Crim 1

Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No.
109266)
Facts:
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly
committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-
99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case
No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate.
The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a
member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. The Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the
motion to defer the arraignment. Petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. According to petitioner, unless she was
furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended
Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds. Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the 32 Amended Informations may be admitted?
Held:
The petition is denied.
The Court find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence,
there should only be one information to be file against her.The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as
delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act - that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also
averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a
single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the
original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states
the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or
about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the
stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government
suffered a single harm or injury.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is
affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office
of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations
(Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number,
i.e., No. 16698.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179943

Appellee,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
-versus- CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON yHOMO, Promulgated:

Appellant.
June 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato
Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of
Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored
Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.[3]
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the drivers side in order to take the key of
the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there
were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up P50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank.
After doing this, he returned the key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the
vehicle would not start.[4] Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline
boy Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers
of the same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38
caliber pistol.[5]
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down, [6] while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car Wash
Section.[7] At that instance, guns were poked at them.[8]
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop
ticket and P50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.[9]
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth P3,000.00. [10] Those four
robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach. [11] Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.[12]
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately leave the
place.[13] The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal. [14] When the robbers left,
Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also
saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the
injured Edralin Macahis to the hospital.[15] Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.[16]
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun at him. [17]
However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita Emma at Pantok,
Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant
asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger
brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain
Christian Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia
if he would allow appellant to hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there
were other passengers in the said vehicle.[18]
When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do so; instead, he
was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he
woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-
up. He never left the vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard
the gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On
their way, they were followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was
then that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind.
When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.[19]
As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias Rey, an alias Jonard,
an alias Precie, and an alias Renato, which read as:
Criminal Case No. 4747
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and
acting as a band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using
disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C. Natividad, and
represented by Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away
its cash earnings worth P3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid
amount of P3,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed
firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station,
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating , together
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and
still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and
acting as a band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using
disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the Cashier of Energex Gasoline
Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at P1,500.00

b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at P2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at P500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at P150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at P175.00
to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of P4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-
named accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with
Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard,
Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a
Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law.
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines
still at-large, and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and
violence and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with
serial number 13265 valued at P12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented
by its General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services
Incorporated in the aforesaid amount of P12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused,
while armed with unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia,
Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie
and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines,
still at-large and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and
violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline
Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:
a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued at P2,000.00
b) Cash money worth P50.00
to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with
Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard,
Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-
large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a
Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly
caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of
not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad, [20] then officer-in-charge of Energex
Gasoline Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis, [21] a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin
Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,[22] a gasoline boy of the same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta, [23] also a gasoline boy
of the same gas station, and Alberto Quintos,[24] general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the
deceased security guard was employed.
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo, [25] a cousin of appellant
and the appellant[26] himself.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[27] convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt of
all the charges against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad
and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of P3,000.00 as compensatory damages and to pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having
acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert
de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission
of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;
3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon
Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the
commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution
is no longer possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having
acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert
de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission
of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the amount of
P2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer possible and to pay the costs.
As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-large, let a warrant
of arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their
reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.
As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias
Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and are still at-large,
let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification
and apprehension of the said accused.
SO ORDERED.
The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,[28] in conformity with the Decision
dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying
the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125
and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated
September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to
the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and
allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court.This Court transferred the
cases to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
The CA, on June 29, 2007,[29] affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the dispositive portion
reading:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y
Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only one count.
Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon
de Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,[30] the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of
the Supplemental Brief[31] dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a supplemental brief.
Appellant filed a Manifestation[32] on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts his Appellant's
Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
Appellant, in his Brief,[33] assigned the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME CHARGED
WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.
The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,[34] insisted that all the elements of the crime and the appellant's participation
in the crime had been established.
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,[35] argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion perpetua,
because the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not
alleged with specificity.
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.
In People v. De Jesus,[36] this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with homicide, thus:
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following
elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. [37]
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.[38] The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human
life.[39]The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference
or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration.[40] There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or
simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim
of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or
usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the
victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed
by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The
word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the
fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the
property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or
thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.[41] The prosecution is not burdened to prove the
actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the
possession of the victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or
value involved.[42]
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although
they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. [43]
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery
and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of
such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the
criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. [44]
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to
prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As
long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other
than the situs of the robbery.
From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution,
the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused
that their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was
committed. The question now is whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant,
the prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The
prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a
convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant
as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at
him.
Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed
and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another
but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. [48] Once conspiracy is shown,
the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,[49] since all the conspirators are principals.
As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
is that the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case. [50]
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the commission of
the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was merely present
during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must
have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the
commission thereof.[51] Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the
company of the robbers nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts
generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct
them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of
the crime committed.[52]
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery with homicide. In the
crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As
decided[53] by the Court of Appeals:
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of

acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.[54] Although there is a series of acts, there is only one
crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. [55]
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the
Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and
valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these
circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing
offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by
an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. [56] This can be said of the case at hand.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,[57] wherein the robbery that took place in
several houses belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be
taken as separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the general plan
to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the [appellant]
had committed eight different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and different acts of
spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons. [58] The Highest Tribunal, however,
ruled that the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one another. [59] Thus,
the single offense or crime.
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision[60] merely states that, in view of the enactment
of R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua,
but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when
the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. [61] It must be remembered that the
Informations filed with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a
special and not a generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by this Court
in Palaganas v. People:[62]
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in
Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect
of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next
higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial
in order to be appreciated.[63] Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to
increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the
next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged. [64] It must always be alleged
and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. [65] Moreover, it
cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are
exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance
provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866, [66] as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,[67] which is a
special law. Its pertinent provision states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is silent as to whether it is
generic or qualifying.[68] Thus, it ruled that when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the
accused.[69] Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying
aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by
degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be
considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance. [70] This interpretation is erroneous, since we already
held in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed
firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic
aggravating circumstance.[71] Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the
commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner in the
instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely
a generic aggravating circumstance.
In another case,[72] this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the firearm.[73] In the said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgodied of, and Pedro
Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident
showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated
the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm
was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be
established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The
prosecution failed to present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or
own a firearm, hence, the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no
longer possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this
Court's rulings[74] on temperate damages apply, thus:
In People vs. Abrazaldo,[75] we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral
expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be
awarded in the amount of P25,000[76] This doctrine specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral
expenses was presented in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than
P25,000 are proved during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs.
Villanueva[77] which modified the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu
of the actual damages of a lesser amount. To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victims heirs
who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation than
those who might have presented no receipts at all but would now be entitled to P25,000 temperate damages. [78]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to
the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 181626. May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Santiago Paera (petitioner) a Punong Barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, allocates limited
distribution of communal water from a communal tank to his constituents. The tank was located at the property
of Vicente Darong, the complainant, father of Indalecio Darong, a complainant. Despite the petitioners’ scheme,
Indalencio continued drawing water from the tank. On April 7, 1999, Santiago Paera reminded Indalencio of the
water scheme and cut Indalencio’s access.
The following day the petitioner inspected the tank due to his constituents’ complaints of about the water
interruption supply and discovered a tap on the main line and he disconnected it. To stop water from leaking,
petitioner borrowed a bolo and made a wooden plug, this was when Indalecio arrived. What happened next
was contested by both parties..
According to the prosecution, Paera without any warning charged and shouted at Indalecio “patyon tikaw!” (I
will kill you). Indalecio ran for safety and passing along the way Diosetea his wife who followed him going to
the tank. Diosetea asked the petitioner what’s the matter and instead of replying, petitioner shouted ”wala koy
gipili, bisag babaye ka patyon tikaw!”, (“I don’t spare anyone, even if you’re a woman, I will kill you!”). diosotea
also ran and sought refuge to a nearby house of her relative. Unable to pursue Diosotea, petitioner turned his
back to Indalecio. As he chase Indalecio, he came across Vicente, father of Indalecio and recognizes him and
thrusts his bolo towards him shouting, “bisag gulang ka, buk-on ko imo ulo!” (“even if you’re old I will crack
open your skull”).
According to petitioner, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo. Angrily inquiring why the petitioner
cut his supply of water connection. Forcing the petitioner to take a defensive stance and using a borrowed
bolo that makes Indalencio ran away.
Except for the father of Indalecio, Vicente who was seriously ill, the Darong’s testified during trial. The
petitioner was the defense lone witness.
ISSUE:
Was Santiago Paera guilty of grave threats?
DECISION:
Yes, Santiago Paera is guilty of grave threats. The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to prove
the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs’ persistent water tapping contrary to
Paeras directive must have angered Paera, triggering his criminal behaviour. The MCTC rejected petitioner’s
defence of denial as self-serving and uncorroborated.
The Regional Trial Court affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s findings on petitioner’s motive. The RTC
similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the ‘”clear, direct and consistent” testimonies of the
Darong`s and other prosecution witnesses.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and
complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the personof the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime. This felony is
consummated as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened.
Santiago Paera’s threat to kill Indalencio and Diosetia and crack open Vicente’s skull are wrongs
amounting to homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized in Revised Penal Code. The threats were
consummated as soon as the Darongs heared Paera said his threatening remarks.
The proof of grave threats against Vicente came from the prosecution’s evidence on the testimonies
of Indalencio and Diosetia and two witnesses who corroborated with them indisputably shows the threat of
Paera on killing Vicente. Vicente’s absence on the stand does not affect the veracity and strength of the
prosecution’s evidence.
There is no justifying circumstances attended on Paera’s commission of grave threats. His claim of
defence of a stranger under rule number 3 of Article 11 of the RPC which negates the criminal liability of
“anyone who acts in defence of his persons or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
in the next preceding circumstance are present and the person defending be not induced by resentment,
revenge or any other evil motives” which requires 1. Unlawful aggression 2. Reasonable necessity of means
to avoid or repeal it and 3. Lack of provocation on the part of the person being attacked. None of this requisites
was obtained.This claim of Paera has no merit on having acted to protect and defend the water rights of his
constituents in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under Article 11 paragraph 5
lies upon a proof the offense was committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty
or the lawful exercise of office. When Paera barred the Darong’s access to communal water, arguably, he acted
in the performance of his duty to ensure the delivery of basic services. But he excessively exceeded the
bounds of his office when he chased the Darong’s with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons
for violation on his orders.
The Supreme Court denied the petition of Santiago Paera and affirms the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete, Branch 39 dated November 28, 2008.
People vs. Comadre 431 SCRA 366 (2004) (Digest)

Complex Crime
26. People vs. Comadre 431 SCRA 366 (2004)
Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking grioup) were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father (Jaime). As the drinking session went on,
Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano (appellants)
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly
throw a hand grenade, ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Drinking group were hit by shrapnel (fragments of the
grenade) and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the Hospital. However, Robert died before
reaching the hospital. TC: appellants guilty of complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants?
Held: Only Antonio is liable for the crime.
RULING:
It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry
Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright. No conspiracy. Only Antonio is
liable for the crime. When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him.
G.R. No. 189846 June 26, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL MORES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Herein appellant Ramil Mores seeks the review of the Decision1 dated August 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 01362, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ramil Mores, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 dated September 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43 in Criminal Case
No. R-632. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder.
The pertinent portion of the Amended Information 3 charging appellant and his co-accused Delio Famor (Famor) with
the commission of the aforementioned felony reads:
That on or about the 24th day of January, 1994 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Multi-Purpose Gymnasium, at
Barangay Bagumbayan, Municipality of Roxas, Province of Or. Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously toss/hurl a live hand grenade at the center
of the dancing hall wherein townsfolks are having a Farewell Ball in connection with the town fiesta celebration, inflicting
upon Ramie Balasa mortal wounds causing his death and injuries to Delfa Ylanan, Harold Fetalco, Noel Faminialagao,
Haynee Lizza Morota, Johnelyn Sinel, Arcel Morillo, Ronald Manalo, Mutia De Leon, Elizabeth Magpantay, Romeo
Ibabao, Joy Gabayno, Manny Balasa, Marilyn Ibabao and Mayra Suarez, thus performing all the acts of execution
necessary to produce the felony directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes not the
will of perpetrators.
That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and nocturnity
are attendant.
At their arraignment, appellant and Famor pleaded not guilty to the charge against them.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits
commenced. While trial was on-going, appellant, who had previously been granted bail, failed to appear during two
hearing dates. Thus, the bail bond that he posted was forfeited, a bench warrant was issued against him and he was
tried in absentia. Only Famor was able to present evidence on his defense.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were summarized in the trial court’s assailed Decision dated September
24, 1998 in this manner:
The prosecution’s evidence tends to show the following: At about 6:00 p.m. of January 24, 1994, Daryl Famisaran was
chatting with his friends at the Madugo [B]ridge. While they were conversing, (appellant) passed by, stopped before
them and with a grenade in his hand, talked to them in this wise: "Gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito?" ("Do you want me to
explode this"). After (appellant) had left, they immediately dispersed. In the evening of the same date, at about 9:00
p.m., he (Daryl) was at Roxas Gymnasium where a ball was being held. He was then standing on the second bench
from the ground floor on the right side of the stadium near the entrance. To his right was Margie Labatete and to the
right of Labatete was Rey Raymundo (TSN, September 7, 1994, p. 12). There were many persons inside the gym.
From their place up to the edge of the dance floor going towards the inner portion of the gymnasium was a distance of
about twenty-five meters (25m) filled up with rows of chairs and tables. While the dancing was going on, Daryl saw
again (appellant) at a distance of about five (5) armslength on the same row or line from them. (Appellant) was then
with accused Delio Famor and they were whispering to each other. In between him and the two (2) accused were
persons sitting on the rows of chairs and spectators (TSN, September 7, 1994, p. 10). He could no longer tell what
Famor was wearing because his view of him was covered by (appellant). It was at this point that he saw (appellant)
pulled out a round object, which Daryl knew to be a grenade, from (appellant’s) left pocket, transferred it to his right
hand and then threw it on the floor as if rolling a ball (TSN, Ibid, [p]p. 6-7). Then, a commotion ensued and he heard
outcries. He looked for his companions and saw one Nonoy Acebuque and assisted him in going out of the gymnasium.
The narrative of Daryl Famisaran regarding the 6:00 p.m. incident of January 24, 1994 at Madugo Bridge where
(appellant) while holding a handgrenade uttered "Gusto ninyo pasabugin ko ito" in their presence was corroborated by
Esteban Galaran, Jr. According to Esteban, he knew (appellant) and accused Famor because they were former
members of Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (hereinafter called CAFGU for brevity). At about 6:00 p.m. of
January 24, 1994, he was at Madugo Bridge with Daryl Famisaran, Jomer Fabiletante and Francisco Depuno.
While they were [seated] on the railings of the bridge, (appellant) and Famor passed by. Then, (appellant) pulled out
an object from his pocket, raised it and uttered in the vernacular "Gusto ninyo pasabugin ko ito?" Thereafter, (appellant)
proceeded to the rice mill and they also left the place (TSN, September 8, 1994, pp. 3-4). In the evening of the same
date, Esteban stayed at his house which is about half a kilometer from the gymnasium. He came to know later on from
Rey Raymundo that a grenade exploded at the Roxas Gymnasium that evening.
Also present at the Roxas Gymnasium during the ball as of the time mentioned by Daryl Famisaran the explosion
occurred were witnesses Delfa Ylanan, Myra Suarez and Noel Faminialagao.
According to Delfa Ylanan, she was then with Ramy Balasa, Manny Balasa and Malyn Balasa at the gymnasium
witnessing the on-going ball. They were in front of a table and in front of them separated by the table was Orpha
Famisaran who was about two (2) meters from them. Then, she saw an object with the size of her fist rolled in front of
them towards the direction of Orpha. The latter peeped under the table and she kicked the object. At that instance,
Orpha’s back was in front of them while in front of Orpha was another table. She claimed that the object even hit the
leg of the table of Orpha (TSN, September 8, 1994, p. 11). After Orpha had kicked the object there was an explosion
and a commotion ensued. She felt her feet getting hot and so, she asked for assistance from her companion Ramy
(also spelled Ramie) Balasa. Ramy was not able to help her because he suddenly fell down such that she instead
assisted Ramy and they brought him to Dr. Comia’s clinic. Ramy Balasa was later on transferred to Roxas District
Hospital where he died.
Myra Suarez was on the dance floor with partner Louie Faina immediately before the explosion. They were dancing at
the right side of the stadium facing the stage when something exploded under the table at their back at a distance of
about two (2) armslength from them. She was wounded at the back for which she was treated at Roxas District Hospital
for a day and then she was transferred to UST Hospital where she was confined for four (4) days.
Noel Faminialagao was also dancing when the explosion occurred. They were then at the right side of the gymnasium
facing the stage at a distance of about ten (10) meters from the place of the explosion. He sustained injury at the back
of his right leg for which he was treated at Roxas District Hospital for two (2) days.
When he heard the explosion, SPO2 Walfredo Lafuente was at his house at Fabella Village which is about two hundred
(200) meters from the gymnasium. He immediately proceeded to the gymnasium arriving thereat approximately twelve
(12) to fifteen (15) minutes from the time he heard the explosion. While walking towards the gymnasium, SPO2 Lafuente
met accused Delio Famor near the store of Aling Norbing Faminialagao which is about fifty (50) meters from the
gymnasium. Famor was then with (appellant) and another unidentified person according to Lafuente. He asked Famor
what happened to which the latter replied that something exploded. In his estimate, Lafuente met Famor about ten (10)
minutes from the time he heard the explosion. He proceeded to the plaza and immediately conducted investigation
thereat with the other members of the Roxas PNP composed of Chief of Police Arnulfo Sison, Diego Falseso and other
members whom he could no longer recall. In the middle of the gym or what he called plaza, they recovered metal
fragments and lever of a grenade with Serial No. UM-204-A-2 which were placed inside two (2) separate envelopes
accordingly marked as Exhibits "I" and "J".
Dr. Efren Faustino who is then the OIC of Roxas District Hospital was at the said hospital in the evening of January 24,
1994 when according to him there was a steady stream of vehicles with several patients with multiple injuries coming
to the hospital and that they could hardly cope with the injured persons as they were only two (2) doctors at the said
hospital. These persons who came to the hospital informed him that there was a grenade blast in the municipal plaza
of Roxas. In his (Dr. Faustino’s) estimate, there were about forty (40) persons who were treated at the hospital of
shrapnel injuries but some of them, they were not able to record or document for lack of time to write that night. In due
course, he identified about twenty-four (24) medico-legal certificates issued by him which were marked in evidence as
Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-23" (Records, pp. 217-240). He likewise opined that all these injuries or wounds treated by him
which were the subject of the medical certificates he issued, were caused by blasting. He also attended to one Ramie
Balasa who sustained a wound on the chest and on the left leg. When they opened the chest of Ramie Balasa they
found a shrapnel embedded at the right anterior wall of the heart causing a blood hemorrhage which caused his death.
He likewise identified the necropsy report on the cadaver of Ramie Balasa which was marked as Exhibit "F" and the
death certificate of the victim issued by him which was accordingly marked as Exhibit "G". According to him, the cause
of death of Ramie Balasa is hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to shrapnel wound or in
layman’s language massive loss of blood (TSN, October 1, 1996, p. 18).
The aforementioned incident was investigated by Roxas PNP Police Investigator Edgar Valencia and the investigators
of the CIS of Oriental Mindoro. According to Police Investigator Valencia, when he arrived at the gymnasium, Police
Officers Renato Cruz and Walfredo Lafuente were already there. They immediately secured the area and told the
people to step out of the gymnasium. They scoured the area and found out that the explosion occurred at the right side
of the gymnasium if one would enter it on the northern side and that the tables inside the gymnasium were hit by the
explosion. One of his companions likewise found a "pin" of a grenade pointing to the safety lever marked as Exhibit "J".
They were not able to determine the source of the grenade on the basis of the metal fragments and the metal lever
although they referred them to the CIS for that purpose. Neither did they refer them to a crime laboratory for
examination. To his recollection, several persons were wounded and one (1) died as a result of the grenade explosion.5
On the other hand, the trial court summed the defense witnesses’ testimonies as follows:
Accused Delio Famor for his part interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that in the evening of January
24, 1994 he slept early at his house with his wife and their two-year old child. His house was located at Fabella Village
just beside the house of a certain Boy Cruz and estimated to be one hundred (100) meters from the gymnasium. At
about 9:00 in the evening he was still asleep when his wife Concepcion Famor woke him up. She told him that there
was an explosion from the direction of Camp Gozar. At that time, he was a member of CAFGU assigned at Camp
Gozar. He stood up and waited if something untoward will happen because he initially thought that there was an NPA
raid. After a while, he put on a t-shirt and went out of the house with his wife. They were many persons around and one
of them told him that something exploded at the gymnasium. He proceeded to the Shell station near Camp Gozar. On
the way, he met Rey Raymundo. He even asked Rey where did the explosion come from who answered that it was at
the plaza. Near the station, he met Sgt. Paraoan, their First Sergeant at Camp Gozar. He (Sgt. Paraoan) borrowed a
vehicle from the Shell station and he joined Sgt. Paraoan looking for the latter’s children who also attended the ball.
They found them at the hospital because they brought there a cousin who was wounded in the explosion. Thereafter,
he returned to his house. He denied the testimony of Daryl Famisaran that immediately before the explosion he was
with (appellant) and about five (5) armslength from Daryl and that they were whispering to each other when (appellant)
pulled out a grenade from his pocket and then pitched it on the floor towards the dancing area. He likewise denied the
statement of Esteban Galaran, Jr. that at about 6:00 p.m. of January 24, 1994 he was with (appellant) at Madugo Bridge
when the latter holding a hand grenade uttered, "Gusto ninyo pasabugin ko ito?"
Accused Delio Famor further claimed that as a member of CAFGU he was seriously wounded and even showed his
lengthy scars in his abdomen and forearm, in an encounter with NPA Unit at Barangay Batangan, Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro and could have been an awardee in that year were it not for his involvement in this case. He further testified
that when he was invited by the CIS operatives, he was brought to Canlubang, Laguna where they subjected him to
electric shocks and water treatments, and he told them that even if they would kill him, he cannot tell them anything
because he knew nothing of the crime being imputed against him. After five (5) days he was brought to the provincial
jail at Roxas but he did not bother to file a case against his tormentors.
The version narrated by accused Famor was corroborated by his wife Concepcion and in part by Rey Raymundo.
According to Rey Raymundo, in the evening of January 24, 1994, he was at Roxas Gymnasium where there was an
on-going ball-dance. Initially, he was with his niece Hayneeliza Morota but later on he was joined by Daryl Famisaran
and Margie Labatete. They were then at the western side of the gymnasium (obviously right side) with the northern
entrance as a point of reference. Before the explosion there was crashing sound similar to that produced by a glass or
bottle hitting the floor near the table occupied by his cousin Elwood and a certain Mutya and Orpha. A few seconds
thereafter, there was an explosion. The lights at the stadium went off and in a few seconds the lights returned. The
table of Orpha was about two (2) meters from their place. He did not see (appellant) nor Delio Famor inside the
gymnasium. After the lights had returned, he saw Hayneeliza bloodied in the face and so he assisted her in going
outside the gymnasium. Thereafter, they saw a jeepney with familiar faces on board. He requested them to bring
Hayneeliza to the hospital while he ran towards his house. Along the way, he met Delio Famor who even asked him
where the explosion was. He claimed to have spent the sum of ₱16,000.00 in connection with the treatment of his
injured eye.6
At the conclusion of court proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder. However, it acquitted co-accused Famor on the ground that there was a paucity of evidence to
establish that Famor was appellant’s co-conspirator in the commission of the criminal act of which both of them were
charged. The dispositive portion of the assailed September 24, 1998 Decision of the trial court reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The court finds the accused Ramil Mores who was tried in absentia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH
to be executed in accordance with existing law. And as he is at large, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued for his
apprehension. But, in accordance with the principle laid down in the case of People vs. Esparas, et al., G.R. No. 120034,
August 30, 1996 that the automatic appeal of a death sentence still applies to a death convict who escaped, the Clerk
of Court of this Court, Atty. Mariano S. Familara III is directed to transmit to the Honorable Supreme Court the complete
records of the case for review.
(2) Accused Ramil Mores is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Ramie Balasa compensatory damages in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 and the sum of ₱6,000.00 to Myra Suarez as actual damages;
(3) For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused Delio Famor beyond reasonable doubt, the said
accused is ACQUITTED of the charge of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. Being a detention prisoner, the said
accused is hereby ordered released from confinement unless he is being detained on some other charge or charges
or that there is an order from other court to the contrary, without pronouncement as to costs. 7
In view of the death penalty handed down by the trial court, appellant’s case was automatically elevated to this Court
for reexamination; however, in conformity with the rule we laid down in People v. Mateo, 8 the matter was remanded to
the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming with modification the trial court’s ruling. The dispositive
portion of the assailed August 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 11,
2007 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:
(1) Appellant Ramil Mores is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole;
(2) Appellant Ramil Mores is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ramie Balasa the following:
(a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(c) ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages;
(3) Appellant Ramil Mores is hereby ordered to pay Myra Suarez ₱5,000.00 as temperate damages. 9
Since Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines) was already in force
when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the appellate court correctly modified the original penalty of death to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Hence, Mores filed this appeal wherein both prosecution and defense counsels merely adopted their briefs with the
appellate court. Appellant reiterated the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10
In connection with the first assigned error, appellant argues that the element of treachery, which qualified his felony to
Murder, is not present in this case. Appellant maintains that "there is no evidence showing that he consciously adopted
the method of attack (grenade throwing) directly and especially to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without danger
to himself."11 He insists that the act of throwing the grenade, as alleged by the prosecution, was made at the spur of
the moment and the short distance between the explosion and his alleged location negates any sense of concern for
his own well-being which serves to belie any treacherous intent on his part.
As for the second and third assigned errors which were discussed jointly, appellant contends that since his co-accused
Famor purportedly successfully proved his alibi, then it follows that appellant should also be acquitted. Appellant argues
that since the prosecution insists that both he and Famor were together when the grenade throwing incident occurred
then the acquittal of Famor on the basis that he was not present at the crime scene totally destroys the prosecution’s
theory of the case. Thus, appellant should be exonerated from any wrongdoing.
Appellant likewise claimed that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and
should not have been given credit by the trial court.
Furthermore, appellant asserts that flight must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Although it is
undisputed that, after his arraignment, appellant had stopped appearing in court and up to this day remains at large,
appellant points out that he never left the vicinity of the crime scene and was, in fact, seen by one of the prosecution
witnesses, to be near that area 10 minutes after the explosion occurred. If he was indeed the perpetrator of the grisly
crime charged, appellant argues that he could have just left town that very evening in order to insure non-
apprehension.12
We are not persuaded and, thus, sustain appellant’s conviction.
Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that "there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."
It is long settled in jurisprudence that two elements must concur in order to establish treachery: (a) that at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means of attack employed.13 Thus, the essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.14
We agree with the appellate court that the manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground
towards the dance floor packed with unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the aftermath of
the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. Appellant’s unexpected action which was immediately followed by
the grenade’s lethal explosion left the victims with utterly no chance to escape the blast area nor to find protective
cover. Though appellant stood a short distance away, he knowingly positioned himself safely from the reach of the
grenade’s destructive force. From the foregoing, we can confidently conclude that treachery, as correctly pointed out
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, was present in the commission of the crime charged.
With regard to appellant’s contention that the acquittal of the co-accused Famor merits a similar acquittal for himself,
we rule that appellant erred in his appreciation of the actual ground for Famor’s acquittal as well as the effect of such
exoneration on appellant’s own criminal culpability.
Appellant is grossly mistaken in his conclusion that Famor was acquitted because the trial court believed his alibi.
Nothing more could be farther from the truth. Even a cursory reading of the assailed September 24, 1998 Decision of
the trial court would reveal that Famor’s acquittal stemmed from the prosecution’s inability to prove that Famor was a
co-conspirator of appellant in the commission of the dastardly act which is the subject of this criminal case. In other
words, the trial court did not exonerate Famor because his alibi was confirmed. He was adjudged not guilty of the crime
charged because his proximity and whispered communications to appellant moments before the grenade throwing
incident occurred was deemed by the trial court as insufficient evidence to establish conspiracy between him and
appellant. Thus, appellant and Famor’s presence in the crime scene as testified to by witness Daryl Famisaran
(Famisaran) was never doubted by the trial court.
Furthermore, contrary to appellant’s protestation, we find no cogent reason to question the veracity of the testimony of
Famisaran as well as that of the other witnesses for the prosecution. We have reiterated in jurisprudence that when the
credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.15 In all, we concur with the trial court in setting aside the inconsequential differences in the
prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies and in pointing out that their testimonies actually corroborated each other as to
rolling of a grenade onto the dance floor and their respective positions from the blast.
Finally, we cannot subscribe to appellant’s theory that his continued presence at the vicinity of the Municipality of Roxas
right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of the crime charged and that his absence in court proceedings
subsequent to his arraignment should not be taken against him. We have elucidated on this point in one recent case
wherein we held that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence, to wit:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave differently and even erratically in
externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while
others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other
members of the community.16 (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, our position on the effects of unexplained flight on the guilt or innocence of an accused remains
unchanged.1âwphi1 In People v. Camat,17 we reiterated the jurisprudential doctrine that flight is indicative of guilt in
this manner:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. In one case, this Court had stated that it is well-
established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as a lion. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
From the foregoing, we have no other recourse but to sustain appellant’s conviction for the complex crime of Murder
with Multiple Attempted Murder. As correctly explained by the Court of Appeals, the single act of pitching or rolling the
hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which resulted in the death of Ramie Balasa (Balasa) and injuries to other
victims constituted a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most serious crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to DEATH. Thus, applying Article 48, the death penalty should be imposed. However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the proper sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Also in line with current jurisprudence,18 we increase the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Balasa
on account of his murder by appellant from Fifty Thousand Pesos (!!50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00). We likewise increase the award of exemplary damages from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (!!25,000.00)
to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00). Moreover, moral damages should also be awarded in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (!!50,000.00). With regard to the instances of Attempted Murder, appellant is ordered to pay Forty Thousand
Pesos (₱40,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages to each
victim. 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01362 convicting appellant Ramil Mores for murder with multiple attempted murder for which he is to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) Appellant Ramil Mores is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Ramie Balasa Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages;
(2) Appellant Ramil Mores is ordered to pay each victim of ATTEMPTED MURDER, Forty Thousand Pesos
(₱40,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
(3) Appellant Ramil Mores is further ordered to pay the private offended parties or their heirs interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Punzalan, Jr.
G.R. No. 199892; December 10, 2012
Facts:
- Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1
Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the
Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.
- On August 10, 2002, at 5 or 6 p.m., they all went to the All-in-One Canteen to drink and at 10 p.m. transferred to
Aquarius, a videoke bar where SN1Bacosa and appellant Punzalan got into a fight.
- The Navy group walked back to the NETC Camp to avoid aggravating the conflict. The appellant, however, drunk
drove a maroon Nissan with plate number DRW 706 and followed the group to the camp. The navy sentries flagged
down Punzalan and heard him threaten to kill the Navy members he fought in the bar.
- Punzalan charged forward despite being flagged down, hit the group of navy personnel from behind, and sped away
resulting to the death of Andal and Duclayna, and injuries to the rest of the group.
- Punzalan was charged with complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Attempted Murder attended
by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
- Punzalan countered the verdict and claimed that he only accelerated the vehicle because he was attacked by the
Navy group. He insisted that he bumped the group without intent to kill and that he may not be held criminally liable as
he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. He asserted that the attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual and
imminent danger to his life and limb.
CRIMINAL LAW
Issue: WON Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury (WON a justifying circumstance may be invoked).
Held/Ratio: NO. Punzalan’s assertions regarding the existence of the evil which he sought to be avoided are baseless
and such evil did not actually exist as the allegations neither conformed to the evidence at hand nor were they consistent
with the testimony of his own witness. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke
avoidance of greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the evil
sought to be avoided actually exists;  (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and  (3) there be no other
practical and less harmful means of preventing it. There is no corroboration among the testimonies. Punzalan also
failed to satisfy the third requisite as the infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not
befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another.
Furthermore, WON Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question of fact.
Issue: WON the crime is qualified as murder
Held/Ratio: YES. Treachery is clearly present in the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially
to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The
elements of treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted. Punzalan’s act of
running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were walking inside the NETC camp was a clear act
of treachery. The victims were surprised and were not able to prepare and repel the treacherous assault of Punzalan.
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
Facts:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to death on
March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270),
Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317).
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres
Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain peace and
order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and
(3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been
also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of
VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan,
who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of
117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with the
deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey,
Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto
Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate.
Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at
the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench
situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west),
from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the
ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5
meters.
At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly
without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive
burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but
was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the
Octagon cockpit arena.
Trial Court’s Ruling:
“In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared to have
been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code,
the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum
period XXX..”
Trial Court’s Justification of the Ruling:
“In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which should
have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been prosecuted under one
information, involving four (4) murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive
automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first
category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as
decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-
26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the
result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by
TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves
against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99
Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single Penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15,
1989).”
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge
Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, are complex crimes and should have been prosecuted
under only one information?
Ruling:
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four
murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4)
victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous
(emphasis ours) does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama
(not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, and People vs. Pineda.
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which
killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex
crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case
at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence
adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He
fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the
crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with
the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case killed five persons with a
Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated
therein:
“In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each
of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other
persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said
article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet
the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted
upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself
criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same.
Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person
killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or
frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of
them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)”
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson
sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his
finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what
a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case because
the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court
read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the first
half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no
showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate
and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:
Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate
murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated
in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the
case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime.
They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has
caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO
January 25, 2017 § Leave a comment

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash
ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the
information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property (YES)
Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property having been previously
convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that
the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to
Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural
and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-
offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that
same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies
in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural
tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the
most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single
act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of
the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND
PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which
affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant Rolly Adriano y
Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and
for the crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the
Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y Sales."
Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of Information read:
Crim. Case No. 13159-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different
parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs. 3
Crim. Case No. 13160-07
On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs. 4
Version of the Prosecution:
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos
(P02 Santos), in civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a motorcycle along Olongapo-
Gapan National Road.5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no.
WHK 635, heading towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV
(CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused
the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla
and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander,
Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to
the Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla but lost track of
the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA)
at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his chest while Bulanan
died on the spot after being shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera
(Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the
several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's
shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who
alighted from the passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was immediately arrested
and brought to the Provincial Special Operations Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City. 8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired
bullet from a .45 caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm. 9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of the incident, he was at his house in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop
and left it there.10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed
to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went home and brought his child to his mother.
On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his
mother's house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon).
After the fights, he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest. 11
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he
went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who borrowed the Corolla from
him, which he rented from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the
Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought to a place where he
was tortured.13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga, and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony. 14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y
Adriano, John Doe, and Peter Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1 Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior
Inspector Roger V. Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03 Antonio dela Cruz, (7)
Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8) Ricky Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga, Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's defense of alibi on the ground that it was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies
of credible witnesses, who positively identified Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the
allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and
P02 Santos. The RTC determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate that PO1 Garabiles
and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the
assessment of damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay the heirs of Cabiedes the amount
of ₱222,482.00 based on the following: (1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2) Sixty
Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as expenses for the food served during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred
Eighty Two Pesos (1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty Thousand Pesos
(₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the CRV.15
The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death
of Danilo Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00 and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia
Bulanan, likewise, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the offense,
he is further sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi,
as well as the testimonies of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred when it gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano
referred to the following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the victim's vehicle was still in motion;
2) which side of the vehicle did the shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal shot; 4)
whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the
precise distance of the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the precise minutes of the
shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. According to
the Court of Appeals, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial
differences in fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R TC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores,
Magalang, Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince because it was not impossible for Adriano to be
physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in
less than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in
Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07 and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount
of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of
Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the
attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength
as generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed
and at the same time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim—19ambush
exemplifies the nature of treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines treachery as the direct employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be
properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of
attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without
risk of himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano,
together with the other accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along the national highway
and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die
of multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane, Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the
right and on to the road embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped, precluding all possible
means of defense. There is no other logical conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano,
together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of
Cabiedes and their safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and consciously adopted by Adriano so
as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was committed with the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and use of
firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He
was at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning, precluding the unknowing victim from repelling
the attack or defending himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less, employ any particular
means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was
killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the
acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet
fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he fact that accused killed a person other than
their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the
commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences
of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera
citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is
intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically
result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa
de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. 26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Nelmida. 27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that
accused-appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts of murder and
seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of
several acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from
a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or
more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in
People v. Flora,30 where the Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified
both killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not established, a perusal of the records would
reveal that Bulanan's fact of death was duly established as the prosecution offered in evidence Bulanan's death
certificate.31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak and unreliable because
they can easily be fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly prove that he was somewhere else
at the time when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. 33 In
the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed
to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the crime scene,
Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene
at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by credible witnesses but by
the accused's relatives and friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of Adriano's relatives
and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar,
as the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the claimant must establish with a reasonable degree
of certainty, the actual amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. 34Documentary
evidence support the award of actual damages in this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages as
₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount of award of actual damages should be
₱232,482.00 as duly supported by official receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual damages from
₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to
pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos {₱232,482.00) as actual damages.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER (Criminal Case No. 13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA
BULANAN in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Talo
G.R. No. 125542 October 25, 2000
Facts:
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1995, at about 2:00 o'clock dawn, in barangay GataDaku,
municipality of Clarin, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused ERLINDO TALO, entered the dwelling by destroying some portion of
the toilet of the offended party, armed with a bolo and hunting knife, and by means of force, violence,
intimidation and threats, did then and there, with lewd and unchaste designs, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take and carry away MISS DORIS SAGUINDANG against her will from the house of her
parents, and upon reaching the ricefield, by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.
Issue:
Whether or not accused should be charged of rape or forcible abduction with rape?
Held:
The Supreme Court found accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape. As provided in Arts. 342 and 335, in relation to Art. 48, of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of this crime are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; (3) that the abduction is with lewd design;
and (4) that the abducted woman is raped under any of the circumstance provided in Art. 335.The
evidence shows that, at knifepoint, accused-appellant forcibly took complainant from her parents'
house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
People vs Sabredo
Facts : Appellant is the uncle of complainant. He is the younger brother of her father. In 1993, Jimmy
arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's family in Cagtagong, Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu, where he
stayed with them for more than a year.
On June 27, 1994, Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed
and forcibly dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo,
Cebu. Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of his
jacket at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. Thence he brought
her to Estampar, Cataingan, Masbate, where they stayed at the house of Conchita Tipnit. Conchita was
Jimmy's sister and Judeliza's aunt, though aunt and niece did not know each other. In Estampar,
Judeliza tried to escape but was caught by Jimmy, who severely mauled her until she lost
consciousness. Scedp
Suspecting that Conchita would report the matter to the police, Jimmy took Judeliza by jeepney to
Cagba, Tugbo, Masbate. They stayed with Roberto Sabredo, his nephew and Judeliza's first cousin. The
two cousins, however, had not met before and Jimmy was able to pass her off as his wife. They stayed
in Cagba from June 29 to July 5, 1994, with Jimmy closely guarding Judeliza. Calrspped
On July 4, 1994, at around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. He
covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers
into her vaginal orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help. Their host,
Roberto, was awakened but could not do anything to assist her. Later, Jimmy struck Judeliza with a
piece of wood, rendering her unconscious. Much later, he brought her to the house of his sister, Nilda
Polloso, also at Cagba.
Nilda noticed the victim's weak and wan condition and offered her medicine. Catching Jimmy in the act
of boiling water, she asked what it was for and was told that it would be poured over Judeliza to finish
her off. Nilda, however, stopped him. On July 8, 1994, Judeliza recovered sufficiently from her
injuries. Nilda brought her to the police where Judeliza reported her ordeal. That same day, while
Jimmy was sleeping, Nilda managed to take away from him the blade, made of stainless steel, which
he had used in the rape of Judeliza. After the initial police investigation, Judeliza was brought to
Masbate Provincial Hospital, where she was confined for four days. The medico-legal officer, Dr.
Artemio Capellan, examined her. Sccalr
On August 11, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate filed an information for forcible abduction
with rape,
Jimmy admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed
that they were lovers and had been engaging in sexual intimacies for three months before running
away. He explained that they had gone to Masbate after Judeliza had revealed to him that she was not
really her father's daughter. They then lived together as husband and wife. He admitted having boxed
and kicked her but claimed that he got mad at her after she confided that she really was his niece,
contrary to what she earlier told him. He likewise admitted having pinched the victim's vagina, but only
to punish her for deceiving him about their kinship. He claimed the instant case was filed against him
because of the maltreatment she received. Appellant likewise admitted that he was facing another
rape case before Branch 45 of the same court, which a certain Juanita Turing had filed against him in
1992. He, however, denied having fled to Cebu to escape prosecution for said case. Sppedsc
The trial court found appellant's version of the incident preposterous and his defense untenable.
Choosing to believe the prosecution, the trial judge convicted appellant, and sentenced him
ISSUE: WON the accused should be convicted of the complex crime of forcible abduction
HELD: NO, the elements of rape and sexual assault were not all proven.
GR: When a complex crime under art 48 of the RPC is charged, such forcible abduction with rape, it is
axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and prove the presence of all the elements of the crime of
rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually
assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence the
crime committed is simple rape only.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139610. August 12, 2002]
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in the government. Indeed,
the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However, this objective can be accomplished only if the
evidence presented by the prosecution passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the
Court is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 29, 1999 Decision [1] and
February 3, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 18768. The dispositive
portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AUREA MONTEVERDE y
RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Document under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the cost.
She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive imprisonment suffered, pursuant to and as mandated by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no pronouncement as to the same.
The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled. [3]
The assailed resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from the Information dated February 4, 1993, signed by Special Prosecution Officer Gualberto J.
dela Llana with the approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. Charging petitioner with estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, the accusatory portion reads thus:
That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Chairman of Barangay 124
of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila with intent to defraud, and by taking advantage of [her] official
position and to liquidate the funds donated/granted by the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation submitted
Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00 allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware
when in truth and in fact said sales invoice is falsified and later did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her personal use and benefit, to the damage of the Government and
which crime was committed in relation to her office.[4]
During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte,[5] pleaded not guilty.[6] After trial
on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the crime of estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a
commercial document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) as follows:
Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District
1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification
programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A-3) with
copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy.
124, charged Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.)
P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of
Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December 1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694
and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B and C).[7]
Version of the Defense
The foregoing account is reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Memorandum. [8] The petitioner
did not submit her own Memorandum, but merely adopted the position of the OSG which recommended her acquittal.
Version of the Sandiganbayan
The foregoing narration does not adequately explain the evidence. In fairness to the Sandiganbayan (SBN hereafter)
which is being faulted with reversible errors by petitioner and the OSG, we deem it prudent to quote the facts and the
evidence it relied upon in its assailed Decision, as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the People presented the following documentary
evidence:
1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991 signed by Santos
Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose Salvatierra;
2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four (4) complainants subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public
on September 8, 1991;
3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed by complainants Jose Salvatierra and Antonio Araza
addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;
4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware.
5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981 listing only three (3)
items;
6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;
7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as buyer and listing eleven
items as articles purchased;
8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit E is not a genuine
reproduction of the duplicate original;
9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991;
10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing Antonio Araza to verify
the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the sum of P13,565.00
as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.
LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware since 1976, that Exhibit D-1 which is [a] duplicate
copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated July 2, 1981 where the amount of purchase is only P157.00 is the invoice used by her
firm in the conduct of its business; that Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she executed a certification to that effect
(Exhibit E-1) when required by a male person; that she does not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but the entries
in Exhibit D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her] sister-in-law Delia Co; that there are three
copies of the sales invoice her business is issuing, and the third copy or last copy is the one left in the store, and that
the one who approached her and asked about Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered that she did not
issue Exhibit E she was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does not know accused Aurea Monteverde and that
she had no delivery of hardware materials to the Barangay on January 17, 1991 (TSN May 14, 1993).
It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of 2256 Malaya St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and that he
secured a copy of Exhibits E and F from the Barangay Treasurer; that he brought the same to the owner of the Sanford
Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to whom he talked x x x in said store manifested that said Exhibits E and F are
not issued by the firm; and for which he requested Luz Co to issue a certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing that
the receipts used by the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints and [a] Joint-Affidavit together with
Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and Jose Salvatierra, and charged the accused before the Ombudsman; that the money
involved in this case are barangay funds because it was donated by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was able to
secure a copy from the PAGCOR evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was submitted to the
Ombudsman; that the Barangay Treasurer lent to him the receipts with the advice to verify it from the proprietor of [the]
Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to him (Exhibit G); that the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E
and F was not used to buy electrical materials or lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post were donated by Councilor
Rene Jose (TSN March 18, 1994).
EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35 to 80 dealing with certificates of commendation in
favor of the accused during her stint as Barangay Chairman from 1991 to 1993 and even prior to her being a Barangay
Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings (Exhibits 1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the accused addressed to Alice
LI Reyes of the PAGCOR with attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales
Invoices/Receipts from different hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are pictures depicting a
basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and Exhibits 18 to 32 are fifteen (15) pictures depicting different
alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over certificate/record of the Barangay properties signed by the incoming
Barangay Chairman with the third page submarked as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the counter-affidavit
of the accused sworn to before a Notary Public on September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr.
and Joel Magbanua.
Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose testimony is as follows: that he knows the accused
to be the Chairman of Barangay 124 from 1991 up to 1992 while he was a Barangay Tanod in the said Barangay; that
one project of the accused was the installation of lights or lighting the streets and playgrounds in the Barangay; that in
January 1991 materials were delivered to the house of the Barangay Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days
thereafter, he helped in the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical wirings, electrical tapes, bulbs,
lamps and lamp covers, and it took them (he and the husband of the accused) about three Sundays in doing so; that
he executed a Joint-Affidavit together with one Joel Magbanua in connection with the incident (Exhibit 81) (TSN April
2, 1997).
Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:
That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to 1994; that in January 1991 she received donation or
cash money in the amount of P44,800.00 from PAGCOR which she used in Barangay projects like lighting, and
cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the matter to PAGCOR and submitted [a] financial statement (Exhibits
1 to 1-A, 1-A-1); that when she purchased electrical and hardware items from Sanford Hardware she was issued a
receipt (Exhibit 9) and considering Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford Hardware issued two (2)
receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, and claimed that with the meager
amount involved, she is not going to sacrifice her good name and reputation; she then identified x x x several awards
she received (Exhibits 35 to 79); that she was the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she actually
paid the same in cash for which she was issued Exhibit 9 (Exhibit F and 9 contain the same items); that the receipt was
issued in her name and the money was in her possession that was why it was she and not the Barangay Treasurer
who personally made the purchase; that the PAGCOR check was issued in her name and was directly given to her and
so she was the one who encashed the check accompanied by one of the councilors but she did not turn over the cash
to the treasurer; that even after she came to know of the existence of Exhibit E, she did not go to Sanford Hardware to
inquire about the said document; that the original of the said exhibit was given to her but she submitted it to PAGCOR.
(TSN September 3, November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997).[9]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The assailed Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have been charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document. However, there was no clear allegation in the Information that the
falsification was a necessary means to commit the estafa.[10] Nevertheless, going along with the supposition that a
complex crime had been charged, the SBN held:
Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is constrained to go with the supposition that what has been
charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two
crimes - that of Estafa and that of Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her. [11]
The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that funds had been misappropriated
or converted.[12] Neither was there proof that petitioner had been required to account for the money received. [13]Without
these proofs, no conviction for estafa was possible.[14]
However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the
P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her barangay. According to the SBN, the
falsification became very clear when the document was compared with another one purporting to be a duplicate original
presented by the prosecution.[15] While the prosecution did not present any proof evidencing that it was petitioner who
had caused the falsification, the SBN relied on the presumption that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, a
person who is found in possession of a forged document, and who uses it, is the forger.[16]
Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, because
there was no proof that she had taken advantage of her position in committing the crime. [17] Instead, she was convicted
of falsification under Article 172.[18]
Hence, this Petition.[19]
Issues
The OSGs Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted, raised the following issues:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:
[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed[;]
[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[; and]
[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited
from it.[20]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Nature of Complex Crimes
Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.
However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether the Information had properly charged a complex crime, it was, as
quoted earlier, constrained to go along with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime,
otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes -- that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her. [21]
We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,[22] a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two
grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary
means for committing the other (or others).[23] Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes
are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other
(or others) .[24]
Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime.
Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to
commit estafa. Neither were the two crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly observed:
x x x. The alleged falsification happened after the money was spent and to explain how it was expended. Thus there is
no complex crime since the falsification is not a necessary means for committing the estafa (as charged) or malversation
(as suggested by Sandiganbayan in its Order dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was intended to conceal the estafa
or malversation.[25]
Well-known is the principle that an information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses.[26] When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the
information.[27]
In the present case, the accused should have objected to the Information on the ground that more than one offense
was charged therein. For her failure to move to quash the indictments, she is deemed to have waived her right to be
tried for only one crime.[28] Furthermore, she did not object to the submission of evidence that tended to prove the
offenses charged in the Information -- estafa and falsification. Verily, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, but the accused fail to object to the defect before trial, the trial court may convict them of as
many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them the penalty for each offense, setting out separately
the findings of fact and law in each.[29]
On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was acquitted of estafa, she could no
longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial document. Having, in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes,
acquittal in one will not necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own merits,
and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each particular offense.
Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal
from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from the other (or others).
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must
allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom
will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime
is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the
others, so long as they are proved.[30]
Second Issue:
Nature of Sales Invoice
The OSG agrees that the subject Sales Invoice is a public and/or a commercial document within the meaning of
falsification as defined under the Revised Penal Code.
Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the character of a public document when it becomes
part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly authorized by law.[31] The OSP aptly explained this point
as follows:
x x x, [I]f the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the preparation of which being in
accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the government, the falsification of that document, although it was
a private document at the time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or official document.
Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was submitted to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be part of the public records and the preparation
thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations. Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part of the official records
of PAGCOR when it was submitted by petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability
to PAGCOR.[32]
Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are
those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.[33] This Court has
previously characterized such documents in this wise:
x x x. In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order slips and invoices] are not always fully accomplished to
contain all the necessary information describing the whole business transaction. The sales clerks merely indicate a
description and the price of each item sold without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the particular receipt
or invoice, and without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt if
businessmen and traders would strive to make the receipts and invoices they issue complete, as far as practicable, in
material particulars. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value but vital pieces of
evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of
contracts.[34] (Italics supplied)
Third Issue:
Proof of Guilt
The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner
with regard to the crime of falsification. A determination of this question will necessarily require an examination of the
facts as presented before the Sandiganbayan.
As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions of law. [35] However, this
Court, in exceptional cases, has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues. This is especially
true in cases in which a palpable error or a grave misapprehension of facts was committed by the lower
court.[36] Criminal cases elevated by public officials from the SBN deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court
as criminal cases brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in both instances. Indeed, in a criminal case, a persons life or liberty is at
stake.[37]
Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption that the possessor of a forged or falsified document
who uses it is the author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG concurs with her on this point. That is why it
recommended that she be acquitted.
We agree. To our mind, the prosecutions evidence is not sufficient to convict. As correctly observed by the OSG, the
Decision of the SBN is based on the assumption that there was only one set of sales invoices issued by Sanford
Hardware. On such a premise, petitioners Exhibit 9 thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with respondents
Exhibit D-1. But on the premise that the two Exhibits are two different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful.
The OSG is correct in observing as follows:
x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify the customers copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568, she/he
would have to erase or cover with correction fluid the spaces pertaining to the name of the customer, date, quantity,
unit, description of articles, unit price and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither the appealed decision
nor the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite opportunity of the
prosecution to see the original of Exh. 9. The only observation the respondent Court mentioned was with respect to the
date: [t]he superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too apparent to be disregarded, and the alteration of the date has
affected both the veracity and the effects of the said document. But the changing of the date was the easiest to
accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they affect wider space, would [have been] the name of the customer and the
purchases. The total absence of any hint or sign of alteration on these areas is revealing.[38]
The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9 and D- 1 is that there are two extant documents.
Whether one is the original and the other is falsified depends on the proof. This the prosecution had to prove, but
unfortunately failed to. In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may
raise, the burden of proof establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the
prosecution.[39]Further, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information.[40] We repeat that, in this case, it failed to discharge this duty. We quote with approval the OSGs disquisition
on these two documents as follows:
A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are two (2) sets of Sales Invoice No. 21568. While the
form is identical in most respects, there are three (3) telling differences: (1) the type set of the sales invoice numbers
are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh. D-1 indicates the name of the printing press while no such information is
indicated anywhere in Exh. 9, and (3) the bottom right of Exh. D-1 states the BIR permit which does not appear in Exh.
9. Who could have printed Exh. 9 is anybodys guess. It is possible that petitioner or any person acting on her behalf
had a printing company copy this particular Sanford Hardware invoice so she could use it to liquidate the PAGCOR
funds she received. However, it is equally possible that Sanford Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts,
one to reflect the real business transaction, the other one - a sanitized version - for the consumption of the BIR people.
Not one of these possibilities has been actually proven, but neither was their improbability established.[41] (Italics
supplied)
Indeed, the OSG points out that there are material differences between Exhibits 9 and D-1. These include: 1) the
discrepancy in the type set or fonts used for the sales invoice numbers in the two Sales Invoices; 2) the presence of
the name of the printing press at the bottom left corner of Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9; and 3) the presence
of the BIR permit in Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by petitioner or
anyone acting on her behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds. But it is equally possible, as the OSG points out, that
Sanford Hardware caused the printing of two sets of receipts to serve its own purposes. However, none of these
possibilities was either actually proven or definitely ruled out by the prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that Exhibit 9 was falsified.
The SBN relied on the settled rule that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of -- and
who used, took advantage of or profited from -- a forged or falsified document is the author of the falsification and is
therefore guilty of falsification.
To convict petitioner of falsification would mean that the prosecution was able to establish that Exhibit 9 was a falsified
copy of an original document. But the rule itself shows that it cannot be applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9
(Sales Invoice No 21568) was not established beyond reasonable doubt to have been forged or falsified. At the very
least, it may be a second document that may or may not have been printed by petitioner herself.
Respondent claims that the original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as adverted to earlier, Exhibit 9 was not satisfactorily
demonstrated to be a copy thereof. In other words, Exhibit 9 being different from Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot
be deemed to have presented an original document, of which Exhibit 9 is a falsified copy.
The question is: who made this second document marked Exhibit 9? Petitioner consistently maintains that Exhibit 9
was issued to her by Sanford Hardware when she purchased the items mentioned therein. On the other hand, the
manager of Sanford Hardware denies having issued such document. Indeed, it is a time-honored principle[42] that
greater probative value is accorded to a positive than to a negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by
the OSG:
x x x [Petitioner] denied the accusation and insisted that she would not sacrifice her name and reputation for the meager
amount involved. She submitted photographs that the lighting of alleys in Barangay 124 was completed. There was
positive testimony by Alfonso Cua, one of the persons who installed the articles listed in Sales Invoice No. 21568. The
prosecution failed to rebut these.[43] (Citations omitted)
One final point. The SBN held that the accused refused to present the original of Exhibit 9, and that it would have been
so easy x x x to ask for a subpoena to direct x x x the PAGCOR to produce the original copy, and yet the accused
satisfied herself in presenting Exhibit 9 -- a mere xerox copy of the supposed document. But, as pointed out by the
OSG in its Memorandum,[44] the original of Exhibit 9 was presented in court during the November 5, 1996 hearing after
a subpoena duces tecum had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel confirmed that the x x x xerox copies
are faithful reproductions of the original.[45]
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused. [46] Indeed,
suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be
acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent
until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our
policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of
right.[47]
Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal conviction must come, not from its weakness, but from the
strength of that for the prosecution.[48]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Topic: Evidence; Hearsay
Title: Patula v. people G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN J.
Facts: In a Estafa case, witness auditor based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Issue: Is the testimony hearsay?
Ruling: Yes
Analysis: Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. Witness-lady-auditor
witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that
purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.

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Santiago v. Garchitorena (G.R. No.

Whether or not the 32 Amended Informations may be admitted?

The petition is denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179943

MARLON ALBERT DE LEON yHOMO, Promulgated:

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4747

Criminal Case No. 4748

a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at P1,500.00

Criminal Case No. 4749

Criminal Case No. 4750

b) Cash money worth P50.00

Appellant, in his Brief,[33] assigned the following errors:

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of

G. R. No. 181626. May 30, 2011

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Was Santiago Paera guilty of grave threats?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

People vs. Comadre 431 SCRA 366 (2004) (Digest)

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants?

Held: Only Antonio is liable for the crime.

G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

Trial Court’s Ruling:

Trial Court’s Justification of the Ruling:

IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO

January 25, 2017 § Leave a comment

G.R. No. 125542 October 25, 2000

Title: Patula v. people G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012

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