absence of legitimate
children and descendants of
the deceased, his
ascendants shall inherit from
him, to the exclusion of
collaterals.
Article 936 provides that:
The father and mother, if
living shall inherits share and
share alike. If one of them
only survive, he or she shall
succeed to the son's entire
estate.
It will be remembered that the
whole argument of the appellants
with reference to the first
assignment of error was that
Rosario Mediavillo had been
disinherited and the court evidently
believed that there were no
"legitimate children, descendants of
the deceased, surviving," and that
therefore the father or mother of
said legitimate children would
inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a
descendant in the direct line,
surviving, the inheritance could not
ascend, and for the reason the
lower court committed an error in
declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo
was entitled to inherit that share of
the estate that would have
belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had
he been living. Therefore, and for
all the foregoing, that part of the
judgment of the lower court
nullifying and setting aside
paragraph 3 of the will is hereby
affirmed, and that art of said
judgment which decrees to Basiliso
Mediavillo one-half of the estate of
Florencio Pecson, belonging to
Teresa Pecson and which would
have been given to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving,
is hereby revoked. And without any
findings as to costs, it is hereby
ordered that the cause be
remanded to the lower court, with
direction that judgment be entered
in accordance herewith, and that
such further proceedings be had as
the interested parties may deem
necessary, for the purpose of
disposing of that part of the
inheritance of Teresa Pecson would
have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving.
136
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA
D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch
21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-
SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY
D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with
application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking
the nullification of the orders, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC),
dismissing the petition for probate
on the ground of preterition, in the
consolidated cases, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled,
"In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In
the Matter of the Probate of the Will
of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng
Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and
Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as
follows:
On September 21, 1988, private
respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–
90870 of the RTC, and praying for
the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio–
Santos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy
Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and
Virginia, all surnamed Seangio,
opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still
very healthy and in full command of
her faculties; 2) the deceased
Segundo executed a general power
of attorney in favor of Virginia giving
her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision
over his business in the Philippines;
3) Virginia is the most competent
and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified
public accountant; and, 4) Segundo
left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting
one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view
of the purported holographic will,
petitioners averred that in the event
the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to
be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the
probate of the holographic will of
Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 99–93396, was filed by
petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate
137
proceedings should take the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko
precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98– at ng anak ko si Virginia.
90870 because testate proceedings
take precedence and enjoy priority Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon
over intestate proceedings.2 ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak
ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng
The document that petitioners refer lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo
to as Segundo’s holographic will is at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko
quoted, as follows: siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana.
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng
Tantunin ng sinuman Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng
Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino
may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A (signed)
Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag- Segundo Seangio
iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at
hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at Nilagdaan sa harap namin
anumang mana ang paganay kong
anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil (signed)
siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin
at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
masama harapan ko at mga kapatid
niya na si Virginia Seangio labis Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
kong kinasama ng loob ko at
sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako (signed)
nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin
ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at ikatlong saksi
siya nasa ibabaw.
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870
ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were
pagalan para makapagutang na consolidated.4
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si
On July 1, 1999, private
Merna de los Reyes sa China
respondents moved for the
Bangking Corporation na millon
dismissal of the probate
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi
proceedings5 primarily on the
ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa
ground that the document
aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga
purporting to be the holographic will
may-ari at stockholders ng China
of Segundo does not contain any
Banking.
disposition of the estate of the
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha deceased and thus does not meet
ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na the definition of a will under Article
mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of 783 of the Civil Code. According to

138
private respondents, the will only
shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else; that all other compulsory heirs
were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence,
there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the
case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally
the court is called upon to rule only
on the extrinsic validity of the will, it
is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the
face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to
the motion to dismiss contending
that: 1) generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a
determination of the extrinsic
validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic
and not the extrinsic validity of the
will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because
Segundo’s will does not constitute a
universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more
6
compulsory heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC
issued its assailed order, dismissing
the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed
as "will" by oppositors/petitioners
Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
shows that there is preterition, as
the only heirs mentioned thereat
are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other
heirs being omitted, Article 854 of
the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy
Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article
854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to
dismiss this petition, for to do
otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme
Court in the case of Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [155
SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its
position clear: "for … respondents
to have tolerated the probate of the
will and allowed the case to
progress when, on its face, the will
appears to be intrinsically void …
would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste
of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was
resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings
No. 99–93396 is hereby
DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied by the
139
RTC in its order dated October 14,
1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE
ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING
THE QUESTIONED ORDERS,
DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14
OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS
"A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE,
WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING
WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT ON THE PROPER
PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE
ON THE ALLEGED GROUND
THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS
VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF
THE EXISTENCE OF
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES
INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED
ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES
PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE
OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT
NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND
THAT THE WILL IS BOTH
INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS
DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING
THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not
comply with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to:
a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance
thereof, and cause notice of such
time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous
to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation;
and, b) cause the mailing of said
140
notice to the heirs, legatees and
devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does
not contain any institution of an
heir, but rather, as its title clearly
states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, simply contains a disinherited by Segundo.
disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the
decedent’s will and the holographic
will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his
compulsory heirs, petitioners and
private respondents alike, with the
sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit
his estate. None of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line of Segundo
were preterited in the holographic
will since there was no institution of
an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly
appears from the face of the
holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid,
respondent judge was mandated to
proceed with the hearing of the
testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the
proceedings in the intestate case
will work injustice to petitioners, and
will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of
Segundo that was presented by
petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground
of preterition, private respondents
did not raise any issue as regards
the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan
ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo’s
intention of excluding his eldest
son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate
for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was
For disinheritance to be valid,
Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the
legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that
were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can
be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter
presents a sufficient cause for the
disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be
sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
(1) When a child or
descendant has been found
guilty of an attempt against
the life of the testator, his or
her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or
descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or
141
 more, if the accusation has
been found groundless;
(3) When a child or
descendant has been
convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse
of the testator;
(4) When a child or
descendant by fraud,
violence, intimidation, or
undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(5) A refusal without
justifiable cause to support
the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or
descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the
testator by word or deed, by
the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or
descendant leads a and within the limits prescribed by
dishonorable or disgraceful
life;
(8) Conviction of a crime
which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be
determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic
will.
A holographic will, as provided
under Article 810 of the Civil Code,
must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it
may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic
will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to
dispose mortis causa[9] can be
clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does
not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition
in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence
of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental
principle that the intent or the will of
the testator, expressed in the form
law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed
to ascertain and give effect to that
intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary
to law, morals, or public policy that
it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being
usually prepared by one who is not
learned in the law, as illustrated in
the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking
into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the
142
testator.12 In this regard, the Court
is convinced that the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended
by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed
by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated,13 the
disinheritance cannot be given
effect.14
With regard to the issue on
preterition,15 the Court believes that
the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It
was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the
exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and
his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
In view of the foregoing, the trial
court, therefore, should have
allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same
purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999
and October 14, 1999, are set
aside. Respondent judge is directed
to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No.
99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo
Seangio. The intestate case or SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby
suspended until the termination of
the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Considering that the questioned

document is Segundo’s holographic
will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the
will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Thus, unless the will is probated,
the right of a person to dispose of
his property may be rendered
nugatory.17

143
 ART 960 In addition, the will contained the following
controversial bequest (paragraphing
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979 supplied to facilitate comprehension of the
testamentary provisions):
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. Doy y dejo como legado
THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, terreno palayeros situados
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant, en el municipiooo de
vs. Guimba de la provinciaaa de
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num.
FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and de CERTIFICADO DE
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE TRANSFERENCIA DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees. TITULO SON; — Titulo
Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m.
cuadrados de superficie
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants.
Titulo Num. 6548, mide
242,998 m. cuadrados de
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee. superficie y annual 6525,
mide 62,665 m. cuadrados
de superficie; y Titulo Num.
6521, mide 119,251 m.
AQUINO, J.: cuadrados de superficie;
a cualquier pariente mio
This case is about the efficaciousness or varon mas cercano que
enforceability of a devise of ricelands estudie la carrera eclesiatica
located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total hasta ordenarse de
area of around forty- four hectares That Presbiterado o sea
devise was made in the will of the late Sacerdote; las condiciones
Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria de estate legado son;
Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative
who would study for the priesthood. (1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la
venta de estos terrenos
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to arriba situados objectos de
be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to este legado;
this Court from the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the order of the probate (2.a) Que el legatario
court declaring that the said devise was pariente mio mas cercano
inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the tendra derecho de empezar
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, a gozar y administrar de este
CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963). legado al principiar a curzar
la Sagrada Teologio, y
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the ordenado de Sacerdote,
parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on hasta su muerte; pero que
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on pierde el legatario este
October 29, 1933 which was probated by derecho de administrar y
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its gozar de este legado al dejar
order of December 5, 1935. Named as de continuar sus estudios
devisees in the will were the testators para ordenarse de
nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-
Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The Que el legatario una vez
testator gave a devise to his cousin, Sacerdote ya estara
Fortunato Gamalinda. obligado a celebrar cada año
VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas
en sufragio de mi alma y de
mis padres difuntos, y si el

144
 actual legatario, quedase Title Lot Area in Tax Ass.
excomulgado, IPSO FACTO No. No. Has. Dec. Value
se le despoja este legado, y
la administracion de esto T- 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00
pasara a cargo del actual 6530
Parroco y sus sucesores de
la Iglecia Catolica de T- 3445- 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
Victoria, Tarlac. 6548 C

T- 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00

Y en intervalo de tiempo que
no haya legatario
acondicionado segun lo
arriba queda expresado,
pasara la administracion de
este legado a cargo del
actual Parroco Catolico y
sus sucesores, de Victoria,
Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de
estate legado, acumulara,
anualmente todos los
productos que puede tener
estate legado, ganando o
sacando de los productos
anuales el CINCO (5) por
ciento para su
administracion, y los
derechos correspondientes
de las VEINTE (20) Misas
rezadas que debiera el
Parroco celebrar cada año,
depositando todo lo restante
de los productos de estate
legado, en un banco, a
nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the
administratix in 1940 submitted a project
containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE
CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in
favor of the legacy purported
to be given to the nearest
male relative who shall take
the priesthood, and in the
interim to be administered by
the actual Catholic Priest of
the Roman Catholic Church
of Victoria, Tarlac,
Philippines, or his
successors, the real
properties hereinbelow
indicated, to wit:
6525
T- 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00
6521
Total amount and value — 44.1163
P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August
15, 1940, approving the project of partition,
directed that after payment of the obligations
of the estate (including the sum of
P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria
parish) the administratrix should deliver to
the devisees their respective shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and
Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the
meaning and implications of Father Rigor's
bequest to his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as
no nephew of the testator claimed the
devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to
that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding
remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of
the project of partition, or on February 19,
1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the
pending testate proceeding a petition
praying for the appointment of a new
administrator (succeeding the deceased
administration Florencia Rigor), who should
deliver to the church the said ricelands, and
further praying that the possessors thereof
be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits. The probate court granted the petition.
A new administrator was appointed. On
January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed
another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor
countered with a petition dated March 25,

145
1957 praying that the bequest be d
inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
persons entitled to the said ricelands since,
as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria,
"no nearest male relative of" the testator
"has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25
and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition
was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the
lower court, through Judge Bernabe de
Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative
and adjudicated the ricelands to the
testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28,
1957. The parish priest filed two motions for
reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond
motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the
testator had a grandnephew named
Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his
first cousin) who was a seminarian in the
San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in
Quezon City. The administrator was directed
to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of
Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that
Father Rigor had created a testamentary
trust for his nearest male relative who would
take the holy orders but that such trust could
exist only for twenty years because to
enforce it beyond that period would violate
"the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that
since no legatee claimed the ricelands
within twenty years after the testator's death,
the same should pass to his legal heirs,
citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil
Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
that the testator created a public charitable
trust and in not liberally construing the
testamentary provisions so as to render the
trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the
Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative
because no one among the testator's
nearest male relatives had studied for the
priesthood and not because the trust was a
private charitable trust. According to the
legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on
this Court. They point out that appellant
priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of
contracts and statutory construction, where
the intention of the contracting parties or of
the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the
primary issue is the determination of the
testator's intention which is the law of the
case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs.
Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs.
Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments.
When his intention is clearly and precisely
expressed, any interpretation must be in
accord with the plain and literal meaning of
his words, except when it may certainly
appear that his intention was different from
that literally expressed (In re Estate of
Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule
in the construction of wills." It is "the life and
soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the
sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving
effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice
Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil.
209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the
testamentary provisions is that "the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from
the words of the wilt taking into
consideration the circumstances under
which it was made", but excluding the
testator's oral declarations as to his intention
(Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may
be useful to make the following re-statement
of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to
anyone of his nearest male relatives who
would pursue an ecclesiastical career until
his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the
ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his
studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
administer the ricelands, and once ordained
146
as a priest, he could continue enjoying and
administering the same up to the time of his
death but the devisee would cease to enjoy
and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he
would be obligated to celebrate every year
twenty masses with prayers for the repose
of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated,
he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to
the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and
his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there
is no qualified devisee as contemplated
above, the administration of the ricelands
would be under the responsibility of the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his
successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the
ricelands would accumulate annually the
products thereof, obtaining or getting from
the annual produce five percent thereof for
his administration and the fees
corresponding to the twenty masses with
prayers that the parish priest would
celebrate for each year, depositing the
balance of the income of the devise in the
bank in the name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions,
it may be deduced that the testator intended
to devise the ricelands to his nearest male
relative who would become a priest, who
was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who
would lose the devise if he discontinued his
studies for the priesthood, or having been
ordained a priest, he was excommunicated,
and who would be obligated to say annually
twenty masses with prayers for the repose
of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during
the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was
excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el
intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the
testator's death would it be determined that
he had a nephew who would pursue an
ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent
ambiguity that has brought about the
controversy between the parish priest of
Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision
is the time when the nearest male relative
who would study for the priesthood should
be determined. Did the testator contemplate
only his nearest male relative at the time of
his death? Or did he have in mind any of his
nearest male relatives at anytime after his
death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the
testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite
time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated
to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must
be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be
sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to the testator's
nearest male relative at anytime after his
death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have
been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest
leagal heirs were his three sisters or
second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs.
Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously,
when the testator specified his nearest male
relative, he must have had in mind his
nephew or a son of his sister, who would be
his third-degree relative, or possibly a
grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or
state with certitude what category of nearest
male relative would be living at the time of
his death, he could not specify that his
nearest male relative would be his nephew
or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or
niece) and so he had to use the term
"nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the
said devise was in reality intended for
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Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew
and godchild, who was the son of his sister,
Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention,
the legal heirs presented in the lower court
the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the
maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan,
who deposed that after Father Rigor's death
her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did
not claim the devise, although he was
studying for the priesthood at the San
Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz)
knew that Father Rigor had intended that
devise for his nearest male relative beloning
to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on
Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her
own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was
not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's
will and that Edgardo's father told her that
he was not consulted by the parish priest of
Victoria before the latter filed his second
motion for reconsideration which was based
on the ground that the testator's
grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for
the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this
juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the
legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals
that the probate court's order adjudicating
the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria
had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which
is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the
testator's intention and which is hearsay,
has no probative value. Our opinion that the
said bequest refers to the testator's nephew
who was living at the time of his death,
when his succession was opened and the
successional rights to his estate became
vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased
reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier
pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie
la camera eclesiatica" would include
indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have
so specified in his will He must have known
that such a broad provision would suspend
for an unlimited period of time the
efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el
intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is
that he was referring to a situation whereby
his nephew living at the time of his death,
who would like to become a priest, was still
in grade school or in high school or was not
yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands before the nephew entered the
seminary. But the moment the testator's
nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer
the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof.
In that event, the trusteeship would be
terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the
inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who
was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the
ecclesiastical career. That query is
categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19,
1954 and January 31, 1957. He
unequivocally alleged therein that "not male
relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor
has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25
and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived
by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest
in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the
ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public
charitable trust was constituted by the
testator in is favor assumes that he was a
trustee or a substitute devisee That
contention is untenable. A reading of the
testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest not support the view that
the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or
a substitute devisee in the event that the
testator was not survived by a nephew who
became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish
priest of Victoria could become a trustee
only when the testator's nephew living at the
time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or,
148
having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies
did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator
manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that

this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides
that if "the bequest for any reason should be
inoperative, it shall be merged into the
estate, except in cases of substitution and
those in which the right of accretion exists"
("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga
efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y
derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2)

of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes
place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no
substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed
among the testator's legal heirs. The effect
is as if the testator had made no disposition
as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person

may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The
old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property
recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon
Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate

Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

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