Evidence Rulings

EVIDENCE CASE UPDATES: JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO 1
TOPIC: SECONDARY EVIDENCE
Atienza vs. Board of Medicine
G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011
Justice Nachura
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of
RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent
kidney operation after the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-
visualizing.
3. Private respondent’s husband Romeo Sioson then filed a complaint for gross negligence
and/or incompetence before the Board of Medicine for the removal of Editha's fully
functional right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly participated
in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of documentary
evidence, which consisted of certified photocopies of X-Ray request forms where
interpretation of the ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Editha's formal offer of exhibits, alleging that
said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are hearsay, and
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent was admitted by the
BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied on the
ground that BOM should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine
its probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine whether the
evidence is relevant or not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence.
Held: No. Petition denied.
Ratio:
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe
strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, "it is the safest policy to
be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand,
their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them."
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive
rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the
Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As pointed out by the appellate court,
the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at
any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their
proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection with Editha’s
medical case, which contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were
both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it
is covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of
the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys because the position and removal may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is also inapplicable. Section 3 of
Rule 130 provides:
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
2. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
3. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
4. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
5. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed,
especially as one of the witnesses testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building" and ultimately, the originals cannot be produced.
Manila Mining Corporation vs. Miguel Tan
GR. No. 171702, February 12, 2009
Justice Quisumbing
Facts:
1. Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing,
was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.
2. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from
Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from
delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the
same, to pay attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the claim.
3. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands,
it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine
invoices.
4. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed
presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC
further directed MMC to present evidence.
5. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002.
Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the
original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the
absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said
documents by MMC’s representatives.
6. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of
MMC’s account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices
and purchase orders to MMC’s accounting department. As proof, he showed three
customer’s acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the
period and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of
the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification,
bearing acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.
7. The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest
and liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by
the RTC.
8. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence the present petition
for review on certiorari.
9. Petitioner contends, among others, that respondent’s claim for payment was premature
inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting
department. Consequently, Tan’s claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes
that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay, in
light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which provides that, "where the obligation of either
party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party
may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.
…"
10. Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented
during trial, claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase
orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tan’s failure to yield the
original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e),
Rule 131, Rules of Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan
failed to comply with certain requisites for payment.
Held: Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit.
Ratio:
Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this Court’s power to review. This Court’s
jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the
Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are
accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on this Court.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical
materials to MMC. Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of
consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the transactions.
As regards respondent’s failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best
evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence
of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced
in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention
was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement
that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale
between the parties.
Department of Education Culture and Sports vs. Julia del Rosario, et.al.
GR. No. 146586, January 26, 2005
Justice Carpio
DOCTRINE: Before secondary evidence of a writing may be introduced on the ground that the
instrument has been lost, there must be proof that a diligent search has been made in the place
where it is most likely to be found and that the search has not been successful. Moreover,
secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted upon the theory that the original
cannot be produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered within a reasonable time by
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Until, however, the non-production of the primary evidence
has been sufficiently accounted for, secondary evidence is not ordinarily admissible.
Facts:
1. In 1992, Julia, Maria and Pacencia, all surnamed Del Rosario, and the heirs of Santos
Del Rosario (“the respondents”) filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of
Possession concerning a parcel of land against DECS. The respondents alleged that
they own land with an area of 1,181 sq.m. in Bulacan, the property having been
registered in their names under TCT No. T-222432. They alleged that the Kaypombo
Primary School Annex (“KPSA”) under DECS was occupying a portion of the property
through respondents’ tolerance and that of their predecessors-in-interest, as well as that
KPSA refused to vacate the premises despite their valid demands to do so.
2. DECS, on the other hand, countered that KPSA’s occupation of a portion of the land was
with the express consent and approval of respondents’ father, the late Isaias Del
Rosario. DECS claimed that Isaias donated a portion of the property to the Municipality
of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, for school site purposes. Because of the donation, DECS now
claims ownership of the 650 sq.m. donated site.
3. DECS admitted the existence and execution of the TCT above-mentioned, and the tax
receipts in respondents’ names for 1991 and 1992. Respondents on the other hand,
admitted the existence of the affidavit of one Judge Natividad that he prepared the deed
of donation and the tax declaration for 1985 in the municipality’s name.
4. DECS presented 3 witnesses:
a. Ricardo Nicolas, a resident of Kaypombo: testified that as far as he knows, the

land occupied by KPSA was formerly owned by Isaias who donated the said
land, that the act was made during a political meeting in his residence, that he
actually saw Isaias and the mayor at the time sign a document which is a deed of
donation in favor of the municipality, that Isaias is now dead but his death
occurred long after the construction of KPSA and that Isaias witnessed the
construction of the school.
b. Vidal de Jesus, barangay councilman of Kaypombo: testified that the barangay

council and the children of Isaias had a meeting in the presence of Judge
Natividad, during which the latter told the children of Isaias that the land had
been donated by their father, that the barangay council tried to secure a copy of
the deed of donation from the municipality, but they were told that the deed got
lost when the municipal hall was transferred to a new building, and that they were
only able to get a copy of the tax declaration in the municipality’s name.
c. Judge Natividad: testified that Isaias was willing to donate a portion of the lot in
question for the school site, and that he prepared the deed of donation which
was signed by Isaias in his residence and which was accepted by the
municipality through a resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the
municipal mayor, that a copy of the said resolution was lost because of the
building transfer, and that he notarized the deed of donation.
5. Respondents presented 2 witnesses:

a. Eugenia Ignacio, daughter of Isaias: they testified that she did not know
everything about the donation because their father never informed them of his
dealings.
b. Maria Esteban, daughter of Isaias: testified that they own the property by virtue of
succession, that their father told them that he just lent the property temporarily to
the municipality, and that she never found any document conveying the lot to the
municipality.
6. The Trial Court dismissed the respondents’ complaint, holding that DECS was able to
prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss
of the same. The Court took note of the rule that a recantation/recollection of witness is a
form of secondary evidence to prove the existence/content of a document. Since the
loss of the deed subject matter of this case was likewise duly proved by the defense,
exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy of the same and without bad
faith on its part, the Court is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary evidence
adduced by the defense vis-à-vis the title in the name of the plaintiffs. Further, they held
that Judge Natividad is in the best position to testify on the matter.
7. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. The Court held that DECS
failed to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the
Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The Court was not fully
satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged "lost"
deed of donation. The Rule requires that the defendant must "prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
the witnesses in the order stated". However, the defendant proceeded with the last
resort-testimony of the witnesses, without even showing any diligent effort to secure a
copy of the deed of donation and the resolution. The defendant only submitted an
affidavit showing that the deed can no longer be located in the municipal government.
There was no evidence to show that the defendant looked for a copy from the Clerk of
Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. If it is true that Atty. Natividad notarized the deed, he
should have a copy of it. In fact, such act of notarizing the deed should have been in his
notarial register.
Issue:
1) Whether or not secondary evidence may be availed of in this instance.
Held:
1) No
Ratio:
1) In cases of donations, the best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an

authentic copy of the deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of
the Civil Code. However, a party may prove the donation by other competent or
secondary evidence under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, which provides that an exception to the best evidence rule is when the
original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror. In addition, Section 5 of the same Rule provides that when the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. Before
secondary evidence may be availed of, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of
the best or primary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order
of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if necessary.
2) In the present case, the testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some
extent the existence of the deed of donation since he testified that he was present when
Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and that he witnessed the signing of the
document. However, as he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the
contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed, his testimony is
not deemed to have proven the existence of the deed of donation.
3) In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus’ testimony does not help to establish the deed of
donation’s existence, execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of
donation. The information that Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed
to him by Judge Natividad himself.
4) Lastly, as regards the testimony of Judge Natividad as to the existence of the deed by
virtue of the fact that he supposedly notarized the deed, as the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out, he failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the law
strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government offices. The
Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The Notarial Law
mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary information
regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the
notary public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him when it is a
contract. DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge
Natividad as the notary public should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively,
DECS should have explained the unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad
could have also explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as
required by law. As regards the lack of diligent search, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the
Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives. These preclude a finding that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of
donation.
5) Much as the Court sympathizes with the plight of the schoolchildren, there is no
reversible error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals. DECS, however, is not without
remedy. The government can expropriate at any time the Donated Site, paying just
compensation to respondents.
NAPOCOR vs. Hon. Ramon Codilla, Jr., Bangpai Shipping Company and Wallem Shipping
Incorporated
GR. No. 170491, April 4, 2007
Justice Chico-Nazario
Facts:
1. On April 20, 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel owned and operated by Bangpai Shipping
Company (“Bangpai”), allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCOR’s power barge which
was then moored at the Cebu International Port. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
damages against Bangpai.
2. NAPOCOR then filed an Amended Complaint impleading Wallem Shipping Inc.
(“Wallem”) as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai.
Wallem filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied.
3. NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence, consisting of Exhibits A to V. Bangpai and

WalleM filed their respective objections to the same.
4. Judge Codilla then issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from
the records several exhibits offered as evidence by NAPOCOR. According to the court a
quo, the record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the
originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. Despite this, it never
produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the
document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallem’s Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute
the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be
authenticated, which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed,
much less presented in evidence.
5. NAPOCOR then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, maintaining that Judge
Codilla acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the admission of the exhibits in issue. The Court of Appeals dismissed this
petition, holding that respondent judge acted correctly in issuing the assailed order.
There was lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary evidence. Further,
said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents
or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted within the
pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence. Section
3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that,
when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases
specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-
presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under
such exceptions.
a. NAPOCOR tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are

equivalent to the original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on
the Rules on Electronic Evidence. However, such a contention is devoid of merit.
The pieces of documentary evidence offered by NAPOCOR which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute electronic evidence

as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information therein were not
received, retrieved or produced electronically.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the photocopies offered in evidence by NAPOCOR are the functional
equivalent of their original based on its interpretation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
2) Whether or not the secondary evidence rule may be applied.
Held:
1) No
2) No
Ratio:
1) As regards the first issue, the NAPOCOR’s contention that the photocopies it presented
as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own
premise that an "electronic document" as defined under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically must fail. What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based
document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of
petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it
is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.
2) As regards the second issue, the court a quo did not err in denying the admission of the
exhibits in issue and excluding them from the records of the case. The trial court was
correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
a. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper
place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering
the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer
was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the Order of the court a
quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as
documentary evidence.
b. Had petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of
the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have
unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for
adjudication. NAPOCOR has only itself to blame for the respondent judge’s
denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence and
consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present
the originals of the documents that were denied admission.
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
NAPOCOR vs. Hon. Ramon Codilla, Jr., Bangpai Shipping Company and Wallem Shipping
Incorporated
GR. No. 170491, April 4, 2007
Justice Chico-Nazario
DOCTRINE:
Facts:
6. On April 20, 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel owned and operated by Bangpai Shipping
Company (“Bangpai”), allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCOR’s power barge which
was then moored at the Cebu International Port. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
damages against Bangpai.
7. NAPOCOR then filed an Amended Complaint impleading Wallem Shipping Inc.
(“Wallem”) as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai.
Wallem filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied.
8. NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence, consisting of Exhibits A to V. Bangpai and

WalleM filed their respective objections to the same.
9. Judge Codilla then issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from
the records several exhibits offered as evidence by NAPOCOR. According to the court a
quo, the record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the
originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. Despite this, it never
produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the
document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallem’s Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies do not constitute
the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded,
retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence must be
authenticated, which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to prove the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed,
much less presented in evidence.
1
10. NAPOCOR then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, maintaining that Judge
Codilla acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the admission of the exhibits in issue. The Court of Appeals dismissed this
petition, holding that respondent judge acted correctly in issuing the assailed order.
There was lack of proper identification of said pieces of documentary evidence. Further,
said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents
or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted within the
pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said documentary evidence. Section
3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that,
when the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases
specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-
presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under
such exceptions.
a. NAPOCOR tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are

equivalent to the original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based on
the Rules on Electronic Evidence. However, such a contention is devoid of merit.
The pieces of documentary evidence offered by NAPOCOR which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute electronic evidence
as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information therein were not
received, retrieved or produced electronically.
Issue:
3) Whether or not the photocopies offered in evidence by NAPOCOR are the functional
equivalent of their original based on its interpretation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence.
4) Whether or not the secondary evidence rule may be applied.
Held:
3) No
4) No
Ratio:
3) As regards the first issue, the NAPOCOR’s contention that the photocopies it presented
as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own
premise that an "electronic document" as defined under the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically must fail. What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based
document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of
petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it
is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.
4) As regards the second issue, the court a quo did not err in denying the admission of the
exhibits in issue and excluding them from the records of the case. The trial court was
correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are
therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
a. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona
fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper
place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering
the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer
was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the Order of the court a
quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as
documentary evidence.
b. Had petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of
the photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not have
unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for
adjudication. NAPOCOR has only itself to blame for the respondent judge’s
denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary evidence and
consequently, the denial of its prayer to be given another opportunity to present
the originals of the documents that were denied admission.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Spouses Manuel and Victor Salimbangon v. Sps. Santos and Erlinda Tan
GR. No. 185240, January 21, 2010
Justice Melo
DOCTRINE:
The parol evidence rule precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or
modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the exclusionary provision of the parol
evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his
1
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto
Facts:
1. Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion,
Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17, 1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr.,
Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition,
adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves as follows:
a. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of

way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
b.. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way
1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
c. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
d. . To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
e. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50
m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.1
2. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior
lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial
partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E
that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this
easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to the heirs.
3. Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take the following
configurations,2 not drawn here to accurate size and proportion but illustrative of their relative
locations:
4. But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs
modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E,
and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively
along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.
4. Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the
result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street.
Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and
built two garages on it.
5. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley
or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this alley
cemented and gated.
6. Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots
B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the
easement area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built.
7. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with the City
Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans filed an action with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223 for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with application for preliminary
injunction.4 The Salimbangons filed their answer with counterclaims.
8. After hearing or on February 9, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, upholding the
Salimbangons’ easement of right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the
Tans. The court pointed out that the easement in this case was established by agreement of the
parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and E. Consequently, only by mutual agreement of the
parties could such easement be extinguished. The RTC declined, however, to award damages
to the Salimbangons.
9. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV 73468. On July 27, 2007
the CA5 reversed the RTC decision, extinguished the easement of right of way established on
the alley in Lot B of the Tans, and denied the Salimbangons’ claim for damages. The court ruled
that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo Ceniza, the true intent of
the parties was to establish that easement of right of way for the benefit of the interior lots,
namely, Lots D and E.
10. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was consolidated into the Tans, the
easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct. The Salimbangons filed a motion
for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its resolution of October 14, 2008. This
prompted them to file the present petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule
Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in establishing the easement
of right of way as against what they stated in their written agreement; and
Held:
The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony that
the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the
interior Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made
Lot A, now owned by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
(Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing
testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the
1
exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents
of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto; XXX XXX XXX.
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when
they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply,
the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus said:
Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to
establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the
partition agreement literally provided. At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not
object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony even when this seemed at
variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition agreement among the heirs.
Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their right to now
question such testimony on appeal.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Heirs of Pacres v. Heirs of Ygoña
GR. No. 174719, May 5, 2010
Justice Puno
DOCTRINE: While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven
under the Parol Evidence Rule. Under this Rule, “[w]hen the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.” While the Rule admits of exception, no
such exception was pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners.
Facts:
1. Lot No. 9 is a 1,007 square meter parcel of land located at Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu
City. The lot originally belonged to Pastor Pacres (Pastor) who left it intestate to his heirs
Margarita, Simplicia, Rodrigo, Francisco, Mario (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest) and
Veñaranda (herein petitioner).
2. Petitioners admitted that at the time of Pastor’s death in 1962, his heirs were already
occupying definite portions of Lot No. 9. The front portion along the provincial highway
was occupied by the co-owned Pacres ancestral home, and beside it stood Rodrigo’s
hut (also fronting the provincial highway). Mario’s house stood at the back of the
ancestral house.
3. This is how the property stood in 1968, as confirmed by petitioner Valentina’s testimony.
4. On the same year, the heirs leased the ground floor of the [ancestral home] together with
a lot area of 300 square meters including the area occupied by the house to respondent
Hilario Ramirez (Ramirez), who immediately took possession thereof.
5. Subsequently in 1974, four of the Pacres siblings (namely, Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia
and Margarita) sold their shares in the ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to
Ramirez. The deeds of sale described the subjects thereof as “part and portion of the
300 square meters actually in possession and enjoyment by vendee and her spouse,
Hilario Ramirez, by virtue of a contract of lease in their favor
6. With the sale, respondent Ramirez’s possession as lessee turned into a co-ownership
with petitioners Mario and Veñaranda, who did not sell their shares in the house and lot.
7. On various dates in 1971, Rodrigo,[14] Francisco, and Simplicia sold their remaining
shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoña (Ygoña). In 1983, Margarita also sold
her share to Ygoña. The total area sold to Ygoña was 493 square meters.
8. In 1984, Ygoña filed a petition to survey and segregate[18] the portions she bought from
Lot No. 9. Mario objected on the ground that he wanted to exercise his right as co-owner
to redeem his siblings’ shares. Vendee Rodrigo also opposed on the ground that he
wanted to annul the sale for failure of consideration.
9. On the other hand, Margarita and the widow of Francisco both manifested their assent to
Ygoña’s petition. By virtue of such manifestation, the court issued a writ of possession
respecting Margarita’s and Francisco’s shares in favor of Ygoña. It is by authority of this
writ that Ygoña built her house on a portion of Lot No. 9.
10. Considering, however, the objections of the two other Pacres siblings, the trial court
subsequently dismissed the petition so that the two issues could be threshed out in the
proper proceeding. Mario filed the intended action while Rodrigo no longer pursued his
objection.
11. The complaint for legal redemption, filed by Mario and Veñaranda, was dismissed on the
ground of improper exercise of the right. The decision was affirmed by the appellate
court and attained finality in the Supreme Court on December 28, 1992.
1
12. The CA held that the complaint was filed beyond the 30-day period provided in Article
1623 of the New Civil Code and failed to comply with the requirement of consignation. It
was further held that Ygoña built her house on Lot No. 9 in good faith and it would be
unjust to require her to remove her house thereon.
13. On June 18, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), expropriated the front portion of Lot No. 9 for the
expansion of the Cebu south road. The petition for expropriation was filed in Branch 9 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-14150. As
occupant of the expropriated portion, Ygoña moved to withdraw her corresponding share
in the expropriation payment.
14. Petitioners opposed the said motion. The parties did not supply the Court with the
pleadings in the expropriation case; hence, we are unaware of the parties involved and
the issues presented therein. However, from all indications, the said motion of Ygoña
remains unresolved.
15. On July 20, 1993, the Pacres siblings (Margarita and Francisco were already deceased
at that time and were only represented by their heirs) executed a Confirmation of Oral
Partition/Settlement of Estate of Pastor Pacres.
16. On September 30, 1994, Mario, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, filed an ejectment
suit against Ramirez’ successor-in-interest Vicentuan. Mario claimed sole ownership of
the lot occupied by Ramirez/Vicentuan by virtue of the oral partition. He argued that
Ramirez/Vicentuan should pay rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should
transfer to the rear of Lot No. 9 where the lots of Ramirez’s vendors are located.
17. The court dismissed Mario’s assertion that his siblings sold the rear lots to Ramirez. It
held that the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as
the ancestral house and lot.
18. Thus, Ramirez has a right to continue occupying the property he bought. The court
further held that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot, at
the very least, the parties are co-owners thereof. Co-owners are entitled to occupy the
co-owned property.
19. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. It held that petitioners failed to prove
partition of the lot in accordance with petitioners’ version. Instead, the trial court held that
the parties’ actual occupation of their portions in Lot No. 9, as evidenced by petitioner
Valentina’s sketch, is the real agreement to which the parties are bound. Apparently
unsatisfied with the parties’ state of affairs, the trial court further ordered that a survey of
the lot according to the parties’ actual occupation thereof be conducted.
20. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Unsatisfied with the adverse
decision, petitioners appealed to the CA questioning the factual findings of the trial court
and its reliance on Exhibit 1. They maintained that Valentina was incompetent and barely
literate; hence, her sketch should not be given weight.
21. The appellate court sustained the ruling of the trial court insofar as it dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for lack of evidence. It held that the oral partition was not valid
because the heirs did not ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with
their oral agreement.
22. Moreover, the CA ruled that Ygoña’s sole undertaking under the deeds of sale was the
payment of the purchase price. Since petitioners did not question the validity of the
deeds and did not assail its terms as failing to express the true intent of the parties, the
written document stands superior over the allegations of an oral agreement.
23. It, however, reversed the trial court on the latter’s order to survey the lot in accordance
with Valentina’s sketch. The appellate court explained that while it was conclusive that
Ygoña and Ramirez bought portions of the property from some of the Pacres siblings,
the issue of the actual area and location of the portions sold to them remains
unresolved.
Issue:
Whether petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral agreements such as
the partition and the additional obligations of surveying and titling
Ratio: No. The petitioners were not able to prove the existence of the alleged oral
agreements
Held:
In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable here). Thus, only a
party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said
contract. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to the contracts of sale between Ygoña
and the petitioners’ siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed obligations
arising from said contracts. It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a contract
under the second paragraph of Article 1311, which provides that “if a contract should contain
some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment.” This refers to
stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the benefit of third parties.
However, the written contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the
petitioners. While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven
under the Parol Evidence Rule. Under this Rule, “[w]hen the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.” While the Rule admits of exception, no
such exception was pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to “the parties and their successors in interest.”
Conversely, it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol
1
Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour
autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has
been held that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract
becomes a party to that contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a
stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown
that “at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written
instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.” A beneficiary of a stipulation
pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a
stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed
stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners’ claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from
proving them by oral evidence.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Leighton Contractors Philippines, Inc., v. CNP industries, Inc.
GR. No. 160972 March 9, 2010
Justice Corona
DOCTRINE:
The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court29 holds
that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties subsequently modify the
terms of their original agreement.
Facts:
1. In 1997, Hardie Jardin, Inc. (HJI) awarded the contract for site preparation, building
foundation and structural steel works of its fibre cement plant project in Barangay
Tatalon in San Isidro, Cabuyao, Laguna to petitioner Leighton Contractors Philippines,
Inc.
2. On July 5, 1997, respondent CNP Industries, Inc. submitted to petitioner a proposal to
undertake, as subcontractor, the construction of the structural steelworks of HJI’s fibre
cement plant project.
3. On July 15, 1997, petitioner accepted respondent’s proposal specifying that the project
cost was for the fixed lump sum price of P44,223,909. Respondent agreed and petitioner
instructed it to commence work.
4. Meanwhile, petitioner revised the fabrication drawings of several of the structure’s

columns necessitating adjustments in the designs of roof ridge ventilation and crane
beams.
5. Petitioner communicated the said revisions to respondent. Respondent estimated that

the said revisions required an additional 8,132 kgs. of steel costing P13,442,882.
However, it did not re-negotiate the fixed lump-sum price with petitioner.
6. On July 28, 1997, petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract providing:
(B) Subcontract works.
To carry out complete structural steelworks outlined in the Sub-contract Lump Sum Price [of
P44,223,909] in accordance with the Main Drawing and Technical Specifications and in
accordance with the Main Contract, all of which are available on Site.
(c) Special Conditions of the Sub-Contract.
xxx xxx xxx
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 11(4) of the General Conditions of the Sub-contract,
this Sub-contract is on a Fixed Lump Sum basis and is not subject to re-measurement. It is
the responsibility of [respondent] to derive his own quantities for the purpose of the Lump Sum
Sub-contract price. No additional payments will be made to [respondent] for any errors in
quantities that may be revealed during the Sub-contract period. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. The contract required respondent to finish the project within 20 weeks from the time
petitioner was allowed access to the site on June 20, 1997,17 that is, on or before
November 6, 1997.
8. Respondent informed petitioner that, due to the revisions in the designs of the roof ridge
ventilation and crane beams, it incurred "additional costs" amounting to P13,442,882.
9. respondent was unable to meet the project schedule, petitioner took over the project on
April 27, 1998. At the time of the takeover, respondent had already accomplished 86% of
the project for which petitioner paid P42,008,343.69.
10. Thereafter, respondent again asked petitioner to settle the "outstanding balance" of
P12,364,993.94, asserting that the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams were
excluded from the project cost. Petitioner refused to pay as the July 28, 1997
subcontract clearly stated that the sub-contract price was a fixed lump sum.
11. The parties submitted the matter to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) for arbitration.
2
12. Respondent argued that the proposal it submitted (accepted by petitioner on July 15,
1997) excluded the roof ridge ventilation and crane beams
13. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that the subcontract explicitly included the
aforementioned works in the scope of work. Furthermore, it was not liable for the
"additional costs" incurred by respondent as the subcontract clearly provided that the
project was for the fixed lump-sum price of P44,223,909. It likewise denied approving
respondent’s additional cost estimates as Bennett signed the August 12, 1997 progress
report only to acknowledge its receipt.
14. CIAC ruled in favor of respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the cost of the additional steel used for the roof ridge ventilation and
crane beams was included in the fixed lump-sum price
Held:
2) No
Ratio:
6) The parol evidence rule, embodied in Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court29 holds
that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. It, however, admits of exceptions such as when the parties subsequently
modify the terms of their original agreement.
Respondent claims that the situation herein falls under said exception. Respondent
contends that when Bennett signed the August 12, 1997 progress report, petitioner
approved the additional cost estimates, in effect modifying the original agreement in the
subcontract.
In the case at bar, the court found that Bennett did not sign the subcontract for and in
behalf of respondent but only as a witness. Respondent was therefore aware of
Bennett’s lack of authority.
Aside from respondent’s failure to present the documents required by Article 17241 of the
Civil Code, we find that the sub-contract was never modified. Petitioner therefore cannot
be liable for the additional costs incurred by respondent.
1 (1) written authority from the developer or project owner ordering or allowing the written changes in work and
(2) written agreement of parties with regard to the increase in price or cost due to the change in work or design
modification.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Estate of Margarita Cabancungan v. Marilou Laigo
GR. No. 175073 August 15, 2011
Justice Carpio
DOCTRINE:
Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required
to be evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of
parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the
existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Facts:
1. Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao

and in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union.
2. Sometime in 1968, Margarita’s son, Roberto Laigo, Jr. (Roberto), applied for a non-
immigrant visa to the United States, and to support his application, he allegedly asked
Margarita to transfer the tax declarations of the properties in his name.
3. For said purpose, Margarita, unknown to her other children, executed an Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property whereby the subject properties were transferred by donation to
Roberto.
4. Not long after, Roberto’s visa was issued and he was able to travel to the U.S. as a
tourist and returned in due time. In 1979, he adopted respondents Pedro Laigo (Pedro)
and Marilou Laigo (Marilou), and then he married respondent Estella Balagot.
5. In July 1990, Roberto sold the 4,512 sq m property in Baccuit to the spouses Mario and
Julia Campos for P23,000.00.
6. Then in August 1992, he sold the 1,986 sq m and 3,454 sq m lots in Paringao,
respectively, to Marilou for P100,000.00 and to Pedro for P40,000.00.
7. Allegedly, these sales were not known to Margarita and her other children.
8. It was only in August 1995, at Roberto’s wake, that Margarita came to know of the sales
as told by Pedro himself.
9. In February 1996, Margarita, represented by her daughter, Luz, instituted the instant
complaint for the annulment of said sales and for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject properties as well as for the cancellation of Ricardo’s tax
declarations.
10. Margarita admitted having accommodated Roberto’s request for the transfer of the
properties to his name, but pointed out that the arrangement was only for the specific
2
purpose of supporting his U.S. visa application. She emphasized that she never
intended to divest herself of ownership over the subject lands and, hence, Roberto had
no right to sell them to respondents and the Spouses Campos. She likewise alleged that
the sales, which were fictitious and simulated considering the gross inadequacy of the
stipulated price, were fraudulently entered into by Roberto. She imputed bad faith to
Pedro, Marilou and the Spouses Campos as buyers of the lots, as they supposedly knew
all along that Roberto was not the rightful owner of the properties.
11. The Spouses Campos advanced that they were innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith, and had merely relied on Roberto’s representation that he had the right to sell
the property; and that, hence, they were not bound by whatever agreement entered by
Margarita with her son.
12. In much the same way, Marilou and Pedro, who likewise professed themselves to be
buyers in good faith and for value, believed that Margarita’s cause of action had already
been barred by laches, and that even assuming the contrary, the cause of action was
nevertheless barred by prescription as the same had accrued way back in 1968 upon
the execution of the affidavit of transfer by virtue of which an implied trust had been
created. In this regard, they emphasized that the law allowed only a period of ten (10)
years within which an action to recover ownership of real property or to enforce an
implied trust thereon may be brought, but Margarita merely let it pass.
Issue:
1. Whether or not that the complaint is barred by laches and prescription

2. Whether or not the rule on innocent purchaser for value applies in this case of sale of
unregistered land
3. Whether or not there is evidence to support the finding that there is an implied
trust created between Margarita and her son Roberto
Held:
1. No
2. No
3. Yes
Ratio:
For issues 1 and 2 (case discusses at length the different types of trusts)
In the case at bar, lands involved are concededly unregistered lands; hence, there is
no way by which Margarita, during her lifetime, could be notified of the furtive and
fraudulent sales made in 1992 by Roberto in favor of respondents, except by actual
notice from Pedro himself in August 1995. Hence, it is from that date that prescription
began to toll. The filing of the complaint in February 1996 is well within the
prescriptive period.
3. Intention – although only presumed, implied or supposed by law from the nature of
the transaction or from the facts and circumstances accompanying the transaction,
particularly the source of the consideration – is always an element of a resulting trust
and may be inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties rather than from direct
expression of conduct. Certainly, intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that
necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by evidence, even circumstantial, of
statements made by the parties at or before the time title passes. Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required to be
evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of
parole evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish
the existence of an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest
on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding that there was no evidence on record
showing that an implied trust relation arose between Margarita and Roberto, we find
that petitioner before the trial court, had actually adduced evidence to prove the
intention of Margarita to transfer to Roberto only the legal title to the properties in
question, with attendant expectation that Roberto would return the same to her on
accomplishment of that specific purpose for which the transaction was entered into.
The evidence of course is not documentary, but rather testimonial.
PAROLE EVIDENCE
Allied Banking v. Cheng Yong
G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005
Justice Garcia
Doctrine:
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties
and evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a
document is inadmissible. Simply put, when the parties have reduced their agreement
into writing, they are deemed to have intended such written agreement to be the sole
repository and memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and
contemporaneous agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that,
as between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive
evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or
modify the same is not admissible.
Facts:
1. Philippine Pacific Fishing Company, Inc. (Philippine Pacific), through its then Vice-
Chairman of the Board and concurrent President Marilyn Javier, obtained from Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), a packing credit accommodation amounting to One
2
Million Seven Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P1,752,000.00). To secure the
obligation, Marilyn Javier and the spouses Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw (spouses Cheng,
for short), executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety bearing date 27
March 1981.
2. Philippine Pacific, due to business reverses and alleged misuse of corporate funds by its
operating officers, defaulted in the payment of said obligation. An intra-corporate dispute
among its stockholders followed, prompting the filing against Philippine Pacific of a
petition for receivership before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
3. Thereafter, the corporation was reorganized, following which the spouses Cheng Yong
and Lilia Gaw were elected as its president and treasurer, respectively. The spouses
Cheng also hold similar positions in another company, the Glee Chemicals Phils., Inc.
(GCPI), which, incidentally, also had a credit line with Allied Bank. Meanwhile, the parties
agreed to create and constitute a management committee, instead of placing Philippine
Pacific under receivership. Hence, in an order dated 14 August 1981, the SEC formally
created a management committee whose functions, include, among others, the
following: to acquire, lease, sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber such assets with the
prior approval of the Commission.
4. Philippine Pacific executed in favor of Allied Bank a promissory note in the same amount
as the packing credit accommodation. Aside from affixing their signatures on the same
promissory note in their capacity as officers of Philippine Pacific, the spouses Cheng
also signed the note in their personal capacities and as co-makers thereof. However,
Philippine Pacific failed to pay according to the schedule of payments set out in the
promissory note. Later, Allied Bank filed with the sheriff of Navotas an application for
extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted on "Jean III".
5. Pursuant thereto, notices of extra-judicial sale were served on the concerned parties by
the Ex-Officio sheriff of Malabon while the vessel was moored at the Navotas Fishing
Port Complex and under a charter contract with Lig Marine Products, Inc. Spouses
Cheng, to prevent the auction sale of the vessel, filed with the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City an action for declaratory relief with prayer for injunctive remedies. Initially,
that court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the sale but later lifted it upon
dismissal of the main case for declaratory relief.
6. Eventually, in a decision dated 08 February 1989, the trial court declared both the
promissory note dated 12 August 1981 and the deed of chattel mortgage over the vessel
"Jean III" invalid and unenforceable.
7. During its presentation, the Cheng spouses introduced the promissory note as evidence.
Issue: Is the promissory note admissible in evidence?
Held: No, it is not.
Ratio:
Under the parole evidence rule, the terms of a contract are conclusive upon the parties and
evidence which shall vary a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document is
inadmissible. Simply put, when the parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are
deemed to have intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of
everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous agreements are
deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them and their successors-
in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal
agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are clear and
explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity depends. To be sure, Allied Bank
was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the management committee was ordered created
– hence, it would not be correct to presume that it had notice of the existence of the
management committee which, incidentally, was still to be created when the subject promissory
note was executed.
Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to form the management committee, it
was only on 14 August 1981 when the committee was actually created and its members
appointed. Clearly then, the subject promissory note was outside the realm of authority of the
management committee. Accordingly, the chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.
Therefore, the promissory note is not admissible in evidence.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
Leodegario Bayani vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 154947, August 11, 2004
Justice Callejo, Sr.
DOCTRINE:
Under section 36 of Rule 130, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is hearsay
if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that
of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed
to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily

follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that
although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse
party’s counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value, unless the proponent can
show that the evidence falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule
In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant

statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish
the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the
truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant.
2
Facts:
The petitioner-accused Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22. It is alleged that the check subject of the case was payable to Cash in the
amount of P10,000.00; and that said check was made to apply to the account of the accused,
Leodegario Bayani whose name appears therein in bold print at the upper portion of the check.
The check was presented to complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, for encashment by
Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check was deposited with the bank, it was
returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, she sought payment of the value of
the check. On the part of the accused, he flatly denied having talked with or otherwise met
Evangelista regarding the latter's claim of payment of the value of the check.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, sentencing him to suffer one
(1) year imprisonment and a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and ordering him to pay the complainant damages and
other costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision; hence the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in refusing to acquit the petitioner-accused on the ground that the trial
court's finding of conviction is based on hearsay evidence.
Held:
No, the Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner’s conviction by the RTC.
Ratio:
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the
evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay.
The Court held that section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on
hearsay evidence, to wit:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.

- A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Under the above rule, any evidence — whether oral or documentary — is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some
other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by
the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached by Alicia
Rubia who told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the check exchanged for cash,
as he needed money badly. Obviously, Evangelista’s testimony is hearsay since she had no
personal knowledge of the fact that petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check
exchanged for cash, as she was not personally present when petitioner supposedly made this
request. What she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own
perception but from Rubia’s.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista’s testimony

even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that the trial
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been finally offered. Section 35 of the same
Rule provides that as regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is asked to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that “in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted.” Since no objection to the admissibility of
Evangelista’s testimony was timely made – from the time her testimony was offered and up to
the time her direct examination was conducted – then petitioner has effectively waived any
objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony excluded
for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily follow
that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that although hearsay evidence
may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value, unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exception to the hearsay evidence rule.
In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant

statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Independent of the truth or the
falsity of the statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant. When Evangelista said that
Rubia told her that it was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash,
Evangelista was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth
or veracity of Rubia’s statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court
to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such independently
relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute
a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact. Indeed,
independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista’s statement is relevant to the issues of
petitioner’s falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently, his culpability
of the offense charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
TOPIC: HEARSAY RULE
Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

2
Justice Bersamin
DOCTRINE:
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under
oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference,
and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness
stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
Facts:
The petitioner-accused Patula was charged with estafa in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Dumaguete City. It is alleged that the accused was a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of
Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City; that she collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from
several customers of the company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of
the sales and deliver the collection to the company; that she failed to deliver the said collection
to the said company but instead willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said company in the amount of P131,286.97.
The RTC rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion.
Insisting that the RTC’s judgment “grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while the charge
against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence
presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense
not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty,” and that said judgment likewise “blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules
on admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all
private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,” petitioner has directly appealed to
the Court via petition for review on certiorari
Issue:
W/N Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for
being hearsay
Held:
Yes, the Court held that Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected.
Ratio:
To establish estafa, the Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan,

and various documents consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of
her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each
customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and
(c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go (branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.) essentially

described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative.
On her part, Guivencan (Footlucker’s store auditor) conceded having no personal knowledge of
the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding
to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly,
her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the
reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence
of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The
denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay,
and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court,
a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of
personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say
about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the
facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight
of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
3
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-
examined. It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to
explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the
simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and
before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the
matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a
prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show
that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not
legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to
which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to
which the hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original
declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is
allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of
testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given
under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND REVERSES the decision convicting ANNA
LERIMA PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the
recovery of any amount still owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
TOPIC: HEARSAY RULE
Malayan Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Alberto
G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012

Justice Velasco, Jr.
Doctrine:
Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the
witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the
witness’ own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he
or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard
those matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what the witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. As
discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. CA, Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or
statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well
as oral statements.
Facts:
1. At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred

at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles:
(1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate number NYS 381; (2) an
Isuzu Tanker with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate
number PDL 297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732.
2. Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police
Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the
Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before the
vehicular incident. All 3 vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south
direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of
the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the
strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion
of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.
3. The Mitsubishi Galant being insured by the Malayan, it paid the damages
sustained amounting to PhP 700,000. Maintaining that it has been subrogated to
the rights and interests of the assured, Malayan Insurance sent several demand
letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes
(Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo
Truck. When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was
constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence.
4. In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the
vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the
Nissan Bus driver. Respondents controverted the results of the Police Report,
asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus
driver. The RTC ruled in favour of Malayan. However, the CA reversed this
decision stating that hat the police report, which has been made part of the
records of the trial court, was not properly identified by the police officer who
conducted the on-the-spot investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that
an appellate court, as a reviewing body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the
genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much less accord it
evidentiary value.
3
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in refusing the admissibility of the police report because
the same did not testify in court.
RATIO: Yes
HELD:
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police
investigator who prepared the police report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially
since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its presentation in
evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the
investigating police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the
witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness’
own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely
learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. As discussed in D.M. Consunji, Inc. v.
CA, Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among which
are entries in official records. In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites
for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in official records,
thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or
by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the
public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or her stated, which
must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally or through official
information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long
as the above requisites could be adequately proved. Here, there is no dispute that SPO1
Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator, prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of
his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking. Respondents failed to
make a timely objection to the police report’s presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to
have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
TOPIC: HEARSAY RULE
People of the Philippines vs. Omictin

G.R. No. 188130, July 26, 2010
Justice Velasco, Jr.
FACTS:
a. Primo Arvin Guevarra, one of the private complainants, arrived home sometime
in September 2003 after his employment contract in Libya expired. In January
2004, he contacted a college classmate who previously informed him that she
knew of a recruiter for overseas employment. Roque thus set up a meeting
between him and the recruiter, who turned out to be accused-appellant Omictin.
b. Omictin met Guevarra along with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Dotimas. In that
meeting, the three agreed to pay Omictin PhP 40,000 each for their deployment
in Londonas caregivers. All three each gave Omictin, there and then, PhP
10,000 as initial payment. Omictin assured them that they would leave
for London within 60 to 90 days. However, none of them were deployed to
London. Other complainants also similarly recounted their experiences with
Omictin, with her promising jobs abroad in exchange for a certain fee.
c. All private complainants filed complaints against Omictin with the NBI for Illegal
Recruitment and Estafa. Before Joffrey Dela Merced, the Supervising Agent of
the Bureau’s Counter-Intelligence Division, Mago related that, the previous day,
he was able to contact Omictin, who required him to pay an additional PhP
60,000 for his deployment abroad. The designated place for the payment was
McDonald’s EDSA. Thus, the NBI prepared an entrapment operation to arrest
Omictin and provided Mago with PhP 60,000 marked money. On March 9, 2004,
the entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked money,
Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents.
d. As a result, separate informations were filed before the Quezon City RTC
charging Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. The RTC
ruled a decision sentencing Omictin, hence, she appealed to the CA. At the CA,
she alleged that Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but
Elisa Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of Omictin in behalf of
Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not
presented by the prosecution, Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated and
should be considered as hearsay.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimony of Ambrosio should be considered as self-serving

evidence.
2. Whether or not Guevarra’s testimony is hearsay.
HELD:
1. No
2. No
RATIO:
3
The testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. The phrase

“self-serving evidence” is a concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals clarified what self-serving evidence is and what it is not, thus:
The common objection known as “self-serving” is not correct because

almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is “hearsay”
(Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving

statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those
made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a
party’s testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not

given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in
court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for
cross-examination.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent People v. Villarama, where the Court
ruled, “x x x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his
favor. It does not include the testimony he gives as a witness in court.” Assayed against the
foregoing standards, Ambrosio’s testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.
We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of

Guevarra and Ambrosio are unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and
self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day for Omictin, since she admitted,
during trial, the substance of their testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:
Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the
processing of their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?

A P16,000.00
Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by
Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000. Hence, the court
considered the evidence, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, and denied Omictin’s
petition.
WEIGHT/SUFFICIENCY EVIDENCE
People of the Philippines vs. Paterno Lasanas

G.R. No. 183829, September 6, 2010
Justice Carpio-Morales
Doctrine: The weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and
quality of the testimony.
Facts:
Version of the Prosecution
On August 28, 1994, at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while the then 14 year old AAA was fixing
clothes inside the room at the second floor of their house at Barangay Mirab, Upi, Maguindanao,
her then 39 year old uncle (first cousin of her mother-herein appellant) arrived and entered the
room, grabbed her by the shoulders and pulled her down. As AAA lay sprawled on the floor,
appellant removed her underwear, undressed himself, went on top of her and forced his penis
into her vagina amidst her loud cries for help.
AAA’s pleas were heard by her then 17 year old brother BBB who went to the room, grabbed
and held appellant who, however, told him "Ipus ka lang hindi ka magsuguid sang guinikanan
mo."
AAA was physically examined by one Dr. Loribel Ann Sevilla (Dr. Sevilla) at the Cotabato
Regional Hospital. The examination yielded findings of fresh complete hymenal laceration at 3
o’clock and 9 o’clock positions.
Version of the Defense
Denying the accusation, appellant proffered alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he
was at his house, which is about 100 meters away from AAA’s, preparing dinner which he and
his family partook at 5:00 p.m. His wife Editha Lasanas corroborated his claim as did his first
cousin Heidi Libresa.
Appellant ventured that the accusation was propelled by a petty quarrel that he had with AAA’s
mother early that month arising from his refusal to haul corn for her, during which quarrel AAA’s
mother "st[umbled] down and collapsed."
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape.
C.A.: Affirmed
Appellant brands AAA’s version as not only implausible but contrary to human experience. He
cites AAA’s claim that her brother heard her cries for help and went to her rescue while she was
being raped, yet the prosecution never called him to testify.
Appellant goes on to argue that the medical certificate showing hymenal lacerations in AAA
cannot strengthen her claim as Dr. Sevilla who examined her was not presented in court.
3
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimony of
the private complainant?
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite the patent weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.
Held: No to both.
Ratio: The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as
witnesses. It need not present each and every witness as long as it meets the quantum of proof
necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
That AAA’s brother was not presented does not thus infirm the case for the prosecution for,
among other things, his testimony would have been merely corroborative.
It need not be underlined that the weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the
credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony. That explains why an accused in rape cases may
be convicted solely on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the victim where such
testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in AAA’s testimony.
Respecting appellant’s argument that the medical certificate cannot be used to corroborate
AAA’s testimony in light of Dr. Sevilla’s failure to take the witness stand, suffice it to state that
she was no longer available at the time of the trial. The hospital’s head of its Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department, Dr. Helen Peralta Yambao, however, identified the signature of Dr.
Sevilla on the certificate.
At all events, a medical examination is not indispensable to successful prosecution of rape.

AAA’s testimony on direct examination, standing alone, proves appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Notably, appellant did not cross examine her, sufficient time and opportunity
afforded him notwithstanding, which thus prompted the trial court to declare him to have waived
his right to cross-examine.
As for appellant’s alibi, it crumbles. On direct examination, he claimed to have been, at about
4:00 p.m. of August 28, 1994, the time AAA claimed to have been raped, in his house preparing
dinner which he and his family partook at 5:00 p.m. following which he slept at 6:00 p.m. On
cross examination, however, he declared that he did not sleep at 6:00 p.m. because the
policemen arrived and went with them.
That appellant’s alibi fails to persuade especially gains light from the fact that it was not
physically impossible for him to have been at the house of AAA. Recall that his house is only
about 100 meters away from AAA’s.
As for appellant’s insinuation that the charge against him was trumped-up as it could have been
the result of a grudge that AAA’s mother harbored against him, it too does not persuade. It is
unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an instrument of malice or revenge, especially if,
as it did here, subjects a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.
TOPIC: WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
People of the Philippines vs. Jessie Malate y Cañete
G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009
Justice Velasco Jr.
Doctrine:
The weight and sufficiency of evidence are determined by the credibility, nature, and
quality of the testimony.
Facts:
Version of the Prosecution
On June 18, 2004, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening in Meycauayan, Bulacan, BBB was on
her way home when she heard someone say, "Pssst! Pssst!" Ignoring the sounds, BBB
continued to walk. Suddenly, a man, who was later identified as Malate, appeared holding a
knife and blocked BBB’s way. Malate grabbed her shirt from behind and poked his knife on her
neck. She tried to struggle free and this caused Malate to cut his finger. She then tried to run
away, but Malate ran after her and again grabbed her by her shirt. She also tried to shout for
help but no help came.
Malate then dragged BBB to a ricefield, all the while pointing the knife at her. There, he made
her remove her clothes and his pants. Afterwards, he made her lie on the ground and kissed her
all over her body. Malate then placed himself on top of her and made her hold his penis and
guide it into her vagina. BBB, frightened, followed every word he said. After penetration of BBB’s
sex organ, Malate succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
Version of the Defense
Malate’s defense, on the other hand, was confined to his denial of the accusation and an alibi,
to wit:
Sometime around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of June 18, 2004 in CCC, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
Malate rode a pedicab to the residence of Edmond Glab, his former Officer-in-Charge (OIC), to
inquire about a job vacancy in the security agency where he was previously employed.
Upon reaching a narrow alley leading toward the house of his former OIC, Malate ordered the
pedicab to stop and he got off from the vehicle. Upon alighting, he immediately noticed three
armed men behind him. Suddenly, one of the men hit him with the butt of his firearm. He tried to
turn around to face them but the three ganged up on him and repeatedly hit him with their rifles.
As a result of the incessant beatings, he lost consciousness.
3
RTC: After trial, the RTC convicted Malate. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
C.A.: Affirmed
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the
prosecution witness’ materially inconsistent and unreliable testimony?
2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the
crime of rape despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt?
Held: No to both. C.A. affirmed.
Ratio:
Testimony of Victim is Credible
In his Brief, Malate argues that the trial court erred in giving full credence and reliance on the
narration of the private complainant who gave implausible statements and whose testimony was
full of inconsistencies, thus rendering the entire charge incredible. He asserts that BBB’s varied
versions of the incident demonstrate her lack of credibility.
In support of his position, Malate draws attention to the fact that during direct examination, BBB
testified that her path was allegedly blocked by him and, then and there, she was forcibly
assaulted. But during her cross-examination, she stated that Malate passed by her and then
suddenly grabbed her from behind. Likewise, he points out that BBB was positive of the rapist’s
identity because of a light emanating from the houses nearby; but again, during her cross-
examination, she stated that the light came from the brightness of the moon and a lamp post. To
him, the foregoing inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony should suffice to support
a judgment of acquittal.
Contrary to Malate’s contentions, this Court finds no cogent reason to doubt the veracity of
BBB’s testimony.
In cases involving the prosecution for forcible rape, the courts have consistently held that, as a
general rule, corroboration of the victim’s testimony is not a necessary condition to a conviction
for rape where the victim’s testimony is credible, or clear and convincing or sufficient to prove
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The weight and sufficiency of evidence
are determined by the credibility, nature, and quality of the testimony.
x x x Her positive identification of the accused as the very same man who had sexual
intercourse with her and with whom she was alone for about three (3) hours in that place
which was not pitch-dark as not to see totally his face, cannot taint her word with
unavoidable inaccuracy on the identity of accused as her real tormentor in those
agonizing hours. She was so certain of him as that man from the time she pointed him to the
police to the time she was asked to identify him at his trial. Strangers to each other, BBB would
not announce to all that herein accused Jessie was her rapist, if she was not sure. His wound
on his left middle finger, the scar it left he even showed while he was on the witness stand, is a
tell-tale sign that it was really he who BBB said was the man with the knife who cut himself
when she struggled to get away from his clutches as he threatened her with that knife. In fact, it
was because of that knife that she fearfully surrendered her body to him and did in submission
what he wanted her to do during all that time she was helplessly alone with him.
Evidently, the trial court had ascertained the truthfulness and credibility of BBB’s testimony and
ruled that it was sufficient to convict Malate.
Additionally, Malate was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of BBB. The fact that he
testified not knowing the complainant and that he first met her when he was brought to the
police station the day after the incident argues against the idea of BBB harboring ill will against
him.

Evidence Rulings

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Evidence Rulings

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EVIDENCE CASE UPDATES: JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO 1

TOPIC: SECONDARY EVIDENCE

Atienza vs. Board of Medicine

G.R. No. 177407, February 9, 2011

1. Whether or not the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence.

Held: No. Petition denied.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

TOPIC: SECONDARY EVIDENCE

Manila Mining Corporation vs. Miguel Tan

GR. No. 171702, February 12, 2009

Held: Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit.

TOPIC: SECONDARY EVIDENCE

GR. No. 146586, January 26, 2005

4. DECS presented 3 witnesses:

a. Ricardo Nicolas, a resident of Kaypombo: testified that as far as he knows, the

b. Vidal de Jesus, barangay councilman of Kaypombo: testified that the barangay

5. Respondents presented 2 witnesses:

1) Whether or not secondary evidence may be availed of in this instance.

1) In cases of donations, the best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an

TOPIC: SECONDARY EVIDENCE

3. NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence, consisting of Exhibits A to V. Bangpai and

a. NAPOCOR tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are

admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute electronic evidence

GR. No. 170491, April 4, 2007

8. NAPOCOR filed a formal offer of evidence, consisting of Exhibits A to V. Bangpai and

a. NAPOCOR tries to contend that the photocopies of documents offered by it are

GR. No. 185240, January 21, 2010

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

a. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of

c. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

Heirs of Pacres v. Heirs of Ygoña

GR. No. 174719, May 5, 2010

Leighton Contractors Philippines, Inc., v. CNP industries, Inc.

GR. No. 160972 March 9, 2010

4. Meanwhile, petitioner revised the fabrication drawings of several of the structure’s

5. Petitioner communicated the said revisions to respondent. Respondent estimated that

6. On July 28, 1997, petitioner and respondent signed a sub-contract providing:

(B) Subcontract works.

(c) Special Conditions of the Sub-Contract.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

14. CIAC ruled in favor of respondents.

Estate of Margarita Cabancungan v. Marilou Laigo

GR. No. 175073 August 15, 2011

1. Margarita Cabacungan (Margarita) owned three parcels of unregistered land in Paringao

1. Whether or not that the complaint is barred by laches and prescription

Allied Banking v. Cheng Yong

G.R. No. 151040 October 6, 2005

Issue: Is the promissory note admissible in evidence?

Held: No, it is not.

Leodegario Bayani vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 154947, August 11, 2004

Justice Callejo, Sr.

While Evangelista’s statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily

In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant

The petitioner-accused Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas

Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.

However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista’s testimony

In this case, Evangelista’s testimony may be considered as an independently relevant

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

TOPIC: HEARSAY RULE

Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012