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International Phenomenological Society

The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtyla: On the Problem of the Phenomenological Foundation


of Anthropology
Author(s): Hans Köchler
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Mar., 1982), pp. 326-334
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107489
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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYJLA:
ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL
FOUNDATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Human sciences have become the most promising field of ap-


plication for the phenomenological method. In the sciences con-
cerned with the nature of man, the phenomenological method was
able - being the articulation of immediate experience - to contribute
substantially to the development of the hermeneutical instrumen-
tarium necessary in order to give a sound methodical basis to a theory
of mental contexts and structures that does not solely depend on the
paradigm of "objectivistic" natural sciences. The necessity of such an
instrument becomes, above all, apparent in a (philosophical) an-
thropology concentrated on evolving the specific human nature as
distinct from other modes of being.
Wojtyla's anthropological point of departure' is founded - in
line with a nonobjectivistic, genuine description of the nature of
man -on the "experience lived through" ('Erlebnuis), meaning the
immediate experience of man, anteceding any -secondary -distinc-
tion between what man "does" and what "occurs" within man (the
distinction between the categories of agere and patz).2 "Experience
lived through" as such constitutes the irreducible premise for human
self-comprehension. Referring to it enables us to reach, according to
Wojtyla, full comprehension of human subjectivity and human per-
sonality that may not, under any conditions, be objectified.3 This vir-
tually empirical-phenomenological basis, on which Wojtyla grounds
his anthropology- in some distance from a "metaphysical"-objectivis-
tic viewpoint -should help to articulate more adequately the nature
of the acting man than it has been possible for the traditional non-
phenomenological anthropology. Wojtyla distinguishes between a

'Our interpretation is based mainly on the English translation of Wo


book Osoba i czyn (Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne. Krak6w, 1969), now publish-
ed under the title The Acting Person (Analecta Husserliana, vol. X, Dordrecht-
Boston, 1979), as well as on the papers "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man"
(Analecta Husserliana, vol. VII, 1978, pp. 107-14) and "Participation or Aliena-
tion?" (Analecta Husserliana, vol. VI, 1977, pp. 61-73).
"Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," p. 110.
3Cp. op. cit., p. 112.

326

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYYA 327

comprehension of man in the cosmological sense and an an-


thropological conception, understanding man primarily as subject.
The first (traditional) conception would understand man as object in
a (surrounding) world and thereby reduce, principally, the specific
human nature to the level of the world; the second conception - as
represented by Wojtyla himself is understood as being an articula-
tion of the principal irreducibility of human nature that, being "sub-
jectivity," cannot be reduced to the level of mere objects of the sur-
rounding world.4 Thereby Wojtyla formulates a contradiction to the
traditional Aristotelian definition of the nature of man as being a
t63ov
t.
PonrtKOV. For Wojtyla the aspect of consciousness and
specific subjectivity- that cannot be reduced to empirical ob-
jects -constitutes the essential property of man.
In this sense we may understand Wojtyla's conception as being
phenomenologically founded in its general structure: immediate ex-
perience, as it manifests itself, is taken as the only basis (and point of
departure) of any reflexion on the genuine nature of man. "Ex-
perience lived through" is the phenomenal basis, so to speak, for any
description of the human being. The fact that "experience," in its im-
mediateness, cannot be traced back to something outside the subjec-
tive, does not, according to Wojtyla, imply that experience would be
inaccessible to cognition in the formal-theoretical sense. The ade-
quate form of cognition, therefore, is based on the phenomenological
method that must not remain on the level of mere description, but
should advance to the comprehension of the fundamental structure of
the contents of experience. The phenomenological method, therefore
(according to Wojtyla), serves the philosophical aim of "trans-
phenomenological cognition,"6 as this method reveals the essential
structures of the subjectivity of man.
This implies, according to Wojtyla, that the ultimate truth
about man cannot be found when remaining within the limits of the
(objectivistic) metaphysical level.7 A personalistic conception, em-
phasizing the aspect of consciousness, does not - in this context
-constitute any contradiction to the cosmological conception of man
but, on the contrary, is complementary to it.8 With this position of

4Op. cit., pp. 108-109.


5Op. cit., p. 113.
6Ibid.
7Op. cit., p. 114.
80p. cit., p. 111.

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328 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

"complementarity" the seeming antinomy between subjectivism and


objectivism may be overcome in a sense, as Wojtyla thinks.9 He holds
that it was precisely the approach of phenomenology that has over-
come this antinomy by performing an analysis of consciousness after
the act of the eiroxri 1 0
This methodical examination of consciousness as such ("ex-
perience lived through") does not, however, lead to an ontological
scheme according to which consciousness alone would be said to own
the quality of real being, and any "validity as such" would have to be
ascribed to this "pure consciousness."11 Wojtyla's examination of con-
sciousness -being not "reducible" in its specific quality -is deter-
mined by the methodical necessity of a genuine access to the nature of
man; it does not, however, lead towards an "idealism" in the on-
tological sense. This again means that Wojtyla, in his theory of the
human being -that may be understood as phenomenology of the
relation between consciousness and the dynamism of the acting per-
son12 -departs from a conception of consciousness that is ess
different from, for example, Husserl's phenomenology. Whereas
Husserl founded "empirical" consciousness on a "pure" consciousness
that, in the end, would constitute the dimension of being-real as
such13 (thus also constituting the reality of the world of objects), Wo-
jtyla arrives, by modification of the concept of intentionality,14 at a
rather "realistic" position: he holds that consciousness be not of an in-
tentional nature, but that it rather consists of a mirroring of the pro-
cesses occurring within the acting person.15 An act of consciousness
therefore may not be characterized by an "active" directedness
towards a realm of objects. Intentionality rather, in its strict sense,
appears to be, as to his view, characteristic of the acts of
"knowledge"-knowledge understood hereby as an active com-

9Cp. op. cit., pp. 107-108.


10 Ibid.
" Compare the description of this problem by the author: Die Subjekt-Objekt-
Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phdnomenologie. Meisenheim a.G. 1974.
12This corresponds to the conception of his work "The Acting Person".
13Cp. especially Husserliana, vol. VIII (The Hague, 1959), pp. 281ff, pp.
480ff.
"4Regarding Wojtyla's conception of the intentional act, cp. his paper: "The
Intentional Act and the Human Act, that is, Act and Experience," (Analecta
Husserliana, vol. V, pp. 269ff), and the paper of the author: "The Dialectical Con-
ception of Self-Determination," (Analecta Husserliana, vol. VI, 1977, pp. 75-80).
15Cp. The Acting Person, pp. 31-32.

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYVA 329

prehension of objective reality and in this sense also of a more genuine


character than consciousness. Knowledge, being directed towards an
object, is performing a process of "objectivation" as it would not be
possible in (passive) "consciousness". As distinct from the "inten-
tional" function of knowledge Wojtyla ascribes to consciousness a
reflexive function. The mirroring by the consciousness will in a sense
"subjectivate" the world of the acting man.16 Turning back towards
his own self in this way, the subject only constitutes itself as subject.
Self-reflexion thus is the fundamental condition for the self-
realization of the human being also on the ethical level.17 According
to Wojtyla, however, consciousness must not be taken as something
absolute, for it does not own - as merely being for itself -the
character of reality. In this regard Wojtyla seems to follow the tradi-
tion of "realistic" phenomenology as it has been conceived, for exam-
ple, by Roman Ingarden and Max Scheler.18 (Transcendental
phenomenology as it has been developed by Edmund Husserl since his
'Ideen' may scarcely be seen as being compatible with Wojtyla's con-
ception emphasizing the passivity of consciousness.) Also the concept
of "knowledge" that Wojtyla comprehends as being distinct from
"consciousness," is to be understood-because it includes the notion
of a dynamic intentionality directed towards the object -as following
the tradition of a realistic (though not objectistivic) phenomenology
which, in turn, is not compatible with the concept of "transcenden-
tality," expressing the process of creating the object of perception,
and relating its character of reality to the "pure" subject. Reflexion
essentially determines, according to Wojtyla, the relation between
person and action, reflexion understood as the one quality of con-
sciousness that accompanies the intentional act directed towards the
object, but that remains unintentional in its nature and is only
represented indirectly ('Cz) 7rspe'pyc') in the act of thinking (h
may see an affinity to Franz Brentano's conception of "secondary con-
sciousness").
In his phenomenological description Wojtyla differentiates,
however, between "action" and "activation" (processes related to the

16Cp. op. cit., pp. 42-43.


17Cp. Op. cit., pp. 48-49.
18Regarding Wojtyla's interpretation of Scheler-within the framework of
Christian ethics-compare his book: Ocena moVliwoSci zbudowania elyki chrzesi-
Ianskzej przy zalaoeniach syslemu Maksa Schelera ('On the Possibility of Creating
Christian Ethics Based on the Assumptions of the System of Max Scheler'). Towar-
zystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin, 1959.

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330 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

"somatovegetative" level, that cannot become accessible to introspec-


tion.) This distinction corresponds to the differentiation between
(reflexive) subjectivity and (pre-reflexive) "subjectiveness. " Conscious
acting of man (connected with an experience of "effecting"
something) implies, according to Wojtyla, a free act of decision.
Antecedent to the conscious act is, however, the "potentiality" of the
human being. In this "potentiality" he differentiates between a
"psychoemotive" and a "somatovegetative" level.19 The pre-reflexive
unity of "life" on the somatic level is the fundamental condition for
the possibility of any kind of consciousness. The variety of poten-
tialities of the individual human being is determined by this pre-
reflexive dimension, and not by "consciousness" that is characterized
by its dimension of passivity and thus is only originated at a later stage
of the process of human self-realization: "Consciousness does not con-
stitute the inner structure of the human dynamism itself."20 This
leads Wojtyla to the formulation of the concept of the "unconscious"
("subconsciousness") in his system of a personalistic anthropology.
The unconscious, according to Wojtyla, establishes the inner con-
tinuity of the subject's flux of experiences (that is: its identity) and, at
the same time, determines the subject's internal experience of time.
The objectivation of this unconscious realm -which, though being
prior to consciousness, does not represent, however, a higher level of
values-is, as Wojtyla states, the main task of ethics. (The
"somatovegetative" level Wojtyla asserts, nevertheless, to be prin-
cipally inacessible -to consciousness and thus inaccessible to objectiva-
tion, which means that this realm may not be subjected to ethical
evaluation).
In his "phenomenology of action," as Wojtyla's personalistic
conception has been characterized also,21 the point of departure is the
(immediate) phenomenal "situatedness" of man as it manifests itself
in the context of the acting in the world. The experience of the real,
i.e., effective character of the action represents for Wojtyla such a
phenomenal datum. At the same time WojtyYa realizes that the in-
tegration of the person into the contextual framework of its acts may
be possible only if the "objectivation" of one's own self (qua "self-
knowledge') is based on the "potentiality" of the human existence

'9Cp. The Acting Person, pp. 90-91.


20Cp. op. cit., p. 93.
2'Andrzej P61twaski, Ethical Action and Consciousness. Philosophical and
Psychiatric Perspectives (Analecta Husserliana, vol. VII, 1978, p. 142).

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYYA 331

that antecedes any reflexive act. The coherence of self-knowledge and


consciousness is, as to Wojtyla's view, the condition for the
equilibrium of the "inner" life of the person.22 (This corresponds to
WojtyYa's general phenomenological differentiation between
knowledge and consciousness.) This implies that self-reflexion can-
not be a formal representation of the acts of consciousness in their
specific structure, but must be viewed within the global context of the
active self-realization of the person.
Against this background the general traits of a
"phenomenological anthropology" may be defined as Wojtyla has
worked them out in his philosophical writings.23 The
phenomenological method demands a rather "empirical" proceeding
oriented on the facts of the concrete self-realization of the acting per-
son. The "experience lived through" thus is to be accepted (as we
have indicated already) as the point of departure for a genuine theory
of the human being.24 As the "given" in the sense of the qc sw6oicror
it is prior to the "metaphysical" distinction between subject and ob-
ject (those categories being the modes of existence of the concrete
world). The specific character of man as manifested in his personality
becomes apparent by precisely this methodical procedure: the
methodical emphasis on the "experience lived through" will not per-
mit to comprehend man simply as an object among other objects of
the empirical world. An analysis of the structures of this "experience"
will lead rather to a comprehension of the human personality as a
subjectivity that cannot be reduced to mere objects (i.e., objects of
the empirically experienced world). "Personalism," in this context,
means that it is not possible to define the fundamental structures of
the human being by subsuming man under a universal "nature" in
the cosmological sense. This nonobjectivistic approach implies, at the
same time, that man, in his genuine mode of being, may not be
reduced to the level of the "world." Thus the classical metaphysical
systems characterizing the human being mainly as an animal en-
dowed with some "additional" qualities (in line with the Aristotelian

22The Acting Person, p. 37.


23In addition to the works mentioned above we refer in our interpretation also
to Wojtyla's paper, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination" (Tommaso
d'Aquino nel suo VII centenario-Congresso Internazionale, Roma-Napoli,
17-24 Aprile 1974). A further exposition of his anthropological system was an-
nounced by him under the title "Person-Subject and Community" (unpublished
manuscript).
24Cp. "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," pp. 110-11.

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332 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

definition of the human being as animal rationale) have to be ques-


tioned. This understanding of the "irreducibility" of the human
nature leads to an original comprehension of "subjectivity" as a mode
of being which is based upon itself and thus guarantees freedom
understood as personal self-determination.
All the same, Wojtyla's conception does not allow us (as we have
been trying to demonstrate) to visualize consciousness as something
absolute in the ontological sense. This means a continuation of the
realistic tradition of phenomenology and, at the same time, renounc-
ing the reification of an empirical and finite consciousness by
hypostatizing it to a so-called "pure" consciousness which is
understood then as fundamental dimension of reality (of being
"real") (as it is expressed in Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology). Transcendentality as the ontological focus of the
"world-constitution" of the subject cannot be justified on the basis of
a realistic point of departure from which Wojtyla starts out himself.
The systematic relevance of the transcendental unity of the subject is
replaced in his phenomenological system rather by the "potentiality"
of the human being25 that is prior -in the two dimensions described
above -to the acts of consciousness (as their fundamental precondi-
tion). This means a substantial limitation of a purely "formal" ra-
tionality, which is not apt--because of its contingency as something
that is coming into existence only after the original factors of acting
have emerged from the core of the personality -to determine the in-
ner structure of the various potentialities of the individual human be-
ing. As much as reflexion may be necessary to add an ethical dimen-
sion to the process of human self-realization, reflexion does not con-
stitute the quality of being "real." Therefore Wojtyla holds the view
that consciousness is of a merely passive character (following thereby
the tradition of "classical" descriptive phenomenology, but contradict-
ing, however, the phenomenology of "transcendental constitution").
Consciousness is, according to Wojtyla, a merely concomitant
phenomenon, a "mirroring" of the intentional act which directs itself
actively towards the object. Therefore - as we have elaborated
above - the mode of intentionality may not be ascribed to con-
sciousness itself; for intentionality is only the specific mode of im-
mediate, object-directed "knowledge." This implies that a
"transcendental reduction," restricting phenomenological descrip-
tion to phenomena of a "pure consciousness," is not introduced into

25Cp. The Acting Person, p. 91

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF KAROL WOJTYYA 333

the phenomenological system. For this would lead to a circle of self-


reflexion, i.e., to consciousness as a self-contained unit (as it may be
found in Husserl's idealism). The concept of intentionality thus would
get the character of constituting "reality." With this emphasis on the
"passivity" of consciousness (of reflexion) Wojtyla's phenomenology
remains method, it does not constitute an ontological system. The
reference to the "experience lived through" is, in this context, dis-
tinctly not an indication of a "subjectivistic" tendency; it only has to
be understood as a methodical-empirical necessity. The "realistic"
dimension of intentionality that becomes apparent in this
phenomenological framework, guarantees for a "direction" towards
and a perception of real objects that reaches beyond the immanency
of the flux of our experiences - as intentionality is not understood
anymore as constitution of a general system of ontological reference
by constituting any mode of real being. Grounding subjectivity on the
"pre-reflexive," on "potentiality," as Wojtyla terms it, means
transcending a merely formal phenomenology of consciousness or
reflexion. Wojtyla's "material" phenomenology does not accept a
transcendental subjectivity as ens a se (in the sense of ontological
idealism, i.e., as being isolated from the actual world). Human sub-
jectivity is -regardless of its "irreducibility" to the realm of objects of
the actual world (i.e., in the cosmological sense)-embedded in a
concrete world by the dynamism of its "potentialities." Those "poten-
tial" structures exist not only in relation to a consciousness reflecting
this dynamism -as was pretended to demonstrate by the idealistic
trend of phenomenology because of its hypostatization of the concept
of the "phenomenon."
The "irreducibility" of the subject (the person) may--if we ac-
cept the fact of this concrete relatedness to the world as explained
above-be elucidated yet more clearly: it means the essential ir-
reducibility of personal self-realization to constant factors of the
world of objects, i.e., the world as described by the natural sciences.
For Wojtyla the specific mode of hermeneutical comprehending of
this "irreducible" aspect of man (as required therefore according to
the methodology of the human sciences) is the phenomenological
method. It is applied to the description of the specific structures of
human subjectivity by analyzing human acting and the relation be-
tween person and action. In his anthropology based on the
phenomenological method Wojtyla solely describes how man "ap-
pears," manifests himself in his actions. Subjectivity as it manifests
itself in the acting of man, constitutes for Wojtyla a "definite

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334 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

reality."26 (The special emphasis on this reality may, from a tradi-


tional "metaphysical" viewpoint, bear no relevance for anthropology,
as Wojtyla explains.)27 This reality is also characterized, according to
Wojtyla, by the social dimension of the human existence, i.e., by the
interhuman relations28 that determine one's own personal self-
realization.
As Wojtyla goes beyond the Aristotelian-scholastic conception of
man -by emphasizing the "irreducibility" of the subject - and, at the
same time, broadens it by his phenomenological method based on the
"experience" ('Erlebnis') -so he tries also-when claiming to for-
mulate phenomenologically founded "transphenomenological cogni-
tion" 2 to transcend phenomenology understood as a system o
manent structures of experience. His phenomenology arises from his
effort to elucidate the real nature of man as a person, and he tries to
describe the self-awareness and self-comprehension of the person in
the process of concrete acting, keeping critical distance in the same
time to the "metaphysical" traditions and to an idealistic (subjec-
tivistic) reification of consciousness as something absolute as well.
Phenomenology, understood in this sense, is a philosophical method,
determined in its structure by the specific realm it is dealing with
(i.e., by the task of analyzing consciousness and concrete acting), it is
not a metaphysical-transcendental system of "pure" consciousness.

HANS KOCHLER.
UNIVERSITAT INNSBRUCK.

"Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," p. 113.


27Op. cit., p. 110.
28Cp. Wojtyla's paper "Participation or Alienation?", and the paper of the
author "The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination."
29"Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man," p. 113.
30Cp. op. cit., pp. 114-15, where Wojtyla says that "the thinker who by
philosophical methods seeks the ultimate truth about man does not limit himself to
'purely metaphysical ground' ".

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