A

DISSERTATION REPORT
ON
POLITICS OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the degree

of

AFFILIATED FROM
H.N.B. GARHWAL UNIVERSITY, SRINAGAR

SUBMITTED BY

NAWANG PHUNTSOG

SUBMITTED TO
DR. DINESH UPMANYU
ASST. PROFESSOR

SGRR PG COLLEGE DEHRADUN

1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At the very outset, I would like to acknowledge with immense gratitude

the support and guidance of some people without whom the project could
not have been completed. Also thanks to them,from whom I learnt a lot
more additional things than that just restricted to my project.
First of all I would like to thank my project guide DR. DINESH UPMANYU
for their support and patience with me despite him being hard pressed for
time .
I am thankful for providing me with the wonderful opportunity and allowing
me to take this study.

I would also like to thank my head of the political department r who gave
me a opportunity to study on this project
Last but not the least I would like to thank my parents who have always
showed their full faith in me, and are the biggest source of my
encouragement and guidance.

NAWANG PHUNTSOG

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 INDEX

SNOI. INDEX

1 INTRODUCTION

2
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

3 THE ACCESSION

4 POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

5 DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

6
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

7 PAKISTAN’S AGGRESSION: 1984-1998

8 Jammu & Kashmir - Article 370

9 . Situation in Jammu and Kashmir and Countours of Future Strategy

10 SUGGESTIION

11 CONCLUSION

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 INTRODUCTION

In recent years Jammu and Kashmir has been the subject of international focus.
Unfortunately, discussion on the issue has largely been flawed by misunderstanding of
the State’s history and its present situation. Pakistan, in promoting its own territorial
ambitions, has deliberately sought to project a distorted version of developments in the
State since 1947 when the State joined the Union of India, in an attempt to disguise its
own sustained effort at undermining the tran equillity of this "Eden of Bliss".

Pakistan continues to look upon the issue of Jammu & Kashmir as one that lies at the
very core of India’s relations with Pakistan. This is manifested by Pakistan’s
pronouncements and its repeated aggression against India, initially in the form of
conventional wars and then by sponsorship of terrorism. This strategy is born of
Pakistan’s non-acceptance of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, made with
the full support of its people then led by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The fact that the
two communities had coexisted for centuries, that a sizeable section of India’s Muslims
chose to live in India, that a princely state with a sizeable Muslim population like
Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India of its own volition, and that the Muslim majority
wing of Pakistan separated and became independent Bangladesh, are aspects of history
that challenge the principle that peaceful and beneficial co-existence was not possible.

Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the Indian Union in 1947 through final
accession in accordance with the legal framework determined by the British Parliament
for the independence of the Indian subcontinent. This was sought to be undermined by
the use of military force in 1947, which though successfully resisted by the Kashmiris
with the support of India’s army, resulted in a portion of the State remaining under
Pakistan’s occupation. Again, in 1965 Pakistan sought to capitalise on local disturbances
to foster insurgency, but on failing to suborn the local Kashmiri population, infiltrated
armed personnel into the State leading to war with India, ending with the Tashkent
Declaration of 1965. In 1971, under threat of an insurgency in its own eastern wing
Pakistan again sought to divert world attention and extend the conflict into Jammu &
Kashmir. This brought about defeat and the loss of its eastern wing with the emergence
4
of independent Bangladesh.

In complete contravention of the Tashkent Declaration of 1965 and the Simla Agreement
of 1972, signed after two wars, Pakistan, still addicted to its quest to wrest Jammu and
Kashmir by force, changed strategy and embarked on a programme of sponsoring
terrorism in the State. Since 1989, with over 20,000 people killed, Pakistan continues its
proxy war against India. Even after the Kashmiris voted for democracy and again elected
their own government in 1996, signalling their disenchantment with terrorist violence,
Pakistan has not given up its policy of trying to disrupt the free democratic polity of
Jammu and Kashmir. Disappointed with the response of the Kashmiris to its calls for
what it sought to promote as a "holy war" in Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has taken
recourse to sending in battle hardened Pakistani, Afghan and other mercenaries who have
distinguished themselves only by drenching the soil with the blood of the very people
whose interests they claim to champion in the name of religion.

India remains committed to dealing with all matters pertaining to its relations with
Pakistan, within the bilateral framework of the Simla Agreement. Solutions that entail a
rewriting of history or a redrawing of geographical boundaries and possible population
transfers can, however, never be countenanced.

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 GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

The terms "Kashmir" and "Muslim" are often loosely, and erroneously, used when
referring to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has deliberately fostered this
misrepresentation to stake its claim to what it terms a "Muslim State".

Indeed, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has a Muslim majority but is by no means a
homogenous religious or ethnic entity. Like the rest of India, it represents a mosaic of
different religions, different ethnic groups and cultures as do many other States of India.
In its entirety, the State consists of Jammu to the south, Ladakh in the northeast and
geographically the smallest segment Kashmir, comprised mainly of a river valley,
surrounded by lofty mountains. All three segments are distinguished by their diversity.
Jammu has a majority Hindu population(60%), but with substantial Muslim and Sikh
minorities. Poonch, Rajouri and Doda, three of its six districts have Muslim majorities.
Variations of Punjabi like Dogri and Pahari, are the languages most widely spoken ,
together with a smattering of Kashmiri. Ladakh has two districts; one, Leh,
overwhelmingly Buddhist and the other, Kargil, overwhelmingly (73%) Shia Muslim.
The languages there are Ladakhi and Balti. Kashmiri is not indigenous to this
geographically largest constituent of the State. The Kashmir Valley itself is
predominantly Muslim, with small components of Hindus and Sikhs. Kashmiri is the
predominant language, but with entire regions speaking Shina and Pahari.

The constituent units of the State of Jammu and Kashmir still retain many of their
distinctive religious, ethnic and linguistic features. This heterogeneity was not lost
even when they were incorporated in one or the other empire - Maurya, Kushan,
Mughal, Sikh or British, and today it reflects the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and
religious diversity of India

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HISTORY

Ancient Kashmir is steeped in legend. It is said that the Kashmir Valley was once the
great lake Satisar (the Lake of the goddess Sati, also known as Durga), home to
ferocious demons.
Responding to the penances of the great sage Kashyapa, the grandson of Brahma himself,
the gods destroyed the demon of the lake, with a pebble divinely caste, which today
stands as the hill upon which towers the fortress built by the Mughal Emperor Akbar, and
known today as Hari Parbat. The water of Satisar was drained through a breach in the
mountains at what is now the mouth of the Valley, beyond the northern town of
Baramulla (or the Sanskrit name of Varaha Mukh, the visage of the boar). From then on
the Valley has carried the name of its founder. Like that of the rest of India, the ancient
history of the State lacks detailed documentation although stuff and legend have been
indistinguishably mired in the work of Rajatarangini by Kalhan whose identity remains a
source of conjecture. In the 3rd Century BC, the state was incorporated into the Maurya
Empire under Asoka, founder of the city of Srinagar. Buddhism became the principal
religion which continued into the times of the Kushanas (1st and 2nd centuries AD), the
names of many of whose rulers several towns in the Valley were named and continue to
be borne by several towns in the Valley, such as Kanispora after Kanishka, and Hushkora
after Huvishka. It was in Kanishka’s time that the 3rd Great Buddhist Council was held
in Srinagar, formalising the split between the schools of Hinayana and Mahayana
Buddhism. Thereafter Buddhism declined in the Valley though it retained its vibrancy
and continues to thrive in Ladakh.

In the 8th century, Kashmir rose to become the centre of a great kingdom , spanning
much of North India and parts of Central Asia under Lalitaditya Muktapida, who was
builder of the Martand (sun) Temple, and founder of the Valley’s irrigation canal
irrigation system which has survived for centuries, helping water rich harvests of the
finest rice, a variety of temperate fruit and exotic crops such as saffron.
7
Islam came to India through traders, warriors and missionaries from the eighth to the
twelfth centuries. The faith came to Kashmir through the Sufi saint Bulbul Shah in the
early fourteenth century, finding wide acceptance. The ruling monarch Rinchen Shah
converted to Islam and assumed the name of Sadruddin in 1327 AD. Thereafter,
beginning with his former general Shahmir, a series of Muslim dynasties ruled the State
with brief interludes of annexation into neighbouring States, to become a part of the
Mughal Empire in the late 16th century, under its greatest ruler Akbar. The State was
fully incorporated into the systems of administration and land settlement which long
remained a legacy of that Empire in India, well after its own disintegration.

All through this period the religious activity of the Shaivites and Sufis continued to
flourish, and fed the vibrant stream of Kashmiri culture. Lal Ded, Kashmir’s great
poetesses was also among her foremost Shaivite ascetics and mentor to one of Kashmir’s
greatest Sufi saints, Sheikh Nooruddin, whose school of Sufism is called ‘Rishi’ and
who is revered by Hindus as Nand Rishi. The songs of Habba Khatoon, queen to the last
Sultan of Kashmir before it fell to the Mughals, who retired to the life of a hermit in the
hills of Gurez after her husband’s deportation, still resonate with the peasant women
harvesting rice in Kashmir’s fields.
The rule of the Mughals has been coloured by romance, the modern remnants of which
are to be found in the masterful architecture and layout of their world famous gardens in
Kashmir: Shalimar, Nishat, Chashme Shahi, Chinar Bagh. A graphic account of the
pomp and panoply of the Emperor’s cavalcade to Kashmir has been left to us by the
French physician Francois Bernier who was in the court of the Emperor Aurangzeb.

The Imperial Court called on the Kashmiri Pandits, famed for their scholarship, to
man courtly positions in Delhi. Thus it was that the ancestor of the Nehrus was
recruited by the Emperor Farrukhsiyar in the early 18th century to serve as imperial
scribe.

The defeat of the Empire at the hands of the Afghan brigand Ahmed Shah Abdali forced
the ceding of Kashmir to the Afghans in 1753 AD, leading to a period of unmitigated
brutality and widespread distress, which remained cruelly etched on the public memory,
8
reinforced by the happenings of 1947. The greatest of the Sikh rulers Maharaja Ranjit
Singh won Kashmir in 1815. On the defeat of the Sikhs by the British, the latter annexed
and then sold Kashmir to the local feudatory Gulab Singh, who then assumed the title of
Maharaja. His dynasty continued to rule the State under British paramountcy till the
events described hereafter.

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 POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Whereas it is general desire of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that a
Constituent Assembly should be brought into being for the purpose of framing a
constitution for the State; Whereas it is commonly felt that the convening of the Assembly
can no longer be delayed without detriment to the future well-being of the State. And
whereas the terms of the proclamation of the Maharaja dated 5 March, 1948 in regard to the
convening of a national assembly as contained in clauses 4 to 6 of the operative part thereof
do not meet the requirements of the present situation;
I, Yuvraj Karan Singh, do hereby direct as follows :

i. A Constituent Assembly consisting of representatives of the people, elected on the basis

of adult franchise, shall be constituted forthwith for the purpose of framing a constitution
for the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

ii. For the purposes of the said elections the State shall be divided into a number of
territorial constituencies, each containing a population of 40,000 or as near thereto as
possible, and each electing one member. A delimitation committee shall be set up by the
Government to make recommendations as to the number of constituencies and the limits of
each constituency;

iii. Elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be on the basis of adult franchise, that is to
say, every person who is a State subject of any class, as defined in the notification No……,
is not less than twenty-one years of age on the first day of March, has been a resident in the
constituency for such period as many be prescribed by the rules, shall be entitled to register
in the electoral rolls of that constituency, provided that any person who is of unsound mind
or has been so declared by a competent court, shall be disqualified for registration;

iv. The vote at the election shall be by direct and secret ballot ;

v. The Constituent Assembly shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy of the
membership thereof ;

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vi. The Constituent Assembly shall frame its own agenda and make rules for the governing
of its procedure and the conduct of its business.
The Government shall make such rules and issue such instructions and orders as may be
necessary to give effect to the terms of this proclamation.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1956

We, the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having solemnly resolved, in pursuance
of accession of this State to

India which took place on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1947, to further define the
existing relationship of the State with the Union of India as an integral part thereof, and to
secure to ourselves.

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of
opportunity; and to promote among us all;

FRATERNITY, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation;

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY This seventeenth day of November, 1956 do

Hereby Adopt Enact and Give to ourselves this constitution.

PRELIMINARY

1. (1) this Constitution may be called the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

(2) This section and sections 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, and 158 shall come into force et once and the
remaining provisions of this constitution shall come into force on the twenty-sixth day of
January, 1957, which day is referred to in this Constitution as the commencement of this
Constitution.

2. (I) In this Constitution, unless the context other-wise

requires.

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(a) "Constitution of India" means the Constitu-tion of India as applicable in relation to this
State.

(b) "existing law" means any law, ordinance, order bye-law, rule notification; or regulation
based, made or issued before the commence-ment of this Constitution by the Legislature or
other competent authority or person hav-ing power to pass. make or issue such law,
ordinance, order bye-law rule, notification or regulation;

(c) "Part" means a part of this Constitution;

(d) "Schedule" means a schedule to this Constitution; and

(e) "taxation" includes the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or
special, and "tax" shall be construed accordingly.

(2) Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of the State Legislature shall be
construed as in-cluding a reference to an Ordianance made by the Sadar-i-Riyasat.

THE STATE

(3) The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.

(4) The territory of the State shall comprise all the territories which on the fifteenth day of
August, 1947, were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State.

(5) The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with
respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State under the provisions of
the Constitution of India.

PERMANENT RESIDENTS

(6) (l) Every person who is, or is deemed to be, a citizen of India under the provisions of the
Constitution of India shall be a permanent resident of the State, if on the fourteenth day of
May, 1954.

12
(a) he was a State subject of class I or of class II: or

(b) having lawfully acquired immovable pro-perty in the State, he has been ordinarily
resident in the State for not less than ten years prior to that date.

(2) Any person who, before the fourteenth day of May, 1954 was a State subject of Class I
or of Class II and who, having migrated after the first day of March, 1947, to the territory -
now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under a permit for resettlement in the State or
for permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the State
Legislature shall on such return be a permanent resident of the State.

(3) In this section, the expression "State subject of Class I or of Class II" shall have the
same -meaning as the State Notification No I-L/84 dated the twentieth April. '1927, read
with State Notification No 13/L dated the twenty- seventh June, 1932.

7. Unless the context otherwise requires, all referen-ces in any existing law to hereditary
State subject or to State subject of class I or of Class II or of class III shall be construed as
references to perma-nent residents of the State.

8. Nothing in foregoing provisions of this part shall derogate from the power of the State
legislature to make any law defining the classes the persons who are, or shall be permanent
residents of the State.

9. A Bill marking provision for any of the following matters, namely.

(a) defining or altering the definition of, the classes of persons who are, or shall be, per-
manent residents of the State;

(b) conferring on permanent residents any special rights or privileges;

(c) regulating or modifying any special rights or privileges enjoyed by permanent residents;

shall be deemed to be passed by either House of the Legislature only if It is passed by a

majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of that House.

10. The permanent residents of the State shall have all the rights guaranteed to them under
the Constitution of India.

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DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY

11. In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government
and the Legis-lature of the State and all local or other authori-ties within the territory of the
State or under the control of the Government of the State.

12. The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the State
and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.

13. The prime object of the State consistent with the ideals and objectives of the freedom
movement envisaged in "New Kashmir" shall be the pro-motion of the welfare of the mass
of the people by establishing and preserving a socialist order of society wherein all
exploitation of man has been abolished and wherein justice-social, economic and political-
shall inform all the institutions of natio-nal life.

14. Consistently with the objectives outlined in the foregoing section, the State shall
develop in a planed manner the productive forces of the coun-try with a view to enriching
the material and cul-tural life of the people and foster and protect.

(a) the public sector where the means of produc-tion are owned by the State;

(b) the co-operative sector where the means of

production are co-operatively owned by indi-viduals or groups of individuals; and

(c) the private sector where the means of produc-tion are owned by an individual or a
corpora-tion employing labour, provided that the operation of this sector is not allowed to
result in the concentration of wealth or of the means of production to the common
detriment.

15. The State shall endeavour to organise and develop agriculture and animal husbandry by
bringing to the aid of the cultivator tile benefits of modern and scientific research and
techniques so as to ensure a speedy improvement in the standard of living as also the
prosperity of the rural masses.

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16. The State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such
powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-
government.

17. The State shall, in order to rehabilitate, guide and promote the renowned crafts and
cottage indus-tries of the State, initiate and execute well consi-dered programmes for
refining and modernising techniques and modes of production, including the employment
of cheap power so that unnece-ssary drudgery and toil of the workers are elimi-nated and
the artistic value of the products en-hanced, while Else fullest scope is provided for the
encouragement and development of individual talent and initiative.

18. The State shall lake steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public-
services, and shall seek to secure a judicial system which is humane, cheap, certain,
objective and impartial, whereby justice shall be done and shall be seen to be done and shall
further strive to ensure efficiency, im-partiality and incorruptibility of its various organs of
justice, administration and public utility.

19. The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make
effective provi-sion for securing:

(a) that all permanent residents, man and women equally, have the right to work, that is, the
right to receive guaranteed work with pay-ment for labour in accordance with its quan-tity
and quality subject to a basic minimum and maximum wage established by law;

(b) that the health and strength of workers, men and women and the tender age of children
are not abused and that permanent residents are not forced by economic necessity to enter
avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength;

(c) that all workers, agricultural or otherwise have reasonable, just and humane conditions
of work with full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities, and

(d) that all permanent residents have adequate maintenance in old age as well as in the
event of sickness, disablement unemployment and other cases of undeserved want by
providing social insurance, medical aid, hospitals, sana-toria and health resorts at State
expense.

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20. The State shall endeavour:

(a) to secure to every permanent resident the right to free education upto the University
standard;

(b) to provide, within a period often years from the commencement of this constitution,
com-pulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years; and

(c) to ensure to all workers and employees ade-quate facilities for adult education and part -
time technical, professional and vocational courses.

21. The State shall strive to secure:

(a) to all children the right to happy childhood with adequate medical care and attention;
and

(b) to all children and youth equal opportunities in education and employment, protection
against exploitation, and against moral or material abandonment.

22. The State shall endeavour to secure to all women:

(a) the right to equal pay for equal work;

(b) the right to maternity benefits as well as ade-quate medical care in all employments;

(c) the right reasonable maintenance, extending to cases of married women who have been
divorced or abandoned;

(d) the right to full equality in all social, educa-tional, political and legal matters; and

(e) special protection against discourtesy, defama-tion, hoolganism and other forms of
miscon-duct.

23. The State shall guarantee to the socially and edu-cationally backward sections of the
people special care in the promotion of their educational, mate rial and cultural interests and
protection against social injustice.

24. The State shall make every effort to safeguard and promote the health of the people by
advancing public hygiene and by prevention of disease through sanitation, pest and vermin

16
control, propaganda and other measures, and by ensuring widespread, efficient and free
medical services throughout the State and, with particular emphasis, in its remote and
backward regions.

25. The State shall combat ignorance, superstition, fanaticism, communialism, racialism,
cultural

backwardness and shall seek to foster brotherhood and equality among all communities
under the aegis of a secular State.

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THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

35. (1) There shall be a council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and
advise the Sadar-i-Riyasat in the exercise of his functions.

All functions of the Sadar-i-Riyasat except those under sections 36, 38 and 92 shall be
exercised by him only on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

(3) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the
Sadar-i-Riyasat shall not be inquired into in any court.

36. The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the Sadar-i-Riyasat and the other Ministers
shall be appointed by the Sadar-i-Riyasat on the advice of The Prime Minister.

37. (1) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative
Assembly.

(2) A Minister who for any period of six conse-cutive months is not a member of either
House of Legislature shall upon the expiry of that period cease to be a Minister.

38. The Sadar-i-Riyasat may on the advice of the Prime Minister appoint from amongst the
members of either House of Legislature such number of Deputy Ministers as may be
necessary.

39. The Ministers and the [Deputy Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Sadar-i--Riyasat.

40. Before a Minister or a Deputy Minister enters upon lids office, the Sadar-i-Riyasat or, in
his absence, any person authorised by him, shall administer to the Minister or the Deputy
Minister to oaths of office and of secrecy according to the form set out for the purpose in
the Fifth Schedule.

41. The salaries and allowances of Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall be such as the
Legislature relay from time to time by law determine and, until so determined, shall be such
as are payable respectively to the Ministers and the Deputy Ministers under the Jammu and
Kashmir Minister s Salaries Act, 1956 (Act VI of 1956) the Jammu and Kashmir Minister's
18
Travelling Allowances Rules for the time being in force, and the Jaminu and Kashmir
Deputy Ministers Salaries and Allowances Act. S. 2010 (Act VIII of S.2010)

THE ADVOCATE GENERAL

42. (1) The Sadar-i-Riyasat shall appoint a person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge
of the High Court, to be Advocate General for the State.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to the Government upon such
legal matters and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time
be referred or assigned to him by the Govern-ment, and to discharge the functions conferred
on him by or under this Constitution or any other law for the time being in force.

(3) In the performance of his duties, the Advocate General shall have the right of audience
in all courts in the State.

(4) The Advocate General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Sadar-i-Riyasat and
receive such remuneration as the Sadar-i-Riyasat may determine.

CONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS

43. The Sadar-i-Riyasat shall make rules for the more

convenient transaction of the business of the

Government of the State and for the allocation

among Ministers of the said business.

44. It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister

(a) to communicate to the Sadar-i-Riyasat all decisions of the council of Ministers relating
to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation;

(b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and
proposals for legislation as the Sadar-i-Riyasat may call for; and

19
(c) if the Sadar-i-Riyasat so rqeuires to submit for the consideration of the Council of
Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not
been considered by the Council.

45. (1) All executive action of the Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name
of the Sadar-i-Riyasat of the Jammu and Kashmir.

(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Sadar-i-Riyasat or
of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir shall be authenticated in such manner as may be
specified in the rules to be made be the Sadar-i-Riyasat, and the validity of an order or
instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is
not an order or instrument made or executed by the Sadar-i-Riyasat or as the case may be,
by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

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PAKISTAN’S AGGRESSION: 1984-1998

Pakistan’s policy with regard to India and other neighbours like Afghanistan, is not
determined only by the civilian government. It has always been the prerogative of the
armed forces and, more particularly, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), even during
periods of civilian rule.

The ISI is often referred to as a state within a state. The ISI received a boost when it
served as the front-line conduit for the training, arming and support of the Afghan
Mujahideen during the war against the erstwhile Soviet Union. It was associated with
the use of the heroin trade to finance the Afghan Mujahideen’s operations and the
present Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, had once told the Washington Post
that his top army brass had approached him for approval to use drug money to finance
the ISI’s operations against India. The ISI is closely associated with the Taliban
movement both in imparting training and in battlefield strategy and operations.

India has always remained a prime focus of the ISI’s activities and with regard to Jammu
and Kashmir, the ISI has been pivotal in organising operations of mercenary outfits like
the Harkat ul Ansar, declared and subsequently banned, as a Pakistan-based terrorist
outfit by the United States of America. Jane’s Intelligence Review in its October 1997
issue carried an article on the Harkat ul Ansar that detailed the organisation’s operations
and said "..the complicity of the ISI is more than merely passive. The Harkat ul Ansar
owes its considerable arsenal in large measure to the generosity of the Pakistani
Government, or, more specifically, its intelligence service.." Instructors in the camps run
for the Harkat ul Ansar, some of which were bombed by the United States of America
after the attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, train not only
extremist Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also cadres for operations in Tadjikistan, Bosnia,
Myanmar and even the Uighers of Xinjiang Province of the People’s Republic of China.
Alumni of these training camps have also been identified with terrorist activities in the
USA, France, the Philippines, Egypt, Algeria and elsewhere.

The present ongoing phase of Pakistan’s aggression was initiated in 1984, exploiting the
21
vulnerability of a public bereaved by the passing away of their great leader Sheikh
Abdullah and subsequent political uncertainty brought on by leadership squabbles in the
ruling National Conference. As the situation deteriorated, civil grievances which are
normal in any society but which are open to resolution, were exploited to breed
disaffection, with some sections then being brain-washed, armed, financed and instigated
into violence. This brutal exploitation of a peaceful people has been marked by over
20,000 killings, the disruption of society and the calculated destruction of basic health,
education and economic infrastructure. The blackest mark on this period will remain the
mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits and many Muslims driven by an enveloping fear
through use of terror, which was deliberately fanned by those who would see an end to
the age old tolerance of the Kashmiri psyche.

A selective killing of prominent persons Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, to spread fear and
suffocate differences of opinion, and to paralyse the economy, press, judiciary and
administration, since 1989 has been the strategy of the terrorists. Those killed included
Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq,the revered Muslim clerics and Imam of its Jama Masjid or
Cathedral mosque, Maulana Maudoodi, a 90 year old scholar, veteran of the freedom
movement, former lieutenant of Sheikh Abdullah and among the most respected of the
leaders of the Gujar community, Qazi Nissar Ahmed, the Mirwaiz of South Kashmir,
Mir Mustafa, a legislator, Lassa Kaul, Director of Doordarshan, Srinagar, H.L. Khera,
General Manager Hindustan Machine Tools, Professor Musheer ul Haq, Vice Chancellor
Kashmir University, Nazir Ahmed Wani, Member of Kashmir’s Legislative Council and
countless other officials and defence personnel. Any person who represented the State’s
authority, considered unfriendly to the militant’s cause, or held in esteem by the local
people and thus able to influence their thinking towards peaceful resolution of conflict
and opposed to militancy and Pakistan’s machinations, became a target.

Despite well documented evidence to the contrary, Pakistan persists in claiming that it is
only providing "moral, political and diplomatic support" to what it calls an indigenous
Kashmiri uprising in Jammu and Kashmir. But the truth behind the latest phase of
Pakistani sponsored violence has been spelt out in the book ‘Fateh’ the biography of the
former Chief of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman.
22
His biographer Brigadier Haroon Rashid states "..The plan which General Akhtar Abdul
Rehman had made for Kashmiris movement for independence was to come into effect in
1991. It appears that this plan was made with the struggle for the liberation of
Afghanistan in mind, which it was thought would be achieved by spring 1989... However
the Kashmir plan was inaugurated in 1984.. The Kashmiris were provided with some
arms which were not suitable for the Afghan Mujahideen.

The year 1984, mentioned by Haroon Rashid, is significant as it was in 1984 that an
Indian diplomat, Ravindra Mhatre, was murdered in Birmingham(UK) by the Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front. Amanullah Khan, Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), sought refuge in Pakistan and still lives there and conducts his
anti-India activities openly.
Hashim Qureshi, an associate of Amanullah Khan, now resident in the Netherlands, has
in his book "Kashmir: Unveiling the Truth", laid bare the plotting of the murder and the
horrors that were to follow in Kashmir. Terrorism escalated in the Kashmir Valley
starting in 1989. Pakistan first used the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, with its
pro independence ideology, to mobilise a mass movement. The period between 1989-90
was marked by the targeted killing of Government officials, media personnel, members
of the judiciary, and members of the minority Kashmiri Pandit (Hindu) community and
Kashmiri Muslims who dared question the terror tactics and excesses of the terrorists.
One immediate effect, between January and April 1990 was the resignation of the duly
elected State government, the massive exodus of nearly 2,50,000 Kashmiri Pandits and
over 50,000 Kashmiri Muslims from the valley with the Pandits settling in refugee camps
in Jammu, Delhi and other cities in India. The objective of creating terror and mayhem,
paralysing the State administration had met therefore with what would have seemed
quick success. This in turn led Pakistan to distance itself from those seeking
independence, who it had earlier sought to cultivate to instigate disaffection in the State,
and increasingly seek to encourage those that favoured joining Pakistan.

A tactic used to telling effect by the militants was to attack the security forces from the
cover of crowded market places and civic facilities, so as to have a human shelter or
embroil civilians into crossfire. The State’s response inevitably led to clashes with both
23
militant and civilian casualties. The deaths of civilians then became the substance of
campaigns orchestrated by Pakistan and the militant groups alleging oppression of the
Kashmiris and violation of their human rights by the government. Because in each case
of such allegation, government would immediately seek to investigate the truth through
its own administrative infrastructure, it was established that while in some cases there
might have been overreaction by the security forces working under enormous threat and
pressure, other cases were wildly exaggerated. In each case of established excess, legal
action against personnel implicated, was initiated by government.

Cordon and search operations to flush out the militants provided militants and their
supporters the ground to accuse the security forces of mass rapes. Such was the case in
March 1991 in Kunan Poshpora Village of Kupwara District, in which a mass rape of
23 women was alleged. The allegation was enquired into by a team of senior civilian
and military officers, on the site of the supposed occurrence with interviews with
alleged victims. The allegations were found to be groundless.

A sustained propaganda campaign to highlight alleged human rights’ abuse was used by
Pakistan as an instrument to internationalise the Jammu and Kashmir question. The
context in which incidents occurred and the environment of violence created by the
terrorists was conveniently glossed over. Exaggerated, and often fabricated, instances
of human rights’ violations were used as a tool of psychological warfare and were
accepted at face value by gullible observers with little or no perspective on the ground
situation. In response, and to deal with specific cases of excess, the Government of
India strengthened supervision and set up a National Human Rights Commission in
1993, whose functioning has been lauded by all human rights groups with which it has
interacted. This is an autonomous commission, free from the dictates of government
and staffed by retired judges and eminent persons. After restoration of a democratic
government in the State in 1996, the State has set up a similar Commission at the State
level under the Chairmanship of a highly respected Kashmiri judge.

On its part the Government and the security forces investigated all allegations of human
rights abuses and, where substantiated, punishment was meted out to the erring
24
personnel. It is, however, ironic that the security forces whom the militants accused of
human rights violations, continue till today to be deployed to provide security to the
leaders of the secessionist and militant groups, whose lives have been threatened
because of their resolve to abjure violence in seeking their political ends.

Since the ideology favouring independence of Jammu and Kashmir could not be
countenanced by Pakistan, the period starting 1990 witnessed the creation of groups
determined to install an extremist Islamic regime in Jammu and Kashmir, and to ensure
its accession to Pakistan. The major responsibility to execute this strategy was given by
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to the Hezbul Mujahideen, whose present
Supreme Commander, Syed Salahuddin, continues to reside in Pakistan. Other groups
that proliferated, primarily to blunt the hold of Pakistan’s opponents in the militancy,
included Hezbullah, Allah Tigers, Al Barq, etc. This period witnessed increasing
internecine warfare with extremist groups seeking to suppress the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front. The thrust of their campaign was to invoke religion to seize legitimacy.
As a result they sought to impose a blinkered version of Islamic tenets at the point of the
gun, resulting in the destruction of schools, cinemas, restaurants, and a ban on all forms
of entertainment. Women were particularly affected since some extremist groups,
defying the very grain of Kashmir’s culture, tried forcibly to confine them to indoors and
the veil, akin to what the Taleban have done in Afghanistan, but without success. To
teach a lesson some Muslim girls were in fact attacked and injured. This in fact
generally alienated womenfolk from the movement, although many had earlier been
supportive of the secessionists through organisations like the Dukhtaran-i-Millat.

This period witnessed the media in the Valley constantly attacked by the militants, even
though these same elements had been initially supportive of militancy, and demanded
that anti-terrorist articles not be carried; government announcements be boycotted; the
"martyrdom" of the militants be eulogised, as also the campaign posing as "liberation".
Attacks on newspaper offices and printing presses and the killing of eminent journalists
and editors became frequent. Among other incidents the ‘Srinagar Times’ was attacked;
the ‘Aftab’ was bombed; the editor of Al Safa, Mohammed Shaban Vakil , a respected
journalist and leading critic of government, was shot dead in his office. Some journalists
25
from the national publications, who wrote against militancy, had their papers banned
from entering the Valley at various times. In short, a determined effort was made to
strangle freedom of the press, surely a basic tenet of liberty. Only the BBC was spared
somehow.

26
 Jammu & Kashmir - Article 370

Article 370 (though originally Article 306-A) of constitute of India conferring Special
Status upon State of Jammu and Kashmir reads as follows:
“Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
1. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,
(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir;
(b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to,
(i) Those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the
Government of the State are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in
the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India
as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws far that
State; and
(ii) Such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the
State, the President may by order specify.
Explanation:
For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time
being recognized by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the
advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's
Proclamation dated the fifth day of March. 1948;
(c) The provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that State;
(d) Such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State
subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify:
Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of
Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in
consultation with the Government of the State:
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred in the
last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-
clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given
before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is
27
convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may,
by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be
operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may
specify:
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in
clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.
In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 370 the President, on the recommendation of
the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that as from the
17th Day of November, 1952, the said Article 370 shall be operative with the modification
that for the Explanation in Cl (1) thereof, the following explanation is substituted namely.
Explanation - For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State means the person
for the time being recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative
Assembly of the State as the Sadr-i-Riyasat (now Governor) of Jammu and Kashmir, acting
on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.”
It would be thus clear that while the State was deemed in Art. 1 of the Indian Constitution
to be an integral part of the Indian Union, it was given a special status by means of a
temporary provision, which in fact limited the powers of the Indian Union Parliament
thereto three matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of
the state to the dominion of India, namely defence, external affairs and communications.
2) The Delhi Agreement:-
The J&K Constituent Assembly was constituted and S. M. Abdullah addressed it on Nov. 5,
1951. Things didn’t end here. The State-Centre relationship talks moved further resulting
into the famous Delhi Agreement on July 24, 1952 that runs as follows:
The Delhi Agreement 1952
i) In view of the uniform and consistent stand-taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir
Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the
Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, the Government of India agreed
that, while the residuary powers of legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all the states
other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself;
ii) It was agreed between the two Governments that in accordance with Article 5 of the
Indian Constitution , persons who have their domicile in Jammu and Kashmir shall be
28
regarded as citizens of India but the State legislature was given power to make laws for
conferring special rights and privileges on the ‘state subjects’ in view of the ‘State Subject
Notification’ of 1927 and 1932: the State legislature was also empowered to make laws for
the ‘State Subjects’ who had gone to Pakistan on account of the communal disturbances of
1947, in the event of their return to Kashmir;
iii) As the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he does in other
Units of India, Article 52 to 62 of the Constitution relating to him should be applicable to
the Stat. It was further agreed that the power to grant reprieve, pardons and remissions of
sentences etc.; would also vest in the President of India;
iv) The Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in addition to the
Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government that the State flag would not be a
rival of the Union flag; it was also recognized that the Union flag should have the same
status and position in Jammu and Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons
connected with the freedom struggle in the State, the need for continuance of the State flag
was recognized;
v) there was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-Riyasat; though
the Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State Legislature, he had to be recognized by
the President of India before his installation as such; in other Indian states the Head of the
States was appointed by the President and was as such his nominee but the person to be
appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the Government of that State; no
person who is not acceptable to the State Government can be thrust on the State as the
Head. The difference in the case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in
the first place be elected by the State Legislature instead of being a nominee of the
Government and the President of India. With regard to the powers and functions of the
Sadar-i-Riyasat the following argument was mutually agreed upon:
a) The Head of the State shall be a person recognized by the President of the Union on the
recommendations of the Legislature of the State;
b) He shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;
c) He may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office;
d) Subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of
five years from the date he enters upon his office;
e) Provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold the
29
office until his successor enters upon his office.”
vi) With regard to the fundamental rights, some basic principles agreed between the parties
were enunciated; it was accepted that the people of the State were to have the fundamental
rights. But in the view of peculiar position in which the state was placed in particular
Sheikh Abdullah’s land reforms programmes, the whole chapter relating to “Fundamental
Rights” of the Indian Constitution could not be made applicable to the State, the question
which remained to be determined was whether the chapter on fundamental rights should
form apart of the State Constitution or the Constitution of India as applicable to the State;
vii) With regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was accepted that for
the time being, owing to the existence of the Board of Judicial Advisers in the State, which
was the highest judicial authority in the State, Supreme Court should have only appellate
jurisdiction;
viii) There was a great deal of discussion with regard to the “Emergence Powers”. The
Government of India insisted on the application of Article 352 , empowering the President
to proclaim a general emergency in the State ; the State Government argued that in the
exercise of its powers over defence ( Item1 on the Union List), in the event of war or
external aggression , the Government of India would have full authority to takes steps and
proclaim emergency but the State delegation was, however , averse to the President
exercising the power to proclaim a general emergency on account of internal disturbance.
In order to meet the viewpoint of the State’s delegation, the Government of India agreed to
the modification of Article 352 in its application to Kashmir by the addition of the
following words;
“But in regard to internal disturbance at the request or with the concurrence of the
government of the State”
At the end of clause (1)
Both the parties agreed that the application of Article 356, dealing with the suspension of
the State Constitution and Article 360, dealing with financial emergency, was not
necessary.”
Under this agreement, the J&K State was given a special status under the Indian
Constitutional frame work (Article 2 of the Constitution itself). Consequently, the
Constituent Assembly elected Yuvraj Karan Singh as the first Sadar -i- Riyasat on Nov. 15,
1952, thus bringing to an end the 106 years old hereditary Dogra rule in the J&K State.
30
A serious opposition to S. M. Abdullah had developed in Jammu under the Praja Parishad,
which launched a political movement with Shri Prem Nath Dogra as its leader. Dr. Syama
Prasad Mukherjee was the President of Jan Sangh Party at the national level who
commented that there was, or would soon be, “two Constitutions, two flags and two Prime
Ministers in one country and cannot be tolerated”. The State Praja Parishad, Jan Sangh and
R.S.S. joined their hands together and advocated the abolition of Article 370 of Indian
Constitution.

31
PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR (SO-CALLED "AZAD KASHMIR")

In terms of territory, the area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is 222,236 sq
kilometers while the area illegally occupied by Pakistan is 78,114 sq. kilometers.

The areas occupied by Pakistan comprise so-called "Azad Kashmir" (referred to

hereafter as POK for Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) and the Northern Areas of Gilgit,
Baltistan and Hunza, etc. Pakistan does not trust the administration of POK to handle the
Northern Areas which Islamabad considers strategically vital. The Northern Areas which
have been incorporated into Pakistan, are five times the size of the area designated as
‘Azad Kashmir’.

As a constitutional enigma POK is unique. It has been given the trappings of a country
with a

President, a Prime Minister and a Legislature of its own. But POK is neither a country
or a even province.

From the time of the Karachi Agreement (April 28, 1949) the POK President and the
Prime Minister have enjoyed only titular power. The Karachi Agreement between
Pakistan, POK and the Muslim Conference handed over matters related to defence,
foreign policy, negotiations with the then UN Commission for India and Pakistan
(UNCIP) and co-ordination of all affairs relating to Gilgit and Ladakh areas to Pakistan.
Residual powers were kept vague. Pakistan retained control of the following subjects :

32
 . Situation in Jammu and Kashmir and Countours of Future Strategy

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on the ‘Current
Situation in Jammu and Kashmir and Contours of Future Strategy’ on January 02, 2008.
The keynote address was delivered by Lt Gen M L Naidu, AVSM, YSM, VCOAS. In the
first session, chaired by Mr. Shekhar Dutt, Deputy NSA, Lt Gen R K Nanavatty (Retd)
former GOC-in-C, Northern Command and Lt Gen A S Sekhon, AVSM, YSM, DGMO,
analysed the present military situation and the demilitarisation issue in J&K state. In the
second session, chaired by Mr. N N Vohra, Special Representative for J&K, Mr. Wajahat
Habibullah, Chief Information Commissioner and a Kashmir veteran, AVM Kapil Kak
(Retd), Additional Director, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, and Dr. Navnita
Behera of Jamia Milia Islamia, analysed the stakes and interests of the various parties to the
conflict in J&K in detail and dwelt on the contours of future strategies for its resolution.

Objectives of the Seminar

(a) To take stock of the conflict/military situation prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir in
general and the pros and cons of demilitarisation in particular.
(b) To discuss the politico-military situation with a view to formulating future strategies for
the early resolution of the conflict.

Programme: The seminar comprised two sessions. For details of speakers, please see
Appendix.

Session I: The Present Military Situation and the Demilitarisation Issue

The comments and discussions highlighted some areas of persisting concern, such as the
ceasefire, the border fence and demilitarisation. The salient aspects and issues
articulated/discussed during the session are highlighted below:-

 A major aspect that emerged in the initial stages was that of the Pakistan Army’s continuing
complicity, duplicity and deceit with respect to policies and activities in Jammu and
Kashmir. While overtly Pakistan states that it extends only political, diplomatic and moral
support to the freedom struggle in Kashmir, it has simultaneously and steadfastly increased

33
 its involvement in terrorist activities in J&K and the rest of the country. Terrorist
infrastructure in POK and Pakistan still remains intact.
 There was general consensus that the Pakistan Army has by and large scripted the
relationship between India and Pakistan since 1948. The situation is no different today.
There may be a drop in infiltration levels in the state but infiltration from other states of
India and through neighbouring countries continues. Funding of the militant organisations
goes on unabated through circulation of fake currency and the ‘hawala’ route.
 While attempts at infiltration continue unabated violence dropped sharply by about 50 per
cent, over the levels of 2006. Violence is now more specifically targeted against the
security forces.
 The number of trained and armed terrorists has come down to about 1,400, with about 700
to 800 in Kashmir Valley and the remainder in the Jammu region. However, not all of them
are now active. Sleeper cells are lying low and waiting to strike at a more opportune time.
After the recent successes achieved by the security forces, the morale of the terrorists is low
and self-preservation is a major motive. They no longer have the support of the people and
are being increasingly actively resisted. Indian Kashmiri militant groups are now relying
less on violence and more on other means like mass protests, influencing viewpoints
through coercion of the local media, prevailing on members of local bar associations to file
human rights abuse cases and nudging some of the political parties to carry forward the
agenda of separatism.
 Efforts towards perception management need to be enhanced to reduce feelings of
alienation.
 It also emerged that persisting with military operations on the same scale, size, pattern and
intensity for a prolonged period will prove counter productive in the long run. Cases of
human rights violations are being reported frequently and this may lead to further alienation
of the people. The policy of “zero tolerance” of human rights abuses must be implemented
resolutely.
 The problem in J&K needs to be viewed as a social-political problem. The current situation
needs to be analysed carefully to ascertain whether it has reached a state of “strategic
stalemate” or is it just a tactical pause. There is a need for a more vigorous political
initiative to address the underlying causes of conflict.

34
 In the present circumstances, the ceasefire has been of significant advantage to Pakistan as
it has negated whatever little military dominance and advantage the Indian army had on the
Line of Control. A declared punitive operations policy in case of attempted infiltration by
militants was suggested by one of the speakers.
 It emerged that although the fence on the Line of Control has resulted in decreased
infiltration, yet it has also resulted in increased commitment of troops and high running and
maintenance costs. Non-tactical deployment of Army troops on the fence with lights and
noisy generators resembles BSF nakas. The army needs to be relieved of manning the
fence. A speaker recommended that the fence should now be manned by RR / BSF
battalions.
 On the much publicised aspect of demilitarisation in J&K, it clearly emerged that this
concept is only applicable to the Line of Control and not to counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorist operations. As far as the Line of Control is concerned, it is evident that
there can be no talk of demilitarisation at present. “Disengagement” is what could be
applicable to counter insurgency operations in the hinterland. However; this is a political
decision that will be taken in consultation with the army, other security forces and
intelligence agencies. In the case of disengagement, the state police rather than the Central
para-military forces must be capable of taking over control from the army in a phased
manner. This would be a better option as it would give a very positive indication of the
improving security situation and gradual return to normalcy. The next benchmark
necessitating a review of the situation will be the 2008 elections in the state.
 There is a need to address the lack of training of J&K police and make it more professional.
The existing units must be better trained and should be given better weapons and
equipment.
 A discussion also arose on the aspect of India’s response to the current political instability
in Pakistan. The options discussed varied from “detached engagement” to aggressive
exploitation. Detached engagement was the favoured option. At the same time it was
suggested that there is a need for more focused economic development in the border areas
in J&K.
 It emerged during the discussions that the factors shaping the situation in J&K are primarily
Pakistan’s intent, political dynamics and relations between the State and the Central
government. Poor governance and realpolitik are continuing to prevent emotional
35
 integration of the local people into the national mainstream. Industrial infrastructure in the
state needs to be improved. Job opportunities in the state and openings for Kashmiris in the
rest of the country need to be created. Socio-economic development needs to receive
impetus along with increased scope for tourism industry. Talks for conflict resolution
should be held only with the genuine representatives of the people.
 The participants also concluded that Pakistan’s innate desire to annex J&K through war and
‘jihad’ has been completely negated. This perhaps gives a pointer that while Pakistan’s
dream of taking Kashmir remains, perhaps the strategy is being given a fresh thought.

Session II: Contours of Future Strategy

The salient aspects and issues articulated/discussed during the session are briefly
highlighted below:-

 Many of the participants bemoaned the absence of a clear and comprehensive, national-
level strategy that simultaneously addresses political, diplomatic, economic, social and
psychological issues. Besides the lack of socio-economic development, poor governance
was especially identified as a major factor fuelling conflict.
 It emerged that integration of the people of J&K with the rest of India is the biggest
challenge. A multi-track approach is required to alleviate the problem. As socio-economic
challenges and poor governance in J&K are the major problems which have caused
alienation of the people, only a comprehensive strategy can remove the irritants. There is
also a need for a joint politico-military strategy.
 Increased trade and increased people to people contacts between India and Pakistan should
be the basis of the external strategy. Simultaneously, an endeavour to improve negotiating
space must continue. Track two or back channels have worked in the past. These must be
given due impetus for finding a solution to the problem. India needs to leverage its soft
power to generate a situation where better relations with India would be in Pakistan’s
favour.
 The disconnect between the government and the people in Jammu, Srinagar and Leh was
brought out. Ground level policy initiatives must be given due importance to develop all
regions of the state.

36
 At the political level there should be an institutionalised mechanism for dialogue.
‘Panchayats’ at the village level need to be empowered to bring about greater democratic
participation of the people. Regional level councils on the lines of Hill Development
Councils were recommended to be created. The need for the state to have an independent
election commission and finance commission was also suggested.
 It was also recommended that there is a need to build up international pressure on Pakistan
towards dismantling the ‘Jihadi’ network that is functional in Pakistan.

37
 SUGGESTION
There seems to no end in sight to the continuing turmoil in Kashmir. Although the curfew
has been lifted in many places, the violence continues unabated. The nature of violence has
even taken on a new dimension; unlike earlier protests against the establishment, which
were mainly the handiwork of separatists with the backing of Pakistan, this time around
ordinary citizens, including women and children, have taken to the streets to protest against
the excesses of the security forces. There appears to be a total loss of confidence in both the
state government and the Indian government.

The unabated violence has already claimed the lives of over 60 innocent people, many of
them young children, and over 100 people have sustained serious injuries because of the
indiscriminate use of pellet guns. The security forces also seem to be at their wit’s end, as
they are unable to come out with a counter strategy to stone throwing protesters.

The curfew, which has continued for over 57 days, has brought the entire valley to a
complete standstill. It is reported that many persons inimical to India are openly using
young children as cannon fodder against the security forces. For the first time in the
troubled history of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the entire Muslim population is feeling
totally alienated with the state.

Kashmir had always wanted to be independent and it was for this reason that Maharaja Hari
Singh, the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, did not want J&K to accede either to India
or Pakistan. However, Pakistan did not take kindly to this idea, as the population in the
Kashmir Valley was predominately Muslims. Pakistan retaliated by sending irregular
forces, mainly comprised of Pathan tribesman from the northwest Province, to take the
Kashmir Valley (barring Ladakh and Jammu) by force. The Maharaja, alarmed by the
sudden turn of events, pleaded with the Indian government to send its army to repulse the
attack. India agreed to come to his rescue on the condition that he gave his consent to sign
the Instrument of Accession with India. The Maharaja, much against his wishes, signed the
Instrument of Accession on October 26, 2016. The forces from Pakistan were repulsed from
the main towns but did manage to capture a large portion of Kashmir, which is now under
the control of Pakistan. India’s then-prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, did not wish to send

38
the army to evict the tribesmen from the illegally occupied portion of Kashmir, as he
viewed that such an act would invite the opprobrium of the United Nations.

The situation in Kashmir has never been same again. In 1987, the Indian government was
accused of rigging the elections and denying full autonomy to the state. This gave birth to
the Kashmiri insurgency, which during the 1990s escalated into the most important internal
security issue in India. Thousands of people have died during fighting between insurgents
and the government, as well as thousands of civilians who have died as a result of being
targeted by the various armed groups.

Violence has long been exacerbated by an unwillingness to consider political compromise.

One of the prominent insurgent leaders, Sayeed Salahudeen, who was willing to drop
demands for independence, agreed to participate in the J&K state elections in 1987. He was
heading for a landslide victory, but, at the instance of Ghulam Mohiuddin Shah of the
National Conference, the election was rigged and Sayeed lost. He escaped to Pakistan in
disgust, where he now leads Hijbul Mujahedeen to fight for the self-determination of
Kashmiris. The situation from then on has gone from bad to worse.

In 1986, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, who was the brother-in-law of the then-chief minister
of J&K, Farooq Abdullah, ousted his relative and became the chief minister. Shah tried to
build a mosque within the precincts of an old temple in the civil secretariat, which led to
protests. He warned Kashmiri Muslims that Islam was in danger and incited Muslims to
attack Hindus. This led to ethnic cleansing where hundreds of Kashmiri Hindus were killed,
their shops either burnt or looted. Many of the Hindus living in south Kashmir had to flee
from Kashmir. By 1990, between 600,000 and 800, 000 Hindus had left Kashmir. The two
communities, which had been living in harmony for centuries, suddenly became sworn
enemies. Although the Shah government was subsequently dismissed, the damage had
already been done. This, coupled with the alleged rigging of elections in 1987, gave birth to
insurgency in Kashmir.

In 2010, news emerged of a fake encounter by the security forces, who claimed that they
had killed three Pakistani infiltrators. They had actually rounded up three innocent civilians
and killed them in cold blood. This incident lead to a renewed insurgency led by separatist

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leaders like Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Hurriyat Conference. The Indian government was
forced to sentence all the six army persons to life in prison.

One of the leaders of the Hurriyat Conference popularized a novel method of attacking the
riot police: He instigated youngsters to throw stones against the security forces. The
security forces were forced to retaliate with tear gas and rubber bullets, and also in a few
cases live bullets. The resulting clashes claimed the lives of over 100 people, including
many teenagers.

The then-Home Minister P. Chidambaram announced an economic package to diffuse the

situation, and restore normalcy in the state. This move paid off, as the insurgency in the
state petered off, and barring a few isolated incidents, normalcy and peace was restored in
the valley.

However, on July 8, 2016, the security forces killed Burhan Wani, a local militant
commander of Hizbul Mujahideen. Wani had used social media to attract young, educated
Kashmiris to join him to wage a war against the state. He became very popular with the
youth of Kashmir. Eyewitness account belied the accidental encounter theory and said that
the J&K police had killed Wani and his two associates, while they were trying to escape
from their hideout. The killing of Wani, who had not refrained from personally taking up
arms, sparked a wave of protests in Kashmir. For the first time, ordinary citizens, including
women and children, took to the streets and indulged in stone throwing against the security
forces. They also burnt and damaged public properties.

If the security forces had arrested Wani and his associates, instead of killing him, the
situation would not have spiraled out of control. Today, Wani is considered as a martyr by
hundreds of Kashmiri youth, and has become the face of new insurgency. Earlier the
militant groups went looking for fresh recruits; now youths are willingly joining militant
groups. An editorial in the New York Times on the growing violence in Kashmir points out
that the new generation of youth has only seen Kashmir being subjected to India’s Armed
Forces Special Powers Act, which grants the military wide powers to arrest, shoot to kill,
and occupy or destroy property. People are feeling suffocated by the security forces being
stationed in all parts of Srinagar.

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Political leaders from all parties in India, concerned over the growing violence and death of
innocent people, raised the issue in the Indian parliament and urged the government to stop
using pellet guns against the stone throwers. They also called upon the government to reach
out to the people to end the violence, and restore normalcy in the state. However, the
biggest challenge now is that there is not a single leader who has the backing of the people
with whom the interlocutors can talk. For the first time, citizens are forming their own
groups to take on security forces. The separatists also don’t seem to enjoy the confidence of
the people. In fact, the state government led by its chief minister, Mehbooba Mufti, a one
time sympathizer of separatist elements, seems to be at a loss. The Indian government also
looks clueless as to how to diffuse the tension.

The government decided to send an all party delegation to reach out to the people and other
fringe elements. However, it was an open question whether citizen groups would be willing
to meet the delegation, as there is a simmering anger in the valley against the establishment.
One must understand that the Kashmir issue calls for a political solution, as the people are
clamoring for independence. The government of India will not kowtow to any such
demands, as such a move may inspire a few states in the northeast to claim independence or
autonomy. Further, if India grants the wish of the people of the valley, Pakistan will take
advantage of the situation by forcibly annexing Kashmir.

The Kashmir imbroglio offers no ready solutions. The decision to send an all party
delegation to Srinagar to engage with civil groups was a bold move, but, as expected, the
separatists snubbed the delegation and refused to meet them. Still, the Indian government’s
efforts to break the current impasse and restore normalcy in the strife-torn state are a step in
the right direction. Both the state and the Indian government should continue their efforts to
engage with the civil groups to bring about a semblance of normalcy there.

Once this is achieved, serious efforts should be made to find a political solution to this
vexing issue. This can be done by engaging with all stakeholders, including Pakistan.
Pakistan, on the other hand, should also realize that by aiding and abetting terror groups,
they are only putting the people of the Kashmir Valley in danger. Such attempts would only
harden India’s stance. Both countries should keep the interest of Kashmiris in mind, and

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look to find a solution that is acceptable to all stakeholders. This is not an easy task, but the
only permanent solution to put an end to the continuing conflict.

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Conclusion
The general consensus at the end of the seminar was that Pakistan is at risk of imploding
and this could have repercussions for J&K. In the present situation, India’s options are to
seize the present opportunity to prevail on Pakistan to make peace or to follow a policy of
detached engagement towards Pakistan. It emerged during the seminar deliberations that
special development of the border areas is a must for proper integration of the people of
J&K with the national mainstream. There is a need to make the dialogue mechanism more
effective as the potential of such dialogues has not yet been effectively tapped.
It was decided to hold a round-table discussion to focus more specifically on
comprehensive future strategies for the resolution of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.

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