163021-2008-Garcillano v. House of Representatives

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO , petitioner, vs . THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS , respondents.
[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI , petitioners,

vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR , respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE , petitioner-in-intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES ,
respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
NACHURA , J : p
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking
o cial of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured
unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed
the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello
Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President's instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
1 cCSDTI
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes", and set in
motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation
emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong
submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity
of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the
hearings inde nitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based
on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) led
with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338.
He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape
recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee
reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent
House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the
House proceedings. 5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the
"Garci tapes" abruptly stopped. AECacS
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Pan lo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse that Brought Darkness". In his
discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth
— the what's, when's, where's, who's and why's" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an
inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in
nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson's speech was referred
to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, who had previously led two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and
use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7
In the Senate's plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 4200 8 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On
August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech,
articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use,
possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities
in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,
retired justices of the Court of Appeals, led before this Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, 1 0 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. 1 1
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public
hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7, 1 2 17 1 3 and October 1, 1 4 2007.
Intervening as respondents, 1 5 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Pan lo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby
A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes led their Comment 1 6 on the petition on
September 25, 2007. aAIcEH
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 1 7

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of
the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 1 8
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and
179275. 1 9
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they
have different objectives — the rst is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in
the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.
The Court dismisses the rst petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second,
G.R. No. 179275.
I
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall rst resolve the issue
on the parties' standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 2 0 we explained that "'[l]egal standing' or locus standi
refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act . . .," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show
that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. 2 1
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions". 2 2 HTcDEa
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo 2 3 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings". 2 4 The fairly recent Chavez
v. Gonzales 2 5 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to
allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the
Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority,
in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with
the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and
the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them". 2 6
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justi es his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his
was publicly identi ed by the members of the respondent committees as one of the
voices in the recordings. 2 7 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees' actions and charges of electoral fraud. The
Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are
of the rm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide
the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid
of legislation. 2 8
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he
is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 2 9 CAaSHI
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of
the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process, 3 0
they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely
being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court's ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 3 1
we nd su cient petitioners Ranada's and Agcaoili's and intervenor Sagge's allegation
that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. 3 2 It should be noted that in
Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the
vindication of their own rights — as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens,
individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession —
which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts. 3 3
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners
and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all. 3 4
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes
the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge. cHATSI
II
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies. 3 5 By actual cases, we mean existing con icts appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
3 6 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief
can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. 3 7 It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things,
cannot be enforced. 3 8
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House
Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their
committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in
the House and heard by its members. 3 9 There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees. 4 0 Having been overtaken by these
events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After
all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done,
and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 4 1
III
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. 4 2 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 4 3 What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "
[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines." 4 4 EScaIT
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 4 5
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 4 6 we said:
Fourth , we nd merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure ". We quote the OSG's explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after
it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of
the Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by
the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules
as it may deem t. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm .
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces

this ruling with the following rationalization: CcSEIH
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing

legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom
are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of
twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
Senators to continue into the next Congress . The 1987 Constitution, like
the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to
do business". Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate
under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority
of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the
Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the
term of twelve Senators. 4 7
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution 4 8 (On the
Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to
issue a clari cation. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct
of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate
itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Un nished business at the end of the session shall be taken up
at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress , but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and
it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
un nished matters, not in the same status , but as if presented for the rst
time . The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status. HSCAIT
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of

the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is re ected in its Rules. The
Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate's main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136 . At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of o ce, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be
presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval. DCTSEA
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137 . These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the
new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended
or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules
simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide
for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In
view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules
for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that
the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted
the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite
that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to
the public at the Senate's internet web page. 4 9 HIESTA
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate's de ance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate
or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Justice Carpio's response to the same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or
in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not su cient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the O cial Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation", precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Ta ña da is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person's liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by
the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, 5 0
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of
valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. 5 1 In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. 5 2 It does not make the internet a medium for
publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject
of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate
has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can
do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure". ECaSIT
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the in rmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court nds it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in
G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of
the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any
inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and
Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., pls. see dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Azcuna, JJ., join the
dissent of Chief Justice Puno.
Corona, J., is on leave.
Reyes, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO , C.J., dissenting :
The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing between what is apparent and
what is real, what is central and what is peripheral, to get to the core of the issues that
will decide the controversy at bar. SCcHIE
The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No 17925 as narrated in
the ponencia are undisputed. Hence, I will go direct to the issues.
First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These were delineated in the Oral Argument
held on October 2, 2007 as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been
published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes" violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. 1
As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on the rst issue, I shall limit my
discussion to the second and third issues. CDHSac
Publication of Senate Rules Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Let me hark back to the ruling of the Court on the publication of the "Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation" (Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries) of the Senate in its March 25, 2008 Decision 2 (March 25 Neri Decision )
and September 4, 2008 Resolution 3 (September 4 Neri Resolution ). I respectfully
submit that the ponencia is not in accord with the ruling of the Court in these Neri cases
(Neri Ruling ). The proper application of the Neri Ruling to the case at bar will yield the
conclusion that the subject Senate investigation should be allowed to proceed even if
the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries were not published in the 14th Congress
prior to the subject investigation. Still, I maintain my dissent to the Neri Ruling and
arrive at this same conclusion through a different track.
In the March 25 Neri Decision , the Court ruled, viz.:
Fourth, we nd merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
procedure ". We quote the OSG's explanation: AECDHS
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every
Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. 4
Subsequently, the Court clari ed the above ruling in the September 4 Neri
Resolution . I quote the ruling at length, viz.:
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent
Committees' fourth argument. Respondent Committees argue that the Senate
does not have to publish its Rules because the same was published in 1995 and
in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not
required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended. SaTAED
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to

issue a clari cation. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct
of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate
itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and
it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
un nished matters, not in the same status , but as if presented for the rst
time . The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts
and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending
matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but
will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same
status. TCIEcH

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of o ce,
the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee
for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be

presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval. (emphasis supplied) DSHTaC
RULE LII
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
(emphasis supplied)
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended
or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules
simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation." (Section 24, Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation) The latter does not explicitly provide
for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In
view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot
be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the
next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules
for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed
that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the
subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of
the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective. 5 (emphasis supplied)
The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling in the September 4 Neri Resolution
in holding, viz.:
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "
[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative,
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the O cial Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."EDISTc
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they rst
opened their session.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate
has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because
it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure".
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of the fact,
the recent publication does not cure the in rmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. In so far as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not
be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no
published rules govern it, in clear contravention of the Constitution . 6
(emphasis supplied) cHTCaI
While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support its conclusion that the
subject investigation cannot be conducted without published rules, I submit that it fails
to adhere to the Neri Ruling , as the latter emphasizes that "not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those
that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null
and void , considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective".
It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court struck down
not the entire proceedings of the Senate investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal
for want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries , but only the
Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the
Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention (January 30 Contempt
Order) as stated in the dispositive portion of the Decision. 7 A faithful adherence of the
case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion that the "Garci tapes"
investigation may be conducted even without the published Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings that result in the
violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered null and void. The ponencia
did not, however, show which orders or proceedings resulted in this violation and,
instead, made a blanket prohibition of the conduct of the "Garci tapes" investigation for
want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision and the
September 4 Neri Resolution , it is my considered view that the subject "Garci tapes"
investigation is not constitutionally in rm for being conducted without the publication
of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to said
investigation. In addition to the points raised in my two Dissents, I respectfully submit
that the following inconsistencies and erroneous assumptions in the March 25 Neri
Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution merit a review of the Neri Ruling and a
consequent conclusion that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans
amendment since its publication in two newspapers of general circulation on August
24, 1995, need not be published by the Senate of every Congress. HAICcD
1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries

but invalidity of the entire Rules
In the March 25 Neri Decision , the Court recognized the validity and effectivity
of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, even without publication in the 14th
Congress, by citing Section 18 of said rules and holding that the January 30 Contempt
Order against therein petitioner Romulo Neri was invalid for failing to comply with the
majority voting requirement under Section 18. In the same breath, however, the Court
held that the subject investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal was procedurally in rm for
being conducted without valid Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, as these were
not published in the 14th Congress. The inconsistency is apparent in the Court's
explanation of the third and the fourth of the ve reasons for holding that the therein
respondent Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
January 30 Contempt Order, viz.:
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30,
2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. Section 18 of the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides
that :
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish
for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the
Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of its members."
cTIESD
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the

Committee . Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of
doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, we nd merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
procedure ". We quote the OSG's explanation: DISHEA
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every
Senate, are therefore, procedurally in rm . 8 (emphasis supplied)
(footnote omitted)
In the September 4 Neri Resolution , the Court reiterated its recognition of the
validity and effectivity of Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, viz.:
In the present case, the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review is
warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt
on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rules provides
that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish
for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the
Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt order because during the deliberation of the three (3)
respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This number
could hardly ful ll the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee
on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations which has a
membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National
Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With
respect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a
membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were present. These
facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators
Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the
issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt
order. 9 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted) HCSEcI
But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries and held that orders issued and proceedings conducted pursuant to said
rules, which result in the violation of rights of witnesses were null and void, viz.:
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put the public on notice.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null
and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective. 1 0 AHSaTI
In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri
Resolution , the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate investigation proceedings
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, which were
not published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled on the issue of executive
privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down only the January 30 Contempt
Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to comply with Section 18 of the Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries, while at the same time holding these rules as
constitutionally infirm for want of publication.
Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.
2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an institution and the discontinuing
nature of its business vis-a-vis the continuing nature of the Rules of the
Senate
In attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency in the March 25 Neri
Decision , the Court, in its September 4 Neri Resolution , saw t to "issue a
clari cation . . . (o)n the nature of the Senate as a 'continuing body'" and dichotomized
this nature into the "continuity of the Senate as an institution" and the "opposite nature
of the conduct of its business". This approach, however, spawned its own
inconsistencies. DHcESI
In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries could not be given continuing effect from one Congress to the next unless
expressly so provided in said rules, the Court interpreted Section 136 on the
"un nished business" in conjunction with Section 137 on the "date of taking effect" of
the Rules of the Senate, viz.:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Congress as if presented for the first time.
RULE LII
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
(emphasis supplied) ACIDSc

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main
rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they
are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent
from the Rules . The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued
effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of
the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into
the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule
on unfinished business. 1 1 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)
There is no quarrel — and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution in
fact acknowledges — that the Rules of the Senate (Senate Rules) provide in Section 136
that all un nished business or pending matters and proceedings of the Senate
terminate with the expiration of a Congress. This provision, in conjunction with Section
137, does not, however, lend support to the Court's ruling that absent a provision in the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries explicitly stating the "continued effectivity of
such rules until they are amended or repealed", it "cannot be presumed that the Rules
(on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress" for the following
reasons: AIDSTE
First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution , the Court interpreted "pending

matters" in Section 136 of the Senate Rules to include the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries that "may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for
the first time". This posture, however, comes also with the interpretation that the Senate
may choose not to take up the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries , thereby
leaving it without rules to conduct legislative inquiries as the effectivity of the rules had
terminated with the previous Congress. This is an absurd interpretation considering
that the Senate is fully aware that Article VI, Section 21 requires legislative
investigations to be conducted in accordance with duly published Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries.
T h e September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that the Senate Rules have
continuing effect from one Congress to the next, because it provides in Section 137
that the Senate Rules "shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in
force until they are amended or repealed". The Senate Rules unmistakably state that
their effectivity can be interrupted only by amendment or repeal as provided in Section
137 and not by termination of one Congress as provided in Section 136. The Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries have the same character as the Senate Rules. Both are
not "pending matters and proceedings" that terminate with the expiration of
the Congress. Pending matters and proceedings include investigations that have not
been terminated or bills that have not completed the legislative process in the Senate
of one Congress. ADCEcI
The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the
next, which the Court acknowledged in its September 4 Neri Resolution,
evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuing body governed by its
continuing Senate Rules . If the Senate were not a continuing body, there would be no
reason for the Senate Rules to likewise have a continuing effect. In contradistinction,
the effectivity of the Rules of Proceedings of the House of Representatives (House
Rules) — which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the terms of all congressmen
end at the same time — terminates upon the expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1,
Section 1 of the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on November 20, 2007 re ects
the practice of the House of Representatives of adopting rules of proceedings on its
first meeting and organization upon the opening of a succeeding Congress, viz.:
RULE I
Convening and Organizing the House
xxx xxx xxx
After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body shall proceed
to the adoption of the rules of the immediately preceding Congress to
govern its proceedings until the approval and adoption of the rules of the
current Congress. (emphasis supplied)
On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the 14th Congress, pending
the adoption of its own House Rules, adopted the House Rules of the 13th Congress as
its provisional rules. 1 2 The House of Representatives of each Congress adopts its own
rules. 1 3 HTcDEa
Second, the above-quoted Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules, adopted
under the regime of the 1987 Constitution, do not depart from the provisions of the
Senate Rules adopted under the 1935 Constitution, viz.:
Chapter XLVI
Unfinished Business in the Senate
Sec. 108. Un nished business at the end of one session shall not be
affected by the closing of same, but shall be taken up again at the next session
in the same status in which it was.
Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph, matters
pending at the expiration of one Congress shall no longer be acted on.
Chapter LIII
Sec. 122. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed. 1 4
Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I have consistently
maintained in my Dissents), it was well-settled that the Senate was a continuing body
as held in Arnault v. Nazareno , citing the U.S. case McGrain v. Daugherty . 1 5 The
1935 Constitution provided that two-thirds, or a majority of the Senate, continued into
the next Congress. 1 6 SIDTCa
Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a continuing body under the
1987 Constitution — as less than a majority continue into the Senate of the succeeding
Congress 1 7 — the termination of the un nished business of the Senate at the
expiration of a Congress and the effectivity of the Senate Rules until amended or
repealed as provided in Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules under the 1987
Constitution, do not lend support to a departure from the Arnault ruling that the Senate
is a continuing body. Under both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions, the Senate Rules
show that a continuing Senate's un nished business terminates at the expiration of one
Congress, and its rules remain in effect from one Congress to the next.
As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution , the
Philippine Senate is patterned after the U.S. Senate, which is a continuing body as ruled
by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain . The continuing nature of the U.S. Senate is also
reflected in the Standing Rules of the Senate under Rule V (2), viz.:
Rule V
SUSPENSION AND AMENDMENT OF THE RULES
xxx xxx xxx
2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the next
Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules. 1 8
(emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the 1935 and the 1987
Constitutions and the Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, after which the Philippine
Senate was patterned, reflect the nature of the Senate as a continuing body . That
the Senate is a continuing body proceeds from its nature as created by the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution and adopted by the 1935 and the 1987 Philippine Constitutions.
The Senate Rules are not the bases for the continuing nature of the Senate, but they
embody and reflect this nature.
Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuing body as re ected in the
continuing effect of the Senate Rules from one Congress to the next is not consistent
with the holding of the ponencia that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries must
explicitly provide for this continuing effectivity if such were the intent of the Senate, viz.:
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not
explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended
or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate
rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries)
would continue into the next Congress. 1 9 (emphasis supplied) DHcTaE
I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution that

the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries on August 24, 1995 has
satis ed the requirement under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that
inquiries in aid of legislation be conducted in accordance with the Senate's "duly
published rules of procedure." Interpreting Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which states that "(l)aws shall take effect after fteen days following completion of
their publication in the O cial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .," the Court
ruled in the landmark Tañada v. Tuvera , 2 0 viz.:
". . . all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is xed by the
legislature. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation." 2 1
Publication must be made in the O cial Gazette 22 or a newspaper of general
circulation. 2 3
As a general rule, one-time publication su ces to satisfy the due process
requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern it and affect its rights. It is
not uncommon for laws and rules to provide that they shall take effect upon a certain
date following publication in a newspaper of general circulation without having to state
that they "shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed" for them to have
continuing effect. These laws and rules are published only once, and yet they continue
to be in force. The Court itself employs this language in its rules as shown in the
recently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
respectively, viz.:
Section 25. Effectivity . — This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
Section 27. Effectivity . — This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007
following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.
HScaCT
The exception to the general rule that one-time publication su ces for a law or
rule to have continuing effect is when there are circumstances or factors that interrupt
this continuity. An example is the discontinuation of the existence of the House of
Representatives as a legislative body, which terminates the effectivity of its published
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and requires the publication of these rules in the
succeeding Congress for them to take effect. As discussed above and in my Dissents
to the March 25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution , the Senate,
unlike the House of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus, contrary to the holding
of the ponencia, the Senate's Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment,
need not be published by the Senate of every Congress and need not also state that
they shall "remain in force until they are amended or repealed" for them to be effective
from one Congress to the next. Quite the opposite of the ponencia's ruling, in the
absence of language stating that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries shall not
continue in effect from one Congress to the next, these rules shall have continuing
effect.
In sum, the above discussion shows that the March 25 Neri Decision and
September 4 Neri Resolution themselves provide bases for concluding that the
Senate is a continuing body and that one-time publication of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, su ces to satisfy the publication requirement
under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. I respectfully submit that the
Court ought to so conclude in order to uphold internal consistency in its ruling with
respect to the constitutional requirement of publication of the Senate's Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries. In line with my position in my Dissents to the Neri
Ruling , I submit that the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
the 14th Congress prior to the conduct of the subject "Garci tapes" investigation is not
a requirement for conducting such investigation. AIDTHC
Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of publication

of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, let us now proceed to the third issue.
The "Garci tapes" in relation to Article III,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 4200
Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of "whether the inquiry, which is
centered on the so-called 'Garci tapes' violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution
and/or Republic Act No. 4200" by stating what the disposition of the case at bar is not
about and proceed forthwith to what the disposition of this case is about . To avoid
clutter, let us excise the fat to get to the lean meat of the controversy before the Court.
While the 1987 Constitution affords paramount importance to the policy of
transparency, public accountability, and informed participation of the citizenry in a
democracy, the case at bar is not about balancing between the right to privacy of
communication under Article III, Section 3 2 4 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
information under Article III, Section 7 2 5 of the charter. The petitioners in this case
are not suing as citizens demanding information from the government. aHTCIc
While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable role of

legislative investigations in crafting sound law and also gives prime recognition to the
right to privacy of communication, the case at bar is not about balancing an
asserted right to privacy of communication against the Senate's exercise of
its power of legislative investigation . This case does not involve a situation in
which a witness in a legislative inquiry invokes the right to privacy of communication,
but the Senate compels him, under pain of contempt, to disclose the communication on
account of an overriding public interest.
The bone of contention in the case at bar is whether the Senate can use,
in its legislative investigation, in admissible evidence of a surreptitiously and
illegally recorded private communication.
The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping
Law enacted in 1965. Introduced by Senator Lorenzo Tañada, the explanatory note of
the bill provides the background and rationale for the law, viz.:
The privacy of communication and correspondence is among the
fundamental rights of an individual secured and guaranteed by our
Constitution. Thus, section 1(5) of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides
that, "The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require
otherwise." aEHAIS
xxx xxx xxx

At present, the laws penalizing the violation of the privacy of
communication are inadequate to cope with modern developments. As we are
all aware of, technology today has so far advanced, and will inexorably continue
to advance, that there is now an ever-growing array of devices or arrangements
for eavesdropping . . . There could, indeed, be no doubt that these modern
devices or arrangements, if availed of by any or o cers of the government, to
spy on another, could be the most obnoxious instruments of oppression or
arbitrary power. Sooner or later we will have to deal with the danger that these
increasingly sensitive electronic ears, which are as fantastic as they are
alarming, may annihilate completely the privacy of communication. An
additional and potent deterrent is obviously called for if we are to guard against
what might well be subversive of one of our cherished personal freedoms which
makes life worth living.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among others on
our high regard for the individual's rights and freedoms, the proposed measure
will be but in accord with the principles of law and government enshrined in the
Bill of Rights of our Constitution which are designed to protect the feelings
and sensibilities of every individual as a human being against the
incursions of unwelcome intruders.
Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping or unwelcome
intrusions into private communications . Section 1 of the law provides that these
acts are unlawful: SECIcT
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized

by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word , to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess
any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law;
or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in
the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes
such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disquali cation from public o ce if the offender
be a public o cial at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the
offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings. (emphases
supplied)
A private communication is characterized as such based not on the content of
the communication, but on the context that it was said in private and not for
public consumption . That the content or nature of the communication is immaterial
was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals , 2 6 viz.:
. . . the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be speci cally alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
su ce to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in
the said law,) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed." (emphasis supplied)(footnote omitted) HIAESC
The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince the meaning of private, as
opposed to public, communication , viz.:
Senator DIOKNO.
Do I Understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator TAÑADA.
Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the

communication between one person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
Senator DIOKNO.
The wording of the law is "communication or spoken word."
Senator TAÑADA.
Yes.
Senator DIOKNO.
The term "spoken word" would automatically include speeches, including, Mr.
Senator, what we are doing here this morning. HcACTE
Senator TAÑADA.
As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this bill is to prevent the tape recording
or interception of a communication between one person and an another —
not between a speaker and a public. Because precisely, the speaker speaks
so that the public may know what he has in mind, what he wants to
communicate to the people, and there should be no objection to tape
recording that speech. . . . 2 7 (emphases supplied)
R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is allowed by
written order of the court under Section 3, viz.:
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it
unlawful or punishable for any peace o cer, who is authorized by a written
order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful
in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason,
espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny
in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as de ned by the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage
and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written
order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or a rmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to
sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or
acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed;
(2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence. (emphasis supplied) CIaHDc
To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makes illegally
wiretapped communications inadmissible in any proceeding, viz.:
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation . (emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the wiretapping of the
communication recorded in the "Garci tapes" may be held legal only if it was recorded
with consent of the parties to the conversation or upon written court order. As the
wiretapping was done in the course of duty by the witness, Technical Sergeant Vidal
Doble, he may be presumed to have been acting regularly in the performance of his
o cial duties. 2 8 Doble testi ed that he presumed that the order of his superior to him
to conduct a wiretap was legal, viz.:
Sen. Cayetano (P). . . Ngayon itong — noong sinabi sa iyo ito, anong
pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang normal lang sa iyo na, "Okay, bagong
assignment", may naisip ka bang baka violation ito ng isang batas? May naisip
ka bang ganon?
Mr. Ooble. Ang nasa isip po kasi naming noon since na galing sa military
hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a legal order, Your Honor. 2 9
The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to proceed to establish the
circumstances surrounding the wiretapping and determine whether or not the wiretap
was legally done with the consent of the parties or lawful court order. AHDcCT
Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci tapes"

were illegally wiretapped, the question that comes to the fore is whether the
"communication or spoken word (in the tapes), their existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained" may be used in the subject Senate investigations.
I n Ramirez , in which the Court found that petitioner Ramirez violated R.A. No.
4200 for secretly recording her private conversation with therein respondent Garcia, the
Court published in its decision the transcript of the illegally wiretapped conversation as
part of the narration of the facts of the case. A mechanical and literal reading of
Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 would yield the absurd conclusion that the Court
violated these provisions for "communicat(ing) the contents thereof (the illegally
wiretapped conversation), either verbally or in writing" and using the inadmissible
transcription in its judicial proceedings. It is clear to the eye that this was not the intent
of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 4200. "Legislative intent is determined principally
from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
(Paci c Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685, [1971]) or absurd or
would lead to an injustice. (12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]). 3 0
(emphasis supplied) There is thus a need to interpret Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200.
CITcSH
Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an exception to the

prohibition on the "use of such record (of wiretapped conversation) or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3. . ." The offenses under Section 3 which allows wiretapping upon written order
of the court are as follows: "treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of
war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to
sedition, kidnapping as de ned by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security."
The exception under Section 1 in t relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 4200 does not
include the use of illegally wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecuting
violations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez . Not reading this
exception into the law would impede the prosecution of the acts it prohibits and
contradict the very purpose for adopting the law as clearly stated in its title, "An Act to
Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for Other Purposes." Well-settled is the rule in statutory
construction that "where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. 3 1 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be given a
sensible construction, so as to give effect to its rationale and intent and thus avoid an
unjust or absurd interpretation. The ineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegally
wiretapped communication must be allowed in a prosecution under R.A. 4200 precisely
to deter the commission of illegal wiretapping.
Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence should be an exception to
inadmissible evidence under Section 4 of the law. Judges and prosecutors who
possess and use illegally wiretapped communications in prosecutions for violations of
R.A. No. 4200 are thus not liable for violating this law in the same manner that, by way
of exception, they are not liable for illegal possession of rearms where the rearm is
presented in evidence in a case involving the prosecution of a violation of R.A. No. 8294.
3 2 This is true despite the absence of such an exception to illegal possession, in
contradistinction to the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which explicitly
provides the following exception to infringement of copyright under Section 184 (l)(k):
"Any use made of a work for the purpose of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of
professional advice by a legal practitioner."TCacIE
For similar reasons, another exception that ought to be read into Sections 1 and
4 of R.A. No 4200 is the use and admissibility of illegally wiretapped communication in
legislative investigations whose particular purpose is precisely to craft or
improve laws that will address the evil of illegal wiretapping. Without this exception, the
absurd result would be that legislators cannot at all investigate illegal wiretaps as they
happen on the ground and plug loopholes in the law, because Section 4 of R.A. No.
4200 provides that even the fact of existence of an illegally wiretapped communication
is inadmissible in evidence. To be sure, this could not have been the intent of the law.
Lest the herein recognized exceptions be misconstrued and open the oodgates
to violations of R.A. No. 4200, it must be emphasized that as a general rule, illegally
wiretapped material is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, including
legislative investigations, in accordance with R.A. No. 4200. 3 3 As a very narrow
exception, however, the wiretapped material may be used and is admitted in a judicial
proceeding for prosecution of violations of R.A. No. 4200 and, akin to this, in a
legislative investigation in aid of legislation whose purpose is precisely to address the
problem of illegal wiretap. IASEca
In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate investigation as shown by the
transcripts of its hearings 3 4 has been the illegal wiretapping of several personalities
including the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Philippines, the possible
involvement of telecommunication providers in the illegal wiretap, the use of scarce
intelligence resources for wiretapping in connection with the conduct of the 2004
Presidential elections, and electoral fraud. The purpose of the investigation may also be
gleaned from two bills previously led in relation thereto by the Chairperson of the
National Defense and Security Committee, seeking to (1) control and regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment; and (2) prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from performing electoral duties. 3 5
Prescinding from the very narrow contours of the exception in using illegally
wiretapped communications, the Senate may proceed with the use of the "Garci tapes"
in a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation whose purpose is to craft or improve
legislation on wiretapping. On the other hand, the "Garci tapes" are not admissible in
evidence in legislative investigations for a different purpose such as the punishment of
electoral fraud. While electoral fraud is a serious anomaly that erodes the foundation of
democracy and should not go unpunished, evidence obtained not through illegal
wiretap should be presented in proceedings investigating this matter. Resort to illegal
wiretapping to catch perpetrators of electoral fraud will only further erode our
democracy. As Senator Tañada exhorted in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 9,
which became the Anti-Wiretapping Law: CAHTIS
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among

others on our high regard for the individual's rights and freedoms , the
proposed measure will be but in accord with the principles of law and
government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which are
designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of every individual
as a human being against the incursions of unwelcome intruders.
In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation for the purpose of crafting
or improving laws on wiretapping, the legislature ought to abide by the constitutional
command under Article VI, Section 21 that in conducting such inquiries, "(t)he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." The legislature
should thus use mechanisms and procedures available to it, such as executive
sessions, in avoiding any further and unnecessary incursion into the right to privacy of
communication. THaAEC
With respect to the question of whether the use of the "Garci tapes" violates
Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights, the above disquisition on R.A. No. 4200
su ciently addresses this issue. Under this constitutional provision, the privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except (1) upon lawful order of
the court, or (2) when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
There is ostensibly no lawful order of the court under the rst exception, and any
argument anchored on the second exception will lead to R.A. No. 4200, being the only
Philippine law on wiretapping.
Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that the petition is moot and
academic. 3 6 The petition prays that the Court issue a Resolution:
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House of
Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the sound recording of the
illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their Report for the inquiries
conducted relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of said recordings for
any other purpose. TAcSaC

b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the
Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the proceedings any and all
references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to desist from
further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in any of its proceedings. 3 7
The rst prayer is moot and academic, as the "Garci tapes" were already played in the
session oor of the House of Representatives on July 5, 2005. 3 8 The second prayer is
also moot and academic, as the subject records of proceedings and reports belong to
the House of Representatives of the Thirteenth Congress, which has already been
terminated. The House of Representatives not being a continuous body, the current
House of Representatives of the Fourteenth Congress is different from the House of
Representatives of the Thirteenth Congress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano ought to rst
seekk recourse to the current House of Representatives with respect to his second
prayer.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No. 179275.
REYES, R.T. , J., concurring and dissenting :
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the petition in G.R. No. 170338
but dissent insofar as it grants the petition in G.R. No. 179275.
I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should be dismissed for being moot.
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano, via a petition for prohibition
and injunction, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, implores the Court to issue a Resolution as follows: TaHDAS
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House of
Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security, Information Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the sound recording of the
illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their Report for the inquiries
relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of said recordings for any other
purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the
Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the proceedings any and all
references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to desist from
further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in any of its proceedings. 1
The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner Garcillano because it has been
mooted. It is of public knowledge, a t subject of judicial notice, 2 that the "Hello Garci"
tapes were already played in the House of Representatives and heard by its members. 3
Then, separate committee reports on the "Hello Garci" tapes were submitted to then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. 4
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of an actual
controversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical, conjectural or
anticipatory questions despite their vast judicial power. Otherwise, a decision rendered
would amount to nothing but an advisory opinion, which would not augur well with the
function of courts as arbiters of controversies. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v.
Sec. Ramos, 5 the Court held: TSIDaH
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that

is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not
extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated
to actualities. 6
While it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from resolving issues
that are otherwise moot, 7 no compelling circumstance is present here that would
warrant the exercise of judicial review.
Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the execution of an act
which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. 8 The o ce of prohibition is to arrest proceedings rather than to undo
them. 9 A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli. 1 0
II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 should likewise be dismissed
because the Senate need not republish its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been
published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
Corollarily:

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement?
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes"
violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. 1 1
Anent the rst issue, I agree with the ponencia and the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Reynato Puno that petitioners Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili, plus intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, possess the requisite locus standi to
bring the suit.
Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest
injustice. Rules of procedure are tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the
attainment of justice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
eschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical
application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public
interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. 1 2 Time and again, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 1 3 CSEHIa
There is no question that the issues raised by petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili
and intervenor Sagge are of paramount importance. Thus, any procedural barrier to
their suit should be put aside.
Now to the second issue — the meat of the second petition.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure . The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation on the "Hello Garci" tapes is
in rm because the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
had not been duly published at the time of the legislative inquiry in question.
I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my separate opinion on the motion for
reconsideration in Senate v. Ermita, 1 4 thus:
True it is that, as the Constitution mandates, the Senate may only
conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pursuant to its duly published
rules of procedure. Without publication, the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is ineffective. Thus, unless and until
said publication is done, the Senate cannot enforce its own rules of procedure,
including its power to cite a witness in contempt under Section 18.
But the Court can take judicial notice that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was published on August 20 and 21,
1992 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star during the 9th Congress.
The Senate again published its said rules on December 1, 2006 in the
Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the 13th Congress. That the
Senate published its rules of procedure twice more than complied with the
Constitutional requirement. aCHDST
I submit that the Senate remains a continuing body under the 1987
Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing body is premised on the staggered
terms of its members, the idea being to ensure stability of governmental
policies. This is evident from the deliberations of the framers of the
Constitution, thus:
"MR. RODRIGO. . . .
I would like to state that in the United States Federal Congress, the term of the
members of the Lower House is only two years. We have been used to a
term of four years here but I think three years is long enough. But they will
be allowed to run for reelection any number of times. In this way, we
remedy the too frequent elections every two years. We will have
elections every three years under the scheme and we will have a
continuing Senate. Every election, 12 of 24 Senators will be
elected, so that 12 Senators will remain in the Senate. In other
words, we will have a continuing Senate . 1 5
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE.
This is just a paragraph of that section that will follow what has earlier been
approved. It reads: "OF THE SENATORS ELECTED IN THE ELECTION IN
1992, THE FIRST TWELVE OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES
SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS AND THE REMAINING TWELVE FOR THREE
YEARS."
This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the idea of a

continuing Senate .
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo).
What does the Committee say?
MR. SUAREZ.
The Committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr. Presiding Officer. 1 6

The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merely because only
half of its members continue to the next Congress. To my mind, even a lesser
number of Senators continuing into the next Congress will still make the Senate
a continuing body. The Senate must be viewed as a collective body. It is an
institution quite apart from the Senators composing it. The Senate as an
institution cannot be equated to its present occupants. It is indivisible. It is not
the sum total of all sitting Senators at any given time. Senators come and go
but the very institution of the Senate remains. It is this indivisible institution
which should be viewed as continuing. HDTISa
The argument that the Senate is not a continuing body because it lacks
quorum to do business after every midterm or presidential elections is awed.
It does not take into account that the term of o ce of a Senator is xed by the
Constitution. There is no vacancy in the o ce of outgoing Senators during
midterm or presidential elections. Article VI, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
The term of o ce of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
The term of a Senator starts at noon of June 30 next following their
election and shall end before noon of June 30 six years after. The constitutional
provision aims to prevent a vacuum in the o ce of an outgoing Senator during
elections, which is xed under the Constitution unless changed by law on the
second Monday of May, 1 7 until June 30 when the Senators-elect assume their
o ce. There is no vacuum created because at the time an outgoing Senator's
term ends, the term of a Senator-elect begins.
The same principle holds true for the o ce of the President. A president-
elect does not assume o ce until noon of June 30 next following a presidential
election. An outgoing President does not cease to perform the duties and
responsibilities of a President merely because the people had chosen his/her
new successor. Until her term expires, an outgoing President has the
constitutional duty to discharge the powers and functions of a President unless
restricted 1 8 by the Constitution.
In ne, the Senate is a continuing body as it continues to have a full or at
least majority membership 1 9 even during elections until the assumption of
o ce of the Senators-elect. The Senate as an institution does not cease to have
a quorum to do business even during elections. It is to be noted that the Senate
is not in session during an election until the opening of a new Congress for
practical reasons. This does not mean, however, that outgoing Senators cease
to perform their duties as Senators of the Republic during such elections. When
the President proclaims martial law or suspends the writ of habeas corpus, for
example, the Congress including the outgoing Senators are required to convene
if not in session within 24 hours in accordance with its rules without need of
call. 2 0 aSTAcH
The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate rules is

contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure . The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The above provision only requires a "duly published" rule of procedure
for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on republication. There is nothing in
the constitutional provision that commands that every new Congress must
publish its rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication is necessary only when
there is an amendment or revision to the rules. This is required under the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The Senate in the 13th Congress caused the publication of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. The present Senate (14th
Congress) adopted the same rules of procedure in the NBN-ZTE investigation. It
does not need to republish said rules of procedure because it is not shown that
a substantial amendment or revision was made since its last publication that
would affect the rights of persons appearing before it.
On a more practical note, there is little to be gained in requiring a new
Congress to cause the republication of the rules of procedure which has not
been amended or revised. The exercise is simply a waste of government funds.
Worse, it unduly burdens and hinders the Senate from discharging its
constitutional duties. Publication takes time and during the interregnum, it
cannot be gainsaid that the Senate is barred or restricted from conducting an
investigation in aid of legislation.
I agree with the Chief Justice that this Court must be wary of the far-
reaching consequences of a case law invalidating the Senate rules of procedure
for lack of republication. Our ruling in this petition will not only affect the NBN-
ZTE investigation, but all other Senate investigations conducted under the 10th,
11th, 12th, and the present 14th Congress, for which no republication of the
rules has been done. These investigations have been the basis of several bills
and laws passed in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Putting a
doubt on the authority, effectivity and validity of these proceedings is imprudent
and unwise. This Court should really be cautious in making a jurisprudential
ruling that will unduly strangle the internal workings of a co-equal branch and
needlessly burden the discharge of its constitutional duty. 2 1 SHADEC
In addition, let me point out the Philippine Constitution, past and present, were
largely in uenced by the United States Constitution. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 2 2 the
United States Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the American Senate is a continuing
body. In Arnault v. Nazareno, 2 3 the Philippine Supreme Court, relying on McGrain, held
that the Philippine Senate is a continuing body. There is no plausible reason why the rule
should be different today.
In view of the foregoing, I nd it unnecessary to delve on the third issue which the
ponencia does not also address.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No.
179275.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
3. Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 1-38.
5. Id. at 36-38.
6. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.

7. Id. at 169. CIAHDT
8. An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communications and for Other Purposes.
9. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
10. Id. at 3-17.

11. Id. at 7-13.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 44.

14. Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16. Id. at 71-90. DcICEa
17. Id. at 62. The Court identi ed the following issues for discussion in the October 2, 2007 Oral
Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees governing the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in accordance with
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
ECDaAc

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called "Garci tapes", violates Section 3,
Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)
18. Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26, 2007.
19. Resolution dated November 20, 2007.

20. 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
21. Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22. Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755. SAcaDE
23. G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160.
24. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.
25. G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26. Id.
27. Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
28. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4. DTaAHS
29. Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.

31. 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
32. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.
33. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.
34. Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.
35. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards that have
to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of
an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.
36. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004). AcTHCE
37. Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.
38. Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
40. See news article "Separate ndings, no closure" by Michael Lim Umbac published in The
Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item "5 House committees in 'Garci'
probe file report on Monday" published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006. TASCDI
41. Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA
117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.
43. Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).
44. As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled "Providing for the
Publication of Laws Either in the O cial Gazette or in a Newspaper of General
Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity".
45. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.

46. G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
47. Id. at 297-298.

48. Dated September 4, 2008.
49. TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
50. Entitled "An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic Commercial and Non-
Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for Unlawful Use Thereof and For
Other Purposes", approved on June 14, 2000.
51. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633, October 15,
2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52. Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read: HEASaC
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages . — Information shall not be denied legal
effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message
purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic
data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents . — Electronic documents shall have
the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and —
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic
document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability, and can
be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that —
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of
any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal
course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or
retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that
requirement is met by an electronic document if —
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it
was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented:
Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of
existing laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written
document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic data
messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best
evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents . — (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or
retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or
electronic document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was rst generated in its nal form,
as an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or
otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the information is capable of being
displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or
whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented
or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete
and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises
in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which
the information was generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances.
PUNO, C.J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. ESaITA
2. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, G.R. No. 180641, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008. HTSIEa

Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 42-25.
6. Ponencia.

Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 139. The dispositive portion
reads, viz.:
WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED . The subject Order dated January 30, 2008,
citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his
arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED .
Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 459 SCRA 77, 132-136. ScHAIT

10. Id. at 44-45.
12. 1 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, July 23, 2007.
13. See 13th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted October 27, 2004;
12th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted October 22, 2002;
11th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted August 31, 1999;
10th Cong. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, adopted July 24, 1995.
14. RULES OF THE SENATE approved on January 25, 1950, and revised as of 1966.
15. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16. 1935 PHIL. CONST., Art. VIII, §3 provides, viz.:
Section 3. The term of o ce of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on the thirtieth day
of December next following their election. The rst Senators elected under this
Constitution shall, in the manner provided by law, be divided equally into three groups,
the Senators of the rst group to serve for a term of six years; those of the second group,
for four years; and those of the third group, for two years.
17. 1987 PHIL. CONST., Art. VI, §4 in relation to Art. XVIII, §2 provides, viz.:
Art. VI, Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
Art, XVIII, Sec. 2. . . .
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the rst twelve obtaining the highest number of
votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
18. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, revised to September 14, 2007.

Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, p. 44.
20. 220 Phil. 422 (1985); Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).
21. Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 533-535 (1986); See also The Veterans Federation of the
Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526; Umali v.
Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992, 209 SCRA 446. IDTcHa
22. Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

23. Executive OrderNo. 200, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
24. Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
25. Article III, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to o cial records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to o cial acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
26. G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590. SHAcID
27. III RECORDS OF THE SENATE, March 12, 1964, p. 625.

28. People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 350, 381.
29. Transcript of Senate hearing held by the Joint Committees on National Defense and
Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws,
September 7, 2007, p. 95.
30. Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590.
31. Lanot, et al. v, Comelec, G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
32. An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, As Amended, Enlitled
"Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties
for Certain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes."
33. Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 111 and
People of the Philippines v. Olivarez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 77865 December 4, 1998, 299
SCRA 635.
34. Transcripts of Senate hearings held by the Joint Committees on National Defense and
Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws,
September 7 and 17, 2007.
35. Rollo, pp. 216, 218; Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, p. 2.
36. Philippine Airlines v. Joselito Pascua, et al., G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA
195. STcaDI
37. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

38. Id. at 56.
REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:

1. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
2. Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2. Judicial Notice, when discretionary. — A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. aSCHIT
3. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.
4. "Separate ndings, no closure on 'Hello Garci' scandal" dated March 29, 2006 by Michael Lim
Ubac in http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?db
=0&article=20060329-70909. The report partly states:
THE HOUSE of Representatives inquiry has resulted in two "Hello Garci" reports, separate
findings, no closure.
At dusk yesterday, the majority and minority blocs came up with separate committee reports
on the wiretapping scandal that nearly unseated President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo last
year. ATICcS
It was the majority bloc represented by the chairs of the ve House committees that rst
handed its report to Speaker Jose de Venecia.
De Venecia congratulated the chairs led by North Cotabato Representative Emmylou Taliño-
Santos for "their wisdom and dedication to duty."
The minority report penned by Cavite Representative Gilbert Remulla highlighted the futility of
the search for truth behind an opposition allegation that the recordings showed that Ms
Arroyo phoned Election Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to boost her chances of
winning the 2004 presidential race.
"It's likewise undeniable that the Arroyo government, in general, has shown utter disregard, if
not disrespect, towards the inquiry. Though members of the administration appeared
during the public hearings, nothing substantial was presented to help ferret out the truth",
said the minority report.
Lost opportunity
The report said that the 14 public hearings could have " nally be the moment for Congress to
address the lingering problem of election cheating, but with the way the witnesses
conducted themselves the opportunity was lost."
The minority report would be "appended" to the main report, said Santos.
As expected, there was nothing new in the majority's findings and recommendations.
The main report did not deviate from the revised draft report it routed to committee members
on March 13, which admitted the failure of the joint congressional inquiry to unravel the
mystery of the political controversy.
The report said that the hearings "only raised more issues and answered none", thus Congress
should "continue to seek the answers . . . and in particular subpoena phone records to
establish the likelihood or unlikelihood that alleged wiretapping conversations could
have taken place."
5. 465 Phil. 860 (2004).
6. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id. at 889-890.

7. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a gave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396,
171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160;
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756; Province of Batangas v.
Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736; Albaña v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 98, Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No.
134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085,
February 3, 2004, 277 SCRA 409. CAScIH
8. Heirs of Eugenia v. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 67195, 78618 &
78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515 (1949);
Calbanero v. Torrens, 61 Phil. 522 (1935).
9. Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, p. 418.
10. Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 432.
11. Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94. AcSHCD
12. Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 68.
13. Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24, 1990, 190 SCRA 31, 38.
14. G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.
15. Constitutional Commission Record (1986), p. 208.
16. Id. at 434.

17. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 8.
18. Id., Secs. 14 and 15 provides:
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
19. The Office of a Senator may be vacant for causes such as death or permanent disability.
20. CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 18 provides:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. cEAIHa
21. Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at 30-35.

22. 273 US 135 (1927).
23. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil, 29 (1950). AIDTHC

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163021-2008-Garcillano v. House of Representatives

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.]

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO , petitioner, vs . THE HOUSE OF

[G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.]

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI , petitioners,

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE , petitioner-in-intervention.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument. 1 7

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of

Publication of Senate Rules Governing

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees t to

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be

1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the

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First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution , the Court interpreted "pending

I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri Resolution that

Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement of publication

While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the indispensable role of

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized

Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the

Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the "Garci tapes"

Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an exception to the

Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among

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a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.

This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the idea of a

The Committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr. Presiding Officer. 1 6

The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate rules is

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

6. Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.

10. Id. at 3-17.

13. Id. at 44.

16. Id. at 71-90. DcICEa

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.

19. Resolution dated November 20, 2007.

30. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.

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47. Id. at 297-298.

2. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations, Senate

4. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations, Senate

7. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public O cers and Investigations, Senate

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18. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, revised to September 14, 2007.

22. Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

27. III RECORDS OF THE SENATE, March 12, 1964, p. 625.

37. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

REYES, R.T., J., concurring and dissenting:

3. Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.

6. La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id. at 889-890.

16. Id. at 434.

21. Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at 30-35.