Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE G.R. No. 170693

CORONEL and BENJAMIN Present:
CORONEL,
Petitioners, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR., August 8, 2010

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court originated from
a Complaint[1] for cancellation of certificate of land transfer and for ejectment filed
by respondent Miguel Tanjangco, Jr. on June 24, 1997 before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan. The
complaint stated that respondent was the owner of parcels of land found in Sta.
Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an aggregate area of 26,428 square
meters.[2] These pieces of land, identified as Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39, were
respectively covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 10547, 10572 and 8203 all of which
show that they were declared for taxation purposes in respondents
name.[3] Initially, these pieces of property were being cultivated by petitioner
Emilia Micking Coronel and her husband as agricultural lessees, and when the
latter died Emilia was given, by force of the governments Operation Land
Transfer, a certificate of land transfer (CLT) covering the lots.[4]

Over time saltwater gradually saturated the property, making it unsuitable

for rice cultivation.[5] Hence, in a 1980 agreement denominated as Kasunduan sa
Pagbabago ng Kaurian ng Lupang Sakahan (Palayan na Gagawing
Palaisdaan), Emilia and her son, petitioner Benjamin Coronel,[6] allegedly agreed
with respondent to convert Lot No. 38 into a fish farm.[7] Respondent claimed that
for a consideration of P6,000.00, petitioners had bound to relinquish their rights as
tenants not only on Lot No. 38 but also on Lot Nos. 37 and 39, which were
likewise converted into fish farms following the execution of the agreement.
Petitioners then purportedly leased Lot No. 38 to a certain Jess Santos for a term of
five years and then to one Dionisio Toribio, both of whom successively operated
fishing ponds on the land. When respondent supposedly learned about these leases,
he demanded that petitioners vacate not only Lot No. 38 but also Lot Nos. 37 and
39. The demand went unheeded. Respondent was, thus, urged to bring the matter
before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, yet the parties could not
amicably settle their issues before the said body.[8]

Petitioners suspected that respondents claim of ownership was a ploy to

circumvent agrarian law provisions on land retention. In their Answer[9] to the
complaint, they disclosed that the subject lots were owned not by respondent but
by the latters father, Miguel Tanjangco, Sr., who had given them leasehold rights
therein many years ago. They claimed that CLT No. 0-092761 was issued in favor
of Emilia upon the death of her husband, and that she and her family had since
been in possession of the property as beneficiaries of the governments agrarian
reform program. As holders of a CLT, they asserted that they had every right to
retain possession of the lots.[10] Furthermore, they denied having relinquished their
rights as land reform beneficiaries, and assuming there was such relinquishment
the same was nevertheless void for being contrary to existing agrarian laws and
rules. They suggest that it was respondent who committed a breach against their
rights when he himself actually constituted a lease on a portion of the property in
favor of Jess Santos. Lastly, they posited that respondent had no cause of action
and if he did have cause to bring suit, the same nevertheless had already
prescribed.[11]
 It is evident from the records that in 1976, respondent had filed before the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) a petition, docketed as MARCO Adm.
Case No. III-1474-86, for the retention of not more than seven hectares of inherited
land acquired from his grandparents, Adriano and Juana Tanjangco the parents of
Miguel, Sr. Lot No. 38 was included in the area applied to be retained and it was
then being tenanted by Emilia. This lot, together with others in possession of
different individuals, could have redounded to Miguel, Sr. had it not been for the
waiver of his share following an extrajudicial settlement of the inherited estate
among the heirs. The MAR granted respondents application in its July 27, 1986
Order, and accordingly, it declared exempt from Operation Land Transfer the lots
subject of the petition and directed that existing tenants in the covered area be
maintained in their peaceful possession as agricultural lessees.[12]

That ruling in MARCO Adm. Case No. III-1474-86 was central to the
provincial adjudicators resolution of the present case. In its April 1, 1998
Decision,[13] the provincial adjudicator noted that the matter of cancelling
petitioners CLT covering Lot No. 38 was already water under the bridge in view of
the MARs directive to cancel it along with all the other existing CLTs. As to
whether petitioners could be ejected not only from Lot No. 38 but also from Lot
Nos. 37 and 39, the provincial adjudicator ruled in the affirmative. Citing the
1980 Kasunduan, in relation to Sections 36 and 27 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3844, it was found that petitioners relinquishment of rights, coupled with the
conversion of the lots into fishing ponds, as well as the voluntary surrender of
possession to Jess Santos, had validly terminated existing tenurial rights. [14] The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and order is hereby issued:

1. ORDERING the defendants to vacate peacefully the subject

property;
2. ORDERING the defendants to restore possession of the
subject property to the herein plaintiff;
3. ORDERING the defendants and all other persons acting in
their behalves not to molest, interfere [with] or harass the herein plaintiff;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.[15]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the DAR-Central Adjudication Board

(DAR-CAB).[16] On January 15, 2001, it reversed the decision of the provincial
adjudicator, holding that petitioners were already deemed owners of the subject
property on the effective date of Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 27 and that the
provisions in the law on prohibited transfers and relinquishment of land awards
should apply to the transactions entered into by the parties.[17] The decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 1,

1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered:

1. Ordering Plaintiff-Appellee to maintain Defendants-Appellants in

peaceful possession and cultivation of Lot 38 as tenants thereof;
2. Ordering the cancellation of CLT No. 0-09276 generated in favor of
Defendant-Appellant Emilia Micking Vda. de Coronel covering Lot Nos. 37, 38
and 39. An Emancipation Patent (EP) CLT be issued in favor of Defendant-
Appellant Emilia Micking Vda. de Coronel with respect to Lot Nos. 37 and 39,
subject matter of this case; and
3. Ordering the parties to execute a leasehold contract over Lot No. 38.

SO ORDERED.[18]

Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration,[19] respondent

elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75112.[20]On October 28, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed
Decision[21] granting the petition in part.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that inasmuch as Miguel, Sr. had failed to
exercise his right of retention during his lifetime, respondent, as successor-in-
interest acquired such right which he could therefore exercise as he in fact
did. Thus, it noted, when the MAR ordered the cancellation of Emilias CLT
affecting Lot No. 38 and affirmed respondents retention rights, petitioners became
leaseholders on the property but their rights as such would terminate on the
execution of the 1980 Kasunduan whereby they relinquished their rights for a
consideration in accordance with Sections 8[22] and 28[23] of R.A. No. 3844. As to
Lot Nos. 37 and 39, the appellate court held that petitioners remained to be the
owners thereof and saw no reason to cancel petitioners title thereto since proof was
lacking to the effect that petitioners had surrendered these lots to
respondent.[24] Modifying the DAR-CABs decision, the appeal was disposed of as
follows:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is hereby PARTLY

GRANTED. The January 15, 2001 Decision of the Central Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is MODIFIED, in
that the CORONELs are hereby ordered to vacate and restore possession of Lot
No. 38 to TANJANGCO. The CLT No. 0-092761 shall be cancelled insofar as it
covers Lot No. 38. Lot Nos. 37 and 39 shall remain in the ownership of the
CORONELs.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Both parties moved for reconsideration[26] which the Court of Appeals

denied. [27] Hence, this petition.

Before the Court, petitioners assail the validity of the exercise by respondent of the
right of retention over Lot No. 38. That right, they claim, is purely personal to the
real owner of the property, Miguel, Sr., who however had not entered into the
exercise thereof at any time since P.D. No. 27 came into force. They note that
under the law, before any of the heirs may exercise the right of retention belonging
to the deceased landowner, it must be shown that the latter had manifested in his
lifetime the intention to exercise the right.This, they believe, has not been proven
by respondent.[28]

Petitioners also aver that the 1980 Kasunduan is against the law and public
policy, because the stipulated consideration of P6,000.00 is shockingly low and
clearly unconscionable, and that they were not fully apprised of the consequences
of the agreement when they acceded to be bound by it. They disown the alleged act
of relinquishment of tenurial rights relative to Lot No. 38, arguing that had there
been such relinquishment, it would have been void nonetheless.[29] Finally, they
deny having entered into any leasehold contract with respondent over Lot No. 38;
they advance instead that it was respondent who constituted a lease on Lot No. 38
in favor of Jess Santos in violation of their rights as agrarian reform
beneficiaries.[30]
To this, respondent counters that he, as the son of Miguel, Sr., has validly
exercised the right of retention over Lot No. 38. He is banking on the July 27, 1986
Order in MARCO Adm. Case No. III-1474 which had already affirmed his
retention right to the mass of property that included Lot No. 38.[31] He asserts the
validity of the 1980 Kasunduan and the resulting relinquishment of rights made by
petitioners thereunder, as these were supposedly executed in accordance with
Sections 8 and 28 of R.A. No. 3844. Lastly, he attributes to petitioners a violation
of Section 36, in relation to Section 27, of R.A. No. 3844 and a breach of the
leasehold contract covering all three lots when portions of the property were
subleased by respondents to Jess Santos and Daniel Toribio.[32]

The Court gave due course to the petition, and on the submission of the
parties memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

To begin with, it is conceded that Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39 have all come
under the land redistribution system of R.A. No. 3844[33] and the
governments Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 27.[34] It is likewise
conceded, as the parties themselves do, that a certificate of land transfer has
previously been issued in favor of petitioners. However, petitioners ejectment from
the landholding is sought on account of the alleged relinquishment of tenurial
rights which they had executed in accordance with the provisions of Sections 27
and 36 of R.A. No. 3844. Petitioners argue that the agreement was not intended to
effect a termination of their tenurial rights on Lot No. 38. In this regard,
respondent submits as proof the 1980 Kasunduan which, for easy reference, is
materially reproduced as follows:

x x x Na ang Maylupa na si Miguel Tanjangco, Jr. ang siyang tunay at ganap na

may-ari ng isang lupang sakahan o palayan na may laki at sukat na humigit-
kumulang sa apat na hektarya na matatagpuan sa San Jose at Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan;

Na ang naturang lupang palayan ay binubuwisan ng 40 kaban sa kasalukuyan ng

mag-inang Emilia Micking at Benjamin Coronel na nagsasaka rito;

Na iminungkahi noong mga nakaraang araw ng Namumuwisan sa Maylupa na

ang bahaging binubuwisang palayan na saklaw at napapailalim sa Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-177647 ng Tanggapan ng Kasulatan ng Lupa para sa
Lalawigan ng Bulacan, na mapagkikilala Bilang 10 na natatala sa titulo at may
parisukat at kalakhan na 18,844 metrong parisukat at ito ang Lote Blg. 38, plano
 Psu-64699, SWO-14929, ay gawing palaisdaan sa dahilang ayaw nang mag-ani
rito ng palay sapagkat inaabot at nadaramay sa alat na tubig ng karatig na
palaisdaan, at ang mungkahing ito ay tinanggap at sinang-ayunan ng Maylupa sa
kasunduang sumusunod;

Na alang-alang sa halagang P6,000.00, perang Pilipino, na tinanggap ng

Namumuwisan bilang kabayaran sa anumang kalalabasan ng pagbabago ng
kaurian ng lupang palayan (Blg. Lote 38, TCT T-177647) ay pumapayag ang
Namumuwisan at ipinauubaya sa Maylupa na gawing palaisdaan ang naturang
bahaging lupang hindi na pinag-aanihan; x x x [35]

Indeed, petitioners are not mistaken. A mere fleeting glance at the

1980 Kasunduan suggests not a hint that petitioners, for a monetary consideration,
agreed to relinquish their rights as agricultural lessees and thereby surrender
possession of the land to respondent. In this connection, we take notice that the
Court of Appeals, applying Sections 8 and 28 of R.A. No. 3844 on voluntary
surrender of landholding, as well as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657,[36] has been
misguided when it ruled that petitioners became leaseholders on account of the
MARs Order affirming respondents retention rights over Lot No. 38 but that said
status terminated with the execution of the 1980 Kasunduan. This, because while
the petition for retention was filed in 1976, it was only in 1986 that respondents
retention rights were upheld by the MAR six years since the execution of
the Kasunduan in 1980.Be that as it may,

What comes clear from the foregoing is that respondent and petitioners
merely agreed, as the latter had previously suggested to the former, to operate
fishing ponds on Lot No. 38 and instead of cultivating rice, conduct fish farming
thereon. Contrary to respondents own interpretation, as well as to the Court of
Appeals assessment of the agreement, the consideration of P6,000.00 was never
meant to operate as compensation to petitioners for abandoning their rights to the
property. At best, the unmistakable import of the consideration in the Kasunduan is
merely to indemnify petitioners for the consequences of the conversion of the farm
lot from rice land to fish farm.

Respondent is bent on defeating the rights of petitioners and to that end, he

cites Sections 27 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.
 Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 governs the dispossession of an agricultural
lessee and the termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding,
whereas Section 27 enumerates certain prohibited transactions involving the
landholding. They provide as follows:

Section 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee - It shall be unlawful for

the agricultural lessee:

(1) To contract to work additional landholdings belonging to a

different agricultural lessor or to acquire and personally cultivate
an economic family-size farm, without the knowledge and consent
of the agricultural lessor with whom he had entered first into
household, if the first landholding is of sufficient size to make him
and the members of his immediate farm household fully occupied
in its cultivation; or

(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided,

however, That in case of illness or temporary incapacity he
may employ laborers whose services on his landholding shall
be on his account.

xxxx

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding

any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an
agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his

immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding
or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent
to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights
under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the
land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more
than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice
of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings
are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail
to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after
the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he
 acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand
possession of the land and recover damages for any loss
incurred by him because of said dispossessions.

xxxx
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.[37]

From these two provisions, as well as from his effusive arguments in the
earlier and present proceedings, we derive that the cause of respondents grievance
are the alleged conversion of Lot No. 38 into a fish farm and the alleged subleasing
of the landholding by petitioners. But even as we assume merit in respondents
arguments in this regard, we still find that his reliance on those provisions is
mislaid.

First, the conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980 Kasunduan is
not the conversion of landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of the
law. Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[38] defined conversion as the act of changing the
current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
DAR.[39] More to the point is that for conversion to avail as a ground for
dispossession, the opening paragraph of Section 36 implies the necessity of prior
court proceedings in which the issue of conversion has been determined and a final
order issued directing dispossession upon that ground.[40] In the case at bar,
however, respondent does not profess that at any time there had been such
proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does he assert that Lot No.
38and Lot Nos. 37 and 39 for that matterhad undergone conversion with authority
from the DAR.

Second, it is evident from the records that the lease agreement [41] over Lot
No. 38 in favor of Jess Santos was executed not by petitioners but rather by
respondent himself.It was respondents name that appears therein as the lessor, with
Jess Santos acceding to operate a fishing pond on the land. With respect to the
lease agreement with Daniel Toribio executed after the expiration of the first lease,
we find that although it was Boy Coronel who signed in as lessor, still, this will not
suffice as a ground to dispossess petitioners of the three lots and eject them from
the property inasmuch as, to reiterate, dispossession on account of having
employed a sublessee under Sections 36 and 27 of R.A. No. 3844 requires a final
judgment of the court in that respect.

Furthermore, since the inception of this case, respondent has been grasping
at straws in his attempt to dispossess petitioners not only of Lot No. 38 but also of
Lot Nos. 37 and 39. He has been insistent that there was an existing leasehold
agreement covering Lot Nos. 37 and 39 which was violated by petitioners when
they supposedly constituted leases on these lands. But we have to approve of the
Court of Appeals finding that aside from this bare and unassisted claim, respondent
was not able to substantiate his thesis. Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844 clearly rests the
burden on respondent, who proclaims himself to be the landowner, to prove the
existence of the grounds for dispossession and ejectment, yet clearly was unable to
discharge this burden as he has not at any time shown either a final order of
conversion by the DAR or a court judgment authorizing the tenants ejectment on
the ground of conversion.

With particular reference to Lot No. 38, it is useful to note that Emilias
certificate of land transfer has already been ordered cancelled in the 1986 decision
of the MAR in connection with respondents retention application. Indeed, the
ruling in that case cannot be downplayed at this juncture inasmuch as it explicitly
affirmed the viability of respondents exercise of retention rights, under the
auspices of P.D. No. 27, over the property.

Thus, because this issue has already been settled, we are certainly not bound
to litigate the same anew as petitioners would have us do. If at all, we must only
emphasize that even with the confirmation of respondents retention rights over Lot
No. 38, petitioners leasehold rights to the land have not been extinguished. In other
words, while indeed petitioners are deemed owners of Lot Nos. 37 and 39 by
operation of P.D. No. 27, the placing of Lot No. 38 under respondents retention
limits have made them lessees only on Lot No. 38. Their status as such is protected
by Section 7[42] of R.A. 3844, which afford them security in their tenurial
rights. Sarne v. Maquiling,[43]citing Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,[44] Endaya v. Court of
Appeals[45] and Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,[46] is instructive on this point, to wit:

x x x [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the

landowner and the farmer be a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant
 a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such as security of tenure of the
tenant and the tenant's right to continue in possession of the land he works despite
the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons,
and now, more basically, the farmer's pre-emptive right to buy the land he
cultivates under section 11 of the Code, as well as the right to redeem the land, if
sold to a third person without his knowledge, under section 12 of this Code.

To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No.

3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by
the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. With
unyielding consistency, we have held that transactions involving the agricultural
land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will not terminate the
rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such
rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest. x
xx

In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of

tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and
tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. x x x [S]ecurity of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself
and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can
take place only for causes provided by law. The causes are specified in Sections
8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No. 3844.

Finally, even on the hypothesis that petitioners, as alleged, voluntarily

relinquished their rights over Lot Nos. 37, 38 and 39 and surrendered the same to
respondent, the transaction would still be void because it is by all means prohibited
by law.

Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor farm

families from the bondage of the soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact
same spirit, with mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated
and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to ensure the continued
possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills
which would certainly not be possible where the former owner is allowed to
reacquire the land at any time following the award in contravention of the
government's objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the
soil.[47]
 In order to ensure the tenant-farmer's continued enjoyment and possession of
the property, the explicit terms of P.D. No. 27 prohibit the transfer by the tenant of
the ownership, rights or possession of a landholding to other persons, or the
surrender of the same to the former landowner. In other words, a tenant-farmer
may not transfer his ownership or possession of, or his rights to the property,
except only in favor of the government or by hereditary succession in favor of his
successors.[48] Any other transfer of the land grant is a violation of this proscription
and is, therefore, null and void[49] following Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of
1979, which materially states:

Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many
farmer-beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their ownership, rights and/or
possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same
to their former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of P.D.
27 and therefore null and void.[50]

All told, we find that the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case must be
modified. In view of the fact that there was no valid relinquishment of agricultural
leasehold rights over Lot No. 38 which may be attributed to petitioners, they are
entitled to possession of the same as agricultural lessees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The October 28, 2003

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75112 is
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioners entitlement to the possession and cultivation of
Lot No. 38 as agricultural lessee in accordance with the July 27, 1986 Order of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform in MARCO Adm. Case No. III-1474-86,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
The complaint was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-5100 97; records, pp. 9-12.
[2]
Records, pp. 6-8, 12.
[3]
The Declaration of Real Property discloses that all three lots are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
177647; id. at 6-8.
[4]
Records, pp. 11-12.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Alternatively referred to in the records as Boy Coronel.
[7]
Records, pp. 5, 11.
[8]
Id. at 11, 13.
[9]
Id. at 30-32.
[10]
Id. at 34-35.
[11]
Id. at 34.
[12]
Id. at 84-85.
[13]
Id. at 137-146. The decision was signed by Gregorio D. Sapera.
[14]
Id. at 139-140.
[15]
Id. at 137-138.
[16]
Id. at 154.
[17]
Id. at 184-185.
[18]
Id. at 183-184. The decision was signed by Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes.
[19]
Id. at 196-197.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 2-13.
[21]
Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member
of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring; id. at 115-119.
[22]
Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844 provides:
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation
established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be
served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or permanent
incapacity of the lessee.
[23]
Section 28, Republic Act No. 3844 provides:
Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During Agricultural Year - The agricultural
lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural year for any of the following causes:
(1) Cruel, inhuman or offensive, treatment of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household by the agricultural lessor or his representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
(2) Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the obligations imposed upon him by
the provisions of this Code or by his contact with the agricultural lessee;
(3) Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm household by the
agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service not in any way connected with farm work or even without
compulsion if no compensation is paid;
(4) Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his representative against the agricultural lessee or
any member of his immediate farm household; or
(5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 118-119.
[25]
Id. at 119.
[26]
Id. at 120-129
[27]
Id. at 141-143.
[28]
Rollo, p. 9. See also Reply, rollo, p. 80.
[29]
Id. at 10-11, 81-82.
[30]
Id. at 12-13. Ses also Reply, rollo, pp. 83-84.
[31]
Id. at 64.
[32]
Id. at 66-67.
[33]
The law is entitled An Act to Ordain the Agricultural Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the
Philippines, Including the Abolition of Tenancy and the Chanelling of Capital into Industry, Provide for the
Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Approved on August 8,
1963.
[34]
Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of
the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor. The law was promulgated on October
21, 1972.
[35]
Records, p. 17.
[36]
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
[37]
Emphasis supplied.
[38]
453 Phil. 373 (2003).
[39]
Id. at 382.
[40]
Id. at 381
[41]
Records, pp. 14-15.
[42]
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall
confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is
extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
[43]
G.R. No. 138839, May 9, 2002.
[44]
33 SCRA 105 (1970).
[45]
215 SCRA 109 (1992).
[46]
168 SCRA 439 (1988).
[47]
Toralba v. Mercado, 478 Phil. 563, 571 (2004).
[48]
Paragraph 13 of Presidential Decree No. 27 states: Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land
Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by hereditary succession or to the Government
in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and
regulations. See also Caliwag-Carmona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148157, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 723,
734; Torres v. Ventura, G.R. No. 86044, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 97, 105; Corpuz v. Grospe, G.R. No. 135297,
June 13, 2000, 333 SCRA 425, 436-437.
[49]
Caliwag-Carmona v. Court of Appeals, supra; Torres v. Ventura, supra; Corpuz v. Grospe, supra.
[50]
The Circular is dated April 23, 1979.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 190276 April 2, 2014

EUFROCINA NIEVES, as represented by her attorney-in-fact, LAZARO VILLAROSA,

JR., Petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO DULDULAO and FELIPE PAJARILLO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 4, 2009 and the
Resolution3 dated November 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105438 which
set aside the Decision4 dated December 13, 2007 and the Resolution5 dated March 13, 2008 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 14727, holding
that the tenancy relations between petitioner Eufrocina Nieves (petitioner) and respondents Ernesto
Duldulao (Ernesto) and Felipe Pajarillo (Felipe) remain valid and enforceable.

The Facts

Petitioner is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice land with an area of six (6) hectares, more or
less, located at Dulong Bayan, Quezon, Nueva Ecija (subject land). Ernesto and Felipe
(respondents) are tenants and cultivators of the subject land6 who are obligated to each pay
leasehold rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each cropping season,7 one in May and the other in
December.8

Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their leasehold rentals since 1985 which had
accumulated to 446.5 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, petitioner filed a petition on March 8,
2006 before the DARAB Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD), seeking the ejectment of
respondents from the subject land for non-payment of rentals.9

Prior to the filing of the case, a mediation was conducted before the Office of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer and Legal Division in 2005 where respondents admitted being in default in the
payment of leasehold rentals equivalent to 200 and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, and promised
to pay the same.10 Subsequently, however, in his answer to the petition, Ernesto claimed that he
merely inherited a portion of the back leasehold rentals from his deceased father, Eugenio Duldulao,
but proposed to pay the arrearages in four (4) installments beginning the dayatan cropping season in
May 2006.11 On the other hand, Felipe denied incurring any back leasehold rentals, but at the same
time proposed to pay whatever there may be in six (6) installments, also beginning the dayatan
cropping season in May 2006.12 Both respondents manifested their lack of intention to renege on
their obligations to pay the leasehold rentals due, explaining that the supervening calamities, such
as the flashfloods and typhoons that affected the area prevented them from complying.13

The PARAD's Ruling

In a Decision14 dated July 6, 2006, the PARAD declared that the tenancy relations between the
parties had been severed by respondents’ failure to pay their back leasehold rentals, thereby
ordering them to vacate the subject land and fulfill their rent obligations.

With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD did not find merit in his claim that the obligation of his father for
back leasehold rentals, amounting to 446 cavans of palay, had been extinguished by his death. It
held that upon the death of the leaseholder, the leasehold relationship continues between the
agricultural lessor and the surviving spouse or next of kin of the deceased as provided by law;
hence, the leasehold rent obligations subsist and should be paid.15

As for Felipe, the PARAD found that his unpaid leasehold rentals had accumulated to 327 cavans of
palay, and that his refusal to pay was willful and deliberate, warranting his ejectment from the
subject land.16

Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the case on appeal.

The DARAB Proceedings

On April 16, 2007, the DARAB issued an Order17 deputizing the DARAB Provincial Sheriff of Nueva
Ecija and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Talavera, Nueva Ecija to supervise the harvest of
palay over the subject land. However, when the Sheriff proceeded to implement the same on April
27, 2007, he found that the harvest had been completed and the proceeds therefrom had been used
to pay respondents’ other indebtedness.18

On December 13, 2007, the DARAB issued a Decision19 affirming the findings of the PARAD that
indeed, respondents were remiss in paying their leasehold rentals and that such omission was willful
and deliberate, justifying their ejectment from the subject land.20

Unperturbed, respondents elevated the matter to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision21 dated June 4, 2009, the CA granted respondents’ petition for review, thereby
reversing the ruling of the DARAB terminating the tenancy relations of the parties. While it found
respondents to have been remiss in the payment of their leasehold rentals, it held that the omission
was not deliberate or willful. Notwithstanding the DARAB’s findings with respect to the amounts of
respondents’ rental arrearages, the CA gave full credence to their assertions and observed that
Felipe failed to pay only 293 cavans of palay or 16.28% of the total leasehold rentals due from 1985
to 2005, while Ernesto failed to pay only 107.5 cavans of palay or 6% of the total leasehold
rentals.22 Relying on the Court’s ruling in the case of De Tanedo v. De La Cruz23 (De Tanedo), the CA
then concluded that respondents substantially complied with their obligation to pay leasehold rentals,
and, hence, could not be ejected from the subject land despite their failure to meet their rent
obligations as they became due.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a
Resolution24dated November 5, 2009, hence this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly reversed the DARAB’s
ruling ejecting respondents from the subject land.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Agricultural lessees, being entitled to security of tenure, may be ejected from their landholding only
on the grounds provided by law.25 These grounds – the existence of which is to be proven by the
agricultural lessor in a particular case26 – are enumerated in Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
3844,27 otherwise known as the "Agricultural Land Reform Code," which read as follows:

Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the

period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding
during the last five preceding calendar years; (as amended by RA 6389)

(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions
of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous
event or force majeure;

(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than
what had been previously agreed upon;

(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under
paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;

(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged
or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee;

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if
the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per
centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or

(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven. (Emphases supplied)
To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold rentals under item 6 of the above-
cited provision, jurisprudence instructs that the same must be willful and deliberate in order to
warrant the agricultural lessee’s dispossession of the land that he tills. As explained in the case of
Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:28

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents
are the complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as ag-ricultural
lessors. This proceeds from the principle that a tenancy relation-ship, once established, entitles the
tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on
grounds provided by law. Section 36 of the same law pertinently provides:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. – Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period
or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:

xxxx

(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result
of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for disposses-sion, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished;

xxxx

Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease
rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land that he tills.

Petitioner’s counsel opines that there appears to be no decision by this Court on the matter; he thus
submits that we should use the CA decision in Cabero v. Caturna. This is not correct. In an En Banc
Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,29 we held that under our law and
jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give the
latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to
pay. This ruling has not been overturned.

x x x x30 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

In the present case, petitioner seeks the dispossession of respondents from the subject land on the
ground of non-payment of leasehold rentals based on item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844. While
respondents indeed admit that they failed to pay the full amount of their respective leasehold rentals
as they become due, they claim that their default was on account of the debilitating effects of
calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This latter assertion is a defense provided under the same
provision which, if successfully established, allows the agricultural lessee to retain possession of his
landholding. The records of this case are, however, bereft of any showing that the aforestated claim
was substantiated by any evidence tending to prove the same. Keeping in mind that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof,31 the Court cannot therefore
lend any credence to respondents’ fortuitous event defense.

Respondents’ failure to pay leasehold rentals to the landowner also appears to have been willful and
deliberate. They, in fact, do not deny – and therefore admit32 – the landowner’s assertion that their
rental arrearages have accumulated over a considerable length of time, i.e., from 1985 to 2005 but
rely on the fortuitous event defense, which as above-mentioned, cannot herein be sustained. In the
case of Antonio v. Manahan33 (Antonio), the Court, notwithstanding the tenants’ failure to prove their
own fortuitous event theory, pronounced that their failure to pay the leasehold rentals was not willful
and deliberate. The records in said case showed that the landowner actually rejected the rentals,
which amounted only to 2 years-worth of arrearages, i.e., 1993 and 2001, tendered by the tenants
therein due to their supposed poor quality. This circumstance was taken by the Court together with
the fact that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for the rejected rentals through the
payments made for the other years. In another case, i.e., Roxas v. Cabatuando34 (Roxas), the Court
similarly held that the tenants therein did not willfully and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold
rentals since they had serious doubts as to the legality of their contract with respect to their non-
sharing in the coconut produce, which thus prompted them to withhold their remittances in good
faith. In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in this case never rejected any rental payment
duly tendered by respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of their
agricultural leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into issue so as to intimate that they
merely withheld their remittances in good faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of
the equation, and considering the examples in Antonio and Roxas whereby the elements of
willfulness and deliberateness were not found to have been established, the Court is impelled to
agree with the DARAB that respondents herein willfully and deliberately chose not to pay their
leasehold rentals to the landowner when they fell due. The term "willful" means "voluntary and
intentional, but not necessarily malicious,"35 while the term "deliberate" means that the act or
omission is "intentional," "premeditated" or "fully considered."36 These qualities the landowner herein
had successfully established in relation to respondents’ default in this case. Accordingly, their
dispossession from the subject land is warranted under the law.

At this juncture, the Court finds it apt to clarify that respondents’ purported substantial compliance –
as erroneously considered by the CA to justify its ruling against their dispossession – is applicable
only under the parameters of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844, which is a separate and distinct
provision from item 6 thereof. Item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844 applies to cases where the agricultural
lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of
the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event
or force majeure; whereas item 6 refers to cases where the agricultural lessee does not pay the
leasehold rental when it falls due, provided that the failure to pay is not due to crop failure to the
extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event.

As the present dispute involves the non-payment of leasehold rentals, it is item 6 – and not item 2 –
of the same provision which should apply. Examining the text of item 6, there is no indication that the
agricultural lessee’s substantial compliance with his rent obligations could be raised as a defense
against his dispossession. On the other hand, item 2 states that it is only the agricultural lessee’s
"failure to substantially comply" with the terms and conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract or
the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code which is deemed as a ground for dispossession.
Thus, it may be reasonably deduced that the agricultural lessee’s substantial compliance negates
the existence of the ground of dispossession provided under item 2. While the failure to pay
leasehold rentals may be construed to fall under the general phraseology of item 2 – that is a form of
non-compliance "with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this
Code,"37 it is a long-standing rule in statutory construction that general legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable - lex specialis derogat generali.38 In other words,
where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially
designed therefor should prevail.39 Thus, consistent with this principle, the Court so holds that cases
covering an agricultural lessee’s non-payment of leasehold rentals should be examined under the
parameters of item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844 and not under item 2 of the same provision which
applies to other violations of the agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code, excluding the failure to pay rent. In these latter cases, substantial compliance
may – as above-explained – be raised as a defense against dispossession.

In this relation, the Court observes that the CA’s reliance in the De Tanedo ruling was altogether
misplaced for the simple reason that the substantial compliance defense in that case was actually
invoked against a violation of a peculiar term and condition of the parties’ agricultural leasehold
contract, particularly requiring the payment of advance rentals "pursuant to [the agricultural lessee’s]
agreement with the landholders,"40 and not his mere failure to pay the leasehold rentals regularly
accruing within a particular cropping season, as in this case.

In fact, the Court, in De Tanedo, applied the substantial compliance defense only in relation to
Section 50(b) of RA 1199,41 otherwise known as the "Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines,"
which is the predecessor provision of item 2, Section 36 of RA 3844. Section 50(b) of RA 1199
states that:

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. - Any of the following shall be a sufficient
cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:

xxxx

(b) When the current tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply
when the tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this Act.

On other hand, the predecessor provision of item 6, Section 36 of RA 3844 is Section 50(c) of RA
1199, which reads as follows:

Section 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. - Any of the following shall be a sufficient
cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:

xxxx

(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure.

The Court’s application of the substantial compliance defense in relation to Section 50(b) of RA
1199, as well as the agricultural lessors’ failure to actually raise in their ejectment complaint the
ground of failure to pay leasehold rentals, is evident from the following excerpt of the De Tanedo
Decision:42

In the decision appealed from as well as in the resolution of the Court of Appeals forwarding this
case to us, it has been found that the rentals for the agricultural years 1958 to 1961, inclusive, had
all been fully satisfied, although not in advance as agreed upon. This is admitted by the petitioners-
appellants. We agree with the Court a quo that the delay in payment does not justify the drastic
remedy of ejectment, considering Section 50(b) of Republic Act 1199, which states that while
violation by the tenant of any of the terms and conditions of the tenancy contract shall be a ground to
eject him, yet this provision shall not apply where there has been substantial compliance. With
reference to the rental for the crop-year 1962-63, failure to pay the same was not alleged in the
original or amended complaints below, and hence may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In any case, the Court never mentioned Section 50(c) of RA 1199 in De Tanedo. Thus, a reading
1âwphi1

thereof only shores up the point earlier explained that the substantial compliance defense is only
available in cases where the ground for dispossession is the agricultural lessee’s violation of the
terms and conditions of the agricultural leasehold contract or the provisions of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, and not in cases where the ground for dispossession is the agricultural lessee's failure
to pay rent. Verily, agricultural leasehold rentals, as in rentals in ordinary lease contracts, constitute
fixed payments which the lessor has both the right and expectation to promptly receive in
consideration of being deprived of the full enjoyment and possession of his property. Unless caused
by a fortuitous event, or reprieved by virtue of a finding that the non-payment of leasehold rentals
was not actually willful and deliberate, there appears to be no credible justification, both in reason
and in law, to deny the agricultural lessor the right to recover his property and thereby eject the
agricultural lessee in the event that the latter fails to comply with his rent obligations as they fall due.
Indeed, while the Constitution commands the government to tilt the balance in favor of the poor and
the underprivileged whenever doubt arises in the interpretation of the law, the jural postulates of
social justice should not sanction any false sympathy towards a certain class, nor be used to deny
the landowner's rights,43 as in this case.

In fine, the Court affirms the DARAB Decision granting the petition for dispossession with the
modification, however, on the amount of rental arrearages to be paid considering that an action to
enforce any cause of action under RA 3844 shall be barred if not commenced within three (3) years
after it accrued.44 Accordingly, respondents are held liable to pay petitioner only the pertinent rental
arrearages reckoned from the last three (3) cropping years prior to the filing of the petition before the
Office of the PARAD on March 8, 200645 or from the May 2003 cropping season, until they have
vacated the subject land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 4, 2009 and the Resolution
dated November 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 105438 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 13, 2007 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 14727 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION ordering respondents Ernesto Duldulao and Felipe Pajarillo to pay petitioner
Eufrocina Nieves the pertinent rental arrearages reckoned from the May 2003 cropping season, until
they have vacated the landholding subject of this case.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-35.

2
Id. at 39-50. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices
Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.

3
Id. at 52-53.

4
Id. at 84-90. Penned by Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, with Undersecretary
Renato F. Herrera and Assistant Secretaries Delfin B. Samson and Edgar A. Igano,
concurring.

5
CA rollo, pp. 34-35. Penned by Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, with Assistant
Secretaries Delfin B. Samson, Edgar A. Igano, and Patricia Rualo-Bello, concurring.

6
Rollo, pp. 79 and 85.

7
Id. at 46.

8
CA rollo, p. 140.

9
Rollo, p. 79.

See Mediation Report dated March 14, 2005 issued by Legal Officer III Pablo C. Canlas;
10

DAR records, p. 1.

11
See Answer dated March 27, 2006; id. at 32-33.

12
See Answer dated March 29, 2006; id. at 36-37.
13
Rollo, p. 42.

14
Id. at 79-83. Penned by Presiding Adjudicator Marvin V. Bernal.

15
Id. at 80-81.

16
Id. at 82.

17
DAR records, pp. 162-163. Issued by Assistant Secretaries Augusto P. Quijano, Edgar A.
Igano, and Patricia Rualo-Bello.

See Implementation Report dated April 30, 2007 issued by DARAB Provincial Sheriff Delfin
18

Acosta Gaspar; id. at 159.

19
Rollo, pp. 84-90.

20
Id. at 89.

21
Id. at 39-50.

22
Id. at 46-47.

23
143 Phil. 61 (1970).

24
Rollo, pp. 52-53.

25
Section 7 of RA 3844 provides:

Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold

relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and
cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein
provided.

26
Section 37 of RA 3844 provides:

Section 37. Burden of Proof. - The burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural
lessor.

27
Entitled "AN ACT TO ORDAIN THE AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE AND TO
INSTITUTE LAND REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INCLUDING THE ABOLITION OF
TENANCY AND THE CHANNELING OF CAPITAL INTO INDUSTRY, PROVIDE FOR THE
NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES, APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

28
593 Phil. 108 (2008).

29
111 Phil. 737 (1961).
30
Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo, supra note 28, at 130-131.

31
542 Phil. 109, 122 (2007).

32
See Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

33
G.R. No. 176091, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 190.

34
Supra note 29.

35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 7th Ed. (1999), p. 1593.

36
Id. at 438.

37
See item (2), Section 36 of RA 3844.

See Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, 698 SCRA
38

742, 762.

39
Id.

40
De Tanedo, supra note 23, at 63.

Entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND

41

TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY)."

42
De Tanedo, supra note 23, at 63.

43
See Perez-Rosario v. CA, 526 Phil. 562, 586 (2006).

44
Section 38 of RA 3844 provides:

Section 38. Statute of Limitations. - An action to enforce any cause of action under
this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of
action accrued.

45
See Petition dated October 18, 2005; CA rollo, p. 127.