Emergency Response Plans for Noble Bully II Drilling Rig

Noble Bully II HSE Case Document No: HSE-NB2-SCM-500
Revision: 1
CONTENTS
5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ....................................................................................... 2
5.1 Emergency Response Management ..................................................................................... 2
5.1.1 Emergency Response Philosophy ............................................................................... 2
5.1.2 Emergency Response Analysis ................................................................................... 2
5.1.3 Emergency Response Plan ........................................................................................ 3
5.2 Command and Communication ........................................................................................... 4
5.2.1 Command During Emergencies .................................................................................. 4
5.2.2 Emergency Response Facilities .................................................................................. 9
5.2.3 External Emergency Response Support ...................................................................... 9
5.2.4 Communications .................................................................................................... 10
5.3 Training for Emergencies ................................................................................................. 10
5.3.1 Emergency Response Training ................................................................................. 10
5.3.2 Drills and Exercises ................................................................................................ 11
5.3.3 HSE Inductions ...................................................................................................... 12
5.4 Temporary Refuge Assessment......................................................................................... 12
5.4.1 Temporary Refuge Concept and Description ............................................................. 12
5.4.2 Loss of Temporary Refuge Integrity ......................................................................... 23
5.5 Evacuation and Escape Equipment .................................................................................... 24
5.5.1 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis .................................................................. 24
5.5.2 Evacuation and Escape Systems .............................................................................. 24
5.5.3 Recovery to a Place of Safety .................................................................................. 27
5.6 References ..................................................................................................................... 29
Figures
Figure 5.1: Brazil Division - Emergency Response Scenarios ............................................................. 3
Figure 5.2: Noble Emergency Response Chain of Command ............................................................. 4
Figure 5.3: Offshore Emergency Planning Cycle ............................................................................... 5
Figure 5.4: Offshore Emergency Response Organization ................................................................... 6
Figure 5.5: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Key................................................................................... 13
Figure 5.6: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck Roof ................................................................... 14
Figure 5.7: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck .......................................................................... 15
Figure 5.8: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Navigation Bridge Deck....................................................... 16
Figure 5.9: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – C Deck .............................................................................. 17
Figure 5.10: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – D Deck ............................................................................ 18
Figure 5.11: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – A Deck ............................................................................ 19
Figure 5.12: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Forecastle Deck ............................................................... 20
Figure 5.13: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Main Deck ....................................................................... 20
Figure 5.14: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Upper Tween Deck ........................................................... 21
Figure 5.15: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Lower Tween Deck ........................................................... 22
Figure 5.16: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Double Bottom ................................................................. 22
Annexes
Annex 5A Emergency Response Details
Annex 5B Escape Route Plans
August 2011 Page 5.1 of 5.29

Revision: 1
5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The purpose of Part 5 of the HSE Case is to demonstrate that emergency response
arrangements have been systematically assessed and that suitable plans are in place to
respond to all foreseeable emergencies.
5.1 Emergency Response Management
5.1.1 Emergency Response Philosophy
Noble Drilling’s emergency response philosophy is clearly presented in the company’s Safety
Policy Manual (Ref. 5.1, HSE-NC-SPM-601). The policy includes the requirement that “all
installations and facilities will maintain written procedures and conduct drills to ensure effective
management and response to emergencies.”
In support of this philosophy, the company provides all the necessary equipment and resources
to ensure that any emergency offshore is dealt with in an efficient and professional manner, so
that the safety of personnel is not compromised in any way and to minimize the potential for
environmental pollution. At all times during any emergency the priorities for ensuring safety
and integrity are:
1. personnel
2. environment
3. equipment / asset
4. well
The philosophy of the Noble do Brasil Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2) is that:
 Clear lines of communication are established.
 There is a defined authoritative source for providing relevant information.
 Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined.
 All foreseeable emergency situations are identified and that procedures, drills and
exercises are in place for these.
 Personnel will be trained and competent to deal with emergencies.
The goals of emergency planning (Ref. 5.2) are to:
 provide advice and support to the on scene commander;
 act as liaison to emergency services and authorities;
 arrange provisions for evacuated personnel and transportation/accommodations if
necessary for next of kin;
 work in conjunction with the Client’s emergency response organization;
 maintain an accurate record of events; and
 deploy additional manpower and support to local shore base if required.
The Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2) applies at all times, to all personnel on board to
control incidents on the NB2 itself. It also applies to vessel moves when the NB2 is not under
contract.
5.1.2 Emergency Response Analysis
A comprehensive listing of all hazards is included within the Hazard Register (Annex 4C) with
major hazards shown in Annex 4B. The controls for all hazards are recorded within the Hazard
Register and the major hazards are considered in detail by bowtie analysis (Appendix A).
In addition, a Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (Ref. 5.5) has been undertaken (see
Section 5.5.1) and a bowtie analysis has been carried out to specifically address escape,
evacuation and rescue (see Part 4).
All hazardous scenarios are covered by emergency response plans and procedures, which are
described in the following sections.

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5.1.3 Emergency Response Plan

Emergency response plans for the Noble Bully II (NB2) are provided both onshore and offshore
and provide for response to HSE, security and pollution events (see Figure 5.1). Additional
interface/bridging documents are added where required e.g. for specific operations. All
Divisional Emergency Response Manuals are approved by the Area Manager.
Key documents are:
 Noble do Brasil Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2);
 Noble Bully II Operations Manual;
 Noble Bully II Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP); and
 Noble Bully II Station Bill.
Figure 5.1: Brazil Division - Emergency Response Scenarios
The Noble do Brasil Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2) includes descriptions of emergency
roles and responsibilities, actions to be taken by onshore and offshore emergency response
teams, call out procedures and contact details.
The NB2 Station Bill (Annex 5A) details the immediate responsibilities and actions to be
performed by all offshore personnel in an emergency situation and is posted in conspicuous
locations about the vessel. Unless otherwise instructed by PA announcements, in an
emergency scenario personnel report to their emergency muster locations (as detailed on the
Station Bill).
The principal muster points for non-essential personnel for all emergency scenarios noted
above are the lifeboat stations on each side of the accommodation block. It is however
recognized that there may be some situations where these location may be hazardous and
personnel will be instructed over the PA to muster at other locations e.g. inside the
accommodation or on the helideck. The decision will be made by the Person in Charge (PiC) on
a case by case basis, based on guidance in the Emergency Response Plan and the NB2
Operations Manual.

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Regular emergency response drills and exercises are held on board, involving all persons on
board, to allow them to be familiar with the emergency response plans and to ensure that the
plans are correct and reflect current operations.
A personnel muster list is maintained on board with a copy placed at the muster stations and
transmitted daily to the shore base office. The muster list is updated whenever any personnel
join or leave the NB2.
5.2 Command and Communication
5.2.1 Command During Emergencies
5.2.1.1 Client Oil Company
When the NB2 is under contract, the Client Oil Company normally assumes the lead role in
response to an emergency, and provides the following (unless otherwise stated in the drilling
contract):
 physical and immediate offshore response including assistance from other installations
and emergency services such as the Navy as needed;
 onshore support and communication with the NB2 as well as communication with
authorities such as the Navy, Emergency Medical Services, Police, and other appropriate
organizations; and
 support of personnel on the NB2 either directly or through the respective service
personnel’s company; and
 emergency medical transport to shore as detailed in the bridging/interface document.
If Noble Drilling is designated as the first responder in the event of an emergency, details are
outlined in the drilling contract with the Client. The Noble Emergency Response Team is
responsible for all communications with next-of-kin.
5.2.1.2 Onshore Organization
Within the Noble organization, onshore overall command of the emergency is by the Emergency
Response Manager (the Division Manager or Drilling Superintendent). The chain of command
for the onshore organization is shown in Figure 5.2 (from Ref. 5.2).
Figure 5.2: Noble Emergency Response Chain of Command

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Noble Drilling has adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as a reference standard for
emergency response management, which applies the following concepts
 Common terminology
 Modular organization
 Management by objectives
 Reliance on an incident action plan
 Manageable span of control
 Predestinated response facilities
 Resource management
 Integrated communications
 Chain of command
The planning cycle, meetings, briefings follow a predefined cycle and structure as detailed
below:
Figure 5.3: Offshore Emergency Planning Cycle
Onshore emergency duties are described in Ref. 5.2 and include:

Division Manager
 Assume management of the situation upon notification.
 Immediately advise Operations Executive, regardless of time of day.
 Ensure liaison with the client’s, agent and other Emergency Response Teams.
 Direct information flow to any outside interest groups or individuals.
 Prepare and preplan to recover from the emergency as soon as the situation allows.
 Ensure compliance with regulatory reporting requirements.
Duty Person Operations - Drilling Superintendent
 Assume management of the situation upon notification in absence of superiors.
 In case of isolated medical situation; advise HSEQ Duty Person immediately.
 Alert onshore Emergency Response Team members (members to alert others).
 Establish number of casualties if any, and integrity of rig and well.
 Inform operator’s onshore representative or designee.
 Check POB and verify latest version available at the office.
 Establish ID numbers as per POB of missing / injured persons.
 Assess number, ETA and location of personnel arriving ashore.
 Maintain written log of events, keep track of personnel movements.
 Check weather conditions and forecast.
 Assess status of the emergency, actions taken and further actions required.

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Authorities Interface - Marine Supervisor

 Contact and report to authorities as per regulatory requirements.
Onshore Medical Support Interface - HSEQ Representative
 Contact and report to authorities as per regulatory requirements.
 Isolated medevac; arrange pick up ashore and transit to hospital.
 Alert SOS International as appropriate (liaise with corporate office).
 Attend to patient in person / by designee; ensure next of kin advised.
 Report back to operations with details of hospital and consultation.
 Anticipate on maximum number of casualties arriving ashore.
 Alert onshore medical services, hospitals, ambulances and staff.
 Ensure bed space and medical support ready for receipt of casualties.
 Assign staff to receive personnel arriving ashore prior onward
 Contact and liaise with public emergency response services.
HR Logistics Interface (HR Representative)
 Anticipate on maximum number of personnel arriving ashore.
 Keep track of all personnel movements and allocate transportation.
 Identify area (outside base) to receive and cater next of kin / family.
Next of Kin Interface (HR Representative)
 Obtain next of kin details for Noble employees from HR files.
 Log all calls made.
 Only release authorized information.
5.2.1.3 Offshore Organization
The Person in Charge (PiC) responsible for managing response in an emergency situation
offshore is the Captain or authorized deputy. The PiC has final authority for implementing
appropriate emergency response procedures and maintaining proper rig operations. The
offshore organization is shown in Figure 5.4 and the chain of command between onshore and
offshore shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.4: Offshore Emergency Response Organization

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The duties of all offshore personnel in the event of an emergency are shown on the Station Bill
(Annex 5A), are documented in Ref. 5.2 and include:
Captain
 proceed to the Control Room or designated emergency response area and assume
command of the offshore response;
 manage the offshore emergency response and direct personnel to take action, including
deployment of emergency teams and organization of search parties;
 ascertain the nature and severity of the emergency;
 ensure the appropriate alarm / PA announcements have been made and, where
possible, personnel are all accounted for and in mustering areas;
 prepare initial emergency response measures;
 liaise with Fire Team coordinator, technical personnel and offshore Client
Representative;
 contact Drilling Superintendent and, after initial notification of situation, continue to
liaise with onshore organization;
 ensure that the Radio Operator has alerted the following:
- Navy / authorities
- stand-by vessel
- local air and marine traffic
- onshore Emergency Response Manager
- nearby installations
 alert neighboring / concurrent operations;
 monitor the emergency situation;
 ensure the necessary means of evacuation are available and initiate and co-ordinate
evacuation if necessary; and
 arrange appropriate medical support in conjunction with shore personnel.
Rig Manager
 assist Captain as required, deputize for Captain in his absence or if he is incapacitated;
and
 assume responsibility for the coordination of the Drilling department responses.
Assistant Rig Manager (On Duty)
 deputize for the Rig Manager in his absence or if he is incapacitated;
 proceed to rig floor, check in Rig Floor Team with Muster Co-coordinator;
 suspend drilling and secure well;
 when well is secure, direct members of Rig Floor Team to a suitable muster point;
 deploy emergency drill floor teams;
 fire fighting duties; and
 establish and maintain status communications with Rig Manager and off shift ARM.
Assistant Rig Manager (Off Duty)
 proceed to Emergency Response Room and assist with co-ordination of muster;
 assist Rig Manager;
 assist co-ordination of suspension of drilling and securing of well;
 establish and maintain communication with Rig Floor Team and onshore drilling
support; and
 ensure the events log and drilling incident log is maintained.
Drilling Supervisor (Client Representative)
 co-ordinate with Rig Manager on operational requirements;
 co-ordinate with Client’s onshore organization;

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 relay all information received from Client to PiC and inform him of any actions taken by
Client to assist;
 assist the PiC in evaluating the situation and provide all possible assistance to bring the
situation under control; and
 in the event of a well control incident, monitor the drilling response and provide
technical advice.
Safety Training Supervisor (STS)
 POB headcount and check PTW board;
 Fire Team coordinator; and
 H2S Responder.
Chief Mate and Chief Engineer
 perform duties as on scene commanders for deck (Chief Mate) and engine room (Chief
Engineer).
Radio Operator (On Duty)
 liaise with emergency authorities, other installations, helicopters in the immediate
vicinity, standby vessel or other vessels in the area;
 co-ordinate POB headcount and maintain events board;
 where appropriate, instruct supply vessel to stop pumping bulk cargoes and to await
further instructions;
 in response to:
- push button alarm activation
- verbal report of an incident
- fire or gas alarm
initiate one or more of the following:
- appropriate investigation
- general or toxic gas alarm
- PA announcement
 brief the PiC of the nature and location of the emergency upon his arrival at the
Emergency Response Room;
 monitor all control systems and update PiC on status; and
 confirm fire pumps are running.
Rig Medic
 report personnel details and status;
 consult with onshore duty doctor as necessary; and
 provide medical support.
Supply / Anchor Handling Vessel Master
 follow appropriate company emergency procedures detailed in bridging/interface
document.
Other
The Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2) and Station Bill also set out the responsibilities of:
 Fire Teams;
 Search and Rescue Team;
 Rig Floor Team;
 Technical Team;
 Catering Crew; and
 Personnel with no assigned duties.

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5.2.2 Emergency Response Facilities

Emergency response facilities and equipment are also described in Part 3 of this HSE Case.
Communications equipment is described in Section 5.2.4 below.
5.2.2.1 Onshore Emergency Facilities
Onshore emergency facilities are made available at the Noble do Brasil shorebase office for the
duration of the emergency. Information maintained here includes
 Latest POB per rig.
 Duty schedule names, roles and contact numbers.
 Contact numbers for Emergency Response Team members.
 Noble Emergency Response Plan.
 Client contact names, job titles and means of contact.
 Location of rigs.
 Bridging documents (as applicable).
Additional contact numbers are contained within the Divisional emergency response Plan (Ref
5.2). A duty rota containing contact details for the onshore emergency team is distributed to
rigs and shore base staff on a weekly basis.
Additionally, the Noble Emergency Response Command Centre (ERCC) is located at the
corporate offices in Sugarland, Texas, with an alternate Emergency Response Room at the
division office of Data 3 Corporation in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
5.2.2.2 Offshore Emergency Facilities
The Navigation Bridge is the designated Emergency Response Control Room.
As the main control center for the vessel, the Navigation Bridge provides a full suite of
communication, control and monitoring equipment supported through main and emergency
power sources. The Navigation Bridge is also the location of the main fire and gas detection
monitoring console (as described within Part 3 of this case), providing on line, real-time status
indication of the presence of any source of flame, smoke, heat or gas onboard the vessel.
As a dynamically position IMO Class 2 vessel the NB2 is designed with an enhanced level of
power, propulsion, and control system redundancy. The power generation plant can be
controlled from the Integrated Automated System (IAS) system console on the main Navigation
Bridge control suite.
In addition to the navigation, communication and control facilities, the Navigation Bridge is also
set up with full facilities for the administration and control of an emergency situation, in terms
of record logs, whiteboards and specific emergency procedures documentation, including:
 The Noble do Brasil Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2);
 The NB2 Operations Manual;
 The NB2 SOPEP;
 Noble/Client Emergency Response Bridging documents; and
 Current POB list.
Refer to Section 5.4.1 below for further description of facilities inside the accommodation block.
5.2.3 External Emergency Response Support
Typical external support may be requested from government authorities, coastal authorities,
spill response facilities, medical facilities, other rigs and vessels in the area. Where required,
such support is obtained using contact details maintained onboard, at the shore base and
within the Emergency Response Plan (Ref. 5.2). Logistics support and oil spill response is co-
ordinated by the Client oil company.
The Division Manager is responsible for ensuring that each rig has an up to date list of coastal
contacts for the area of operation.

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5.2.4 Communications
Communications systems are described in Part 3 of this HSE Case.
The ability for these systems to function as required during an emergency has been assessed
and it is concluded that the communications in place are adequate to manage all identified
potential emergencies. Emergency communications systems’ survivability is reviewed as part of
the bridging documentation for each specific drilling campaign.
Communications between the NB2 and shore base or other platforms and vessels is co-
ordinated by the Radio Operator under instruction from the Captain / Rig Manager. Extensive
direct, satellite-based voice communications form the first line of external communication in any
emergency. Radio communications during distress and emergency situations are in accordance
with Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) protocol.
In addition to the private satellite-based communication links, the following commercial systems
are available:
 HF/MF SSB radio;
 VHF radio;
 satellite radio/facsimile (InMarsat B);
 aeronautical radio;
 Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB);
 hand-held VHF and UHF radios and hand-held aeronautical radios; and
 hardwired emergency phone from Navigation Bridge to critical control centers.
5.3 Training for Emergencies
5.3.1 Emergency Response Training
The processes in place for ensuring individuals are competent to fulfil their role, including their
role in an emergency, are described in Part 2. Competency standards for each role are
presented in the Drilling Training and Development Manual (Ref. 5.4).
With respect to emergency response, all personnel should have received instruction in:
 combined fire fighting/survival;
 medical; and
 confined space rescue.
Emergency Response Team members receive additional offshore and shore-based emergency
training to enable them to fulfill their roles. Additional competencies are required as follows:
 Incident Command – Captain, Rig Manager, Assistant Rig Manager;
 First Responder - Assistant Rig Manager, STS;
 Fire fighting - minimum eight response team members; and
 Coxswain - minimum two response team members for each primary lifeboat.
All training is managed by the NB2 STS who is responsible for ensuring that all training is
maintained up to date.
Additionally there are sufficient personnel on board, trained and with adequate knowledge to
perform the following tasks:
 close all air ports, watertight doors, scuppers and sanitary or other discharges that lead
through the hull;
 shut down all fans and ventilation systems;
 operate relevant safety equipment;
 prepare all lifeboats and life rafts for launching and starting;
 extinguish fires;
 direct personnel to their appointed stations;

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 conduct search and rescue;

 shut down all engines and heat sources;
 start fire pumps, hydrants, foam equipment and CO2 system;
 stretcher loading and patient movement;
 power on and off the electrical system;
 operate the main and emergency ballast control panels;
 operate radio room and equipment;
 operate cranes; and
 operate BOP control panel and BOP remote panels.
Where helicopters are being used to transport personnel to/from the NB2, all personnel are
required to have completed helicopter escape training prior to being permitted to travel.
5.3.2 Drills and Exercises
It is the responsibility of the Rig Manager to ensure that emergency response drills and
exercises are being conducted (HSE-NC-SPM-601).
All NB2 emergency drills and exercises are coordinated and scheduled by the STS in conjunction
with the Rig Manager. The STS also schedules a post-drill meeting with Noble personnel
including the emergency teams as soon as possible after any drill to evaluate the effectiveness
of the drill and to identify potential improvements. All drills are recorded on the Emergency
Drill Report (SCF-EP-NC-01), see Annex 5A, and submitted monthly to the Division office.
If a drill must be cancelled because the rig activities pose a hazard to personnel, the STS
schedules the drill for a later date, or completes an Emergency Drill Exercise report indicating
the drill was cancelled and the reason for the cancellation.
Practice emergency exercises with the Client are coordinated by the Drilling Superintendent or
Division Manager.
The following emergency response drills are conducted at specific intervals:
At least weekly
 fire or abandon; and
 pit drill and blowout drill, for each crew conducted by the Driller and recorded in the
IADC Tour Report.
At least every 60 days:
 man overboard;
 environmental spill;
 search, rescue and mock injury drill;
 helicopter crash drills; and
 ballast control drill (including a manual stability calculation exercise).
At least annually:
 man down; and
 confined space rescue.
Additional drills to address specific risks, (i.e. shallow gas, H2S, well test) are conducted on a
periodic basis depending on operation / location.
The following support functions, where appropriate, are practiced as part of the exercise:
 mustering and evacuation;
 performing first aid;
 fire fighting;
 man overboard rescue;
 using breathing apparatus;
 coordinating with standby and emergency service vessels;

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 using emergency equipment;

 casualty handling; and
 onshore assistance.
5.3.3 HSE Inductions
The induction program for new personnel is described in Part 2 of this HSE Case. All personnel
arriving on or visiting the NB2 receive a New Arrival Orientation which covers emergency
procedures, alarm signals and muster locations. The orientation is based upon a fixed script
(SCF-COM-NC-03 - see Annex 5A) to ensure that nothing is omitted, and includes a physical
tour of the NB2 and a welcome orientation card (SCF-COM-NC-02 - see Annex 5A).
Where the NB2 is operating in a potential H2S area, the additional measures in place will also
be included within the induction process.
Prior to all helicopter travel to or from the NB2, a helicopter safety briefing is conducted to
ensure personnel are aware of the correct response in case of emergencies.
5.4 Temporary Refuge Assessment
5.4.1 Temporary Refuge Concept and Description
Although not formally designated as such, the accommodation of the NB2 provides the key
functions of a temporary refuge i.e. providing a protected command and control space and, if
required, a protected mustering area. However, personnel will muster at their designated
muster locations (as defined on the Station Bill – see Annex 5A), with non-essential personnel
proceeding to the lifeboat stations (rather than the accommodation) unless instructed
otherwise.
The accommodation area is described in Part 3 of this HSE Case. It can provide:
 safe refuge for a limited period (depending on the nature of the incident and
environmental conditions);
 a place from which to monitor and assess hazardous events;
 a place from which to organize a safe evacuation and access means of evacuation via
evacuation routes;
 command support (Navigation Bridge) including:
- monitoring equipment;
- communication equipment;
- emergency power and lighting; and
- alternate location for power plant control;
 life support - hospital and medical facilities; and
 expedient evacuation routes to a means of evacuation (helideck above and forward of
the accommodation; lifeboats located on either side of the accommodation).
The accommodation block is equipped with the following resources:
 protection from ingress of gas (being positively pressurized over the external
environment);
 full gas monitoring of the Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) and
automatic shutdown of HVAC in the event of gas detection;
 fire detection in every compartment; and
 emergency power supplies and lighting in the event of loss of power.
The accommodation module incorporates the following key support facilities:
 hospital;
 washrooms;
 Navigation Bridge and Communication Center; and
 galley.

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Inside the accommodation module, the Navigation Bridge, as the Emergency Response Control
Room, is equipped with the following control, monitoring, communication and alarm facilities:
 radio and telephone communications (see Section 5.2.4);
 Dynamic Positioning (DP) station keeping control;
 manual thrusters control system;
 integrated station keeping control and IAS system;
 alternate machinery control console;
 ballast control panel;
 fire and gas detection system console;
 radar facilities;
 hospital alarm;
 BOP Control Panel;
 PA system; and
 fire and gas alarms.
5.4.1.1 Passive Fire Protection
A rated walls and decks are capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame for a one
hour standard fire test. In addition, for A60/A15 rated partitions in the event of a fire, the
average temperature of the unexposed side of the bulkhead wall will not rise more than 140°C
above the original temperature within 60/15 minutes.
B rated partitions are capable of preventing the passage of flame for 30 minutes of a standard
fire test. In addition, for B15 rated partitions in the event of a fire, the average temperature of
the unexposed side of the wall will not rise more than 140°C above the original temperature
within 15 minutes.
The NB2 accommodation is designed with passive fire protection in accordance with the
international standards identified within the DNV Class requirements, the MODU Code 2005 and
within SOLAS 2004. The accommodation block has passive fire protection as shown in Figure
5.5 to Figure 5.16. Furthermore, the accommodation block has no aft facing windows on any
level below the Navigation Bridge deck, providing protection of the lower accommodation levels
from a drill floor event.
Figure 5.5: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Key

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Figure 5.6: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck Roof
The diagram above indicates A0 rated fire protection at the Top Deck Roof level for the
emergency equipment and machinery room which is adjacent to the helideck.

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Figure 5.7: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck
The Top Deck consists of an emergency generator room to accommodate the emergency diesel
generator set, emergency switchboard and emergency auxiliaries. The diagram above shows
the fire protection that covers electrical, store and machinery rooms.

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Figure 5.8: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Navigation Bridge Deck
The diagram above shows the fire protection at the Navigation Bridge area. The bridge deck is
rated to A60 insulated deck standard. The wheelhouse/DP Control, Captain’s office, instrument
and radio room bulkhead also have A60 rated fire protection to the adjoining common space.
The main bulkhead of the navigation bridge area, including the HVAC, elevator and staircase
area, is A0 rated. All office rooms, lavatory and pantry bulkhead adjoining common space are
rated to B0.

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Figure 5.9: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – C Deck
Within the C and D Deck accommodation area, the central staircase and utility ducts are
encased with an A0 bulkhead; the accommodation main bulkheads on port, starboard and
forward have also been provided with the same rated fire protection. The external bulkheads
for living rooms with adjoining common space are rated to B0. The boundary bulkhead at the
aft of the accommodation is rated to A60 fire protection.

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Figure 5.10: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – D Deck

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Figure 5.11: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – A Deck
The main bulkhead of A Deck accommodation areas that are exposed to and/or bounded by
machinery and equipment are insulated with A60 rated fire protection. All living rooms’
bulkheads adjacent to common space is rated B0. Within the A deck accommodation area, the
central staircase and utility ducts are encased with an A0 bulkhead. The boat deck as can be
seen on port and starboard side, is fully rated to A60.

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Figure 5.12: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Forecastle Deck
A similar arrangement to A deck exists on the Forecastle Deck, with A0 protection of the central
staircase and utility ducts. The aft mid section deck of the accommodation block is rated A60
because the galley is located right below this zone on the Main Deck.
Figure 5.13: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Main Deck
The galley area and the transverse bulkhead of the main deck accommodation block have A60
passive fire protection; the forward bulkhead for galley areas is rated to A30. Mess room,
freezers and lobby are rated the same as staircase and utility ducts with A0 protection.

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Figure 5.14: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Upper Tween Deck
The Upper Tween Deck level provides stores, sauna, changing room, gymnasium and toilets.
Both staircase bulkheads at aft port and starboard side are rated with A60 protection. The same
protection applies to the store at aft and the male and female sauna at the forward side of the
block. Within the accommodation area, the central staircase and utility ducts are encased with
an A0 bulkhead. The external bulkhead for the changing rooms, laundry room, drying store,
linen, bathroom and toilet is A0 rated and the internal bulkhead is rated to B0.
The Lower Tween Deck and Double Bottom have a similar arrangement of bulkhead standards
and containment of the central staircase.

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Figure 5.15: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Lower Tween Deck
Figure 5.16: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Double Bottom

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5.4.1.2 Protection Against Smoke and Gas Ingress

The Accommodation block is at the forward end of the vessel with maximum separation from
the drill floor and moonpool. The helideck is located above and forward of the accommodation
block and supports its functionality as a place of refuge. As a dynamically positioned vessel,
the NB2 will maintain a heading into the prevailing environment to maximize station-keeping
ability. It is therefore likely that, in the event of an emergency, the accommodation block and
helideck will be upwind of the drill floor and machinery spaces located aft.
Remotely operated fire dampers on the accommodation HVAC fresh air suction provide
protection against the ingress of smoke and gas. Damper closure can be initiated from a
control panel located in the Air Handling Unit Room portside of the Lower Tween Deck in the
accommodation. Dampers can also close automatically via a thermal trigger trip device (failsafe
spring return actuators coupled to a thermal trip device which operates to close the dampers if
the temperature inside the duct exceeds 72 deg C).
In addition, the accommodation, hull pump rooms and machinery spaces HVAC ducts are fitted
with gas detectors. The HVAC automatically shuts down on confirmed high gas (25% LEL) or
confirmed fire; the Drilling Control Room (DCR) HVAC also automatically shuts down if gas is
detected in the DCR air intake. The accommodation HVAC automatically shuts down on
detection of smoke at the intakes (Ref. 5.5).
5.4.2 Loss of Temporary Refuge Integrity
In common with all drilling rigs, all the major hazard events identified in Part 4 of this HSE Case
have the potential to affect the accommodation area and could impair the TR depending on the
magnitude of the event. The vessel layout, together with the passive fire protection and ability
to isolate the HVAC described above, mitigates the effect of drilling events such as fire or gas
release on the accommodation.
The NB2 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis (EERA) (see Section 5.5.1) evaluates the
potential for impairment of the Accommodation/TR as well as impairment of escape routes to
muster areas, the muster areas themselves and the means of evacuation or escape to sea.
5.4.2.1 Impairment of Muster Areas
The external muster areas at the lifeboats could suffer rapid impairment (Ref. 5.5) as a result
of:
 Surface and shallow gas blowouts, which may involve:
o direct flame impingement of support structures and/or
o high levels of thermal radiation
Thermal radiation impairment of life raft stations is also likely in the event of a blowout
(Ref. 5.5);
 Heat radiation and smoke from helifuel pool fires in either the helifuel storage or
refuelling skid (lifeboat station on the fwd port side of A-Deck potentially affected,
however duration of fire will be insignificant and insufficient to cause structural damage
given the provision of a fixed deluge system on the helifuel tote tank fire);
 Ship collision and / or loss of NB2 stability (potentially rendering lifeboat launch
impossible from one or either muster area);
 Toxic gas from sour gas blowout; and
 Helicopter crash (extent of impairment depends on location of helicopter impact, but
unlikely to simultaneously affect lifeboat stations on both sides of NB2).
5.4.2.2 Impairment of the Temporary Refuge
The accommodation could potentially be impaired after a period of time as a result of:
 blowout;
 helifuel fire;

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 fire in the accommodation (e.g. cellulosic fire, cooking oil fire, etc.);
 sour gas blowout; and
 helicopter crash (extent of impairment depends on location of helicopter impact with
the NB2); and
 gas release during well testing.
The accommodation design incorporates a number of features to prevent smoke and gas
ingress in the event of the above scenarios, including:
 high degree of fire rated compartmentation within the accommodation (see Section
5.4.1.1; and
 automatic fire dampers and HVAC shutdown on smoke and/or gas detection (see
Section 5.4.1.2.
5.5 Evacuation and Escape Equipment
All methods of evacuation are inherently hazardous. The overall object of securing the safety
of all individuals involved in an emergency may be compromised during an evacuation. This
must, therefore, be weighed against the hazards to which personnel may be exposed if they
remain onboard. During an emergency, the PiC may decide to initiate a full evacuation or a
partial evacuation.
Evacuation is the process of leaving the vessel using helicopters, life boats or life rafts i.e.
without direct entry into the sea. Escape is the process of leaving the vessel in the event of
part of, or all, means of evacuation failing. Under these circumstances, personnel on board
make their way to the sea by various means.
Evacuation, escape and lifesaving equipment on board the NB2 complies with the requirements
of the certifying authority, coastal authority, International Convention on the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) Regulations 1974 (2004) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code
for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code) (2001).
Details of the evacuation and escape equipment are also given in Part 3 of this HSE Case.
5.5.1 Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis
An Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis (EERA) has been performed for the NB2 (Ref. 5.5)
using the output from a rig-specific Fire and Explosion Analysis (FEA) (Ref. 5.6) to identify
events which may have the potential to impair the EER systems. The analysis examines the
systems and facilities available on the NB2 to provide escape from a place on the drillship
affected by an emergency and evaluates the measures for evacuation, escape to sea, rescue
and recovery of personnel.
The analysis concludes that, in general, effective arrangements are in place to ensure the
successful escape on the NB2 and subsequent evacuation, escape, rescue and recovery of
personnel can be achieved. Furthermore, if a drilling location-specific review is carried out prior
to commencement of operations, a good prospect of recovery can be achieved with respect to
major accident events that have the potential to cause the need for evacuation or escape from
the NB2 (Ref. 5.5).
The EERA recommends a number of modifications to EER provision which are itemized in Part 6
of this HSE Case.
5.5.2 Evacuation and Escape Systems
The primary muster areas for personnel are the forward lifeboat stations (port/starboard),
which are shielded from the drill floor by the accommodation structure. In the event of an
emergency, all non-essential personnel muster at their designation station, in preparation for
evacuation, unless directed to do otherwise.
In the event of impairment of either muster area, and depending on the nature of the incident,
secondary muster areas may include the mess room inside the accommodation at main deck
level or the helideck on top of the accommodation (as directed by the PiC via the PA system).

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5.5.2.1 Escape / Egress Routes

Escape/egress routes are provided to/from all areas to the living quarters and lifeboat stations
(see Annex 5B). These routes are clearly marked and provided with emergency lighting
powered by the emergency generator with UPS battery back up. In addition, all escape routes
are marked with luminous markers.
For all normally manned areas, there are usually two independent means of escape, with an
emergency escape system also provided from the monkey board to the drill floor.
Regular drills and post-drill evaluation meetings (see Section 5.3) are held to ensure that
escape and mustering times are acceptable.
5.5.2.2 Life Saving Appliances
Life jackets are provided in each room, with additional stocks at the lifeboat stations. Whilst
working in Brazilian waters, water temperatures are such that survival suits are not required.
There are 20 life buoys located around the NB2.
5.5.2.3 Preferred Means of Evacuation (Helicopter)
Helicopters mobilized from the shore are the preferred means of evacuation in an emergency
on the NB2. The helideck is located above the Accommodation, forward of the living quarters,
with multiple access routes.
The aircraft operator, the type of helicopters used and their availability is location-specific and
defined in the client-specific bridging document and emergency response plans. Under the
Client’s contractor management process, the helicopters and the helicopter service provider
have to meet minimum expectations and supply the required support services to enable
evacuation. Noble has oversight of this in the bridging document process.
In addition, in an emergency, other nearby helicopters will also be used for evacuation e.g.
Navy, other commercial aircraft.
The NB2 Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) and the helideck team have received formal training
which includes dealing with helideck emergency scenarios. For all helicopter arrivals and
departures the helideck team is present, with the helideck fire fighting foam system ready for
operation and the HLO is in communication with the helicopter Captain to confirm:
 the nature of the incident;
 the drillship integrity; and
 the availability of the helideck, its safety equipment and assigned personnel.
During a developing hazardous scenario, if the helideck and aircraft are available, the PiC will
consider precautionary evacuation of non-essential personnel as early as possible. The time to
evacuate non-essential personnel depends on the flight time to a suitable safe location and the
size of the available helicopter(s). It is unlikely this course of action could be considered in the
event of a rapidly escalating incident.
Any down manning process would be carried out under the overall command of the PiC with
organization of the flight allocation carried out by helideck personnel. The last flight would
generally comprise essential personnel such as the Captain, Stability Technician, Rig Manager
and Assistant Rig Manager, etc. if the emergency situation could not be brought under control.
During an emergency, the decision on whether it is safe to land, or to continue to land, on the
vessel is made between the helicopter Captain and the HLO.
During an emergency, the situation may change such that the PiC decides to evacuate
personnel using a combination of helicopters and lifeboats, or to revert to lifeboats alone if the
aircraft or helideck are not available.
5.5.2.4 Primary Means of Evacuation (Lifeboat)
If helicopter evacuation is not possible, the next method of evacuation is by lifeboats launched
via a Norsafe LH luffing davit specially designed for safe and efficient launch and retrieval.

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There are four 80 person, Norsafe Totally Enclosed Motorized Survival Craft (TEMPSC) located
forward, two on each side of the Accommodation block.
Evacuation by TEMPSC carries its own risks due to environmental conditions, sea state, lifting
and launching operations and personnel contained in an enclosed space, and as such the PiC
must at all times consider the associated risks of using the TEMPSC against the other possible
means of evacuation - helicopter or life rafts.
The TEMPSCs are propelled by a NLDE-3 type diesel engine (based on a 380J-3); the engine is
installed in a watertight and fire retardant compartment under the helmsman’s position and has
an easy access hatch. The fuel tank has sufficient capacity for the engine to run the fully
loaded boat at 6 knots for a minimum of 24 hours. The engine is able to run for 5 minutes in
the boat’s permanent suspension position. Two independent batteries are provided for the
engine starting system, and the gear box enables the boat to be driven both ahead and astern.
The lifeboats meet SOLAS requirements and as such are approved by classification society and
flag-state. The lifeboat hull, superstructure, hatches, buoyant tanks, steering nozzles, water
and provision containers are made of fire-retardant Glassfibre Reinforced Polyester (GRP). The
lifeboat is fitted with shock absorbing skate/fender to provide protection to the inboard side of
the craft during launching. The Lifeboat hull and superstructure are made of GRP and molded
into one unit. Together with the GRP structure, the design forms a double skin boat preventing
water from flooding if the outer hull should be destroyed.
The craft has two large watertight embarkation doors in the stern. Additional watertight
hatches are installed at the helmsman’s position and on the forward part of the canopy and
both side of the boat.
Normal access is through two large watertight embarkation doors in the side. Additional
watertight hatches are installed at the helmsman’s position and on the forward part of the
canopy on both sides of the boat. This ensures that the can be boarded rapidly.
The internal structure provides seating for up to the rated capacity of personnel and all seats
are equipped with safety belts according to regulations. The boat design includes watertight
food and water storage compartments, survival equipment in accordance with SOLAS and the
IMO Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code requirements, engine and breathing air, marine diesel
engine, bilge pump, fuel tank, lighting, magnetic compass, VHF marine radio system with
battery power and radar transponder, and instrumentation.
Launching is accomplished from inside the TEMPSC by pulling the winch release handle
mounted at the steering position. The TEMPSCs have ON/OFF TOR 8T hooks forward and aft,
controlled from the release handle and will release simultaneously when the craft is fully
waterborne. Emergency release of the hooks is possible, but the system is secured against
accidental release.
The superstructure, sides, all seats, the bow and the bottom have buoyant compartments willed
with polyurethane foam making the boat float upright even if flooded. The TEMPSCs are self-
righting, when intact and also when flooded, even when fully loaded.
The compressed air system installed has a sufficient capacity to provide air for the maximum
number of personnel and engine at full speed combustion for a minimum of 10 minutes, and to
establish an overpressure inside the boat to prevent ingress of toxic fumes or gas. Provisions
have been made to recharge the air system from the ship’s compressed air system. An
overpressure relief valve is mounted on the aft of the superstructure. The valve prevents the
cabin from becoming dangerously over-pressured when the emergency air system is in
operation. Natural ventilation is achieved via an automatic valve located on the aft of
superstructure. The valve will be above water in all heeling conditions (0-180 degrees). The
valve also prevents the cabin from becoming dangerously under-pressured while the engine is
running. The engine compartment air inlet is placed in an area of the cabin which is above the
water in flooded conditions at all angles of heel.
A water spray system is installed for fire protection and cooling of the external surfaces. The
spray system consists of an engine driven spray pump which takes seawater from the lowest

Revision: 1
possible location under the boat ensuring that no flammable liquid is drawn into the system.
The spray system provides water over the entire surface of the craft (80m3 per hour). In
addition, one portable fire extinguisher is installed inside the boat.
The boat has a hydraulic steering system, with a steering nozzle improving maneuverability
both astern and ahead; there is also an emergency steering. The helmsman’s position is in the
aft part of the boat having forward, backward and both port and starboard side views. The
helmsman operates hook release handle, engine controls and instruments, steering control,
compressed air system and all electrical equipment.
The boats are maintained in a constant state of readiness and the boats, winches and davits
are covered by the NB2’s maintenance management system, including a lifeboat engine
function test and thorough inspection. Any faults identified during inspection are rectified
immediately.
In accordance with Class and Flag state requirements, the lifeboat winches and davits were
load tested when installed and are also load tested after any modifications. They are also
inspected by an independent competent body. Lifeboat falls are visually inspected during
routine lowering of the boats for test runs and are also inspected by an independent competent
body. All lifting equipment documentation is located in the NB2 Lifting Equipment register.
In an emergency situation where evacuation by TEMPSC is required, delegated competent
personnel will make the boats ready immediately after mustering at the embarkation points and
prior to the remainder of the personnel assigned to that boat being given instructions to board.
The Coxswains are responsible for boarding and launching the TEMPSCs in an emergency.
In the event of ship abandonment, the TEMPSCs can be used to tow liferafts away from the
vessel.
5.5.2.5 Secondary Means of Evacuation (Liferafts)
Liferafts are only deployed to allow personnel to escape from the drillship if both the preferred
and primary means of evacuation have failed or are impaired. Escape by liferaft can be safe,
expedient and highly efficient provided all personnel follow the required procedures. Liferafts
can be used in most weather and sea conditions, except when a surface fire exists or when in
fast flowing ice.
On the NB2, this secondary means of evacuation comprises eight 40 person inflatable liferafts
located (Ref. 5.3):
 on the Poop Deck, two each on the port and starboard sides; and
 on the Forecastle Deck, two each on the port and starboard sides.
The liferafts are contained in GRP containers, with automatic hydrostatic release and are
equipped with food and rescue equipment.
5.5.2.6 Escape to Sea
Escape to sea is viewed as a last resort. The least favorable method of escape is direct entry
by jumping into the sea (from lowest entry point possible) and attempted entry to life rafts or
lifeboats from sea where available. Entry to the sea should be from the lee-side, if possible.
When in the sea, personnel should swim clear of the installation and attempt to group together
in a safe location prior to attempting entry into lifeboat, life rafts, standby vessel, etc.
Whilst working in Brazilian waters, water temperatures are such that survival suits are not
required, though the vessel does have a full complement of immersion suits available.
5.5.3 Recovery to a Place of Safety
The preferred means of recovering personnel to a place of safety is by direct helicopter
evacuation to shore. In the event that this is not possible and evacuation using TEMPSC or
liferafts, or escape directly to sea is required, whilst operating in Brazilian waters, recovery from
the sea is via Navy vessels, supply vessels or other shipping.

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Personnel can be recovered from the sea by:

 rescue vessel using scramble net or basket; and
 helicopter and transfer to a rescue vessel, adjacent facility or shore.
5.5.3.1 Fast Rescue Craft
The NB2 Fast Rescue Craft (Man Overboard Boat) can also be used to retrieve personnel from
the sea.
The NB2 is equipped with 1 x MAKO 655 Diesel jet Fast Rescue Boat. The boat is fitted with its
davit in the starboard forward side of the vessel at main deck level. It is designed and
manufactured according to latest SOLAS, Classification Society and National Authority
requirements.
The boat is fabricated from fire retardant GRP. The space between hull and inner liner is filled
with polyurethane buoyancy foam. If damaged below the waterline, the boat will float at a safe
level in fully flooded and loaded condition. It is self-bailing through two drainage outlets at the
stern.
Lifting is by a single point arrangement. An approved off load release hook, with connection
ring for davit hook, is installed on top of the reinforced console. The hook can only be opened
when there is no load on the fall and must be used together with the painter release hook on
the bow for safe launching of the boat.
The boat is equipped with a SOLAS approved inboard diesel engine and suitable water jet, and
has been designed to provide a protected and safe working environment for the crew with the
following features:
 Console with watertight instrument panel and controls for engine start-stop, steering
and maneuvering and electrical equipment;
 Individual seating for three persons, with pilot and co-pilot side by side;
 Equipment storage with watertight hatch;
 Manual bilge pump;
 On load painter release hook;
 Towing/mooring attachment mounted at each aft corner;
 Secure grab handles throughout the boat; and
 Spray hood to protect persons on deck.
 Electrical starter with two independent batteries;
 Freshwater engine cooling with heat exchanger to seawater cooling;
 Water jet with dry run capability, allowing the boat to run in the davit for a maximum of
5 minutes;
 Fuel tank located forward of the engine and filled through a fitting on the spray hood;
 Water jet protection frame fixed to the transom;
 Dual engine shut off system in case of capsize or driver being removed from his
position, provided by dead man switch and mercury switch;
 Engine air intake designed to prevent water ingress in case of capsize;
 Wet exhaust system, with outlet at the transom, which expels water from the seawater
engine cooling system;
 VHF radio communications; and
 Large watertight hatch on console giving maintenance access to the engine.
In the event that the boat capsizes, the engine is automatically shut off. The boat can be
returned to the upright position by 2 persons and a rear mounted arch is fitted to aid righting of
the boat.

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5.6 References
5.1 Noble Drilling, Safety Policy Manual, HSE-NC-SPM-100
5.2 Noble do Brasil, Emergency Response Plan, EP-NdB-ERP-001
5.3 Bully II Vessel Escape and Evacuation, Lifesaving Arrangement Plan, BU2-X-500-01
5.4 Noble Drilling, Training and Development Manual, OD-NC-TDM-01
5.5 Frontier Bully II Evacuation, Escape and Rescue Analysis, Worley Parsons, 402020-00090-
SR-REP-0003, Rev. C, May 2010.
5.6 Frontier Bully II Fire and Explosion Analysis, Worley Parsons, 00090-SR-REP-0001, Rev. C,
April 2010.

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Annex 5A
Emergency Response Details
Station Bill
Emergency Drill Report
Welcome Orientation Card
New Arrival Orientation Script
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WELCOME TO THE
NOBLE BULLY 12
NOBLE BULLY 12
PLEASE ASSIST US IN MAKING YOUR STAY ONBOARD
A SAFE ONE
The Rig Manager onboard is
The Captain onboard is
The Operating Company is
Operator Representative is
Your stateroom during your

stay will be
Your lifeboat station is

Lifeboat No.
Your alternate station is
While onboard please observe the following basic rules GENERAL ALARM The general alarm is a bell (horn). In high noise areas there is
also an alarm light.
1. No illegal drugs, alcohol, firearms or unauthorized knives allowed.
2. If you have with you, or are taking any medication, it must be listed FIRE ALARM The Fire alarm is an intermittent ringing of the General Alarm
with the Medic on a Noble Drug Authorization Form. followed by a PA announcement
3. No work boots are allowed in the quarters or gym. ABANDON RIG Continuous signal with the alarm bells (horn) and PA
4. All accidents, unsafe acts or conditions to personnel and or the announcement.
natural environment are to be immediately corrected and reported to
your Supervisor.
5. For your safety no rings necklaces or earrings are to be worn
outside the living quarters.
6. No smoking is allowed outside of the living quarters or while working CURRENT
inside the living quarters. OPERATING
7. Smoking is only allowed only in the designated smoking area CONDITIONS ARE
outside the Portside Accommodation.
8. Smokeless tobacco is not allowed in the galley or food preparation
areas.
9. Whenever outside the quarters, all personnel must wear non-
metallic hard hats, safety boots, safety glasses and work clothing in
good repair.
10. Work clothing must adequately cover the body.

11. Do not wear work clothes in the recreation rooms, gym or in bed.
12. Observe all safety warning signs.
13. Engine rooms, etc., are high noise areas so hearing protection must
be worn when working in or passing through them.
14. Wear the proper personal protective equipment when mixing mud or
handling other chemicals.
15. Dispose of wastes using the proper waste containers ensuring
adequate segregation.

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Annex 5B
Escape Route Plans
August 2011 Page 5B-1 of 5B-5

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HOLD 8 – Updated Escape Route Plans to be inserted
August 2011 Page 5B-2 of 5B-5

Emergency Response Plans for Noble Bully II Drilling Rig

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Noble Bully II HSE Case Document No: HSE-NB2-SCM-500

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5.1.3 Emergency Response Plan

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Onshore emergency duties are described in Ref. 5.2 and include:

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Authorities Interface - Marine Supervisor

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5.2.2 Emergency Response Facilities

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 conduct search and rescue;

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 using emergency equipment;

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Figure 5.6: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck Roof

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Figure 5.7: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Top Deck

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Figure 5.8: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Navigation Bridge Deck

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Figure 5.9: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – C Deck

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Figure 5.10: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – D Deck

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Figure 5.11: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – A Deck

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Figure 5.12: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Forecastle Deck

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Figure 5.14: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Upper Tween Deck

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Figure 5.15: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Lower Tween Deck

Figure 5.16: Noble Bully II Fire Rating – Double Bottom

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5.4.1.2 Protection Against Smoke and Gas Ingress

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5.5.2.1 Escape / Egress Routes

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Personnel can be recovered from the sea by:

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Emergency Response Details

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The Rig Manager onboard is

The Captain onboard is

The Operating Company is

Your stateroom during your

Your lifeboat station is

Your alternate station is

10. Work clothing must adequately cover the body.

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