The Ethiopian Revolution After 40 Years 1974-2014

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The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years (1974-2014):

Plan B in Progress?
Article in Journal of Developing Societies · September 2015

DOI: 10.1177/0169796X15590321
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The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years
(1974–2014)
Plan B in Progress?
Jon Abbink
African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In this article, I reflect on the sociopolitical impact and memory construction of

the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Decades have passed and a new political leader-
ship has reshaped Ethiopian society after the demise of the Ethiopian revolutionary
regime in May 1991, but the effects are still felt. The violent political drama of the
1970s and 1980s redefined the Ethiopian political tradition and the practices of
(political) violence in the light of new revolutionary ideologies, mainly imported
from abroad. The post-1991 regime has shown a particular way of handling
the aftermath of the 1974 events, but evinces a number of continuities with the
ideologies and practices of that era – if only because all participants and
current rulers were part of the same revolutionary (student) generation. The regime
presently in power is thus partly a successor regime to the “socialist” regime,
having started with largely a similar socioeconomic and Marxist-ideological
program. At least in one central aspect, the two regimes differ: in their practical
response to the “nationalities question.” The handling of this issue after 1991 by
the current regime of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front –
Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (EPRDF-TPLF) has confirmed that today we
in fact may see “Plan B” of the 1974 revolution being consolidated. We analyze
the two strains of the Ethiopian revolution and comment on the how and why of
their different paths since 1974.
Keywords: Revolution, Ethiopia, post-Marxist politics, ethnic politics, political

culture
Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s inclination
to injustice makes democracy necessary.
(Reinhold Niebuhr, 1944, p. xxxii)
Copyright © 2015 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com

(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC)
Vol 31(3): 333–357. DOI: 10.1177/0169796X15590321
Downloaded from jds.sagepub.com at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on September 2, 2015

334 Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357
Introduction and Hypothesis
The Ethiopian revolution that “erupted” in February 1974 was more

than a generation ago and discussion of it has largely disappeared
from the public view and the media, also in Ethiopia. The debate con-
tinues, however, in the scholarly literature and via reflections and comments
of participants and eyewitnesses, writing memoirs and reminiscences,
often on surprisingly minute points of ideological and sectarian detail.
Internet forums provide ample room for postmortem recriminations
and criticisms of former opponents of the erstwhile student movement
sections. So is the revolutionary legacy gone and overcome? In Ethiopia
and among the wider public, discussion of its impact and meaning is
now muted by the new discourse on economic growth and development.
The traumatic period of the 1970s and 1980s is seen as an aberrant phase
of political violence and misrule that has been “closed.” Behind the sur-
face, however, there is still the deep memory of personal tragedies and
lives lost in appalling violence, present in almost every family, notably
in Addis Ababa,1 and a subtext of fear or insecurity in political life.
The political “legacy” of the revolutionary movement is not favorable.
It is often said that the “wrong turn of the revolution” occurred as a
result of the military-led Derg2 regime’s hijacking of popular protests
in September 1974 and of the imposition of top-down policies by the
emerging leadership in the name of “revolution,” but bent foremost on
maintaining its newly won power. The Derg campaigns of mass mobi-
lization, such as, the 1976 zämäch’a (a mass student “development”
campaign in the countryside), as well as the tensions or urban warfare
between the regime and the revolutionary groups, such as, the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP)3 and later in 1977 the All-Ethiopia
Socialist Movement (MEISON), 4 Ethiopian Marxist–Leninist
Revolutionary Organization (MALERID), and Woz League, further
contributed to this. The battles between the Derg forces and the so-
called “genuine” revolutionaries of these movements came to naught
in the streets of the cities and left tens of thousands of mostly young
people dead, and as many injured and maimed, while others fled and
were forced into exile.5 The violence and suffering of a whole generation
was too appalling to be even recounted in its full extent (cf. Babile, 1997;
Gebru Tareke, 2008).
I am not sure that many new things can be said on the Ethiopian revo-
lution after Messay Kebede’s exhaustive and remarkable work (2011),
but the event will draw continued study, if only because more voices

Abbink: The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years (1974–2014) 335
from the past will speak out and because its impact will always show up.
In such studies, the entire ideological canvas of the revolutionary move-
ment in Ethiopia has to be considered, preferably in a more comparative
perspective, as the revolutionary momentum and the massive violence
in its wake have pervasively reshaped politics, society, interpersonal
relationships, and the cultural fabric of Ethiopian society – in often
unacknowledged ways.
The Ethiopian revolution was indeed a revolution, and not a revolt
or an insurgency: a fundamental social upheaval changing the political
order and the basic structures of society, accompanied by new ideologies
that reversed the assumptions of established authority, and yielded new
leadership elites, with other legitimization strategies. In its ideas and
practices, this revolution was evidently an event of enormous histori-
cal importance; also, I contend, because it cut off the road to a gradual
development toward a democratic republican state order – in contrast
to developments in several other African countries. It entrenched forms
of authoritarian politics based on a new metaphysics of governance
and of violence. The use of violence as political means reached new
heights since 1974 and these remained as modes of operation, going
against the strain of mediation and reconciliation that was also present
in traditional Ethiopian politics under the empire (cf. Schaefer, 2006;
Teshale Tibebu, 2008, p. 357).
The aftermath of the revolution in Ethiopia is still very much with us,
and it is as yet too early for an autopsy. As a political movement toward
social justice, a democratic ethos, and human improvement, it was not
overall successful, as most evident in its ending in the civil war that tore
the country apart and in the durability of problems that already existed
before 1974. Given the state of Ethiopian politics, social structure, and
economic inequality in the late imperial era, chances of its success were
indeed slim. A reversal of socioeconomic and political structures was
certainly achieved, but not in accordance with the “ideals” or aspirations
first set. The imperial order was relegated to the realm of history, first and
foremost due to the nationalization of all land in 1975 and the forceful
removal of the land-owning class. The popular euphoria about this was
notable, especially in the Ethiopian south and west, but it was also short-
lived. Soon, the uncompromising attitudes of all actors involved – for
whatever combination of reasons – prevented the revolution developing
into a movement leading to freedom, democratic culture, or meeting
the aspirations of common Ethiopians. As the late Yonas Admassu said
(2008, p. 271), it “…turned into an unspeakable nightmare.”
Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

A task for sociohistorical and anthropological research today remains

to probe more in-depth the social, psychological, and cultural impact
of the revolutionary phase on Ethiopia’s societal and political routines.
This article is a call for that. Although the analysis here is strongly
in terms of evolving political ideas and ideologies, a full explanation of
the revolutionary ferment and political developments in Ethiopia after
1974 should ultimately be tied to the processes of change in the socio-
economic and political conditions of the country. The post-1974 period,
after the fall of the imperial order, was a time of radical change and socio-
political experimentation, where emerging social groups were searching
for new meanings and new frameworks of organization in a process that
showed a great deal of contingency.
Origins – Ideological Elements
An explanation of revolution must combine structural factors and per-

sonal agency in a unified model. In Ethiopia, socioeconomic and political
conditions in the late 1960s to early 1970s were clearly present to produce
a “revolutionary situation.” But it would not have been converted into
an actual revolution without the strong ideological predispositions of
situated agents, social groups, and individuals acting upon – and being
able to act upon – the critical situation.
As is well known, the origins of the revolutionary ferment were in the
Ethiopian student movement, domestically generated but strongly influ-
enced by, if not a full part of, global revolutionary currents seen among
youths in the rest of the world, notably in the 1960s. Marxism was the
attractive ideological language because of its abstract, “covering law”
approach to history, class relations, and social inequality (cf. Teshale
Tibebu, 2008). In this context, I need not dwell on this for long because
it has been well described in numerous studies (e.g., Balsvik, 1985, 2007;
Paulos Milkias, 2006; Kiflu Tadesse, 1993, 1998; Fentahun Tiruneh, 1990).
Obviously, that era was the heyday of Marxist-Socialist critique and revolt.
There were deep concerns among the students and emerging educated
classes about social injustice, class contradictions, inequality, and poverty
in Ethiopia. Since the 1960 coup attempt, which also turned violent, such
ideals had been spreading under the surface. In 1964, students at Haile
Sellassie University (Addis Ababa) set up the “Crocodile Society,” a
semi-legal group adopting Marxist–Leninist ideological stances. The same
year,6 students first came out on the streets with the slogan “Land to the
tiller,” thus declaring their commitment to revolutionary social change.

In subsequent years, the protest movement turned more radical Marxist,

clearly guided by a domestic agenda but also inspired by student protests
elsewhere. Illustrative are Clapham’s remarks in his 2006 paper on the
politics of emulation in Ethiopian development: the emulation of foreign
models, he suggests, reached its
…most intense form in the search for revolutionary alternatives to what was
clearly a failing imperial order: (…) the wholesale conversion of a younger
generation of Ethiopian intellectuals – from the mid-1960s onwards – to
Marxism-Leninism as a development strategy (…). The students who provided
the impetus for the revolution espoused different forms of communism, and
the vicious and bloody conflicts between them continue to be played out in
Ethiopian politics even today. (Clapham, 2006, pp. 144–145).
Indeed Marxist views on politics and development were the thing to

believe in during those days; it was an almost unavoidable phenomenon.
It was not a question of balanced reasoning but more of generational
effervescence for change and political drama, fueled by sincerely idealistic
but misguided ideals. Factional and doctrinaire strife were soon part of it
and later turned extremely violent, as compromise thinking was absent
and the feeling among the contenders of possessing the one and only
truth was paramount. The ideology used was characterized by the fact
that, to use Acheson-Brown’s words, “exciting and empowering goals”
were set “before a realistic assessment of means” occurred (1997, p. 94).
Ethiopian student federations in Europe (Ethiopian Student Union
in Ethiopia [ESUE]) and North America (Ethiopian Student Union in
North America [ESUNA]) were in intense interaction with the student
movement in Ethiopia (University Students Union of Addis Ababa
[USUAA]) in the last years of the imperial state under Emperor Haile
Sellassie I. This regime followed a policy of repression to protests and
demands of the emerging young opposition, but the student movement
kept up momentum despite the arrests and loss of leaders, and they
set the agenda for regime change and social revolution. Due to the
Emperor’s policy since the 1960 coup attempt to not prepare for his
succession, there were no organized societal or political forces to resist
the creeping revolutionary process. The historical record of 1974–1975
has shown that when army units and urban workers and others with
grievances7 joined in the protests and demands, the fate of the empire
was sealed. Ethiopian workers led by the Confederation of Ethiopian
Labor Unions (CELU) played an important role with a huge general

strike of c. 100,000 participants on March 7–10, 1974, after agitation

by students (Paulos Milkias, 2006, p. 209). In April, mass strikes and
demonstrations of workers and teachers unions followed, and on
April 20, there was the mass demonstration of Muslims asking for
equal religious rights. Eventually, the strikes and actions – all sup-
ported and partly organized by student radicals – brought down the
imperial government but also were met with massive force by the new
Armed Forces “Coordinating Committee” (precursor of the Derg). The
repression worked; by late May, the revolutionary push of workers,
teachers, civil servants, and religious functionaries was ended with a crack-
down (Paulos Milkias, 2006, p. 212) on the CELU and demonstrating
workers by fourth division army troops (ibid.). In September, the CELU
top leadership was arrested. Hereafter, the dynamics shifted to the
military and the leftist revolutionary parties. Though the CELU remained
active (although mostly underground) in agitating for an independent
workers’ union,8 its “revolutionary” role diminished.9
In the months of confusion and political vacuum until August 1974,
the army, the only organized force in the country, could establish itself
in power. Hopes that it would use its leverage for the good were however
soon dashed. The ideologically schooled Socialist-Marxist student
groups had their impact on army thinking, but the military tried to co-opt
or sideline them. The path toward positive change and justice was
definitively abandoned in November 1974 with the killing of the first
leader of the Derg, General Aman M. Andom, by radical military
within the Derg, and by the almost simultaneous mass killing of dozens
of ancien régime functionaries and leaders, held imprisoned without trial.
This wanton massacre of people – who had voluntarily turned them-
selves in – recalled the methods of the Italian massacre in Addis Ababa
after the attempt on the life of Fascist viceroy R. Graziani in 1937, and
slashed away the legitimacy of the Derg as the revolutionary vanguard.
Most people from then on saw what was to follow. The idea of “yalä
mïnïm dämm (…) Itiopp’ia tïqdäm”10 – the initial slogan (song) of the
Derg – was down and out, a fiction. The ensuing years of repression,
arbitrary rule, brutal killing, abuse with impunity, and economic misrule
left Ethiopia impoverished and bereaved, and led to major social and
cultural crises. The story has been told many times in detail and I refrain
from repeating it. (For some studies of the course of the revolution until
1991, see Andargatchew, 1993; Paulos Milkias, 2006; Gebru Tareke,
2009a; Teferra, 1997).

As noted, forty years after the events of the revolution year, debate
about the violence and the “legacy” has somewhat receded from the public
domain, and the revolutionary ideologies of class struggle and “anti-
feudalist,” “anti-capitalist,” or “anti-imperialist” policies of the self-
appointed Ethio-communist Derg regime seem dead and buried. The
“Red Terror” trials (cf. Tronvoll, Schaefer, & Alemu, 2009), completed
with the sentence against former Derg leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam in
2007, were deemed by the post-1991 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) government to have “ended” the affair, and
the (selectively construed) memory of it was hallowed in a monument
and in a new legitimacy derived from it being overcome. Also the EPRP,
the MEISON, and other Marxist-oriented groups based on national class
struggle analysis and “Socialist state” theory, are gone (although the
groups still have a token existence in exile, and networks of comrades
are maintained).
The dismal record of the Derg as the so-called custodian of the revo-
lution eliminated any convincing arguments for the class struggle-based
version of Socialist-Marxist discourse. What remains of the Derg and
the revolutionary fronts is a tragic record of tyrannical–authoritarian
politics, misplaced warfare (Abbink, 2009; Gebru Tareke, 2009a),
destruction of cultural traditions (e.g., prohibiting the mourning of those
who were killed), and heaps of dead people and traumatized survivors
(cf. Abdulreshid & Mohammed, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c).
But in many respects, there is of course continuity. In the post-1991
period, one may argue, we have seen in large part the unfolding of the
Ethiopian revolution, Plan B. As Bahru (1994, p. 152) already noted:
“Marxism-Leninism supposedly died with the Mangestu regime,” but
this was incorrect: it just continued in a different form. This could not be
otherwise when seeing what the background was, and, as Bahru contin-
ued: “…the Marxist credentials of the two main units of the EPRDF, the
TPLF and the EPDM11 (….) antedate those of the Darg and are probably
more authentic” (Bahru, 1994, p. 153). These two organizations of course
belonged to the second branch of the revolutionary movement of the 1970s.
The Ethiopian revolution was ideologically prepared and fed by the
student and insurgent movements of the 1960s and 1970s, inspired by
general and utopian ideals of progress, development, equality, justice,
etc. (cf. Bahru, 2014), but formulated vaguely and in authoritarian
terms.12 Marxist ideology played the major role, but in a (too) Eurocentric
form. The movements were also strongly influenced (Teshale, 2008,
p. 346) by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and later the Eritrean

People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and their programs of national

revolution through independence. (The Eritrean movements were not
based on ethnicity but on a territorial identity resulting from ex-colonial
boundaries.)
Indeed, the revolution from the start basically had two strains: first,
the one just mentioned, the class analysis-based “anti-feudalist,” “anti-
bourgeoisie” approach to perceived political and social inequality.
Second, the “anti-imperialist,” “anti-capitalist,” and ethno-regionally
based approach, pointing to “national oppression” in Ethiopia, seen by
the revolutionary movements as led by predominantly one (Amhara)
elite oppressing the rest, notably in the countryside: the “nationalities
question.”13 It was of course put on the agenda of the Ethiopian student
movement by Walleligne Mekonnen (1969) in his famous but unhistorical
and superficial paper, which was not an analysis but ideological position
taking. Later, it was taken up in another overstated though influential
piece (1971) by “Tilahun Takele” (pseudonym of two members of the
proto-EPRP “Algeria group”), discussed in the various branches of
the student movement.
Taking note of these two lines in the revolution is nothing new
(cf. Teshale, 2008, p. 347), and we now know that the second line was set to
gain the upper hand, perhaps due to the state of Ethiopia’s socioeconomic
system: an imperial, land-based, nonindustrial society of a multiethnic
nature, and based on patron–client relations and nondemocratic elite poli-
tics. This system did not allow for the overall mobilization of class-based
movements, nor of civic–political interest groups that could negotiate,
as a societal counterforce, with the political power holders. Territorially
based ethnicity or ethno-nationalism commanded people’s prime loyalty –
ultimately even in the cities – and carried the day, as evident in the ethnic-
based “liberation movements,” such as, Tigray People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Sidama Liberation Movement
(SLM), and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). Together with the
EPLF in Eritrea, the EPRDF (led by the TPLF) brought down the Derg’s
“People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.” The 1991 battlefield victory
of ethno-regionally based movements was facilitated by the fact that the
Derg had effectively killed off Socialist or democratic ideals, alienated
the emerging educated elites and business people, and had destroyed or
thwarted the aspirations for social justice among the wider population
(the “broad masses”). Still, as Clapham (1987, pp. 106, 109, 124) noted,
it cannot be denied that the Derg tried to execute a consistent Marxist
program (cf. also Acheson-Brown, 1997, p. 93).

Asserting that Plan B of the revolution in the 1980s was on course to

win – and was implemented to a large extent after 1991 – also implies
noting that deep flaws in Socialist-Marxist revolutionary thinking within
the insurgent movements of the 1970s may have been continued as well.
The “intellectual origins” – if that word is needed – of the Marxist-
revolutionary thinking on nationality/ethnicity could of course be traced
back to J. Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question (1913, reissued 1944)
and also to earlier work by fellow Marxist Rosa Luxemburg (1908–1909),
and some others. It appealed to the young student generations in multi-
ethnic Ethiopia where ethnic disparities were quite visible, but it was far
from certain that there should be a direct line from ethnic inequality to a
revolutionary politics based on ethnicity. Discord on this key ideological
element was ever present. Nevertheless, the idea of self-determination of
“nationalities” was the core item on the EPRDF’s agenda, defining the
exploitation of the rural masses as mediated through the “ethnocratic”
Ethiopian state, in either its imperial or its military-Marxist form. The
Front’s reference to the “ethno-regional home area” was a bridging ele-
ment that related rural culture and revolutionary politics, without however
solving all problems. Still, after 1991 this agenda led to new forms of
“empowerment” of ethnic groups and peoples, thereby utterly changing
the face of the country.
Some Causes of Revolutionary Turmoil – and the Sequel
Historical understanding of the antecedents and the unfolding of a

revolution is important, but we can be brief here on the “causes” of the
Ethiopian revolution, as we are concerned here with their effects. There
is also an extensive – if not voluminous – literature on this revolution that
is often making similar points.
As to causes, deep structural problems in the political and economic
(land holding) order of the empire, as well as the rapidly declining status
of the conservative and aging emperor, were clear to see in the decade up
to 1974. Contributing immediate factors were the indignation about the
famine of 197314 and the glaring rural poverty it revealed, sudden price rises
for the urban masses, and the deteriorating living conditions of soldiers.
Legitimate grievances that had long been simmering among the popu-
lation (urban workers, peasants) and the younger educated generation
came out in the open, and were channeled into mimetic social revolt.15
If the public unrest would have been met swiftly and adequately by
the government via plans for structural reform, an evolutionary path

toward social and political reform might have been taken, although
it might have been too late for system change. Popular protest was
pervasive and contagious. But it did not lead to a strong civic political
front – this was impossible due to a lack of civic institutional frameworks
or representative bodies to negotiate, and to the internal divisions of
the opposition groups and student fronts. Among these revolutionary
groups, insults, such as, “leftist infantilist,” “petty bourgeois pseudo-
radical,” “right-roader,” “traitor,” or “national nihilist” were soon thrown
back and forth, and a dialogical political process was absent. Violent
discourse in pamphlets and in demonstrations continued in 1974–1975
and turned into actual mass violence in 1976–1977 among and between
student/political movements and the Derg forces.
After September 1974, and after months of demonstrations, inconclu-
sive negotiations, and actions by the Socialist student fronts, the EPRP
was gaining the ideological upper hand (e.g., in the written media, as
with their periodical Democrasia) and getting more and more youth
support. But then, the Derg took over. This was probably for fear of
losing power, and also to thwart any further deliberations on the new
draft Constitution that was offered in early August 197416 by some
legal experts. From then on, violent and repressive authoritarianism set
out the future course. This was stimulated by the extremely negative
response that the student movements gave to this constitutional draft
(cf. Paulos Milkias, 2006, pp. 227–228), only because it proposed retaining
a (constitutional) monarchy.17
Due to the mounting denunciations in the press, the student and revo-
lutionary party periodicals and to the declining charisma of the emperor
as a result, the monarchy was gradually stripped of its support structures
and finally abolished by proclamation of the Derg on September 12,
1974.18 This was preceded by a highly charged documentary on Ethiopian
Television (ETV) on the Wollo famine in the September 11 evening
program. After the emperor was removed, the ideological battles
continued as vehemently as ever, now with new targets; but the Derg
moved to keep dominance and use the student groups for their own
purposes and later eliminate them.
Attempts at collaboration of the Derg with the Socialist student move-
ments were halfhearted and ultimately to no avail (as the example of
MEISON allying with the Derg showed). The Derg (renamed “Provisional
Military Administrative Council” or PMAC in September 1975) tried to
deflect the emerging rivalry and tensions with the Marxist parties and the
ever-demanding students. One move was the organization of a “National

Development Campaign” or Idgät bäHibrät (zämäch’a) in the first half of

1975 (cf. Andargatchew, 1993, pp. 102–103) “to spread the revolution.”
It is still a somewhat of a mystery why c. 65,000 leftist students, activists,
and teachers let themselves be sent out of Addis Ababa and other cities
to do campaign work in remote rural areas, ordered and coordinated by
the Derg.19
But in 1976, violent campaigns were started, first against the EPRP.
The Derg’s Näbälbal special forces were brought to Addis Ababa in
August that year and came into action even before the EPRP had
fired its first shot. The so-called “White Terror” and “Red Terror” that
followed next year are well described and will not be discussed here
(cf. also Andargatchew, 1993, pp. 208–214; Babile, 1997; Bahru, 2009;
Gebru Tareke, 2008). The complicated chain of events and the cycles
of imitative violence make it also difficult to engage in a blame-game
analysis of who “started” it and who was “justified in using violence,” etc.
The regression into ugly violence was caused by the regime in place as
well as by the insurgent movements engaged in Ethiopia in the 1970s and
1980s, turning on each other. While no doubt the Derg was paramount
in its exercise of massive violence and cruelty, the point is that by their
choice for collective violent action – even if it was in some way involun-
tary and forced by circumstances – the student movements and the Derg
together sealed the fate of further progress on a meaningful social-
revolutionary path, and engendered a “culture of violence” that reshaped
the Ethiopian political system and society.
The radicalization of the Derg is often ascribed to the ideological
impact of the Marxist student movements, while the specific violent
radicalism of both has been explained by Messay Kebede (2009) as a
result of the “cultural dislocation” of an entire generation from the roots
of Ethiopian civilization and education in favor of a kind of “alienated”
Western-based education. No doubt, there is some truth here. But another
argument to explain this could be that the insurgents continued in dialecti-
cal form the strongly hierarchical and authoritarian political (and familial)
culture of Ethiopia, where “loyal opposition” and critical political debate
did not exist and where political struggles of any importance were usually
resolved through force (cf. Bahru, 1994, p. 156). They became caught
up in a process, or a situational logic, of violence that they did not fully
control and had no alternatives for. In addition, the seamless conversion
of violent discourse into violent practice may be indicative of the fact that
often in Ethiopian society, words (and threats) are taken very seriously
if not literally, and thus are reality.

The violent defeat of the leftist parties by the Derg toward the end of
the 1970s (the 1977–1978 anti-EPRP “Red Terror,” cf. Gebru Tareke,
2008 for details), the elimination of MEISON in late 1977 after its 2-year
close alliance with the Derg, the disbanding of the Woz Ader League,
Echa’at, and MALERID, and the removal of the EPRP remnants from
their retreat in Tigray after the battle of Assimba with the TPLF in late
February 1978, created a new phase in the revolution.
For this article, the important point here is that this meant that revo-
lutionary resistance to the Derg from then on took the rural guerrilla-
based, ethno-nationalist path (TPLF, OLF, etc.), although with its Marxist
credentials intact (cf. Aregawi, 2009; Clapham, 1992, pp. 116). The
later formation of the Marxist–Leninist League of Tigray within TPLF
(in July 1985) was a confirmation of this. As the strength of the insurgent
fronts grew, the second strain of the Ethiopian revolution emerged victori-
ous and assumed power in May 1991: in Eritrea in nationalist-separatist
form, in Ethiopia in ethno-regionalist form, leading to a redefinition of
Ethiopian nationhood.
Issues in Plan A and Plan B: After 40 Years
All crucial issues that were discussed in the student movement periodicals
and parties in the 1960s and 1970s came back after 1974 in the policies of
the Derg and after 1991 in policies of the new EPRDF regime, although
with different emphasis. The Derg, carrying out Plan A, tackled the
land issue first, and went on to establish a state-centralist economy that
stifled the private sector and economic growth (except for a couple of
years). It followed the Soviet Communist governance model, deriving
also its party formation (Workers’ Party of Ethiopia, September 1984)
from it. The entire process was steeped in repression of opponents and
civilian parties. In the post-1991 period, obviously the nationalities
question (and the Eritrean question) was foremost, as it was the agenda
and means of mobilization that had brought victory. This was under-
standable. But also here the Marxist governance model was followed:
“democratic centralism” under the vanguard party, and no bottom-up
democratic federalism.
The Land Issue
This was and is a crucial element of the revolution from all sides.
Ownership and access to land, although cultivated by independent peasant

smallholders and family- or clan-groups – was deemed to be an essential

prerequisite for the state order and regime maintenance (cf. Markakis,
2011, p. 356). The revolutionary groups all pleaded for land to go to those
who cultivated it and for dispossessing the “feudalist” land-holding class.
The Ethiopian revolution in the form of the Derg of course nationalized
all land and abolished the private land-owning class with the Rural Land
Proclamation Act of March 1975, a faithful follow-up to student agitation
on this point. It gained support among part of the (southern) population,
and also from MEISON, which hereupon had entered a tactical alliance
with the Derg. The land question saw a checkered history under the
Derg, because its policies had little positive effect on agrarian wealth
creation and development. Farmers often complained that “everyone
was now made equally poor.” This feeling still exists among today’s
smallholders. The post-1991 government continued the policy of state
ownership of all land. It is too early to see what the new government policy
(since 2008) of handing out huge tracts of land under lease to foreign
and rich domestic investors (to be cultivated with export mono-crops on
a commercial scale) will yield. Under Emperor Haile Sellassie and the
Derg there were also such big concessions (of course less in number), but
they all failed and caused trouble to local populations (cf. Shehim, 1985).
There is still no smallholder empowerment, rural inequality and poverty
are worrying, and no quantum leap in agrarian productivity or growth was
realized. So the revolutionary answer to solving the land question is still
with us. But it was not a good answer. Next to blanket state possession of
everything, other forms of property holding, from private to communal,
were not considered. But various new forms of ownership might have
very different outcomes as to socioeconomic dynamics. Because the land
question was only resolved very partially, it keeps haunting Ethiopian
rural society. The current regime went even further than any previous
one by also nationalizing all urban land, with even private plots falling
into state-controlled lease upon house sale,20 which is unprecedented
in Africa.
Class Rule and Governance
• Mandate: Like the Derg and the student fronts, also the EPRDF
rhetoric of power claimed to have taken over the government on
behalf of the oppressed, toiling masses of peasants, and workers
(the “broad masses”). While the idiom in today’s Ethiopia has
shifted, the self-perception of the current government and party

in power is strongly shaped by it. Allied to this is a perception

of the monopoly of power at the center (Markakis, 2011, p. 355,
calls it a “structural fault” in the design of the state project). This
reveals that ideologically schooled political elites (cf. Messay
Kebede, 2011, p. xiv) are still dominant in charting Ethiopia’s
development.
• Democratic centralism: As under the previous regime, this form
of decision making is still in place under the current ruling party.
It obviously comes from the Marxist–Leninist tradition. Part and
parcel of this are the “organizational operations” (dirigitawi sera),
known under the Derg and used when proclaiming state or party
projects top-down, for elections and for consulting the population
via ‘mass organizations’, and they are perfected under the current
government, sometimes for the good, sometimes for the bad. Part
of this is the continuation of political evaluations (gimgäma) and
expulsion procedures in all institutions and party organs, a practice
that may go beyond constitutional principles.
• Political democracy and the public sphere: In revolutionary think-
ing, since c. 1970s there was no place for a regular parliamentary-
democratic system and free and really independent media, but more
for a Socialist peoples’ republic under a vanguard party. The Derg
as well as the various leftist parties saw themselves as such, and
so did the TPLF and the OLF. This strand is continued in TPLF’s
“revolutionary democracy,” which needs a dominant party and is
of course not “liberal democracy” – this is seen as inappropriate
for a developing, multiethnic country with limited literacy, mass
rural poverty, low popular education levels, and a small urban
middle class.21
• Hegemonic regime and the use of selective repressive violence:
visible in the suppression of demonstrations, civic organiza-
tions, opposition activists, independent journalists, and in the
numerous “ethnic” conflicts. The scale of violence after 1991 is not
to be compared with the mimetic cycles of massive violent destruc-
tion under the Derg, and as such there is no continuity, and the
“language of violence” is different – for example, no “theatrical”
display of those killed. But regularly, power holders play upon the
legacy of fear among citizens, and use targeted violence as political
means, and due prosecution of perpetrators is often lacking. This
is what numerous human rights’ organizations reported in the
past two decades.

• The administrative structures installed by the Derg were main-

tained: Urban qäbäles and peasant associations, with a minor
reform in the higher units – no longer käftegnas and awrajas but
wärädas and zones, including “special” ones. They function as local
implementation structures for top-down government policies aided
by new means of control and dissemination such as the Internet
(via “WoredaNet”) and other communication modes.
• The discursive mutation of “revolutionary democracy” into
“developmental democracy” occurring since late 2013 has not led
to system changes yet; it may be a search for a new basis of state/
party legitimacy. While this “technocratic” move seemingly de-
emphasizes the “revolutionary” aspect of governance, the latter
form nevertheless stays in place as the political basis for party and
state policy.
Rights of Nationalities or Ethnic Groups
This was, and is, a centerpiece of revolutionary thinking, as evident from

the persistent leftist student debates in the late 1960s and 1970s, briefly
referred to above. Even the Derg had paid attention to it, in accordance
with Marxist–Leninist theory. It redefined ethnic diversity in Ethiopia
in terms of the Marxist–Stalinist definition of “nationality” and used
three “forms”: “people” (hizb),” “nation” (behér), and “nationality”
(behéreseb), partly a fictitious evolutionary ranking that did not really
correspond to Ethiopian realities, Behér traditionally meant territory,
region, or land with its population, rather than ethno-linguistic group.
The concept was all taken over from Marxist thinking then prevalent in
the Ethiopian student movements. The Derg’s “Institute for the Study
of Ethiopian Nationalities” (ISEN) according to Marxist nationality lore
had identified and described the ethno-linguistic groups/peoples/cultures
of Ethiopia, recognized them, and started literacy campaigns in some
15 languages. But while the post-1991 EPRDF government abolished
the ISEN, it took over its definition and categorization of groups, and
used them in the formation of killils, special (ethnic) wärädas and zones.
Some of these later also further split and multiplied. The Stalinist defi-
nitional straightjacket is still with us, as evident in the current Ethiopian
Constitution, Article 39, where the three terms of behér, behéreseb, and
hizb are defined on the same five criteria (see Article 39.5).
The crucial and much-discussed Article 39 in the Constitution (on the
rights of “nations, nationalities and peoples, up to and including secession”)

reflects unadulterated Marxist thinking, in line with the second stream in

erstwhile student revolutionary ideology. It aimed to specifically respond
to Ethiopian conditions of ethno-regional and ethno-linguistic disparities,
and the mobilization of ethno-regional insurgent movements in the rural
areas was partly successful because of that. But this style of mobilization
essentialized ethnicity and drew new lines between communities in the
process.22
The ethnic-based approach to politics and nationhood has thus
meant that “democracy” was defined via membership of or appeal
to one’s own ethnicity/nationality, and not in an ethnicity-neutral
political discourse. This was the revolutionary thing in EPDRF-style
“revolutionary democracy”; it has led to Ethiopians being primarily
ethnic subjects, not citizens.
The ethnicity factor in Ethiopian politics therefore is and will be a
key revolutionary legacy of the EPRDF to Ethiopia, and while it has
worked up to a certain extent in enhancing self-respect and visibility
of groups, the full implications are not yet clear. Some have noted that
the policy may have been “too successful,” as it threatens the state. The
essentialization of identities that has resulted is difficult to remove and
has a self-fulfilling prophecy effect, making national identity secondary.
In this respect, Plan B of the revolution may have run out of national
glue, so to speak. This will be an everlasting challenge, despite the
annual celebrations of the “National Flag Day” (since 2007) and the
“Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Day” (since 2005).23 The ethnic
numbers game, especially in mixed constituencies and zones, is very
complicated and tense. Furthermore, there is no necessary connec-
tion between the ethnicization of the political arena and democratic
structures (cf. L. Aalen & A. Kefale, 2013; Abbink, 2013).
Socioeconomic Questions and Social (In)equality
Revolutionary-socialist policies in Marxist vein of course aim for social

equality and disempowerment of the elite classes of land, capital, and
property owners, and for respecting the rights of workers and peasants,
including their self-organization. Here, the policies of the Derg were
partly continued, as nothing much changed in property relations: all land
remained state property, much of the productive assets and key industries
were state or party owned and remained so or were sold to party-linked
groups. The state as a major investor also figures very prominently under
EPRDF, which is now a self-declared “developmental-democratic” party,

and Ethiopia is declared a “developmental state.” But a new class elite

of wealth owners and officials has emerged, with in its tow a new upper
middle class of bureaucratic employees, parastatal officials, party-linked
investors, etc. A semi-independent investor class has emerged. As to the
kind of economic growth pursued, it seems that here the classic Walt
Rostow model (1960) of the stages of economic growth and takeoff is
being followed – a quintessentially liberal–capitalist model. Local reali-
ties and sensitivities are often cast aside, and frictions, for example, with
pastoralist groups and minorities, are ignored or suppressed. Social
inequality has also increased strongly in the past decade, and is much more
pronounced than under the Derg. A new class structure has emerged,
with a very wealthy upper layer, strongly linked to party and state.
The self-organization of Ethiopian workers and peasants has remained
very weak, also compared to other African countries, with, for instance,
the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) having no
autonomous status and being largely invisible.
Cultural and Religious Freedoms
After the revolution in 1974, there was initial success in the domain of
religious rights and freedoms, with the constitutionally declared equal-
ity of religions (although not for the traditional–tribal religions) and
the institution of a “secular state” regime. This was a legacy of revolu-
tionary thought as implemented by the Derg, which disempowered the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church and gave new rights to the Muslims. This was
continued under EPRDF (in the 1995 constitution), although no militant
antireligious policy was followed like the Derg had done.
In the early years of EPRDF rule, the policy toward religions was
not given much attention; rights were declared and religions were
tolerated and more or less left to sort it out, perhaps out of divide-and-
rule motives. But according of rights was perhaps also “too successful”:
vehement competition and polemics emerged between the various denom-
inations within Islam and Christianity, enhanced by proselytization and
inventive use of new media and of public space. Religious freedoms were
regularly abused by religious groups; polemical exchanges were exagger-
ated to great heights and yielded extremist responses. Local religion-based
conflicts were often not properly managed by the state. Additional law
giving was done in the past few years to dampen religious competition,
mobilization, and “extremism” (whereby the threats emanating from
Somalia were often cited). The standoff between the Ethiopian Muslim

community and the government in the past 3 years (2012–2014) led to

repression and is evidence of renewed policy engagement with the issue
of religious rights and the statute of the secular order.
Still, the irony of history is not lost on us here: In the first phase of the
revolution, religion, as “opium of the masses,” was strongly devalued
and suppressed by the political actors and movements, notably the Derg.
Now, after 1991, it is tolerated as an escape valve for spiritual fulfillment
(which is real), and as nonpolitical empowerment discourse, although it
is to be government controlled.24 The “return of the religious” has indeed
become a challenge to the state order.
Conclusion
Overseeing the 40-year period since the revolution, one could argue that
its legacies are still very much present in Ethiopia, and to a significant
extent continued in policy. It might also be noted that the revolution’s
“achievements” were probably not worth the human costs in lives lost,
economic damage, continued food insecurity, and deep humiliation
undergone by the popular masses. As it unfolded, the revolution had no
unitary program or trajectory, and was carried out by situated actors –
military, political groups, individuals – that compromised, “betrayed” it,
or changed course in order to keep power. In the process, they did serious
damage to the country’s unity.
The remarkable dogmatism and sectarianism, and the violent imple-
mentation of revolutionary ideals – initially without the starry-eyed
revolutionaries seeing the seeds of tyranny already present in their own
ideologies – have wrought havoc and created a subtext of fear and insecu-
rity in the entire society (cf. Abbink, 1995). It put the political and social
agenda back for decades. Rebellion and revolt against the imperial order
were understandable and to a large extent justified – and to be expected
after the failed 1960 coup, which was a watershed. But in true “dialectical”
fashion, the revolutionary ideals were formulated in the mirror image of
the authoritarian–repressive imperial order, with the revolutionaries of
all sides even exceeding it with their often unspoken belief in the “purify-
ing force” of “revolutionary violence,” that is, acts of brutal repression,
persecution of “enemies,” terror’ and targeted killing. This is indeed
the final and long-lasting legacy of the revolutionary turmoil – the fear
and deep distrust that settled in social relations and politics in particular.
The shades of fear, lingering trauma, and cynicism toward politics lie
just under the surface.

It is true that many modern democratic countries before consoli-

dating their political systems have gone through a traumatic phase
of “formative” violence: the Netherlands in its 80 years’ war with
Spain (seventeenth century), the USA with its appalling civil war
(mid-nineteenth century), Spain and its 1930s civil war, and many other
European countries in and after World War II. In this respect, Ethiopia
may not be an exception. But its postrevolutionary democracy is long
in coming, and its current form is highly contested and incomplete.
It is ideologically “over-determined” (see the name of the current ruling
party) and defined in a peculiar way, in the shadows of top-down Marxist
governance models of “democratic centralism” still alive and well.
In the post-1991 period, the erstwhile Socialist revolutionary elements
can clearly be seen in the political dispensation, the politics of governance,
and the policies implemented. A one-party-dominant (“vanguard”)
system is in place,25 with a strong focus on hegemonic policy, but also
on developmental issues and on the issue of nationalities as potentially
equal partners in a national venture. Indeed the “mandate” of the gov-
ernment is often said to be that of the broad masses, both the rural poor
and the disadvantaged nationalities. The economy has increasingly been
organized in the mirror of the Chinese model, including the party (and
state) as engine of economic activities and keeping control of all sectors of
society. And needless to say, in China that party is the Communist Party.
The above discussion shows that three general elements of revolu-
tionary Marxist doctrine as present in the student movements and in
Derg policies are still recognizable in today’s Ethiopia (cf. Clapham,
1992, pp. 107–108): the doctrine of development – in the name of the
masses, the doctrine of state control by a dominant vanguard party, and
the doctrine of multiethnic nation building – this time via ethno-regional
federalism. Obviously, these were adapted and fine-tuned, and show
pragmatic adaptation in response to changing external conditions and
donor-country priorities in a post-Cold War world, but in their core
they are still in place.
In Ethiopia, it is unclear whether the recent change in using the term
“developmental democracy” instead of “revolutionary democracy” will
entail further changes toward a more “open access” democratic system
(cf. North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009) and leave more of the revolution-
ary legacy (or burden) behind. The current government got the economy
moving, but not the system of political autocracy.
One can conclude that the ideological and political legacy of the
Ethiopian revolution, derived from the student movement, has been

absorbed in the “mainstream” of Ethiopian political culture. In fact, the

same premises of the revolutionary-socialist ideologies keep coming
back and are being recycled in all political and developmental debates
in Ethiopia, as well as in much of the analysts’ literature. The amount
of repetition in the descriptions of the Ethiopian political and economic
trajectory as well as of its “problems and challenges” is notable, and they
always hark back to the same issues of land, ethnic relations and nationali-
ties, food (in)security, “removing backwardness,” economic productivity
and growth, the developmental process, modernization, etc. Rarely are
modern democratic theory, deliberative politics, or institutional rule of
law issues tackled or even discussed, because they are usually declared
(by ruling elites) as out of sync with “African politics,” with its underde-
veloped economic base and tense ethnic diversity. While indeed ethnic
or ethno-regional realities need to be addressed and carefully managed,
it is difficult to see why they should hold democratic discourse and
political evolution hostage for the sake of the status quo. This status quo
suggests that autocracy is well entrenched and that a new developmental-
bureaucratic, party-bourgeoisie has been established. The irony is that
this class has emerged from the generation of revolutionary (ex-)Marxist
students/activists that in its time agitated against the imperial bourgeoisie
and its consorts. As some observers noted, history may have come back
full circle.
In the zero-sum game arena of Ethiopian politics, it will take a big politi-
cal effort, as well as culture change, to develop an ethos of compromise
and deliberation, and a representational democratic order with coalitional
politics and strong independent institutions. This may require the final
abandonment of the heavy ideological weight of the revolutionary past
to further transform the present.
Acknowledgment
This paper was prepared during a 2014–15 Fellowship at the Netherlands Institute
for Advanced Studies (NIAS), in Wassenaar, the Netherlands. I express my
deep gratitude to the NIAS. Also my sincere thanks to Dr. Stefano Bellucci
(IISG, Amsterdam).
Notes
1. The slaughters in other towns like Gondar, Dessie, Jimma, or Harar were as
bad. The extent and impact of the terror and violence in the smaller towns
and rural areas have long been understudied.

2. A term used for the “Committee” of the armed forces (variously estimated
at 109–120 members) that took power on June 28, 1974. It followed an earlier
Committee, the Armed Forces Coordinated Committee formed on March 23
that year, next to the fledgling imperial cabinet, but which was ousted by
radical military at a shoot-out at Debre-Zeit Air Force base on June 22.
3. Founded in 1972 in Ethiopia.
4. Founded in 1968 (in Hamburg, Germany).
5. This era was the first in which thousands of Ethiopians left their homeland
and gave the impulse to the emergence of the modern Ethiopian “diaspora.”
6. According to Darch (1976, p. 8). Bahru (2010, p. 1) mentions 1965.
7. Such as, remarkably, the c. 200,000 Orthodox Church priests, who on March
12, 1974 demanded higher pay and pension rights, under threat of a strike
(Paulos, 2006, p. 21).
8. I owe this point to Kiflu Tadesse (a former EPRP leader), personal com-
munication, November 14, 2014.
9. Research is urgently needed on the role of CELU in the revolutionary period.
One project, by Adem Kassie (PhD student, Addis Ababa University), is in
progress.
10. “Let Ethiopia advance without shedding any blood.”
11. “Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement,” a group that emerged from an
EPRF splinter group in northern Ethiopia after 1979.
12. Remarkable, however, in these movements was their quite patriarchal gender
insensitivity. Cf. Netsanet Mengistu’s remarks in Bahru (2010, pp. 117–118).
13. Also, during the ESUNA 19th Congress of August 26, 1971 in Los Angeles,
a resolution was passed on the nationalities question, declaring it more
important than the class struggle point of view. But it was repudiated by
the ESUNA General Assembly in a public statement of August 27, 1971,
restating the subservience of the “national question” to the “anti-feudalist”
and “anti-imperialist” struggle. Here, the big controversy that effectively
split not only ESUNA (see ESUNA 1971) but also the revolutionary student
movement in general became clear (cf. Bahru, 2010, p. 68). The results are
still with us.
14. News of which was repressed but which led to great indignation in the country,
especially among students and the urban educated class.
15. The well-known “spark” was the humiliation of soldiers by their officers in
Neghelle army camp in the South, on January 12, 1974.
16. August 10, 1974. It would have made Ethiopia a constitutional monarchy
with only a marginal role for the emperor, with parties and periodic general
elections. It proposed human rights clauses, free mass media, a National
Ombudsman office, and a justice system independent from the monarch.

17. In general it is remarkable, although to some extent understandable, that

no sustained discussions were conducted within the student movement on
forms of representative democracy and rule of law structures for Ethiopia –
presumably because they were (mistakenly) seen as elements of “bourgeois
democracy.”
18. See Paulos (2006, pp. 285–287) for the text.
19. Kiflu Tadesse, former EPRP leader (personal communication, November 14,
2014) emphasizes that there was genuine student enthusiasm for ‘spreading
the revolutionary ideas’ among the rural population. They were all the
more motivated by the declaration of “Ethiopian Socialism” by the Derg on
December 20, 1974, one day before the zämäch’a call was issued.
20. Cf. Proclamation no. 721/2004 EC, “Urban lands lease holding proclama-
tion,” Federal Negarit Gazet’a 18(4), November 28, 2011.
21. Democracy probably missed its chance in Ethiopia in the highly problematic
2005 elections.
22. In contemporary Ethiopia, de facto only ethno-linguistic parties are allowed;
other, nonethnic-based ones have been actively discouraged and even pre-
vented from operating.
23. However, there are indications that a gradual change is occurring because
many national development policy issues (such as hydropower dams/lakes
and large agrarian land-lease schemes and state plantations) are implemented
regardless of ethnic identities and rights.
24. Even many erstwhile Socialist activists and revolutionaries have turned to
religion.
25. Before the 24 May 2015 elections, only one parliament seat was held by an
opposition member. At the time of writing the final outcome of these much
criticized May elections was not yet known, but of the 442 seats counted in
mid-June none was accorded to an opposition party.
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Jon Abbink is an anthropologist-historian and a senior researcher at the

African Studies Centre, Leiden, and a research professor at VU Univer-
sity, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He carried out field research mainly in
Ethiopia and his chief interests are ethnicity, political anthropology, and
culture and religion in the Horn of Africa. Current projects in Ethiopia
deal with political culture, ethnic relations, and livelihoods and ethno-
history in southern Ethiopia. Among his recent publications are the
edited volumes The Anthropology of Elites (2012, with T. Salverda), and
Reconfiguring Ethiopia (2013, with T. Hagmann), and the co-authored
book Suri Orature (2014).
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The Ethiopian Revolution After 40 Years 1974-2014

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The Ethiopian Revolution After 40 Years 1974-2014

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The Ethiopian Revolution after 40 Years (1974-2014):

Article in Journal of Developing Societies · September 2015

Food cultures; developmentalism View project

Political change in the Horn of Africa View project

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In this article, I reflect on the sociopolitical impact and memory construction of

Keywords: Revolution, Ethiopia, post-Marxist politics, ethnic politics, political

Copyright © 2015 SAGE Publications www.sagepublications.com

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Introduction and Hypothesis

The Ethiopian revolution that “erupted” in February 1974 was more

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Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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A task for sociohistorical and anthropological research today remains

Origins – Ideological Elements

An explanation of revolution must combine structural factors and per-

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In subsequent years, the protest movement turned more radical Marxist,

Indeed Marxist views on politics and development were the thing to

Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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strike of c. 100,000 participants on March 7–10, 1974, after agitation

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Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and their programs of national

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Asserting that Plan B of the revolution in the 1980s was on course to

Some Causes of Revolutionary Turmoil – and the Sequel

Historical understanding of the antecedents and the unfolding of a

Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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Development Campaign” or Idgät bäHibrät (zämäch’a) in the first half of

Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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Issues in Plan A and Plan B: After 40 Years

The Land Issue

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smallholders and family- or clan-groups – was deemed to be an essential

Class Rule and Governance

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in power is strongly shaped by it. Allied to this is a perception

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• The administrative structures installed by the Derg were main-

Rights of Nationalities or Ethnic Groups

This was, and is, a centerpiece of revolutionary thinking, as evident from

Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357

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reflects unadulterated Marxist thinking, in line with the second stream in

Socioeconomic Questions and Social (In)equality

Revolutionary-socialist policies in Marxist vein of course aim for social

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and Ethiopia is declared a “developmental state.” But a new class elite

Cultural and Religious Freedoms

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community and the government in the past 3 years (2012–2014) led to

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It is true that many modern democratic countries before consoli-

Journal of Developing Societies 31, 3 (2015): 333–357