Received: 13 February 2017 Accepted: 13 February 2017

DOI: 10.1111/faam.12122

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Transforming social sector auditing – they audited

more, but scrutinized less
Gustaf Kastberg Emma Ek Österberg

Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden

Correspondence
Gustaf Kastberg, Göteborgs universitet, Box 100,
40530, Göteborg Sweden.
Email: Gustaf.kastberg@spa.gu.se
Abstract
The legitimacy of audit technologies is inevitably linked to a knowl-
edge base. Even though it has been pointed out that the agreements
on how to measure and verify certain operations are only temporal,
empirical studies on change in audit are rare. This paper reports a
detailed empirical study of change in performance audit within social
services in Sweden. The paper complements previous research since
this paper is not about making new things auditable but about chal-
lenging existing technologies within a field. We observe how the new
‘sharp’ control-based model – realized through measures of priori-
tizing, focusing and standardizing – was related to new demands on
‘facts’ about the audit object. The effect was that many things in this
new situation became unauditable; they audited more, but actually
scrutinized less. The paper also contributes to existing literature on
the role of ‘sharp’ control-based audit in the social sector. With a
‘soft’ and ‘fuzzy’ object, as is often the case in many parts of the public
sector, it is difficult to produce hard, convincing evidence that holds
true in different settings.

KEYWORDS
performance auditing, social sector, transformation

1 INTRODUCTION

From a constructivist standpoint, Power (1996) notes that the undertaking of audits reflects a system of auditing
knowledge in which certain procedures and techniques are legitimate. This is not primarily because these procedures
and techniques ‘work’, he argues, but because they are accepted and perceived to ‘work’. Hence, common sense within
the audit system is a matter of negotiation. Building on such a constructivist reading of an auditing knowledge sys-
tem, several researchers have shed light on the negotiations taking place in order to make new things auditable, for
example, efficiency, government performance and quality (Radcliffe, 1997, 1999; Gendron, Cooper, & Townley, 2007;
Skærbæk, 2009). These studies have emphasized the spread of audit knowledge and the expansion of auditors’ juris-
diction. From Gendron et al. (2007) and Skærbæk (2009), we learn how (new) things are made auditable in practice
through a network of allies that promotes and anchors audit routines and procedures. We also learn that auditability is
not a property of the things being audited, but an agreement on how to measure, assess and verify certain operations.

Financial Acc & Man. 2017;1–15. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/faam 

c 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1
2 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

As pointed out by Power (1996), such agreements are stable only temporarily. Over time, as new networks are created,
audit techniques will be contested and new routines and practices will emerge to maintain legitimacy.
That is what happened in the case described in this paper, which is about performance auditing within the social
services in Sweden. During the 1990s, audit in various forms was increasingly promoted within the public sector.
Within social services, a powerful performance audit was depicted as a key measure to overcoming various prob-
lems such as insufficient legal certainty, inequality and lack of quality. Several policy makers, including the Minis-
ter of Public Health, declared that performance audit was to be regarded as a ‘civic guarantee’ of the right to social
support. In parallel with the increasing interest in audit, the existing audit model within the sector was highly con-
tested and criticized. Social sector auditing was too weak and ineffective it was argued, and the demand for change
became increasingly evident as time went on. The quest for change was reflected in a series of actions that funda-
mentally changed the way in which audits were undertaken. The dialogue-oriented approach and evaluative tools
that had traditionally been used in social sector auditing (described in the debate as ‘soft auditing’) were gradually
replaced with a control-oriented approach that accentuated accountability and the use of sanctions (described in
the debate as ‘sharp auditing’). In this paper, we describe and analyze this process of change in detail and discuss its
consequences.
The case offers an opportunity to explore the relationship between programmatic ambitions and technological
change (Miller & Rose, 1990; Miller & Rose, 2008) within the audit field. In doing so, the paper further contributes
to previous research on how the auditing knowledge system works in practice (Power, 1996; Radcliffe, 1999; Gendron
et al., 2007; Robson, Humphrey, Khalifa, & Jones, 2007; Skærbæk, 2009; Morin, 2011). The case illustrates how the
realization of the new audit model significantly changed not only the way in which audits were undertaken in practice,
but also the way social services were made auditable. In fact, the realization of the new audit model had several unin-
tended consequences, one paradox being that the new audit model resulted in a situation where auditors, in contrast
to the high ambitions, covered and criticized even less!
There is a growing body of literature on the effects of performance auditing (Morin, 2008; van Loocke & Put, 2011;
Reichborn- Kjennerud, 2013; Morin, 2014; Raudla, Taro, Agu, & Douglas, 2015) and on the relationship between audit-
ing style (e.g. controlling or consultative) and its impact (Morin, 2003; Raudla et al., 2015). Our ambition is to add to
the ongoing discussion about why the audit turns out as it does (Jacobs, 1998; van Loocke & Put, 2011). Accordingly,
our overall aim is to explain and understand intended and unintended consequences of technological change within
the field of performance audit. More specifically, we examine the relationship between techniques that are legitimate
and perceived to work and the actual carrying out of audits. Our study complements previous research as we observe
a movement from a dialogue-oriented, consultative role for the auditors to a control-oriented audit style. The general
trend within the public sector (Pollitt, 1999) and the few field studies that report on a shift in existing audit practices
(Morin, 2003) have captured the opposite movement, from a distanced, control-oriented approach to a more catalytic
and consultative role for the auditors.
The findings of the paper contribute to the existing literature in two respects. First, we observe how the new sharp
audit model – realized through measures of prioritizing, focusing and standardizing – was related to new demands
on ‘facts’ and purified audit objects, which in practice made fewer dimensions of the social services auditable. The
expansion of audit regimes is not ‘inevitable’ (Jacobs, 1998), although in our case the auditing of less was more
of an unintended consequence. Second, the observations allow us to reflect on the role of control-based (‘sharp’)
auditing in the social sector. With an intangible – ‘fuzzy’ – audit object, as is the case in social services and in
many other parts of the public sector, it is difficult to produce convincing evidence that holds true in different
settings.
The paper is organized as follows. First, the theoretical approach and our perspective on legitimacy as a network
effect are presented and audit practices are discussed in relation to the things being audited. In the next section, the
research design and research method is described. Then, the paper illustrates how the program for performance audit
in social services in Sweden has changed during the last years, moving toward what is described as ‘sharp audit’. The
paper then analyzes the shift in the undertaking of audits. Finally, the major findings of the paper are summarized and
the conclusions are presented and discussed.
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 3

2 THEORETICAL APPROACH

In this section, we take as our point of departure the notion of an auditing knowledge system and discuss core concepts
within the constructivist research on auditing such as legitimacy and auditability. Following this line of research, audit
change is conceptualized as a process in which numerous actors do a great deal of work to question the existing audit
ideas and practices and make an impact for a new audit approach. Within research on organizational change the ‘travel
of ideas’ across time and space has been recognized by Czarniawska and Joerges (1996). The concept of translation
has been used within this line of research to analyze the process in which ideas are adopted and materialized in various
settings, underlining that people are active as they receive, interpret and handle ideas (Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005).
Using the concept of translation, it is also underlined that ideas, practices and objects change as they travel. When we
analyze audit change in this paper, we focus on the process of translation, in which the idea – manifested as a model of
sharp auditing – is interpreted and materialized in techniques and methods in local settings.
The analysis of this process of translation is informed by Actor-network theory (ANT). Although this theoretical per-
spective can hardly be described as a mainstream perspective, it is well established within accounting research (Baxter
& Chua, 2003; Mouritsen & Justesen, 2011). In relation to our aim, ANT is relevant because the theoretical perspective
urges us to scrutinize legitimacy and audit practices (Latour, 1986; Christensen & Skærbæk, 2007; Mouritsen, 2011)
and helps us address issues regarding the relationships between auditing, organizational processes, power and knowl-
edge (Hopwood, 1987; Humphrey, 2007).

2.1 The system of auditing knowledge as an institutionalized field

In the mainstream audit literature, the way in which auditors carry out audit in practice is primarily interpreted as an
operational issue, often analyzed with respect to audit effectiveness. Hence, change in audit is often appraised in terms
of aims to improve audit practice (e.g. Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; Flint, 1988). In contrast to this line of research, Power
(1996) suggests a constructivist reading of audit as a knowledge system, underlining the fact that concrete practices of
assessment and verification are made possible through, and accompanied by, practices of knowledge production and
negotiations. The system of auditing knowledge, as described by Power (1996), is to be understood as an institutional-
ized field – a field in which certain professionals are regarded as experts, certain techniques are accepted as common
sense and certain information is accepted as fact. This implies that legitimacy on an operational level is inevitably linked
to a knowledge base that underpins audit practices. What Power (1996) therefore suggests is an approach in which
the consensus that supports the system as a whole becomes the object of study. The main question, he argues, is not
whether techniques work or not, but how and why certain techniques are perceived to work. Read through the lens
of an auditing knowledge system, the answer to this question lies with agreements on an institutional level. Building
on such a constructivist reading of an auditing knowledge system, we argue that technology and knowledge must be
understood as related to each other; hence that the legitimacy of audit practice is a reflection of institutionalized ideas
on how audits are to be organized and conducted (see Robson et al., 2007).

2.2 Legitimacy as a network effect

Fields of knowledge – including the auditing knowledge system – may be more or less institutionalized, but they are by
no means stable or given by nature. Rather, common sense is the result of hard work producing knowledge. In the con-
text of audit, Power (1996) describes this knowledge production as a process including two main components: nego-
tiating audit knowledge and creating the environments in which this knowledge base is operable. Using this as a lens
to analyze how new things have been made auditable, several researchers have illustrated the intrinsic link between
successful claims to expertise and the anchoring of these claims in auditee organizations (e.g. Gendron et al., 2007;
Skærbæk, 2009). Thus, making new things auditable has been described as a project of expanding auditors’ jurisdic-
tion, giving them the role as experts within new domains. It has also been demonstrated (e.g. by Gendron et al., 2007;
Skærbæk, 2009; Morin, 2011) that auditors are heavily involved in implementing auditable arrangements, such as
4 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

performance measurement systems, in auditee organizations. That auditors participate in the creation of auditable
environments is vital to the functioning of the auditing knowledge system. However, combining the roles of indepen-
dent controller and change agent is not without problems. The credibility of auditors as professionals is traditionally
based on independence and objectivity and these ideals imbue the way audits are carried out, as pointed out by Pent-
land (1993). Researchers such as Morin (2003, 2011) and Skærbæk (2009) display how auditors in practice navigate
between, often conflicting, roles and how they act to maintain credibility. These researches contribute significantly to
the knowledge about the changing roles of auditors within ‘audit societies’ (Power, 1997) where auditors tend to act as
both modernizers and controllers.
The quality of audit products is difficult to define. That is why the quality of the audit process is even more impor-
tant to display (Pentland, 1994; Power, 2003). Detailed empirical studies (e.g. Radcliffe, 1999; Gendron et al., 2007;
Skӕrbӕk & Thorbjørnsen, 2007; Skærbæk, 2009) demonstrate that the technologies that enable assessment and ver-
ification become legitimate due to hard work by numerous actors supporting and realizing certain audit ideas. Even
though this work is comprehensive, it is not visible from the outside and this is why technologies seem natural, obvious
and neutral (Callon, 1986; Mouritsen, 2011). We learn from ANT researchers that stability is a result of a successful
network, but also that such networks, being only temporarily stable, may be threatened (Latour, 1986; Callon, 1986).
This is why it is essential within ANT to trace actors and actions taken over a longer period of time. Important questions
for the analysis in this paper are by whom and for which reasons the change of audit within social services was driven.
To answer these kinds of questions, we find it necessary to apply a longitudinal approach and to account for the process
from the questioning of the existing order to the formulation and implementation of the new audit model.

2.3 Making things auditable

From a constructivist standpoint, the interrelatedness between ideas and practices are well documented by Power
(1996) and we take this perspective as point of our departure as we analyze the realization of the new sharp auditing
model within social services in Sweden. We add to the analysis another dimension, which is highlighted in the construc-
tivist audit literature, albeit less extensively, namely the objects at stake – the audit objects.
It is well known that audit demands auditable statements or arrangements – there has to be something for the
auditors to assess and verify. However, audit objects are not merely ‘out there’ waiting to be collected, nor are they in
themselves auditable, as underlined by Power (1996). Rather, operations are constructed as audit objects within audit
processes, within the context of an auditing knowledge system.
As already pointed out, auditability is achieved through the installment of systems that create measurable and com-
parable representations of performance (e.g. Skӕrbӕk & Thorbjørnsen, 2007). Auditors use these representations as
indicators as they define the operations being audited. In fact, the construction of audit objects has proven to be an
essential part of auditing, especially within performance audits where intangible phenomena such as performance,
quality and efficiency are at stake (Radcliffe, 1999). Pentland (1993) describes audit as a fact-building process in which
representations of phenomena become facts about these same phenomena. He argues that audit can be understood as
a process in which pure audit objects and assessments are produced for public consumption. In doing so, he points out
that something happens in audit processes that gives representations the character of facts – something that makes
these representations appear to be independent of the audit itself (Latour, 1986). In a similar manner, Lindeberg (2007)
uses Latour’s (1987) concept of ‘black boxes’ to emphasize that audit technologies hide how input becomes output, for
example, agreements on how things should be measured and represented. Even though black boxes such as facts are
the result of a process, they are perceived as stable and unproblematic (see also Latour & Woolgar, 1979, 1986). This is
also how audit procedures seem technically neutral.
Building on this, we assume in this paper that an activity – for example, social services – may be constructed as an
audit object in various ways and that this construction depends on the techniques and methods used and the social
context in which each audit takes place. Thus, we find it important to explore how changes in an auditing knowledge
system alter the way in which things (such as social services) are made auditable in practice. What representations of
social services are, within audits, given the character of facts and why? Latour (1987) discusses hard and soft facts,
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 5

arguing that this is a function of what happens to them in other hands, later on, which draws attention to the network
of allies supporting or objecting to facts or evidence.

2.4 Analyzing the transformation of social sector auditing

In line with the argument of Robson et al. (2007), we argue that audit change (on an operational level) is fruitful to study
since the mechanisms of the auditing knowledge system then become observable.
The conceptual framework discussed in this section highlights the interrelatedness between ideas, practices and
objects. It stresses the importance of paying attention to the consensus (resulting from a successful network) that sup-
ports the auditing knowledge system as a whole. Legitimacy on an operational level is inevitably linked to ideas on how
audits are to be performed, which in turn are linked to how things are made auditable in practice. It is this interrelated-
ness we wish to explore in the paper, by studying in detail a process of change within social sector auditing in Sweden.
The perspective helps us structure the analysis using three theoretically guided research questions:

1. Knowledge base and legitimacy: What is regarded as legitimate audit? What are the driving forces and who are the
actors in the network that stabilize the new audit model?
2. Techniques and fact-building: How does the undertaking of audits change, both with respect to techniques and with
respect to facts/evidence regarding the audit objects?

3. Which are the main implications (if any) – intended and unintended – of the changes?

The theoretical reasoning also has implications for carrying out the empirical study. A single case-study approach
is of course less suitable if the aim is to decide on causal relations and provide generalizations. However, in line with
the theoretical approach, this is not the ambition with an ANT-inspired approach. Instead, the aim is to give a detailed
account that allows us to identify new relations and dimensions of auditing and remain open to surprises (Mouritsen,
Mahama, & Chua, 2010).

3 EMPIRICAL SETTING AND MATERIAL

Social services is a generic term for public support to those in need. It includes measures directed toward elderly,
disabled, children and adults in need of support. Terms of eligibility for social services are regulated nationally,
although in Sweden municipal authorities bear the primary responsibility for the provision of social services. Swedish
municipalities are governed by the principle of municipal autonomy, meaning that municipal undertakings, includ-
ing social services, are financed through local taxation. It follows from the principle of municipal autonomy that the
local authorities enjoy a far-reaching freedom of discretion regarding policies, priorities and organizational choices
within their municipalities. Although it is the municipalities that fund the services, private or not for profit orga-
nizations may provide the services. This constitutes an elemental consideration with regard to auditing within the
social services, where much of the public debate has focused on the equal right to welfare services between various
municipalities.
The social services are audited in various ways. Within the scope of this paper, we focus on performance-oriented
auditing, which is governed by national regulations. Two legislative acts are of particular importance; the Social Secu-
rity Act (SoL), which regulates citizens’ rights to social benefits of general character, and the Act on Support and Ser-
vices for Disabled Persons (LSS), which specifically governs certain categories of disabled persons’ eligibility for social
support. Until 2010, auditing within these policy areas was carried out by the 21 Regional Boards (Länsstyrelserna).
The Regional Boards are national authorities that sort directly under the Swedish Government and their obligations
span a variety of tasks where auditing was but one. In 2010, the audit assignment within social services was trans-
ferred to another national authority, the National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW) (Socialstyrelsen) inter alia for
the purpose of advancing a uniform and effective state performance audit within these services. The NBHW has a long
tradition of performance-oriented auditing within the healthcare sector. Consequently, social sector auditing arrived in
6 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

an organizational context with an existing audit structure and an accumulated auditing experience. The organizational
reform involved several measures, some of which were of immense practical importance.
The empirical study stretches over several years: from before the re-organization to after the new principles for
auditing social services were established within the NBHW. The main source is interviews. All in all, the study is based
on 24 interviews. Four interviews were conducted in 2008 (prior to the re-organization) and 20 interviews were made
during 2010 and 2011. Twenty of the interviews were with auditors and the rest with superiors and coordinators.
The analysis also relies on a study of documents. There is an extensive documentation covering the events before the
change: evaluations, suggestions for change, preparatory documents and formal legislative decisions. In line with the
argument that different sources provide different angles, sometimes corroborating each other and sometimes contra-
dicting each other, we could see that carrying out an interview study as well as a document study gave a fuller picture.
Different interview guides were used during the interviews since they were adjusted to the specific circumstances.
The questions were broad and open-ended. The first question was, for example, ‘could you describe and reflect on the
development of the audit function in recent years?’ The interviews were transcribed and then analyzed with the assis-
tance of a software program. First, overall readings of the interviews resulted in thematic broad categories following
the main themes identified as relevant in the literature. Examples of themes are: who were the actors involved, what
were they pushing for, how could legitimacy be conceptualized, how were audits actually carried out and what were the
implications of the changes? The material was then divided into subcategories. Our empirical description was brought
back to the respondents who were given an opportunity to reflect upon it. At large, this resulted in a corroboration of
the material. The result is presented in the next section as a dense description of the case following the three themes
described in the previous theoretical section.

3.1 Presentation of the case study

In this section, we describe the empirical material. First, we illustrate the governing paradigms and the actors that drove
for change and we clarify the main ingredients in the ideas that were manifested in the model of ‘sharp audits’. Then,
we describe the operation of translating the model into audit practices. Finally, we describe intended and unintended
consequences and analyze the impact on the government’s ambition of creating a clear, efficient and strong state per-
formance audit.

3.1.1 Problematizing auditing within social services

In order to understand the reform of auditing within social services, one has to consider the intense public debate that
has taken place in Sweden within the auditing area in general during the last decade. Programmatic ambitions regarding
audit within social services – and critique leveled at the way audit was undertaken within this area – reflects a general
debate on the role of performance audit in the Swedish public sector. As in many other countries, policymakers’ atten-
tion to audit increased significantly in Sweden during the 1990s and there was an intensified debate on audit effective-
ness. In fact, several agencies and government investigations reported on severe problems associated with state per-
formance audit as such (1994/95:RR9; SOU, 1997, p. 57; Prop, 1997/98, p. 13; Statskontoret, 1998, p. 8). As described
in the public debate, the main problem was that state performance audit was an indistinct and inefficient policy instru-
ment. This problem was described as having three components. First, there were problems of conceptual character. It
was submitted that the notion of state performance auditing was unclear. Second, concerns were raised regarding the
prevalence of conflicting roles and mandates of various agencies; especially authorities with supplementary, advisory
tasks. It was submitted that the auditors’ independence was put at peril by their simultaneous capacities of auditors,
advisors and educators. Third, problems of implementation were reported. For instance, the Swedish Agency for Public
Management (Statskontoret) came to the conclusion that state performance auditing was not sufficiently prioritized
(Statskontoret, 1998, p. 8).
It was in the light of these considerations during the late 1990s that the Swedish government initiated an inves-
tigation with the aim of advancing the precision and efficiency of state performance auditing. The investigative
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 7

Commission on state performance auditing presented their findings in an interim report in 2002 (SOU, 2002, p. 14)
and in a final report in 2004 (SOU, 2004, p. 100). Both of these reports received ample attention in the public debate.
One of the Commission’s most significant recommendations was to tie audit more closely to control and regulation,
which also meant a reduction of the advisory functions. Within social services, this statement had a large impact on the
initiatives taken. It constituted an unequivocal paradigm in the sense that it was consistently enforced by influential
actors such as the responsible Minister. The NBHW was held to lie behind many of the underlying ideas, but also behind
parts of the criticisms directed toward the dialogue-based audit style that had been predominant within the Regional
Boards. The formulation of the new auditing discourse was also driven by (national-level) politicians who argued that
the improvement of state performance audits was essential to guarantee compliance with national legislation. From
their point of view it was obvious that providers of social services at a local level needed to be audited with increased
frequency and vigor. Moreover, the media was an important actor, as the new audit model had provided a new place
in the media for performance audits within social services. One auditor submitted, not without pride, that ‘there is not
one day’ when the NBHW does not figure in the media.

3.1.2 Introducing sharp audits

Based on the problematization of state performance audit in general, another investigative Commission presented the
following guidelines for auditing within social services (SOU, 2007, p. 82):
Auditing within the social services must be:

• Powerful (provided with sufficient resources and sanctions),

• Clear and precise (founded upon a solid and distinct regulatory ground in order to avoid conflicting roles),
• Less vulnerable (sufficient expertise and resources to cope with, e.g. temporary vacancies),
• Coordinated (organized together with audit within healthcare),
• Well structured (uniform and equitable enforcement: ‘the same techniques, methodologies and evaluation criteria’),
• Effective (clear priorities and professional implementation).

These guidelines, referred to in documents and by interviewees as ‘sharp audit’, laid the ground for the transforma-
tion of audits within the social services. Sharp audit was to be control oriented, underlining auditors’ independence and
capacity to use sanctions.
On a central level, three main initiatives were taken to concretize a model of sharp audits in line with the guidelines
above: safeguarding uniformity through re-organization, increasing central control through regulation and strength-
ening the legal dimension of auditing.
The first initiative was a way to meet the requirement of uniformity, which was a key term within the reform pro-
cess. As pointed out by the government, audits within social services were to be carried out to the same extent and
by similar methods across the country. In 2007, the government proposed a re-organization due to coordination prob-
lems between the Regional Boards that had been addressed by several actors, for example, the Swedish National Audit
Office:

[T]he current organization and design of the auditing of LSS does not meet the demands that ought to be placed
on welfare legislation. It is the view of the Swedish National Audit Office that the organization of the auditing
activities holds back the realization of an even-handed auditing. (RiR, 2007, p. 1)

The main argument was that the re-organization would support uniformity in auditing and hence support unifor-
mity in the implementation of policy objectives in social services throughout the country. Consequently, in 2010, the
audit duties within social services were transferred to the NBHW, and three-quarters of the performance auditors
previously employed at the Regional Boards were instead engaged by the NBHW and integrated with the healthcare
auditors.
The second initiative was increased central control. Within the NBHW there was a central unit, with the Director
General and his management, which was situated in Stockholm. Also, there were six regional units, each responsible
8 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

for audits within their geographic area. A common opinion among the auditors, especially the ones that came from the
Regional Boards, was that top-down management increased markedly during the reorganization. It was ‘a Stockholm
perspective’ that limited auditors´ maneuverability, they argued. It was primarily the Director General and his staff
whom the auditors referred to when the claimed that ‘everything was managed from Stockholm’. But politicians were
also anxious to control the priorities made. A highly debated key policy decision was launched in 2009 regarding ‘high-
frequency auditing’ of homes for disabled children, a political decision that was manifested in the legislation. High-
frequency auditing entailed a legal obligation to audit each and every home for disabled children twice a year. It was
also determined politically that one of these audit visits was to be pre-registered while the other was to be carried
out unannounced. In practice, the regional units within NBHW were to carry out 1,600 visits on 800 sites each year in
order to meet the requirements.
Using high-frequency auditing as an illustrative example, the auditors described a situation in which several deci-
sions were determined politically: the issues of what was to be audited (homes for disabled children), how often audit
was to take place (twice per year) and how audit visits were to be carried out (announced or unannounced). One audi-
tor portrayed the situation as one in which audits were ordered centrally, and then executed locally by auditors at
the regional units. Another auditor described his and his colleagues’ professional tasks as equivalent to the task of
‘go-fers’.
High-frequency auditing was controversial, and its impact on priorities within social sector auditing was addressed
at an early stage. One manager at the NBHW confessed to a newspaper that it was problematic to meet the require-
ments and stated that the high-frequency auditing had far-reaching consequences:

We are forced to limit our ambitions within other auditing areas such as healthcare, where we do not have any
obligation to carry out auditing a certain number of times per year. This is, of course, not good in any way. We will
communicate to the government our concerns regarding the problems resulting from the high frequency auditing.

The auditors framed the problem as having to do with their knowledge and experience no longer being considered
as a useful resource or being put to good use. For example, several auditors raised concerns about the prioritization
of homes for disabled children over homes for disabled adults. While homes for disabled children were audited reg-
ularly, homes for disabled adults were systematically neglected since neither time nor resources allowed auditors to
sufficiently cover both areas. One auditor stated that, due to the way in which priorities were made, providers of wel-
fare services for adults could more or less count on not being audited. The same went for other undertakings within
social services such as daily care and assistance. Consequently, auditors had to handle the paradox of conducting many
‘unnecessary’ visits while knowing that a lot of operations that needed to be audited were not audited at all. Of course
this was not the intended outcome from a political point of view.
Alongside the initiative for creating uniformity and increased central control, the third main initiative was to
strengthen the legal dimension of auditing. This was in line with a conceptual refinement expressed in the guidelines and
achieved by giving audit decisions and reports a clearer legal character. The formal opportunities to impose sanctions
were extended and there was an increased informal pressure within the authority to make use of the legal instruments.
The legal backing within the NBHW was also stressed: legal expertise was always available. Many of the respondents
emphasized the use of sanctions as a significant element in the new auditing model.
Strengthening the legal dimension went hand in hand with measures to distance the auditor from the auditees.
Dialogue-based strategies and tools to achieve compliance were abandoned, primarily in favor of an emphasis on the
audit report. Although some respondents stressed that the new orientation gave credibility to the auditing process,
several auditors argued that the new legal character of audit within social services was an undesirable development,
deeming the dialogue-oriented approach more successful.
One issue that was raised by the auditors was the advisory function. ‘We are no longer allowed to give advice’, one
auditor explained. Several auditors (albeit not all of them) were critical of the new arrangements that were recognized
as de lege lata. The criticism primarily referred to the question of how compliance in audited organizations was to be
achieved: if auditees do not understand why they are being criticized, then there is no point in criticizing them. Several
auditors stressed that a fruitful dialogue with auditees was essential. In fact, they underscored that counseling was
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 9

vital in order to make a difference and obtain de facto compliance. However, their arguments were not successful and
the dialogue-based tools were replaced by a set of newly instituted sanctions.

3.1.3 Increased standardization of the audit process

The ideas of creating a new audit model based on the guidelines provided by the government were translated in the
sharp audit model described above. It entailed the three initiatives taken – strengthened ties to the juridical system,
closer ties to the political system and increased centralized governance. It was a model in which audit processes and
audit results went from being a matter between two parties – the auditors and the auditees – to becoming a concern
for a larger network of actors (auditors, auditees, politicians, media, juridical system). When these new actors entered
the audit process, several new demands were raised on how audits were to be carried out and represented.
Within the NBHW, a process of standardization was initiated regarding how audits were to be carried out. As men-
tioned above, the high-frequency auditing entailed an obligation that one out of two audit visits be unannounced. Pre-
viously, such choices of method had been left at the discretion of the auditors. Also, templates and other standardized
methodological support were prepared centrally and increasingly put to use at the regional units. The standardization
aimed at securing a unified conduct of each audit and it was to a large degree a response to the critique of the Regional
Boards’ lack of uniformity.
The templates specified not only which areas were to be audited, but also which indicators should be observed in
specific auditing contexts. Thus, standardization was apparent in several parts of the process: At the planning stage,
standards stated what documents to ask for, whom to speak with and so forth; during the site visits, formulas stated
which questions to ask, and there were ready-made formulas to register answers directly on a laptop.
Also the writing of the reports was standardized, including assessments and decisions. According to the new guide-
lines on how to carry out audits within the NBHW, an audit report was supposed to be limited to a maximum of two to
three pages. To reach their quantitative goals, an audit report had to be produced in no more than four hours. Compared
to the way in which the auditors had previously worked within the Regional Boards, this constituted a fundamental
change.

3.1.4 The construction of audit objects

On an operational level, auditors within social services faced the challenge of making audit objects (social services)
comparable to the standards (the requirements of the legislation). The professional task was to interpret and opera-
tionalize the standards and to comprehend and account for the operations being audited. The Social Security Act is
an open-ended legislative framework and the challenge this poses in the context of audit had been discussed for a long
period of time. Also, the challenging task of getting a clear picture of the audited operations on-site had been discussed.
Several auditors emphasized that the ability to capture the important parts – the essence – of the audited operations
was a significant part of their competence as auditors, and that this work was hard to describe in detail. One of them
pointed out that their impressions of audit visits, for example, at homes for disabled children, were often based on a
‘gut feeling’ and that this feeling may be difficult to pin down:

Maybe you have to somehow make observations, and try to feel what things are like here. How does the staff
seem to be and how does the communication work between them? In that way, it’s more of a feeling.

The above-discussed challenges in principle had nothing to do with the new auditing model. However, the auditors
perceived the challenges as all the more serious, given the existence of new stakeholders and the way in which auditing
had been linked to various juridical tools. In practice, the strengthened legal dimension increased the requirements on
the ‘evidence’ used.
One strategy to provide a closer link between the open-ended legislative framework and the diverse operations
within social services was to delimit the auditing activities to particular branches of the organizations being audited.
Documentation and internal systems of quality and control became critical elements of the audit object, as these were
tangible aspects of the complex social services. Focusing on documentation and internal systems of control was also a
10 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

way to meet the demands on productivity (e.g. the high-frequency auditing). Implementation of such audits was, if noth-
ing else, at least rapid. Another advantage was that it was consistent with the quest for uniformity within social sector
auditing. Documents and systems undoubtedly provided more tangible and convincing evidence than ‘gut feelings’.
However, several respondents commented on the structural effects. There was an inherent risk, they submitted,
that the standardization and focus of the auditors was too detailed and that ‘reality’ was reduced to theoretical models:

So I think there has been a greater focus on what the templates should look like than on what we have actually
observed… Templates are good. But the templates cannot be governing; we cannot change what we have seen in
order to adapt it to the templates. I think that this is a clear example of the fact that a lot is being managed from
above. A lot of jurists think and act in terms of above management. But it is not entirely rooted in what we see
in our auditing activities. Things have to match. It is, indeed, useful to have people who know the legislation and
can interpret it. But it must be coherent.

One auditor explained that a long time ago social workers used to open the linen closet in homes where vulnerable
children were placed. This was how the social workers at that time assessed whether families were suitable. The auditor
who told this story thought that audits within social services were today as shallow as this: They ‘open linen closets’ and
then decide, based on what they see, if the entire operation is ok.
What the auditors pointed out was that many important parts of the undertakings were left out. These were parts
that were neither covered in the templates nor could they easily be described in two to three pages in such a convincing
way that they would hold for a juridical test. Taking the new demands on evidence into account, auditors became more
careful when criticizing. As they described, they often chose not to criticize, because they felt that the evidence was not
strong enough. They criticized only when the situations were ‘crystal clear’ – which from a strictly juridical perspective
was correct. However, the tools were blunt and several auditors argued that many deficient undertakings escaped crit-
icism in the audit reports. Since the auditors had lost their mandate to use dialogue-oriented strategies they felt that
the tools needed to exert influence and bring about change in practice were now lacking. In the previous audit model,
when the predominant strategies to promote compliance were dialogue oriented, crystal clear evidence was not that
central since various types of critique could be handled through discussion. This lack of tools – and the consequence
that the scope of the auditors’ work was limited – was perceived as a major drawback of the new audit model and it was
undoubtedly paradoxical relative to the aim of establishing a powerful performance audit within social services.

4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this section, we return to the themes identified in the theoretical section and address the three research questions.
Using the notion of an auditing knowledge system (Power, 1996) as a lens, we analyze the link between the establish-
ment of a network promoting ‘sharp audit’ and the technologies that came to be accepted and used in practice. Then, we
discuss the consequences of the new audit procedures for what was being audited in practice. The new audit approach
was launched as a way to strengthen the audit. But contrary to what was intended, we argue based on the analysis that
the new sharp audit model led to less things being audited.

4.1 An extended network and new demands for legitimacy

The transformation of audit technologies described in this paper reflects a change in the knowledge base that under-
pins audit practices. What we observe are several changes, described in policy documents, newspaper articles and
interviews, pointing in the same direction: toward a politically emphasized audit that underlines its juridical status
and tools. In the new ‘sharp’ audit model, the focus was on politically flavored decisions, which did not correspond
to the priorities made by auditors within the field. The realization of the new model involved and was commented on by
several actors: politicians as well as the NBHW and the media. This extended network in turn amplified the demands
on the way in which audits were undertaken.
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 11

Legitimacy in such a context rests heavily on written products, as these stakeholders act from a distance (Mouritsen,
2011). Hence, their demands had to be reflected in the audit reports, but also in the formalized techniques and stan-
dardized methodological support. Thus, the extended network with several stakeholders acting from a distance helps
explain why auditors’ localized knowledge – their ‘gut feeling’ – and the way in which they were able to use that knowl-
edge in practice, were deemed less valuable. What we observe is an auditing knowledge system that was destabilized,
as there was a mismatch between what was perceived as legitimate knowledge, on the one hand, and the technologies
used, on the other. Various measures taken in order to transform technologies constituted a way to restore stability. In
sum, we observe new or augmented demands regarding productivity, legal foundation, uniformity and priority, which
were to different degrees promoted by different parties.
The question of how ‘new’ things are made auditable in practice has been illustrated in previous research, for exam-
ple, by Skærbæk (2009), Gendron et al. (2007) and Radcliffe (1997, 1999). In these studies, auditors’ legitimacy is
strengthened through successful claims to expertise in new areas. As indicated in these studies, the expansion of audi-
tors’ jurisdiction requires several actors to be enrolled in a network promoting audits within new contexts. The case
described in this paper reflects the same types of stabilization processes albeit in the opposite direction. We observe
several new actors enrolled in the audit network, but in our case one of the most significant actors saw its influence
decrease, the auditors. As their knowledge base was being contested and they failed to uphold claims to expertise, it
became legitimate to increasingly regulate audit practice centrally. In fact, as will be discussed in the following section,
in the regulatory model that was put in place, uniformity and efficiency was undoubtedly linked to technologies that
restricted the auditors’ room for maneuver.

4.2 Techniques and fact-building

Here, we turn to the second research question and address the theme highlighted by Power (1996) regarding the
construction of auditable environments. Social services have been audited – and have consequently been regarded
as auditable – for decades. However, when the legitimacy of the auditors’ knowledge base was challenged, this also
reflected a questioning of social services, in themselves, as auditable. Not in the sense that audit was withdrawn from
the field, but in the sense that audit within the field had to be transformed.
When we examine the conduct of ‘sharp audit’, we can also elaborate on the relationship between the audit object
and the technologies that came to be accepted as legitimate. The empirical description reveals a process in which the
scope of audit, with respect to the operations that were being audited, was narrowed down. Based on the empirical
descriptions, we can categorize how sharp audit was operationalized through three main measures: prioritizing, focus-
ing and standardizing.
First, we observed centralized prioritizing concerning what to focus on, that is, decisions on what should be audited.
For example, homes for disabled children were politically important and sensitive, and hence a central audit area. The
lack of time and resources was detrimental to the auditors’ capacity to sufficiently cover both the priorities that were
set centrally and priorities based on their own professional judgment. The second significant measure taken in the real-
ization of sharp audit was focusing on certain aspects of the audited operations. Considerable attention was directed
toward documentation and internal systems of control, that is, operational aspects that are tangible. These systems
can be seen as auditable suborganizations (Power, 1996), which in our case reflected the juridical knowledge-base
that underpinned the narrow definition of ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’. Third, through a narrow focus, the audits were oper-
ationalized through the standardization of working procedures. The empirical material indicates an extensive use of
ready-made formulas and routines in the planning of audits, during the site visits and in the writing of audit reports.
Standardized templates facilitated uniformity and productivity and gave credibility to the auditing process.
What we see is an audit approach that responds to different demands in order to gain legitimacy. Auditing pro-
ceeded more rapidly and the function of legal expertise became prominent. Clarity on the one hand and productivity
on the other became crucial, which in turn was in coherence with the national guidelines that had been put in place.
Focusing audit on tangible aspects such as documentation and systems of internal control strengthened the evidence.
12 KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG

Also, the use of standardized templates gave credibility to the auditing process. The standardized and juridical charac-
ter of the audit report accommodated the demand for claims to be founded on solid grounds.

4.2.1 Main implications – intended and unintended

Many social service organizations were audited (not the least homes for disabled children), but the dimensions within
these organizations that auditors de facto came to audit were limited. In fact, dimensions that had earlier been audited
within the dialogue-oriented audit model, now escaped auditing, as these aspects were not tangible enough. We argue
that this can be explained by the shift in consensus within the auditing knowledge system concerning what was recog-
nized as ‘evidence’. Earlier, when the focus was more on dialogue, evidence was not so central since different aspects
could be handled through dialogue. But when the audit report had to hold true not only in the relation between the
auditor and the auditee, but also in a juridical sense with regard to the new opportunities to use legal sanctions, evi-
dence had to be based on ‘hard facts’ (Latour 1987). Only when a case was ‘crystal clear’ could the auditors use the
legal backing integrated in the new sharp audit model. This observation is important since it indicates the boundaries
of control-oriented performance audit within social services.
While it is underlined that making things auditable is an achievement that involves knowledge production and tech-
nologies, one might add, drawing from the case, that this also goes for the process of making things unauditable. Pro-
ducing evidence that counted as ‘hard facts’ was a major challenge for the auditors. Still, it was not only the quest
for ‘hard facts’ that caused a shift in what was regarded as auditable in the case described in this paper. The quest
for uniformity, productivity and effectiveness also drove the change toward the focus on documentation and systems
of control. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the NBHW produced, and made available on its home-
page, manuals for quality systems directed to organizations within social services. In previous research, these types
of auditable suborganizations have been used as an example of how the expansion of audit into new fields has been
accomplished (Power, 1997; Gendron et al., 2007). When examining intended and unintended consequences we illu-
minate the relationship between legitimacy, the conduct of audit and the construction of audit objects. The transfor-
mation of audit concerned both the way audits were to be carried out and what counted as evidence within audits.
This had far-reaching consequences for the undertaking of audits in practice but also for the construction of the audit
objects.

4.3 Contribution concretized

Here, we concretize the contribution of the study and elaborate on the two specified aims indicated in the ‘Introduc-
tion’. It has been argued that audit ideas and practices have spread and this expansion includes making new things
auditable (Power, 1996, 1997). Power (1996) suggests that this is accomplished through negotiation of the auditors’
knowledge base and through the creation of environments mirroring this knowledge base (i.e. making the auditee
deliver the output needed). Several researchers have pointed out that auditors act both as controllers or independent
auditors and as modernizers, consultants, catalysts or change agents (e.g. Skærbæk, 2009; Morin, 2011). Our study
does not alter these observations, but, since our case is about audit change rather than the introduction of audit into a
new field, we bring the reasoning a bit further.
In line with other studies, the control-oriented audit seems to easily gain legitimacy by different stakeholders
(Morin, 2003). We argue that what we observe is an audit that is transformed from a ‘matter of concern’ to a ‘mat-
ter of fact’ (Latour, 2005). The fuzziness of the more dialogue-based audit approach was not suitable in a situation with
a greater number of stakeholders: especially not when a case should also be able to withstand juridical scrutiny. This
link between audit technologies and legitimacy is in line with previous research (Power, 2003). We know from Gendron
et al. (2007) that auditors may import legitimacy, in our case most obviously from a juridical and political discourse.
What we add is that the character of the new audit model had consequences not only for the auditing activities,
but also for what was regarded as auditable, and hence audited. What counted as facts changed as the knowledge
base underpinning the assessments transformed. In fact, the things that counted as evidence were restricted, as audit
practice – and in particular audit results and reports – received much more public attention. The effect was that
KASTBERG AND EK ÖSTERBERG 13

several things in this new situation became unauditable. This observation is paradoxical in the light of the thesis on how
new things are made auditable (e.g. Power, 1996, 1997; Pentland, 2000); what we observe is therefore how auditors
audited more, but actually scrutinized less. Our observation therefore, at least to some extent, contests the idea that
greater publicity and recognition furthers change and compliance (Raudla et al., 2015). While this observation might
still hold true, we add that the scope of change and compliance will be limited since the sharp audit itself is more limited.
Our observations are therefore in line with the findings of others (Jacobs, 1998) who have argued that the depicted
expansion of audit regimes is not ‘inevitable’ – although in our case the auditing of less was more of an unintended
consequence.
A further contribution is a reflection on the role and functioning of ‘sharp audit’ in the social sector within the polit-
ical system. Our observations are also paradoxical in the light of the political aim of a more solid audit. Within audit
research, the discussion on various strategies to ensure compliance, and in particular the balance between indepen-
dence and business/consulting, is well documented (see Sikka & Willmott, 1995; Morin, 2003; Power, 2011). Although
our study does not provide evidence that a consultative approach is more effective than a control-based approach, the
results indicate several unintended consequences of a control-oriented, distant, approach within social services. With
a ‘soft’ and ‘fuzzy’ audit object, as is often the case in many parts of the public sector, it is difficult to produce hard,
convincing evidence that holds true in different settings. From the reasoning above, one might assume that this obser-
vation is not a coincidence or something exceptional. Instead, one might argue that this is an expected consequence of
the purifications that have to be made in order to produce sharp audits with an enlarged group of stakeholders.
We can see several interesting questions arise. One is how the sharp audit affects the auditees. Justesen and
Skærbæk (2010) underline the blame games and feelings of discomfort among auditees, and this effect would be inter-
esting to further investigate in connection to different audit practices and auditor roles. Another is whether there is
a difference between transformations of audit in the social sector and other sectors. A third question regards what
happens when the transformation goes in the other direction, from sharper to softer audit. The study also indicates
an important topic to research in greater detail; namely the transforming role of the auditor (Gendron et al., 2007;
Skærbæk, 2009; Morin, 2011) not only as a professional expanding his or her jurisdiction, but as a professional whose
maneuverability gets circumscribed as the public attention to audit processes and audit reporting is accentuated.

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How to cite this article: Kastberg G, Ek Österberg E. Transforming social sector auditing – they audited more,
but scrutinized less. Financial Acc & Man. 2017; 00: 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12122