I.
APPRENTICES AND LEARNERS
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES vs,
APRILITO SEBOLINO ET AL.
JANUARY 26, 2011
Complainants Sebolino et al. filed several
complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization,
underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money
claims against Atlanta Industries and its President and
Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan. The complaints
alleged that they had attained regular status as they
were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six
months from the start of a purported apprenticeship
agreement between them and the company. They
claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the
apprenticeship agreement expired.
In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the
workers were not entitled to regularization and to their
money claims because they were engaged as
apprentices under a government-approved
apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire
them as regular employees in the event vacancies for
regular positions occur in the section of the plant were
they had trained.
The LA dismissed the complaint with respect to
Dela Cruz, Magalang, Zano and Chiong (who executed
Pagtalikod at Pagwawalang Saysay), but found the
termination of the remaining complainants illegal.
Atlanta appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC modified the
decision of LA. Sebolino moved for a reconsideration,
but was denied by the NLRC. Sebolino sought relief to
the CA, who granted their petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sebelino et al. are
regular employees of Atlanta?
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that the CA
correctly ruled that Sebolino et al. were illegally
dismissed because 1.) They were already employees
when they were required to undergo apprenticeship and
2.) Apprenticeship agreements were invalid.
The fact that the complainants were already
rendering services to the company when they were
made to undergo apprenticeship renders the
apprenticeship agreement irrelevant. This reality is
highlighted by the CA finding that the respondents
occupied positions that are usually necessary and
desirable in Atlanta’s usual business or trade as
manufacturer of plastic building materials. The task
and nature of their employment characterized the
complainants as regular employees under the Labor
Code.
Even if we recognize the company’s need to
train its employees through apprenticeship , we can
only consider the first apprenticeship agreement for the
purpose. With the expiration of the first agreement and
the retention of the employees, Atlanta had, to all intents
and purposes, recognized the completion of their training
and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To
foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement
for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the
agreement, is a violation of the Labor Code’s
implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to
the employees.
CENTURY CANNING CORP. vs. CA
G.R. No. 152894, August 17, 2007
Ponente: Justice Antonio T. Carpio
On July 15, 1997, private respondent Gloria C. Palad
was hired by petitioner corporation as a fish cleaner.
Palad signed an Apprenticeship Agreement with
petitioner on July 17, 1997. On July 25, 1997,
petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program to
TESDA for approval. On September 26, 1997, TESDA
approved the apprenticeship program.
On November 15, 1997, a performance
evaluation was conducted and Palad got a low rating
since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100%
indicator. As a consequence, petitioner issued a
termination notice dated November 22, 1997 to Palad to
be effective at the close of business hours on November
28, 1997.
Palad filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and non-payment of pro-rated
13th month pay for the year 1997.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit but ordered the payment of last salary and
pro-rated 13th month pay.
On appeal, NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling but
modified the amount to be paid.
On appeal to the CA, the appellate court set
aside NLRC’s ruling. The court held that since the
apprenticeship agreement was not yet approved by
TESDA at the time it was entered into, the same was
not valid and binding and as such, Palad is considered
to be a regular employee. Also, the court ruled that Pala
was illegally dismissed because petitioner did not
comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Palad
was not an apprentice
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RULING: NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of
the CA. The court ruled that under the Labor Code, an
apprenticeship program should first be approved before
an apprentice may be hired, otherwise, the person hired
will be considered as a regular employee.
Prior approval by the TESDA of the proposed
apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non
before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly
entered into.
Since Palad cannot be considered as an
apprentice, she is deemed a regular employee for the job
of a fish cleaner is necessary in petitioner’s business as
a tuna and sardine’s factory.
II. WOMEN WORKERS
CLAUDINE ZIALCITA vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
February 20, 1997
Zialcita is a stewardess of PAl. She was fired
from work because she had gotten married. PAL argued
and cited its policy that stewardesses must be single.
The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a
stewardess shall automatically terminate employment.
Zialcita anchored on Article 136 (now 134) of
the Labor Code which states that: “It shall be unlawful
for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee
shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of her marriage.”
PAL on the other hand, sought refuge from
Article 132 (now 130) of the Labor Code which provides
that: “The Secretary of labor and Employment shall
establish standards that will ensure the safety and
health of women employee. In appropriate cases, he
shall, by regulations, require any employer to: To
determine appropriate minimum age and other standards
for retirement or termination in special occupations such
as those of flight attendants and the like.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Zialcita’s termination
was proper?
HELD: No. The termination was improper.
During the time Zialcita was terminated, no regulations
had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor to
implement Article 132 (now 130). Furthermore, even
assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already
issued such regulation and to the effect that
stewardesses should remain single, such would be in
violation of Article 136 (now 134) of the Labor Code.
Article 136’s protection is broader and more
powerful that the regulation provided under Article 132.
MARITES BERNARDO vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999
Ponente: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
FACTS: Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who
were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money
Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called ‘Employment Contract for
Handicapped Workers.
Subsequently, they are dismissed. Hence, the
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.Petitioners
maintain that they should be considered regular
employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. They further allege that their
contracts served merely to preclude the application of
Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits
that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and
should not in any way be considered as part of the
regular complement of the Bank.” Rather, they were
“special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled against
herein petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are deemed regular
employees
RULING: YES. The renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to
the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts
show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their
disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for
the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee
should be given the same terms and conditions of
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employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section
5 of the Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for
Employment.—No disabled person shall
be denied access to opportunities for
suitable employment. A qualified
disabled employee shall be subject to
the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances
as a qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified
disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna
Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied
persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual
Employment. — The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the
employer, x x x”
The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a
probationary employment, during which the bank
determined the employees’ fitness for the job. When the
bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-
month probationary period, the employees thereby
became regular employees.
OLYMPIA GUALBERTO vs. MARINDUQUE MINING &
INDUSTRIAL CORP.
FACTS: The company employed plaintiff Olympia
Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while she was still
single. She married Roberto, another employee
(electrical engineer) of the company, in 1972. The
company informed her that she was regarded to have
resigned her office, invoking the firm’s policy that
stipulated that female employees were regarded to
automatically terminate their employment the moment
they got married. Olympia filed a claim for
compensation.
The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim
for damages but also awarded exemplary damages, and
held, inter alia: ‘No employer may require female
applicants for jobs to enter into pre-employment
arrangements that they would be dismissed once they
get married and afterwards expect the Courts to sustain
such an agreement.’
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer may terminate an
employee by reason of marriage.
HELD: No. The Court made references to the Civil Code,
the Woman and Child Labor Act and the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines. In light of this the Court
further stated: ‘The agreement which the appellants
want this Court to sustain on appeal is an example of
discriminatory chauvinism. Acts which deny equal
employment opportunities to women because of their
sex are inherently odious and must be struck down.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH and TELEPHONE
COMPANY vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
GRACE DE GUZMAN
May 23, 1997
Petitioner hired private responden, Grace De
Guzman as Supernumerary Project Worker for a fixed
period of November 1990-April 1991 as a reliever for
one Tenorio who went on maternity leave. After the first
contract, she was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina Dizon who went on leave from
June 10 1991- July 01, 1991 and July 19, 1991-August
08, 1991.
September 0f 1991, Grace was again asked to
join as probationary employee for a period of 150 days.
She indicated in her job application form that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier. When petitioner learned about the
marriage, the company sent Grace a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in
the said memorandum was a reminder about the
company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was later on dismissed.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner illegally
dismissed Grace who had already gained the status of a
regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that
she had discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged concealment
of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services
of employee.
HELD: Article 136 (now 134) of the Labor Code,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
marriage of a female employee. Petitioner’s policy of not
accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record
discloses that private respondent’s ties with petitioner
were principally dissolved because of the company’s
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policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in the company and not merely because of
her supposed act of dishonesty.
STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs. RONALDO
D. SIMBOL
G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
Ponente: Justice Reynato S. Puno
Simbol and Comia were employed by petitioner.
Later on, both met co-employees and eventually got
married. Prior to the Marriage, the manager advised
that should the couples decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to the company policy
that if two employees got married, one of them should
resign. Pursuant to the policy, Simbol and Comia had
no other choice but to resign.
Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, constructive dismissal and payment of
separation pay and attorney’s fees. They claim that said
company policy is illegal and contrary to the
constitution and the Labor Code.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. On appeal, CA
reversed the ruling of NLRC, declaring the respondents
illegally dismissed and thereby granting the reliefs
prayed for. Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that
their actions were a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the policy is a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
RULING: NO. Such policy is not a valid exercise of
management prerogative and it is violative of the
constitution and the Labor Code. The company policy,
to be upheld must establish the requirement of
reasonableness. There must be a compelling business
necessity for which no alternative exists other than the
discriminatory practice.
According to the court, in order to justify a
bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must
prove that: (1) the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and (2) there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient.
The failure of the petitioner to prove their factual basis
in imposing the said policy cannot prejudice the
employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination
based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.
The employer cannot create policies based on
an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMENT-
PTGWO and PEDRO TECSON vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.
September 17, 2004
Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo as
medical representative. As stipulated in their contract,
employee is expected to inform management of any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity
with co-employee or employees of competing companies.
That if management perceives a conflict of interest or a
potential conflict between such relationship and the
employee’s employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a transfer to another department or
preparation for employment outside the company after
six months.
Tecson entered into a romantic relationship
with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals, a
competitor of respondent. Tecson married Bettsy
despite the constant reminder of his District Manager of
the conflict of interest. When Tecson failed to resolve
the conflicting issue, Respondent offered Tecson a
separation pay or to be transferred from Camarines to
Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales area to which Tecson
refused. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a petition to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
which affirmed respondent’s policy as valid. The Court
of Appeals affirmed NCMB’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether of not Respondent’s policy
against its employees marrying employees of the
competitor companies is valid, and whether or not said
policy violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
HELD: The prohibition against personal or
marital relationship with employees of a competitor
companies is reasonable because relationship of that
nature might compromise the interest of the company.
Respondent only aims to protect its interest against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access
to its secrets and procedures. Respondent possesses the
right to protect its economic interest. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also
entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of
fair play.
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The company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause. In the contractual provision and the
policy in its employee handbook, Respondent does not
impose an absolute prohibition against relationship
between its employees and those of competitor
companies. What the company merely seeks to avoid is
a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationship.
III. DOMESTIC WORKERS
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs.
ERLINDA CASTANEDA
November 20, 2006
Respondent Erlinda filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner Remington Industrial.
Erlinda alleged that she started working as company
cook with the salary of P4,000. That she worked for six
days a week starting as early as 6:00 am to 5:30 pm, or
even later, after most of the employees, if not all, had
left the company premises; that she continuously
worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously
prevented from reporting for work when Remington
transferred to a new site. Erlinda believed that her
dismissal was illegal because she was not given the
notices required by law.
Remington denied the charges against it. It
posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a
regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job
had nothing to do with the company’s business of
trading in construction or hardware materials. That
contrary to Erlinda’s allegation that she worked for 8
hours a day, Erlinda’s duty was merely to cook lunch
and merienda, that after chich her time was hers to
spend. Remington maintained that it did not exercise
any degree of control and/or supervision over Erlinda.
The LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that
Erlinda was a domestic helper. Upon appeal, the NLRC
reversed the LA’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Castaneds
is a regular employee of Remington?
HELD: YES. She is a regular employee. In Apex
Mining vs. NLRC, the court ruled that a house helper in
the staff house of an industrial company was a regular
employee of the said firm. In the present case, petitioner
itself admits in its position paper that respondent
worked at the company premises and her duty was to
cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and merienda.
Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s
work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr.
Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s
employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition
of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in
Apex Mining case. That she works within company
premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the
personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of
the existence of the petitioner’s right of Control over her
functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence
of er-rr relationship.
APEX MINING CORP. vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 94951, April 22, 1991
Ponente: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco
FACTS: Private respondent Sinclitica Candido was
employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on
May 18, 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff
house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the
beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However,
starting on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a
monthly basis.
On December 18, 1987, while she was
attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her
laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a
stone. As a result of the accident she was not able to
continue with her work. She was offered by her
supervisor P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job
but she refused and preferred to return to work.
However, petitioner did not allow her and dismissed her
on February 4, 1988.
On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a
request for assistance with the DOLE. The Labor Arbiter
assigned ruled that petitioner pay private respondent
her Salary Differential, Emergency Living Allowance,
13th Month Pay and Separation Pay amounting to a
total of P55,161.42.00.
On appeal, NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Is the private respondent a mere househelper or
domestic servant or a regular employee of petitioner.
RULING: Private respondent is a regular employee of
the petitioner. Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book III of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code as
amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant"
are defined as follows:
“(b) The term 'househelper' as used herein is
synonymous to the term 'domestic servant' and
shall refer to any person, whether male or
female, who renders services in and about the
employer's home and which services are usually
necessary or desirable for the maintenance and
enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to
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 the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family”

The criteria is the personal comfort and

enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of
said employer. While it may be true that the nature of
the work of a house helper, domestic servant or
laundrywoman in a home or in a company staff house
may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are
actually serving the family while in the latter case,
whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship
engaged in business or industry or any other
agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered
in the staff houses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are
employees of the company or employer in the business
concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.

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