3.8.

Dismissal of action (Rule 16)

- Grounds
- lack of jurisdiction over person

[3.8 01] Amigo v CA, 253 SCRA 382 - AKI

GR # 102833 | February 9, 1996
Petitioner: ​LOLITA AMIGO and ESTELITA VDA. DE SALINAS
Respondent: ​THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE AUGUSTO V. BREVA, as Judge, RTC of
Davao, Branch X, THE SHERIFF OF THE RTC represented by Alfonso M. Zamora, Deputy Sheriff of Branch X, and
JESUS WEE ENG
Motion to Dismiss: Lack of Jurisdiction

FACTS
➢ Petitioners leased in 1961 from Mercedes Inigo, a parcel of land.
○ Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot.
○ Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein
private respondent Jesus Wee Eng.
➢ Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City Government of Davao.
○ They exchanged a portion of their lot for a portion of a lot under the name of the city.
○ The transaction was authorized and approved by the City Council of Davao.
➢ Both pertinent lots were subdivided and the titles, cancelled.
○ New titles were issued as per the exchange aforementioned.
➢ Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners.
○ The city court dismissed the action on the technicality that the plaintiffs did not observe the required
15-day period from the sending of the letter of demand before filing the action.
■ Twelve days before the filing of the action nila sinend.
➢ Bosquit sold his rights and interests over the lots to Wee.
➢ Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of the real property in question.
○ After the petitioners had filed their answer, the court appointed a duly licensed geodetic engineer to
conduct a relocation survey of the boundaries of the land.
■ In his report, it was stated that — ". . . portions of about two-thirds (2/3) of the houses of
Lolita Amigo and that of Estelita Vda. de Salinas is inside the lot of Wee; the remaining
onethird of it lies on the road widening and the creek respectively."
➢ Private respondent sought an amendment of his complaint which was allowed.
○ The complaint prayed not only for the recovery of real property and damages but also for an
abatement of nuisance over the portion of the improvements introduced by petitioners that
encroached on the sidewalk of Leon Garcia Street.
➢ In their amended answer, petitioners denied the material allegations of the amended complaint.
○ Petitioners stressed that their houses stood neither on private respondent's land nor on the
sidewalk or shoulders of Leon Garcia Street but along the banks of the Agdao Creek.
➢ The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent.
➢ The CA dismissed the appeal because petitioners failed to file an appellate brief.
➢ Private respondent then moved for execution of judgment, but petitioners filed for the annulment of the
RTC’s decision at the CA.
○ A TRO was issued but was lifted when the CA dismissed the case.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their person.​ – YES
RULING & RATIO:​ YES.
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter:
➢ conferred by law and determined by the allegations of the complaint
○ It should hardly be of any consequence that the merits of the case are later found to veer away
from the claims asseverated by the plaintiff.
➢ The case is on recovering real property -- an action within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Jurisdiction over the Person:

➢ acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons
➢ By filing an answer and later an amended answer, the petitioners must be deemed to have formally and
effectively appeared before the lower court.
○ Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any stage of the
proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be
seasonably raised.
■ can be pleaded in a motion to dismiss
■ can be through an affirmative defense in an answer
➢ The records bear out the fact that petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned
until the rendition of the judgment.
○ They cannot question the jurisdiction too late in the game.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

- lack of jurisdiction over subject matter

[3.8 02] La Naval v CA, 236 SCRA 78 - JEWEL

Doctrine: Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the
action, the invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to
violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character.
Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither
estoppel nor waiver shall apply.

Petitioner:​ La Naval Drug Corporation

Respondents:​ Court of Appeals and Wilson Yao

FACTS:
Respondent Yao is the present owner of a commercial building a portion of which is leased to petitioner
under a contract of lease executed on December 23, 1983 with the former owner thereof, La Proveedora,
Inc., which contract expired on April 30, 1989. Petitioner exercised its option to lease the same building
for another five years. But petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the
controversy, the latter, thru written notices to the former, expressed his intention to submit their
disagreement to arbitration, in accordance with Republic Act 876 (Arbitration Law). Petitioner and
Respondent chose Atty. Casiano Sabile and Domingo Alamarez Jr. as their arbitrators respectively,
however, an issue arose in choosing the third arbitrator.
This prompted Yao to go to court to demand the arbitrators to proceed with the arbitration. Yao went to
the regional trial court and the case was filed as a summary proceeding case under R.A. 876. Yao also
prayed for an award for damages in his favor.
In its answer, La Naval asserted that the case should be dismissed as it was filed prematurely; La Naval
questioned Yao’s claim for damages as it averred that the same should be litigated independently and not
in the same summary proceeding case.
RTC announced that Eloisa Narciso was chosen as the third arbitrator and ordered the parties to submit
their position paper on the issue as to whether or not respondent’s claim for damages may be litigated in
a summary proceeding for enforcement of arbitration agreement.

CA agreed with Petitioner that a court, acting within the limits of its special jurisdiction, may in this case
solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however,
considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and
decide in the summary proceedings private respondent’s claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself
filed similarly its own counter-claim with the court a quo.

ISSUE:​ Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

RULING:
No. Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor
waiver shall apply.

In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of the
controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court’s authority only to pass upon the issue of
whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute
ordains that the court shall issue an order “summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration
in accordance with the terms thereof.” If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement
exists, “the proceedings shall be dismissed.” The proceedings are summary in nature.

All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for
damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune
time and venue. The circumstances obtaining in this case are far, we hold, from justifying the application
of estoppel against either party.

WHEREFORE​, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial court in question are ​SET
ASIDE​. The court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is ordered to ​DESIST ​from further hearing private
respondent’s claim, as well as petitioner’s counterclaim, for damages. No costs.

[3.8 03] Ilocos Sur Electric v NLRC 241 SCRA 36 - KATE

Doctrine: ​While jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable
practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Facts:
Engr. Egdon Sabio was employed as Manager of the Engineering Department of Ilocos Sur Electric
Cooperative (ISECO), herein petitioner, in May 1982. He was relieved of his duties on June 10, 1989 and
was dismissed on July 1, 1989 pursuant to ISECO's Board Resolution No. 63 s. 1989.

It appears that Sabio wrote to the ISECO Board of Directors (nagsumbong), about the expenses incurred
by Acting General Manager, Atty. Bautista, in the total amount of P131,788.79 from May 1988 to May
1989 for his travel to the office of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and places outside the
area serviced by the cooperative. Sabio revealed that in one year, Bautista was away for two hundred
twenty (220) days, while in contrast the previous Acting General Manager, Genaro Cada, who stayed out
of the cooperative for not more than thirty (30) days for the same length of time spent not more than ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) only.

Bautista summoned Sabio to his office and asked him to file a letter of irrevocable resignation with the
assurance that separation benefits will be granted to him. ​Thereafter, Bautista issued Memo No. 55-89
requiring Sabio to explain in writing within 24 hours upon receipt why he should not be separated from the
service for grave and serious misconduct.

Sabio submitted his answer denying all the charges against him. On June 30, 1989 Bautista placed him
under ​preventive suspension ​without pay effective July 1, 1989, which prompted Sabio to file a complaint
for ​illegal suspension and a claim for representation/travel allowances before the Labor Arbiter.

Bautista then created an ad hoc committee; to investigate the case against Sabio. Thereafter, the ​ad hoc
committee ​submitted a report of its investigation and finding Sabio ​guilty​ and recommended that he
should be dismissed. Bautista recommended to the ISECO Board of Directors the approval of the report
and recommendation of the ad hoc committee. On July 29, 1989, the​ Board adopted the
recommendation of the ad hoc committee ​and passed Resolution No. 63 s. 1989,​ terminating​ the
services of Sabio retroactive July 1, 1989.

Consequently, Sabio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for damages against petitioner with
respondent ​National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)​, docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB-1-07-1050-89, which was assigned to Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen of the Regional Arbitration
Branch, DOLE, for compulsory arbitration. On January 8, 1990, the Labor Arbiter, after considering the
evidence on record, held in his decision that ​Sabio was illegally and unjustly dismissed without due
process of law.

Petitioner (ISECO) appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, but ​NLRC dismissed the
appeal for having been filed out of time​. T ​ he NLRC found that petitioners filed their appeal beyond the
ten-day period prescribed by the Revised Rules of the NLRC, specifically Rule VIII section I(a). A motion
for reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the NLRC in its resolution of November 16, 1990. A notice of
appeal to the President was filed. This was merely noted by the Commission on June 24, 1991, a petition
for the issuance of a writ of execution was submitted by Sabio. Upon computation of the exact amount to
be awarded to Sabio, the Executive Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner now assails that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and therefore, their
decision must be void.

Issue: ​Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case of Engr. Egdon A. Sabio.

Held: YES. It is clear from the provision of P.D. 269, as amended by P.D. 1645 that only the power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or controlled, is given
to the NEA. There is nothing said law which provides that the NEA administration has the power to hear
and decide termination cases of employees in electric cooperatives. That authority is vested in the Labor
Arbiter (NLRC). In the present case, there is no dispute that ​Sabio is an employee of ISECO whose
services as manager of the Engineering Department of ISECO were terminated. The dismissal arose from
a purely labor dispute which falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC.​ Thus, Section. 217 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension,
even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural
or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination of disputes;

Moreover, the NLRC’s jurisdiction was only raised for the first time in this petition. ​Petitioners did not
question the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter either in a motion to dismiss or in their answer​. In fact,
petitioners ​participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter​, as well as in the NLRC to which they
appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision. It has been consistently held by this Court that while jurisdiction
may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[3.8 04] Andaya v Abadia 228 SCRA 705 - JOCHE

Petitioners: ​NOE S. ANDAYA
Respondent: ​LISANDRO C. ABADIA, RENE R. CRUZ, VICTOR M. PUNZALAN, LYSIAS C. CABUSAO,
JOSE O. BARNUEVO, JOSE M. FORONDA, LAMBERTO TORRES, EDGAR C. GALVANTE, EMERSON
C. TANGAN, PRIMITIVO A. SOMERA and BENJAMIN N. SANTOS, SR.
Doctrine: ​Jurisdiction over subject matter is essential in the sense that erroneous assumption thereof
may put at naught whatever proceedings the court might have had. Hence, even on appeal, and even if
the parties do not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that it has
no jurisdiction over the case. It is elementary that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties or even by the judge. It is also irrefutable that a court may at any stage of the
proceedings dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. For this matter, the ground of lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing a case is not waivable. Hence, the last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly
states: "Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the
action."
FACTS:
- Petitioner contends that RTC, and not SEC, has jurisdiction over his complaint.
- That the civil case he filed should not have been dismissed
- He asserts that "actually, the complaint is based not so much on plaintiff's attempted
removal but rather on the manner of his removal and the consequent effects thereof ."
- That “the directors of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc., (AFPSLAI) . . . acting in concert and pursuant to an illegal and
nefarious scheme to oust petitioner from his then positions as President and
General Manager of the AFPSLAI, with grave abuse of authority and in gross and
deliberate violation of the norms of human relations and of petitioner's right to
due process, illegally, maliciously and with evident bad faith, convened a meeting
of the AFPSLAI Board of Directors and illegally reorganized the management of
AFPSLAI by ousting and removing, without just and lawful cause, petitioner from
his position and praying for the issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction…”
- TC granted the prayer of TRO and set the hearing on the injunctive relief.
- Respondent filed an urgent motion to dismiss.
- Complaint raised an intra-corporate controversies over which SEC has exclusive original
jurisdiction.
- Respondent also filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Restraining ORder and Opposition to Preliminary
Injunction.
- Petitioner filed a Consolidated Opposition to Urgent Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift
Restraining Order with Reply to Opposition to Preliminary Injunction and Reiteration of Motions
for Contempt (for violation of the Temporary Restraining Order).
- Before the TC could rule on the motion to dismiss, petitioner filed an amended complaint
impleading additional defendants. (Central Bank managing director and acting director)
- Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion: that the filing of the amended complaint seeking to confer
jurisdiction on the court was improper and shouldn’t be allowed.
- TC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction insofar as respondents are concerned and denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
- That “...the specific law, P.D. No. 902-A, defines and vests jurisdiction over corporate
matters in the Securities and Exchange Commission in no uncertain terms, Section 3, to
be 'absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations.' In the case at bar,
AFPSLAI is a corporation and the alleged causes of action in the complaint are clearly
corporate matters....”
- Petitioner moved to consider and argued that "since the case under the Amended Complaint
impleads parties-defendant not in any way connected with the AFPSLAI, any apparent corporate
element in the case is swept away." but was denied.

ISSUE:
1. WON it is the SEC that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and not the court
2. WON the court acted on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the Omnibus Motion without the
requisite notice as provided by Secs. 4 & 6 of Rule 15

HELD: ​YES.
1. The determination of the rights of petitioner arising from the alleged illegal convening of the
meeting of AFPSLAI Board of Directors and his subsequent ouster from corporate offices as a
 result of the voting for the reorganization of management are obviously intra-corporate
controversies subject to the jurisdiction of SEC as provided in P. D. No. 902-A.
- Even the supposed allegations of violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations,
as in par. 7 of the Complaint which states that "certain parties, including defendant SANTOS
"masterminded a plot to degrade plaintiff and to denigrate his accomplishments in the AFPSLAI
by spreading false and derogatory rumors against plaintiff," are all treated in the complaint as
mere components of the general scheme allegedly perpetrated by respondents as directors to
oust him from his corporate offices, and not as causes of action independent of intra-corporate
matters.
- These paragraphs themselves show that the allegations of violations of the rules on
human relations also fall within the jurisdiction of SEC because they are treated merely
as ingredients of "malevolent and illegal acts calculated to realize and accomplish the
threatened illegal removal of plaintiff from his (corporate) positions."
2. NO. ​Petitioner posits that the court a quo was precluded from acting not only on the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss because it was deemed superseded, but also on the Omnibus Motion because
no hearing was had thereon thus leaving the assailed orders without basis to lean on. This is
untenable.
-The Omnibus Motion already comprehended the lone issue raised in the Urgent Motion
to Dismiss (i.e., the court has no jurisdiction over intra-corporate matters) and upon which
ground the court a quo dismissed the case against respondents, the previous hearing on
the Urgent Motion to Dismiss may cure the defect of absence of hearing on the Omnibus
Motion but only insofar as said issue was concerned. What is important is that petitioner
was heard on that issue, hence, due process was observed.
-The last sentence of Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court, expressly states: "Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it shall dismiss the
action."
We note that Sec. 2, Rule 9 uses the word "shall," leaving the court no choice under the
given situation but to dismiss the case. The same Rule also uses the phrase "whenever it
appears," which means at anytime after the complaint or amended complaint is filed,
because the lack of jurisdiction may be apparent from the allegations therein. Hence,
from the foregoing, even if no answer or motion to dismiss is filed the court may dismiss
the case for want of jurisdiction. In this sense, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction may be
ordered by the court motu proprio. Applying this notion to the case at bar, with the
dismissal of the case against respondents for lack of jurisdiction, it then becomes
inconsequential whether the court acted on the Urgent Motion to Dismiss or on the
Omnibus Motion without the requisite notice as provided in Secs. 4 and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court. The determination of lack of jurisdiction over respondents being
apparent from the face of the amended complaint, the defect of want of prior notice and
hearing on the Omnibus Motion could not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the court a
quo.

DISPOSITIVE: ​Petition dismissed.

[3.8 05] Republic v Bantigue Point Development Corp 668 SCRA 158 - SAI

- pendentia litis

[3.8 06] Andersons Group v CA. 266 S 423 ​- MIGUEL

PETITIONER:​ The Andersons Group, Inc. (Andersons)
RESPONDENT:​ Court of Appeals (CA), Spouses Willie A. Denate and Myrna Lo Denate (Denate)

DOCTRINE:
Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute the defense of lis
pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial
identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata the case on hand.

FACTS:
Denate entered into an agency agreement with Andersons as its commission agent for the sale of
distilled spirits (wines and liquors) in Davao City, three Davao provinces and North Cotabato. On
November 18, 1991, Denate filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against Andersons before
the RTC of Davao City. In the complaint, Denate alleged that he was entitled to the amount of
Php882,107.95, representing commissions from Andersons, but that the latter had maliciously failed and
refused to pay the same.
December 19, 1991, Andersons likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with
damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Denate with the RTC of
Kalookan City, Branch 22. Andersons alleged in the complaint that Denate still owed it the sum of
P1,618,467.98 after deducting commissions and remittances.
On February 5, 1992, Denate filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with the Kalookan
RTC on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of Davao City.
On February 14, 1992, Andersons filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.
RTC of Kalookan denied MTD saying that it has already acquired jurisdiction over the parties by
virtue of the service of summons. MR denied.
CA set aside the order of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:
​WON the action in the Kalookan RTC should be dismissed on the ground of ​lis pendens.​

RULING: YES.
Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To constitute the defense of lis
pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial
identity in the cause of action and relief sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata​ the case on hand.
All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan cases
are the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of agency. As
observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same facts and there is identity of
rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would amount to ​res judicata​ in the other.
​Litis pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon which
a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and
vexatious.
 A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The phraseology adopted in the
Rules of Court merely states that another action pending between the same parties for the same cause is
a ground for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending
action, since it is enough that there is a pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with
summons before ​lis pendens​ should apply.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

[3.8 07] Ramos v Peralta, 203 S 412

FACTS

[3.8 08] Yap v Chua 672 S 411 - VIN

Doctrine:​ Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second
action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

Facts:
-Yap delivered the checks to Te, which were payable to property owners and various financers, for the
purchase of a land. Bagatao was among the people who received checks. However, Yap was later
informed that Bagatao was not the owner of the land. He concluded that it was proper to cancel the
checks he issued at payment to all other contracts of sale he entered into through Te.

-Verbal demands for Yap to make good the checks he issued proved to be futile. Thus, Chua filed with
RTC General Santos City a complaint for sum of money. RTC General Santos ruled in favor of Chua.

-Petitioner Yap filed a complaint against respondents Chua and Te before RTC Makati principally praying
for the cancellation of several checks. Yap alleged that he purchased several real properties through Te
(real estate broker) and delivered checks as payments either to the property owners or to individuals who
agreed to finance the acquisitions.

-Armed with the decision of RTC General Santos, Chua moved for the dismissal of Yap’s complaint on
the twin grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Chua averred that Yap violated the rule against
forum shopping when he failed to inform RTC Makati of the case. RTC Makati refused to dismiss the
case. CA ordered the dismissal of the case.

-Yap urges the SC to reverse as the alleged existence of litis pendentia is belied by the incomparable
causes of action he and Chua advanced in the separate complaints they initiated against each other.

Issue:​ W/N Yap is liable for forum shopping

Ruling: Yes.
What is critical in forum shopping is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who
asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same reliefs. To determine
whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action
is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. The theory is founded on the public
policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in
order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and
status of persons.
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(a) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
(c) Identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.

All 3 elements are present.

Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks to Chua after he was adjudged by RTC General
Santos liable. This is indicative of his deliberate and willful attempt to render worthless and defeat the
adverse decision of RTC General Santos and relieve himself of the obligation to pay by having the checks
annulled. By seeking to cancel such checks, Yap attempted to use the RTC Makati to destroy the
evidentiary foundation of the decision of RTC General Santos. In doing so, Yap trifled with court
processes and exposed the courts to the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 10, 2008
and Resolution dated February 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93974 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

- res judicata

[3.8 09] Vda de Cruzo v Cariaga, 174 S 330 - MICHA

[3.8 10] Hacienda Bigaa Inc v Chavez 618 S 559 - KYLE

- no cause of action

[3.8 11] San Lorenzo v CA, 288 S 115 - ELLA

Petitioner: ​San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc.
Rspondents: ​Court Of Appeals; Hon. Judge Roberto C. Diokno, Presiding Judge, Rtc, Makati, Branch 62
and Almeda Development & Equipment Corporation

FACTS:
● Respondent Almeda Development and Equipment Corporation (ADEC) ​is the owner of a parcel of
land with building and other improvements situated at Pasay Road, San Lorenzo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila.
● ADEC’s ownership was evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by Ponciano L. Almeda, married
to Eufemia Pere-Almeda, and ADEC on Sept 15, 1991.
● In the TCT, there appears to be restrictions as to the use of the property:
1. The owner of this lot or his successor in interest is required to be and is automatically a
member of the San Lorenzo Village Association. The lot may not be subdivided. The lot
shall only be used for residential purposes. Only one single storey or one (duplex) house
may be constructed on a single lot, although separate servant's quarter or garage may be
built. The property is subject to an easement of two meters within the lot and adjacent to
the rear and sides thereof not fronting a street for the purpose of drainage, sewage, water
and other public facilities as may be necessary and desirable.
2. All buildings on the lot must be of strong materials. Building shall not be higher than 5
meters above the ground directly beneath the point in question. All building plans must be
approved by the Association before construction begins. All buildings including garage,
servant's quarter (porte cocheres) must be constructed . . . not less than 3 meters from
boundary bordering a wall, not including pedestrian paths, and not less than 2 meters
from the other boundaries of this lot. Sewage disposal must be by means of septic tank
or into a sewage system.
3. Walls on the perimeter of this property shall not exceed 2 meters in height, except that no
restriction as to height applies to walls made of live vegetation.
● These restrictions were imposed by San Lorenzo Company, Inc. to lot and house owners in San
Lorenzo Village.
● However, the condition prevailing along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) when the restrictions
were imposed was no longer the same at present.
○ At that time, houses located along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village) were used purely
for residential purposes. Today, what are found along Pasay Road (San Lorenzo Village)
are commercial/industrial buildings such as the matter of security and garbage collections
are taken care of by their buyers.
● Accordingly, petitioner San Lorenzo Association, Inc. (SLVAI) was no longer relevant in so far as
the building and lot owners are concerned.
● ADEC contended that the restrictions were unlawful limitations to their rights.
○ Under Art 428 of the Civil Code, as the owner of the said parcel of land together with the
building and other improvements thereon, ADEC has the right to enjoy and dispose of
said property without limitation except those established by law.
● ADEC prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the San Lorenzo
Company, Inc. and its agents.
● SLVAI filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of
ADEC's personality to sue.
○ It alleged that ADEC was not a registered owner of the parcel of land; that the sale of the
property by Ponciano L. Almeda to ADEC could not bind third parties; that ADEC had no
reason to pray for the cancellation of the Memorandum of Encumbrances not being the
owner of the land nor a member of SLVAI but simply a stranger that had no demandable
right against the SLVAI.
● RTC: ruled in favor of ADEC.
 ○ As successor in interest of the original registered owner, plaintiff step (sic) into the shoes
of the latter, consequently it can sue and be sued.
● CA: affirmed.

ISSUE: ​WON the petition alleges a cause of action against SLVAI that the lower court may be deemed to
have correctly denied the motion to dismiss the same petition

HELD: YES.
● A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the three (3) essential elements of a cause
of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
● If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action. If the allegations are vague, indefinite, or in the form
of conclusions, the defendant's recourse is not a motion to dismiss but a bill of particulars.
● A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the hypothetical admission is
limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly
deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor
does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice."
● However, it should be pointed out at the outset that it is not "lack or absence of cause of action"
that is a ground for dismissal of the complaint, but rather, that "the complaint states no cause of
action".
● Applying to the case at bar, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADEC's vendor, the
execution of the sale by said vendor to ADEC, the latter's status as the vendor's
successor-in-interest, and the altered physical environment along Pasay Road, are allegations
well within the hypothetical-admission principle. These averments satisfy the three (3) elements
of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint did state a cause of action.
● In view of such, SLVAI cannot successfully invoke the ground that the complaint "fails to state a
cause of action" in its motion to dismiss.
● What SLVAI essentially puts at issue is whether substantively, ADEC, as plaintiff in the case
below, possesses a tenable right of action. As discussed, said issue is not a ground for a motion
to dismiss. As a matter of law, neither are the efficacy of the sale to pass title to the property, and
consequently, ADEC's acquisition of the status of successor-in-interest, specific mandatory
modes to challenge the restrictions in question, or the change in the physical environment along
Pasay Road, grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Instead, the
aforementioned issues may be properly raised in the Answer.

WHEREFORE​, the petition should be​ DISMISSED​ and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
should be​ AFFIRMED.

[3.8 12] Calalang v IAC, 194 S 514 - KIM

[3.8 13] Perpetual v Fajardo, 233 S 720 - AKI

GR # 79760 | June 28, 1993
Petitioner: ​PERPETUAL SAVINGS BANK, HON. JOSE L. COSCOLLUELA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Branch 146
Respondent:​ JOSE ORO B. FAJARDO and EMMANUEL F. DEL MUNDO
Motion to Dismiss: No Cause of Action

FACTS
➢ J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation executed and delivered to petitioner Perpetual Savings Bank a
promissory note.
○ P750,000.00
○ payable in one lump sum
○ matures on 29 January 1984
○ with interest at 23% per annum
○ penalty interest of 3% per month, compounded monthly
➢ The promissory note was executed for J.J. Mining by respondents Jose Oro B. Fajardo and Emmanuel F.
Del Mundo who were officers of J.J. Mining.
○ respondent Del Mundo was apparently also counsel for J.J. Mining.
➢ Upon maturity of the promissory note, neither J.J. Mining nor anyone else paid the amount of the
indebtedness, notwithstanding petitioner's repeated written demands for payment.
➢ Petitioner Bank filed a complaint with the RTC against J.J. Mining, Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni and herein
respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, for collection of the amounts due under the promissory note.
○ Respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had failed to state a cause of action against them.
○ Petitioner Bank filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, citing paragraph 1.6 of its complaint
and invoking, among other things, Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides for
alternative defendants.
➢ RTC: denied Motion to dismiss.
○ Respondents moved for reconsideration.​ Denied.
➢ Respondents went to SC with a petition for certiorari, but it was resolved to be referred to the CA.
➢ CA: granted the motion of respondents and dismissed motion for reconsideration of petitioners.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
W/N the complaint filed sufficiently stated a cause of action. – YES

RULING & RATIO

YES
➢ The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of action against the
defendants is ​whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint.​
➢ In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be
considered.
➢ It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence.
○ If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants.
➢ A careful review of the records of this case reveals that the allegations set forth in the complaint sufficiently
establish a cause of action.
○ The following are the requisites for the existence of a cause of action:
 ■ a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
■ an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect, or not to violate such right;
and
■ an act or omission on the part of the said defendants constituting a violation of the
plaintiff's right or a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
➢ In the case at bar:
○ The first basis of suing the respondents was them as tort-feasors who contracted the loan although
they allegedly knew that the apparent principal obligor, J.J. Mining, would never be able to pay the
loan upon maturity.
■ cause of action: fraudulent inducement, concealment or misrepresentation exercised upon
petitioner Bank which was misled into granting and releasing the loan
○ The second basis for suing Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities is
that they allegedly used the proceeds of the loan for their own personal benefit, rather than for the
benefit of the borrower corporation.
➢ When CA dismissed the petition, it considered evidence outside the complaint.
○ The SC found that it was premature for the Court of Appeals to consider evidence (or lack of
evidence) outside the four corners of the complaint and to reach the above conclusion.
○ The fraud consisting of false representations has yet to be proved by petitioner Bank in the course
of the trial before the court a quo.
○ Evidently, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the trial has yet to begin; for it assumed as
real and established the defenses which need to be proved during that trial.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25 August 1987 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
11547 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court dated 9 October 1986 and 22 December
1986 in Civil Case No. 14501 are hereby REINSTATED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this Decision. Costs against respondents.

[3.8 14] City of Cebu v CA, 258 S 175 - JEWEL

- Remedy in case of granting/denial of motion to dismiss

- Order denying motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence proper remedy is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered

[3.8 15] Indiana Aerospace University v Commission On Higher Education, 356 S 367 - KATE

[3.8 16] Bangko Silangan v CA, 360 S 322 - JOCHE

Petitioners: ​BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Respondent: ​COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE PABLO D. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Nasugbu, Batangas and LEONIDA
UMANDAL-BAUSAS
Doctrine: ​An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.

FACTS:
 - Respondent, Leonida Umandal-Bausas, had been maintaining a savings account as depositor of
petitioner where she deposited P15,000 thereto.
- When respondent attempted to withdraw P5,000, the bank teller told her that 15,000 has already
been withdrawn by her brother, Antonio Umandal, and only P800 as left in her account.
- Respondent inquired about withdrawal slip and found out that signatures were neither her nor her
brother’s.
- Respondent sought assistance of family friend, Villadolid, who was a President-Manager of the
Rural Bank.
- Villadolid sent the petitioner bank a letter together with an affidavit executed by respondent.
- In the letter: “Claiming that the withdrawal smacked of "foul play" and "dubious exercise
of unwarranted banking operation," Villadolid warned the petitioner bank that he would be
constrained to elevate the matter to "higher authorities" should there be no "reasonable
and convincing results at the earliest (sic) possible"
- Petitioner BSDB caused an investigation on the matter.
- Denied the alleged foul play and defended that withdrawal was processed in accordance
with the standard operating procedure.
- Villadolid requested Central Bank to intervene and conduct an investigation on petitioner’s
banking processes.
- Villadolid wrote petitioner another letter.
- He reminded the petitioner bank that it had been forty-five (45) days since the failed
withdrawal and that,, no "concrete results and/or remedies" has been arrived at. He
warned that if, within five (5) days, the petitioner bank would continue its "insulting
treatment" on the matter, respondent Bausas would be constrained to hire the services of
a lawyer in order that the proper charges would be filed against the petitioner bank.
- Petitioner reiterated its denial and confirmed proper banking processes were followed.
- Respondent sought help from NBI and a case was filed with the Office of Provincial Prosecutor.
- It appears that respondent shared the matter to the press.
- The September issue of the People's Journal Tonight, the following headline appeared:
"Bank Money Withdrawn w/o Depositor's Knowledge." was reproduces and posted by
respondents in conspicuous places within municipal hall.
- Petitioner filed in RTC complaint for damages: series of publication were defamatory and libelous.
- Respondent in their answer with compulsory counterclaim, alleged that the withdrawal slip was a
forgery and that Villadolid's actions were moved by a "sense of moral duty" to respondent Bausas
and her family. That there was no malice on their partas well.
- Instead of filing a responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioner BSDB filed a motion to dismiss.
- there was another action pending between the same parties for the same case
- the action caused the splitting of the cause of action raised in the answer and
counterclaim in a Civil Case
- the action violated the principle of multiplicity of suits
- the filing of the complaint constituted forum-shopping.
- RTC dismissed.
- Petitioner BSDB elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
- CA dismissed. Held that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, cannot
be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: ​WON CA erred in denying the certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because a motion to dismiss
is not an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari
HELD: ​NO.
- The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of
Appeals is not the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss in Civil Case. The
Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to dismiss are merely
interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always
under the control and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge
cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby. These limitations
were not transgressed by the trial court in the case at bar when it denied the petitioner's motion to
dismiss. The alleged "chaos and confusion" arising from conflicting decisions that petitioner
purportedly seeks to avert by the dismissal of Civil Case are actually far-fetched and contrived
considering that any adverse decision of the CTA can be made the subject of a proper appeal.

DISPOSITIVE: ​Petition for review on certiorari, denied.

[3.8 17] Yutingco v CA, 386 S 85 - SAI