the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners’ appeal because petitioners merely assigned an error
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
1) OSCAR R. BADILLO, GIOVANNI C. ONG, EDGAR A. RAGASA represented by heirs CYNTHIA G.
RAGASA, and their children JOSEPH, CATHERINE and CHARMAINE all surnamed RAGASA, ROLANDO
SANCADA, and DIONISIO UMBALIN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY, GOLDKEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSEFA CONEJERO, IGNACIO D. SONORON,
PEDRO DEL ROSARIO, and DOWAL REALTY AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM COMPANY, respondents. D E
C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:
The Case: This petition for certiorari1 assails the 17 September 1997 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50035. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners Oscar R. Badillo, Giovanni C.
Ong, Edgar A. Ragasa, Rolando Sancada, and Dionisio Umbalin (petitioners) questioning the 5 June 1995 Order3
of Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-91-10510 for Annulment of
Documents with Prayer for Issuance of Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and Damages.
The Facts : Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a road lot known as
Lot 369-A-29 or Apollo Street of subdivision plan Psd-37971 (road lot). The road lot is a short access road which
connects petitioners’ properties to the main road known as Road 20. The road lot is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-20895 (22682) and registered in the name of respondent Pedro del Rosario (del
Rosario). Annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-20895 is a court-ordered Entry No. 605/T-22655 which reads as
follows: "It is hereby made of record that as per order of the Court, the street lot covered by this title shall not be
closed or disposed of by the registered owner without previous approval of the court."4
Petitioners alleged that in gross violation of the court order, del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the road
lot to his co-respondents Josefa Conejero (Conejero) and Ignacio Sonoron (Sonoron) without obtaining prior court
approval. Del Rosario, Conejero, and Sonoron then entered into a partition agreement to divide the road lot into
four lots which resulted in the partial cancellation of TCT No. RT-20895 and the subsequent issuance of TCT Nos.
35899 and 35100 in the name of Conejero, TCT No. 35101 in the name of del Rosario, and TCT No. 35102 in the
name of Sonoron.5
Petitioners stated that del Rosario sold TCT No. 35101 to Goldkey Development Corporation (Goldkey).6
Petitioners alleged that the Register of Deeds violated the court order when it allowed the registration of the sales
and the subsequent issuance of new titles without first obtaining judicial approval. Petitioners claimed that
Goldkey had built cement fences on the lot, thus blocking the ingress and egress of petitioners.7
Petitioners prayed that the sales made in favor of Conejero, Sonoron, and Goldkey and the partition of the road lot
be declared void.8
In its Comment, Goldkey alleged that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has exclusive
jurisdiction over the cases mentioned in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1344.9 Goldkey argued that
involving a pure question of law. Goldkey added that petitioners are using the present petition as a substitute for
an already lost appeal since petitioners’ counsel had received the decision on 17 October 1997 and the present
petition was posted only on 16 December 1997.10
In May 1991, petitioners filed an initial complaint with the Office of the Building Official (building official) of Quezon
City, docketed as Building Case No. R-10-91-006 entitled Giovanni C. Ong, et al. v. Manuel Chua (building
case).11 Petitioners, who initiated the building case when Goldkey started putting up fences in some portions of
the property, claimed that the parcel of land was a road lot.12
On 10 September 1991, the HLURB issued a Development Permit to Goldkey allowing it to develop the land into
residential townhouse units. The permit also mentioned that the project is classified as "Residential Townhouse
Subdivision" and, as evaluated, the same is "in accordance with the Zoning Ordinance of Quezon City."13
On 4 November 1991,14 petitioners filed a case for Annulment of Title and Damages15 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Subsequently, the building official of Quezon City resolved the building case against petitioners and this decision
became final and executory.16 The ruling held that the property is not a road lot but a residential lot.17
On 5 June 1995, Branch 222 of the Regional Trial Court (trial court) of Quezon City issued an order dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court dismissed petitioners’ case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court pointed out
that there was a decision rendered by the building official of Quezon City declaring the disputed property a
residential lot and not a road lot; hence, the building official issued a building permit. The HLURB also issued a
permit for the development of the land into a townhouse project. Petitioners did not appeal both rulings. The trial
court stated that petitioners’ contention that the property is a road lot had been rendered moot by the finding of the
building official which made the contrary declaration. If petitioners had any objection to the ruling, they should
have appealed the same to the Secretary of Public Works and Highways as provided in Section 307 of Executive
Order No. (EO) 1096. The findings of administrative agencies which have expertise are generally accorded not
only respect but even finality.
The trial court also stated that the property had been approved by the HLURB for development into a townhouse
project. The subject land was therefore removed from the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The HLURB’s decision
was also not appealed to the Office of the President as provided in Section 4 of PD 1344 which gave the HLURB
quasi-judicial powers.
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On 17 September 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain the same. The appellate court stated that the original and amended complaints filed by petitioners were
both premised on the claim that the subject parcels of land were subdivision road lots that were illegally converted
into residential lots and thereafter disposed by del Rosario, the subdivision developer. Therefore, petitioners’
complaints were filed for the purpose of enforcing a contractual and statutory obligation of del Rosario to preserve
a subdivision road lot for street purposes. As such, the agency with jurisdiction is the HLURB, pursuant to the
provisions of PD 957, 1216, and 1344, EO 648 dated 7 February 1981 and EO 90 dated 17 December 1986.
Further, the appellate court ruled that the error assigned by petitioners involves the issue on what law will apply to
determine the jurisdiction of a tribunal over the subject matter of the complaints. Petitioners’ assigned error
involves a pure question of law; hence, petitioners appealed to the wrong forum. Petitioners should have elevated
their appeal to the Supreme Court and not to the Court of Appeals by way of a simple appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raise three issues in this petition:
1. Whether the appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by
dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that jurisdiction does not lie with the regular courts but with the
HLURB;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by
dismissing petitioners’ appeal on the ground that petitioners did not assign any error of fact; and
3. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper remedy for
petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development.18 The extent to which an
administrative agency may exercise its powers depends on the provisions of the statute creating such agency.19
Courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion.20
Jurisdiction Lies with the HLURB
PD 957,21 otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree," granted the
National Housing Authority (NHA) the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate business. The scope of the
regulatory authority lodged in the NHA is indicated in the second whereas clause which states:
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads,
drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the
health and safety of home and lot buyers," (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 22 of PD 957 provides:
Sec. 22. Alteration of Plans. — No owner or developer shall change or alter the roads, open spaces,
infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision development as contained in the approved
subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the permission of the Authority and the written
conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners association, or in the absence of the latter, by the
majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision. (Emphasis supplied)
PD 134422 amended PD 957 by empowering the NHA to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its
decisions. Section 1 of PD 1344 states:
Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a. Unsound real estate business practices;
b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Emphasis supplied)
Under EO 648,23 the NHA’s functions were transferred to the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
Section 8 of EO 648 provides:
Section 8. Transfer of Functions. — The regulatory functions of the National Housing Authority pursuant to
Presidential Decrees No. 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to the Commission,
together with such applicable personnel, appropriation, records, equipment and property necessary for the
enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among these regulatory functions are: (1) Regulation of the
real estate trade and business; (2) Registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) Issuance of
license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) Approval of performance bond
and the suspension of license to sell; (5) Registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen engaged in the business
of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; (6) Revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen;
(7) Approval or mortgage on any subdivision lot or condominium unit made by the owner or developer; (8)
Granting of permits for the alteration of plans and the extension of period for completion of subdivision or
condominium projects; (9) Approval of the conversion to other purposes of roads and open spaces found within
the project which have been donated to the city or municipality concerned; (10) Regulation of the relationship
between lessors and lessees; and (11) Hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific
performance.(Emphasis supplied)
EO 9024 renamed the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The HLURB retained the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the NHA.
Clearly, the scope and limitation of the HLURB’s jurisdiction are well-defined. The HLURB’s jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved, and
the parties.25 In the present case, petitioners are the registered owners of several lots adjoining a subdivision
road lot connecting their properties to the main road. Petitioners allege that the subdivision lot owners sold the
road lot to a developer who is now constructing cement fences, thus blocking the passageway from their lots to
the main road. In sum, petitioners are enforcing their statutory and contractual rights against the subdivision
owners. This is a specific performance case which falls under the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction.
In Osea v. Ambrosio,26 the Court held that the provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions
relating to subdivisions. This intention was aimed to provide for an appropriate government agency, which is the
HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual
rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.
Petitioners claim that respondents violated the annotation at the back of TCT No. RT-20895 by selling an
unsegregated portion of the lot without obtaining prior court approval. The date of entry of this annotation is 18
August 1953. When PD 957, PD 1344, and EO 648 were enacted in 1976, 1978, and 1981, respectively, this
annotation was impliedly modified such that the conversion of the road lot in the subdivision plan would fall under
the HLURB’s jurisdiction pursuant to these laws.
Petitioners argue that they can file a specific performance case to compel respondents to comply with their
contractual and statutory obligation to maintain the road lot. However, petitioners can only be granted complete
relief if the subject sales are declared void and the subsequent partition is declared illegal. Petitioners further
contend that the HLURB, having only the jurisdiction to hear and decide specific performance cases, can only
compel petitioners to file a case for annulment of title and prosecute the action. Petitioners insist that in the final
analysis, a case for annulment of title would still have to be filed with the ordinary courts.27
In Peña v. GSIS,28 the Court ruled that when an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its
jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored.
As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:29
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is
out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now performing this function
by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by
them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their
particular expertise.
In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of
justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the
need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.
Finally, in Cristobal v. Court of Appeals,30 we held that "questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites
for conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the NHA, now the HLURB, pursuant to Section 22 of
PD 957 and not by the regular courts."
Appeal by Certiorari Involving Questions of Law
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 2. Mode of appeal.—
(a) Ordinary Appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sevilleno v. Carilo,31 citing Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court
summarized the rule on appeals:
(1) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of
Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
(2) In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only
questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
(3) All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be
brought to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied)
In First Bancorp, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,32 this Court also explained the two modes of appeal from a final order
of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and
law are raised or involved; or
(2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised
or involved. (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioners raised only one issue in their Appellants’ Brief — whether "the Honorable Trial
Court a quo seriously erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when in fact it
has already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter of the case."
The question on jurisdiction is undoubtedly one of law. We have held that "a question of law exists when the doubt
or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted."33 Consequently, it is not disputed that the issue brought by petitioners to the Court of Appeals
involves solely the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
As petitioners’ appeal solely involves a question of law, the appellate court did not err in dismissing the appeal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. — An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law
not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from
the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 65 is not a remedy for lost appeal.
Petitioners should have directly taken their appeal to this Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 and not an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 nor a petition for certiorari with this
Court under Rule 65.
As held in Balayan v. Acorda,34 "the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of
last recourse." It lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
In the present case, petitioners chose the wrong mode of appeal. Hence, the instant petition cannot prevail since
a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if the loss or lapse was an error in petitioners’
choice of remedy. We have held in David v. Cordova35 that:
A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available
to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions
for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternate or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave
abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied)
There were instances when the Court has relaxed the rule on the special civil action for certiorari as a substitute
for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 such as where the application of this rule
would result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.36 Although the Court has the discretion to treat a
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, there is nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal
application of the rules.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 17 September 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL THE CITY OF
MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL
PERALTA, J.:
NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period
from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said
assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77
assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated as one
for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to
Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over
the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund,
which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC
in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases
to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or
body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August
24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.
FALLO: petition is denied
B. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. GMA NETWORK, INC., respondent.
Facts: On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic corporation, filed an
application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the
respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC).
The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from
"Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for
another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.
Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal Department a separate
filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock
plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.
On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the
said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested
by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The
following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application
for extension of corporate term.
The following year, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation,
specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to
the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from
the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996,
issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment.
Thusly, GMA appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Court of Appeals (CA), on the ground that ground that the
assessment of filing fees for the petitioner’s application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of
the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
Issue: Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing
fee relative to GMA’s application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term?
Held:
The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals which directed that SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA
Network, Inc.’s (GMA’s) application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term.
The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh
license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As
such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and
ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according
to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its
publication is required for its effectivity.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other
pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued
by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily
infringes on a person’s right to property.
The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
2 THE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, and THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners vs.
EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM, Respondent
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on May 28, 2008, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the petition for prohibition of the respondent,2 and enjoined the petitioners from enforcing
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03- 211; any and all of their revisions; and
the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order for being null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioners Ex.ecutive Director and Chairman of the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD),
Messrs. Winston G. Arzaga and Vicente A. Sandoval, respectively, were the public officials tasked with the duty of
executing and implementin A.O. No. 00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order, while the PCSD
was the government agency responsible for the governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic
Environment Plan (SEP) for Pala wan. On the other hand, the respondent was the operator of a domestic air
carrier doing business under the name and style Bonanza Air Services, with authority to engage in nonscheduled
air taxi transportation of passengers and cargo for the public. His business operation was primarily that of
transporting live fish from Palawan to fish traders.3
The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the transport of live fish from Palawan
would be allowed only through traders and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. On
September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sent to the PCSD its communication to the effect that A
TO-authorized carriers were considered common carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD
accreditation requirement. It attached to the communication a list of its authorized carriers, which included the
respondent's air transport service.4
The respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing the PCSD-required accreditation; that
the PCSD Chairman had started harassing his clients by issuing Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2002,
which contained a penal clause imposhig sanctions on the availment of transfer services by unaccredited aircraft
carriers such as cancellation of the PCSD accreditation and perpetual disqualification from engaging in live fish
trading in Palawan; that due to the serious effects of the memorandum, the respondent had sent a grievance letter
to the Office of the President; and that the PCSD Chairman had nonetheless maintained that the respondent's
business was not a common carrier, and should comply with the requirement for PCSD accreditation.
In disregard of the prohibition, the respondent continued his business operation in Palawan until a customer
showed him the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order issued by the PCSD to the effect that he had still
made 19 flights in October 2002 despite his failure to secure accreditation from the PCSD; and that he should
explain his actuations within 15 days, otherwise, he would be sanctioned with a fine of ₱50,000.00. 5
According to the respondent, he had not received the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order. 6
The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) upon
his application after finding that there were sufficient grounds to issue the TR0. 7 After the petitioners did not file
their comment despite notice, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon his posting of the injunction
bond for P.50,000.00.8
The petitioners countered that the petition for prohibition should have been dismissed because A.O. No. 00-05
was in accord with the mandate of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan
for Palawan Act);9 that Resolution No. 03-211 had meanwhile amended or repealed portions of A.O. No. 00-05,
thereby rendering the issues raised by the petition for prohibition moot and academic; 10 that by virtue of such
developments, the PCSD accreditation was now required for all carriers, except those belonging to the
Government; that on August 18, 2003, the respondent had received another notice regarding the enactment of
Resolution No. 03-211; and that they had subsequently dispatched to the respondent on September 9, 2003
another show cause order in view of his continued non-compliance with Resolution No. 03-211. 11
The salient portions of Resolution No 03-211 read:
SECTION 3. A new Paragraph 1.5 is hereby added to Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 00-05, as amended,
as follows:
"CARRIER - any natural or juridical person or entity, except the Government, that is engaged or involved in the
transportation of live fish or any other aquatic fresh or saltwater products, whether or not on a daily or regular
manner or schedule and whether or not for compensation, from any point within or out of the Province of Palawan
under a contract or transportation, whether or not in writing, through the use of aircrafts, seacrafts, land vehicles
or any other mode of transportation, whether or not registered, mechanical or motorized in nature, and whether or
not such persons or entities are common carriers or not as defined by law and regardless of the place of
registration of such persons or entities as well as the crafts and vehicles used or employed by them."
xxxx
SECTION 5. The new section 2 for Administrative Order No. 00- 05, as amended, shall read as follows:
"Section 2. Accreditation. Before it can proceed with the transport or carriage of live fish or any other aquatic fresh
or saltwater products within or out of the Province of Palawan, a CARRIER must secure a CERTIFICATE OF
ACCREDITATION from the PCSD." 12
The respondent then filed a supplemental petition alleging that due to the implementation of Resolution No. 03-
211, his carriers were forbidden to transport or deliver fish from Palawan to his clients resulting in loss of income
amounting to ₱132,000.00; and that such supervening event was a mere scheme to circumvent the TRO and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA.
As stated, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on May 28, 2008, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of 2002, Resolution No.
03-211, and any and all of its revisions, and the Notice of Violation and Show-Cause Order are declared NULL
and VOID. The injunctive writ previously issued by this Court prohibiting the Respondents from implementing or
enforcing the said issuance(s) is declared PERMANENT. Costs against the Respondents.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.
Issues The sole issue for determination is whether or not the CA erred in declaring A.O. No. 00-05, Series of
2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and the the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order null and void for having been
issued in excess of the PCSD’s authoity.
The petitioners submit the following grounds for consideration, to wit:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTIONS 4, 6, 16, AND 19 OF RA 7611 AS
LIMITATIONS TO THE POWER OF THE PCSD TO PROMULGATE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO 00-05.
II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PCSD'S ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 05 (sic) IS AN ENCROACHMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALA WIGAN OF PALA WAN,
A. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00-05 AND ITS REVISIONS WERE PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO THE
RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE PCSD.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00-05 AND ITS REVISIONS POSSESS ALL THE REQUISITES OF A VALID
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROMULGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. 00-05 AND ITS REVISIONS IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
PALAWAN. 14
Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition for review on certiorari, and reverse the decision of the CA
1. Procedural Matters
We first deal with the propriety of the petition for prohibition for the purpose of annulling the challenged
administrative issuances
Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi-legislative or rule-making power, and the quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. The first is the power to make rules and regulations that results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. 15 The issuance of the assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other
issuances by the PCSD was in the exercise of the agency's quasilegislative powers. The second is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. 16
The challenge being brought by the petitioners rests mainly on the theory that the CA should not have interpreted
the functions of the PCSD, particularly those provided for in Sections 4, 6, 16, and 19 of R.A. No. 7611, as
limitations on the power of the PCSD to promulgate A.O. No. 00-05. Clearly, what was assailed before the CA
was the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as an administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function. The question thus presented was a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and exclusively and originally pertained to the proper Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 19(1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court expressly states that any person
"whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation" may bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court "to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise the issue
against such validity should have adhered to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had
sufficient justification to do otherwise. Yet, he utterly failed to show justification to merit the exception of bypassing
the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, by virtue of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,17 the Court's power to
evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.
In this regard, the Court has categorically observed in Smart Communications, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission 18 that if what is being assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, then the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. 19
To accord with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, therefore, the petition for prohibition should have been originally
brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as a petition for declaratory relief.
We also need to remind that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative order
issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess
of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 20 Its lies against the exercise of
judicial or ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of the writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels.21 In other words, prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained.22
Nevertheless, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on this case on the merits if only to facilitate its speedy
resolution. In proper cases, indeed, the rigidity of procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice. The power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of
justice so require cannot be questioned. 23
2. Substantive Matters
Were A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and the the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order null and void for having been issued in excess of the PCSD's authority?
We answer the query in the negative.
R.A. No. No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan consistent with the declared
policy of the State to protect, develop, and conserve its natural resources. The SEP is a comprehensive
framework for the sustainable development of Palawan to protect and enhance the Province's natural resources
and endangered environment.
Towards this end, the PCSD was established as the administrative machinery for the SEP' s
implementation.1avvphi1 The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 ofR.A. No. 7611, to wit:
SEC. 16. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development. - The governance, implementation and policy direction
of the Strategic Environmental Plan shall be exercised by the herein created Palawan Council for Sustainable
Development (PCSD), hereinafter referred to as the Council, which shall be under the Office of the President. x x
x
The functions of the PCSD are specifically enumerated in Section 19 of R.A. No. 7611, which relevantly provides:
SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. - In order to successfully implement the provisions of this Act, the Council is
hereby vested with the following powers and functions:
1. Formulate plans and policies as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act;
2. Coordinate with the local governments to ensure that the latter's plans, programs and projects are aligned with
the plans, programs and policies of the SEP;
3. Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government, and on private entities
and organizations for cooperation and assistance in the performance of its functions;
4. Arrange, negotiate for, and accept donations, grants, gifts, loans, and other funding from domestic and foreign
sources to carry out the activities and purposes of the SEP;
5. Recommend to the Congress of the Philippines such matters that may require legislation in support of the
objectives of the SEP;
6. Delegate any or all of its powers and functions to its support staffs, as hereinafter provided, except those which
by provisions of law cannot be delegated;
7. Establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence and moral
character and prescribe a compensation and staffing pattern;
8. Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor for the effective
implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of this Act;
9. Enforce the provisions of this Act and other existing laws, rules and regulations similar to or complementary
with this Act;
10. Perform related functions which shall promote the development, conservation, management, protection, and
utilization of the natural resources of Palawan; and
11. Perform such other powers and functions as may be necessary in carrying out its functions, powers, and the
provisions of this Act.1âwphi1 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out the objectives of R.A.
No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's natural resources consistent with the SEP. In that task, the
PCSD could establish a methodology for the effective implementation of the SEP. Moreover, the PCSD was
expressly given the authority to impose penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and
the other provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-
211 was well within its statutory authority.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 28, 2008; DECLARES VALID and EFFECTIVE Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of
2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and all their revisions, as well as the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order
issued to the respondent; LIFTS the permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining petitioner
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development from enforcing Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of 2002;
Resolution No. 03-211; and all their revisions, as well as the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order issued to
the respondent; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
C ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW
1 National Housing Authority vs Almeida
525 SCRA 383
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS:
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several of land which are
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.The records show that Margarita had two children: Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child
of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative,
being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late
Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed
by Margarita Herrera.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before
the then Court of First Instance of Laguna.
On December 29, 1980, a decision on the case questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication was rendered and the
deed was declared null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the
application.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera.
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the
Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her
heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights
was approved by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and
titles were issued in their favor. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to
leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent
Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of
Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-
raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because
the other heirs were disregarded.
The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of
the Office of the President was already final and executory.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." The
case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the
decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the
deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition
of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to
probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were
both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner NHA
elevated the case to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President have attained
finality, and if so, whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata bars the court from further determining
who between the parties has preferential rights for award over the subject lots
RULING: Yes. Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the
hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme
Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply
exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing
the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies
upon whom judicial powers have been conferred. the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be
enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of
quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power— that
which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative
agency for the "formulation of a final order."
This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of
powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the legislative, the executive, and the
judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon
the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave
abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government
committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein provided
that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution." and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule
over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of
the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of
judgment dated October 10, 1989). We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end
to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final
and executory judgment. The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by
the parties by reason of policy.
RATIO: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine
the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same binding effect as a judgment of a court
of law, such that when they attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that even the courts of justice have
to respect.
2 MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO, G.R. No. 140656 Petitioner,
Present: QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, - versus - CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 13, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NORBERTO N. LINDONG, G.R. No. 154482 Petitioner, versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions, the determination of both rests ultimately on whether Felipe K.
Constantino (Constantino), mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
In G.R. No. 140656, Constantino filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the 15 November 1999 decision[1] and the 15 March 2000 resolution[2] of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 23433 finding him and his co-accused, petitioner Norberto N.
Lindong (Lindong) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 154482 is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by Lindong questioning three (3) orders[3] of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) relative to the execution of judgment against him also in Criminal Case No. 23433.
The Antecedents
In an Information dated 31 July 1996, Constantino, in his capacity as mayor of Malungon, Sarangani Province,
together with his co-accused Lindong, was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
That on or about February 28, 1996, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public officer, being then the Mayor of the Municipality of Malungon, Sarangani
Province, committing the crime herein-charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his
official functions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, and
conspiring and confederating with accused Norberto N. Lindong, President and Chairman of the Board of the
Norlovanian Corporation, Davao City, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Lease
Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments (sic) for a period of six (6) years for and in consideration of
the sum of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED ELEVEN and 11/100
(P257,111.11) per month or a total consideration of PESOS: EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE and 92/100 (P18,511,999.92) and a guaranty deposit of PESOS:
ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P1,780,000.00) contrary to the express mandate of
Resolution No. 2, series of 1995, of the Municipal Planning and Development Council implementing Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 198, series of 1995 and Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 21 dated February 22, 1996
authorizing the Municipal Mayor of Malungon to enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments
(sic) on a five-year term basis for and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,200,000.00) per year or a total consideration of only PESOS: ELEVEN MILLION
(P11,000,000.00), thus, giving said Norlovanian Corporation, which was fully paid for the Guaranty Deposit and
was actually paid heavy equipment rentals for the period March 5 to May 6,
1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY
and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage and causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Nazario B.
Tomanan (Tomanan), Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor III of the COA Regional Office No. XI. In rebuttal, it
presented Benjamin C. Asgapo (Asgapo), councilor of Malungon, Sarangani Province and one of the
complainants below. The prosecution sought to establish the facts as follows:
The Municipality of Malungon listed as one of its priority programs, the acquisition of a fleet of heavy equipment
needed by the municipality in its development projects.[5] For this purpose, it appropriated an amount of P2.2
Million per annum for a period of five (5) years beginning in 1996 for the amortization of such purchase.[6]
Pursuant thereto, the municipality conducted two (2) public biddings for suppliers of the required fleet of heavy
equipment. Both attempts, however, failed. Hence, the Sangguniang Bayan instead passed Resolution No. 21 on
22 February 1996, authorizing petitioner Constantino to enter into a negotiated contract for the lease/purchase of
the needed fleet of heavy equipment.[7]On 28 February 1996, Constantino entered into a Lease Agreement[8]
with Norlovanian Corporation, represented by Lindong. The agreement required, among others, the municipality to
provide Norlovanian Corporation with a guaranty deposit. The following day, Lindong appeared before the
Sangguniang Bayan to discuss the Lease Agreement. Not one of the members of the Sanggunian questioned the
legality of the agreement.[9]
The seven (7) units of heavy equipment subject of the agreement were thus delivered to the municipality on 4
March 1996.[10] On 6 March 1996, the Municipality of Malungon paid Norlovanian Corporation a total amount of
P2,177,090.91 representing the guaranty deposit as well as the rental for the period of 5 March 1996 to 5 April
1996 and partial rental for the period of 5 April 1996 to 6 May 1996.[11]
Thereafter, on 18 April 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously passed Resolution No. 38[12] requesting
petitioner to operate the newly acquired fleet of heavy equipment. The municipality subsequently utilized the
fleet.[13]
However, only five (5) days later, or on 23 April 1996, Sanggunian members Benjamin C. Asgapo, Rafael J.
Suson, Sr. (Suson), Leo G. Ingay (Ingay), Pablo V. Octavio (Octavio) and Wilfredo P. Espinosa (Espinosa), and
Vice Mayor Primitiva L. Espinosa (Vice Mayor Espinosa) filed a formal complaint against petitioners Constantino
and Lindong for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
On 6 June 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 47, urging the municipality to stop all forms of
unauthorized payment/expenditure relative to the illegally acquired pool of heavy equipment by the Municipality of
Malungon.[14]
In particular, Tomanan testified that he was directed by the COA Regional Office XI to conduct a special and
comprehensive audit of the municipality of Malungon for the period of 1 May 1995 to 31 May 1996[15] in view of a
complaint filed by certain officials therein. In January 1997, Tomanan submitted his report detailing the following
adverse findings relative to the purchase of the subject fleet of heavy equipment: (a) the lease/purchase contract
was disadvantageous to the municipal government because of the rigid terms and conditions therein required of
the municipality before the latter could acquire ownership over the pool of heavy equipment; (b) Norlovanian
Corporation had no proof of ownership of the fleet of equipment as the audit revealed that title to the equipment
was in the name of Lindong; (c) the lease/purchase procedure violated Sections 27 and 28 of the Rules and
Regulations on Supply and Property Management in Local Governments;[16] and (d) the lease/purchase
procedure utilized by the municipality was uneconomical and resulted to a wastage of P9,658,000.00 of
government funds.[17]
Asgapo, on the other hand, testified that he was present during the 29 February 1996 meeting where Lindong
appeared before the Sanggunian. The witness asserted that the lease contract was never concurred in by the
municipal council as required by Resolution No. 21. He admitted, however, that neither was there any resolution
passed opposing, objecting to or rejecting the lease contract. Moreover, Asgapo alleged that at the time he first
obtained a copy of the lease contract from the municipal treasurer on 6 March 1996, he did not see the
Undertaking dated 28 February 1996[18] attached or annexed thereto. He was only able to get a copy of the latter
document about three (3) or four (4) days thereafter, following an inquiry with the provincial auditor.[19]
The defense presented Lindong as its sole witness. According to Lindong, after negotiations between himself and
petitioner Constantino, together with some members of the Sanggunian, the parties agreed to a lease/purchase
scheme in accordance with the mandate of Resolution No. 21. They agreed that since the municipality did not
have sufficient funds to buy the fleet of heavy equipment outright at P8.9 Million, the latter would purchase the
subject equipment on installment basis but with allowance for Norlovanian Corporation to recover some
incremental cost. Thus, on the very same day, 28 February 1996, Lindong as representative of Norlovanian
Corporation and Constantino as representative of the municipality entered into the lease/purchase agreement.
They contemporaneously executed the Lease Agreement and Undertaking in the presence of the members of the
Sanggunian who accompanied the mayor.[20]
Lindong further testified that he attended the municipal council meeting on 29 February 1996 to provide the
members thereof with a copy of the lease contract and to explain the transaction. Moreover, he explained that
notwithstanding the fact that the main agreement was captioned only as a Lease Agreement, the same being a
standard pre-printed form of his corporation, the intent of the parties was to enter into a lease/purchase
agreement. Hence, he clarified that the Undertaking he executed bound him to convey ownership over the fleet of
heavy equipment to the municipality upon the full payment thereof.[21]
Finally, Lindong averred that more than two (2) months after he delivered the fleet of equipment to the
municipality, he received a Certificate of Concurrence dated 9 May 1996 issued by Nemesio Liray, Chairman of
the Committee of Finance of the Sangguniang Bayan, certifying that the Lease Agreement was concurred in by
the members of the Committee on 29 February 1996. Likewise, he received a Certification dated 17 May 1996
from the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Malungon, that the members thereof
approved, concurred in and signed the contract of lease between the municipality and Norlovanian
Corporation.[22]
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Constantino and Lindong of the
offense as charged, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision sentencing them both, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO and NORBERTO N.
LINDONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and said accused are hereby sentenced, as follows:
(a) to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) month as maximum;
(b) to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office;
(c) to jointly and severally indemnify the Municipality of Malungon, Province of Sarangani the sum of Two Million
One Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand [sic] and 91/1000 [sic] Pesos (P2,177,090.91), representing the amount
actually paid to Norlovanian Corporation, with interest at the legal rate computed from March 6, 1996 until fully
paid; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The Sandiganbayan held that neither manifest partiality nor evident bad faith attended the commission of the
offense. However, it found that petitioner Constantino caused undue injury to the Municipality of Malungon
through his gross inexcusable negligence in executing only a lease agreement over the fleet of heavy equipment.
Anent Lindong, the graft court upheld his culpability as co-conspirator of Constantino despite its finding that the
latter violated the anti-graft law through negligence only. The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that since the law
violated is a special law, proof that he intended to commit the particular offense was not essential, as it otherwise
would have been for a felony punishable by the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it was
sufficient for the prosecution to have proven, as it did, that Lindong allowed or failed to prevent Constantino from
entering into an agreement which was clearly contrary to law. Thus, even if petitioner was found guilty of causing
undue injury to the municipality through gross inexcusable negligence, the anti-graft court concluded that his co-
conspirator could likewise be held liable.[24]
It appears that during trial, both accused were represented by the same counsel. However, after judgment was
rendered against them, Constantino and Lindong filed separate appeals to the Supreme Court which have taken
disparate routes. On 25 April 2006, during the pendency of his present appeal, Constantino passed away.[25]
Lindong himself likewise filed a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 142379, to seek a reversal
of the Sandiganbayan decision finding him guilty as Constantinos co-conspirator. On 10 July 2000, this Court
denied Lindongs petition for failure to state the material date of receipt of the assailed decision of the
Sandiganbayan. His subsequent attempts for reconsideration proved futile. On 25 July 2001, the Court issued the
Entry of Judgment in the case.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) issued three (3) orders relative to the execution of judgment
against Lindong, all of which are assailed by the latter, in his petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 154482, for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan issued on 16 May 2002 the first challenged order
which directed petitioner Lindong to appear before it in person for the execution of judgment. On 6 June 2002, the
respondent court issued a resolution, the second assailed order herein, denying Lindongs urgent motion to defer
execution of judgment. The third assailed order, a resolution issued on 3 July 2002, directed the issuance of a
bench warrant against petitioner Lindong and the confiscation of his cash bond for provisional liberty pending
appeal, and required him to surrender his person to the court and explain why judgment should not be rendered
against the cash bond.
With the demise of Constantino during the pendency of his appeal, the same should normally be regarded as
moot and academic following the norm that the death of the accused marks the extinction of his criminal
liability.[26] However, the present two petitions are so intertwined that the absolution of Constantino is ultimately
determinative of the absolution of Lindong. Indeed, the exoneration of Constantino will necessarily signify the
injustice of carrying out the penalty imposed on Lindong. Thus, the Court in this instance has to ascertain the
merits of Constantinos appeal to prevent a developing miscarriage of justice against Lindong.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: First, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution;[27] Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;[28] Third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;[29] and Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[30] In the
instant case, the exceptional character of the appeals of Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other, as well
as the higher interest of justice, requires that the Court determine the merits of the petition and not dismiss the
same outright on the ground of mootness.
The Ruling of the Court
G.R. No. 140656
Petitioner Constantino impugned his conviction and asserted that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him
based on its finding that he violated Resolution No. 21 by entering into a Lease Agreement with the Norlovanian
Corporation and for his failure to sign the accompanying Undertaking. Likewise, he argued that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution was insufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
Finally, Constantino contended that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to disregard the findings of the Supreme
Court en banc in the earlier case of Constantino v. Hon. Ombudsman Desierto.[31]
Constantinos petition would have been granted and he would have been absolved of criminal liability had he been
still alive today. This is why it is so.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
In order to be liable for violating the law, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is a public officer or
a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether
the government or a private party; (3) the said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of
his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (4) such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[32]
There are two (2) modes of committing the offense, thus: (1) the public officer caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government; or (2) the public officer gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions.[33] An accused may be charged under either mode[34] or under
both should both modes concur.[35]
Additionally, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence before liability can be had under the provision. Manifest partiality is characterized by a clear, notorious
or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.[36] Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[37] Gross inexcusable negligence is
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected.[38] Mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for
one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or
manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable.[39]
As discussed previously, the Sandiganbayan held that manifest partiality could not be rightfully imputed to
Constantino.[40] The prosecution did not present proof that he was actuated with malice or fraud sufficient to meet
the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[41] However, the respondent court found that Constantinos
act of entering into a purportedly pure lease agreement instead of a lease/purchase agreement was a flagrant
violation of Resolution No. 21. In view of the rigid terms of the subject contract to which Constantino assented,
coupled by his failure to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into the agreement,
the Sandiganbayan found that his conduct constituted gross inexcusable negligence.[42] Likewise, the anti-graft
court ruled that Constantinos acts resulted in undue injury to the Municipality of Malungon.[43] Notably, in the
course of trial, the prosecution admitted that it had no proof that unwarranted benefits and advantage had been
given to Norlovanian Corporation.[44]
Undoubtedly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 is quite high which, in this case,
was not hurdled by the evidence presented against Constantino. Verily, the prosecution failed to satisfy the
requisite proof to demonstrate Constantinos guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While Constantino should have
exercised more prudence when he transacted with Norlovanian Corporation, he could not however be held liable
for gross inexcusable negligence as contemplated in R.A. No. 3019. Indeed, in the earlier case of Constantino v.
Desierto,[45] the Court had already made an express finding that petitioner Constantino did not violate the
mandate of Resolution No. 21 but instead merely carried out its directive.
That case was a special civil action for certiorari filed by Constantino to seek the invalidation of the resolution of
the Ombudsman finding him guilty of grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and/or gross
neglect of duty, and on that account, dismissing him from service. The controversy arose from the same
transaction entered into between Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation and involved the same subject matter
as in the case at bar. The administrative complaint was initiated through a letter-complaint and joint affidavit
signed by Vice Mayor Espinosa and to it was appended a certification signed by the Vice Mayor and Councilors
Suson, Ingay, Asgapo, Espinosa and Octavio.
In exonerating Constantino from the administrative charges, the Court found that the evidence against him was
inadequate to warrant his dismissal from service on the grounds of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and gross neglect of duty. More particularly, we made the following pronouncements:
The explicit terms of Resolution No. 21, Series of 1996 clearly authorized Mayor Constantino to lease/purchase
one (1) fleet of heavy equipment composed of seven (7) generally described units, through a negotiated contract.
That resolution, as observed at the outset, contained no parameters as of rate of rental, period of lease, purchase
price. Pursuant thereto, Mayor Constantino, representing the Municipality of Malungon, and Norberto Lindong,
representing the Norlovanian Corporation, executed two written instruments of the same date and occasion, viz.:
One an agreement(on a standard printed form) dated Febr[ua]ry 28, 1996 for the lease by the corporation to the
municipality of heavy equipment of the number and description required by Resolution no. 21, and
Two an undertaking for the subsequent conveyance and transfer of ownership of the equipment to the
municipality at the end of the term of the lease.
That the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan knew of this lease/purchase is evident from Resolution No. 38,
Series of 1996 unanimously enacted by them shortly after delivery of the equipment. In that resolution they (1)
declared that the Municipal Government ** has just acquired its fleet of heavy equipment leased/purchased from
the Norlovanian Corporation, and (2) requested Mayor Constantino to operate the newly acquired heavy
equipment ** leased/purchase from the Norlovanian Corporation. The Resolution is consistent with the allegations
of Mayor Constantino which in any event are not denied by the Councilors or Vice-Mayor Espinosa that:
1) the equipment was delivered to the Municipality by Norlovanian Corporation on February 28, 1996 and duly
inspected by Councilors Guilley, Ruez, Nallos and Liray, as well as the Municipal Engineer and the Municipal
Treasurer;
2) prior to the delivery of the units, the Vice Mayor and other Members of the Sanguniang Bayan had opportunity
to read the Lease Agreement as well as the Undertaking but then raised no objections thereto;
3) neither did they raise any objections (a) at the session of the Municipal Council on February 29, 1996, when
Norberto Lindong explained the terms of the negotiated contract of lease/purchase, or (b) at the time that the units
were delivered and inspected by designated minicipal officials.
Now, it is germane to advert to the deplorable inaccuracies in the Joint Affidavit of private respondents (P.L.
Espinosa, Suson, Sr., Ingay, W. P. Espinosa, Octavio, Asgapo) submitted as part of their complaint in the
Ombudsmans Office. The affidavit contains a clearly distorted version of Resolution No. 21 of February 22, 1996.
In that document of the affiants described Resolution No. 21 as authorizing Mayor Constantino to purchase and
acquire ** heavy equipments (sic) to be paid within five (5) years at the yearly amortization of P2.2 million **. This
is a misleading reading of Resolution No. 21. As the most cursory perusal of that resolution at once discloses,
what the Mayor was thereby empowered to do was to enter into a negotiated contract in the Municipalitys behalf
with interested parties, in line with the expressed wish of the Municipality to lease/purchase one (1) fleet of heavy
equipment ** not simply to purchase and acquire said equipment (as complainant Councilors aver). Neither does
Resolution No. 21 state (contrary to complainants description of it) that the price shall be paid within five (5) years
at the yearly amortization of P2.2 million **; indeed, as already above stressed, the resolution is completely silent
as regards any terms and conditions of the negotiated contract that the Mayor was assigned to execute in the
towns behalf. Such obvious distortions cannot but erode the complainant councilors credibility and bona fides.
It is also relevant to draw attention to the flagrantly inaccurate statements and inferences about the Mayors
negotiated contract regarding the heavy equipment, contained in Resolution No. 47 approved only by four (4)
Members of the Municipal Council at its session of June 6, 1996 (the four (4) being Councilors Octavio, Espinosa,
Asgapo and Ingay). That Resolution No. 47, it will be recalled, stopped all rental payment/expenditures relative to
the pool of heavy equipment of the Norlovanian Company. The stoppage was based on prior resolutions of the
Council allegedly setting down the terms under which the heavy equipment should be acquired, and which terms
were supposedly violated by the Mayor. but unaccountably and again indicative of bad faith, if not malice, on the
part of private respondents Resolution No. 47 made absolutely no reference to two (2) resolution which on their
face justify the Mayors contract with Norlovanian Corporation, to wit: (1) Resolution No. 21 which, having been
enacted after the cited resolutions, must be deemed to have superseded them, and which, to repeat, motivated
and constitutes the justification for the lease-purchase agreement entered into by the Mayor and Norlovanian
Corporation, and (2) Resolution No. 38 in which the Councilors not only expressly aknowledged that the municipal
government ** (had) just acquired its fleet of heavy equipment leased/purchased from the Norlovanian
Corporation, but also requested ** (the) Mayor ** to operate the newly acquired heavy equipment of the
municipality leased/purchased from the Norlovanian Corporation.
In light of the forego[i]ng facts, which appear to the Court to be quite apparent on the record, it is difficult to
perceive how the Office of the Ombudsman could have arrived at a conclusion of any wrongdoing by the Mayor in
relation to the transaction in question. It is difficult to see how the transaction between the Mayor and Norlovanian
Corporation entered into pursuant to Resolution No. 21 and tacitly accepted and approved by the town Council
through its Resolution No. 38 could be deemed an infringement of the same Resolution No. 21. In truth, an
examination of the pertinent writings (the resolution, the two (2) instruments constituting the negotiated contract,
and the certificate of delivery) unavoidably confirms their integrity and congruity. It is in fine, difficult to see how
those pertinent written instrument, could establish a prima facie case to warrant the preventive suspension of
Mayor Constantino. A person with the most elementary grasp of the English language would, from merely
scanning those material documents, at once realize that the Mayor had done nothing but carry out the expressed
wishes of the Sangguniang Bayan.
xxxx
The investigator also opined that Resolution No. 21 should be interpreted in light of other official documents,
executed a year earlier. He [Graft Prosecutor Buena] does not explain why he did not adopt the more obvious
construction of Resolution No. 21 indicated by the elementary doctrine that it is within the power and prerogative
of the town council to repeal its prior acts, either expressly, or by the passage of essentially inconsistent
resolutions. When the town council passed Resolution No. 21 without any mention whatever of those prior official
documents respecting the acquisition to heavy equipment, the evident intention was to supersede them and to
have such acquisition governed solely by Resolution No. 21. This conclusion is strongly supported by the fact that
the Sanggunian expressly admitted in the Second Whereas Clause of its Resolution No. 21 that there had been a
failure of bidders to submit bids despite of two biddings ... public announcement [sic] the two biddings being
obviously related to said earlier official acts of the town council. The conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that
the Council (with full awareness of said negotiated contract,) and of the delivery of equipment thereunder, had
requested the Mayor to put the equipment into operation for the town projects. The Court is thus satisfied that it
was in fact the Councils intention, which it expressed in clear language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to
execute a negotiated contract with any interested party, without regard to any official acts of the Council prior to
Resolution No. 21.
It is also difficult to see why the patent inaccuracies in the affidavit-complaint and Resolution No. 47 were ignored
as difficult to understand how the execution of two writings to embody one contract of lease/purchase could be
regarded as fatally defective, and even indicative of a criminal conspiracy, or why said two writings should be
interpreted in such a way as to magnify their seeming inconsistencies. The fundamental and familiar legal
principle which the Office of the Ombudsman ignored is that it is perfectly legitimate for a bilateral contract to be
embodied in two or more separate writings, and that in such an event the writings should be read and interpreted
together in such a way as to eliminate seeming inconsistencies and render the parties intention effectual.
The statement in the appealed Resolution as to the absence of prior consent of the Council to the negotiated
contract executed by Mayor Constantino and Norlovanian Corporation flies in the teeth of the evidence; there is
unrebutted proof that the heavy equipment delivered to the Municipality pursuant to the contract, was inspected by
designated councilors and municipal officers; that shortly thereafter, the negotiated contract composed of two
documents was explained and discussed at the session of the town Council of February 29, 1996; and that
afterwards the Council requested Mayor Constantino to put the equipment into operation. (Emphasis supplied)[46]
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still
the findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases.
What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the principle of
bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the
re-litigation of the same issue in another action.[47] It is well established that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.[48] The dictum therein laid down became the law of the
case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding
between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected
anew since such issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at
least by conclusiveness of judgment.[49]
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability as the purpose of administrative
proceedings on the one hand is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a
public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of
crime.[50] However, the dismissal by the Court of the administrative case against Constantino based on the same
subject matter and after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of
the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the level of proof required in administrative
cases which is substantial evidence was not mustered therein. The same evidence is again before the Court in
connection with the appeal in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with greater reason satisfy
the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
The elementary principle is that it is perfectly legitimate for a bilateral contract to be embodied in two or more
separate writings, and that in such an event the writings should be read and interpreted together in such a way as
to eliminate seeming inconsistencies and render the intention of the parties effectual.[51] In construing a written
contract, the reason behind and the circumstances surrounding its execution are of paramount importance to
place the interpreter in the situation occupied by the parties concerned at the time the writing was executed.[52]
Construction of the terms of a contract, which would amount to impairment or loss of right, is not favored.
Conservation and preservation, not waiver, abandonment or forfeiture of a right, is the rule.[53] In case of doubts
in contracts, the same should be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.[54]
G.R. No. 154482
Lindong ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in issuing the challenged orders. He
argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not holding in abeyance the execution of judgment against him in light of
the pending petition for review by his co-accused before this Court of the same decision for which he was
convicted. Should the decision be set aside by the Supreme Court, petitioner Lindong contends, he will be
benefited to the extent that there can no longer be any judgment to legally execute against both himself and
Constantino.
The virtual acquittal of Constantino inevitably puts a welcome end to the tribulations of Lindong. Thus, we grant
the petition.
One of the essential elements for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the respondent is a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions, or that he or she is a private individual in conspiracy with
such public officer. In the instant case, the essential acquittal of Constantino, as presaged in G.R. No. 140656 and
presented in the disquisition, renders an absence in the critical requisite of a public officer with whom Lindong, the
private individual, allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged.
Hence, we now have before us an incongruous situation where execution of judgment has been entered against a
private person accused with conspiring with a public officer for violation of the anti-graft law, but at the same time
said public officer would unequivocably be entitled to exoneration had he not died in the meantime. Yet, it is utterly
illogical to absolve Constantino who entered into the contract on behalf of the government and send the private
person to prison.
The case of Marcos v. Sandiganbayan (1st Division)[55] is instructive. Here, the Court granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by former First Lady Imelda Marcos and acquitted her of the charge of violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019. Her acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the subject lease agreement not as a
public officer, but as a private person. Thus, the Court found that the first element of the offense, i.e., that the
accused is a public officer, was lacking. However, the acquittal of the former First Lady was taken in conjunction
with the acquittal of the public officer with whom she was accused.[56]
The case of Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, et al.[57] further elucidates the matter as illustrated in
Marcos, to wit:
x x x [T]he acquittal of the former First Lady should be taken in the context of the Courts Decision dated January
29, 1198, in Dans, Jr. v. People, which the former First Lady sought to reconsider and, finding merit in her motion,
gave rise to the Courts Resolution in Marcos. In Dans, the Information filed against the former First Lady and Jose
P. Dans, Jr., then Minister of Transportation and Communications, for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.]
3019, alleged that they were both public officers and, conspiring with each other, entered into the subject lease
agreement covering the LRTA property with the PGHFI, a private entity, under terms and conditions manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The Court in its original decision affirmed the former First Ladys conviction for violation of Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.]
[No.] 3019 but acquitted her co-accused, Dans, Jr., of the said offense. As stated earlier, upon the former First
Ladys motion for reconsideration, the Court reversed her conviction in its Resolution in Marcos.
It can be gleaned from the entire context of Marcos and Dans that the reversal of the former First Ladys conviction
was based on the fact that it was later held that she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not a
public officer. However, this acquittal should also be taken in conjunction with the fact that the public officer with
whom she had supposedly conspired, her co-accused Dans, had earlier been acquitted. In other words, the
element that the accused is a public officer, was totally wanting in the former First Ladys case because Dans, the
public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired in committing Section 3(g) of R[.]A[.] [No.] 3019, had already
been acquitted. Obviously, the former First Lady could not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the
same offense. (Emphasis supplied)
It is therefore apparent that in light of the prevailing milieu in the instant case, we cannot sustain the execution of
judgment against Lindong. The reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23433 makes
it legally absurd to execute any such judgment against him.
Moreover, Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure operates in his favor. The Rule
provides:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Although the rule states that a favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not appeal, we have held that a
literal interpretation of the phrase did not appeal will not give justice to the purpose of the provision. It should be
read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused
who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable.[58]
In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him. In such cases, the co-accused already
withdrew his appeal,[59] failed to file an appellants brief,[60] or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but
eventually withdrew the same.[61] Even more, in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of
conviction but for one reason or another, their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless,
the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused.[62] Therefore, we cannot find a
reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so in this case where the public officer accused of violating the anti-
graft law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was dismissed on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 140656, although meritorious, is DENIED on the ground of mootness. The
petition in G.R. No. 154482 is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
23433 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is permanently enjoined from executing said orders.
SO ORDERED.
3 Magallanes vs. Sun Yat Sen G.R. No. 160876 January 18, 2008
Facts: Azucena Magallanes, Evelyn Bacolod, Judith Cotecson (represented by her heirs), petitioners, Grace
Gonzales, and Bella Gonzales were all employed as teachers in the Sun Yat Sen Elementary School in Surigao
City. Paz Go and Elena Cubillan are principals of the said school. Willy Ang Gan Teng and Benito Ang are its
directors, while Teotimo Tan is the school treasurer. They are all respondents herein.
On May 22, 1994, respondents terminated the services of petitioners. Thus, on August 3, 1994, they filed with the
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. X, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Butuan City, complaints
against respondents for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, payment of backwages, 13th month pay,
ECOLA, separation pay, moral damages, and attorney’s fees. Likewise, on August 22, 1994, petitioner Cotecson
filed a separate complaint praying for the same reliefs.
Issue: (1) whether the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) erred in holding that affixing a wrong docket number on
a motion renders it "non-existent;" and (2) whether the issuance by the NLRC of the Order dated March 30, 2001,
amending the amounts of separation pay and backwages, awarded by the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) to
petitioners and computed by the Labor Arbiter, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Held: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Resolutions dated October 29, 2001, May 8, 2003,
and October 10, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 are REVERSED. The Order of the NLRC dated March 30, 2001
in NLRC Case No. M-006176-2001 is SET ASIDE. The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated January 8, 2001 is
REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) is correct when it ruled that petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 is "non-existent." Petitioners’
counsel placed a wrong case number in their motion. Where a pleading bears an erroneous docket number and
thus "could not be attached to the correct case," the said pleading is, for all intents and purposes, "non-existent." It
has neither the duty nor the obligation to correct the error or to transfer the case to the Seventh Division.
However, we opt for liberality in the application of the rules to the instant case in light of the following
considerations. First, the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed where adherence thereto
would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require.
Second, this Court is not a slave of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion – in rendering justice; it is guided by
the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. Thus, if the application of
the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within this Court’s power to suspend the
rules or except a particular case from its application.
We sustain petitioners’ contention that the NLRC, in modifying the award of the Court of Appeals, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial agencies have neither
business nor power to modify or amend the final and executory Decisions of the appellate courts. Under the
principle of immutability of judgments, any alteration or amendment which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.8 We thus rule that the Order dated March 30, 2001 of the NLRC
directing that the monetary award should be computed from June 1994, the date petitioners were dismissed from
the service, up to June 20, 1995 only, is void.
4 Ruivivar vs. Office of the Ombudsman (2008)
G.R. No. 165012, September 16, 2008. J. Brion:
FACTS: Dr. Connie Bernardo is the President of the Association of Drug Testing Centers (Association) that
conducts drug testing and medical examination of applicants for driver’s license. In this capacity, Bernardo went to
the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to meet with representatives from the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) and some other errands. Before proceedings to the office of the LTO Commissioner,
Bernardo passed by the office of Rachel Beatriz Ruivivar to conduct a follow up on the status of her company’s
application for accreditation. While there, Ruivivar shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner, hurled
invectives upon her person and prevented her from entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. This prompted
Bernardo to file an Affidavit-Complaint charging Ruivivar before the Ombudsman of serious misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority and violations of the RPC and of the Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Ruivivar administratively liable for discourtesy in the
course of her official functions and imposed on her the penalty of reprimand. Ruivivar filed a MR arguing that she
was deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies of the affidavits of Bernardo’s witnesses. The
Ombudsman responded to the motion by order that Bernardo furnish Ruivivar with copies and directed the latter
to file, within 10 days from receipt of the Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances.
Ruivivar, nonetheless, did not choose to controvert the affidavits and insisted on her previous stand that she was
deprived of due process. Thus, the Ombudsman issued a ruling maintaining its findings. On petition for certiorari,
the petition was dismissed on the ground that Ruivivar used the wrong legal remedy and failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before the Ombudsman. The CA posits that the remedy should have been an appeal to
the CA by way of petition for review, citing the case of Fabian v. Desierto.
ISSUEs: (1) Whether or not Ruivivar chose the wrong remedy and (2) Whether or not Ruivivar was deprived of
due process
HELD: The Mode of Review Issue
Petitioner contends that he ruling in Fabian is not applicable to the Ombudsman rulings under the express
provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
7 since the penalty of reprimand imposed is final and unappealable. The appropriate remedy, under the
circumstances, is not the appellate remedy provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of these Rules.
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770
(The Ombudsmans Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule
III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of
judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional
Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law. We pointedly said: As a consequence of our ratiocination that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA
under the provisions of Rule 43.
We restated this doctrine in several cases and further elaborated on the recourses from Ombudsman actions in
other cases we have decided since then. In Lapid v. CA, we explained that an appeal under Rule 43 to the CA
only applies to administrative cases where the right to appeal is granted under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770. In
Lopez v. CA and Herrera v. Bohol, we recognized that no appeal is allowed in administrative cases where the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, is imposed. We pointed out that decisions of administrative agencies that are declared by law to be final
and unappealable are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness or upon proof of gross abuse
of discretion; the complainants legal recourse is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
applied as rules suppletory to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The use of this recourse
should take into account the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court i.e., the petition shall be
filed in and be cognizable only by the CA if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or by the Rules. In the present case, the Ombudsmans decision and order imposing the
penalty of reprimand on the petitioner are final and unappealable. Thus, the petitioner availed of the correct
remedy when she filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the Ombudsmans decision to reprimand
her.
The Due Process Issue
The CA Decision dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust all the
administrative remedies available to her before the Ombudsman. This ruling is legally correct as exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a requisite for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Other than this legal significance,
however, the ruling necessarily carries the direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been granted
the opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due
process. In the words of the CA ruling itself: Petitioner was given the opportunity by public respondent to rebut the
affidavits submitted by private respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate administrative remedy but she
failed to avail thereof for reasons only known to her.
The records show that the petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration on due process grounds (i.e., for the
private respondents failure to furnish her copies of the affidavits of witnesses) and on questions relating to the
appreciation of the evidence on record. The Ombudsman acted on this motion by issuing its Order of January 17,
2003 belatedly furnishing her with copies of the private respondents witnesses, together with the directive to file,
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order, such pleading which she may deem fit under the circumstances.
Given this opportunity to act on the belatedly-furnished affidavits, the petitioner simply chose to file a
Manifestation where she took the position that The order of the Ombudsman dated 17 January 2003 supplying her
with the affidavits of the complainant does not cure the 04 November 2002 order, and on this basis prayed that
the Ombudsman’s decision be reconsidered and the complaint dismissed for lack of merit.
5 NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al. vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED
MINES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 202877, December 2015, First Division (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation (Redmont) filed an Application for an Exploration Permit (EP) over
mining areas located in the Municipalities of Rizal, Bataraza, and Narra, Palawan. After an inquiry with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Redmont learned that said areas were already
covered by existing Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) and an EP, which were initially applied for by
petitioners Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation (Narra Nickel), Tesoro Mining and Development,
Inc. (Tesoro) and McArthur Mining, Inc. (McArthur) respective predecessors-in-interest with the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, Office of the DENR.
Upon the recommendation of then DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., through a memorandum, petitioners'
FTAA applications were all approved on April 5, 2010. Consequently, on April 12, 2010, the Republic -
represented by then Executive Secretary Leandro R. Mendoza, acting by authority of then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo - and petitioners executed an FTAA covering the subject areas, denominated as FTAA No. 05-
2010-IVB (MIMAROPA).
Prior to the grant of petitioners' applications for FTAA conversion, and the execution of the above-stated FTAA,
Redmont filed three separate petitions for the denial of petitioners' respective MPSA and/or EP applications
before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR-MGB. Redmont's primary argument was that petitioners were
all controlled by their common majority stockholder, MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI) - a 100% Canadian-owned
corporation - and, thus, disqualified from being grantees of MPSAs and/or EPs. The matter essentially concerning
the propriety of denying petitioners' MPSAs and/or EPs in view of their nationality had made it all the way to this
Court. In the Court's Decision, petitioners were declared to be foreign corporations under the application of the
"Grandfather Rule." Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision, which was, however, denied.
Redmont separately sought the cancellation and/or revocation of the executed FTAA through a Petition before the
Office of the President (OP). Redmont asserted, among others, that the FTAA was highly anomalous and
irregular, considering that petitioners and their mother company, MBMI, have a long history of violating and
circumventing the Constitution and other laws, due to their questionable activities in the Philippines and abroad.
Petitioners opposed Redmont's petition through a motion to dismiss, contending that: (a) there is no rule or law
which grants an appeal from a memorandum of a department secretary; (b) the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; (c) the appeal was not perfected because copies of the appeal were not properly served on
them; and (d) Redmont is not a real party-in-interest. The OP granted Redmont's petition. The CA affirmed the OP
Ruling. The CA ruled that the Republic, as represented by the OP, had the right to cancel the FTAA, even without
judicial permission, because paragraph a (iii), Section 17.233 thereof provides that such agreement may be
cancelled by either party on the ground of "any intentional and materially false statement or omission of facts by a
[p]arty."34 Accordingly, it sustained the OP's finding that petitioners committed misrepresentations which
warranted the cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA.
ISSUE:
Whether the OP has quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of the cancellation and/or revocation of the
FTAA
RULING:
In this case, the OP cancelled/revoked the subject FTAA based on its finding that petitioners misrepresented, inter
alia, that they were Filipino corporations qualified to engage in mining activities.
Again, this is obviously an administrative exercise of a contractual right under paragraph a (iii), Section 17.2 of the
FTAA, which finds legal basis in Section 99 of RA 7942 that states: "[a]ll statements made in the exploration
permit, mining agreement and financial or technical assistance shall be considered as conditions and essential
parts thereof x x x." A material misrepresentation, if so found by ordinary courts of law as enunciated in Gonzales
upon a case duly instituted therefor, would then constitute a breach of a contractual condition that would entitle
the aggrieved party to cancel/revoke the agreement.
The scenario at hand does not involve a complaint for cancellation/revocation commenced before the ordinary
courts of law. Hence, Redmont's recourse to the OP - that, on the assumption that it even had the legal standing
to oppose an already executed FTAA which it was not a party to - was, by and of itself, done outside the correct
course procedure. Observe that RA 7942 and its RIRR do not state that the OP has the power to take cognizance
of a quasi-judicial proceeding involving a petition for cancellation of an existing FTAA. In fact, there is even no
mention of a petition for cancellation or revocation to be taken by a third party before the OP. While it may be said
that the OP has administrative control or supervision over its subordinate agencies, such as the POA, again the
jurisdiction of that body pertains only to mining disputes, and not those which involve judicial questions cognizable
by the ordinary courts of law.
Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an FTAA's validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial
power to adjudicate the propriety of its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point, the FTAA is a
contract to which the OP itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic.
It merely exercised a contractual right by cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action which
should not be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP's proper exercise of a quasi-judicial
function, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is, perforce, null and void.
III. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
A ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
1 Jocelyn Limkaichong vs Commission on Elections
FACTS: Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival,
and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not
a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the pendency of
the case against Limkaichong before the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC. Election day came and votes
were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared
Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a
disqualified candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC
issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in
compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the
COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise
jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since
the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the lower
house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning
his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to
the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent in G.R. No. 178831-32:
COMELEC, on May 7, 2001, issued a Resolution No. 4116 which reads:
This pertains to the finality of the decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a)Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate
(c)Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend as election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special
action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
The Commission En Banc Resolution affirming that of the Second Division was promulgated on June 29, 2007.
Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on July 3, 2007 and had until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a
restraining order from this Court to prevent the assailed resolution from attaining finality. Instead of filing a petition
before this Court with a prayer for a restraining order, Limkaichong opted to file a Manifestation and Motion for
Clarification before the COMELEC En Banc. This procedural lapse is fatal as her motion with the COMELEC En
Banc did not toll the running of the five (5)-day reglementary period. Thus, the June 29, 2007 COMELEC En
BancResolution has become final and executory.
On the other hand, petitioner Limkaichong argues that the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction over the
disqualification case when she was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 25, 2007. She
insists that jurisdiction is now exclusively vested in the HRET under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
This posture will not also prevent the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc from becoming final
and executory. When petitioner received a copy of the assailed resolution, she should have instituted an action
before the HRET to challenge the legality of the said resolution affirming her disqualification.
This, she failed to do.
On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong’s manifestation and motion for clarification,
thus:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30, 2007, this
Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be
determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all pending incidents
relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of Representatives should now
be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral tribunal.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)
Despite the clear direction from the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner again failed to institute the necessary action
before the HRET to contest the June 29, 2007 Resolution within ten (10) days from receipt of the August 16, 2007
COMELEC Resolution. Around seven (7) months had lapsed from promulgation of the August 16, 2007 ruling of
the COMELEC and petitioner has not lifted a finger to challenge the June 29, 2007 COMELEC En Banc
Resolution in question. Plainly, said resolution has become final and executory.
I vote to DISMISS Limkaichong’s petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32.
2 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. MARICELLE M. CORTES, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS: On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued
Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent
Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and
requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered
an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing
authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson
Purificacion C. Valer Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to
assume her position because her appointment is not yet complete.
On April 4, 2008 the Civil Service Commission-NCR (CSC-NCR) Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing
that it will conduct an investigation on the appointment of respondent Cortes.
Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the
appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of
the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR,
Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a
mere member of the Commission En Banc.
Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied on September 30, 2008.
Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition for review on November 24, 2008 before the CSC.
On March 2, 2010 the CSC issued Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed the nepotic
character of respondent Cortes appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same
was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010.
Consequently, in a letter dated August 10, 2010, CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Ma. Victoria V.
Cardona terminated respondents services effective August 4, 2010.
Cortes filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA) which was granted. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 10, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR
is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: nepotism
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or
office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent
Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter
of Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential
capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present
case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions
provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority referred to in Section
59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual Commissioners who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and
recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures
the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested.
Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding
the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: spirit of the law must prevail
Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that we must interpret not by the letter that killeth,
but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the
individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the Commission En
Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments made by a
group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is
elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his
father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His
mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
B LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1 Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule,
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette
brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of
the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority.
She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for
her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad
faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that
under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code.
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who
acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that
may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable
to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are
no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may
arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V.
CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined
as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.
C PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
1 PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The
Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents
from administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit
its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –
(a) x x x xxx xxx
(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or
instrumentalities xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or hearing, the
Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and
recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty
recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of
the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE,
ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the
different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy
and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)
provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines
to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the President of the Philippines
shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government and may, at
his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units
of the National Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions and
authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act of 2010)
authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and corruption in
the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities.
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency
in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the President (OP)
to directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive Department including
heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and other powers and
functions inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to the
Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and duties mentioned
in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the President,
thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and recommendations of the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be affected by
the abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under existing laws if applicable. The
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the necessary funds for the benefits
of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets and
Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition or transfer of their
functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the
applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or
Attached to the Office of the President) dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later than
31 December 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and Management, shall
ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and winding-up of the activities of
PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin,
which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy
Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring
him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law,
petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A
PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any
existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial
functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds
and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due
process requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by
virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the
executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which
constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to
reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function
from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the
President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart
from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v.
Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of
EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the
President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31
(2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations
prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly
"under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have
now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong
to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him to
reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition of an office
but the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court in several
cases does a reorganization include the act of creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing
office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the
administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to
discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that –
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good
faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.13
It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with
such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption
in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of
the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's
operation in the 2010 annual budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain its
personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under the General
Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner
by which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational
funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention is without
legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the
budget necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the necessary authority to
evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency in the executive department would need to
operate in the most economical and efficient manner.17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A.
9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and
consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President’s power to
reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and realigning
appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of
the appropriation for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may
be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all,
there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the
existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the
Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative
agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA
wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory" appears
part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-
ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and recommendations to the
President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the
power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot
be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the
enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the President
to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The
primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to –
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner
may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its
investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that
of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the
President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of
limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the
government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government.29 It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of
the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This
we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well
settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential
appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct
in office.33 Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial distinctions that exist
between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue
of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected.
In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the
formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process,35 which simply means having the opportunity to explain one’s side.36 Hence, as
long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation
under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his
explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending
that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere
suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably
sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the
presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore,
deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to
discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
2 Quimbo vs. Gervacio
Facts:
Petitioner Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was placed under preventive suspension without pay after he
was administratively charged for harassment and oppression. The Ombudsman found him guilty of oppression
and ordered his suspension for 8 months without pay. The Court of Appeals, however, found him guilty of simple
misconduct only and penalized him with 2 months suspension without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for
Modification/Reconsideration praying that he should no longer be required to serve the penalty of 2 months
suspension without pay, he having priorly served preventive suspension for more than 2 months. He argued that
he should not be punished twice nor be made to suffer the suspension penalty after he had served the same
(although in a preventive suspension).
Issue:
May the period within which one is under preventive suspension be credited to form part of the final penalty of
suspension?
Held:
No. There is a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws.
SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a
preventive measure.
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the
actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:
SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension
shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.
Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to
disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the
substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.
Since the law explicitly prescribes the rules on crediting of preventive suspension to the final penalty of
suspension, petitioners invocation of equity may not lie.
3 Campol v. Balao-as GR No. 197634, November 28, 2016
Facts: Campol served the Municipality of Boliney, Abra since 1999 as Secretary to the Sangguniang
Bayan(SB).He held the position in a permanent capacity with salary grade 24.
During the 2004 elections, Ronald S. Balao-as (Balao-as) and Dominador J. Sianen (Sianen), respondents in this
case, won as mayor and vice-mayor, respectively (collectively, Respondents). They assumed office in July 2004.
Shortly after this, the SB passed a resolution terminating Campolas SB Secretary on the ground that he was
absent without approved leave from August 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004.However, when the resolution was
transmitted to the SangguniangPanlalawigan (SP), it referred the matter to CSC-Abra.CSC-Abra then wrote
Sianen informing him that Campol cannot be removed from his position because he is protected by the
Administrative Code. The SP followed this advice.The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)-Abra
also took the same position.Despite the unanimous position of these three agencies, Sianen issued Memorandum
Order No. 001, Series of 2004, which dropped Campol from the rolls.
Campol challenged this memorandum before the CSC-CAR, which ruled in his favor.Sianen, in tum, elevated the
matter before the CSC. The CSC granted his appeal and ruled that Campol was properly dropped from the rolls.
Campol filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, in its Decision, reversed the CSC.However, while the CA ruled
that Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls, it refused to order his reinstatement. The CA reasoned that since
Campol was already gainfully employed with the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) since October 2005,
reinstatement was no longer possible. It also held that Campol is entitled to backwages only from the time of his
dismissal until October 2005, prior to his employment with another government agency.
Campol filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the CA's refusal to order his reinstatement. He also
asserts that the CA erred in ordering the payment of his backwages only up to October 2005.
Issue:
Whether Campol is entitled to reinstatement and to the payment of his backwages from the time of his dismissal
until he is reinstated.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Law on Reinstatement
Section 2, paragraph 3 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states -No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
This constitutional provision captures the essence of security of tenure.An employee of the civil service has the
right to be protected in the possession and exercise of his or her office. He or she cannot be removed from his or
her employment, save for causes allowed by law. A necessary consequence of the importancegiven to security of
tenure is the rule that an employee invalidly dismissed from service is entitled to reinstatement.
In Tan v. Gimenez, etc. and Aguilar, etc., we have pursued the doctrine that an employee of the civil service
illegally dismissed from office has the right to reinstatement. Any other employment he or she obtains while
waiting for the court to rule on the propriety of his or her dismissal should not be construed as an abandonment of
his or her position.This was also our pronouncement in Tañala v. Legaspi. In the latter case, we even held that the
reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee is proper even when another person is already occupying the
position. This is not a legal impediment to reinstatement.
Thus, in accordance with the doctrine in the aforementioned cases, Campol should be reinstated to his position as
SB Secretary. In the event that another person has already been appointed to his post, our ruling in Tañala should
apply. In the eyes of the law, the position never became vacant since Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls.
Hence, the incumbency of the person who assumed the position is only temporary and must give way to Campol
whose right to the office has been recognized by the proper authorities.
The Law on Backwages
An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her
backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of
his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the
employee never truly left the office. Fixing the backwages to five years or to the period of time until the employee
found a new employment is not a full recompense for the damage done by the illegal dismissal of an employee.
Worse, it effectively punishes an employee for being dismissed without his or her fault. In cases like this, the twin
award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages are dictated by the constitutional mandate to protect civil
service employees' right to security of tenure. Anything less than this falls short of the justice due to government
employees unfairly removed from office. This is the prevailing doctrine and should be applied in Campol's case.
4 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner,v.MINERVA M.P. PACHEO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue(BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City. The BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order
(RTAO)No. 25-2002, ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon
City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene G. Banez, then Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR). She considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to a
constructive dismissal.
Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint before the CSC- National Capital Region (CSC-
NCR), praying for the nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. The BIR, through its Deputy Commissioner for Legal and
Inspection Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara), denied Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her
reassignment could not be considered constructive dismissal as she maintained her position as Revenue Attorney
IV and was designated as Assistant Chief of Legal Division.
Pacheo appealed to the CSC where the latter granted the same. However, the CSC held that rules and so holds
that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to
have performed any actual work in the government on the principle of no work no pay. Still not satisfied, Pacheo
moved for reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she was constructively dismissed
and, therefore, entitled to back salary. However, the motion was dismissed. Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse
before the CA via a petition for review. The CA reversed the CSC decision, stating that Pacheo was constructively
dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Pacheo was constructively dismissed and entitled to backwages
HELD: No.
Political Law- transfer or assignment of personnel cannot be done when the same is a preliminary step toward his
removal or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior consent, it
cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil
Service.
Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive
dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads unreasonable,
humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to
have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the
employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work either in her original
station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga negates her claim of
constructive dismissal.
It is clear, however, from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7) that there is no such duty
to first report to the new place of assignment prior to questioning an alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon
an employee. Pacheo was well within her right not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
to question her reassignment.
Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of tenure, which is
assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented
transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and back wages? The
Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement, but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that she
is entitled to full back wages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil service
employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back
salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.
5 CSC vs. Sojor
Facts: Respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas
Polytechnic College (CVPC). In 1997, R.A. No. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997" was
enacted which mandates that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges.
The BOT of CVPC appointed Sojor as president, with a four-year term until September 2002. He was appointed
president of the institution for a second term, expiring on September 24, 2006.
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). A Board of Regents
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members
before the Civil Service Commission regional office. Respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The CSC denied his motion to dismiss. Thus, respondent was formally charged
with three administrative cases.
He appealed to CSC proper, arguing that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher Education
Chairperson who was under the Office of the President , the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of
CVPC was appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted
to CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that
this was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292, a later law which granted to the BOT the power to
remove university officials.
Issues:
1. Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over presidents of state universities or schools with
governing boards exclusively granted by their charters the corporate powers of administration?
2. Does the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of a state university exclusive to the
Board of Regents?
3. Does the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over a president of a State University
violate academic freedom?
4. Does respondent's appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative
cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him?
Held:
1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-
owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential
staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract
to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes
the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of
the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the
governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
2. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the
university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration." Although the BOR of NORSU
is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that
such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that
another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction
over the matter. In this case, the CSC also has jurisdiction to discipline all members of the civil service, career or
non-career. Hence the CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with the BOR of the university in the discipline and
removal of its officials.
3. The principle of academic freedom finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters
traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed
against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of
official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are
classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service,
may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so
under the principle of academic freedom.
4. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v. Santos are inapplicable to the
present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is
an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi
est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The
same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to
speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.
6 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. MARIAN D. TORRES and MARICAR D. TORRES,
respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated January 6, 2004 and the Resolution3 dated May 27,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69749.
The case arose from an administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Document filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0926) by then Barangay
Chairman Romancito L. Santos of Concepcion, Malabon, against Edilberto Torres (Edilberto), Maricar D. Torres
(Maricar), and Marian D. Torres (Marian), then Municipal Councilor, Legislative Staff Assistant, and Messenger,
respectively, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malabon. Maricar and Marian are daughters of Edilberto.
Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant on February 16, 1995, while Marian was appointed as
Messenger on May 24, 1996. At the time of their public employment, they were both enrolled as full-time regular
college students – Maricar, as a full-time student at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and Marian as a
dentistry-proper student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar University. During the period subject of this
case, they were able to collect their respective salaries by submitting Daily Time Records (DTR) indicating that
they reported for work every working day, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
After due proceedings held in the Office of the Ombudsman, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Moreno F.
Generoso, in the Decision4 dated November 9, 2001, found Maricar and Marian administratively guilty of
Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document and recommended the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
from the service. The charge against Edilberto was dismissed, having become moot and academic in view of his
re-election on May 14, 2001 in accordance with the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos5 that "a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." Upon
recommendation of Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto affirmed the
findings of GIO Generoso but tempered the penalty to one (1) year suspension from service without pay.
Aggrieved, Maricar and Marian went to the CA via a petition6 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated January 6, 2004, the CA granted the petition. While affirming the findings of fact of the Office
of the Ombudsman, the CA set aside the finding of administrative guilt against Maricar and Marian ratiocinating in
this wise:
It is undisputed that petitioners are confidential employees of their father. As such, the task they were required to
perform, is upon the instance of their father, and the time they were required to report may be intermittent. To our
mind, the false entries they made in their daily time records on the specific dates contained therein, had been
made with no malice or deliberate intent so as to constitute falsification. The entries made may not be absolutely
false, they may even be considered as having been made with a color of truth, not a downright and willful
falsehood which taken singly constitutes falsification of public documents. As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera
inexactud no es bastante para integrar este delito." In the present case, the daily time records have already
served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third person because under the
facts obtaining, petitioners may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from their superior.
It may be true that a daily time record is an official document. It is not falsified if it does not pervert its avowed
purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case of a public
document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare, which is naturally damaged if that document is
falsified when the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. The keeping and
submission of daily time records within the context of petitioners’ employment, should be taken only for the sake
of administrative procedural convenience or as a matter of practice, but not for reason of strict legal obligation.
Assuming that petitioners are under strict legal obligation to keep and submit daily time records, still we are
disposed to the view that the alleged false entries do not constitute falsification for having been made with no
malice or deliberate intent.
The following pronouncement in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan may serve as a guidepost, to wit: "[I]f
what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent
can be rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general
rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious
responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which
is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence. In the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of criminal
intent on the part of petitioners.
As a final note, there may be some suspicions as to the real intention of private complainant in instituting the
action before public respondent, caution should be taken to prevent the development of circumstances that might
inevitably impair the image of the public office. Private complainant is a government official himself, as such he
should avoid so far as reasonably possible, a situation which would normally tend to arouse any reasonable
suspicion that he is utilizing his official position for personal gain or advantage to the prejudice of party litigants or
the public in general. For "there may be occasion then where the needs of the collectivity that is the government
may collide with his private interest as an individual."
In closing, it must be borne in mind that the evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep a daily
time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering to the policy
of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the
government as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily
time record as an official document, however, remains untarnished if the damage sought to be prevented has not
been produced. The obligation to make entries in the daily time records of employees in the government service is
a matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation of salary for a given period,
characteristically, not an outright and strict measure of professional discipline, efficiency, dedication, honesty and
competence. The insignificant transgression by petitioners, if ever it is one, would not tilt the scales of justice
against them, for courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and justice.7
Petitioner moved to reconsider the reversal of its Decision by the CA, but the motion was denied in the CA
Resolution dated May 27, 2005. Hence, this petition based on the following grounds:
I THE FILLING-UP OF ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL DAILY TIME RECORDS (DTRs) IS NOT A MATTER OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL CONVENIENCE, BUT RATHER REQUIRED BY CIVIL SERVICE LAW TO
ENSURE THAT THE PROPER LENGTH OF WORK-TIME IS OBSERVED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. THE
FALSIFICATION OF DTRs WOULD RENDER THE AUTHORS THEREOF ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
DISHONESTY AND GRAVE MISCONDUCT FOR THE DAMAGING FALSE NARRATION AND THE
COLLECTION OF FULL COMPENSATION FOR INEXISTENT WORK.
II THE ELEMENT OF DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT A REQUISITE FOR ONE TO BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR DISHONESTY AND MISCONDUCT. ASSUMING IT IS FOR ARGUMENT’S
SAKE, DAMAGE WAS CAUSED THE GOVERNMENT WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FALSIFIED THEIR
DAILY TIME RECORDS IN ORDER TO COLLECT THEIR SALARIES.
III THE ELEMENT OF INTENT OR MALICE APPLIES TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, NOT TO AN OFFENSE
OF DISHONESTY AND MISCONDUCT.8
Petitioner’s first submission is that the filling-up of entries in the official DTR is not a matter of administrative
procedural convenience but is a requirement by Civil Service Law to ensure that the proper length of work-time is
observed by all public officials and employees, including confidential employees such as respondents. It argues
that DTRs, being representations of the compensable working hours rendered by a public servant, ensure that the
taxpaying public is not shortchanged. To bolster this position, petitioner cited Rule XVII on Government Office
Hours of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws, to wit:
SECTION 1. It shall be the duty of each head of department or agency to require all officers and employees under
him to strictly observe the prescribed office hours. When the head of office, in the exercise of discretion allows
government officials and employees to leave the office during the office hours and not for official business, but to
attend socials/events/functions and/or wakes/interments, the same shall be reflected in their time cards and
charged to their leave credits.
SEC. 2. Each head of department or agency shall require a daily time record of attendance of all the officers and
employees under him including those serving in the field or on the water, to be kept in the proper form and,
whenever possible, registered in the bundy clock.
Service "in the field" shall refer to service rendered outside the office proper and service "on the water" shall refer
to service rendered on board a vessel which is the usual place of work.
SEC. 3. Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of agencies who are appointed by the President, officers who rank higher
than these chiefs and assistant chiefs in the three branches of government, and other presidential appointees
need not punch in the bundy clock, but attendance and all absences of such officers must be recorded.
SEC. 4. Falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or employee
administratively liable without prejudice to criminal prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
SEC. 5. Officers and employees of all departments and agencies except those covered by special laws shall
render not less than eight hours of work a day for five days a week or a total of forty hours a week, exclusive of
time for lunch. As a general rule, such hours shall be from eight o’clock in the morning to twelve o’clock noon and
from one o’clock to five o’clock in the afternoon on all days except Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays.
SEC. 6. Flexible working hours may be allowed subject to the discretion of the head of department or agency. In
no case shall the weekly working hours be reduced in the event the department or agency adopts the flexi-time
schedule in reporting for work.
SEC. 7. In the exigency of the service, or when necessary by the nature of the work of a particular agency and
upon representations with the Commission by the department heads concerned, requests for the rescheduling or
shifting of work schedule of a particular agency for a number of working days less than the required five days may
be allowed provided that government officials and employees render a total of forty hours a week and provided
further that the public is assured of core working hours of eight in the morning to five in the afternoon continuously
for the duration of the entire workweek.
SEC. 8. Officers and employees who have incurred tardiness and undertime regardless of minutes per day
exceeding [at least] ten times a month for two (2) consecutive months or for 2 months in a semester shall be
subject to disciplinary action.9
Petitioner posits that, by reason of the above provisions, making false entries in the DTRs should not be treated in
a cavalier fashion, but rather with a modicum of sacredness because the DTR mirrors the fundamental maxim of
transparency, good governance, public accountability, and integrity in the public service pursuant to the
constitutional precept that "public office is a public trust." Consequently, the officer or employee who falsifies time
records should incur administrative liability.
On its second and third submissions, petitioner assailed the position of the CA that respondents cannot be held
guilty of falsification because they did not cause any damage to the government and there was no intent or malice
on their part when they made the false entries in their respective DTRs during the questioned period of service.
According to petitioner, respondents were not criminally prosecuted for falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, but were being held administratively accountable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of
official documents; thus, the elements of damage and intent or malice are not prerequisites. It further claimed that
for this purpose, only substantial evidence is required, and this had been strongly established. Petitioner also
argued that, even if the element of damage is mandatory, respondents had caused damage to the government
when they received their full salaries for work not actually rendered.
In their Comment,10 respondents claimed that the CA correctly dismissed the administrative charges against
them as the integrity of their DTRs had remained untarnished and that they acted in good faith in making the
entries in their DTRs. They said that the CA clearly elaborated the legal basis for its ruling in their favor. They
even argued that the administrative charges lodged by Romancito Santos were based on mere conjectures and
conclusions of fact, such that it was not impossible for college students to work eight (8) hours a day and attend
classes. They further claimed that petitioner failed to prove that they actually attended their classes which they
were enrolled in.
Respondents also argued that petitioner erred in not having dismissed outright the administrative charges against
them because, at the time the complaint was filed, the charges had already prescribed under Section 20 (5) of
Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), to wit:
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
They said that the acts complained of occurred in 1996 to 1997, while the case was filed only on February 2000,
or after the lapse of more or less three (3) years.
Respondent Maricar also asseverated that the doctrine laid down in Aguinaldo v. Santos11 should also apply to
her considering that she was elected as City Councilor of Malabon City in the 2004 elections. She also claimed
that the instant case adversely affected their lives, particularly in her case, for while she graduated from the
University of the East College of Law in 2004, she was only able to take the bar examinations in 2005 due to the
pendency of the administrative case against her. She also cited the fact that the criminal case involving the same
set of facts was dismissed, insinuating that, as a result of this, the administrative case should have likewise been
dismissed.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that this is an administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
falsification of official document. To sustain a finding of administrative culpability only substantial evidence is
required, not overwhelming or preponderant, and very much less than proof beyond reasonable doubt as required
in criminal cases.12 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
The following facts are borne out by the records: (1) Maricar was appointed as Legislative Staff Assistant in the
Office of then Councilor of Malabon, Edilberto Torres, on February 16, 1995;13 (2) Marian was appointed as
Messenger in the same office on May 24, 1996;14 (3) at the time of Maricar’s appointment to and employment in
her position (1995-1997), she was a full-time regular college student at UST;15 (4) at the time of Marian’s
appointment and employment as messenger in her father’s office (1996-2000), she was a full-time regular
dentistry-proper student at the College of Dentistry of Centro Escolar University;16 (5) during the employment of
respondents in government service, they submitted DTRs indicating that they religiously reported for work from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. during work days;17 (6) by reason thereof, respondents collected their full salaries during
the entire time of their employment in their respective positions;18 and, (7) these all occurred with the full
knowledge and consent of their father.19
It is also worthy to note that the factual finding made by petitioner, i.e., that respondents made false entries in their
respective DTRs for the period subject of this case, was affirmed by the CA in the assailed Decision dated
January 6, 2004.20
On the basis of these established facts, petitioner was correct in holding respondents administratively guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of official document. Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity."21 Falsification of an official document, as an administrative offense,
is knowingly making false statements in official or public documents. Both are grave offenses under the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which carry with it the penalty of dismissal on the first
offense.22
Falsification of DTRs amounts to dishonesty.23 The evident purpose of requiring government employees to keep
a time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely adhering to the
policy of no work-no pay, a DTR is primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the government
as would result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done.24
Respondents’ claim of good faith, which implies a sincere intent not to do any falsehood or to seek any undue
advantage, cannot be believed. This Court pronounced –
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition,
and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind
and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another. x x x25
In this case, respondents knew fully well that the entries they made in their respective DTRs were false
considering that it was physically impossible for them to have reported for full work days when during those times
they were actually attending their regular classes, which undoubtedly would take up most of the daytime hours of
the weekdays. With this knowledge, respondents did not bother to correct the DTR entries to honestly reflect their
attendance at their workplace and the actual work they performed. Worse, they repeatedly did this for a long
period of time, consequently allowing them to collect their full salaries for the entire duration of their public
employment as staff members of their father.
Respondents’ protestations that petitioner failed to prove their actual attendance in their regular classes and thus,
suggest that they may not have been attending their classes, is preposterous and incredible, simply because this
is not in accord with the natural course of things. The voluminous documentary evidence subpoenaed by
petitioner from UST and Centro Escolar University showing the schedule of classes of respondents during the
questioned period, along with the certificates of matriculation painstakingly perused by GIO Generoso, strongly
militates against this claim. It would be the height of absurdity on the part of respondents to voluntarily enroll in
their respective courses, pay school fees, and not attend classes but instead report for work. Even if this was
remotely possible, such a situation would be irreconcilable with the respondents having graduated from their
respective courses.
Without doubt, the scrutiny of the numerous school documents, the DTRs submitted, and the payrolls from the
office of the then Municipal Accountant of Malabon overwhelmingly revealed that the classes in which
respondents enrolled for several school years were in stark conflict with the time entries in the DTRs, and several
payroll sheets showed that respondents collected their full salaries corresponding to the DTR entries. These
findings of fact made by petitioner, being supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive;26 more so that the
finding of false entries in the DTRs was affirmed by the CA.
Thus, the CA gravely erred when it exonerated respondents from administrative guilt based on the findings of fact
of petitioner which it even affirmed. The jurisprudence27 adopted by the appellate court in laying the legal basis
for its ruling does not apply to the instant case because said cases pertain to criminal liability for Falsification of
Public Document under the Revised Penal Code. The element of damage need not be proved to hold
respondents administratively liable.
But it cannot even be said that no damage was suffered by the government. When respondents collected their
salaries on the basis of falsified DTRs, they caused injury to the government. The falsification of one’s DTR to
cover up one’s absences or tardiness automatically results in financial losses to the government because it
enables the employee concerned to be paid salaries and to earn leave credits for services which were never
rendered. Undeniably, the falsification of a DTR foists a fraud involving government funds.28
Likewise, the existence of malice or criminal intent is not a prerequisite to declare the respondents administratively
culpable. What is merely required is a showing that they made entries in their respective DTRs knowing fully well
that they were false. This was evident in the many documents viewed and reviewed by petitioner through GIO
Generoso.
On the issue of prescription, we agree with petitioner’s contention that the Office of the Ombudsman is given by
R.A. No. 6770 a wide range of discretion whether or not to proceed with an investigation of administrative
offenses even beyond the expiration of one (1) year from the commission of the offense.29
Likewise, the dismissal of the criminal case involving the same set of facts cannot benefit respondents to cause
the dismissal of the administrative charges against them. As we held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan30 --
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold
responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may
be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act
results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the
law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may
also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is
separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. x x x
Hence, there was no impropriety committed by petitioner when it conducted the administrative investigation which
led to the finding of guilt against respondents.
As regards the applicability of Aguinaldo, our pronouncement therein is clear that condonation of an administrative
offense takes place only when the public official is re-elected despite the pendency of an administrative case
against him. In the case of Maricar, prior to her election as Councilor of now Malabon City, she held an appointive,
not an elective, position, i.e., Legislative Staff Assistant, appointed by her very own father, then Councilor
Edilberto Torres.
As mentioned above, falsification of a DTR (an official document) amounts to dishonesty. Thus, respondents
should be held administratively liable. While dismissal was originally recommended for imposition on respondents,
the penalty was eventually tempered to suspension of one (1) year without pay.
We agree with the imposition of the lower penalty considering that respondents’ public employment with the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Malabon, even while they were regular college students, was of a confidential character,
and the arrangement was with the full knowledge and consent of their father who appointed them to their
positions.
While this Court recognizes the relative laxity given to confidential employees in terms of adjusted or flexible
working hours, substantial non-attendance at work as blatant and glaring as in the case of respondents cannot be
countenanced. Collecting full salaries for work practically not rendered is simply, downright reprehensible.
Inevitably, this leads to the erosion of the public’s faith in and respect for the government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman dated November 9,
2001 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
D. IMPEACHMENT
1 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a "petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an
original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65" of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals of 18
December 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58460 entitled, Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v.
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr. and the Committee of Peers
composed of Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman Rolando Casimiro and Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint2 with the Office of
the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following:
1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and
3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees on the
date the said amount was due for release.
The complainants further requested that an officer-in-charge from the OMB-Manila be appointed to manage their
office to prevent the Deputy Ombudsman from harassing witnesses and wielding his influence over them. To
underscore the seriousness of their intentions, they threatened to go on a mass leave of absence, and in fact took
their cause to the media.3
The subsequent events, as stated by the Ombudsman and adopted by the Court of Appeals,4 are as follows:
The Ombudsman immediately proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office in Cebu City to personally deal with the office
rebellion. Reaching Cebu, the Ombudsman was informed by Petitioner that Petitioner wanted to proceed to
Manila, apparently because of his alienation and the fear for reprisal from his alleged lady victims’ husbands.
Petitioner in fact already had a ticket for the plane leaving two hours later that day. The Ombudsman assented to
the quick movement to Manila for Petitioner’s safety and the interest of the Office’s operations. Subsequently, the
Ombudsman installed Assistant Ombudsman Nicanor J. Cruz as the Officer-in-Charge of OMB-Visayas.
Acting on the formal complaint against petitioner, the Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB) to conduct a verification and fact-finding investigation on the matter. The FFIB, later in its Report,
found the evidence against Petitioner strong on the charges of acts of extortion, sexual harassment and
oppression. The FFIB report was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers composed of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, The Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military.
The Committee of Peers initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of
impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman after careful study, and following
the established stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor
are not removable through impeachment. As succintly (sic) stated by the Ombudsman in his Memorandum dated
March 27, 2000 (in reiteration of the March 13, 2000 Order of Overall Deputy Ombudsman) -
Acting on your query as to whether or not the Ombudsman confirms or affirms the disapproval by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., of your recommendation to conduct instead an investigation of the
complaint against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica solely for the purpose of impeachment, I hereby confirm
the action of disapproval.
xxx
Moreover, as demonstrated in many previous cases against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy
Ombudsman Manuel B. Casaclang, Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero, Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo and former Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, the official position of the Office is that the
Constitution, R.A. 6770 and the Supreme Court in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, 19 May 1988, exclude
the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor from the list of impeachable officials and the Jarque case
involves Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto as respondent, hence, the mention therein of the Deputy Ombudsmen is
merely an obiter dictum.(why?) Two of your present members in fact participated in the investigation of the
previous Mojica cases and thereafter recommended the dismissal thereof for lack of merit.
In the same Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the Committee of Peers to evaluate the merits of the case
and if warranted by evidence, to conduct administrative and criminal investigation(s) immediately thereafter. Upon
evaluation, the Committee recommended the docketing of the complaint as criminal and administrative cases. The
Committee of Peers’ Evaluation dated 30 March 2000, stated as follows:
On the basis of the foregoing facts, duly supported with sworn-statements executed by all concerned parties, the
undersigned members of the COP find sufficient cause to warrant the conduct of preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica for the following criminal and
administrative offenses, namely:
I. CRIMINAL
Violation of Section 3, paragraph[s] (b) and (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
Violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995),
II. ADMINISTRATIVE
a. Dishonesty
b. Grave Misconduct
c. Oppression
d. Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
e. Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his Office;
(Section 22, paragraphs (A), (C), (N), (T) and (U), Rule XIV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987".)
Accordingly, let the instant case be docketed separately, one for the criminal case and another for the
administrative case covering all the offenses specified above and, thereafter, a formal investigation be
simultaneously and jointly conducted by the Committee of Peers, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7.
Accordingly, on 6 April 2000, the Committee of Peers (COP) directed the herein private respondent Mojica in
OMB-0-00-0615 entitled, Padua-Varona v. Mojica, for violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995) and Sec. 3, par. (b) and (c) of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) to submit his
controverting evidence.
On 10 April 2000, the complainants in OMB-0-00-0615 filed a Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive
Suspension,5 claiming that the offenses for which private respondent Mojica was charged warranted removal from
office, the evidence against him was strong, and that Mojica’s continued stay in office would prejudice the case,
as he was harassing some witnesses and complainants to recant or otherwise desist from pursuing the case.
On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a Memorandum6 to the COP, directing them to conduct administrative
proceedings in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 entitled, OMB Visayas Employees v. Mojica (for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and directly or indirectly
having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of his office), and submit a
recommendation on the propriety of putting Mojica under preventive suspension.
Subsequently, the COP issued an Order7 in OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 finding prima facie evidence against Mojica
and requiring him to submit an answer to the above-mentioned offenses within ten days, as well as his counter-
affidavit and supporting evidence.8
Aggrieved, the private respondent filed a petition9 for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying that a
resolution be issued:
1. . . . issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the filing of the petition to enjoin and restrain the
respondents, (the Ombudsman, the Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, the Committee of Peers, and the Special
Prosecutor) their agents and representatives, from suspending the petitioner (herein private respondent Mojica);
2. thereafter, converting said TRO into a Writ of Preliminary Injunction;
3. after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the following acts of the Ombudsman null and void ab initio:
a. detailing and assigning indefinitely the petitioner to OMB-Manila "in a [special] capacity," thus effectively
demoting/suspending petitioner, and preventing him from preparing his defense;
b. authorizing or directing the docketing of the complaints against the petitioner, which is equivalent to authorizing
the filing of the administrative and/or criminal cases against the petitioner, who is an impeachable official;
c. denying the request of petitioner for leave of absence, which acts were done without lawful authority, in a
malevolent and oppressive manner and without jurisdiction.
On 04 May 2000, the Court of Appeals resolved to grant the prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and required
the Ombudsman to comment and show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, which reads
in part:
Meanwhile, to maintain the status quo and in order to forestall the petition at bench from becoming moot and
academic, and considering that upon examination of the records we believe that there is an urgent need for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent great and irreparable injury that would result to herein
petitioner before the matter could be heard on notice, the herein respondents, their agents and representatives
acting for and in their behalf or under their authority, are hereby enjoined and restrained from proceeding with the
hearing of the Motion to Place Respondent Under Preventive Suspension dated April 10, 2000, which hearing is
set on May 9, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon and/or from conducting any further proceedings relative to the
suspension from (o)ffice of the herein petitioner until further order and/or notice from this Court.10
Nevertheless, on 6 June 2000, the COP issued an Order11 in both OMB-0-00-0615 and OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 to
the effect that having failed to submit the required counter-affidavits despite the lapse of seventeen days from the
expiration of the extended reglementary period for filing the same, respondent Mojica was deemed to have waived
his right to present his evidence. The COP thus deemed both criminal and administrative cases submitted for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
Thus, on 13 June 2000, the private respondent thus filed an urgent motion12 before the Court of Appeals to enjoin
the Ombudsman from taking any action whatsoever in the criminal and administrative cases aforementioned. The
following day, the private respondent filed another urgent motion, this time praying that the Court of Appeals issue
an order requiring the Ombudsman to show cause why it should not be cited for contempt for failing to conform
with the 4 May 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed13 the
Ombudsman to comment on the above pleadings, and to comply with the former’s Temporary Restraining Order
of 4 May 2000.
The parties subsequently exchanged various pleadings that culminated in a Resolution14 by the Court of Appeals
on 5 July 2000 that, among other things, directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining all
therein respondents from taking any action whatsoever in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 (criminal) and No. OMB-
ADM-0-00-0316 (administrative) against Mojica, and deemed the instant petition submitted for resolution on the
merits upon the submission of the comment or explanation on the appellate court’s show cause Resolution of 20
June 2000.
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military directed the private respondent
Mojica ostensibly to answer a different set of charges for "violation of Art. 266 and Sec. 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019"
(OMB-00-0-1050) and for "grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service"15 (OMB-ADM-0-00-0506). Feeling that this was merely an attempt at circumventing the directives of
the Court of Appeals, Mojica filed an urgent motion before the Court of Appeals for respondents to show cause
again why they should not be cited for contempt.
By way of opposition, the Ombudsman pointed out that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the appellate
court was against any action taken in cases No. OMB-0-00-0615 and No.OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, and not against
any new cases filed against the private respondent thereafter. The Ombudsman further pointed out that since
Mojica’s term of office had already expired as of 6 July 2000, the private respondent could no longer invoke his
alleged immunity from suit.
On 14 August 2000, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military issued an order deeming that cases No.
OMB-0-00-1050 and No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 had been deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the
evidence at hand. On 17 August 2000, the private respondent filed an urgent motion for the immediate issuance
of an order enjoining the Ombudsman from taking any further action whatsoever in OMB-ADM-0-00-0506 and
OMB-0-00-1050.16
On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica’s term of office, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision17 on the grounds of public interest.
In essence, the appellate court held that although the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
commentaries of noted jurists, all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable official, it was
nevertheless constrained to hold otherwise on the basis of this Court’s past rulings. Thus, the dispositive portion
thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the order of the Committee of Peers in its Evaluation dated March 30,
2000 directing the docketing separately of the criminal case as well as the administrative case against the
petitioner is hereby SET ASIDE and DECLARED NULL AND VOID. Accordingly, the complaints in Criminal Case
No.OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, respectively, filed against the petitioner
are hereby DISMISSED. All acts or orders of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and the
Committee of Peers, subjecting the petitioner [herein private respondent] to criminal and administrative
investigations, or pursuant to such investigations, are likewise hereby DECLARED INVALID.18
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court "a petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action
forcertiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules," of the above decision, on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ERRONEOUSLY RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AS THEN DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, IS AN IMPEACHABLE
OFFICIAL, CONSIDERING THAT THE PLAIN TEXT OF SEC. 2, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AS
WELL AS THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS THEREOF, EXCLUDES A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FROM THE
LIST OF IMPEACHABLE OFFICIALS.
II
THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE MAY NOT BE INVOKED TO PERPETUATE
AN ERRONEOUS OBITER DICTUM.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF A
CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST A RETIRED DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, WHICH IS STILL PENDING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION BEFORE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN.19
At the outset, it bears noting that instead of assailing the Court of Appeals Decision solely by petition for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner lodged the present petition
"alternatively" as "an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules."
It is settled that the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45
and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45, the reglementary period to appeal is
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.20
The records show that following the petitioner’s receipt on 5 January 2001 of a copy the Court of Appeals
Decision, it filed the present petition on 16 January 2001, well within the reglementary period so indicated.
We go now into the substantive aspect of this case, where we are presented an attack upon a prior interpretation
of Article XI, Sec. 2 in relation to Article XI, Sec. 8 of our Constitution.
The interpretation in question first appears in Cuenco v. Fernan,21 a disbarment case against then Associate
Justice Marcelo Fernan filed by Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former member of the House of Representatives, where
we held in part:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme
Court must, under Article VIII (7)(1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed
from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of
the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and
conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in
respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), a majority of the
members of the Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the members of
the Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are
constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
Barely two months later, we issued another Resolution in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,22 concerning the same
charges for disbarment brought against Justice Fernan, wherein we cited the above ruling to underscore the
principle involved in the case, that "[a] public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer."23
In 1995, we subsequently anchored our Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,24 a disbarment case against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, on the above ruling, adding that:
. . . [T]he court is not here saying that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are required by the
Constitution to be members of the Philippine Bar and are remova[ble] only by impeachment, are immunized from
liability possibly for criminal acts or for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or other claimed
misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is here a fundamental procedural requirement which must be
observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively – e.g., in disbarment proceedings – for any wrong or misbehavior
which may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella,25 the Court, citing
its Resolution in Jarque v. Desierto,26 dismissed, in a minute resolution, the complaint for disbarment against the
herein private respondent Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, stating that:
Anent the complaint for disbarment against respondent Arturo C. Mojica in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas, suffice it to state that a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the
office held by him and removable only by impeachment cannot be charged with disbarment during his
membership (In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771, 774 [1988]; Cuenco vs. Fernan, 158 SCRA 29, 40
[1988]). And we have held in the case of Jarque vs. Desierto (A.C. No. 4509, En Banc Resolution December 5,
1995), that the Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via impeachment before they may
be held to answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in disbarment proceedings.
The above Resolution was subsequently made the basis of the appellate court’s assailed Decision of 18
December 2000. Thus, in holding that a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, the appellate court stated
that it had to "defer to the loftier principle of adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise known as the doctrine
ofStare Decisis.... necessary for the uniformity and continuity of the law and also to give stability to society."27
Nevertheless, the court a quo took pains to point out that the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
Is the Deputy Ombudsman, then, an impeachable officer? Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, states
that:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
To determine whether or not the Ombudsman therein mentioned refers to a person or to an office, reference was
made by the appellate court to the Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as to the opinions of leading
commentators in constitutional law. Thus:
. . . It appears that the members of the Constitutional Commission have made reference only to the Ombudsman
as impeachable, excluding his deputies. The pertinent portions of the record read, to wit:
...
MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you.
On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo about who
will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the
government. This recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis
custodiet ipsos custodies," who will guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the
rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also removable only by impeachment.
MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.
MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?
MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.
MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of." We know, for
instance, that the City Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is
not a part of the judiciary. So I think we should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for
purposes of the Commission and the Committee.
MR. ROMULO. Yes. If I may just comment: the Ombudsman in this provision is a rank in itself really. That is how
we look at it. But for purposes of government classification and salary, we thought we have to give him a
recognizable or an existing rank as a point of reference more than anything else.
MR. REGALADO. Yes, but my concern is whether or not he is removable only by impeachment, because Section
2 enumerates the impeachable officials, and it does not mention public officers with the rank of constitutional
commissioners.
MR. ROMULO. But we do mention them as the Ombudsman is mentioned in that enumeration. We used the word
"Ombudsman" because we would like it to be his title; we do not want him called "Chairman" or "Justice." We
want him called Ombudsman.
...
(Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 26, 1986, pp. 273-274)
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist.
On lines 13 and 14, I move for the deletion of the words "and the Ombudsman." The Ombudsman should not be
placed on the level of the President and the Vice-President, the members of the judiciary and the members of the
Constitutional Commissions in the matter of removal from office.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. We regret we cannot accept the amendment because we feel that the Ombudsman is at least on
the same level as the Constitutional Commissioners and this is one way of insulating it from politics.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, to make the members of the Ombudsman removable only by impeachment
would be to enshrine and install an officer whose functions are not as delicate as the others whom we wanted to
protect from immediate removal by way of an impeachment.
MR. MONSOD. We feel that an officer in the Ombudsman, if he does his work well, could be stepping on a lot of
toes. We would really prefer to keep him there but we would like the body to vote on it, although I would like to ask
if we still have a quorum, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Do we have a quorum? There are members who are in the lounge.
The Secretary-General and the pages conduct an actual count of the Commissioners present.
THE PRESIDENT. We have a quorum.
MR. MONSOD. May we restate the proposed amendment for the benefit of those who were not here a few
minutes ago.
MR. DE LOS REYES. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. I thought that amendment was already covered in
the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo. One of those amendments proposed by Commissioner Rodrigo was to
delete the word "Ombudsman" and, therefore, we have already voted on it.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, may I comment on that.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, the Gentleman may proceed.
MR. DAVIDE. The proposed amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo was the total deletion of the Office of the
Ombudsman and all sections relating to it. It was rejected by the body and, therefore, we can have individual
amendments now on the particular sections.
THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman
among those officials who have to be removed from office only on impeachment. Is that right?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?
MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.
MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.
MR. MONSOD. No.
...
(Ibid., p. 305, emphasis supplied)
Moreover, this Court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the
Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in
unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In
their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Foremost among them is the erudite Justice
Isagani A. Cruz (ret.), who opined:
The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme
Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is
exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by legislative enactment. The power to impeach is essentially a
non-legislative prerogative and can be exercised by the Congress only within the limits of the authority conferred
upon it by the Constitution. This authority may not be expanded by the grantee itself even if motivated by the
desire to strengthen the security of tenure of other officials of the government.
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only
through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently being to withdraw them from the removal power of the
Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious constitutionality. In the first place, the list of impeachable officers is
covered by the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the Constitution
states that all judges of inferior courts – and this would include the Sandiganbayan – are under the disciplinary
power of the Supreme Court and may be removed by it. This view is bolstered by the last sentence of Article XI,
Section 2, which runs in full as follows:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., pp. 333-334)
Equally worth noting is the opinion of no less than Rev. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself who was a member of
the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, (who) asserted:
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2 exclusive?
A. As presently worded, yes.
(Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 401)
Last but certainly not the least is the equally erudite Representative Antonio B. Nachura himself, who, as a
professor of law, commented that the enumeration of impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, is exclusive. (Nachura, Antonio B., Outline/Reviewer in Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 192)28
From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that, as enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court,
the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.29
How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales,
Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep. Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella? By
way of reiteration, said Resolution reads in part:
. . . To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member’s incumbency, would in
effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be
removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of the
Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in
relation to Article XI [2]), . . . all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar.30(Emphasis supplied)
In cross-referencing Sec. 2, which is an enumeration of impeachable officers, with Sec. 8, which lists the
qualifications of the Ombudsman and his deputies, the intention was to indicate, by way of obiter dictum, that as
with members of this Court, the officers so enumerated were also constitutionally required to be members of the
bar.
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without
argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.31
The legal maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled) states that where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties
similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.32
The succeeding cases of In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a
Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and
Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for
disbarment against the herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v. Fernan and
the succeeding cases without going into the merits.
Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the
previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.33
As to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally
and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute
grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.34 Hence, the moment he is no longer in office
because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the
courts.35
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given
that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the
provisions of Sections 1236 and 1337 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2000 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No.OMB-ADM-0-00-0316
are hereby REINSTATED and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative
to the above cases.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
36 Sec. 12.Termination of Office. – No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
37 Sec. 13.Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title Seven Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may already have been separated from service, has already received
such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the government.
2 GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE 415 SCRA 44
Certiorari and prohibition
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two
impeachment complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice,
sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was denied due process and that the said resolutions
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers. Court dismissed
the petition.
Facts:
– 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against
Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
– 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2,
directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
– 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre
Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein
petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
– HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress
and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
– 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ
for brevity)
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form
– 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two complaints, which both allege
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance
– Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7
alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings
Issue/s:
Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress
denied due process to the Petitioner
Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
– Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
– the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review
2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings?
– (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaints is tainted
with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan
– Presumption of regularity
– The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making power in the
HOR
– the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must
be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”
– The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.
– impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of
the offender
3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
– (P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22,
2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
– INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint
(referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)
– IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
– Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to prevent undue or too
frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,”
“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.” (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
3 CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES sitting as an
IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE
"KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO
FARINAS, SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI COLMENARES
(ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C.
Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives
(HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for
impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief
presentation, on the same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it,
way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.
On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court
the following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY
AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT
CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that "a public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required by the
Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of
high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that Respondent has, among
others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh
Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required
under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this
acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate
and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure?
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE
A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE
SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE
OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE
ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN
DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY
ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16
NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE
HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS
PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA
IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND
HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE
PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME
COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO. ARTICLE VIII RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE
PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO
ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE
JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.1
On December 26, 2011, petitioner filed his Answer2 assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment
complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. Citing previous
instances when President Aquino openly expressed his rejection of petitioner’s appointment as Chief Justice and
publicly attacked this Court under the leadership of petitioner for "derailing his administration’s mandate,"
petitioner concluded that the move to impeach him was the handiwork of President Aquino’s party mates and
supporters, including"hidden forces" who will be benefited by his ouster. As to the charges against him, petitioner
denied the same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term
of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez
of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez
without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to
him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of
the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a
judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.
Meanwhile, the prosecution panel composed of respondent Representatives held a press conference revealing
evidence which supposedly support their accusations against petitioner. The following day, newspapers carried
front page reports of high-priced condominium units and other real properties in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig and
Quezon City allegedly owned by petitioner, as disclosed by prosecutors led by respondent Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
The prosecution told the media that it is possible that these properties were not included by petitioner in his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) which had not been made available to the public. Reacting
to this media campaign, Senators scolded the prosecutors reminding them that under the Senate Rules of
Procedure on Impeachment Trials3 they are not allowed to make any public disclosure or comment regarding the
merits of a pending impeachment case.4 By this time, five petitions have already been filed with this Court by
different individuals seeking to enjoin the impeachment trial on grounds of improperly verified complaint and lack
of due process.
On January 16, 2012, respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial
proceedings against the petitioner.Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012,
Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment
Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution
witnesses also testified regarding petitioner’s SALNs for the previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records
Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V.
Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).
In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their
respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the allegations
in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to
disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in
Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner’s alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required
by the Constitution).
On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution5 which states:
IN SUM, THEREFORE, this Court resolves and accordingly rules:
1. To allow the Prosecution to introduce evidence in support of Paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of Article II of the Articles
of Impeachment;
2. To disallow the introduction of evidence in support of Par. 2.4 of the Articles of Impeachment, with respect to
which, this Court shall be guided by and shall rely upon the legal presumptions on the nature of any property or
asset which may be proven to belong to the Respondent Chief Justice as provided under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 3019 and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.
SO ORDERED.6
In a subsequent Resolution7 dated February 6, 2012, the Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request
for subpoena directed to the officersof two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and
dollar currencies, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the Prosecution’s Requests for
Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and Bank of the Philippine Island
(BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of
Chief Justice Corona, only for the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
a) The Branch Manager of the Bank of Philippine Islands, Ayala Avenue Branch, 6th Floor, SGV Building, 6758
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the
original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for Bank Account no. 1445-8030-61 in
the name of Renato C. Corona and the bank statements showing the balances of the said account as of
December 31, 2005, December 31, 2006, December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and
December 31, 2010.
b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on
February 8, 2012, the original and certified true copies of the account opening forms/documents for the following
bank accounts allegedly in the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the said
accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December 31, 2010:
089-19100037-3
089-13100282-6
089-121017358
089-121019593
089-121020122
089-121021681
089-141-00712-9
089-141-00746-9
089-14100814-5
089-121-01195-7
SO ORDERED.8
On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the
Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru
its authorized representative to testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening documents
for petitioner’salleged foreign currency accounts, and thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas
including the bank statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint
filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable
cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-
podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on
suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the
Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to
prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection
to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth
which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention "graft and corruption" or
unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the
Constitution that "graft and corruption" is a separate and distinct ground from "culpable violation of the
Constitution" and "betrayal of public trust"; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged
bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the
poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute
confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also
penalized under Sec. 10 thereof. Petitioner thus prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) Immediately upon filing of this Petition, issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining: (i) the proceedings before the Impeachment Court; (ii) implementation ofResolution dated 6 February
2012; (iii) the officers or representatives of BPI and PSBank from testifying and submitting documents on
petitioner’s or his family’s bank accounts; and (iv) the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on
paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the Impeachment Complaint;
(b) After giving due course to the Petition, render judgment:
(i) Declaring the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio;
(ii) Prohibiting the presentation, reception and admission of evidence on paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the
Impeachment Complaint;
(iii) Annulling the Impeachment Court’s Resolution dated 27 January 2012 and 6 February 2011 [sic], as well as
any Subpoenae issued pursuant thereto; and
(iv) Making the TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction permanent.
Other reliefs, just or equitable, are likewise prayed for.9
Petitioner also sought the inhibition of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno on the ground
of partiality, citing their publicly known "animosity" towards petitioner aside from the fact that they have been
openly touted as the likely replacements in the event that petitioner is removed from office.10
On February 9, 2012, this Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from implementing the
Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment
Court, both dated February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for the inhibition of
Justices Carpio and Sereno "in the absence of any applicable compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition
from the Justices concerned."
On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition11 claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the coldneutrality of
impartial judges by acting as prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S. Drilon,
whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no avail. He further called attention to the fact that
despite the Impeachment Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction of evidence in
support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for reconsideration would be entertained, "the allies of
President Aquino in the Senate abused their authority and continued their presentation of evidence for the
prosecution, without fear of objection". In view of the persistent efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to
overturn the ruling of Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present evidence on
paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President Aquino even thanked "his senator allies in delivering what the
prosecution could not"-- petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti12 filed on behalf of the respondents, the Solicitor General
argues that the instant petition raises matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only
by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being filed by the respondents "without
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional
and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and of the Senate to try and decide all
cases of impeachment." Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States,13 respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before this
Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily
long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment
case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.
Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain that
subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They
contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his
assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of
this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which
was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of
public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury
being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus
prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be
dismissed.
The core issue presented is whether the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or
incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due
process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
Impeachment and Judicial Review
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was foreseen as
creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the
decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of
innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment
cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments,
are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as
provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in
Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers
of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was
impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished
with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails
the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some
Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges
during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court,
Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the
trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the
Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of
expanded judicial review.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.16 we ruled that the power of judicial
review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the question
of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which
was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the
required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed
90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.1âwphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.19
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on
the ground of MOOTNESS.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the 4 Republic v. Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or
allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate’s sole power to try DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:
and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission
was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office
as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of
integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed
and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law.
While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal
counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner
of the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file
of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only
nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to
the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared
vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to
December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private
sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private
sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old,
it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO
and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on
a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed
Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for
determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not
made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting
to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’
SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction
under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic,
through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void
Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her
on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.
Contentions:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):
OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the validity
of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and
Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since
Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it
has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time
runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a continuous
interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year
period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by
which to know the disqualification.
Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and
ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person
of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing
the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal obligation,
should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith
cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus
governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Sereno (respondent):
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article
XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement
from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends
that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who
can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing
certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that
the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e.,
removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.
Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other
impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto
may be allowed.
Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a
conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative
supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the personnel
thereof.
Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the
Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.
Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public
officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the
presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the
President.
Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing,
not of non-filing.
Intervenors’ arguments:
The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity
required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the
JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of
the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and experience are
enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective
considerations.
ISSUES:
Preliminary issues:
Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention
Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices
Main Issues:
Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an
impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e.,
whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers
Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC
and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory
and review powers;
Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent
nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
HELD:
Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the
court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and
prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-
be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the
Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition
of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual
or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy
and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.
Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.
It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias
must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment
proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify
only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition
has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the
Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.
Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo
warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between
the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino
people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen
who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be
received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or
favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]
Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition
based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty
to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in
character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference
to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through
the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the
election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process
to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be
contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a
public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is
given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national
interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.
Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum
shopping and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum
shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an
impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain
impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an
impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her
removal from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is
legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first
place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.
Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.
Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for
this express provision.”
The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for
an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar
to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide
for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President
and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are available,
then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of
impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer
cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in
offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the
Bar.
Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be
an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of
an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment,
nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion
that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and
legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of
perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a
public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.
For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.
The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the
one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office,
unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the
government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.
Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of
the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary
statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public
right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the
reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by
the Government.
That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the
action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much
more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s
qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not
been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore
not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.
Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies
with its own rules.
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its
non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates.
What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in
wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain
leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled
discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the
Court is barred from resolving. [yourlawyersays]
[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]
With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the
JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”
Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary.
Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.
Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a
violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of
the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of
the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such
requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or
a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.
Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case,
those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens
and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative
provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary.
Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a
formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or
not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.
Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily
dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet,
Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case,
invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the
personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the
OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor
was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence
of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial
evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on
file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.”
This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.
For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the
burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon
the respondent.
In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN because
it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the
periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be
exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]
Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when
Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman
had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State
Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came
about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its
ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.
Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist
nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of
candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity.
She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have
considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely
addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do
not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake
Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .
Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended
by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996
SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-
2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases,
2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected,
suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice.
It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also
committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose
the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained
discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.
Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the
JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate
Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for
nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of
the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that
JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it
appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and
instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file
the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her
government service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible
to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.
These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in
her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno
curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such
failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity
especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]
Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at
the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with
the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to
perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons,
the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.
Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false representations
that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her
false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her
commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a
brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite
public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the
venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the
DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court
with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits
to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now
AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter among
others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.
Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application
The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief
Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement
of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to
submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the
applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of
the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN
since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.
Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.
Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the
JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to
be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course.
The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take
judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding,
maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident from
the composition of the JBC itself.
An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which,
the appointment is susceptible to attack.
Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto
The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.
Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.
The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is
directed to commence the application and nomination process.
This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.
Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub
judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.
E. SANDIGANBAYAN AND OMBUDSMAN
1 EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting throughand
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT,
Petitioner, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to thePresident's exercise
of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - theOffice of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutionalSection 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989,which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of theOmbudsman
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robberyextortion and physical injuries) was filed
before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District SeniorInspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.
Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were stillpending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turnedover,
upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence inrelation to said case to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrativeadjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. RolandoMendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Meanwhile, the casefiled before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the
materialallegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all towarrant the
indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal AffairsService of the PNP issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of theadministrative case against the same police
officers, for failure of the complainant to appear inthree (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However,
upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow
policeofficers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and hiscolleagues filed for
a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrezfor final approval, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on
that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in adesperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.In the
aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eightHongKong Chinese nationals,
the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creationof the Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determineaccountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligenceand gross violation
of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion forreconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, inviolation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration inadministrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross,considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperateresort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232:
Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman chargedMajor General Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan PauloGarcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and MoneyLaundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied
Major General Garcia'surgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant
of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulitand sought the
Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") enteredinto with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of pleawarranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hookwith nothing but a slap
on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strongevidence of his culpability for serious public
offenses, the House of Representatives'Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the
conclusion of thesepublic hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No.
3,recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service andthe filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriategovernment office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpableviolations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
which are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrativedisciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to theconstitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.
While the Ombudsman's authority to disciplineadministratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective,with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority
is by nomeans exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to thedisciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares theOmbudsman's disciplinary authority
over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the otherhand, grants the President express power of removal over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a SpecialProsecutor. A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting
provisions in R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and
thePresident to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enactingboth provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for anexternal authority, through the person of the
President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor without in theleast diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over
allgovernment officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check andbalance"
intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman andhis Deputy may try to protect
one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor,
Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is
byimpeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provisionsimilarly dealing
with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor,for that matter. By enacting Section
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the lawwithout running afoul of any provision in the Constitution
or existing statutes. In fact, theConstitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the removal
of all otherpublic officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject
toimpeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutoris Implied from his Power
to Appoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authoritythat is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaidofficials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the DeputyOmbudsman
for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities thataffect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordialimportance in relation to the President's own role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrentdisciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcementoffices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.6770 granting the President the power to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman from office totallyfrustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman istenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended
tofree it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What
the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially,political independence. This means
nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, theappointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from thewhims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional
standards, do not constitute betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without
citingany reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in thecase that
would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of
concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of theconstitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people."The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the
Office of the Ombudsman uponpetitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp.
Mendozaeven without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decisionwas
immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remainedpending for more than nine
months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undueinterest in the case considering the lack of
evidence of any personal grudge, social ties orbusiness affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could
have impelled him to act as hedid. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any
corruptintention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountabilityagainst
petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal mustbe reversed and set aside,
as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do notamount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested withauthority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman,
there being nointentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed Administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for Her removal from office as provided for under
the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act. WHEREFORE in G.R. No. 196231 the decision of the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered
REINSTATED withpayment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately,
evenas the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection withthe above
case against petitioner. In
G.R. No. 196232
We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DCCase No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for
alleged acts andomissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust,
inaccordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
1B EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-
SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY
AND ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF
OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4, 2012 Decision1
which ruled on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.2
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the
President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however,
reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting
betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against
her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the
continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1 O-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In
G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of
public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.3
In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for reconsideration.
I. ANTECEDENTS
A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)
a. Factual antecedents
On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs
Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical
injury.4
On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative charge for grave
misconduct with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza, et al. based on
the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.5
On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO),
directed the NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office. The Office of the Regional
Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24, 2008.6 Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with
Gonzales, in compliance with his Order.7
Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his allegations.8
Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative
case against Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute.9
On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the entire
records to the Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review.10 In his draft decision, Gonzales
found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the
service.11
Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’ recommendation on
October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration12 on November 5, 2009, followed by a
Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.13
On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records to the Criminal
Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14, 2009, the case was assigned to
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia for review and recommendation.14
GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for appropriate action
on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’ office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales
reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval
by the Ombudsman.16
On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a
tourist bus and held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages. While the
government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the
deaths of Mendoza and several others on board the hijacked bus.
In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of
Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments
issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their
"gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza."17 The IIRC stated that the
Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification
and despite repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended
the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the
initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.19
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.20
b. The OP ruling
On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service.21 According
to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that
spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of
the Office of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure."22
c. The Petition
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On
May 6, 2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman
for final approval. Since the draft order on Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of
preparation, review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself
acted on the draft order only within nine (9) calendars days from his receipt of the order.23
B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before
the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail
which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010,
in view of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.
On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea
bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to
the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea
of not guilty to the charge of money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money
laundering. In exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the
real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the information.25
The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the parties’ submitted Joint Motion for
Approval.27
The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on Justice of the
House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her
deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust – grounds for
removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.28 The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from
the service of Sulit and the filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate
government office.
Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit.29 On March 24, 2011, Sulit
filed her Written Explanation, questioning the OP’s jurisdiction.30 The question of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the
OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.
II. COURT’S RULING
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. (As the full explanation
of the Court’s vote describes below, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under
the Constitution. The prevailing ruling on this latter point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
J. Marvic Mario Victor Leonen).
A. Preliminary considerations:
a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners
At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
September 4, 2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling
reinstating Gonzales.
This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious
constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the
presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman
and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the
merits will be an empty one.
In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the
final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains
alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.
b. The justiciability of the constitutional issue raised in the petitions
We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political
– question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized
by law,31 as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers
conferred on a political branch of the government.32
In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent
disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant violates the
Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core constitutional principle of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.
To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 grants
where the Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a vacuum, more so when the
authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to
intervene under the powers and duties granted and imposed on it by Article VIII of the Constitution.
B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the
people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government.
Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence
necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.33
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office
to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution,
President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD
No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to
investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the
corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.34
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat.
Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are
to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II35 and the standard of accountability in public service under
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the
"protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make
the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to
enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or
over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [emphasis ours, italics supplied]
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are
reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.38
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from
the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an
"independent" office. Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to
be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A
separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. [emphasis ours]
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies."39 It has
powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability
of public officers.40
b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s independence
Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as "independent."41 The extent
of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two
significant considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and
second, consistency of any allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and
balances.
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution
intended that these "independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
"independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the interference that the
President may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal system.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema
to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based.
The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions’ need for independence. In the
deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a
constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the
effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics.43 In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past
Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.44
Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser
degree of independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to the
constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution
clearly expressed their desire to keep the Commission independent from the executive branch and other political
leaders:
MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to him our concept,
he can advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the committee is that we need a body
that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive because the Commissioner is right. Many of the
services needed by this commission would need not only the cooperation of the executive branch of the
government but also of the judicial branch of government. This is going to be a permanent constitutional
commission over time. We also want a commission to function even under the worst circumstance when the
executive may not be very cooperative. However, the question in our mind is: Can it still function during that time?
Hence, we are willing to accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to reconcile this. We realize the
need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build in some safeguards that it will not be rendered
useless by an uncooperative executive.
xxxx
MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights go to a country,
the most credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often these are private organizations,
many of which are prosecuted, such as those we find in many countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are
proposing is an independent body on human rights, which would provide governments with credibility precisely
because it is independent of the present administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be
credible because it is not subject to pressure or control from the present political leadership.
Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are in opposition
today and those who are in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow. Therefore, if we have a Commission
on Human Rights that would investigate and make sure that the rights of each one is protected, then we shall
have a body that could stand up to any power, to defend the rights of individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and so
on.45
These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized
under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge
functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President’s act of temporarily
appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however well-meaning"47 it might
have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President:
Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the
Constitution to be independent – as the Commission on Human Rights – and vested with the delicate and vital
functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as
well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in
office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No.
163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has
to be declared unconstitutional.
Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,49 the Court considered even the mere review of the rules of the
Commission on Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of independence of this body.
Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less pressure on a constitutional body than the
Executive’s power to discipline and remove key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior – but is similar in
degree and kind – to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional
Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its
existence and proper functioning.50
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional
Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution against presidential interference with the constitutional
commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, on the other, in
protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak for themselves as overwhelming reasons
to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 for violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to
support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted
independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with
the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete
trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to
pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still
in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government.
For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman)
should be declared void.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman fully support this
position. Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional Commission expressed his apprehension that any
form of presidential control over the Office of the Ombudsman would diminish its independence.51 The following
exchanges between Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod further reveal the constitutional intent to
keep the Office of the Ombudsman independent from the President:
MR. OPLE. xxx
May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an amendment xxx, by way of
designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good government, efficiency of the public
service and the integrity of the President of the Philippines, instead of creating another agency in a kind of
administrative limbo which would be accountable to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?
MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we prepared the
report, it was the opinion of the Committee — and I believe it still is — that it may not contribute to the
effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of the culprits in inefficiency, injustice and
impropriety are in the executive department. Therefore, as we saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan
which was under the tremendous influence of the President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the
function of a special fiscal. The whole purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions and to
produce a vehicle that will give true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret that we cannot
accept the proposition.52
The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power to
remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would
result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity
and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression
that would be given to the public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking
official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged from approaching the
Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be
susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the
constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and
bureaucracy.
d. The mutual-protection argument for crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770
In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack of an external
check against the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the Ombudsman and her
Deputies.
While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that this concern
stands on shaky grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the
Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the impeachment power of
Congress. On the other hand, the Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be
questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.
The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a non-political
independent body mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial disputes, whose judges and
employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less
questionable. The Members of the Court themselves may be subjected to the impeachment power of Congress.
In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly implausible. At the same
time, the Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the independence granted to the
Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from either the Executive or Congress – and is in full
accord with constitutional intent.
e. Congress’ power determines the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable officers is not a carte
blanch authority Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,53 Congress is empowered to determine the
modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are
all impeachable officials.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI
is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" to favored public
officers.54 Understandably so, impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public
officer from office. It is, by its nature, a sui generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a judicious
and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding;56 the one-year limitation or bar
for its initiation;57 the limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined instrumentality given the power to try
impeachment cases;59 and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.60 All these argue against the
extension of this removal mechanism beyond those mentioned in the Constitution.
On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment proceeding
entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the highest echelons of responsibility in
our government. To name a few, some of the negative practical effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative
work; it is an expensive process in terms of the cost of prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently
divisive of the nation.61 Thus, in a cost-benefit analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting
Congress’ power to otherwise legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the country.
It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution should be read.
Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for
Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to
congressional determination, this must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely:
the right to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the
principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances.62
In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of
all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts
established by the Constitution.
In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority is not a blanket
authority for Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without running afoul of the independence
enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without disrupting the delicate check and balance mechanism under
the Constitution. Properly viewed from this perspective, the core constitutional principle of independence is
observed and any possible absurdity resulting from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the
Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to determine the manner and cause of removal of all non-
impeachable officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core constitutional principle of
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in Macalintal v. Comelec63 is apt:
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."
While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is intended as a
measure of protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor – since these grounds are not intended
to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the
erosion of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman that it creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-
created sword of Damocles hangs over the Deputy Ombudsman’s head, by itself, opens up all the channels for
external pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of external reprisal from the very
office he is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high standard required in
determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of
removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of
independence. The mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their suspension and can interrupt the performance of their
functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a
Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to the very same
ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these
offices independent constitutional bodies.
At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its decision
finding Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust is
patently erroneous. The OP’s decision perfectly illustrates why the requirement of impeachment-grounds in
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue
a. The Office of the President’s finding of gross negligence has no legal and factual leg to stand on The OP’s
decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct. The assailed Decision of the
OP reads:
Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy Ombudsman himself,
and other documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the inordinate and unjustified delay in the
resolution of Captain Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to
gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency in the performance of official duty.64
b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Let us again briefly recall the facts.
1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman,65 which
was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration;66
2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and make his
recommendation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;
3. April 5, 2010 – GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate superior, Dir. Cecilio;68
4. April 27, 2010 – Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order;69
5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) – Gonzales endorsed the draft order
for the final approval of the Ombudsman.70
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already pending
before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.71
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him
within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP72 relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7
(or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales
should have acted on Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision
or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:
a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the
same within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a
Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the
initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and
submission of the proposed decision, the period for resolving the case does not cover the period within which it
should be reviewed:
Section 6. Rendition of decision. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared submitted for
resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his findings and recommendation for
the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be reviewed by the Directors, Assistant
Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned. With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy
Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving authority. Upon approval, copies thereof shall be served upon the
parties and the head of the office or agency of which the respondent is an official or employee for his information
and compliance with the appropriate directive contained therein. [italics and emphases supplied]
Thus, the OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days, to
review a case was totally baseless.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The OP’s claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on Mendoza’s motion and
apprised the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous cases that involve
the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot conclusively state, as the OP
appears to suggest, that Mendoza’s case should have been prioritized over other similar cases.
The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.73 This consideration certainly militates against the OSG’s observation that there was "a grossly
inordinate and inexcusable delay"74 on the part of Gonzales.
Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among others, quasi-
judicial bodies,75 like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself a relative concept.76 Thus, the delay, if any, must be
measured in this objective constitutional sense. Unfortunately, because of the very statutory grounds relied upon
by the OP in dismissing Gonzales, the political and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what is
legal and constitutional.
The facts do not show that Gonzales’ subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work. While
GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy that he had not
drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review the case for the first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself
could not be faulted for acting on a case within four months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the records,
research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion. If this Court rules
that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate to prosecute
all the erring officials of this country would be subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint.
Similarly, if the Court rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to
reconcile this with the established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases – something the Court may
be hard put to justify.
d. No undue interest
The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendoza’s case by having the case endorsed to
the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-
affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.
The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if it were based
merely on the request of the alleged victim’s father. The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and her
Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against any public official or employee of the
government.78 This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No. 6770,79 and by Section 3, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as amended.80
Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the unverified affidavit
of Kalaw. Based on the prosecution officer’s recommendations, the finding of guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al.
was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al. admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic
violations and allowed him to stay the whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next
morning, Kalaw was allowed to leave the precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on
his promise to return with the proper documents.81 These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to conclude that
Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since the proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic
violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when appropriate.82
Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales’ decision differs from the decision of the PNP-
IAS (which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we cannot tie the hands of any judicial or
quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur with the decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies
which may have also taken cognizance of the case. To do so in the case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be
repugnant to the independence that our Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify the
very purpose for which it was created.
e. Penalty of dismissal totally incommensurate with established facts
Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal imposed by the OP
necessarily suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own
misdeeds; we can be made to account only for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it
was Gonzales who took the least time — nine days — followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia — the writer
of the draft — took less than four months, and the Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping
incident rendered Mendoza’s motion moot.
In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion, however, does not preclude
the Ombudsman from looking into any other possible administrative liability of Gonzales under existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing Tanodbayan at the
time83 became the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution. While the composition of the
independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution does not textually include the Special
Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
should equally apply to the
Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as expounded in
jurisprudence.
Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the Ombudsman, known as
the Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Accordingly, on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand
Marcos enacted PD No. 1487.85
Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive authority" to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.87
PD No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control and supervision over the Special
Prosecutor.88 Consistent with this grant of power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or
detail to the Office of the CSP "any officer or employee of Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the
executive supervision thereof" to assist the Office of the CSP.
In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken away from it by the
Office of the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor"
under the Tanodbayan’s control,90 with the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Unlike the earlier decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan
to appoint Special Investigators and subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public
officer or employees who "shall be under the supervision and control of the Chief Special Prosecutor."91 In 1979,
PD No. 1630 further amended the earlier decrees by transferring the powers previously vested in the Special
Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan himself.92
This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
"independent Office of the Ombudsman" is created.93 The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now94 or hereafter may be provided by
law."95
Other than the Ombudsman’s Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and employees of the
Office of the Ombudsman.96 Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman may
exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this
constitutional command, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization
of the Office of the Ombudsman and the extent of its disciplinary authority.
In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman,
including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but the Office of the Special
Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman,
his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor, from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case
of vacancy in these positions, the law requires that the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from
occurrence.97
The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the Ombudsman
himself/herself and his/her deputies.98 Their terms of office,99 prohibitions and qualifications,100 rank and salary
are likewise the same.101 The requirement on disclosure102 is imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and
the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot
assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special
Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman.103 The power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other
government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by the Special
Prosecutor.104
Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman, both under the
1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would insulate the Deputy
Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the Special Prosecutor to the same ills that
a grant of independence to the Office of the Ombudsman was designed for.
Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside
from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office.105 This power of control
and supervision includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special
Prosecutor as he/she may deem fit.1âwphi1 Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no
means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of
his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.
Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking executive officials. For
emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the President, whose own alter
egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor,
would seriously place the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential
treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials
of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and
distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the Court said:
Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
President. Xxx
In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth
known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or
subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special
Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the
Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as
may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman.107
Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with the
Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy
the same grant of independence under the Constitution.
III. SUMMARY OF VOTING
In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012
Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation
of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This
ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is
without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the
possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules
and regulations.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
2 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks the
reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893.
The assailed decision annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001,3 finding
Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a
Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions
effective July 1, 1998.4 On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF.5
On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P.
Malonzo, Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation (Steel Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and
Chief Operating Officer, Steel Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was
criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.6 As government employees, Andutan, Belicena and
Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.7
The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates
(TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others.8
During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred Forty-
Two Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos (₱242,433,534.00).9 The
FFIB concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan – in their respective capacities – irregularly approved the
"issuance of the TCCs to several garment/textile companies and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to
Steel Asia.10
On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their counter-
affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on
March 13, 2000.
Upon the respondents’ failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed the case
submitted for resolution.
On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.11 Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other
benefits and privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.12
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision,13 Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the CA.
On July 28, 2004,14 the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter "should
not have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the
Ombudsman "may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if
it believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
of";15 and second, the administrative case was filed after Andutan’s forced resignation.16
THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the CA. It
submits, first, that contrary to the CA’s findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year from their
commission,17 and second, that in cases of "capital" administrative offenses, resignation or optional retirement
cannot render administrative proceedings moot and academic, since accessory penalties such as perpetual
disqualification and the forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be imposed.18
The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the use of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or permissive.19 Thus, it is not ministerial
upon it to dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any of the circumstances under Section 20 is
present.20 In any case, the Ombudsman urges the Court to examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, and hold that an imposition of a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases
unconstitutionally restricts its mandate.21
Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan’s resignation from office does not render moot the administrative
proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 38,22 the Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was
committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a
bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication."23 It is irrelevant that Andutan had already
resigned from office when the administrative case was filed since he was charged for "acts performed in office
which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public."24 Furthermore,
even if Andutan had already resigned, there is a need to "determine whether or not there remains penalties
capable of imposition, like bar from reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits."25 Finally, the
Ombudsman reiterates that its findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence.
THE RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman’s petition.
First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive period; rather, the
CA merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the administrative complaint. According to
Andutan, Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x but simply prohibits the Office of
the Ombudsman from conducting an investigation where the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of."26 Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred
the complaint to another government agency.27 Further, Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsman’s interpretation
of Section 20(5). Andutan suggests that the phrase "may not conduct the necessary investigation" means that the
Ombudsman is prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5).28
Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer in the
public service at the time the case was commenced.29 According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge Abiera30 and
similar cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations against the
respondents in those cases were commenced prior to their resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule
otherwise since unlike the cases cited, he had already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He
further notes that his resignation from office cannot be characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an
atmosphere of fear for the imminence of formal charges"31 because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum
issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness of the
administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the "officer’s fitness to remain in
office, the principal penalty imposable being either suspension or removal."32 The Ombudsman’s opinion - that
accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a fundamental legal principle that "accessory
follows the principal, and the former cannot exist independently of the latter."33
Third, the Ombudsman’s findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were not observed.
Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman’s findings lacked legal and factual bases.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:
I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a
year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings supported by substantial
evidence?
THE COURT’S RULING
We rule to deny the petition.
The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an
investigation a year after the supposed act was committed.
The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by
jurisprudence.34 In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,35 the Court, speaking through Justice Austria-
Martinez, held:
[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr.,
A.M. No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218; Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 476; Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004); Floria v. Sunga, 420 Phil. 637, 648-649
(2001)]. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In
disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but
the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government
[Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].
Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:
SEC. 20. Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
xxxx
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. (Emphasis
supplied) proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that the period
stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given
to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may"
in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481; Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481;
National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].
In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50], the Court interpreted Section 20
(5) of R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:
Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's
complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged commission
of the acts complained of.
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends.
When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative,
operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis
supplied)
The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory, the
negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word "not," becomes
prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on
statutory construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt,
even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman
was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the
Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who had already
resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor.
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint against him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the
Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public
servant at the time the case was filed.
The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA – that Andutan’s
retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged with an offense he
committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to
the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an
offense while in the public service.
The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38 for this
proposition, viz.:
Section VI.
1. x x x
An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case
but it shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice
to the filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the service.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where the officers or
employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from service."36 In this
case, the CA noted that "the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was retired, hence the
Ombudsman was already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the cases."37
Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the cited Civil
Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence."38 Further, according to the Ombudsman, "the court a quo
ignored the second statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where previous to the institution of
the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee subject of the investigation has
resigned."39
To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case
that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,40 we held that:
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court
categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable
by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way
out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does
not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v.
Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,41 we held:
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA
8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public
Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M.
No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against
him while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing
Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22
April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez,
350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-
03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the
Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the
continuation of a case already filed42 or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.43 Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since
he "knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him"44 is
unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign.
Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on
September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find
reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed
the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman’s position that
Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to
prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of Section
VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman’s interpretation that "[a]s long as the
breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public
servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication."45 If we agree
with this interpretation, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be
subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent
with the principal motivation of the law – which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith and
confidence in the government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned.46 Likewise, if the act
committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are
available to redress the same.
The possibility of imposing accessory penalties does not negate the Ombudsman’s lack of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan’s removal from the service is moot, there is an
"irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from
re-entering the public service and forfeiture of benefits."47 Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still
be imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability
of the principal penalty of removal from office.
We find several reasons that militate against this position.
First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case moot and
academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in its proper context. In
Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,48 indeed, we held:
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128, 9
May 2005, 458 SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation
from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service -
may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later
found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere availability of
accessory penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a misplaced reading of the case
and its ruling.
Esther S. Pagano – who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet – filed her
certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer directed her to explain why no
administrative case should be filed against her. The directive arose from allegations that her accountabilities
included a cash shortage of ₱1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy under the pretext that since she
was deemed ipso facto resigned from office, she was no longer under the administrative jurisdiction of her
superiors. Thus, according to Pagano, the administrative complaint had become moot.
We rejected Pagano’s position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a government employee
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case
against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction."49
Our position that accessory penalties are still imposable – thereby negating the mootness of the administrative
complaint – merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It
was neither intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the
administrative complaint if Pagano’s filing of candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual
findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:
At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial Treasurer
that she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash
shortage of ₱1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities. Moreover, she had already filed her answer. To all intents and
purposes, the administrative proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was considered
separated from service through her precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy. Petitioner’s bad faith was
manifest when she filed it, fully knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as part
of the procedural due process in laying the foundation for an administrative case.50 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvphil
Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case – notwithstanding Pagano’s resignation –
was her "bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.
Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of transcendental
[importance]51" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels the state to prevent the "re-entry [to]
public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office."52
However, the State must perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As
earlier stated, under the Ombudsman’s theory, the administrative authorities may exercise administrative
jurisdiction over subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil
service may still be the subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and
the public policy behind it.
Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations while in
office, but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold liability rule," the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.53 Even if the Ombudsman
may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the
Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutan’s alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the
Ombudsman – through the FFIB – filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the
penalty of imprisonment, but also the penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or
forfeiture of any prohibited interest.54
Conclusion
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what
assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants
to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by
Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that
Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the
Ombudsman’s factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set
aside the July 30, 2001 decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
F. PUBLIC OFFICE AND RESPONSIBILITY
1 G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner, vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Paredes Law Office for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which follows this
majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice Griño-Aquino as a
working basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and for the subsequent votes of
concurrence or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn
from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is of the view that
Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of
evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the
conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public
funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his consolidated
manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with
costs de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had also recommended the
dropping of Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out
and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public eye.
However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a
document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of
the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the
criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman,
agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which
they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was
the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt
must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged
with others as part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land
purchased by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease
the perennial floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been
assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The
land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or
preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a
private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square
meter instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal
assessor, not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter
value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if
the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and
reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was,
therefor, nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be
arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of
the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of
sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code).
Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into
consideration such other factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After
taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount
of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair
market value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as
stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution's
principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the
purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that
'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that
the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing
Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13);
that said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential
subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the
Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only
(lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their
locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the existence of many factories and
subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from
and always lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation
proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree
that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax
declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors must be considered. These
factors must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was
used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal
conviction.
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair
evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain,
however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct"
valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage,
and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent
court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or
negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into
a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace
every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his
signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A
key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark
was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of
conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the
Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures,
and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in
all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have
to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not
ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present
at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the
reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should
examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions
can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting
paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the
government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977.
The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other
words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of
the purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature
linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-
accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the
transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a
square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas
Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax
declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is
no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted
to rice or kangkong but this is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial,
or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based
on firmer foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained
that the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents and under no
circumstance to relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up
to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained
by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records
in that office.
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is
the alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed
exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of
the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been
consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had been
issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The auditors
have no more leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase
price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the
government to private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the
papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the
government without paying the price Did you not consider that rather odd
or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition
that no payments will be made unless the corresponding title in the
payment of the Republic is committed is made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the
government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is
an appropriation set aside to cover the said specification. As of the price it
is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property
to be bought by the government; the sale was consummated; the title was
issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the
seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the
government comes later than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also
that function you are also called upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN,
page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine whether
there is any irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the
tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They
are not required documents that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April
27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of
the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his
counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16,
Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the
then District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed by
Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro
Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to
handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys,
negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary
documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the
Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents
presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed
of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting
documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents
which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and
the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit
G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter
transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the
Bureau of Public Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public
Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review
and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher
authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner Data
signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing
and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268,
Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and
convincing evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was
no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged existence of
conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission
of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere
 in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one
instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning,
preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the
information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District
Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher
covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they
were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should
be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government
as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable
price of P80.00 per square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price
in the deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may
be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from the estimated 19,328 square
meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which
resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to
Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections that even benefited
the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the use
of the unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the approval
of the survey plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of the deed of
sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by the Government under the
deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and another one issued to
the Government incorporating therein the technical description as approved by the Land
Registration Commission, as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners,
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on
grounds of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible
error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph
(e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased
by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of
the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D.
Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as
such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the
Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the
District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as assistant of accused
Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the
Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who
was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's
Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila,
who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of lands
needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and official
positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C.
Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of
land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident
bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting
with manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and
prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of
 and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of Tax
Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and
an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the accused to make it
appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers is a residential land
with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were
transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax
Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland
with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration No.
49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia
San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad,
Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the
fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P.
Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by
the accused officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an
overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced
amount, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and
actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods
affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern
portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in
leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District
Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by
the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo
Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and
Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to
notify lot owners affected by the project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and
process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to
Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by
the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD,
Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered
in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H).
The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad
Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3)
lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978
(Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham,
through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared
for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter
(p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-
1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was
P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690
(P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property,
according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property
(riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a
compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions
the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the
accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February
24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and
describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value
of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value
appeared to be P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No.
0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True
Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio
Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot
1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting
documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-
fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards,
the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale
was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3)
Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by
the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16)
PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00
were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused
Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978
(Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of
P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting
to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's
typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They
declared that such certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No.
47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169
square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of
P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No.
47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S),
was fake, because of the following tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit
Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of
only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and
K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the
names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a
declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who
approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase
price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in
words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting
documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando,
certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had
examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was
not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro
was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial
variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description
of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C,
C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan
observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the
General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983
(Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been
replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over
the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and
the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987,
whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS,
as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of this action. (p.
104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the
court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on
misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was
reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the
petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the
Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven
by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988;
People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to
protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel
truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by
the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and
to verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they
should have asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner
to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to
the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher
for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the
agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination,
as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and
question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like."
(State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him
for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any
person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the
reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his
casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was
lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be
useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose
that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway
Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he
delegated the task that was assigned to his office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway
project, gather and verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of
sale, and process claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the
implementation of the project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner
in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect,
made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz
and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the
Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's
property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be
overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the
transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan
Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the
price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of
having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the
property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine
tax declaration may not be used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD
Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as
declared by the owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this
Court in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but
through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the
price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did
was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and
E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by
the accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the
State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that
was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation
of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's
genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter.
A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs
against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible
error in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph
(e), of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased
by the Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of
the Anti-Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D.
Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as
such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the
Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the
District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as assistant of accused
Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G. Cruz, then the
Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who
was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal,
Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project;
accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's
Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to
private lands acquired by the Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and
accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering District, Pasig, Metro Manila,
who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of lands
needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and official
positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C.
Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of
land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident
bad faith, while accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting
with manifest partiality in the discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and
prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of
and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General
Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14, 1978, which was
purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of Tax
Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and
an alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the
 Philippines, said supporting documents having been falsified by the accused to make it
appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers is a residential land
with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were
transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax
Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland
with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax Declaration No.
49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia
San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad,
Pasig, Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the
fact that the true and actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P.
Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by
the accused officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an
overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced
amount, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and
actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs,
uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods
affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern
portions of Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in
leading newspapers advising affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District
Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by
the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo
Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and
Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to
notify lot owners affected by the project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and
process applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to
Data on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by
the Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD,
Counter-Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered
in the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H).
The land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad
Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3)
lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978
(Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham,
through Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared
for taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter
(p. 10, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-
1) was issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was
P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690
(P10 per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property,
according to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property
(riceland) not on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a
compilation of sales given to the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions
the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the
accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February
24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and
describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value
of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value
appeared to be P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No.
0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True
Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio
Arcaya, who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot
1 (19,004 square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting
documents and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-
fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards,
the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale
was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth
certifications of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3)
Cresencio Data as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by
the accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16)
PNB checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00
were issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused
Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978
(Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of
P2,413,520 and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting
to be that of his subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's
typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They
declared that such certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No.
47895 dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169
square meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of
P60,340 and a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No.
47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S),
was fake, because of the following tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit
Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of
only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and
K-1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the
names of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a
declared market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who
approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase
price therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in
words and figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting
documents listed at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando,
certifying that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had
examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was
not an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro
was verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial
variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description
of the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C,
C-1) bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan
observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the
General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983
(Exh. CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been
replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over
the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and
the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987,
whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez,
Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
 hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS,
as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from
public office; to indemnify jointly and severally, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of this action. (p.
104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the
court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on
misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was
reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the
petitioners because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the
Government and to unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven
by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988;
People vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to
protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel
truth the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by
the standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and
to verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they
should have asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner
to approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to
the Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher
for payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the
agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination,
as applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and
question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like."
(State Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him
for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any
person for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the
reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his
casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was
lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be
useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose
that negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway
Project. He in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he
delegated the task that was assigned to his office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway
project, gather and verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of
sale, and process claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the
implementation of the project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner
in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the
committee. By signing the deed of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect,
made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz
and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the
Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's
property because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be
overlooked, however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the
transaction was fair, honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan
Floodway Project within his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the
price of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of
having caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the
property owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine
tax declaration may not be used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD
Nos. 76 and 464 (making it mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as
declared by the owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this
Court in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but
through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the
price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did
was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and
E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by
the accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the
State agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the
reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that
was also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation
of the Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's
genuine 1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter.
A Tax Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs
against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The Solicitor General was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Zoilo A. Andi and Solicitor
Luis F. Simon.
2 ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET. AL,. G.R. No.
154499, February 27, 2004
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER SHALL NOT BE
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE FOR MISFEASANCE OF
HIS SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT
OR MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF
ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET. AL,.
G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004
Facts: In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charge the petitioner
with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). The
Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the matter.
The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of major
violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The examination team
headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.
Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with respect to
the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify, monitor and report to
the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings noted, until the same shall have
been corrected.
Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724 ordering RBSMI to correct the major
exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of P2,538,483.00
as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.
More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724 insofar as the
imposition of fine amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted Resolution No. 71,
authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on reserve deficiency. Subsequently, on
April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of the penalty “pending the outcome of
the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the penalty.”
The above incidents, particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”
recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the respondent to
file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with “unprofessionalism.”
In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong liable for
violation of the “standards of professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the distressed financial
condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP seminars and did the “brokering”
of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the decision of the CA by reducing the penalty imposed from the a fine
equivalent to six months’salary to a fine of 2 months salary for Reyes and one month salary for Domo-ong.
The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The exoneration is subject to RBSMI’s
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty,
negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.
Held: The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or omissions of duty of their official
subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance or positive wrong rests, according to MECHEM, “upon obvious
considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the perplexities and embarrassments of a
contrary doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves public officers though of an inferior grade, and
therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.
Under the Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly
liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has
actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.
3 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
• A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement
and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
• The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st Special
Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative
cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and
Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
• Binay’s First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III, IV and V of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract without
the required publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor.
• Binay’s Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of contract with Hilmarc's for Phase
V of the Makati Parking Building project; and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture &
Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
• Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to
the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to
influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.
• Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
o Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending
any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before
he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that
the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is
strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for
injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by
landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
• At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
• Proceedings before the SC:
o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant
to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension
orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate,
there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in
2013.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on
the condonation doctrine
Held:
1. YES
o OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office
to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in
conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to
further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said
writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
• Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
o Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,]
and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
• Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the
Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. the concept of
Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or
an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose
of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by
officials of the political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can
only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman frompolitical
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."
• That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate
the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are
ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension
order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
• The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional
injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o
writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not
cover the Supreme Court.
• Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the
policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of
similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole
prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition
against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned
injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of
belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction
conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the
main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
2.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.
• By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. Its purpose is
to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him
• The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of
preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty;cralawlawlibrary
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-
compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs.
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since
it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative
disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering
the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the
ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the
same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation
doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is
nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that
the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then,
following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with
condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA
deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of
issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each
term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and
this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend
beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was
elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right
to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct
to practically overrule the will of the people.274
The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning
an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot
anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to
office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official
who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine
of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in
effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that the
disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295
In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of
the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through
re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present
Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation
was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not
reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no
way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either
their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the
condonation doctrine under our existing laws. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the
penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows
said official to still run for re-election.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have
done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if
he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302
Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's
misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded
in secrecy, and concealed from the public.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is
almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should beprospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. Hence, while the
future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse
of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015
Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine,
which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse
of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition forcertiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already
found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges
against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive
suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination
of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the
preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations,
particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic
principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon
the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution
which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the
people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective
officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been
brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further,
since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of
elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative
law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the
1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial
doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of
public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the
administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that
"for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the
Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred
cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade
review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its
own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution,
revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
G. ILL GOTTEN WEALTH AND STATE RECOVERY
1 MARIA REMEDIOS ARGANA, DONATA ALMENDRALA VDA. DE ARGANA, LUIS ARGANA, JR.,
PEREGRINO ARGANA, ESTATE OF GELACIO ARGANA, EUFROCINIO NOFUENTE, AMPARO
ARGANA NOFUENTE, JUANITO ROGELIO, MILAGROS ARGANA ROGELIO, MARIA FELICIDAD
ARGANA, MARIA DOROTEA ARGANA, REFEDOR SOUTH GOLD PROPERTY MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolution dated April 11, 2000 and
the Order dated February 22, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Civil Case No. 0026.[1]
On July 29, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a Petition for
Forfeiture of alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of the late Maximino A. Argana, who served as Mayor of the
Municipality of Muntinlupa[2] from 1964 to 1967 and from 1972 until his death in 1985.
On October 28, 1998, the Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the conduct of an inquiry. In 1990, the case was reactivated in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Maria Remedios Argana, Donata Almendrala Vda. De Argana, Luis Argana, Jr., Peregrino Argana,
Estate of Gelacio Argana, Eufrocinio Nofuente, Amparo Argana Nofuente, Juanito Rogelio, Milagros Argana
Rogelio, Maria Felicidad Argana, Maria Dorotea Argana, and Refedor South Gold Property Management &
Development Corporation filed a series of motions, including a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the lack of
authority of the PCGG to institute the case on behalf of respondent. This issue eventually reached this Court and
was decided in favor of respondent on September 29, 1994.[3]
Petitioners, in their Answer, denied that the properties sought to be forfeited by respondent were unlawfully
acquired by the deceased Mayor and/or by petitioners. Still, to avoid a protracted litigation, petitioners exerted
efforts to settle the case amicably with respondent through the PCGG.
After a series of motions were again filed by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan finally set the case for pre-trial
on November 26, 1997, but the pre-trial was reset several times in view of the manifestation of the parties that
they were in the process of negotiating a compromise.
On August 7, 1997, petitioners offer of compromise was accepted by the PCGG in its Resolution No. 97-
180-A.[4]
Thereafter, the PCGG conducted an evaluation of the properties offered for settlement by petitioners. In
a Memorandum dated August 18, 1997, Mauro J. Estrada, Director of the PCGG Research and Development
Program, recommended the inclusion of another tract of land [5] belonging to petitioners among the properties
which would be subject of the compromise.
On September 18, 1997, respondent, represented by PCGG Commissioners Reynaldo S. Guiao and
Herminio A. Mendoza entered into a Compromise Agreement with petitioners, represented by petitioner Maria
Felicidad Argana. Petitioners conveyed, ceded and released in favor of respondent a total of 361.9203 hectares of
agricultural land in Pangil and Famy, Laguna, or 75.12% of the properties subject of litigation, in consideration of
the dismissal or withdrawal of all pending civil, criminal and administrative cases filed, litigated or investigated by
respondent against them. The remainder was distributed as follows:
To be retained by the late
Mayor Arganas heirs 9.88% 47.78787
hectares
Owned by the Mayors
Brothers and Sisters 5.53% 26.6318
hectares
Foreclosed by Los Baos
Rural Bank 1.24% 5.9856
hectares
Owned by Other Persons 8.23% 39.64865
hectares
____________________________
24.88% 120.05392
hectares[6]
In a letter dated October 7, 1997,[7] the PCGG informed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the
signing of the Compromise Agreement and requested the OSG to file the appropriate motion for approval thereof
with the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the OSG requested for clarification from the PCGG if the compromise agreement included all
the sequestered assets of petitioners subject of litigation. In response to the request, PCGG informed the OSG in
a letter dated February 4, 1998[8] that the properties mentioned in the Compromise Agreement comprise all the
sequestered assets subject of litigation, and reiterated that it entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners because it believed that the evidence might not be sufficient to warrant continuing the prosecution of
Civil Case No. 0026 and that it is to the best interest of the government to accept the offer of petitioners.[9]
On May 27, 1998, then President of the Republic of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos approved
the Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent.[10]
On June 4, 1998,[11] the OSG filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.
Petitioners expressed their conformity to the motion on June 15, 1998.
After conducting hearings on the motion, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision on July 31, 1998
approving the Compromise Agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with the terms thereof.[12]
However, on October 5, 1998, respondent, through the OSG and the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by Compromise (Motion to Rescind).
Respondent prayed for the rescission of the Compromise Agreement or reformation thereof after a renegotiation
with petitioners. Respondent contended that the partition of the properties in the Compromise Agreement was
grossly disadvantageous to the government and that there was fraud and insidious misrepresentation by
petitioners in the distribution and partition of properties, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
According to respondent, there was fraud and insidious misrepresentation because petitioners proposed to divide
the propertieswith 75% accruing to the government and the remaining 25% going to petitioners and their other
creditorsbased on the total land area of the properties instead of on their value. As a result, the government
obtained only Three Million Six Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P3,620,000.00) worth of land, while petitioners
received almost Four Billion Pesos (P4,000,000,000.00) worth.
Petitioners filed an Answer to the Motion to Rescind and contended that the July 31, 1998 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan could no longer be annulled because it had already become final and executory; that respondents
counsel had no authority to file the motion; and that the motion was defective because it did not include a
Certification against Forum-Shopping. They also argued that there was no agreement to divide the properties by a
75% to 25% ratio in favor of the government. What they proposed to cede to the government by way of
compromise were their properties in Pangil covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-4044 and T-4009
and those in Famy, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. T-3813 to T-3817 and T-4104, 4106 and 4108, not a specific
percentage of the properties subject of litigation.[13]
In its Resolution dated September 22, 1999, the Sandiganbayan treated the Motion to Rescind as a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and set the motion for hearing.
On April 11, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting respondents motion to rescind and
setting aside the Decision dated July 31, 1998. The Sandiganbayan held that the Motion to Rescind was filed on
time on October 5, 1998, the working day immediately following October 4, 1998, which was a Sunday and the
60th day after respondent received the July 31, 1998 Decision on August 5, 1998. It also ruled that the
presumption that the OSG had authority to file the Motion to Rescind was not overcome by petitioners. Under
Republic Act No. 1379,[14] the filing and prosecution of cases for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property is a
function of the OSG. Petitioners failed to show proof that pleadings or motions filed by lawyers of the government
or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Republic. The
Sandiganbayan likewise held that respondent was not required to file a certification against forum-shopping
because the motion to rescind was not an initiatory pleading.[15]
With respect to the issue of fraud, it held that there was extrinsic fraud in the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. The Sandiganbayan stated:
The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adheres to the 75%-25%
ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill-gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of
compromise, with the greater share of 75% going to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did
believe, that the Compromise Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government.
What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with 99.85% going to the
Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a transaction grossly disadvantageous and
immoral to the government, it is against the law as being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019.
In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of plaintiff Republic in the
PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market values of the properties involved, so as to
make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering
into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG
who handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous administration fraudulently
gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic
down the river by entering into an agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff
Republic got 00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case, defendants
almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is no compromise but a virtual
sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in
the PCGG. Instead of protecting the interest of the government, they connived at its defeatalmost.[16]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 9, 2000 and a Supplement to said motion dated
May 30, 2000. Petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated May 18, 2000 praying that the
members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan voluntarily inhibit themselves from hearing and resolving the
petitioners pending motions.
On February 22, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued two Orders, one denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration,[17] and the other, denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.[18]
Hence, petitioners filed the present petition on April 27, 2001.
Respondent filed its Comment on October 22, 2001.
On November 12, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.[19]
Respondent filed its Memorandum on January 29, 2002. Petitioners filed theirs on February 26, 2002. In
their respective memoranda, the parties reiterated the arguments in their earlier pleadings.
Specifically, petitioners raise the following arguments:
(A) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) denied Petitioners their right to substantive and procedural
due process when it refused to voluntarily inhibit itself from further hearing the instant case.
(B) The PCGG lawyers had no authority to ask for the rescission of the subject Compromise
Agreement without the consent of the PCGG En Banc and the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
(C) The Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) as a Petition for
Relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, is fatally defective because
1. It was not filed by a party to the case, i.e., it was filed by counsel without the clients authority.
2. It was filed out of time.
3. It was filed sans any supporting Affidavit of Merit.
4. It lacked the required Certification on Non-Forum Shopping.
(D) There is no factual or legal basis for the finding of fraud by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).
(E) Upon approval of the Compromise Agreement, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lost jurisdiction
over the case, including the authority to rescind said Compromise Agreement and to set aside
the judgment based thereon.
(F) The Sandiganbayan (Third Division) lacked authority to alter a contract by construction or to make
a new contract for the parties.
(G) Since the Compromise Agreement had already been implemented, rescission cannot be availed
of.[20]
Petitioners contend that the members of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan should have inhibited
themselves from resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration because from the tenor of the April 11,
2000 Order of the court granting respondents motion to rescind, it was evident that the Sandiganbayan had
already prejudged the properties subject of litigation as having been unlawfully acquired.[21]
Petitioners likewise assert that the property value of a property offered for the amicable settlement of a case
is not always material in determining the validity of a compromise agreement. They point out that what impelled
the PCGG to enter into a compromise agreement with them was PCGGs perception that its evidence against
petitioners was weak and might not be sufficient to justify maintaining the case against them.[22]
In addition, petitioners insist that the Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is fatally defective for (i) lack of authority of respondents lawyers to
file the same; (ii) having been filed out of time; (iii) non-submission of an Affidavit of Merit; and (iv) non-submission
of a Certification against Forum-Shopping.[23]
It is argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should have denied respondents Motion to
Rescind outright for having been filed without authority from the PCGG En Banc and the President of the
Republic, both of whom earlier approved and authorized the execution of the Compromise Agreement. According
to petitioners, after final judgment has been rendered in a case, an attorney has no implied authority from his
client to seek material or substantial alterations or modifications in such judgment.[24]
Petitioners claim that the Motion to Rescind was filed only on October 5, 1998, or beyond sixty (60) days
from the time the Sandiganbayan promulgated its July 31, 1998 Decisionapproving the Compromise
Agreement.[25] In support of their petition, petitioners cite Section 3 of Rule 38 which requires that the petition for
relief be filed within sixty (60) days after the party seeking the relief learns of the judgment or final order to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered. They also invoke the case
of Samonte v. Samonte[26] where the Court held that a judgment upon compromise is deemed to have come to the
knowledge of the parties on the very day it is entered.[27]
It is further argued by petitioners that the Sandiganbayans finding that the settlement between petitioners
and respondent was attended by fraud has no factual or legal basis. Petitioners point out that the property values
cited by respondent in its Motion to Rescind were based solely on the estimates of the PCGG lawyers and no
evidence of the valuation of the properties were presented before the Sandiganbayan to establish fraud. They
also contend that the Sandiganbayan had no legal basis for taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural land
in rural areas such as Famy and Pangil, Laguna is much cheaper and is usually sold by the hectare, while land in
Metro Manila and in nearby municipalities such as Muntinlupa is more valuable and sold per square meter.
Petitioners insist that knowledge of the valuation of property is not a condition sine qua non for the validity of a
compromise agreement.[28]
Petitioners also assert that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction to annul the Compromise
Agreement because its July 31, 1998 Decision had already become final and executory. Moreover, as a contract
validly entered into by the parties, the Compromise Agreement had binding effect and authority on the parties
thereto even if it were not judicially approved.[29]
 Petitioners likewise contend that the Sandiganbayan cannot alter the Compromise Agreement which is a
valid and binding contract between themselves and respondent and impose the additional requirement that the
moneys, properties or assets involved in the compromise must be fully disclosed and described not only as to the
number or area (in case of real properties) but also as to their exact location, classification, appraised and fair
market value, liens and encumbrances, whether titled or not, etc., so as to leave no room for doubt that all the
parties, the Court and the public know exactly what each party is giving or taking away, and under what specific
terms and conditions.[30] According to them, the imposition of this requirement would be beyond the scope of the
Sandiganbayans authority.[31]
Lastly, petitioners argue that the Compromise Agreement can no longer be rescinded because it had
already been implemented. In support of this argument, petitioners claim that on September 22, 1997, or four
days after the signing of the agreement, they delivered to the PCGG the original TCTs of the properties ceded to
respondent under the agreement.[32]
Respondent, through the OSG, contends that the Sandiganbayans April 11, 2000 Resolution which granted
the motion to rescind the Compromise Agreement and set aside its July 31, 1998 Decision cannot be the proper
subject of a Petition for Certiorari. According to respondent, petitioners were not without any other remedy from
the adverse ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and they should have gone to trial and reiterated their special
defenses.[33]
Respondent also maintains that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioners motion for voluntary
inhibition of its members because petitioners allegations of partiality and bias were not supported by clear and
convincing evidence.[34]
It is also argued by respondent that there is no rule or law requiring that pleadings or motions filed by
lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the
Republic.[35]
Anent the alleged procedural infirmities in the filing of the Motion to Rescind, respondent asserts that it
complied with the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 and that it
is not an initiatory pleading which is required to be accompanied by a Certification against Forum-Shopping.[36]
Respondent disagrees with the contention of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan already lost jurisdiction
over the case when it rendered its Decision on the Compromise Agreement on July 31, 1998 considering that the
decision is immediately executory since there is no appeal from such judgment. According to respondent, the
Rules of Court does recognize the jurisdiction of the court which rendered a decision over a petition for relief from
the same decision, and does not distinguish whether the judgment is based on the evidence presented or on a
compromise agreement. Moreover, as an exception to the general rule that the court which rendered judgment on
the compromise cannot modify such compromise, the court may order modifications thereon when the parties
consent to such modification or when there is a hearing to determine the presence or absence of vitiated
consent.[37]
Respondent adds that the Sandiganbayan did not make a new contract for the parties but simply declared
their Compromise Agreement null and void with the net effect of continuing the case from where it left off.[38]
Respondent insists that a compromise agreement which is unconscionable, shocking to the mind and
contrary to law and public policy, such as that entered into by it with petitioners, is null and void. A void
compromise agreement vests no rights and creates no obligations. Considering that the compromise agreement
sought to be declared void in this case is one which is prejudicial to the government, it is the Courts duty to strike
it down as null and void.[39]
It is argued by respondent that while it did not present additional evidence after it filed the Motion to
Rescind, it submitted the motion on the basis of all the verified pleadings and papers on record. Respondent
likewise claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in taking judicial notice of the fact that agricultural lands in the
provinces, such as the lands titled in petitioners names in Famy and Pangil, Laguna, are much cheaper than lands
in urban areas such as those in Muntinlupa City. Respondent insists that such fact is a matter of public knowledge
and may be taken judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[40]
Respondent also points out that petitioners expressly admitted in their Answer to the Motion to Rescind that
the value of the properties which they ceded to respondent under the Compromise Agreement is less than the
value of the properties retained by them.[41]
Respondent claims that there was fraud of an extrinsic character because its representatives in the PCGG
connived with petitioners in concealing the assessed or market values of the properties subject of
the Compromise Agreement to make it appear that the latter adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG
in entering into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. It is pointed out by respondent that
the OSG was in fact initially reluctant to file the motion for approval of the compromise agreement with the
Sandiganbayan because the Compromise Agreement only mentioned the areas of the properties but
conspicuously failed to mention the property values thereof. Respondent explained:
On October 7, 1997, the PCGG forwarded to the OSG a copy of the Compromise Agreement between the
Republic and the Arganas in SB Civil Case No. 0026, with a request that the OSG file a motion with the
Sandiganbayan for the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. On November 7, 1997, in reply to the letter
of PCGG, the OSG with then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III as signatory, wrote the PCGG requesting it to
submit to the OSG clarification on the provision in the compromise agreement that the properties mentioned
therein comprise all the sequestered assets subject of the litigation considering that in the petition filed by the
Republic, it is alleged that the late mayor Argana acquired no less than 251 OCTs/TCTs in Muntinlupa and the
neighboring towns plus some other ill-gotten properties. The OSG likewise opined that the Compromise
Agreement must first be submitted to the President for his approval before submitting it to the Sandiganbayan.
On February 10, 1998, the OSG received a reply from the PCGG, through Commissioner Herminio Mendoza,
reiterating that the PCGG has decided to enter into the compromise agreement because it believes that the
evidence may not be sufficient to warrant continuing prosecution of Civil Case No. 0026 against the Arganas.
With respect to OSGs request for clarification, the PCGG furnished the OSG a copy of the report conducted by
the PCGG Research and Development Department whereby it is stated that there are 324 OCTs/TCTs evaluated
representing real properties of the late Mayor Argana with a total land area of 481.77422 hectares out of which the
Republic will get 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% of the total land area under the Compromise Agreement. No
mention, however, was made as to the value of the properties to be ceded to the Republic and the properties to
be retained by the Arganas.
On March 2, 1998, the OSG, through then Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz, again wrote the PCGG
reiterating its previous position that before submitting the compromise agreement to the Sandiganbayan for
approval, it must first be submitted to the President of the Philippines for his approval as required in par. 6 of the
Compromise Agreement. The OSG also reiterated its request for clarification regarding the properties covered by
the compromise agreement as the Report submitted to it made mention of 361.9203 hectares or 75.12% out of
the total land area of 481.71422 hectares to be ceded to the Republic, and 24.88% to be retained by the Arganas,
no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of land, location and value of the respective areas.
On June 2, 1998, the OSG received a letter dated May 29,1998 from then Commissioner Herminio A. Mendoza
forwarding it copy of the approval by then President Fidel Ramos of the Compromise Agreement. With respect to
its query, it was stated therein that the PCGG is unable to determine the value of the land to be ceded to the
Republic and those to be retained by the Arganas because of the big number of the parcels of the land located
mainly in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and Laguna and/or the lack of available records showing their respective
values for tax purposes. The PCGG reiterated their request that the OSG file with the Sandiganbayan in SB Civil
Case No. 0026 a motion for the approval of the compromise agreement.
Obviously, through such a scheme, those in the PCGG then who handled or were involved with the case
fraudulently gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability, but in truth, it was
grossly disadvantageous to the government. The motion to approve compromise agreement was filed by the
OSG out of courtesy as the PCGG was able to get the approval of then Pres. Fidel V. Ramos but not because it
(OSG) totally approved the same after an independent evaluation of the report. [42] (Emphasis in the original.)
Finally, respondent argues that the Compromise Agreement had not yet been implemented. Although
petitioners delivered the TCTs covering the lots ceded to respondent under the terms of the compromise on
September 22, 1997, such delivery could not have the effect of implementation of the Compromise
Agreement because the contract was submitted to the Sandiganbayan for approval only on June 15, 1998.
The Compromise Agreement expressly required that in order for it to be effective, it must be approved by the
President of the Republic and of the Sandiganbayan.[43]
The issues for the Courts resolution are as follows:
1) Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy;
2) Whether the OSG and the PCGG lawyers have authority to file the Motion to Rescind on behalf of
respondent;
3) Whether the Motion to Rescind, which was treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for relief, complied
with the requirements of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
4) Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Rescind and
in setting aside its Decision dated July 31, 1998; and
5) Whether the members of the Sandiganbayans Third Division should have inhibited themselves from
resolving petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court shall first tackle the first, second, third and fifth issues since these involve procedural matters.
The Court does not agree with respondents contention that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy
to assail the February 22, 2001 Order of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed its earlier directive to set the case
against petitioners for pre-trial following the annulment of its judgment by compromise agreement. A special civil
action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[44] The Court has previously held that an order setting the case for further proceedings, issued after the
original judgment rendered pursuant to a compromise agreement is set aside, is an interlocutory order and is
therefore not appealable.[45] Since no appeal is available against such an order, the proper remedy to assail it is a
special civil action for certiorari. The remedy taken by petitioners is therefore proper.
Petitioners contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG should
have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper because the motion was filed without the
authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the President of the Republic has no legal basis. There is no requirement
under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the PCGG must first be approved
by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More importantly, R.A. No. 1379 expressly
authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee.[46] It must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of
petitioners allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise Agreement between petitioners and respondent
was an amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based
on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed
unlawfully by the late Mayor Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed
precisely because the PCGG, as respondents authorized representative in the compromise, discovered that the
execution of the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought the help of the OSG which in turn is
the duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld the authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the Motion to
Rescind.
The Court also finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in
granting the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed:
Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be.
The Court has previously held that as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the sixty (60)-day
and six (6)-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date
when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is considered
immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the court.[47]
Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, the sixty (60)-day period should be counted from July 31,
1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement. The
sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion to Rescind was filed by the OSG only on
October 5, 1998, clearly several days after the sixtieth day from the rendition of the July 31, 1998 Decision.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan in
admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed.
Although as a general rule, the party filing a petition for relief must strictly comply with the sixty (60)-day and
six (6)-month reglementary periods under Section 3, Rule 38,[48] it is not without exceptions. The Court relaxed the
rule in several cases[49] and held that the filing of a petition for relief beyond the sixty 60-day period is not fatal so
long as it is filed within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment.[50]
The Court notes that the filing of the Motion to Rescind on October 5, 1998 was indeed seven days beyond
the sixty 60-day period but still well within the six (6)-month period from entry of judgment. Moreover, the case
involves an alleged fraud committed against the Republic, and thus justifies the liberal interpretation of procedural
laws by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners claim that respondent failed to attach an affidavit of merit to its Motion to Rescind is belied by the
record of the case. Petitioners in fact attached, as Annex N of their Petition for Certiorari, a copy of the
respondents Motion to Rescind. The Affidavit of Merit signed by Dennis M. Taningco, the counsel of the PCGG in
Civil Case No. 0026, was attached to the Motion to Rescind. In any case, the Court in Mago v. Court of
Appeals[51] held that the absence of an affidavit of merit does not always result in the denial of the petition for
relief, so long as the facts required to be set out in the affidavit appear in the verified petition. The oath which
forms part of the petition elevates it to the same category as an affidavit.[52]
Neither was it necessary for respondent to attach a Certification against Forum-Shopping to the Motion to
Rescind. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition for relief, is
not an initiatory pleading which requires the inclusion of a Certification against Forum-Shopping. Section 2, Rule
38 requires that a petition for relief must be filed with the court which rendered the judgment or order sought to be
set aside, and in the same case wherein the judgment or order was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations
in the petition for relief are true, it shall set aside the judgment and try the principal case upon the merits as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted.[53] Clearly, then, a petition for relief is not an initiatory pleading in a
new case which would require the filing by the petitioner therein of a Certification of Non- Forum Shopping.
The Court also finds no abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners Urgent Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition. As explained in Gutang v. Court of Appeals,[54] the import of the rule on voluntary inhibition is
that the decision of a judge on whether or not to inhibit is left to his or her sound discretion and conscience, based
on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case where the motion for inhibition is filed. It implies that in
addition to pecuniary interest, relationship, or previous participation in the matter under litigationwhich are grounds
for mandatory inhibition under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Courtthere might
be other causes that could diminish the objectivity of the judge, thus warranting his or her inhibition. Petitioners
claim of bias and partiality on the part of the Sandiganbayan justices who issued the April 11,
2000 Resolution, evaluated in light of the resolution itself, is evidently more imagined than real. To say, as is
petitioners wont, that a judge who throws out a partys motion in the language employed by the Sandiganbayan in
the questioned Resolution is necessarily prejudiced, is to be indiscriminate and precipitate.
Petitioners assertion that the April 11, 2000 Resolution was harshly worded and evinced prejudgment of the
case in respondents favor is easily disproved by a reading of the Resolution in its entirety. As will be discussed
hereafter, the Sandiganbayans pronouncement that the Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous
and prejudicial to the government is supported by the facts on record. In charging the Sandiganbayan with
forejudgment when it said that all it takes to prove the case is evidence that the properties are manifestly out of
proportion to the late Mayor Maximino A. Arganas salary and to his other lawful income and other legitimately
acquired income,[55] petitioners have taken the statement out of context. The Sandiganbayan made the statement
in relation to its bewilderment as to why the PCGG expressed difficulty in prosecuting the case against the late
Mayor Argana in spite of the presumption regarding unexplained wealth in Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Sandiganbayan therefore had legal and factual grounds to deny petitioners
motion for inhibition.
Anent the propriety of the Sandiganbayans nullification of the Compromise Agreement on the ground of
extrinsic fraud, the Court holds that no error nor grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan
for ruling that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was tainted with fraud on the part of petitioners and in
connivance with some PCGG officials. A circumspect review of the record of the case reveals that fraud, indeed,
was perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement, the assessed or market values
of the properties offered for settlement having been concealed from the reviewing authorities such as the
PCGG En Banc and even the President of the Republic. The discussion of the Sandiganbayan on the nature and
extent of the fraud perpetuated upon respondent in the execution of the Compromise Agreement is clear and
convincing:
Noticeable from the documents submitted to the court after the decision approving the Compromise Agreement
was promulgated is the fact that only the percentage of sharing based on area was mentioned and brought to the
attention of the PCGG en banc and the Solicitor General. The value of the properties was never, and not even
once, mentioned. Thus, in the Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada of the PCGG Research and
Development Department to the PCGG Chairman, dated August 18, 1997, the following exposition appears:
12. On July 10, 1996, the Arganas submitted a proposal for Compromise Agreement (copy attached, per Annex J)
that would cede by donation about 231 hectares of agricultural lands to the government, Xerox copies of nine (9)
TCTs attached therewith, enumerated as follows:
TCT No. Area in Square Meters Location
T-3813 47,908 Famy, Laguna
T-8314 47,461 -do-
T-8315 30,000 -do-
T-8316 40,000 -do-
T-8317 30,000 -do-
T-4104 20,000 -do-
T-4106 38,550 -do-
T-4108 31,618 -do-
T-4044 1,137,361 San Isidro & Banilan,
883,355 Pangil, Laguna
2,306,253 Sq. Meters
230,6253 Hectares
Another big tract of land located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna, consisting of 131,2950 hectares covered by TCT No.
T-4009, per Annex K may be considered for inclusion in the proposed compromise settlement. The reason for this
is that this land is being eyed by the DAR for distribution under the CARP. As a whole, the government may be
able to acquire about 361.9203 hectares of land equivalent to 75.12% of the 481.7742 hectares of land of
sequestered real estate property belonging to the Arganas and other owners.
However, of the 481.7742 hectares covered by a sequestration order, the late Mayor Argana owns about
409.50817 hectares and possibly the heirs are willing to cede 361.9203 hectares which is equivalent to 88.38%,
retaining 47.5887 hectares or 11.62% of what they owned.
E. EVALUATION The family of the late Mayor Maximino A. Argana offered to cede to the government a total of 230.62553 hectares
of land covered by nine (9) TCTs. Another property, however, consisting of 131.2950 hectares may be considered
1) As presented in Annex L, page 13, the total area of real estate property sequestered aggregated to for inclusion which would increase to 361.9203 hectares of land that may be ceded to the government.
481.7742 hectares accounted as follows:
In the event that the 361.9203 hectares are finally considered and acceptable by both parties, the PCGG and the
Total Area Sequestered 100.00% Arganas, the 481.77422 hectares of sequestered property would be accounted as follows:
481.77422
Accounted as Follows: Total Area Sequestered 481.77422 has.
100.00
%
a) owned by Mayor Maximino Argana
Accounted as follows:
75.12% 409.50817 has.
a) To be ceded the Government 361.9203 has.
b) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters 75.12%
b) To be retained by the late Mayor Arganas Heirs
9.88% 26.6318 has.
c) Foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank 9.88% 47.78787 has.

c) Owned by his Brothers & Sisters

1.24% 5.9856 has.
d) Owned by Other Persons 5.53% 26.6318 has.

d) Foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank

8.23% 39.64865 has.
TOTAL 100.00% 1.24% 5.9856 has.
481.77422 has.
e) Owned by Other Persons 39.64865 has.
8.23%
2) Out of the total area of 481.77422 hectares covered by a sequestration order, about 409.50817 Total 481.77422 has.
hectares are owned by the late Mayor Argana. The other lots are owned by his brothers and 100.00
sisters (26.6318 hectares), foreclosed by Los Baos Rural Bank (5.9856 hectares), and %
registered and/or acquired by other persons (39.64865 hectares). In the event that the other
big area consisting of 131.2950 hectares of land is included in the compromise settlement in
favor of the government, a total of 361-50817 (sic) hectares of land would comprise about However, since the late Mayor Argana owns 409.50817 hectares sequestered and may possibly cede 361.9203
88.38 % of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of the late Mayor Argana. hectares, the percentage share of the government would be 88.38% of the 409.50817 hectaresactually registered
in his name and his children.
3) However, as a whole the 361.9203 hectares to be ceded to the government is equivalent to
75.12% of the 481.77422 hectares sequestered by PCGG as presented above. Since the late G. RECOMMENDATION
mayor owns 409.50817 hectares to the government, the percentage share of the government
would be 88.38 % and the remaining 11.62 % may be retained by the heirs of the late Mayor The PCGG wanted to recover as much as it could and as fast as possible, while the Arganas wanted to buy peace
Argana, equivalent to 47.58787 hectares. without admitting guilt. In order to avoid further lengthy litigation and to put an end to an almost ten-year
unresolved sequestration issue, and to expedite recovery so that the remaining assets may be used to contribute
F. SUMMARY to the national recovery, the 230.6253 hectares of land covered by nine (9) TCTs (Nos. T-3813, T-3814, T-3815,
T-3816, T-3817, T-4104, T-4106, T-4108 and T-4044) offered by the Arganas be favorably considered, on
condition that another real estate property covered by TCT No. T-4009, located at Matikiw, Pangil, Laguna,
consisting of 131.2950 hectares, be included and to be ceded to the government. All other lots sequestered
should be freed from the sequestration order.
As a whole, the government stands to acquire about 361.9203 hectares out of the 409.50817 hectares registered
in the name of Sps. Maximino A. Argana, REFEDOR, and their children, equivalent to 88.38%. The remaining
11.62% or 47.58787 hectares will be retained by the latter.
For the consideration of the Commission.
Signed
MAURO J. ESTRADA
(Record, v. 6, pp. 776-78)
(Underlining supplied)
....
The value of the properties must have been raised or even discussed during the several years that the properties
were held under sequestration. Yet, not even the PCGG bothered to produce any tax declaration, assessment or
appraisal to show the assessed or fair market value of the properties. . . . .
Again in another Memorandum of Director Mauro J. Estrada to PCGG Counsel Edgardo L. Kilayko, dated
February 2, 1988, the properties were listed according to the name of the owner, certificate of title, area in square
meters, location and percentages in relation to the whole. Obvious from the listing is the absence of a column to
indicate the value of the properties or their classification. . . .
The percentage based solely on area, was clearly emphasized, as shown by the following portions of said
Memorandum:
Out of the 409.50817 hectares registered in the name of Spouses Maximo A. Argana and Donata A. Argana as
presented above, 361.9203 hectares covering eleven (11) TCTs are to be ceded to the government under the
compromise agreement signed by Argana and the Commission in the latter part of 1997. The 361.9203 hectares
to be ceded to the government is equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area of 481.77422 hectares, as presented
below: x x x (Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied)
As a whole, there are 324 TCTs/OCTs covering a total area of 481.77422 hectares, out of which the heirs of the
late Mayor agreed to cede 361.9203 hectares equivalent to 75.12 % of the total area. Sometime. In August 1997,
the Commission agreed to accept the offer by concluding a compromise agreement with the heirs of the late
Mayor. (Record, v. 6, p. 1739) (underlining supplied)
....
. . . The values were deliberately omitted to make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adheres to the 75%-
25% ratio broadly adopted by the PCGG in compromising cases of ill-gotten wealth. It was this 75%-25% mode of
compromise, with the greater share of 75% going to the government that misled the Court to believe, as We did
believe, that the Compromise Agreement was fair, reasonable and advantageous to the Government. . . .
. . . What was projected to be a 75%-25% ratio was in reality a 00.15%-99.85% ratio, with 99.85% going to the
Arganas. This is unconscionable and immoral. And since it results in a transaction grossly disadvantageous and
immoral to the government, it is against the law as being violative of Section 3(g) of Republic Act 3019.
...
In the instant case, fraud of an extrinsic character exists because the representatives of plaintiff Republic in the
PCGG connived with defendants in hiding the assessed or market values of the properties involved, so as to
make it appear that the Compromise Agreement adhered to the 75%-25% ratio adopted by the PCGG in entering
into compromise of cases involving the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Through their infidelity, those in the PCGG
who handled or were closely involved with the case during the last days of the previous administration fraudulently
gave the Compromise Agreement a semblance of fairness and official acceptability. They sold plaintiff Republic
down the river by entering into an agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government. For while plaintiff
Republic got 00.15% (00.15074) of the estimated value of all the properties involved in this case, defendants
almost ran away with 99.85% (99.84526) of their value. This is patently unfair. It is no compromise but a virtual
sell-out. It could not have been pulled off without the connivance or collusion of those responsible for the case in
the PCGG. Instead of protecting the interest of the government, they connived at its defeatalmost.[56](Emphasis in
the original.)
It is evident from the foregoing that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is grounded on facts and on the law.
The Court sees no reason to depart from the conclusions drawn by the Sandiganbayan on the basis of its
findings, especially considering that the three justices comprising the Sandiganbayans Third Division conducted a
thorough examination of the documents submitted by the parties to this case, heard the testimonies of the parties
witnesses and observed their deportment during the hearing on the Motion to Rescind.
Moreover, it is an established rule that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its
agents.[57] Respondent cannot be bound by a manifestly unjust compromise agreement reviewed on its behalf and
entered into by its representatives from the PCGG who apparently were not looking after respondents best
interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 11, 2000 of the
Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Rescind Compromise Agreement and to Set Aside Judgment by
Compromise and setting the case for pre-trial, as well as the Order dated February 22, 2001 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
H. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
1 ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS THEN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.,
Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Labrador was the former Chief of the POEAs Employment Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997,
then Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered his dismissal from service as he was found
to have bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the amount ofP6,200.00 in order to
expedite the issuance of her overseas employment certificate.
Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against
Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated
a Decision,convicting him of the aforementioned crime. Labrador applied and was subsequently granted probation
which then suspended te execution proceedings.
The SB, however, withheld the approval of the recommendation that the probation be terminated and Labrador be
discharged from its legal effects and, instead, issued a Resolution stating that Labradors application for probation
was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section
4 of the Probation Law.
Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum which contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of the POEA
pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to March
15, 2004. Consequently, it ordered Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally liable for the
salaries and other benefits unduly received by Labrador in the amount ofP1,740,124.08, paid through various
checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.
ISSUES: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the COAs disallowance in this case.
Whether or not Dimapilis may be held liable for the salaries paid to Labrador
HELD: No.
Political Law- COA has the authority to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds.
COAs exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore, it has also been declared that the COA is
endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the disbursements pertaining to the personnel benefits paid to
Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped reporting for work as early as June 28, 2000 when the
denial of his appeal from the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision rendered his conviction for the crime of direct bribery
final and executory, notwithstanding the grant of his application for probation. In this regard, it opines that the
period of disallowance should be reckoned from May 3, 2000 which is the date the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision
had become final and executory.
Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of the disallowance is the undisputed fact that, pursuant
to an order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador had already been made to suffer the
administrative penalty of dismissal from service on May 2, 1997, which was long before the SB convicted him of
direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As a matter of law, a department secretarys decision confirming the removal of
an officer under his authority is immediately executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed public
officer.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the COA in fixing the
reckoning point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since records are bereft of any showing that it had
any knowledge of Labradors prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise would be simply antithetical to the
concept of grave abuse of discretion, much less countenance a speculative endeavor.
Remedial Law- presumption of good faith
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not
be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty
While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report for work despite the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision
convicting him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that she merely acted in good faith and lawfully exercised
her duties when she approved the payment of Labradors salaries, wages, and other personnel benefits for the
period beginning August 31, 1999 to March 2, 2004.
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the salaries and benefits which Labrador
unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his conviction, the liability for refund cannot be imposed
upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any reasonable indication that the payment of salaries
to Labrador was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this conclusion: first, Labradors 201 File with the
POEA was without any record of the SB case; and second, Dimapilis-Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction
when her office was furnished a copy of the SBs March 2, 2004 Resolution which ordered the revocation of
Labradors probation. In addition, Dimapilis-Baldozs good faith is further strengthened by the fact that she lost no
time in issuing the Separation Order as soon as she was apprised of Labradors situation. Thus, absent any proof
to the contrary, it cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-Baldoz's approval was spurred only by the honest belief that
the payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due and owing to him.
COA ruling affirmed with modification as to the personal liability of Dimapilis.
2 Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, Present: as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
For consideration are: (1) the letter dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon (Judge
Macarambon); and (2) the Memorandum of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (Court Administrator),
both addressed to former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona regarding the request of Judge Macarambon to retire
under Republic Act (RA) No. 910, as amended by RA No. 9946.
Judge Macarambon was a judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for a period of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days.
Before reaching the optional retirement age of 60, Judge Macarambon transferred to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) having been appointed as Commissioner by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(President Arroyo). He served as COMELEC Commissioner for less than a year and was no longer re-appointed
after having been bypassed thrice by the Commission on Appointments. Judge Macarambon was subsequently
appointed by President Arroyo as President/CEO of the National Transmission Corporation but he resigned from
the position less than a year after when he failed to receive a reappointment from President Benigno C. Aquino III.
In his letter, Judge Macarambon requests that he be allowed to retire under Section 1 of RA No. 910, as
amended, the pertinent portions of which read:
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of
Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit
trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established who has rendered at
least fifteen (15) years service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for
having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of
his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court, he/she shall receive during the residue of his/her natural life, in
the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation,
representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional
compensation allowance which he/she was receiving at the time of his/her retirement, or resignation, and non-
wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a
state university or college: Provided, That such grant will cover only one (1) bachelor's degree. When a Justice of
the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court
hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least fifteen (15) years service
in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall
likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter
provided, the salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances
such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was
then receiving and the non-wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and
Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or college: x x x .
Judge Macarambon asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the RTC who
resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re: Application for
Retirement under R.A. No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, he
posits that his appointment as COMELEC Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his duties as an RTC
judge on account of his "submission to the will of the political authority and appointing power."
As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1 considering that
he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total of 35 years of government
service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he believes that
the Court’s ruling in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda1 is applicable to his case where the Court brushed aside such
requirement and considered the retiree’s career which was marked with competence, integrity, and dedication to
public service.
In his Memorandum, the Court Administrator disagreed with Judge Macarambon’s position. The Court
Administrator averred:
We humbly submit that Judge Macarambon’s case is different from that of Justice Britanico’s. Justice Britanico,
together with the other Members of the Judiciary at that time, was ordered by then President Corazon C. Aquino,
through Proclamation No. 1, to tender their courtesy resignations. The decision as to whether or not they would
stay in their office was the prerogative of then President Aquino. On the contrary, the prerogative to accept the
appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner depended entirely on Judge Macarambon. He had the choice of
whether or not to accept the appointment of being a Commissioner or to stay as a RTC Judge. Therefore, his
appointment as a COMELEC Commissioner did not render him incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office
as a RTC Judge.
Nonetheless, based on the documents submitted, Judge Macarambon may retire under R.A. No. 1616, as he
meets all the requirements for retirement under the said law, i.e., has been in the government service as of 01
June 1977 and has rendered at least twenty (20) years government service, the last three (3) years of which have
been continuous.
The sole issue is whether we can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before reaching
the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended.
Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our
jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and
service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employee’s own intent and
volition to resign and relinquish his/her post.2 Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance
to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the
employment relationship endures for the purpose of the grant of retirement benefits.
RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from
judicial service or resigned from judicial office.
In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as provided
in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum requirements for
optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have
been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception
remains to be on a case to case basis.3 We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed
rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.4
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be "by reason of incapacity to discharge the
duties of the office." In Britanico, we held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. 910, as amended must
have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to
discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would not
have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond
his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible to retire
under RA No. 910, as amended.
First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement as shown by the records and by his own admission
that he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before transferring to the
COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in continuous service with the
Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement.
Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.
His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, our ruling in Britanico cannot
be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary.
Third, we find no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. In Re: Gregorio Pineda, the case
cited by Judge Macarambon, the Court fully explained how a liberal approach in the application of retirement laws
should be construed, thus:
The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. However, when in the
interest of liberal construction the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or
Justices, there are ample reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to
make up for lack of required age or length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on a case to case
basis.
In some instances, the lacking element-such as the time to reach an age limit or comply with length of service is
de minimis. It could be that the amount of accumulated leave credits is tremendous in comparison to the lacking
period of time.
More important, there must be present an essential factor before an application under the Plana or Britanico
rulings may be granted.1âwphi1 The Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of required age or service
only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public
service; it was only a bowing to policy considerations and an acceptance of the realities of political will which
brought him or her to premature retirement.5
In this case, Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and
sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A verification from
the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court on November 5, 2007, Judge Macarambon only
had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in the age of retirement.
Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the COMELEC upon his transfer. Further, we
already stated that unlike in Britanico, the nature of his separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
All told, we are not unmindful of Judge Macarambon’s long and dedicated service in the government for which he
is undeniably entitled to be rewarded. We agree with the Court Administrator that although Judge Macarambon is
not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents
he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service requirements under the said law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
(1) NOTE the Memorandum dated April 3, 2012 of Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez; and
(2) DENY the letter-request dated September 15, 2011 of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon to retire under
Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 for lack of legal basis.
Judge Macarambon is hereby ADVISED to file an application for optional retirement under Republic Act No. 1616
with the Government Service Insurance System, subject to the submission of the requirements for retirement, and
to the deduction of the retirement gratuity he received from his previous retirement, if there be any, and subject
finally to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.
SO ORDERED.
3 EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners, MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR.,
Petitioner-Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado
Calderon (Calderon) as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however,
adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban
on presidential appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus,
Fetalino and Calderon merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec,
pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in its
subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments study, completely disapproved the
Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating that one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have
completed his term of office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a
lump sum benefit of five years salary. Petitioner-intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the
petitioners in questioning the assailed subsequent resolution.
ISSUES:
A.Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-
year lump sum gratuity;
B.Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum gratuity is already final and executory;
C.Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full retirement benefits provided by RA
No. 1568.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office
First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No.
1568, as amended.
The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when
the conditions imposed by the applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an actual
retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that retirement entails compliance with certain age
and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the Chairman or any Member of the Comelec
who has retired from the service after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona
obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of
office. While the Court characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo as a permanent
appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office, the Court have also positively ruled in that case that an ad interim appointment that has
lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office.
Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of judgments.
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final
and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional
remedies and special reliefs. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of the assailed
resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings under Section 13, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.
Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.
Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely
gratuitous in nature; thus, they have no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided under
R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of deferred compensation for services
performed; in a pension, employee participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested
rights over the pension as part of their compensation.
DENIED
4 MELINDA L. OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Court assailing Decision No.
2008-0171 dated 15 February 2008 and Decision No. 2009-0382 dated 1 June 2009 of the Commission on Audit
(COA) sustaining Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003 disallowing the payment of
retirement gratuity to petitioner Melinda L. Ocampo (Ocampo) as Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, of
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), amounting to P1,449,450.48.
On 1 March 1996, Ocampo retired from the National Electrification Administration under Commonwealth Act No.
1863 as amended, by Republic Act No. 1616,4 after more than seventeen (17) years of service. Ocampo availed of
the lump sum payment with a net gratuity of P358,917.01.
Three days thereafter, on 4 March 1996, under Letter of Appointment dated 16 February 1996, Ocampo assumed
office as Board Member of the ERB. On 30 June 1998, upon expiration of her term, Ocampo retired under
Executive Order No. 172, "Creating the Energy Regulatory Board" in relation to Republic Act No. 1568, "An Act to
Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections."
Ocampo availed of the five year lump sum benefit and the corresponding monthly pension to be paid out for the
remainder of her life. This first gratuity lump sum payment based on sixty (60) months or five (5) years advance
salary was immediately received by Ocampo after her retirement. Likewise, Ocampo began to receive her monthly
pension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 25 August 1998, Ocampo was again appointed, this time as Chairman of ERB with a term of four (4) years. On
15 August 2001, the ERB was abolished and replaced by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) as a
consequence of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Reform Act of 2001. For the second time,
Ocampo sought retirement under Executive Order No. 172. Ocampo's claim was endorsed by the then
Chairperson of the ERC, Fe C. Barin (Chairperson Barin), to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
Upon release by the DBM of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA), Chairperson Barin approved the payment thereof to Ocampo.
However, on post-audit of the transaction with Ocampo as payee, State Auditor IV, Nelda R. Monterde (Auditor
Monterde), issued Notice of Suspension (NS) No. 2002-002-101 dated 10 July 2002: (1) suspending payment of
the amount of P1,452,613.71 covering Ocampo's second retirement gratuity computed on a pro-rata basis
equivalent to only two years, eleven months, and twenty days;6 and (2) requiring submission by the ERC of "legal
basis for [the payment of] retirement gratuity twice under the same law (EO 172)."7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a letter dated 23 July 2002, Chairperson Barin responded:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The application for retirement and or claims for retirement benefits of former Chairman Melinda L.
Ocampo [were] endorsed to DBM for its proper disposition together with the pertinent information or
circumstances attendant thereto. Please see the attached letter of endorsement dated April 2, 2002 and
the matrix of information on Chairman Ocampo's appointment and tenure in office. This was received by
DBM on April 5, 2002.
2. In its letter dated April 24, 2002, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) and the corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to cover the
payment of Chairman Ocampo's second gratuity benefits.
3. Under the above-mentioned circumstances there was no more cogent reason nor basis for this Office to
defer the release to Chairman Ocampo of the amount corresponding to the DBM approved gratuity
benefits, especially considering the follow-up efforts by the beneficiaries. To do otherwise could expose
the undersigned to charges of unreasonable delayed action.8
On 28 October 2002, Ocampo likewise wrote Auditor Monterde asking for the lifting of NS No. 2002-002-101
dated 10 July 2002 and asseverating her entitlement to the second retirement gratuity:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. That the basic law (E.O. 172, as amended) provides no prohibition to receive second retirement
gratuity;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
2. That I retired under different positions, first as Board Member and second as Chairman of the Energy
Regulatory Board;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the employee because the level of retirement
compensation is below the cost of living requirements of a retiree. A grateful nation owes the retiree at
the very least a liberal interpretation.9
Acting on Chairperson Barin's request for the lifting of NS No. 2002-001-101 dated 10 July 2002, the Legal and
Adjudication Office-National (LAO-N) of the COA issued LAO-N-2003-132 dated 12 June 2003 denying the
request:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Of pertinence is the last paragraph of Section 1 of EO 172, quoted hereunder, thus:
The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming eligible for
retirement under existing lawsshall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and privileges provided for
the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
The retirement benefits of the Members of the Commission on Elections is found in RA 3595, amending RA 1568.
Section 1 thereof states:
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the [Chairman] or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires
from the service for having completed his term [of office] x x x, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his
salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary
that he was receiving at the time of retirement, x x x; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity
payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary that he
was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation. (Emphasis theirs).
The above provision of law is integral to the matter on hand since RA 1568 merely extends to the Auditor General
and the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections the retirement benefits granted under RA 910.
EO 172, on the other hand, explicitly provides that the Chairman and Members of the Board shall be entitled to
the same retirement benefits given to the Chairman and Members of the COMELEC. Having claimed retirement
benefits under EO 172 twice, x x x Ms. Ocampo, therefore, would in all certainty be receiving double pension for
the remainder of [her life].
The above-situation is predictable considering that under Paragraph 2 of Section 1 of EO 172, a person may be
appointed to the Board for a minimum of two terms, to wit: "No person may be appointed to serve more than two
(2) successive terms in the Board." It follows then that upon meeting the condition of completion of terms or
eligibility for retirement each time, the concerned official would apply for retirement benefits, as a matter of course.
While this could have been the scenario, it bears emphasizing that EO 172, however, does not have a parallel
provision that would allow a Board Member to claim the full benefits of the law for as long as the number of term
[of] office of such official would allow. The most practical solution that would not run counter to the prohibition
against double pension is to deduct the amount of lump sum and monthly pensions already received on the first
retirement under EO 172 from the gratuity claimed on the second retirement under the same law. While there is
no hard and fast rule requiring such deduction, for reasons of equity however, it would be proper and logical that
said benefits should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement pay to be received by the employee
concerned. x x x.nadcralavvlawlibrary
xxxx
EO 172 sets forth the condition when the Chairman and the Members of the Board of the ERB shall be entitled to
retirement benefits provided under RA 3595. For clarity, the condition is "upon completion of their terms or upon
becoming eligible for retirement under existing laws." A quick review of the circumstances herein obtaining would
show that x x x Ms. Ocampo had met such condition when [her] term [was] completed upon the abolition of ERB.
As then ERB Chairman, [she was] originally appointed to a term of four years which was however shortened to
less than three years. x x x Of equal importance is the fact that [she was] also eligible for retirement under existing
laws. Records bear that x x x Ms. Ocampo had previously retired on March 3, 1996.
Section 1 of RA 3595 is clear as to the extent of the gratuity: lump sum of salary for one year, not exceeding five
years, for every year of service plus the life pension. In the attached pertinent documents, it is shown that
[Ocampo was] granted retirement gratuity in the amount of x x x P1,472,155.43, x x x computed as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxxx
Highest Monthly Salary (Per NOSA) x No. of Gratuity Months = Gratuity Pay
P41,275.00 x 35.667 = [P]1,472,155.43
As already mentioned, [she is] also entitled to an annuity payable monthly during the residue of [her] natural [life].
The payment of pension starts after the expiration of the five year period as provided for under Section 3 of RA
910, the retirement law of the Members of the Judiciary, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 3. Upon retirement a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals shall be automatically
entitled to a lump sum payment of the monthly salary that said Justice was receiving at the time of his retirement
for five years, and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of this period of five years, to a further
annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of the monthly salary
he was receiving on the date of his retirement. (Emphasis theirs).
In our jurisdiction, the legal precept is against double pension. The rule in construing or applying pension and
gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent
any person from receiving double compensation x x x. There must be a provision, clear and unequivocal, to justify
a double pension. x x x It is therefore, incumbent upon x x x Ms. Ocampo to show that they are exempt from this
general rule.
The provision of second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution which states "Pensions or
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation[,]" may not be invoked. This
provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or
gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which compensation is attached x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein request for lifting of NS. No. 2002-001-101 (2002) is hereby
DENIED.10
On motion for reconsideration of Ocampo, the COA LAO-N issued ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003
affirming NS No. 2002-001-101 disallowing Ocampo's receipt of a second retirement gratuity under Executive
Order No. 172.
On appeal, COA, in Decision No. 2008-017 dated 15 February 2008, partially affirmed ND No. 2003-021 and
allowed Ocampo's receipt of a pro- rated retirement gratuity based on her salary as Chairperson of the
ERB:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission affirms in part the disallowance, under ND No. 2003-021
dated September 03, 2003, and rules that [Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement gratuity, conformably to her
years in service as Chairman of ERB which is, two years, eleven months and twenty days. In accordance with the
computation prepared by the Office of the Supervising Auditor, Energy Regulatory Board hereto attached as
Annex A and made an integral part hereof, of the total amount of P4,138,086.71, inclusive of gratuities and
pensions, received by Ms. Ocampo only P2,688,636.23 is allowable. In fine, this Commission affirms the
disallowance up to the amount of P1,449,450.48.
Accordingly, the monthly pension that [Ocampo] should receive shall only correspond to one monthly pension
based on the computation of her last retirement benefit.
The Auditor concerned is hereby ordered to require the adjustment in the books of accounts of the agency as
regards the payment of the first lump sum gratuity.11
In its Decision No. 2009-038 dated 1 June 2009, COA denied Ocampo's motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the disallowance of the amount of P1,449,450.48 and of the double monthly for Ocampo.
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COA.
The singular issue for our resolution is framed by Ocampo:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
ONLY THE BENEFITS CORRESPONDING TO HER RETIREMENT AS ERB CHAIR, AND THE PERIOD
DURING WHICH SHE SERVED AS MEMBER OF THE SAID BOARD SHOULD BE MERELY TACKED IN TO
THE PERIOD DURING WHICH SHE SERVED AS SUCH CHAIR.12
In sum, Ocampo posits that she should be separately paid retirement benefits for her respective terms as Board
Member and Chairperson of the ERB. In other words, Ocampo claims two (2) lump sum payments, and payment
thereafter of two (2) monthly pensions.
While Ocampo accedes that the "rule is against a retiree's receiving double pension," she claims exemption to the
application thereof because of the absence of a prohibition, whether express or implied, in Executive Order No.
172 or Republic Act No. 3595 "for a covered official to retire twice thereunder and receive the corresponding
benefits each time." Ocampo stresses that the applicable laws, Executive Order No. 172 and Republic Act No.
3595, were intended specifically to accord special privileges to covered government officials who are considered,
for retirement purposes, on the same level as Members of Constitutional Commissions; and the "very enactment
[of these laws] are unequivocal expressions of the intention to remove the covered officials from the operation of
the general rule." Thus, a liberal interpretation thereof must follow.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, ostensibly defending COA's stance, concluded
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence, [Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount on her retirement gratuity to be computed based on her two
(2) years, eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days actual creditable service as Chairman of ERB considering that
she cannot anymore tack her previous stint as member of the Board of the ERB since her retirement benefits
were already awarded to her.13
In her Reply, Ocampo counters that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. With due respect, the Comment of the OSG in behalf of COA did not fully support the COA Decision
dated February 15, 2008 and Resolution dated June 1, 2009.
1.1 x x x [T]he OSG Comment argued that "[Ocampo] is entitled only to a pro-rata amount of her retirement
gratuity to be computed based on her two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and twenty (20) days actual creditable
service as Chairman of ERB x x x." This is contrary to the COA Decision dated February 15, 2008 being
questioned which ruled that "[Ocampo] should have received only pro-rata amount on her retirement gratuity to be
computed based on two years and four months actual creditable service as Board Member of the ERB. Likewise
[Ocampo] is entitled to a pro-rata retirement gratuity as ERB chairman, based on two years, eleven months, and
twenty days of service as ERB Chairman."
1.2 x x x [T]he OSG x x x, posits that [Ocampo], after legally receiving the first gratuity pay equivalent to a lump
sum of five years as Board member III of ERB in the total amount of Php1,784,040.00, is also entitled to a pro-rata
computation of her retirement gratuity as ERB Chairman equivalent to two years, eleven months, and twenty days
in the amount of Php1,452,613.71. However, the COA's Decision subject of this case ruled that [Ocampo] is
entitled to the pro-rata computation of her retirement BOTH as ERB Board Member III and as ERB Chairman for a
total of five (5) years, three (3) months, and 20 days in the total amount of Php 2,688,636.23 only.
1.3 x x x This is significant because in the COA Decision, [Ocampo] is being required to refund the amount of
Php1,449,450.48 while in the OSG position before this Honorable Court, [Ocampo] will not refund any amount. x x
x.14 (Emphasis theirs).
Considering the foregoing asseverations, we list the following issues for our resolution:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Whether Ocampo is entitled to a second lump sum retirement gratuity as ERB Chairperson under Executive
Order No. 172, given that she had already received in full, as admitted by Ocampo herself, a five year lump sum
retirement gratuity as ERB Board Member;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
2. Corollary thereto, whether Ocampo is entitled to double monthly pensions as part of her two retirement
gratuities for having held the positions of ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively.
To obviate confusion, we state at the outset that the parties make no issue of Ocampo's second retirement as a
consequence of the abolition of the ERB and its replacement by the ERC. The issues for our resolution relate only
to Ocampo's retirement benefits in the two instances of her retirement from the ERB.
For easy reference, a recital of the applicable laws:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Section 1, paragraphs 2 and 6 of Executive Order No. 172.
[2] The term of office of the Chairman and the Board Members shall be four (4) years, but the first Chairman to be
appointed shall hold office for four (4) years, and of the first four (4) Members, two (2) shall hold office for a term
of two (2) years, and two (2) shall hold office for a term of three (3) years. No person may be appointed to serve
more than two (2) successive terms in the Board.
xxxx
[6] The Chairman and the Members of the Board, upon completion of their terms or upon becoming eligible for
retirement under existing laws shall be entitled to the same retirement benefits and privileges provided for the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections.
2. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3595.
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires from
the service for having completed his term [of] office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his
office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the
expiration of [his] term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding
five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of
retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be; Provided, That in case of resignation, he has
rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government: And, provided, further,
That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of
monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
3. Item No. 4, Administrative Order No. 444.
4. Upon retirement, the lump sum of five years' gratuity as provided under R.A. 3595 for the
Chairman/Commissioner of a Constitutional Commission shall be computed on the basis of the highest monthly
salary plus the duly authorized transportation, living and representation allowances in the last month prior to
retirement or expiration of term.15
Textually, the rules on the retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172, in relation to Republic Act No.
3595, are:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The employee must have completed his term of office, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of his
office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the
expiration of his term of office;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
2. The lump sum is to be paid out according to the employee's number of years of service with the
ERB;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. The lump sum gratuity to be paid is the employee's salary for one year, not to exceed five
years;16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4. The lump sum is based on the employee's last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement,
incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
5. In case of resignation, the employee should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the
government; and,
6. The employee shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the
amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
In affirming ND No. 2003-021 dated 3 September 2003, the COA ruled that: (1) the phrase "for every year of
service" limits the payment of the lump sum to the employee's length of service and does not automatically entitle
an employee to a lump sum gratuity of five years; (2) Ocampo is not entitled to two (2) lump sum benefit of five
years for each term as it would run counter to the "common-sense principle" laid down in jurisprudence; (3)
payment to Ocampo of two retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 for both her retirements, albeit
under different positions and offices, is unconstitutional as it violates the provision against additional or double
compensation; and (4) ultimately, Ocampo should have received only a pro- rated amount on her retirement
gratuity based on her two years and four months as ERB Board Member, and two years, eleven months and
twenty days as ERB Chairperson.
We note that, while COA's decisions did not state whether Ocampo, for her first retirement gratuity, received the
maximum lump sum benefit of five years which an employee may receive, Ocampo asseverated in her Reply, and
the records of this case categorically show that for her retirement as ERB Board Member, she received the
maximum lump sum benefit of five years although her actual creditable service for that position and period is less
than five (5) years, i.e., two years and four months. This has already been paid to, and received by Ocampo, and
has never been the subject of any audit or disallowance by the COA prior to Ocampo's claim for a second
retirement benefit as ERB Chairperson.
Ocampo is surprised, therefore, that her first retirement gratuity, which she had long received, was audited by the
COA. In short, Ocampo argues that the foregoing expenditure is not the proper subject of COA's jurisdiction, as
COA should confine itself to its disallowance of Ocampo's second retirement gratuity in the amount of
P1,452,613.71 computed on a pro-rated basis equivalent to Ocampo's length of service as ERB Chairperson for
two years, eleven months and twenty days.
In fact, in the dispositive portion of COA's Decision 2008-017, COA's pro-rated computation of Ocampo's first and
second retirement benefits as ERB Board Member and Chairperson, respectively, exceeded the five-year limit set
forth in the law. The pro-rated computation of COA of Ocampo's retirement benefits corresponded to Ocampo's
total period of employment as both ERB Board Member and Chairperson for five (5) years, three (3) months, and
twenty (20) days, in the total amount of P2,688,636.23. Thus, in the Decisions 2008-017 and 2009-038, COA
affirmed the disallowance of ?1,449,450.48. COA noted that Ocampo had already received the total amount of
?4,138,086.71 as retirement benefits, and ordered the Auditor concerned to adjust the books of accounts of the
agency respecting the payment of the first lump sum gratuity.
First. We disagree with Ocampo that COA should not have audited the first retirement benefit paid to Ocampo as
ERB Board Member. COA's plenary authority, consisting of pre and post audit, is enshrined in the
Constitution,17 and as oft observed in jurisprudence.18 COA validly looked into the government expenditure
relating to the first retirement benefit paid to Ocampo because she now claims payment of a second retirement
benefit under the same law. Part of the scope of the COA's power, authority and duty is to "promulgate accounting
and auditing rules, and regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties."
Second. Before examining the correctness of the COA audit, however, it is imperative to ascertain first, in view of
the circumstances herein obtaining, as to how much Ocampo is entitled to receive as retirement benefits under
Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. We can
recall that Ocampo retired twice from the ERB under the following circumstances:
a. Ocampo first retired from the ERB on 30 June 1998, after serving a total of two (2) years and four (4)
months as a member thereof (first retirement).
b. After her first retirement, Ocampo was re-appointed to the ERB, this time, as its chairman on 25 August
1998.
c. Ocampo retired once again from the ERB on 15 August 2001, after serving a total of two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and twenty (20) days as chairman thereof (second retirement).
Owing to her two retirements from the ERB, Ocampo now claims that she is likewise entitled to two (2) sets of
retirement benefits under Executive Order No. 172 in relation to Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic
Act No. 3595.
We disagree.
Claim of Ocampo for Two Sets of
Retirement Benefits Not a Claim
of Double Compensation
At the outset, it must be clarified that the claim of Ocampo for two (2) sets of retirement benefits under Republic
Act No. 1568 is not, strictly speaking, a claim for double compensation prohibited under the first paragraph of
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Claims for double retirement benefits fall under the prohibition against
the receipt of double compensation when they are based on exactly the same services and on the same
creditable period.19 This is not, however, the case herein.
In this case, Ocampo is not claiming two (2) sets of retirement benefits for one and the same creditable period.
Rather, Ocampo is claiming a set of retirement benefits for each of her two (2) retirements from the ERB. In other
words, each set of retirement benefits claimed by Ocampo is based on distinct creditable periods i.e., one for her
term as member of the ERB and another for her term as chairman of the same agency.
What Ocampo is merely claiming, therefore, is that she is entitled to two (2) sets of retirement benefits for her two
(2) retirements from the ERB under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Hence, in order to resolve her claim,
what is only required is an interpretation of Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
Republic Act No. 1568 as
Amended Does Not Justify
Payment of More than One
Gratuity and Annuity as a
Consequence of Several
Retirements from the Same
Agency
As can be seen from our discussion above, the success of Ocampo's claim actually depends on the existence of a
provision in Republic Act No. 1568 that allows her to recover two (2) set of retirement benefits as a consequence
of her two (2) retirements from the ERB. Ocampo hinges her claim for two (2) sets of retirement benefits solely
on the provisions of Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595.
We rule against her.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 that allows a qualified retiree to
therein recover two (2) sets of retirement benefits as a consequence of two (2) retirements from the same covered
agency. As worded, Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, only allows payment of only a single gratuity and a
single annuity out of a single compensable retirement from any one of the covered agencies.
In fact, the contingency of multiple retirements from the same covered agency could not have been contemplated
by the law. We can confirm this if we take into consideration that Republic Act No. 1568 is a law that, first and
foremost, was intended to cover the retirement benefits of the chairmen and members of the COA (formerly the
Office of the Auditor General) and of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)20 and that it has been the
consistent policy of the State, indeed since the 1935 Constitution, to prohibit any appointment of more than one
term in the said constitutional bodies. Hence, Republic Act No. 1568, as it was passed and in its present form,
cannot be said to have sanctioned the payment of more than one set of retirement benefits to a retiree as a
consequence of multiple retirements in one agency.
The mere circumstance that members and chairmen of the ERB may be appointed to serve therein for more than
one term (but not for two consecutive terms)21 does not mean that they would be entitled a set of retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. 1568 for each of their completed term. Section 1 of Executive Order No. 172
merely extends to members and chairmen of the ERB similar retirement benefits that retiring members and
chairmen of the COA and COMELEC are entitled to under the law. Similar does not mean greater.
Since Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 clearly does not justify the payment of more
than one gratuity and one annuity to a qualified retiree, Ocampo cannot claim two (2) sets of retirement benefits
under the same law.
How Much Ocampo is Entitled to
Recover As Retirement Benefits
Having settled that Ocampo is only entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under Republic Act
No. 1568 as amended, We now proceed to the determination of how much Ocampo is entitled to receive as
retirement benefits under the same law.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1568 grants two (2) types of retirement benefits to a qualified retiree, i.e.,
a gratuity or a lump sum payment and an annuity or monthly pension, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires
from the service for having completed his term or office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties
of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the
expiration of this term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not
exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at
the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That in case of
resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And, provided, further, That
he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount
of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation. (Emphasis
supplied).
Applying the above provision, We discern that Ocampo may recover one gratuity in an amount equivalent to
her last annual salary multiplied by her actual years of service in the ERB but not to exceed five (5) years. In
addition, Ocampo is entitled to receive only one annuity equivalent to the amount of her last monthly salary.
While Ocampo is entitled to receive only one set of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended,
despite her two (2) retirements, We believe that her subsequent stint as Chairman of the ERB and her
consequent second retirement necessitated an adjustment of the retirement benefits she is entitled to
under the law. This is because Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, reckons the amount of gratuity on the
retiree's last annual salary and actual years of service not exceeding five (5) years, and it bases the amount of
annuity on the retiree's last monthly salary.
Hence, for purposes of computing her gratuity, Ocampo's last annual salary shall be that which she was receiving
at the time of her second retirement and her actual years of service shall be the sum of her years of service both
as ERB member and chairman, but not to exceed five (5) years. On the other hand, for purposes of computing her
annuity, Ocampo's last monthly salary shall be that which she was receiving monthly as of the date of her second
retirement.
Third. We now come to COA's findings. As can be seen from the factual narration, the disallowance made by the
COA with respect to some of the retirement benefits already received by Ocampo rests on a different premise
than that We have settled in the previous discussions. Hence, for the sake of accuracy, We require a remand of
this case to the COA with the following directives:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles enunciated in this
Decision;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
annuity;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already received by
Ocampo so far; and,
a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or annuity
already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the excess,
b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or annuity
already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo and require the
refund thereof.
It is in this light that We are constrained to grant this petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the
Commission on Audit with the following directives:
 1. To recompute the gratuity and annuity of Ocampo in accordance with the principles enunciated in this
Decision;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
2. To require the adjustment of Ocampo's account to reflect such recomputed gratuity and
annuity;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
3. To compare such recomputed gratuity and annuity with the gratuity and annuity already received by
Ocampo so far; and,
a. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is greater than the gratuity or annuity
already received by Ocampo, to allow the payment to Ocampo of only the excess,
b. In the event that the recomputed gratuity or annuity is lesser than the gratuity or annuity
already received by Ocampo, to disallow the excess payments to Ocampo and require the
refund thereof.
SO ORDERED.
5 RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO
LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, EN BANC (Brion, J.)
This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, CA Associate Justice
Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate Justice Vicente Veloso for their claim of longevity pay for services
rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package. They anchored their claim under
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and the Court's ruling in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case,
Justice Pardo was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to
the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service. Accordingly, the
court considered Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary as part of his service in the judiciary for
purposes of determining his longevity pay.
Issue: Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services rendered outside the judiciary.
Ruling: No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of
courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service
outside of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or
justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary.
Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an incumbent MTC Judge, then she served as
Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC, then she was appointed as Commissioner of
COMELEC, then as a consultant of COMELEC, and only then that she was appointed as Associate Justice of CA.
Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened which did not comply with the requirement of service in a
single non-judicial position. On the other hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as Commissioners
of NLRC before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an agency attached to the DOLE, an Executive
Department, and hence such is not considered ascontinuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary for
the purpose of longevity pay.
6 RE: APPLICATION FOR OPTIONAL RETIREMENT UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5095 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946, OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
RESOLUTION
MARTIRES, J.:
The present matter concerns the computation of the longevity pay of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama,
Jr. (Justice Villarama), a former member of this Court.
Previously, Justice Villarama, in a letter1 dated 2 November 2015, applied for optional retirement under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 910, as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and R.A. No. 9946, to be effective on 15 January 2016. In a
Resolution2 dated 10 November 2015, the Court granted Justice Villarama's request for optional retirement and
approved the payment of Justice Villarama's retirement gratuity and terminal leave benefits, exclusive of the
longevity pay component, pending the resolution of his requests for adjustments to his longevity.
We are tasked to determine the amount of longevity pay due to Justice Villarama.
THE FACTS
Antecedents
On 14 August 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (B.P. Blg. 129), known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980," became effective and, by virtue thereof, created or established the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 42 of the law granted
to justices and judges of the said courts a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for
each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary.
Since the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals were not covered by B.P. Blg. 129,
the justices and judges of these courts were not entitled to the monthly longevity pay provided in Section 42 of
B.P. Blg. 129. Presidential Decree No. 1927, approved on 2 May 1985, corrected the gap.
On 25 September 2003, Justice Josue N. Bellosillo (Justice Bellosillo), a former member of this Court who was
then due to retire compulsorily, requested that his earned leave credits be tacked to his judicial service in order to
increase his longevity pay. Justice Bellosillo’s letter-request was docketed as A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC. He wrote:
In the past, the Court had allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to government service in order to enable
retiring members of the judiciary to complete the age/service requirement under R.A. No. 910 or to increase their
longevity pay for purposes of computing their retirement benefits.
Invoking past judicial precedents, may I request that my earned leave credits be tacked to my judicial service to
increase my longevity pay.
Tacking my earned leave credits to my judicial service I would have served, upon my retirement, for thirty-seven
(37) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days, that would entitle me to additional longevity pay in accordance
with B.P. Blg.129.
While Sec. 42 provides for entitlement to longevity pay for every five (5)-year period of judicial service, fairness
and justice dictate a liberal construction of the provision if the member of the judiciary concerned is retiring
compulsorily and therefore is left with no option, unlike one who retires optionally, to complete the five (5)-year
period requirement in order to be entitled to the whole five percent (5%) additional longevity pay.
In other words, even if he opts to extend his stay to complete at least another five (5)-year period, he cannot do so
because of the constitutional limitation to his term of office.3 (emphasis omitted)
In its resolution in A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC, the Court granted the request of Justice Bellosillo. The approved
resolution became the basis of Administrative Circular (A. C.) No. 58-2003 which this Court approved on 11
November 2003. Entitled "ALLOWING THE TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION
OF LONGEVITY PAY UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES," the circular reads:
WHEREAS, The Court has studied proposals to allow the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of judicial
service for computation of the-longevity pay.
WHEREAS, Section 42 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129 provides for a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the
monthly basic pay for every five years of service rendered in the judiciary;
WHEREAS, it is true that vacation and sick leave credits earned during the period of employment are, by their
nature and purpose, generally enjoyed during employment; however, the law does not preclude the accumulation
of these leave credits, not to be paid while one is working, but to be reserved for senior age;
WHEREAS, retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for
his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood
and the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security, and well-being of government personnel may be enhanced;
WHEREAS, laws pertaining to retiring government personnel should be liberally construed to benefit retiring
personnel, following an interpretation that rightly expresses the nation’s gratitude towards the women and men
who have tirelessly and faithfully served the government;
WHEREAS, earned leave credits, computed in accordance with Section 40, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on
Leave, should accordingly be allowed to increase the longevity pay of Justices and Judges reaching the age of
compulsory retirement;
NOW, THEREFORE, the COURT RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that earned leave credits shall be
allowed to be tacked to the length of judicial service for the purpose of increasing the longevity pay of Justices and
Judges who reach the age of compulsory retirement. The computation should also include the additional
percentage of longevity pay that corresponds to any fraction of a five-year period in the total number of years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered, considering that the retiree would no longer be able to
complete the period because of his compulsoryretirement.4(emphasis supplied)
Gleaned from the text of A.C. No. 58-2003, the benefits provided therein seemed to apply only to justices and
judges who retire compulsorily.
Perhaps cognizant of the limitation, Justice Ma. Alicia AustriaMartinez (Justice Austria-Martinez), also a former
member of this Court who was to retire optionally, requested that the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-
2003 be applied in her favor. The Court, in a resolution dated 24 February 2009, approved the request of Justice
Austria-Martinez but with a qualification that the ruling be only pro hac vice.
The letter-request of
Justice Villarama
Like Justice Austria-Martinez, Justice Villarama also applied for optional retirement. In his 2 November 2015 letter,
Justice Villarama requests that the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 be applied in computing his longevity pay in view
of the following considerations:
1. He would have completed 28 years, 2 months and 8 days of judicial service by 6 January 2016, lacking only 2
months and 29 days to reach the mandatory age of 70 for compulsory retirement from the judiciary on 14 April
2016;
2. In its resolution adopted on 24 February 2009, the Court considered Administrative Circular No. 58-2003
applicable, pro hac vice, to Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez who optionally retired on 30 April 2009 and whose
compulsory retirement date was on December 19, 2010 or 1 year and 8 months short of the mandatory date of
compulsory retirement;
3. In its Resolution adopted on 3 February 2009, the Court allowed the service as bar examiner be credited as
part of government service and be tacked in the computation of the longevity pay upon compulsory or optional
retirement.5
Justice Villarama prays that, in the light of his attendant circumstances, A.C. No. 58-2003 should be applied to
him, pro hac vice. He also prays that his earned leave credits and services as Bar Examiner in 2004 be tacked to
the length of his judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity pay.
We referred the matter to the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (the committee) for its
recommendation.
The recommendation of
the committee
Based on its 12 January 2017 memorandum, the committee recommended the denial of the requests of Justice
Villarama.
The committee's recommendation is based on the consideration that A.C. No. 58-2003 was intended to apply only
to those who retire compulsorily. Further, the committee believes that the pro hac vice ruling in the case of Justice
Austria-Martinez cannot be considered a precedent to be applied in subsequent cases as in the case of Justice
Villarama. The committee also adds that neither tacking of leave credits nor fractional longevity pay finds support
in Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129; thus, it recommends that A.C. No. 58-2003 be abandoned.
Anent Justice Villarama's service as bar examiner, the committee opines that it cannot also be tacked to his
judicial service because at the time Justice Villarama served as such, he was an incumbent member of the
Judiciary. A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC6 adverted to by Justice Villarama, as the committee puts it, explicitly covers only
service prior to appointment to the Judiciary.
THE ISSUES
At the outset, we note the letter-request of Justice Villarama seeking a pro hac vice ruling. However, in order to
put to rest this lingering issue, our disposition of the present matter should not bind Justice Villarama only but
include other members of the judiciary who may be similarly situated in the present or will be so in the future.
Thus, the issues may be couched in broad terms to cast a general interpretative effect for the guidance of the Bar
and the bench in future cases, viz:
I. Whether the benefits under A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional retirees, particularly that: (a) earned
leave credits are tacked to judicial service, thereby increasing longevity pay, and (b) the fraction of a five-year
period is included in computing longevity pay; and
II. Whether the service rendered by a member of the judiciary as bar examiner is credited as part of judicial
service, thereby increasing longevity pay.
OUR RULING
After careful deliberation, the Court rules to grant Justice Villarama’s request to tack his earned leave credits, but
not his services as Bar Examiner in 2004, to his years in judicial service for purposes of computing his longevity
pay. The fraction of the five-year period immediately prior to Justice Villarama’s optional retirement shall also be
included in the computation.
On the application of A.C. No. 58-2003
The committee insists that A.C. No. 58-2003 should not be construed liberally to extend its benefits to those who
retire optionally.1âwphi1 It explains that the circular was issued, through A.M. No. 03-9-20-SC,7 in response to the
request of Justice Bellosillo to adjust his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to government service.
Such issuance was already a liberal interpretation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and must, accordingly, no longer
be given further liberal interpretation without undermining the proscription against judicial legislation. The
committee lengthily quotes this Court's discussion in Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso
for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for his Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations
Commission8 (Veloso case).
We are not persuaded. It is unnecessary even to treat whatever beclouds the committee's mind in suggesting that
the Court is crossing the realm of judicial legislation when it (the Court) topped the exercise of liberal interpretation
in Sec. 42 of B.P. Big. 129 with another liberal interpretation, as was this Court’s fear in Veloso. Incidentally, we
would be amiss not to mention that whatever result was reached by this Court in Veloso was later reversed in our
26 July 2016 resolution on the motion for reconsideration in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA.9
A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic provision on longevity pay
granted by law to justices and judges in the judiciary.
Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges for each five-year period of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.10 The purpose of the law is to reward long service,
from the lowest to the highest court in the land.11
A plain reading of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 readily reveals that the longevity pay is given the justice or judge on
a monthly basis together with his or her basic pay, provided that the justice or judge has completed at least five
(5) years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The amount is equivalent to five percent
(5%) of the monthly basic pay, and it increases by an increment of 5o/o for every additional cycle of five (5) years
of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. It is given while the justice or judge is still in active
service andbecomes part of the monthly pension benefit upon his or her retirement, or survivorship benefit upon
his or her death after retirement.
In granting the longevity pay to the justice or judge still in active service, taking into consideration its salutary
purpose, the law did not qualify whether the recipient is to subsequently retire compulsorily or optionally. Upon his
or her retirement, whether compulsory or optional, the justice or judge continues to enjoy the longevity pay by
receiving the same together with the monthly pension benefit. Thus, if a justice or judge has rendered long service
in the judiciary, he or she must be rewarded even if the retirement is optional; and the purpose of the law is served
no more than it would be in the case of one who is retired compulsorily. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why
the benevolent objective of the law should be limited to justices or judges who retire compulsorily.
On the other hand, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to interpret laws
and, as such, has the force and effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court duly considered the long-standing
policy of according liberal construction to retirement laws covering government personnel. The liberal approach in
construing retirement laws, which are enacted as social legislations, is necessary in order to achieve the
humanitarian considerations of promoting the physical and mental well-being of public servants.12 Given this legal
milieu, the Court allowed the tacking of earned leave credits to the length of judicial service in order to increase
the longevity pay of justices and judges. Thus, the wisdom behind the issuance of A.C. No. 58-2003 is to ensure
the comfort and security of retired justices and judges who had tirelessly and faithfully served the government.13
As noted above, A.C. No. 58-2003 was issued as the Court's response to the letter-request of Justice Bellosillo
who sought the adjustment of his longevity pay by tacking his earned leave credits to the length of his judicial
service andat the same time recognizing the fractional portion of the unexpired 5-year period of his service
immediately prior to his compulsory retirement. In circularizing the tacking of earned leave credits and
recognition of fractional longevity pay, however, the Court styled A.C. No. 58-2003 as "ALLOWING THE
TACKING OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS IN THE COMPUTATION OF LONGEVITY PAY
UPON COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES. " Under the circular, all those who may be
similarly situated with Justice Bellosillo can then be entitled to its benefits.
The seeming express limitation of the benefits of A.C. No. 58-2003 only to justices and judges who retire
compulsorily apparently developed the view that the circular's benevolent provisions are beyond the reach of
those who retire optionally. This is the same view advanced by the committee when it mentioned in its
memorandum that on the face and articulated rationale of A.C. No. 58-2003, it applies to and is intended only for
those who retire compulsorily.
Upon deeper reflection, no discernible reason exists to deny optional retirees the tacking of leave credits for
purposes of computing their longevity pay. If the rationale of such longevity pay is to reward loyalty to the
government, then it makes no sense to limit the tacking of earned leave credits to the service of compulsory
retirees only. The question therefore arises:
Are members of the judiciary who optionally retire necessarily considered less loyal, and therefore less deserving,
than those who compulsorily retire?
An affirmative answer can hardly be justified. Otherwise, an absurd situation ensues when a justice or judge who
had rendered, say, only 7 years of judicial service but is compulsorily retired because he entered the judiciary at a
late stage in his professional career, is allowed to tack earned but relatively few leave credits to his judicial service
thus gaining from an increase in his longevity pay; as compared to another justice or judge, who had rendered 30
long years of service in the judiciary and had opted to retire before reaching the compulsory retirement age, yet is
precluded from tacking a possibly substantial amount of earned leave credits, and is thus denied the reward
intended for long and loyal service to the public.
When juxtaposed with Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, the very same law sought to be implemented by A.C. No. 58-
2003, it becomes evident that limiting its scope only to justices and judges who retire compulsorily cannot stand.
As previously discussed, the longevity pay is paid to justices or judges who had proven their loyalty to the
judiciary, regardless of the manner by which they retire.
Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the tacking of leave credits to the length of judicial service
rendered by qualified justices and judges should be applied to optional retirees as well.
What comes to the fore in our discussion is that allowing the tacking of leave credits only to compulsory retirees is
simply wrong. To avoid this error, A.C. No. 58-2003, regardless of its title and the contents of its dispositive
portion, should be read to likewise cover justices and judges who retire optionally.
We believe it a better policy to consider A.C. No. 58-2003 as complete in its scope, effectively covering both
compulsory and optional retirees. Not only is it consistent with the moral fiber of B.P. Blg. 129, it makes
unnecessary the issuance of a separate circular to cover optional retirees only.
On the pro hac vice ruling in
Austria-Martinez
It is unfortunate that the ruling of this Court in the case of Justice Austria-Martinez was qualified as pro hac
vice. As discussed herein, this qualification could have been avoided and the result could have been just as
persuasive.
To recall, Justice Villarama cites the ruling in Austria-Martinez wherein the Court, taking cognizance of the special
circumstances of Justice Austria-Martinez, granted the magistrate's request to tack her earned leave credits to her
judicial service even though she had not reached the compulsory retirement age. Justice Villarama, an optional
retiree, also points to special circumstances that, according to him, justify a pro hac vice application of A.C. No.
58-2003.
The committee asserts that Justice Villarama may not benefit from the pro hac vice ruling in Austria-Martinez. As
the committee has pointed out, the said ruling does not in any way detract from the prevailing ruling that A.C. No.
58-2003 applies only to those who retire compulsorily, nor should it be considered as an exception to nor a
departure from it.
Concededly, the Court had, in not a few occasions, disposed of a matter before it on a pro hac vice basis.
From a survey of these cases, we have invariably imputed to the term pro hac vice the meaning of "for this one
particular occasion." 14 We have also said that a ruling expressly qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a
precedent to govern other cases.15
Yet, a pro hac vice ruling in favor of Justice Villarama in this case is decidedly pointless. As has already been
presented, justices and judges who retire optionally are also entitled to the benefit of tacking their earned leave
credits to their judicial service in order to increase the longevity pay due them.
To reiterate, the idea that the tacking of leave credits, as authorized by A.C. No: 58-2003, is for compulsory
retirees only is erroneous. By consequence, the inference that A.C. No. 58-2003 may be applied to optional
retirees pro hac vice, proceeding as it does from a wrong premise, must be rejected. The application of A.C. No.
58-2003 to justices and judges who optionally retire need not be on pro hac vice basis but on due consideration of
the manifest intent of the law to make the longevity pay available to all types of retirees.
Thus, Justice Villarama’s earned leave credits should be included in the computation of his longevity pay upon his
optional retirement.
On the submission that the tacking
of leave credits to judicial service
has no legal basis
In essence, the committee proposes that when Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 states that the grant of longevity pay is
based on continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary, the law means actual service.
Unused but earned leave credits, according to the committee, refer to commutable terminal leave. Following the
prevailing treatment of terminal leave as excluded from "service," unused leave credits cannot therefore be tacked
to lengthen one's actual years of service.
Such view is not novel.
In Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement, 16 the question on whether the continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service contemplated by A.C. No. 58-2003 is "actual" or not was squarely raised. The
incident stemmed from the refusal by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release Justice
Bellosillo’s longevity pay, computed in accordance with A.C. No. 58-2003. It appeared that the DBM’s negative
response to the application of the subject circular was rooted in its view that Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129 covers
actual service only. Then Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Secretary Boncodin) of the DBM expressed her
observations on the tacking of leave credits in a letter, dated 6 May 2004, that was conveyed to the Court. To
Secretary Boncodin, unused leave credit is not actual service and, thus, cannot be tacked to the length of service
in computing longevity pay.
In no uncertain terms, the Court rejected the view of Secretary Boncodin. The Court emphasized that it had
already sufficiently settled its position on the matter in the resolution of Justice Bellosillo’s request. Accordingly,
A.C. No. 58-2003 explicitly dictates the tacking of earned leave credits.
On the payment of fractional
longevity pay
We uphold the computation of the longevity pay to include the fractional percentage of the unexpired five-year
period.
The position taken by the Committee against the payment of fractional longevity pay in favor of retired justices and
judges was also taken up in Re: Computation of Longevity Pay Upon Compulsory Retirement. Secretary Boncodin
also held the view that the payment of longevity pay is conditioned on the full expiration of the five-year period; it
cannot be granted before the expiration of the five-year period.
Such reasoning failed to convince us then; it fails to persuade us now.
We reiterate our reason for including any fraction of the five-year period in computing the longevity pay of retiring
Justices and Judges. When the Court approved A.C. No. 58-2003, it was with due consideration of Justice
Bellosillo’s observation that despite the predilection to extend one's service in the judiciary in order to complete
the five-year period, a retiring justice or judge is precluded from doing so because of the constitutional limitation to
his term of office. In line with the liberal approach, we adopted Justice Bellosillo's viewpoint which has since been
the norm.
We hasten to add that the fractional portion of the five-year period is actual service rendered, a fact that cannot be
reversed. It would be a mockery of the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws for government
personnel if such fractional portion is disregarded to the detriment of the retiring justice or judge. Going back to
the rationale behind the grant of longevity pay, it cannot be gainsaid that service during such fractional portion of
the five-year period is an eloquent manifestation as well of the justice's or judge’s loyalty to the judiciary as the
service rendered during the previously completed five-year periods.
Rounding off the
fractional period
We are fully aware that the fractional portion of the unexpired fiveyear period immediately preceding retirement is
the direct consequence of the tacking of leave credits to the judicial service of every retired justice or judge.
However, we also recognize that Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 was crafted in such a way as to grant a full 5%
adjustment of the longevity pay for every cycle of five years of judicial service. All attempts must be made in order
to realize the granting of a full 5% as adjustment in the computation of the longevity pay. Thus, in order to align
the tacking of leave credits under A.C. No. 58-2003 with the full 5% adjustment for every five-year expired period
specified in Section 42 of B.P. Big. 129, and in pursuance of our rule-making power under Section 10 of Rule XVI
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, 17 we deem it appropriate to consider a
fraction of at least two (2) years and six (6) months as one whole 5-year cycle. In this instance, the additional
percentage of monthly basic pay which is added to the monthly pension pay of a retired justice or judge as
longevity pay is always divisible by five (5).
For those whose service (inclusive of the tacked-in leave credits) during the unexpired 5-year period immediately
preceding retirement is below the threshold above, the adjustment of the computation of additional longevity pay
shall be an additional one percent (1% ) for every year of service in the judiciary.
Thus, in the case of Justice Villarama whose total judicial service is 28 years, 2 months, and 8 days, and whose
total leave credits (1,3 86 days) is equivalent to 5 years and 3 months, his judicial service for purposes of the
longevity pay is 33 years, 5 months and 8 days. The fraction of 3 years, 5 months and 8 days in the unexpired 5-
year period immediately preceding Justice Villarama's optional retirement is well above the aforestated threshold.
Thus, consistent with the foregoing formula, the longevity pay of Justice Villarama shall be thirty-five percent
(35%) of his basic monthly pay.
On Justice Villarama’s service
as bar examiner
The committee likewise recommended the denial of Justice Villarama’s request to count his service as bar
examiner part of his judicial service. It explains that A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC, the basis of Justice Villarama’s claim, is
inapplicable because while the subject resolution of the Court coyers service (as bar examiner) prior to one's
appointment to the judiciary, Justice Villarama was already a member of the judiciary when he served as such.
We agree.
Indeed, by the express terms of A.M. No. 08-12-7-SC relied upon by Justice Villarama, we quote:
Henceforth, services rendered by all Justices of the Supreme Court as Bar Examiners prior to their appointment to
the Judiciary shall be credited as part of their government service and be tacked in the computation of their
longevity pay upon compulsory or optional retirement.18
Clearly, this does not apply to Justice Villarama since he was already a member of the judiciary when he was
tasked to serve as bar examiner.
The reason for denying an incumbent member of the judiciary the inclusion of his or her service as bar examiner
in the computation of the longevity pay is simple. At the time of his or her appointment as bar examiner, an
incumbent justice or judge is already concurrently serving in the judiciary. The regular functions of the justice or
judge and the service performed as bar examiner cannot appropriately be considered as two separable and finite
judicial services if they supposedly coincide at the same time or period. It would be defying logic and sensible
reasoning if one is to be tacked to the other, in effect extending the length of judicial service, even if no
additional time was really spent in the performance of the service as bar examiner outside of the time or
period actually served as justice or judge. Not even the liberal approach in the treatment of retirement laws
could save the argument for tacking such service as bar examiner in favor of an incumbent justice or judge.

Thus, for purposes of computing longevity pay, we find no justifiable reason in tacking the service as bar examiner
to the judicial service of one who is already a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, Justice Villarama’s service as
bar examiner could not be credited in the computation of his longevity pay.

In sum, a justice or judge who retires optionally, just like Justice Villarama, is entitled to the tacking of leave
credits provided in A.C. No. 58- 2003 for .the purpose of computing the longevity pay as granted in Section 42 of
B.P. 129; likewise, a fraction of the unexpired five-year period immediately prior to retirement is with sufficient
basis. In the case of Justice Villarama, there remains a fraction of the 5-year period prior to his optional retirement
on 6 January 2016 which must correspondingly be counted in computing his longevity pay. Lastly, service as bar
examiner by a member of the judiciary is not to be factored in computing longevity pay.

It bears repeating that despite Justice Villarama’s plea for a pro hac vice ruling, what we have forged today
henceforth lays a precedent. Members of the judiciary who are similarly situated can find doctrinal value in this
decision.

WHEREFORE, the request of Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Court DIRECTS that Justice Martin S. Villarama be paid his longevity pay in accordance with Administrative
Circular No. 58-2003, that is, to include his unused and earned leave credits, subject to adjustment in accordance
with the "Rounding off the Fractional Period" portion of this resolution, but to exclude his service as Bar Examiner
in 2004.

The 12 January 2017 Memorandum of the Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits
is NOTED.

SO ORDERED.