Bedol vs COMELEC- Petitioner questions the probative value of the newspaper clippings published in the Philippine

Daily Inquirer on June 26, 2007 which showed a photo of him with a firearm tucked to his side and his supposed
exclusive interview. He claims that said newspaper clippings are mere hearsay, which are of no evidentiary value.

True, there were instances when the Court rejected newspaper articles as hearsay, when such articles are offered to
prove their contents without any other competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. However, in Estrada v.
Desierto, et al.,13 the Court held that not all hearsay evidence is inadmissible and how over time, exceptions to the
hearsay rule have emerged. Hearsay evidence may be admitted by the courts on grounds of "relevance,
trustworthiness and necessity."14 When certain facts are within judicial notice of the Court, newspaper accounts "only
buttressed these facts as facts."15

Another exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply;
hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact.

Lea Mer vs COMELEC- That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial,50 and that their testimonies
must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from which we quote:

"Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. –A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules."51

On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which respondent had offered as
evidence.52 Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered
hearsay.53

An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements." A report made by a person is
admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. 54 Independent of the truth or the falsity
of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. 55

In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only as part of the testimonies of
respondent’s witnesses. The referral to Cortez’s Report was in relation to Manlapig’s final Adjustment Report.
Evidently, it was the existence of the Survey Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.

People vs Pruna- The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the
personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its
credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the
credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-
examination.39If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those
facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.40

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is
deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed.41Moreover,
the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person
who made them.42lavvphil.net

In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The
appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner
of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as
hearsay evidence.
People vs Cabintoy- The Court is not persuaded. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the knife found at the
scene of the crime was not adequately proved to be owned by Celso Fernando. The testimony of Pfc. Salvador that in
the course of his investigation, three (3) butchers had identified the subject knife as frequently used by appellant
Fernando, is not sufficient to prove such ownership, such evidence being merely hearsay in nature.[15] Clearly, Pfc.
Salvador had no personal knowledge of the ownership or use by appellant Fernando of the subject knife. Not one of
Celso Fernando's three (3) fellow butchers who had allegedly identified the said knife as belonging to Fernando,
testified in court. Hence, Fernando was deprived of his right to confront his fellow butchers and to cross-examine
them for their truthfulness. The hearsay character of evidence commonly affects the intrinsic weight and credibility
of such evidence.

In the case of People vs. Damaso (212 SCRA 547 [1992]), the Court made the following pronouncements:

"It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should
not be misled into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence."

Marturillas vs People- Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying persons declaration made under the
consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case.[37]

Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death, are entitled to the highest
degree of credence and respect.[38] Persons aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in
their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations.[39] The dying declaration is given credence, on the premise
that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation.[40] Hence, not infrequently,
pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim.[41]

To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the
declarants death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily
without coercion or suggestions of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that
person been called upon to testify

True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law, however, does
not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.[44] The perception may be
established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that would
justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending death.[45] Even if the declarant did not make an
explicit statement of that realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death occurred shortly
afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
consciousness of being in a dying condition.

The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not preclude it from being admitted as part of
the res gestae, if the elements of both are present.[48]

Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime
immediately before, during, or after its commission.[49] These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
statement.[50] An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement,
any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an
opportunity for deliberation.[51]
 A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule,
when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.

Geraldo vs People- At all events, even if the victim’s dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify
the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance.

People vs Tabarnero- Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2
Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan who stabbed him. [52] While
Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, which provides:

Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at
least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the
statement of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents wounds,
or other relevant circumstances.

We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no person who knows of
his impending death would make a careless or false accusation. When a person is at the point of death, every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth.[54] It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his body already manifesting an
impending demise, would summon every remaining strength he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.

Parel vs Prudencio- SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true,
may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding they are
hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.[9]

The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioners father and had adequate knowledge with respect to
the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant
of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing
in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as
it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs.[10] A declaration against interest is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. [11] Notably, during Florentinos lifetime, from
1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked
such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of
evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latters will and held that the remedy of respondent
was to file an action for ejectment;[12] and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner
and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondents action should be
an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Cavile vs Litania-Hong- the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of the nature of an admission against a
persons proprietary interest.[27] As such, the same may be admitted as evidence against Castor and petitioner spouses,
his successors-in-interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence,
notwithstanding that they are hearsay, is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further, that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or
moral interest.

Heirs of Ulep vs Ducat- Exhibit 15 is a very solid piece of evidence in favor of respondents. It constitutes an admission against
interest made by Bernardo Ulep, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,[25] the Court elucidated
thus:

x x x Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no
man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that
the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.[26]

Bernardo Ulep's admission against his own interest is binding on his heirs, herein petitioners. It is now beyond cavil that petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest recognized respondents as the legal owner of the lot in dispute.

Napomuceno vs Ulep- The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

xxxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by
the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted
by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to
a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:

Manila, Aug. 7, 1999

I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount
of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15,
1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of
demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.

The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It
is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to
in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by
the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her
which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced.It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that
unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.

Trinidad vs CA- This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a marriage
has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage maybe proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification[20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all
records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered the
primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as
other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed
under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,
according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
People vs Cudal- That Camilo and Segundino were not eyewitnesses to the incident does not render their testimonies
inadmissible, for they may be considered part of the res gestae,[29] an exception to the hearsay rule. For the same to
be considered part of the res gestae, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.

The spontaneity of the utterance and its logical connection with the principal event, coupled with the fact that the
utterance was made while the declarant was still strong and subject to the stimulus of the nervous excitement of the
principal event, are deemed to preclude contrivance, deliberation, design or fabrication, and to give to the utterance
an inherent guaranty of trustworthiness.[31] The admissibility of such exclamation is based on experience that, under
certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a
spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock.
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,
the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.

The victims information to Camilo and Segundino as to the material facts was made immediately after the startling
incident occurred. It is as categorical as it is spontaneous and instinctive. It cannot be concluded that in a very short
span of time, taking into consideration the ripe age of the victim, his relationship to appellant, and the cruelty and
suffering which immediately preceded the confession, the victim had the opportunity to concoct the facts surrounding
the incident and its authorship. Besides, there appears to be no reason or motive on the part of the victim to point his
son as the culprit if such were not indeed the truth.

People vs Flores- The ride of res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify, provided that the testimony
of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.

In the instant case, the declarant, Sareño, testified and was cross-examined in court. Hence, there is no need to apply
the rule on res gestae.

Sareño categorically testified that he saw four persons emerging from the clump of banana plants; that two of them
were armed with short firearms; that he was shot by Tuason; that while in the act of escaping, he heard another shot
fired; and that, because of familiarity, proximity and the light coming from the fluorescent lamps lighting the gasoline
station, he was able to identify the assailants as Tuason, Flores, Nicolas, and Absalon.

Aznar vs Citybank- Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to entries
in the course of business, to support Exh. G. Said provision reads:

Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.

Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
 5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a
preponderance of evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it.[40]

In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which
caused its dishonor in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency
in Indonesia where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a blacklisted
card.

As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of
evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the hot list.[41]

Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by
Citibank and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states

Fullero vs People-

that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness,
therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because
he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. [57] This is
known as the hearsay rule.

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One
of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty
by a public officer.[58] In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence
regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and
testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and
trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions
in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty by a public officer.
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
 a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts;
b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; and
c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[44]

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public
officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have
taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has
the official custody of the document which he falsifies.

Valeroso vs People- The general is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his perception. Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being
hearsay. On this score, the certification from the firearm and explosives division is an exception to an exception rule
by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of Rules of Court.

In Africa v. Caltex,[79] we enumerated the following

Alvarez vs PICOP Resources-
requisites for the admission of entries in official records as an exception to the
hearsay rule: (1) the entries were made by a public officer or a private person in the
performance of a duty; (2) the performance of the duty is especially enjoined by
law; (3) the public officer or the private person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts stated by him, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.

The presentation of the records themselves would, therefore, have been

admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule even if the public officer/s who
prepared them was/were not presented in court, provided the above requisites
could be adequately proven. In the case at bar, however, neither the records nor the
persons who prepared them were presented in court. Thus, the above requisites
cannot be sufficiently proven. Also, since SFMS Evangelista merely testified based
on what those records contained, his testimony was hearsay evidence twice
removed, which was one step too many to be covered by the official-records
exception to the hearsay rule.
 The accused-appellants also point out that, since the chemist
People vs Quebral-

who examined the seized substance did not testify in court, the prosecution was
unable to establish the indispensable element of corpus delicti. But this claim is
unmeritorious. This Court has held that the non-presentation of the forensic
chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. [14] The corpus
delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. This means
that proof beyond doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[15]

Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory
analyst. In fact, this Court has ruled that the report of an official forensic chemist
regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
preparation. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court,
entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state.[16]Therefore, the report of Forensic Chemical
Officer Sta. Maria that the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez gave to her for
examination contained shabu is conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the
contrary. At any rate, as the CA pointed out, the defense agreed during trial to
dispense with the testimony of the chemist and stipulated on his findings.