Fule v.

Legare subsequent production of it to the herein petitioners operated as a “conclusive authority from
the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new certificate.” The doctrine that favor
Emilia E. De Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land, together with a residential house innocent purchasers for value in instances when such a fraudulent document may become the
erected thereon at Sta. Mesa Blvd. Ext. In the evening of March 29, 1953, an intruder entered root of a valid title applies in this case
her home and at knife point, demanded for an amount of Php 10,000.00. Emilia said she does
not have the money and the intruder told her to raise the said amount until he comes back the
next day. When the intruder left, her adopted son, John Legare told her to sign papers that
would allow him to receive cash due to her from the US Veterans Administration. Emilia,
being unable to read and write except to sign her name, signed the said papers as witnessed by
her househelper Purita. It turned out that said paper was a deed of sale of the lot and house in
favor of John Legare for the sum of Php 12,000.00, and that it was supposed to have been
executed on the 7th day of April 1953, and acknowledged before a notary public on that date.

John approached Elias Fermin, the real estate broker who intervened in the securing of a prior
loan contracted by Emilia from Thomas Q. Soriano, and sought said broker’s help to sell
Emilia’s house and lot. Fermin offered the property to Conrado Fule and Lourdes Aragon. The
spouses agreed to purchase the property for Php 12,000.00 on condition that the sum of Php
7,000.00, the unpaid balance of Emilia’s indebtedness to Thomas Q. Soriano secured by a
mortgage thereon, would be deducted from the price, and that Fule would assume said
mortgage.

After the terms were agreed upon, John caused to transfer Emilia’s title to his name by virtue
of the purported Deed of Sale. After which, he executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Fule and
Aragon, which cancelled the transferred title to John and re-registered to their names with the
annotation for the deed of mortgage in favour of Soriano. Thereupon, the spouses delivered
the agreed amount minus the mortgage due to Soriano.

Upon discovery that Emilia’s house and lot had been sold to Fule and Aragon, she filed for the
cancellation of new titles based on her adopted son’s fraudulent acts. The trial court ordered
the cancellation of the new titles and making valid the title of Emilia de Legare. CA affirmed
said judgment by the lower court.

Issue: W/N Fule and Aragon are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of the
properties contested.

Ruling: Yes, Spouse Fule and 0ragon are innocent purchasers for value of the house and lot
here disputed and they are here adjudged the lawful owners.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.

In the instant case, nothing in John Legare’s person or behavior suggested anything suspicious
to cause further inquiry from spouses Fule and 0ragon. John was the adopted son of Emilia,
and, to the time that he was contracting with the spouses, he had not been known to commit
crime or dishonesty. On the contrary, John has had previous dealings with the real estate
broker during which he exhibited the expected degree of trustworthiness. The diligence and
precaution observed by the spouses could hardly be wanting.

Under Section 5 of Act 496, as amended, John’s possession of the certificate and his
G.R. No. 107967 March 1, 1994
CONSORCIA TENIO-OBSEQUIO, ORLANDO OBSEQUIO, and MANUEL, REGINA,
TUNAY and MELITON, all surnamed OBSEQUIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
EUFRONIO ALIMPOOS, and PONCIANA ALIMPOOS respondents.

TOPICS: Executed by an impostor; Innocent purchaser in good faith

FACTS: Eufronio Alimpoos mortgaged a parcel of land he acquired through homestead to

Eduardo Deguro for P10,000.00. Alimpoos delivered to Deguro the original certificate of title
to land to guaranty the loan.

Deguro and his wife, without the knowledge and consent of Alimpoos, then prepared a deed of
sale to make it appear that Alimpoos sold the land to them. The original certificate of title was
cancelled and Deguro was issued with a transfer certificate of title. Deguro died and his heirs
sold the land to Consorcia Tenio-Obsequio. A transfer certificate of title was also issued to
Tenio-Obsequio. Alimpoos only learned that the land was already titled in the name of another
when he received a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold of his land from the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

Alimpoos went to the trial court for recovery of possesion and ownership of land on the
ground that his original certificate of title was cancelled by virtue of a forged deed of absolute
sale. Nevertheless, the court ruled that Tenio-Obsequio is the true and absolute owner of the
land. The Court of Appeals later on reversed the decision. Tenio-Obsequio also filed for a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appelate court. Hence, this instant case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tenio-Obsequio is the true and absolute owner of the land.

HELD: Yes, Tenio-Obsequio is the true and absolute owner of the land.

It has been consistently ruled that a forged deed of sale can legally be the root of a valid title
when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes.

Under Section 55 the Land Registration Act, as amended by Section 53 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, an original owner, of registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof
on the ground of fraud. However, such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any
innocent holder for value with a certificate of title.

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and pays a full and fair
price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest
of some other person in the property.

Tenio-Obsequio is a purchaser in good faith. There is no showing whatsoever nor even an

allegation that herein petitioner had any participation, voluntarily or otherwise, in the alleged
forgery. Moreover, there is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused
any suspicion as to its authenticity. Such being the case, Tenio-Obsequio has the right to rely
on what appears on the face of the certificate of title.

The right of the innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected, even if the
seller obtained his title through fraud.
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. JOCSON
G.R. No. L-42805, August 31, 1987
Topic: Recoverability/demandability from the Assurance Fund (under Sec. 101 of Act No.
496)
In 1965, a certain Lawaan Lopez (man) offered to sell a parcel of land to the Sps, Jocson
(herein respondents) located in Quezon City, claiming the same as his property. They have
agreed to a price of ₱75.00 per square meter. However, the sale was deferred with Lopez
claiming that his certificate of title was burned in his house in Divisoria, and that he would be
filing a petition for a duplicated certificate of title before the CFI of Quezon City. Without any
opposition, the duplicate certificate of title was issued to Lawaan Lopez. Subsequently, the
parcel of land was sold to the respondents for ₱98,700.00 and the corresponding certificate of
title was issued to them and the certificate of title of Lopez was canceled. Shortly after,
another Lawaan Lopez (woman) claimed to be the owner of the parcel of land. She then filed a
petition before the CFI of Quezon City to declare the sale to respondents as null and void
alleging that it has been made by an impostor. After trial, the deed of sale between the
respondents and the impostor was canceled, and the parcel of land was transferred in favor of
the true Lawaan Lopez. The case was further appealed by Lopez for damages
Aggrieved, Sps. Jocson filed a complaint for damages against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and
the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund. The lower court(s) held
that the Assurance Fund is subsidiarily liable (for ₱138,264.00) in case the judgment could not
be enforced against the other defendant who could not be located. Hence, this petition of the
Treasurer.
In the case at bar, the Sps. Jocson do not belong to any of the two classes mentioned above.
In the first instance, there was no omission, mistake, or malfeasance of the clerk of court or
the register of deeds in the performance of their duties. In the second, because of the invalid
sale by the impostor Lopez, respondents acquired no land or any interest therein. With the
trial court declaring the sale null and void ab inition, it had no legal effect whatsoever at any
point in time.
Respondents’ argument that they were the owners of the land from the time of transfer of title
up to its cancellation is misplaced. Here, the true Lawaan Lopez had her title all the time and
was valid and subsisting despite the issuance of another title in the name of respondents.
Further, respondents failed to exercise due diligence in verifying the credentials of the
impostor, most especially when the latter claimed that his title was lost due to the fire
(together with other suspicious circumstances). It is a condition, in order to bring an action
for damages before the Assurance Fund, that the person is either the registered owner and
holder of certificates of title or innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. However, in
this case, respondents were neither. Therefore, they are not entitled to recover from the Fund.
Note: The applicable law was Act No. 496, before the revision of P.D. 1529;
Note: The Court ruled that the recourse of respondents was to file for civil action for
recovery and damages, and/or prosecute the impostor under the Revised Penal Code
assuming the latter can be located and arrested.

Issue: W/N the Assurance Fund could be held subsidiarily liable

Held + Ratio: No. The Assurance Fund cannot be held subsidiarily liable and that the
Sps. Jocson are not entitled to recover from the same. The Court ruled (citing Noblejas,
Land Titles and Deeds) that under Sec. 101 of Act No. 496, “[R]ecovery from the Assurance
Fund could be demanded by:
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part; and
b) that the loss or damage was sustained through any omission, mistake, or misfeasance
of the clerk of court, or the register of deeds, his deputy or clerk, in the performance
of their respective duties under the provisions of the land Registration Act; or
2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or any interest therein under the
following conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part;
b) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein
under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by
any other persons as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any
certificate or owner's duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other
official book, or by any cancellation; and
c) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of
such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.”
G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989
APOLONIO EGAO AND BEATRIZ EGAO vs. CA
Lot No. 662 (subject land) is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3559 Free Patent
No. 298112 registered in the name of APOLONIO EGAO married to Beatriz Menosa. Said
parcel has been transferred in ownership in favor of ROBERTO N. MARFORI per Deed of
Absolute Sale.
The VENDEES (Respondents) herein is [sic] aware of the fact that the Certificate of Title over
the abovementioned parcel of land have not yet been transferred in favor of ROBERTO N.
MARFORI except for the tax declarations but that the VENDOR herein is in actual, physical,
continuous, uninterrupted, and adverse possession of the above described parcels of land free
from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever; 1
Petitioners asserted that Apolonio Egao is the registered owner of the parcel of land known as
Lot No. 662, pursuant to Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12 August 1965; that he (Apolonio
Egao) and his family have been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous possession
thereof even before the issuance to him of the free patent; that the land has never been sold by
reason of the prohibition against alienation under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land
Law).
RTC ruled in favor of the Egaos, herein petitioners stating that the execution of said deed of
sale after the filing of the application for free patent but before the issuance of the latter,
without the approval of the Director of Lands, were ipso facto cancelled upon issuance of Free
Patent No. 29811…And as long as OCT No. P-3559 remains in the name of defendant Egao,
this is the ultimate and best evidence of title granted by the government which must be
honored and respected by the courts.”
The CA set aside the RTC decision, stating that Marfori and Egao were in pari delicto for
violating the five (5) year restriction under Sec. 118, CA No. 141 as amended by Act No. 496
against encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under a free patent or homestead; hence,
they cannot, according to the appellate court, seek affirmative relief, but respondents on the
other hand were declared innocent purchasers for value. Thus, declared herein respondents the
absolute owners.
Issues:
1. Was the sale between Egao and Marfori valid, as to give title to the vendees over
the subject land when Marfori made such transfer?
2. Were the respondents herein innocent purchasers?
Ruling:
1. NO. It is undisputed that Free Patent No. 298112 was issued to petitioner Apolonio
Egao over Lot No. 662 on 12 August, 1965. Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, prohibits the alienation or encumbrance, within a period of five (5)
years from the date of issuance of the patent. Assuming, arguendo, the authenticity
of the Deeds of Sale executed by the Egaos in favor of Marfori over portions of Lot
No. 662, dated 7 May 1964, 14 January and 6 October 1965, it clearly appears that
all deeds were executed within the prohibited period of five (5) years.
As correctly found by the appellate court:
…any acquisition, conveyance, abenation, transfer or other contract made or executed in
violation of any of the provisions of Sections 118,121,120,122 and 123 of this Act shall be
unlawful, null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually
or prescriptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the state. 9
OCT No. P-3559 over the land in dispute was issued a few months after the execution by the
Egaos of the last Deed of Sale in favor of Marfori. 11 The OCT is registered in the name of the
Egaos, herein petitioners. A Torrens title, once registered, cannot be defeated, even by adverse
open and notorious possession...cannot be defeated by prescription…is a notice to the
world…No one can plead ignorance of the registration. 12
2. NO. Respondents are not innocent purchasers for value. Where a purchaser neglects
to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his
vendor's title, and relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the
vendor, purchases the property without making any further investigation, he cannot
claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value.
While one who buys from the registered owner need not look behind the certificate of title,
one who buys from another who is notthe registered owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any
flaws in the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise
caution of any kind whatsoever is tantamount to bad faith. 18
Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null
and void (Sec. 124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could
be validly transferred to herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat quod non
habet (nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him).19
While the government has not taken steps to assert its title, by reversion, (because of violation)
to a homestead sold in violation of the Public Land Act, the vendor or his heirs is better
entitled to the possession of the said, the vendee being in no better situation than any
intruder.20
NOTES:
A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the
effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain,
as only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. 16
An "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed, under the Torrens system, to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value.
The rule of pari delicto non oritur actio (where two persons are equally at fault neither party
may be entitled to relief under the law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an
inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initiounder the Public Land Act, when its
enforcement or application runs counter to the public policy of preserving the grantee's right to
the land under the homestead law.
G.R. Nos. 91383-84 May 31, 1991 The appellate court, therefore, gravely erred in the appreciation of evidence on the good faith
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, of private respondent Diana Torres. Consequently, because respondent Torres was not a
vs. mortgagee in good faith, there is no sufficient basis for the appellate court to order the notation
COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SAN JOSE, DIANA J. TORRES, respondents. of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of private respondent Diana Torres on the
Certificate of title which is to be re-issued to herein petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitioner was the registered owner of a residential house and lot, located in Mandaluyong and
covered by a TCT. She has occupied the property ever since she had her house built and has
introduced other improvements thereon. Later on, private respondent Norma San Jose offered
to buy the property, which was accepted by petitioner, payment of which shall come from
proceeds of a loan by San Jose using petitioner’s title as collateral but she issued postdated
checks to petitioner. On San Jose’s request, another deed of sale was executed over the same
property, which was then registered, such that petitioner’s TCT was cancelled and a new TCT
was issued.

Because of unfulfilled promises to make good the postdated checks, petitioner demanded San
Jose for the return of the title. However, the latter informed that the title was in the possession
of Diana J. Torres, the mortgagee. San Jose never returned the said title as she had promised
nor did she ever make any payment to the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Diana Torres is a mortgagee in good faith.

HELD: No. There are strong indications that Atty. Flor Martinez, the lawyer of Diana J.
Torres, the mortgagee, knew of the defect of San Jose's title.

When Atty. Martinez personally inspected the property with San Jose for her client Torres, she
allowed herself to be introduced to Socorro Crisostomo who was then actually occupying the
house, as a Bank Inspector of the Development Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan from whom the
loan was being obtained, obviously to convince Crisostomo that the procedure is in
accordance with her agreement with San Jose.

Based on jurisprudence, a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely upon the fact
of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make further inquiries.

Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the circumstances of the sale, she is bound
by the knowledge of Atty. Martinez or by the latter's negligence in her haphazard investigation
because the negligence of her agents is her own negligence.

It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under
the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor.

His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the
possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not make him
an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact
defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be required of a prudent
man in a like situation.
[G.R. No. 96259. September 3, 1996]
HEIRS OF LUIS J. GONZAGA, namely ROMANA, FERNANDO, PAZ, LUISA and
LUIS ANTONIO, all surnamed GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES JOSE LEELIN and LILIA SEVILLA, respondents.

Facts: The irreconcilable conflict between petitioners and private respondents centers on two
parcels of land which they each claim in full exclusive ownership. We gather from the records
that one Jose Eugenio had once been the registered owner of lot nos. 3619 and 3620 of the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17519. Sometime
in 1960, Eugenio sold the two lots to deceased defendant Luis J. Gonzaga. Consequently,
Eugenios TCT No. 17519 was cancelled, and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
issued on November 29, 1960, TCT No. 81338 in the name of Gonzaga. On September 28,
1981, Gonzaga sold the two lots to petitioner Mascarias. Following the conveyance, Gonzagas
TCT No. 81338 was cancelled, and issued in the name of Mascarias was TCT No. 48078
covering the same two lots. Another subsisting Torrens title covers the same two lots subject
of the sale between Eugenio and Gonzaga and that between Gonzaga and petitioner Mascarias.
This other title is TCT No. C-26086 in the name of private respondent Lilia Sevilla, married to
Jose Seelin, issued on August 2, 1979 by the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila, District III.
TCT No. C-26086 covers a number of lots, among them, lot nos. 65 and 66 which are identical
with lot nos. 3619 and 3620 embraced by the titles issued in the names of Eugenio, Gonzaga
and petitioner Mascarias. private respondents filed on October 14, 1981, a complaint for
annulment of Gonzagas Torrens title insofar as it embraced lot nos. 3619 and 3620 which are
identical with those described in private respondents own title as lot nos. 65 and 66. Before the
court a quo, Gonzaga interposed an answer asserting that since he had already sold and
conveyed the subject lots on September 28, 1981 to petitioner Mascarias, private respondents
no longer have any cause of action against him.

Issue: Whether or not Mascarias have the legal and valid title

Held: We empathize with petitioner Mascarias who may be a purchaser for value and in good
faith, but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917,
could not possibly be of force and effect more than its parent title. Certainly the spring cannot
rise higher than its source. In resolving this question, we are bound by our ruling in the
aforecited earlier case of MWSS, in that case it was ruled that a certificate is not conclusive
evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier
certificate for the same is in existence.

Since the land in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19,
1917, the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void. In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate
or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or
whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents
title prevails over that of petitioner MWSS

\
 WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
(WIDORA) vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP G.R. No.91797
August 28, 1991
This is a petition for review seeking to annul the judgment of the Courts of Appeals and prays
that the case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried on the merits
Facts as found by the respondent trial court:
Then respondent WIDORA filed before the respondent court an application for registration of
a parcel of land alleging that said is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 and issued
in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and acquired siad property from the
heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, with an area of
156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352.
Molina, a respondent of the previous case, filed an opposition to the CA, claiming ownership
over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. Petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging
that said court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already
registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT
77653 and that the Land Registration Commission itself has advised the court that the 156
hectares property sought to be registered is covered by valid and subsisting titles in the name
of Ortigas.
On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner
Ortigas, holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they
were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 142; that the contention of
Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an area in Manila and also a part of Rizal is not credible,
for if this were true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear on the face of said decree
of registration, which is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 were not derived from
any decree of registration, and that the said TCTs being null and void, cannot be used as basis
to contest the right of the applicant to apply for registration over the subject land.
Held: Yes, Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration
Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the
corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the title to and binds the land. Consequently, if no
decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for, then the
certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land
and is null and void.
As for the error of the court, Sec. 108, PD 1529 states that “no correction of certificate of title shall
be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered” and jurisprudence held that
“While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to
alter or correct the certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the decree
of registration beyond the period allowed by law”
As jurisprudence stated “One who relies on a document evidencing his title to the property must prove not only
the genuineness thereof but also the identity of the land therein referred to” In the case at bar, private respondent's
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their origins from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from
OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent Ortigas.
As for the decision of the trial court in the previous case, ..." Nowhere in said decision,
however, is a pronouncement that TCT Nos.77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No.
227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that TCT Nos. 77652 and
77653themselves show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not
from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed, thereal origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what
respondent Ortigas should have done was to file a petition for the correction of the TCTs in
question as stated earlier.
Wherefore, , the assailed judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and the orders of the trial court in dismissing
Ortigas’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration are reinstated.

Petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for consideration of the said order of March 30, 1988 but was
once again denied. Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30,
1988 and May 19, 1989 and prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land
registration case. Respondent court granted said petition.

The petition on hand, WIDORA argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of
TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and
instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425.
Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds
of Manila and on its face shows that it covers a parcel of land with an area of only 17 hectares
in Sta. Ana while the parcel of land applied for contains an area of 156 hectares, located at
Quezon City, 4 kilometers away from Sta. Ana and certified by the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.

Issue: W/N the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the validity of the TCT Nos. 77652
and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration.
G.R. No. 76148 December 20, 1989
CARO vs. CA
In 1946, Simeon Gallego bought a parcel of land located in Guimaras. The parcel of land was
then declared for taxation purposes and it was sold by Simeon Gallego to Epifanio Caro in
1948. Another land was sold to Epifanio Caro from Trinidad Castem, et al. which they
inherited from Custodia Jaladoni. The land was also declared for taxation purposes. In the
same year, Epifanio Caro bought another parcel of land from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan and
the same was also declared for taxation purposes.
private respondents. He should have been vigilant of his right as the allegedly new owner of
the questioned land. What he did was the reverse, he slept on his rights for a number of years.
The Court held that considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is
strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to
enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded. Thus, he is estopped by laches from
questioning the ownership of the questioned land.
The petition is denied.

Epifanio Caro had those three (3) parcels of land surveyed and were then designated as Lot No.
54 but the private respondents Serafin V. Ronzales et al. was also claiming the land as Lot No.
55. Epifanio Caro had the three lots consolidated after survey into one lot and tax declaration
was issued. During the cadastral proceeding, Epifanio Caro filed an anwer for Lot No. 54.
There is no showing whether or not a title was issued to him.

The private respondents claim that the questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala
Lacson and was declared in her name under a tax declaration. Private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest had been living on the questioned land. When Epifanio Caro bought
the parcel of land, the private respondents were already living in a house on the questioned
land. An original certificate of title was issued in the names of the private respondents in 1970.
The spouses Caro filed and ejectment and illegal detainer case against those living in the Lot.
54.

Epifanio Caro also filed a complaint for reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages on
the ground of fraud. During the pendency of the case, Epifanio Caro died, so he was
substituted by his heirs.

The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioners contend that since private respondents do not own the questioned land, they are
mere trustees and this being the case; prescription does not lie in an action for reconveyance.

Issue: WON the plaintiff in said civil case was in estoppel.

Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff was in estoppel.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. It is a well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over
the property.

The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title. In the present case, it was well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10)
years from the date of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title in 1970.

The private respondents did not employ any fraud in securing title to the questioned land. It is
clear, that as early as 1948, Epifanio Caro was already aware of the adverse claim of the