126 BASIC PRINCIPLES

justift limited infringements on the rights of sorne individuals. Sufficiently large so-
cial costs and benefits rnay also be significant enoush to justifu limited i"prltor.,
frorn stairdards of justice. The crirrection of Irrgc and u'iclcs;lrc,r<l injustices rnay bc
important enough to justifu lirrriretl infrinsernenrs on sonre inclividual rights. \Mren a
Iarge injusrice or large violaticrn of riglrm, or evcn larqe social lrarnrs, are at stakc, drc
demands of car:ing ma1, [1vs to qivc wllv to drc dclrr:rntls olt inrpar:ti.;rliry.
At dris tirne, we har.e no c<lnrPrchensive rnorirl theory caPablc of cleter:rnining pfc-
cisehr urhsn utilitarian corsiclerarions llcconre "strificier.rtly large" enoueh to outweigh
limited infringements on e cc,rnflictirrg riuht, a stanclarcl of jtrstice, o. the dcrnancls oitca-r-
ing. Nor can we provicle a trniversal rulc that will tcll us whcn consider:rtions of justice
becorne "irnportant enough" to ounveig'h ir.rfi-ingements on coirllictir-rg rights or on thc
demands of caring. Moral philosophers l-rave beerr u.able to agree ou anv alrsol.te rules
for making such judgmetr$. I-Ior.vever, there rlre so1rle r:ough criteria drat can glicle us
in.these matters. Suppose, For cxample, that only by irrvading rny ernployees'iight rc,
privacy (with hidden c-arneras anci leeal on-the-job phone tnps), rvill i be abte to sr6p
the continuine theft of several lifb-saving drugs drat son',e of ihem are clearly stealing.
How can I detennine u'hether the udlitarian benefhs herc ar-e sulticielrtll, lar-ge to
fusrift,
infringing on their risht to privacv? First, I misht ask r-vherher the kiut!.r oi utilitariair
values involved are cleirrlv nrore important th:rn rJrc kiruls of values protected by the riehr
(or distributed by dre standar:cl of justice). The utilitarian benehts in the present
include the s:rving of hunran lif-e, li,4-rereas the right ro privac\r ""rr.rlpl.
1rr.or..t ll"t rls suppose)
the I'alues of freedom fr:clti sharne and blaclmail ancl lieecloni to live one's life ai'one
chooses, Considering this, I might decicle tlrnt human life is clearly thdrnbib' iriipitrr.'t#l*:
kind of valr,re because rrithoirt life, fi-cedorrr has lirtle v:rlue. Sccond, I nrigJrt thgn"ask
whether securing rhe nrore inrpt-r'tanr u,r,t ,rt:ol.tu. *;ir, l"-irrit r'.rrL.", l"ri.;;;;;:
terests of rnore (or fev'er) people rhan rvould be affected b1r securino the less important
For example, because tire recovered clrugs ivill (wr a"isume) saveseveral
J<ind.of y{ue-
' hundredrlives, whereas'the invasion ofprir.:rc1', r.r'ill alfuct ,oniv a dozen, people; seetui g
t}le utilitarian values will affect tl-re interesls of"sub.stanriallviuore
ireople, ,Third,15c*i
ask whether the actual injuries sustained lrv the,persons rvhose righis are viof"m&ilta
q'ill be iiirge or srnall. For exarnple, t.rppor. thm I can ensure
thom'an injustice is done)
that my employees suffer no sharne, blachnail, or restriction ot-t tlielr tieedom as a resulr
of my uncovering infounation about their privare lives (T inrencl to desrrov all such infor-
mation), dren their injuries rvill be relarively smell. Fourth, I can ask u4ledrer the pote r.r-
tial trreakdormn in trusting relationslrips drat sun eillirnce risls is more or ,less irnportrnt
dran the dreE of life-savins resources. Let us suppose, fbr exarnple , that the potential
harm that sun'eillance rvill inflict on enlplol,ss relaionships of nrrst is norlarge. "Ihcn, it
wou1dqppeardraq4r11iir-".asionofrhepnvae1'ofe1nplo1teesis.jrrstifiecI.
Hence, tltere are rough and intuitive criteria that can guide our thinkine rvhcn it
appears tlrat, iu a certain sinr'ation, utilierrian consiclerations nriglrt be sufficientlv impor-
tant to override conflicting r:ights, standards cF justice, rll rhc dcrnalcls of carilrt. Sirirftar
criteria can be used to detenniire u'hcdrer, in a certziirr sitr-ration, consicler:atious of justice
should override an irrdividual's righrs, or whcn thc derrran<js of cirr:ingare nlofe or less
significant than dre letliiretnents of justice. Hou,ever, tlrcse criteria icurairl r-ough errcl
intuitive. Tl-rey Iie at the edges of dre light drat erhics can shecl cxr moral reasonirra..

2.6 An Altercrative to lMoral Frinciples:

Virtue Ethics
Ivan F. Boesllr, born irrto r falnily of nrodest nreans, rrr,ivcd (o Nclv York Ciq, r.vfiep,
as a young lawyer, he wrs turned dov'n for jobs by Detroit's top law firrrls. B), the
mid-1980s, the hard-rvorking Boesky lr:rd:rccumul:rrecl a pcrsonal forrune estimated
it1

ErHrcau PRtlctples tx Busrruess 127

ar over ti400 rnillion and r.r'as CEO of a large financi:rl services cornpany. He rvas
famous in financial circles for his extraordinaryr skills in arbitrage, the art of spotting
clifFercnces irr the prices at which financial securities irre sel[inq on diff'erent r.r'orld
rnarkets and llrofiting hy lluying dre securities w4rcrc thel'x1-s price<[ lrirv and scll-
ing them r,vhe rc thcy arc llriced high. A.s a prorrrincnt rncrnbct <if Ncu' \'rirli socictv,
lloesky enjoyctl a rc[)utrlt-i(rn :ls rr qcncr()us Jrl-ril,irrrhrollist.lll'
[-]owevcr, r;n l)ecerrrlrcr 113, l9tl7, Ilocsl<t'\\ies scntcnced to -j -\,clrs itt prisotr
and paid a pcnalty of $100 nrillion for illcgally profiting {rctnt insidtr in.frnwntiort.
According to colrrt records, Iloeskv p'.rici l)avid [,eviue, a fr-icrrtl u'ho ivorkcd in-
side a firr-n th21t arranged tnergers and acqrrisitirrr.rs, to proviclc hirn rvitlr infitrntr-
tion about cornpanies tlrat r.vere about to lre prrrchaseil bv anotlrcr prrlv (usually
a corporation) for much nrore than the culrent price of their.sr-ock on the stock
marker. Relyipg on this insidcr:'s inttrrrnetioir :incl bcfirre it beclnre public, lSocslry
rvould buy up the stocli of tlie companies on thc stock nrarket-in e lfcct buying the
stock frotn stockholclers u,ho did not realizc thrt their: conrpanies were'll)out to lic
purchased for much morc than the current stock nrlrkct price. Whcn tlre purcluse
of the cornpanv \vas'innourrccd, tlre stock pricc t'ose an<l Boeskv u'rlulcl scll his stock
ata hanclsorne profit. Ilui'ingancl sellingstocL on thc basis of insi<lcr-infirrnration lt
,. the time was legal in nrarrl' countries (e.g., ltalv, Su'itzcrlancl, [: Ionq Iirinq). iVan-t'
ccononists arq-ue that the econonric benefits of the prxctice (it tcncls to nrake the
price of a compirny's stclck ref'lect d.re true v:rluc of thc colnpan)') outlvcigh its^ harnts
(it te.nds to discouraqe noninsider:s from particip:rtine in the stock mirrket). Never-
,.-r.:-ir$eless,.the practice is illegal in the Unitecl Stlrtes dLre to its pelceivetl unfair:uess
.,,i;''irpd its potential to har:n the slock market.
,i.,. , . \'\lhat drove a man who aireadl' had lrunclreds of rnillions oi dollals and everl'-
, ;thing else most people coulcl ever want or neecl, to become so obsessed r.vitl'r making
, .mon€y that he deiiberatelv broke the larv? *Iuch of- dre ansr,ver, it was clairned, lay in
rr.;,Jliqchgracter. Atbrmer friend is q.uoted as sa-ving, "Maybe he's greeclvberrond the
. r.r'ilclest irnaeinings of nrere ur()rtals like voLr arrrl tne."ltl Boeskr olrce described lris
. ..obsession to.accrirnulntc c\-cr rnore monc\. lis "rt sickrtess I have irr tlrc ftrcc of rvlrich
, Iln helpless."lll In a speecir at the Liniyersitlr ef Oaliton-ria, Berkeler', he tolcl stu-
dents, "Greed is alriglrt, by the w'ay. I think greecl is healthr'. I u'ant vou to knou'
that I think greed is healtlrv. \bu curn be pJreedv end still feel soocl ,rbout t,ourself."t'ii
Othcrs said of hinr dr:rt:

I':[e rl,'as clriven by u,ork, clvct:z-eal<lus, atiti sullject to severc tuootl su'itrq's.
Intirr:ratcs of N'Ir. Boeskl. s'"rv lte vrrcill,rreri bctu.'cetr "being loud, antl irarsl'r
and aggressive, to mellif'louslrt sofi'-sirolien, clrarrnitrq irtrcl c<lttrtlr'.n' I'{e
rvas also fiendish allout his pursuit <lf irrtirrnration. "\{hen tut'tt.1,11111; got
an edge or1 solnethillg, he uroulcl qo bsrranas." \\rherr it crttrtc t() IltolrL'\'
and business c{eaiir.rgs, he n'as qtrite r:uthlcss:rnd llursuecl his rtoel rvith
a singie-minderl purpose .... Altlrorich his first lclve rvas rrr()rlcvr hc h:trt-
kered fbr the genteel respectabilitl'rrnd strttus thirt arc qcrrct-:rlli'tleniecl
the nouveau l-iche. ti+

The storlt of thc firll of h':rrr Boeskv is tlre stolv of a rnlr.r llr-orrEht don'rr [r-y qrcetl.
\,\,hat stands otrt in this storl:lre the dc.^criptiotts olthi-s ntorll ch:trrtclcr-tlrc chtrr-
acfer of a ltlalt driven $\t ir1 oitsessige "l1r,e" cli:utr.rl.c\r. Ilrcskv is rlcscritlcrl l:- lre-
ing"greedyr" "sick," "aggressi.r'er" "'fiendish," rtrrcl "rr.rthless." l3r:c'tttse uhtrt ltc seitl <lit
himself dicl not nratch his secret dealirrrts, s<lurc sriicl he "lackecl irtteqliw" rrr<l <.rthcrs
tfuat he was "hypocritical" ancl "dishonest." AlIoltthese desct:iptiolts ar:e ittdgments
about dre moral character of the rnan, not jtic-i$i,nents aboul tlrc tnor:rliti, <lf his ac-
tions. In fact, altl-rough it is clear that trading'on,insider itrfurrrtation is illeqal, the firct
 124 BASIC PRINCIPLES
uir*ate An acquired
rtr,.DFa!
disposition that is valued
as part of the character
of a morally good human
being and that is exhibited
in the person's habitual
behavior.
that th.e practice is legal in rnany counrries and that many economists support it sug-
gests_ that the practice is not in itself immoral. What was irnrnoral was th^at greed lJd
Boesky to knowingly break the law he had an obligation to follorv.
As thc story of lSoesky r'akcs clear, we evaluate the noraliry of people's char-
acter as rvcll as their actions.'l'he approaches to etlrics that we have exarnined so
far ail fbcus tttr actiou as tlrc key subjecl rnatter of erhics and ignore the character of-
tlre agcnt wl-ro carrics out the action. Utilitarianism, for e*allrple, tells us that"ac-
tion-t are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness," and Kantian ethics
tells us tlrat "I ought never to ltct except in such a way that I can also will that rny
maxiur should ltecome a universal law." IJowever, the central issue that emerges in
the case of- Boes'rcy'-, and in rnany similar stories of unethicai behavior by men antl
women in br-rsiness, is not the \.vrongness of their actions, but the flawed nature of
their character.
Many ethicists have criticized the assurnption that acrions are the fundamental
subject rnatter of ethics. Ethics, they have argued, should look not only at the kincls
of actions an.asent ought to perforrn, but should pay attenriorl ro the kind of person
an agent oughr to be. An "agent-based" focus on wl'rat one ought to be, in .orrL"rt to
an "acdon-based" focus on horv one ought to act, would look careftllly at a person's
moral character: including whether a person's moral character exhibits virrue or vice.
A nore adequzrte appr<lach to ethics, according to these ethicists, r.vould take the vir-
tues (such as honesqy, courage, ternperance, integrity, compassion, self-control) and
the i.ices (such as dishonesry; rurhl€ssn.ess, greed, lack of integriqy, cowardliness) as
the basic starting points for ethical reasoning.
Althougl'r vir:tue ethics looks at rnoral issues from a very different.perspecrive tfun
action-based ethics; it does not follow.thatithe conciusions' ,rf vrrr,uJ:eth'ics riU-Jtp
fer radicallv Fr-orn the conclusions of arr action-basecl ethic. As we will see, there are
virrues that are correlated widr utilitarianisnr (e.g., the virrue of benevolence), virrues
that are correlarcd u'ith rights (e.g., the uirtue 6f respecr), .Jnd virrues rhat'are cor-
TJ?*4
wi th jusri ce
""d ",;hs,
fi'; ;;;*.,, ;.;'; ;;;;#;;;., ;;;;;;;;;;i,
fifth alternarivc ro utiliw, rights, justice, and caring, Insread, rhe virrues .rn b. r""n
as providing a perspective that suweys tlre sarne giound as the forrr approaches, but
from an entireiy clifferent perspective. \4'1"rat the principles of utiliw, rights, justice,
and caring do from the perspective ofaction evaluations, an ethic ofvirtue does fron:
the perspective of ciraracter evaluations.
The Nature of Virtue
\tr4rat exactlv is a rnoral virtue? A moral virtue is an acquircd clisposirion to behave
in certain rva1r5 fl1r1 is valued as part of the character of a morally good iruman being
and that is exhibited it'r the per'son's habirual bel'ravior. A person has a moral virrue
l'hen he is rlisposed to behave habirurlli' as r rnorally good persorr would behave, and
with the l'easons, f-eelings, ancl desires that are characceristic of a rnorally good p"rrorr.
Honesty', for: exarlple, is a of rnorally good people. A person possesse, th"
virtue of hone'^ty vr.hen lre is'irtue
disposed to habituallv teil the truth and does so because
he believes telling the truth is riglrt. f'[-re honesr person feels gootl r.i,hen he tells the
truth :rnd uncomfortalrlc rvlrerr he lies, and alu,a1,s wanls to tell ihe truth out of respect
for the truth attd its ilnpor-tance in huuran comrnunicarion. If a person told the tiurh
on occasion, or did so For the wrong reasons or with the wrong clesires, u,e would not
say that dre person is honest. We would not say a person is honest, for example, if the
p"ll?n frequently lies, rells thc tr:uth only because lre thinks it is the way ro get people
to like hiin, or told the truth out of fear and with relucrance. Moreovei, a moial
virtue tnust be acquired, arrd is not just 1l natural characteristic such as intelligence,
 Erurcal PRrrucrpLEs rN BUsTNESS 129

'or beauty, or natural strength. A moral virrue is praiseworthy, in part, because it is an

' achievement-its development requires effort.

The Moral Virtues

'['he basic issucs, lrorrr thc
l)erspective of vir:tue ethics, are the questiorls: \tr/hat are
thc tr:aits r.rF charactcr that r-nake a person a nrorally good human be ing? \4/hicl-r
tr:aits qf character irrc rnolal virtues? On this issue, there have treen nulnerous
views.'I'hc Greek philosopher r\r'istotle proposed what is still rhe most influential
thcory of virtue.
Aristotle :rrgued that a rnoral virtue is a habit tlrat enables a human being to live
according^ to reason. I{e argrred that a person lives according to reason when the per-
son knows ar-rd habimally chooscs the reasonable middle ground betra'een going too
far and not going fir enough in his feelings and actions. "Moral virtue is .. . a mean
bcnveen fivo vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency, and . .. it airns at hit-
ting the mean in emotjons ancl acdons." With respect to fear, for example, cotr.r-age is
rhe virnre of feeline a level of fear that is appropriate to a situation and facing what
is fearful r.vhen it is worth doing so. Cown.rtllincss is the vice of feeling more fear than
-sjtuzrtions rnerit ancl fleeing anything fearful even wl.ren one should smnd finn, aud
recklessness is the vice of l'eelingless fear than oire should and of rushinginto fearful
situations even x{ren one should not. With respect to pleasure, t(mperance is the vir-
' ' rue 'of enjoy.'ing reasonable arnounts of pleasure, wirereas self-indulgence is the I'ice of
..:,:,'indulginpl in pleasure to excess, and self-deprir.atiou is the vice of indulging too little.
., r,14ri1|1 respecr to ttre action of giving people rvhat thel' desen'e, justice is the virrue of
:r:"',;giving people exactly lvl-rat the,v deserve, whereas injustice is the vice of giving thern
: rnor€ than they desen-e or giving them less than they deserve. In addition to these
thl6ekey virtues-courage, teinperance, and justice-Aristotle describes a number
",.
':i11..;ef e1fterlvirtues and their corresponding vices of excess and deficienry as indicated in
,' ,,Fig-r-rre 2.2. ln Aristotle's classic account, dren, virnres are habits of dealing with one's
,r erlotions and actions in wa\rs that strike the reasonable mean betu,een the extrernes of
', r,
excess and deficienc1., u'hereas r,'ices are habits of going to the unreasonable extreme
of eitl'rer excess or deficiencv.
Arisrotle suggesrs drat virtues, like other habits, are acquired through repetition.
B,v reireatedi,v standing firrrr t'l-ren I arn fearful, I become courageous; by repeatedly

Figure 2.2
The Vicaof excess' 'TheVirtue:of thd'.:it 6-rViceoi'-'. :

tlie lmage oir

The emotion or inthe'Cmotionor meanintfi*',",, ciehcy,'intle Q"{fi"*
mythinkinglab.corn
action involved action r', : , ' emotioh 6l ;6666::-sriltititi-n''lrrCetion
Fear Recklessness Courage Oowaidliness,
Pleasure Self.indulgence Temperance Self-deprivation
Taking one's due lnjustice: taking more Justice lnjustice: aking less
Donating money Prodigality Generosity Stinginess
Spending money Ostentatiousness Refinernent Cheapness
Feeling admired Vanity Confidence Self-abasement
Seeking honor Over-ambition Ambitisn Unambitiousness
Anger lrascibility Good temper Apathy
Shame Self-consciousness Self-esteem Arrogance
Talking about Boastfulness Honesty False modesty
oneself
Entertaining peoPle Buffoonery Wittiness Eoorishness
Socializing Obsequiousness Frieridliness O.uarrelsomeness
130 BASIC PRINCIPLES
Theo,riq o! Moib I Virtu e
. Aristotle: vjrtues are habits
,.,urard:O;gie,;,p n to.
live a'Scbiding:to ieaSon
by habitually choosing the
mean between extremes
in actions and emotions
' Aquinas: virtues are habits
that enable a person to
live reasonably in this
world and be united with
God in the nert
Maclntyre: virtues are
dispositions that enable
a person to achieve the
good atwhich human
"practices" aim
Pincoffs: virtues are
dispositions we use
when choosing between
persons or potential future
selves.
exercising control over my appetites, I become temperate; and by repeatedly giving
people what they deserve, I become jusr. Bur thii suggestion tf ho* ui.iols ,rI
acquired leads to apuzzle: howcan I engagc in virtuouiacts before I anr virtuous?
For example, lrou' can I behave couragcous^hr before T arn conrugeous? Arist<itlc point-s
out tlrat u'hen a person docs notyet have a virtuc, tlrc Jrerson ca,r l,c frainctl o. iirrcc,l
to do r"'hat a \,'irtuous person *'ould do. rl chilcl, firr example, can lrc lrrr:ccd to behaye
cotlr:rgeously altl'rough he does not yet have the virtuc of courage" 1'lrc
ltcrsr,in rvh6
does notyet have the virtue will gradually corne to acquire it by r:cpearccllv bcinq
rnade to do what the virtue requires.
Aristotle held that the virtuous person clrooses the "rerrsonallle" rniclclle
path between the extremes of excess and deliciency. I{ow clcles or.rc kncllv u.hat
is reasonable? Aristotle believed that pruclence is the virrue o1'our inrellect that
enables us to determine what is reasonable in a given situation. The:rirn of hunr..rrr
life is happiness, he argues, and so thc reasonable choice in e siruation is rhe one
that contributes toward a happy human life. A person with pruderice has the alliliry
to figure clut which choices these are, an ability a person acquires tl-rrough learning
and experience. 'I'he moral virtues-like courage; t..r,p.r.rr.",
and I
justicf__epable
person to control his desires, emotions, and actions. The person can thus c:lrw ogt
the choices that prudence determines are right fbr the situation, ancl can restrain
himself from m:.titing the virong "excessive" choices that his desires ancl emotious
may tempt him to rnake. Prudence and the other moral .virrues work togerlrer, then.
Prudence determines the choices that are li'kely to make a per:scrn's1if'e a happy
one, rvhile the other virtues give a persorr the selfl-control neecled tLl carry orrt thgsc
clroices. ,,' , ,;,',
';,
St. Thornas Aquinas, a Cl'rristian philosopher of rhe A4idclle Agcs, {bilorue.l Aris-
.
totle iu holding tlrat dre m-oral virtues enable people to follow ,"rrlrr in <lealing rvitJr
their desires, ernotions;'and actioirs and also accepted that,the,four pivotal o, ca-rclinal
,rnofal,vi.rfues.aie couiage, tempeitnce;.,iuqti,ce;rand..prucience.,But as a,Chrisua.ru ancl.
so, unlike Aristode, Aquinas.held,that'the:purpose'",F,,",'tr.rro,,r'is no{ irrerelr.,a, leup,li
ness in this life drar is'achieveij,through rhe exercise of reason, but a,hapttirieryigtiie
next life that is achieved through union rvith God. Aquinas added rhe "theological"
or Christian virtues of faith, hope, and chariry-the virtues that enable , p".*., to
achieve ur-rion rvith God to Aristotle's list of the moral r.irtues. -il,1oreor-er; Aquinas
expanded Aristotle's list of dre moral r.irtues to include others ti.rat make sense u-jrhin
the life of a Christian, butwould have beer-r foreigr-r ro the life erf rhe (]reek aristo-
cratic citizen on rvholn Arisrode had focused. For example, Aquinas held that for tlre
Christian ltumility is a virtue and pride is a vice, *he.eai Aristorlc lrrd rrrguerl rhat f,rr
the Greek aristocrat pride is a virnle and hurnility is a vice.
More recently, tl're American philosopher Alasdair Maclnryre has claimecl that:r
virtue is any hutnan disposition that is praised because it enables a pers()lr to achieve
the good at which hunran "practices" ainr:
The virtues . . . are to be understo<r<i as those dispositior-rs ..n,hich u,ill not
only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goo.{s internirl to prrlc-
tices, but v'hich will also sustain us in the relevant kind of qLresr fc,r- the
good, by enabling us to overcorne the harms, dangers, ternptatir'rrrs :r1-1cl
situetions whiclr we encounter, and rvlriclr will furrrish us rtitI irrt.r-c:rsilrq
self-knowledge and increasing kno$.ledec of the g<iod.rt-
Critics have_argued, however, that Maclntyrc's appr:oach does nor scenl to ger thillgs
quite right. When Ivan Boesly, for- exarnple, was criticized as .,greed),," ,,clishonestl,'
"ruthless," and so on, people were not faulting him for faifin[ ro havc rhe virrues
ffi,

Ersrcal Pnrrucrpres rru Busrruess 131

proper to the practices within which he was pursuing his vision of the good. The
moral defects for which Boesky was criticized were his alleged failings as a humatr
beir,rg, regarclless of how well or poorly he did in the various human practices in which
he u'as cngaged. The moral virtues seern to bc those dispositinns that er-rable one to
live a m<;rally good human lifc in gener:al and not merely tlr<>se thrr{, crrabie onc to cr1-
g'age succcssftrlly in solne set of hurnln practiccs.
lrdrnund l-. Pincoffs, in particular, criticizes A4acllrryrc for clairning tlrat vir-
tues include only tlrose traits rcquired by or.rr social prrctices. Instead, Pincof{i sug-
ges$ thar virtucs include all those dispositions to Act, feel, ancl think in certaiu wavs
that we Llse as the basis for choosing between persons or between potential furure
selves.l16 M4ren deciding, for example, whcrrn to choose zrs a fiiend, spouse, etnployce,
or inanager, we look to people's dis;lositions: Are they honest or dishonest, since re
or insincere, greedy or selfish, reliable or unreliab[e, trusfi^/ort]ry or untrustworthy,
dependablc or undependable? Similarly, when thinkjng about a moral decisiolt, &'e
often tirink not so rnuch of what rve are obligated to do, but instead of the kind of
person rve vvould be if we were to do it. In carrying out the action, woulcl I be honcst
or dishonest, sincete or insincere, seli-ish or unselfish?
Ilou'ever, rvhat makes one disposition a moral virtue '.rnd another a mnral r,ice?
There is no simple answer to dris questiorl, Pincoffs claims. He rejects Aristode's vieu,
that everv virtue can be understood as "a mean between extremes." Iustead, Pincoff^i
irgues, virrues should be understood in terms of the roll they pla1, in hurnan lif'e. Some
disposirions, he points out, pr<x'ide specific grounds fbr pref'erring a person because
..,:5.,i.,r1.i.0'ttlake a person good or bad at specific tasks such as painting houses. Specific
. , dispositions drat airn at specific tasks are rzot virtues. Hor.r'ever, other dispositior.rs are
', , r" generallr. desirable because thelz p2p" a person good at dealing u'ith the kinds of sinr-
: -arions tirar frequently and.typically arise in human life. The virrues consist of such
, "generally desirable dispositions" that it is desirable to have in view of the "hurnan
-'":''.,sirriation; of conditions, that,is, under which human beings must (given the narure
:,.:i,,:r6f dre physical world and of human natlrre and human association) live." Because tire
:'::,'r::,human situation often requires concerted effort, for exan'rple, it is desirable that we
har.e persistence and courage. Because tempers often flare, r'r'e need tolerance ancl
' racr, Because goods must often be disuibuted by consistent criteria, rve need fair-
ness ancl lor.rdiscrimination. However, selfishness, deceptiveness, cr-uelw, and unfhir-
ness :1fe vices: They are generalll. undesirable because thev are destructive to hum:rn
relationships. The rnoral virrues, dren, are those dispositions gener-ally desirable fbr-
f ,:ople ro have in the kinds of sinrations they q.pically encounter in living tosether.
Ther. are desirable trecause the\r are useful either "for et'entone in g;enerai or fcr: tire
pos:Sessor of the quality."
PincofFs rheoq' of virrue seems trrore adequate than a theor,v like l/[aclutvre's
rvhicir confines virtue to traits connected u'ith practices. The virtues seem to be dis-
positions that enable us to deal ,q'ell vvitir all of the exigencies of hnman Iife and rrot
merely the exigencies of practices. For example, both Aristotle and i\quinas felt that,
in articulating the rnoral rrirtues, they were articulating those habits that enable a pcr-
son ro live a human life well and not merely to do r.vell in social practices.
As lve have seen, horvever, f istotle and Aquinas had different viervs on exactlv
r.vhat human life required- This suggests that to some extent u'hat couttts its rt tttorel
virrue vi'ill depend o1l one's beliefi; about the kir-rds of siru:rtions that hutlans u,ill ficc.
Nevertheless, as Pincoffs suggests, "$'e share a good deal of rvell-groundetl agrec-
rltent en the question of who is the right sort of person in gencral," beciruse people in
all sscicties have to face similar problems in living togethe r. Carholics, for exatnple,
can recognize rvhen a Buddhist is not just a godd Buddhist,but also a person ofgood
noral character: "Courage is not rrrore a Catholic thair it is a Buddhist virtue; honesty
132 BASIC PRINCIPLES
virtue theor,y The theory
that the airn of the moral
life is to develop those
general dispositions called
moral virtues, and to
exercise and exhibit them
in the many situations that
hurnan life sets before us,
''''':1:': :::1 l'.:1: :.'r':',
eXhibiL sltd:dev€Job th e
j
virtu€is
. ,We should,av-sid
exercising, extribitin g, and
developing vices
. ing, principled, honest, open. and self-s'lcri{icing, rhen such :rctions arc morally right.
lnstitutions should instill
virtues not vices.
cotnmends irself to Presb)rrerian and Coptic Christian alilce." The moral virtues in-
clude that wide varieqy oldispositions th;t people in all societies recognize as desir-
able llecause thev "servc as re21sor1s fcrr preference iu the ordinary ancl not-so-orclinary
exigencies of lilc." l.hc frlur classical r,irrucs on ri,hiclr Ari:^torle and Aquinas Lro*r
:tqrceil-couraq'e, terlrpe rancc, justicc, arrd yrrrrticrrcc-,ftrll into this class. Ll,rwever,
tlrc three theologic:rl virtucs--l:ritl'r, hopc, arrcl chrr:irv-thar Aquirras lclrlcrl trccause
ol their special inrportance for a (-hristiarr lilte q'ould n()t c()unt trs n:or:rl virtues be-
cause thcy irre desirablc only rvithin a s1'reci'al l<ind <-rf lif'c do'oted to the pursuit of
specill religious objectivcs. Sirnil:trlv, pr:i<1c, u,hich rv:rs a tluality adnrir:ecl in Cireek
society, would, not count rls zr nroral virtue ltecatrse it, t<.ro, is clesirable onlv."i'ithin a
speci{ic kirrd of socictr.,.
Virtues, l\ctions, and lnstitutions
Thus farrve have ignored l
kev aspect of vir[uc rheorv: Flclrv does it help us decide
r,vhat we arc to drl? Citn atr ethic of virtrre do rnore than rell us the kind of people we
should be? Is an ethic oFvirnre ahle to provicle us q,irh anv quidance about horv we
should live our lives, hor.v u'e shoLrld beh:u'e? One of rhe rnejor cr:iricisms made against
rrirnle th€ory, in fact, is that it Fails to provide us rvjth guidance.on how \ve ai-e, ro act.
V!he1 a womall is rnring to decide rvhether to have irn :rbi;rtion, lbr exanrple, she may
ask a fr.iend, "What shoulcl I do?" In such siruariorrs, ir cloes nor help to be told what
kirtd oFcharacter one shoultl lrave. In srrch siruatiolrs. onc needs lduice alrout rvhat
kinds of actions are ai:propria'te in onels siruarion, and virtue
'theor seems,i*icad6lb}e
of providing suclr advice. firis criticism---..thrt vi1:ftre theory pr,ovidc-s no guidance,f,or
rlction-is not srrrltlising becatrse virtuc tlreorv dcliltcrrrtelv turrls aia,ar, frgrn action
and fbcuses ou moral character as the fundanrental morel category. NevertheleSs,
although virtue is the fotrnrlarion of yirrue tlrcolt,, this cloes no,,i.^,', rlrat virtue the-
oly,cannot provide a ny.gti dance,.fbr. actio rr,
Virtue theoq, flrg-ues rher the airrr of rhc rrror-al lift i.s to develoP those genep.al
dispositions r.r'e cell tltcntot'nlz,irttresrrnd to ercrcisc:urcl erhibit thern in the rnlnl"sj"t.
uatioris that human life sets before us. Insot:rr'ls u'c elercise tl're virrires in o.rr actions,
insofar as our actior-rs exhibit the virtucs. clr insofir as our actions rnake us rrirtuous,
those actions are ruorail-r' right acti,ons. \'et, insofrr its our actions are the ex€rcise of
vice or insofhr as our :lctions develop a r.icious ch2rrilcter, t() that cxtent the actions
are rnorally \i.rong. The kev action-guitlinq inrltlicltion of virtue rheo{.., then, can be
sunrrrred up in tlris clairrr:
fu-r ictio,, is ttiolrtlli riglrt if in c'lrrvirrg irut rhc iiction the aqcrrt c.rcrcises.
exhibits, or develops rr rnolally .,irtuo',,^s chrrracrer, antl it is iiiorally $:rol'rg
to the extent that by carqriqq oi.rt thc xctiolr thc :rgetlt exercises, exhibits, or.
dcvclops n rrrolaIIi' vici,rrri cha'-,rctc..
Flont this perspecti\re, tl.rcu, thc r.i'r:onqlulrrcss of '.rn rrction clur be clcternrleci bv ex-
atniuing the kind ef per-son the rrction tencls to Proclucc or the kind of person that
tends to pr-oduce the '.rction. Irr eitho' cilsc. thc cthics of tlre action clcpencls on its
r-elationship to thc r,irtucs tntl vices of fhcr rrgcnr- Iior cr..rrnplc, it has b..,r
tlrat the moralitv of-altoi'tioit, :idultew, ()r iur\i othcr rrction should be eveluatecl"rg,recl
by at-
tendinE; to tl're kincl of chirracter cvidcnccd 111, llcoplc rvhr-r cngage irr such acrions. If
tlrc dccision to cttgagc in strt'lt Jcli()lrs t",,,1. t,, rr',',i.",r;r.r...r,r',rlorc resporrsilllc, car-
I'Iowevet, if the decision to enqaqe irr such actions tends to rnake people rnore self-
centered, irresponsible, dishonest, careless, anci selfish, then such actions are morally
 EtHrcar Pnrrucrpres rr.r Busrrurss 133

wrong. Actions are not only evaluated b1' d1s kind of cl-raracter they develop; we also
'' conderlrn cert'lin actions precisely because they 21s the outcome of a morally vicious
character:. F'or exan'rplc, u'e condelnn cruel actions because they cxlribit a vicious char-
acter, ancl r.vc conderrur lies becruse drev arc producls of a dishonest character.
Virtuc tlrcory is not onl\,:rble tri prrlr,irlc:r criterion lbr evalu:rting actions, it also
llrrlviclcs r uscfirl critcriorr {or cvulultinq our social institutior.rs ancl pr.':rctices. For ex-
:rnrple, it hirs lrcen argucrl tlrat sonre cconoruic instirutions mekc pcoplc greedv, that
largc burcirLrcr'rtic ()rglrr1iz:ltions nral<c pcople lcss rcsponsible, rrr.rcl that the practicc of
provicline q()\/crnurent "h:rndouts" t() pcol)le rnrtkcs thcm lazy and degrendent. All such
ill:qunlcltts ctitlu';te institutions'.rnd practices basctl on a tlreory of virrue. AJthough
such.rrgururcnts nlav bc filse, thev all appeal to thc idca that instirutions are morally
clefective r,r'hen thcy tencl to ftrrm rnor:rllv dcfective characters.
\4.re uotccl thirt zrccording to Pinco[tls, mor:rl virtues are dispositions that are
generallv clcsir:rble bccar,rse tlrey 216 recluired by the human situat,ions r.vith rvhich
all people everyrvhcre r-nust cope. Sorle clispositions are moral virtues, for example,
because pcoplc er,crlrvhcrc are tcrrrptecl by 61191r emotions and desires to not d<l what
thcl'[111v11' tlrerrslr<rulci do. (]riurage, tenrperauce, and, in gener:rl, rhe virrues of self-
c()ntrol rre oltthis sort. Some virnrcs are clispositions to engage u.illinglv in specific
llinds <rf rnoral acfiori tlrat are r.alued in all sr;cieties, sucir as honcs6;. Pincoflib suggesLs
that sclrrie dispositions crin be classified ris "irlstnirnental virrues" bcc:ruse they enable
people evervr.r'lrere to l)ursue thcir q-onls eflectivel], as individuals (persistence, carehrl-
ncss, detern,rinaticln) or as part of a group (cooperativeness), r'r,here2ls some are "non-
'i;']::).insfrllrncnta[ f ilnt.t'r because tire\r are desir:able tbr: their ow'n sake (serenitv, nobility,
,. wittiness, .sirlrceftllness, tolemllce, reasonableness, gentleness, \\,'al:lnth, Irlodest-v, and
, civiliq.), Sor:rc virtues are cognitive and consist of understancling tlre requirelnents of
. moralitt' toward ourselr.es and others, such as rvisdom and prudence. Od'rer virrues are
dispositions th:1t incline one to act according to general moral principles. The virtue of
.r,: benevolerlce, for exa[1ple, inclines one to maximize the l-rappiriess of others, the virtue
;,.,:i, of,[espect for,,othe rs iirciines one to exercise consideration fbr.dre rights of individuals,
;:;. 1,rrgl1g iirtue ol justice inclines one to beh,rve according to d1e principles of justice, and
the virtuc clf cirrinq inclines orle to iive up to the tenets of care.

Challenges to Virture Theory Scirne irhilosophers have argued that i.irtue dreory is
not col.rsistcrrt q,ith dre flndinss of nroclern ps-t'chologl'.ll'- In a str.rcl-t'inr<rlr.ing theologv
stuclcrrrs ;rr Princetorr Llniversin' Divirritr. School, studerrts ri.erc 'rsked trt reatl a Bible 0biections to Virtue
storv at)olrt rr q'ooti S'.rrnlritan rtho l-relps a u,ountlecl man lt'ing trext to the road, artd Theory
rhen eecl-r u'rs told hc h.ad to rush to arrother building fnr an extretlclv important ap-
. ltis inconsistentwith
psychology which showed
pointuicnt he u'ls airriosthte fcrr.lls,-\s eaclr snrdenf hurried to the other building, he
inlhe Milgram and'
h:rcl to g^o llilst a nr'lrr l-vine ou the qt'otrnrl u'ho lonked sick ol inf iir.-ecl. Ninety percent ,Princet6n studies that
of the theolr)qv- stu(lents glanccd at thc rniul, stepped over him or \r,ent around hitn, behavior,is.determined by
and hui-r'icd on wirhout hel;ling. \'et, the stircleuts hacl not on[1' just read about and, the external situatign; not
prcsulrrablr,, thought irbout the irnportlncc oi helpirrg (parricularlv helping an injured moral character.
persou lying lrr,orle's l)ath), tlrer,'ri.erc also larqel1, good people u'ith a'r'ir:tuous character- , Defenders ofvirtue
:rspiring^ to bc rrrinistcrs.'l-hc autlrors of thc snrtly'colrcluded that a person's behavior is say moral character
deterrninctl llv his e.ttet-nrtl sinratiort, ttrtt br; his rrroral character. determines behavior
[n a rliltlcrclt stutl-l,irrvolr,ing studcnts rrt Strnford lJniver:sity, 2l ruale students in a person's familiar
u,cre r..trr(lolrrll'xssiql1g1l to bc either:r "Jllisoncr" or a "gu1ird" iu a "pris<tn" in the environment and recent
b:tsernctrl. <tl: thc l)svcholopl. I)ep:rr-tlncnt.l]e The srudents werc sciecte ci fronr 75 r'ol- psychology shows
behavior is determined by
uuteers rrnrl q-ivcrr psychologicirl tests tcl cstallli.sh that arnong thc voluntecrs' they were
one's moral identity which
the trrrt.st crnroti<lrully stabl:c, nlost rraturc, lerrst auti-socia,l, nontlal, and p,sychologi-
.r4,o[e rnirr:or-ed sulrslasses to pre- includes one's virtues and
callv hcaltlrit _voung mcn. l-he guards hacl unifbnr.rs, vices.
velrt eyc contact, and hacl u'r,rot{eu batons to establis'h their authorilY blrt 11ot to be used
134 BASIC PRINCIPLES

to punish the prisoners, The prisoners wore poorly fitting dress-like white smocks that
reached only to their knees and that had a number on the back. Each prisoner wore
a chairr around his ank.les and was referred to by his rrunrber ancl not Ly narnc. Thc
experiment was to go on for rwo weeks but was stopped after six days because it hacl
spull out of control. As the experiment progressed, the guards became incr:easingly
dornineerins and abusive, harassed the prisoners, punished thern by Forcing rhcm to*clo
"push-ups" or to slcep otr tle corlcrete floor without a nrattress, rrradc so-rrrc go rrudc
tcl clegpade them, and humiliated all of them in numerous peny ways. About a thircl cli
the gurrrds became "sadislic" and "cruel." The "prisoners" bccarne increasinglv passive,
servile, dehumanized, erratic, and hateful o[the "guards." They exhibited extie,r-re cle-
pressiort, ctying, rage, and acute anxiery. Philip Zimbardo, aurhor of the experirnenr,
concluded that the experiment showed that a person's behavior is not determinecl by
personal psychological or moral traits, but by the external environrnent. If placecl in
irn environment rhat approves of, legitimizes, and supports dornineering and cmel be-
havior, people will exhibit those behaviors regardless of wl'rat virrues rhey happen to
have. Zinrbardo later claimed that the torrure and sadistic behavior that U-S. iol.li.rt
inflictecl on their prisoners jn the Abu Ghraib military prison in 2004 was a resulr o1,
tlte sanre kind of environment that his expcriment had srudied.l{,r
More recent work in psychology, however, has tended to be more supportive"of
virtue theory.l4l Some psychologists have argued that people may learn to act on their
virtues within cerrain familiar types of situations, but not beyond. If those ps),chologists
are correct, then the subjects tested in the Princeton and Stanford sardies rn"y h*u"
failed to accon theirvimres only.because t}le sittrations-inwh,ich,.drcstudies,ptraeed,q$rrl
were unusual and not farniliar siruadons. People's behavior may be governed b], their
virtues, but only within certain more or l.r, farrrilia. kinds of siruadois. The Princeton
and Stanflorcl srudies should not lead us to give up on rhe virn;es, but shou]d spur us ro
figure_out how to widen the raage of situations in which they come into pray.
'
Mor.eover, more, direc,t s.tudies,'oni:.the, rel,ationship,,between ,ihara.cter,-,,a4d
behavior has suggested tlratthe virtues,inftruen".'u,rt *o"nl decisions,,more;orlessias
predicted by viitue theory. One,set,of studies.arguesrrhat moral decisions *harr:hat-
mouize with those character traits a person feels are part of who he or she is-part
of his or her identity-are more stable and enduring characteristics of a p".ron ih..,
decisions that conflict with those traits. t+2 Otherutodi., shorv that a person's under-
starrrlinq of his or her own moral character or identiry influences his or he. behar.-
ior because failing to live up to one's moral identiry creates emorional discomfort
and tr feeling of having betrayed oneselllal Although sffange or unusual €nl,-iron-
tnental factors can reduce the influence of virtue on behavior (as the Princeton and
Sranforcl smdies indicated), an un<ierstanding of one's own character s.ill orclinarily
influence one's hehavior. As virtue theory suggests, when making a moral decision,
people lvith a strong sense of therriselves as caring, compassionate, fair, friencliy,
g'enerous, irelpful, hardworking, honesr, and kincl will consider how a p.rron L-ik"
themselves should behave. Ordinarilv their decision u,ill be consisteniwirh their
sense of tlre kind of person they are.re

Virtues and Principles

What is the relationship between a theory of virtue and the theories of ethics thar s'e
considered earlier (utilitarian theories, rights theories, justice rJreories, and care theo-
ries)? As a glance at the many kinds of dispositions that count as virtrres suggests, the
moral vir-rue-s- support ot facilitate adherence to moral principles, but they do this iu
variety of different ways. There is, dren, no single, simple relationship between the vir-"
nres aud our moral principles. Some virtues enable people to do what moral principles
s:i:::
t;i
t 1-

ErurcnL PRrrvctprEs rN BUsTNESS 135

require. Courage, for example, enatrles us to stick to our moral principles even when
fear of the consequences tempts us to do otherwise. Some virnres consist of a readiness
to act on moral principles. Justice, for exarnple, is the virtue of being disposed to follow
principles of justice. Sonre virnres are dlspositions tl'rat our moral principles requirc us
to develop. Utiliurianisrn, for exanrple, requires us t() develop dispositious such as kirrd-
ncss and generosiqF drar rvill Icad us to increase the happiness <lfpeoplc.
Hence, tirere is no conflict betr.veen tlreorics of ethics that are llascd ou principles
and theories of ethics btrsed onvirtues- I{owever, a rheoryof virtue diflers from an
ethic of principles in the perspective frorn r,vhich it appr<-raches rnoral o'aluations. A
theory of virtue judges actions in terms of the dispositions that are associated with
those actions, whereas an ethic of principles judges clispositions ill terlns of thc ac-
rions associated with those dispositions. For an ethic of principles actiotls :rre pri-
mary, whereas for an ethic of virtue dispositions are primary. \4re firay say, then, that
both an ethic of principles and an ethic of virtue identi$' what the moral lif'e is zrbout.
I{owever, principles look at the rnoral lifb in tenns of the actions that rnoraliry obli-
gates us to perform, r.vhereas the virtues look at the moral lif-e in terrns of the kjncl of
persolt moralityoblie:rtes us to be. fur ethic of virtue, then, cor.ers rnuch of thc satrte
ground as an ethic of ptinciples, but frorn a verv different standpoirrt-
An ethic of virtue, then, is not a fifth kind of rnoral principle that should take its
place alongside the principles of utilitariar:rism, rigl-rts, justice, aud c:rring- Instead, an
ethic of virnre fills out and adds to these principles by looking not at the actions people
are require'il'to perfomr, but at the character thev are required to have. fur aclequate edric
':+-i:i!f rrir.nre;.drbn, q'ill look at the vimres that are associated with utilitarianisrn, rvidr rights,
.: .with justice, and drose associated with caring. In addition, it will (and in this respect an
'" 'et}ric of virrue goes beyond an edric of principles) look at dre virtues people need to ad-
here to theif moral principies vu'hen their feelings, desires, and passions tempt them to
' do otherwise-'It will iook at the many other virtues that the principles of utilitarianism,
'ji;:
iighs jfstice, and caring require a person to cultivate. An ethic of virnre, d-reil, addresses
,,'..:the sdriie landscape of issues rhat an edric of pri-nciples does, but it also addresses issues
:; :'."lrLd:*.r:modvation and feelings that are large\t iglored by an ethic of principles.

2.7 Unconseic}{rs trVl{}ral Gecisions

We saw in this chapter and in chapter one that nroral reasoning is the process of
applying our mo'.'ll principles to the knorvledse or understandingJ u'c have about
a situation, and making a iudgment about what ought to be done in that situation.
The managers of Ford l{otor Company, for example, rv'ere faced with a chr desisn
that could injure passengers in a rear collision. They searched fol nrore information
and found a fix for the probiern and calculate<l the costs aird benefits of making tire
fix. They applied their utilitarian principles to the knowledge tl-relr hrrd srrthered and
judged they 5fi6r16 not change the design of the car.
Now, think for a moment about the many times today that vou dccided to do
what was rnorally right. For example, you probabl)' had several couversations c'luring
which you told the uuth instead of lying, or you walked past other peoplc's properry
and did not steal it, or \rou kept your pronrise when you told someonc th:rt you r.vould
meet her after class or that )tou would refurn a llen she loanecl you.
Notice that as you made these ethical decisions throushout your dr5,, rou dic{ not
go through the conscious and deliberate process of moral reasoning rve ir:n'e been
discussing. When you talk vou usually tell the truth without a seconti thougl-rt, y'ou
respect people's properry without reasoning about what iiotrr lloral pdnciples say'
aird you keep your prornises without thinking about it. It seetns that rl'e make mauy