ALFREDO VELOSO vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT.
The case cited is not apropos because the quitclaims therein invoked were
FACTS: the petitioners, along with several co-employees, filed a complaint against
the private respondent for unfair labor practices, underpayment, and non-payment
of overtime, holiday, and other benefits. This was decided in favor of the
complainants on October 6,1987. The motion for reconsideration, which was
treated as an appeal, was dismissed in a resolution dated February 17, 1988.
the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and recomputation of the
amount awarded to the petitioners. On April 15, 1988, while the motion was
pending, petitioner Alfredo Veloso, through his wife Connie, signed a Quitclaim
and Release for and in consideration of P25,000.00, 1 and on the same day his
counsel, Atty. Gaga Mauna, manifested “Satisfaction of Judgment” by receipt of
the said sum by Veloso. 2 For his part, petitioner Liguaton filed a motion to dismiss
dated July 16, 1988, based on a Release and Quitclaim dated July 19,1988 , 3 for
and in consideration of the sum of P20,000.00 he acknowledged to have received
from the private respondent.
the petitioners claim that they were forced to sign their respective releases in favor
of their employer, the herein private respondent, by reason of their dire necessity.
The latter, for its part, insists that the petitioner entered into the compromise
agreement freely and with open eyes and should not now be permitted to reject
their solemn commitments.
These releases were later impugned by the petitioners on September 20, 1988, on
the ground that they were constrained to sign the documents because of their
“extreme necessity.” In an Order dated December 16, 1988, the Undersecretary of
Labor rejected their contention and ruled:
IN VIEW THEREOF, complainants Motion to Declare Quitclaim Null and Void is
hereby denied for lack of merit and the compromise agreements/settlements dated
April 15, 1988 and July 19, 1988 are hereby approved. Respondents’ motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied for being moot and academic.
Reconsideration of the order having been denied on March 7, 1989, the petitioners
have come to this Court on certiorari.
ISSUE:
RULING: The Court had deliberated on the issues and the arguments of the
parties and finds that the petition must fail. The exception and not the rule shall be
applied in this case.
secured by the employer after it had already lost in the lower court and were
subsequently rejected by this Court when the employer invoked it in a petition for
certiorari. By contrast, the quitclaims in the case before us were signed by the
petitioners while the motion for reconsideration was still pending in the DOLE,
which finally deemed it on March 7, 1989. Furthermore, the quitclaims in the cited
case were entered into without leave of the lower court whereas in the case at bar
the quitclaims were made with the knowledge and approval of the DOLE, which
declared in its order of December 16, 1988, that “the compromise
agreement/settlements dated April 15, 1988 and July 19, 1988 are hereby
approved.”
It is also noteworthy that the quitclaims were voluntarily and knowingly made by
both petitioners even if they may now deny this. In the case of Veloso, the
quitclaim he had signed carried the notation that the sum stated therein had been
paid to him in the presence of Atty. Gaga Mauna, his counsel, and the document
was attested by Atty. Ferdinand Magabilin, Chief of the Industrial Relations
Division of the National Capitol Region of the DOLE. In the case of Liguaton, his
quitclaim was made with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Leopoldo Balguma,
who also notarized it and later confirmed it with the filing of the motion to dismiss
Liguaton’s complaint.
The same Atty. Balguma is the petitioners’ counsel in this proceeding. Curiously,
he is now challenging the very same quitclaim of Liguaton that he himself
notarized and invoked as the basis of Liguaton’s motion to dismiss, but this time
for a different reason. whereas he had earlier argued for Liguaton that the latter’s
signature was a forgery, he has abandoned that contention and now claims that
the quitclaim had been executed because of the petitioners’ dire necessity.
“Dire necessity” is not an acceptable ground for annulling the releases, especially
since it has not been shown that the employees had been forced to execute them.
It has not even been proven that the considerations for the quitclaims were
unconscionably low and that the petitioners had been tricked into accepting them.
While it is true that the writ of execution dated November 24, 1987, called for the
collection of the amount of P46,267.92 each for the petitioners, that amount was
still subject to recomputation and modification as the private respondent’s motion
for reconsideration was still pending before the DOLE. The fact that the petitioners
accepted the lower amounts would suggest that the original award was exorbitant
and they were apprehensive that it would be adjusted and reduced. In any event,
no deception has been established on the part of the Private respondent that
would justify the annulment of the Petitioners’ quitclaims.

G.R. No. 161003 May 6, 2005
FELIPE O. MAGBANUA, CARLOS DE LA CRUZ, REMY ARNAIZ, BILLY ARNAIZ, ROLLY
ARNAIZ, DOMINGO SALARDA, JULIO CAHILIG and NICANOR LABUEN, petitioners,
vs.
RIZALINO UY, respondent.
FACTS: “As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court
in Rizalino P. Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al. (GR No. 117983,
September 6, 1996) which affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC in NLRC
Case No. V-0427-93, hearings were conducted [in the National Labor Relations
Commission Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch in Iloilo City] to determine the amount of wage
differentials due the eight (8) complainants therein, now [petitioners]. As computed, the
award amounted to P1,487,312.69 x x x.
“On February 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.
“On May 19, 1997, [respondent] Rizalino Uy filed a Manifestation requesting that the cases
be terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had been complied
with to the satisfaction of [petitioners]. Said Manifestation was also signed by the eight (8)
[petitioners]. Together with the Manifestation is a Joint Affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of
[petitioners], attesting to the receipt of payment from [respondent] and waiving all other
benefits due them in connection with their complaint.
“On June 3, 1997, [petitioners] filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
wherein they confirmed that each of them received P40,000 from [respondent] on May 2,
1997.
“On June 9, 1997, [respondent] opposed the motion on the ground that the judgment award
had been fully satisfied. In their Reply, [petitioners] claimed that they received only partial
payments of the judgment award.
“On October 20, 1997, six (6) of the eight (8) [petitioners] filed a Manifestation requesting
that the cases be considered closed and terminated as they are already satisfied of what
they have received (a total of P320,000) from [respondent]. Together with said Manifestation
is a Joint Affidavit in the local dialect, dated October 20, 1997, of the six (6) [petitioners]
attesting that they have no more collectible amount from [respondent] and if there is any,
they are abandoning and waiving the same.
“On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter issued an order denying the motion for issuance of
writ of execution and [considered] the cases closed and terminated x x x.
“On appeal, the [National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter ‘NLRC’)] reversed the
Labor Arbiter and directed the immediate issuance of a writ of execution, holding that a final
and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases are
normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy.”
The CA held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final judgment.
Thus, petitioners validly released respondent from any claims, upon the voluntary execution
of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for having been filed out
of time.
RULING:
1) COMPROMISE AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT. A compromise agreement is a contract
whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and
thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.11 They adjust their difficulties in the manner they have
agreed upon, disregarding the possible gain in litigation and keeping in mind that such gain
is balanced by the danger of losing. Verily, the compromise may be either extrajudicial (to
prevent litigation) or judicial (to end a litigation).
A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and
must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. To have the
force of law between the parties, it must comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts. Upon the parties, it has the effect and the authority of res judicata, once entered
into.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract
binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a
determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately
executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of
its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
General Rule: Article 2040 of the Civil Code does not refer to the validity of a compromise “The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was
agreement entered into after final judgment. Moreover, an important requisite, which is lack voluntarily entered into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms and
of knowledge of the final judgment, is wanting in the present case. consequences thereof.

Exceptions: The issue involving the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a
final judgment is not novel. Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise agreement that
covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final judgment. The Court noted that Article
2040 impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should
be entered into. Palanca v. Court of Industrial Relations sustained a compromise
agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment in which only the amount of back wages was
left to be determined. The Court found no evidence of fraud or of any showing that the
agreement was contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Gatchalian v. Arlegui upheld the right to compromise prior to the execution of a final
judgment. The Court ruled that the final judgment had been novated and superseded by a
compromise agreement. Also, Northern Lines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals recognized the
right to compromise final and executory judgments, as long as such right was exercised by
the proper party litigants.
“A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor
Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be approved by him, if after confronting the
parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and
conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them and
the agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy.”51
This provision refers to proceedings in a mandatory/conciliation conference during the initial
stage of the litigation. Such provision should be made applicable to the proceedings in the
pre-execution conference, for which the procedure for approving a waiver after final
judgment is not stated. There is no reason to make a distinction between the proceedings in
mandatory/conciliation and those in pre-execution conferences.

There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered

into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the
requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the
law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent of
the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the
compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established.

The principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise after final judgment.
Novation, a mode of extinguishing an obligation,43 is done by changing the object or
principal condition of an obligation, substituting the person of the debtor, or surrogating a
third person in the exercise of the rights of the creditor.44
For an obligation to be extinguished by another, the law requires either of these two
conditions: (1) the substitution is unequivocally declared, or (2) the old and the new
obligations are incompatible on every point.45 A compromise of a final judgment operates
as a novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite.46 In the
present case, the incompatibility of the final judgment with the compromise agreement is
evident, because the latter was precisely entered into to supersede the former.
2) WAIVER OF QUITCLAIMS. The presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is
executed does not determine its validity. There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel
to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed voluntarily, freely and intelligently;
and whether the consideration for it was credible and reasonable. Where there is clear proof
that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a gullible person, the law must step in to
annul such transaction.

In the present case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that their consent
had been vitiated.

“Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the
same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel, or
authorized representative, if any,50 before the Labor Arbiter.