Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 109131-33 October 3, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEONITO MACAGALING y ATILLANO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sancho F. Ferancullo for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

On July 19, 1991, two separate informations were filed against accused-appellant Leonito
Macagaling y Atillano for the crimes of murder and homicide and, on October 29, 1991, for an
additional charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition, which were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 1814, 1815 and 1834, respectively, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81,
Romblon, Romblon. 1

Assisted by counsel de parte, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos.
1814 and 1815 on August 28, 1991. 2 Likewise, appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in Criminal
Case
No. 1834 on May 28, 1992. 3 The three cases were thereafter consolidated and jointly tried under the
continuous trial system.

On September 14, 1992, the lower court rendered its decision on the aforesaid three indictments
with the following dispositions:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused LEONITO MACAGALING Y ATILLANO

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of:

1) Homicide under the Information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1814,
and sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from TEN (10) years and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties therefor. The accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of DENNIS
MACAGALING then following amounts:

a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and

b) P34,000.00 as actual damages

 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

2) Homicide under the information, dated July 19, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1815,
and sentences him to an indeterminate prison term of from EIGHT (8) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties therefor. The accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased
TEOTIMO FAMERONAG the following amounts:

a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;

b) P64,000.00 as actual damages; and

c) P350,000.00 by way of lost earnings

without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

3) Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition under the Information, dated

October 29, 1991, in Criminal Case No. 1834, and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs.

The .38 caliber revolver (Smith and Wesson original without serial number) (Exh. E);
the five (5) empty shells (Exhs. E-1 to E-5); and the live bullet (Exh. E-6) are
confiscated in favor of the government.

After the judgment has become final, the Clerk of Court is ordered to deliver and
deposit the foregoing Exhibits E, E-1 to E-6, inclusive, to the Provincial Director,
PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be
attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.

The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited
in his favor to its full extent and the penalties herein imposed shall be served
successively in accordance with Articles 29 and 70, respectively, of the Revised
Penal Code. 4

The prosecution's version of the incident, as culled from the testimony of its witnesses in open court,
is to the effect that in connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, a
coronation ball was held in the evening of May 2, 1991 at the public plaza. Present on said occasion,
among others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro, Concepcion, Romblon; Anita
Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling;
Pfc. Roque Fesalbon, investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of
Teotimo Fameronag.

At about 10:00 P.M., the aforesaid Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis
Macagaling, was watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling point
and then fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but wounded
Teotimo Fameronag on the right chest causing the latter to collapse in front of Dennis. Dennis, on
his part, tried to escape from Leonito by running away from the scene. 5

At this juncture, Anita saw that her son Dennis was running in a wobbly manner and she embraced
him to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his head, pulling the
latter away from his mother. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito," but the latter pointed
the gun at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down ("sumubasob") on the
cement floor. Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times successively on the neck, uttering
the expletive "Putang ina mo," and then tried to leave the vicinity. 6

At that very moment, Pfc. Roque Fesalbon was at the barangay tanod outpost near the plaza,
having been dispatched by his station commander to maintain peace and order there. Hearing a
gunshot, he immediately went out to investigate and, on his way, he saw Teotimo Fameronag fall
down on the floor of the plaza. He proceeded to the place of the incident and saw Dennis
Macagaling lying on the floor while Leonito Macagaling was holding a firearm. At that time, he had
with him his service pistol and he was also holding an M16 armalite rifle. Sensing that Leonito was
about to flee, he fired three warning shots to prevent him from doing so. Initially, Leonito refused to
hand over his gun but he later relented. Together with Pfc. Sofronio Fabregas, Fesalbon arrested
Leonito and took him to the latter's house which was near the scene of the incident. Fesalbon
inspected the gun which he had retrieved from Leonito and found five empty shells and one live
bullet. The serial number of the gun had been erased. 7

Meanwhile, Roger Lacambra, a stepson of Teotimo Fameronag and a member of a dance group,
also heard the gunshots. He noticed that people were screaming and scampering away from the
dance hall. Wanting to know the cause of the commotion, he went near the dance hall and saw
Fameronag staggering towards him. Fameronag fell down on the floor and asked for his help. With
the assistance of his co-dancers, he brought Fameronag to a hospital in Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro and, later, to the provincial hospital of Calapan where the latter expired.8

On the other hand, after talking to Leonito Macagaling in the latter's residence, Fesalbon decided to
go back to the crime scene to proceed with the investigation. He verified that Fameronag had one
gunshot would while Dennis was shot four times. He also found out that the motive of the killing
might have been Leonito's suspicion that Dennis was divulging information about the former's
participation in illegal fishing. It appears that Leonito was previously charged with illegal fishing but
the case was later dismissed. 9

According to Anita Macagaling, her family incurred funeral and burial expenses in the sum of
P15,000.00. For their trips to and from Corcuera, they spent P2,000.00 for herself and their
witnesses' transportation, aside from P19,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses. 10 On the other
hand, Concepcion Vda. de Fameronag, testified that she spent P40,000.00 for the burial and the wake of
her deceased husband, and incurred litigation, transportation and other incidental expenses in the sum of
P31,500.00. 11

As was to be anticipated, the defense had a different account of the incident. Rosauro Fabreag, Jr.
testified that between 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. of the same day, he saw Dennis Macagaling, together with
Nonoy Fabellon, Roger Lacambra and two others whose names he does not know, drinking in a
store near his house. Dennis asked him to join them and he accepted the invitation. While they were
drinking, Dennis showed him a gun tucked on his waist. At about 6:00 P.M., after having taken a
couple of drinks, he decided to leave the group which appeared to be very drunk at that time. 12

William Ferrancullo, a barangay tanod of Calabasahan and a relative of appellant, was also called to
testify for the defense. He averred that in the evening of May 2, 1991, he and
other barangay officials were assigned byBarangay Captain Feras to oversee the proceedings and
maintain peace and order at the plaza. At about 9:30 o'clock the evening, he was at the gate and
there he noticed a group of five apparently drunken men enter the dance hall. 13
Later, he decided to go to the barangay tanod outpost located a few meters from the gate. Abruptly,
he heard a gunshot coming from the direction where the intoxicated persons were seated. Rushing
towards that area to investigate, he met Teotimo Fameronag who appeared to have been shot. He
saw Fameronag fall to the floor and it was then that he noticed Dennis Macagaling holding a gun
and threatening to shoot anyone who would come near him. Frightened, he did not move from the
spot where he was standing. 14

While all these things were happening, appellant Leonito Macagaling claims that he was in his
residence at Calabasahan, getting ready to rest for the night. He was startled when he heard a
gunshot coming from the direction of the plaza. Still in his short pants and undershirt, he hurried to
the plaza and saw the group of Dennis Macagaling, Willy Ferrancullo, Willito Bruit, and Carlito
Macagaling. He approached them and when he was about two meters from the group, he became
aware of Dennis Macagaling who was intoxicated and holding a gun. Leonito asked Dennis to drop
the gun but the latter retorted, "Isa ka pa." Without warning, Dennis fired at him but missed. Leonito
dashed towards Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from him. A struggle for the firearm
ensued and they grappled for it on the floor. While they were thus wrestling for the gun, it went off
and hit Dennis. Leonito then stood up, went home, and informed his wife of what had just
happened. 15

Leonito's wife, after observing that he had some bruises, proceeded to clean them. Shortly
thereafter, policemen Roque Fesalbon and Sofronio Fabregas, together with Ferrancullo, arrived
and inquired if the gun was his. He denied ownership of the firearm. Informed by them that Dennis
was dead, Leonito said it was not his fault. The policemen then left. 16

Fesalbon, Fabregas and Ferrancullo thereafter went back to the crime scene and decided to bring
Fameronag, then still alive, to Pinamalayan for treatment. There being no doctor then available in
the barangay, the body of Dennis Macagaling was examined by a rural health midwife, Avemie F.
Fabroa, who submitted her medical findings. 17

Queried as to what might have motivated the deceased Dennis Macagaling to harbor any ill feelings
against him, Leonito recounted an incident that took place in October, 1990 when he slapped
Diomedes, the younger brother of Dennis Macagaling. It appears that Leonito and Diomedes had a
previous agreement that the latter would work in the former's fishing operations. Due to Diomedes'
commitment to work for him, Leonito advanced him some money but, much to his dismay, Diomedes
decided to join another group. Leonito waited for Diomedes along the shore to demand an
explanation. An argument ensued and Leonito slapped Diomedes when the latter cursed him.
Having learned of the slapping incident ten days later, Dennis confronted Leonito. There was a
heated exchange of words between them, with Dennis later warning him, "You watch out." 18

Seeking to discredit Pfc. Fesalbon's testimony, Leonito told the court that Fesalbon had reason to
hate him. He claimed that in 1976, due to an incident in a dance hall at Sampong, Calabasahan, he
filed an administrative case against Fesalbon, Luvizmindo Fabroa and Sofronio Fabregas before the
National Police Commission. In retaliation, Fesalbon filed a criminal case for less serious physical
injuries against him. However, both cases were dismissed after they decided to settle the matter
among themselves. 19 Appellant opined that
Pfc. Fesalbon continued to hold a grudge against him.

1. In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself. 20 As the burden of proof is shifted to him, he must
consequently rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.
Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing under such circumstances, is
whether or not the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support him claim of self-defense. 21

A careful analysis of appellant's version and a thorough evaluation of the evidence presented by the
parties fail to persuade this Court to rule in appellant's favor.

For one, Leonito's version of the incident appears to be too good to be true. Leonito was confronted
by an armed Dennis Macagaling who apparently was prepared to shoot him. In addition, he and
Dennis did not exactly part as good friends when they last saw each other. In fact, the latter had
threatened him to "watch out." Despite all these, Leonito is supposed to have nonchalantly directed
Dennis to hand over his gun. Not heeding his order, Dennis fired at him, whereupon Leonito
heroically rushed towards Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away from him, seemingly
unconcerned for his safety. And then, after Dennis was shot "accidentally" while they were wrestling
for the gun, Leonito just calmly got up and went home, as if nothing had happened.

If, as Leonito asserted, he had tried to get Dennis to hand over the gun because he was even
concerned that an innocent bystander might be hurt, it baffles the Court why he did not immediately
rush his own nephew Dennis to the hospital for medical care and attention when the latter was shot.
It is a most unusual reaction for one who had accidentally shot another to just leave the vicinity with
the victim unattended to or without even making arrangements for his care. Furthermore, as will
hereafter be discussed, the number of wounds sustained by the victim completely demolishes this
theory of accidental shooting.

Principal defense witness William Ferrancullo, who was presented in court obviously to corroborate
the version of appellant, miserably failed to do so. He is one witness the defense could have done
without, for this star witness could not seem to get his story straight, conveniently changing his
testimony to suit his purpose at the particular moment, without taking into consideration the
statements he had previously made, some instances of which we shall illustrate.

For example, Ferrancullo earlier testified that when he was asked by

Pfc. Roque Fesalbon as to who started the trouble, he pointed to Leonito Macagaling as the
culprit. 22 Later, however, he insisted that he did not inform the policemen as to what he knew, giving the
flimsy reason that "there was no chance for us to talk." 23 How he could justify that excuse is beyond
comprehension since he himself asserted that he was all the while with the policemen when they went to
appellant's residence after the shooting and he also tagged along when they went back to the scene of
the crime where they conducted further investigations.

Evidently, Ferrancullo had definite knowledge that Leonito was a suspect in these cases. His
statements, however, would show that he does not have the uncanny knack for lying and getting
away with it. In an earlier testimony, he said it was only on July 2 or 5, 1992, when so informed by
the wife of Leonito, that he came to know that Leonito was a suspect in the cases. 24 Yet, he
subsequently admitted that as early as June, 1992, he had visited Leonito at
the provincial jail where the latter was detained because of the killings in question. 25

The trial court, posing clarificatory questions, asked Ferrancullo about the persons to whom he had
confided what he knew about the case. He said he first narrated the incident to his mother who lives
in the mountains of San Pedro on the morning of May 3, 1991. 26 Pressed further by the court, he
amended that by saying that he had informed his wife thereof after he left the dance hall of that fateful
night. He also told Atty. Ferrancullo about the incident in November, 1991 and, naturally, when he
testified in court. Asked if he told any other person, he said there was none. Later, he claimed that he also
told Leonito's wife. 27
The court, not satisfied with the answers it was getting from the witness, inquired why Ferrancullo,
being abarangay tanod, did not tell the barangay captain who had assigned him at the plaza as to
what he knew. This time, Ferrancullo suddenly recalled that, from Leonito's house, he did in fact go
to the barangay captain's house purposely to inform the latter of the incident. 28

Ferrancullo's propensity for prevarication is further demonstrated by his varying accounts as to the
wounds sustained by the victim. First, he asserted that while Leonito and Dennis were grappling for
the gun, he heard only two shots 29 which meant that Dennis could have sustained only two gunshot
wounds at the most. Thereafter, he said that he was sure that the victim sustained one shot on the head
and three on the neck, having been present when the photographs of the cadaver of Dennis was taken.
Later, he changed his mind, stating that the victim suffered only one wound on the neck and one of the
head. 30

This brings us to the matter of the number of wounds sustained by the victim, which physical
evidence is vital since it could lend credence to appellant's claim of self-defense. However, as earlier
stated, appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and negated precisely by
the number of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof. Appellant maintains that
while both he and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the same accidentally fired, hitting
the latter. If indeed the firing of the gun was merely accidental and it fired only once, it would be
impossible for Dennis to sustain four gunshot wounds, one in the temple and three in the
neck. 31 Furthermore, the number of wounds indicate that the act was no longer an act of self-defense but
a determined effort to kill the victim. 32 Such wounds are indicative of aggression and confirm the theory of
the prosecution that appellant assaulted the deceased. 33

Considering the grave contradictions in Ferrancullo's testimony on issues of serious importance, this
Court agrees with the court a quo which, after chronicling twelve instances undermining the
credibility of said witness, trenchantly concluded that "the principal witness of the defense, William
Ferrancullo, did not see the incident that evening or if he did, he narrated it differently." 34

In his brief, appellant makes an issue of the fact that although Antonieto Fabella categorically
testified in court that it was Leonito Macagaling who shot and killed Dennis Macagaling, he did not
mention their specific names in his affidavit. This argument is misleading and specious, to say the
least. A careful perusal of said affidavit shows that when asked to narrate what happened, Fabella
indeed did not refer to the parties involved by their given names. However, immediately after said
narration, he was asked whether he knew their names and he answered in the affirmative, giving
their first and family names. 35

Appellant, in his desperate bid for acquittal, even questions the fact that the lower court, instead of
granting his own counsel's motion for a postponement, appointed Atty. Cesar M. Madrona of the
Public Attorney's Office as counsel de oficio. Appellant asserts that, in doing so, the trial court
deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a counsel of his choice. We reject this
pretension.

The records show that appellant was given the right to choose his own counsel. However, the court
in its desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system made
appropriate arrangements to avoid unnecessary delay and postponements of the trial in case of the
absence of appellant's counsel de parte. Thus, in its December 12, 1991 order, the trial court set out
the specific dates for the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, noting that the prosecution
witnesses were all from the far-flung island municipality of Concepcion in Maestre de Campo Island,
Romblon, which is about seven hours away by boat. It also advised appellant of the availability of
Atty. Madrona as counsel de oficio any time Atty. Sancho Ferancullo was not available. Appellant
was properly forewarned that any legal maneuvers meant to unduly delay these cases wound not be
entertained by the court.

Furthermore, after the presentation of the prosecution witnesses,

Atty. Ferancullo took over the conduct of the defense of appellant. Thus, in all stages of the trial, his
own counsel was in charge except when the prosecution witnesses were testifying. The Court, after
a review of the records, agrees with the Solicitor General's position that "with the demonstrated
strength of the prosecution evidence, it is unlikely that Atty. Ferancullo's presence during the entire
proceedings would have materially affected the result of the cases." 36

Appellant would discredit the prosecution witnesses by adverting to the fact that, except for Pfc.
Roque Fesalbon, they are all very close relatives of the victims. 37 A witness' relation to the victim does
not necessarily mean that he is biased. There is absolutely nothing in our laws to disqualify a person from
testifying in a criminal case in which said person's relative is involved, if the former was really at the scene
of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act. Precisely, being blood relatives of the
deceased, these witnesses would not just indiscriminately impute the crime to anybody but would
necessarily identify and seek the conviction of the real culprit himself to obtain justice for the death of their
relative.

Still bent on assailing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, appellant cites alleged
inconsistencies in their testimonies. Firstly, Antonieto Fabella had testified that when he heard the
first gunshot, Leonito was inside the dance hall of the barangay plaza. 38 On the other hand, appellant
claims that Roger Lacambra testified that he saw Leonito on the street at that time. This is, of course, not
an inconsistency on the part of Fabella since the supposed variant version was made by a different
witness, Lacambra. Just to satisfy appellant, however, we have verified from the transcripts that what
Lacambra said was that he saw Leonito on the street before the first shot was fired, to wit:

Q: If you heard the first shot while you were on your way, you did not
see Leonito before the first shot, am I correct?

A: I saw him.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Where was Leonito?

A: He was in the street. 39

A second flaw, according to appellant, is the fact that Fabella testified that he heard Fesalbon fire
two warning shots, 40 whereas Fesalbon declared that he fired three times. 41 This is clearly an
insignificant and minor detail which would not affect the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies. As long
as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details do
not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements, 42 more so where the trivial issue is the number of
shots one hears from rapid gunfire.

Thirdly, appellant insists that Fabella testified that when appellant was running away from the crime
scene after the incident, Fesalbon and Fabregas blocked his path while Fesalbon stated that he was
alone when he approached the suspect. However, nowhere in his testimony did Fesalbon state that
he alone blocked the path of Leonito. In fact, when queried as to what he did
with appellant after he got the gun from him, Fesalbon answered, "We arrested him," 43 thereby
affirming the fact that he was not alone at that time but that Fabregas was working in concert with him.
On the charge of homicide for the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, appellant did not offer any defense.
When Ferrancullo was asked if he knew who killed Fameronag, he said he did not know. 44 Neither
did appellant offer any explanation on the death of Fameronag despite the positive statements of the
prosecution witnesses that while trying to shoot Dennis, appellant instead hit Fameronag. The only
defense, then, of appellant for the death of Fameronag is a complete denial. Denial, like alibi, is inherently
a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses
that the accused committed the crime, 45 especially where, as in these cases, such denial is unexplained
and is contradicted by eyewitnesses.

For the death of Dennis Macagaling, although the information in Criminal Case No. 1814 charges
the felony of murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation, the People's
evidence does not prove the attendance of these circumstances. They cannot, therefore, be
appreciated against appellant and the lower court correctly convicted him of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 1814.

For the killing of Teotimo Fameronag, the same cannot be said to be accidental as it was the result
of anaberratio ictus, or miscarriage of the blow. As a matter of law, since such death resulted from a
culpable aberratio ictus, appellant should be punished under Article 48, in relation to Article 4, of the
Revised Penal Code. Having committed attempted homicide as against Dennis Macagaling and
consummated homicide with respect to Teotimo Fameronag when he fired the first shot, appellant
committed two grave felonies with one single act and, accordingly, he would be liable for a complex
crime in the nature of a delito compuesto, or a compound crime. 46However, not having been so
47
charged, he cannot be convicted of a complex crime, hence the court below did not err in finding him
guilty of simple homicide in Criminal Case No. 1815.

2. The charge of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition merits a more extended
consideration. It will be recalled that this third accusation was filed as Criminal Case No. 1834 on
October 29, 1991, or more than three months after the filing of the first two indictments in the same
court, under an information which alleged that during the same incident involved in Criminal Case
Nos. 1814 and 1815 —

. . . the said accused, did then and there, without legal authority therefor, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control
one Cal. 38 Revolver (Smith and Wesson without serial number) with one live bullet
and five empty shells which he used in shooting Dennis Macagaling and Teotimo
Fameronag. 48

Prefatorily, we note from appellant's brief his position that the lower court erred in holding that the
gun was owned by him without being supported by convincing proof. He asserts that
assuming arguendo that the gun was handed by him to Pfc. Fesalbon immediately after the former
arrived at the scene of the crime, this is not sufficient proof that he owned the gun. 49 Appellant's
theory is off-tangent.

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is basically the fact of
possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was so possessed with animus
possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text of said decree, the crime may be
denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from the aggravated form wherein such
firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. 50 However, to be liable for the aggravated
form of illegal possession of a firearm which entails the capital punishment, such illegal possession must
be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing being included in the particulars of the
indictment. 51
In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession of the
firearm without the requisite license or permit, and this disposes of appellant's objection on this
score. What, however, is of greater concern to the Court is whether the prosecution has discharged
the burden of proof on this charge. Corollarily, the inquiry should be whether there was sufficient
identification of the firearm presented in the trial court and, more importantly, whether there was
sufficient evidence to establish the negative allegation that appellant possessed the gun "without
legal authority therefor."

On the identification of the gun, these exchanges in the courtroom during the cross-examination of
Pfc. Fesalbon, the lone prosecution witness on this issue, give us ground to pause and doubt:

Q — You also stated that this was the gun you got from Leonito
Macagaling that evening of May 2?

A — Yes sir, that is the gun.

Q — How did you know that this is the gun?

A — Because it was really the gun I took from him.

Q — How do you know that this is really the gun?

A — Because at the bottom of the bat (sic, should be butt) there is a

serial number and it was erased by grinding and the serial number
was erased.

Q — When did you discover that the serial number here was erased?

A — Immediately after my inspection I discovered that there is no

serial number.

Q — When did you make your inspection?

A — Immediately after his arrest.

xxx xxx xxx

Q — But there were many guns like this whose serial number has
been erased, do you think serial number —

A — I don't know, that is the only gun I saw with erased serial
number, even paltik guns have serial numbers.

Q — So that is the only distinguishing mark that you can tell us how
you recognized this gun to be the gun which you took from Leonito
Macagaling that evening?

A — Not only that serial number but the whole body of the gun.

COURT:
 Did you not place your own personal identification mark in Exhibit E?

A — My personal identification is that I could identify paltik and those

genuine guns.

COURT:

You did not answer the question, answer the question.

A — I did not put any distinguishing mark.

COURT:

That should be answered that way. That can be answered by yes or no. Next tine
again you should place again your own identification in guns and even ammos. (I)n
Exhibits E-1 to E-6, did you place your own identification mark in each of them?

A — No, sir.

COURT:

Next time you place your own mark. Because from apprehension up to this very
moment, it is a long, long time, it crossed the very handle (sic) by many hands.
Proceed.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. MADRONA:

Q — What I mean with general appearance li(k)e this gun, would you
agree with me that there are thousands of (S)mith and (W)esson
guns with the general appearance like this?

A — Yes, sir. 52

It is a curious fact that although the incident took place on May 2, 1991, the information in Criminal
Case No. 1834 for illegal possession of the gun was filed only on October 29, 1991. Pfc. Fesalbon
testified thereon on May 29, 1992 and yet, although the firearm was in the possession of the police
for more than a year, there was no attempt to ensure its positive identification through standard
police procedure of which Pfc. Fesalbon, as a police investigator, could not have been unaware.

For that matter, the efforts exerted to obtain evidence proving that appellant was not a licensed
holder of the firearm was lackadaisical at best. This is the prosecution's only evidence to prove the
allegation in the information that appellant's possession of a firearm was "without legal authority
therefor," again through the bare testimony of Pfc. Fesalbon:

Q — You made mention that you conducted an investigation after

taking Exhibit D (sic, should be E) from the accused, did you find out
whether that gun is licensed or not?
 A — Yes, sir.

Q — What did you find out?

A — I found out that the gun has no license.

Q — Do you mean to tell this Honorable Court that the accused

Leonito Macagaling is not a firearm licensee of your town?

A — Yes, sir. 53

This is all. Nor did the witness deign to explain how he arrived at his conclusion. No other evidence
was presented on this serious charge which, in its aggravated form could, at the least, be punished
by reclusion perpetua due to the proscription against the death penalty.* Yet, despite the opportunity and
intervening time to do so, not even a certification that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder was obtained from the Firearms and
Explosives Office or the local command of the Philippine National Police. And this brings us to the question of the necessity and the quantum
of evidence for proving a negative allegation in an information, in this case the lack of a firearms license or permit.

The evidentiary rule on negative averments in the 1940 Rules of Court 54 as adopted in the 1964
Rules of Court 55 in criminal cases was as follows:

Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal case. — In criminal cases the burden of proof as
to the offense charged lies on the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the
prosecution need not be provedunless it is an essential ingredient of the offense
charged. (Emphasis ours.)

While the italicized portion was not carried over to the revised Rules on evidence, there is no reason
to believe that such requirement for proof of a negative element of the offense charged has been
dispensed with, since it is specifically provided therein that the "(b)urden of proof is the duty of a
party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law." 56

As applied to prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, the present rule on
proving the negative fact of lack of a license actually harks back to the case of People vs.
Quebral, 57 where we find this passage clarifying the seemingly contentious pronouncements on the
matter:

The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative averment, like,
for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law, inheres in
the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the same (Sec. 297, Act No. 190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307). In
view, however, of the difficult office of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution,
under such circumstance, need do no more than make a prima faciecase from the
best evidence obtainable. (U.S. vs. Tria, supra) It would certainly be anomalous to
hold ". . . that mere difficulty in discharging a burden of making proof should displace
it; and as a matter of principle the difficulty only relieves the party having the burden
of evidence from the necessity of creating positive conviction entirely by his own
evidence so that, when he produces such evidence as it is in his power to produce,
its probative effect is enhanced by the silence of his opponent" (22 C.J., pp. 81, 82).

xxx xxx xxx

 Section 770 of the Administrative Code provides that "no person shall practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands without having previously obtained the proper
certificate of registration issued by the Board of Medical Examiners. . ." This
provision clearly includes the want of certificate as an essential element of the
offense charged. The negative fact is not separable from the offense as defined. It is,
therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that negative fact, and failure to
prove it is a ground for acquittal. (Emphasis in the original text.)

While the offenses involved or discussed therein were illegal practice of medicine without the
certificate of registration and the unlawful act of voting without the qualifications required by law, the
rationale evidently applies to illegal possession of firearms without a license. Thus, although there
were some supervening departures from the doctrine announced therein, the principle in Quebral
was adopted in People vs. Pajenado 58 where we held:

Upon the question of whether or not appellant should also be convicted of the crime
of illegal possession of a firearm, We agree with both appellant's counsel and the
Solicitor General that the appealed decision should be reversed.

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with
illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess
the firearm, but We are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of Section
2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of
proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact
alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the
offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove
that the firearm used by appellant in committing the offense was not properly
licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of

the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against appellant .
. . specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber
pistol mentioned therein. Thus, is seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not
merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

This doctrinal rule was reiterated in People vs. Tiozon, 59 People vs. Caling, supra, People vs. Ramos,
et al., 60People vs. Arce, 61 and People vs. Deunida, 62 and this constitutes the present governing case law
on this question. We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable duty of the
prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as alleged against the accused in an information,
which allegations must perforce include any negative element provided by the law to integrate that
offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental mandate that since the prosecution must
allege all the elements of the offense charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all
the elements it has thus alleged. 63

Applied to the cases at bar, we cannot conceive of how, under the demonstrated circumstances
herein, we can sustain a judgment of conviction on this particular charge. It may be well to recall that
how the firearm came into appellant's possession is a seriously contested issue, with the prosecution
witnesses merely stating that they saw the gun only when appellant aimed and fired at the victims,
but with appellant contending that he actually wrested it from Dennis Macagaling. As to who in truth
was the possessor of the firearm prior to the incident cannot be determined with certitude due to the
paucity of the evidence thereon. In fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in
possession of the gun only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment
coeval therewith, it cannot be concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for the
offense charged.

The highly unsatisfactory identification of the gun, coupled with the intervening time between its
retrieval from appellant to its presentation in the court below, increases our misgivings on whether it
was in fact the weapon involved. Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to
the non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the situation in People vs.
Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in evidence. We held
that such failure effectively closed the door to any proof of the negative fact that no license or permit
therefor had been issued to the accused therein.

The foregoing disquisitions in Quebral, Pajenado and other cited cases have inevitably clinched the
case for herein appellant on this accusation, this time by reason of the abject failure of the
prosecution to adduce the requisite evidence on its negative averment. Even on the assumption that
mere prima facie evidence of the lack of a license or permit on the part of appellant would suffice,
still the self-serving, unexplained and undocumented conclusion thereon of Pfc. Roque Fesalbon
could not even assume a rough approximation of that evidential quantum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court finding accused-appellant Leonito Macagaling y
Atillano guilty of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814 and also of homicide in Criminal
Case No. 1815 is hereby AFFIRMED. However, its judgment in Criminal Case No. 1834 for illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition is REVERSED and said accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged therein on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ. concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97612 March 23, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO AMANIA and GAUDENCIO GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Antonio S. Ramos-Uypitching, Sr. for G. Guevarra.

Public Attorney's Office for E. Amania.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra were charged before Branch XXXIV
of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City with the crime of robbery with double homicide in an
information filed in Criminal Case No. 7942 which alleges:

That on or about July 14, 1987, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at Sitio
Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and intent to kill, waylay and
ambush, assault, attack and use physical violence upon PRIMO OMANGAY and
MACARIO OMANGAY, with the use of bolos with which they were armed and
provided, thus inflicting multiple injuries on vital parts of (the) victims' bodies, which
injuries caused the victims' death sometime thereafter; and in pursuance of their
criminal design, after having used violence against persons, the above-named
accused, with intent (to) gain and without the consent of the afore-named victims, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the
person of PRIMO OMANGAY the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00),
Philippine currency, in a plastic container and placed inside (the) victim's pocket, and
one-half (1/2) sack of corn grits; and from MACARIO OMANGAY, another one-half
(1/2) sack of corn grits, the corn grits having a total value of TWO HUNDRED
NINETY PESOS (P290.00), to the damage and prejudice of said victims in the
aforestated amounts. 1

Appellants, duly assisted by counsel, both pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After trial, the lower
court found them both guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to return to the heirs of the victims the sum of P700.00 and one sack of corn grits, or to
pay the amount of P350.00 representing the value of the latter item; and to respectively indemnify
the heirs of Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay in the sum of P30,000.00 for each of said
victims. 2

Hence, this appellate review, appellant Amania contending that the trial court gravely erred in
disregarding appellant's claim of self-defense and convicting him of robbery with double homicide
instead of simple homicide, "granting without admitting that he is guilty." 3 Appellant Guevarra, who
appealed as a pauper-litigant, was unable to file his brief allegedly because of his failure to secure the
complete transcripts of stenographic notes, free of charge. Accordingly, he manifested his desire to adopt
his co-appellant Amania's brief. 4

The People's version of the case, which has been correctly summarized by the trial court, is
reproduced hereunder:

The theory of the prosecution as testified to mainly by Arsenia Omangay and Isidra
Omangay is that at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987 while they,
Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, together with Leonides Omangay and victims Primo
Omangay and Macario Omangay were negotiating (walking in a single file) a small
trail at Sitio Talustos, Barangay Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, accused
Eduardo Amania, sitting on a stone at the left side of the trail suddenly stabbed with
his bolo victim Primo Omangay. Immediately after he fell down, co-accused
Gaudencio Guevarra, who was standing at the right side of the trail, suddenly hacked
several times and beheaded victim Macario Omangay. After killing the two victims,
Amania carried away the half sack (of) corn grits earlier carried by Primo while
Gaudencio Guevarra got the P700.00 which was wrapped in plastic and placed
inside the pocket of Primo and also carried away the other half sack of corn grits
earlier carried by Macario Omangay. Upon seeing Primo who was the husband of
Arsenia and father of the other Omangays, and Macario, the son of Primo and
Arsenia, killed, Arsenia, Isidra and Leonides fled as the two accused also attempted
to assault them as in fact they chased them, though for a short distance. The two
accused then carried away the two victims' load and left. 5

On the other hand, appellant Eduardo Amania's version, as condensed in his brief, is of the following
tenor:

On July 14, 1987 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant Eduardo
Amania was on his way home after spear-fishing at the Talustos river, (in) Barangay
Amio, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. Primo Omangay was on his way home together
with his son Macario, wife Arsenia and a daughter. Primo inquired from accused-
appellant if he have (sic) plenty of catch and the latter answered he had no catch.
Primo and Macario were not carrying any bundles while Arsenia and her daughter
carried plastic bags. Macario Omangay cut a fruit-bearing banana tree growing by
the roadside within Gaudencio Guevarra's property, thus prompting Primo to invite
Amania to their house to eat the bananas gathered by his son. Meanwhile, Guevarra
who was gathering firewood within his farmland, heard the sound of a falling banana
tree. He rushed to the site and admonished Macario saying: "So you are the one
cutting down my bananas." Macario, holding his bolo used in cutting down the
banana tree, rushed towards Guevarra and stabbed the latter. Guevarra dropped his
bundle of firewood and fled, pursued by Macario. Arsenia and her daughter ran
home. Primo told Amania to chase Guevarra. Primo became angry and boxed
Amania on the chest when the latter refused to follow his order. As a result, Amania
stabbed Primo once on the left abdomen. Amania ran away and proceeded to
surrender to Noe Romero, barangay captain of Barangay Marsogomayon, Sta.
Catalina. 6
Appellant Gaudencio Guevarra testified that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 14, 1987
he was bundling firewood in his farm when he heard a banana tree fall, prompting him to investigate.
He saw Macario Omangay, who at that time was with his father Primo, his mother Arsenia, his sister
Isidra and Eduardo Amania, cut down his banana tree. He admonished Macario for cutting down his
banana tree without permission and the latter retorted, "Who are you to admonish here?", and
immediately rushed towards him. Gaudencio ran away and was chased by Macario who was
carrying a bolo. When Gaudencio reached the river, he slipped and was able to lean on a rock.
Macario tried to hack him thrice but he was able to evade the blows. Fearing for his life, Gaudencio
successively hacked Macario. He immediately left Macario, who was still breathing at that time, and
ran to the house of Noe Romero, the barangay captain, to surrender. 7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court would like to reiterate some elementary but
fundamental principles which are material hereto but which have apparently been overlooked. The
decision rendered by the trial court convicted both appellants of robbery with double homicide. Time
and again, this Court has held that there is no crime of robbery with double homicide. The term
"homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is to be understood in its generic
sense. 8 The juridical concept of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide does not limit the
taking of human life to one single victim. 9 In this special complex crime, the homicides or murders and the
physical injuries, irrespective of their number, committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are
merged in the single composite crime of robbery with homicide. 10 Therefore, the crime in this case should
have been properly denominated as robbery with homicide.

Again, in criminal cases the burden of proof is generally on the prosecution. The prosecution must
rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. Herein appellants have
raised self-defense, thereby shifting the burden of evidence to them and the onus of which they must
satisfactorily discharge, otherwise conviction would follow from their admission that they killed the
victim. 11 Further, appellants must this time rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after appellants
themselves admitted the killing. 12

Still on the basics, paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the requisites of
self-defense are unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. For self-
defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and unprovoked
attack that placed the life of the accused in danger and forced him to inflict more or less severe
wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to resist said attack. 13

Hence, the twin issues to be resolved in the case at bar are whether or not appellants acted in
complete self-defense in respectively killing Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay, as they claim,
thus absolving both of them from criminal liability; and, in the negative, what crime was actually
committed by herein appellants.

Essentially involved, in view of the conflicting submissions of the prosecution and the defense, is the
matter of the credibility of their respective theories. While it is the rule, so well-settled as to warrant
dispensing with any citation of authorities, that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
generally within the province of the trial court which is better circumstanced because of its direct role
in the reception of the testimonial evidence, a thorough review of the evidence in the case,
particularly the testimonies reflected in the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the trial,
persuades us that there are certain aspects in the respective versions of the contending parties
which do not justify our acceptance thereof in toto. In fine, what actually happened in the criminal
offenses charged here is somewhat deducible from the evidence for both sides, and the truth
appears to be somewhere in the middle under a situation contemplated in the so-called dictum
of veritas in medio stat.
The Court is not inclined to fully accept the thesis of the People in light of some conflicts in the
testimonies of its principal witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, both members of the immediate
family of the victims, and by reason of the absence of competent evidence to establish the elements
and commission of one of the component felonies for the special complex crime imputed to
appellants.

For instance, when Arsenia Omangay was queried on cross-examination as to where appellants
were situated shortly prior to the homicidal attack, she declared that she saw appellant Amania
quietly sitting on a big stone on the side of the pathway on which the victims and their family were
walking, while appellant Guevarra was standing on the other side of that path. 14 On the other hand,
Isidra declared that both appellants were gathering firewood at that time, which declaration she later
corrected to mean that they were chopping wood while sitting on different stones. 15

Again, although both the defense and the prosecution apparently failed to discern the same and
raised no issue thereon, another contradiction surfaces from the testimonies of Arsenia and Isidra
with respect to the alleged relative positions of the victims and their family members accompanying
them at the time of the commission of the killing. Arsenia narrated that when the assault took place,
they were all walking, in single file, on an inclined pathway in this order — Isidra walking ahead,
followed by Leonides, Arsenia, Primo and then Macario. When the victims were attacked by
appellants, 16 the others ran forward in the direction going uphill. 17

Contrarily, Isidra avowed that although they were indeed walking in single file, at the time of the
incident they were proceeding in the following
order — Primo being in the lead, followed by Macario, Isidra, Leonides and Arsenia. 18 Thereafter,
Isidra admitted that she, her mother Arsenia and sister Leonides ran away and "had taken a complete
about face and taken a direction opposite to the direction when (they) were proceeding home," 19 that is,
this time by going downhill.

While the foregoing observations do not suffice to completely discredit said witnesses, they do cast
serious doubts on the prosecution's position on the mode of commission adopted by appellants in
the killings although said crimes were admitted by them, and also on the matter of the alleged
robbery. While the Court is inclined to be lenient in its appreciation of the testimonies of said
witnesses who are unschooled and simple country folk, nevertheless their conflicting testimonies
reveal, if they are reflective of anything at all, that their powers of recollection and capacity to narrate
the details of what they supposedly observed are to be evaluated with caution.

Thus, since the apparent thrust of the submission of the prosecution which is sought to be
established by the declaration of said witnesses is that the killings were attended by treachery in
view of the alleged sudden and unexpected attack launched by appellants, we are not persuaded to
accept the same as gospel truth. At any rate, not having been alleged in the information, treachery
cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the deaths of the two victims, and neither can
it be considered as an aggravating circumstance for lack of evidence that the supposed treacherous
mode of commission was deliberately adopted by appellants to specially ensure their commission of
the crimes with impunity.

Aside from the foregoing flaws in the prosecution's evidence as to how the victims were killed, that
deficiency is more pronounced with respect to the charge of robbery which is the principal felony
with which the homicides are sought to be complexed. On this point, the settled doctrine is that to
integrate the component felonies of this complex crime, the killing must have been directly
connected with the robbery. It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the
offenders to commit robbery from the outset and, on the occasion or by reason thereof, a killing
takes place. 20 The original design must have been robbery and the homicide, even if it precedes or is
subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation or was committed with a view to consummate the
robbery, 21and not where the taking of the property was only an afterthought which arose subsequent to
the killing. 22 The records of this case do not yield the requisite quantum of evidence on the aforesaid
requisite which would produce the special complex crime charged. In fact, we have reason to believe that
the incident was unpremeditated for when appellant Amania went to surrender to the barangay captain
thirty minutes thereafter, he was half-naked since he had just come from spear-fishing in the river and
had merely proceeded thereafter to the scene of the crime. 23

The prosecution having thus failed to demonstrate the commission of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, the inquiry then is whether or not the defense has, on its part, proved that
appellants can be absolved of the homicidal acts committed by them under their invocation of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. The records of the case give us a negative answer.

Appellant Amania narrated the events which led to the death of Primo Omangay in this wise:

Q When Gaudencio Guevarra r(a)n away chased by Macario

Omangay, what did you do?

A (O)n my part, I was told by the father of Macario Omangay to run

also after Gaudencio since I did not take part in cutting the banana
tree.

Q When you ma(d)e that reply, what did Primo Omangay do, if any?

A Because I did not help chasing, he boxed me.

Q Who boxed you?

A Primo Omangay.

Q Where were you hit?

A I was hit here, (the witness pointed to his chest) but I did not f(a)ll
down.

Q Now, after Primo Omangay boxed you and hit your chest, what did
you do?

A Because he boxed me and I was hit here and since I have (sic)
also a bolo, I dr(e)w my bolo and stabbed him and ran away. 24

Even indulging appellant Amania in his asseverations, the same nonetheless disclose that he was
not justified in stabbing Primo Omangay. Assuming that the victim did deal a fistblow on said
appellant, which may be considered as unlawful aggression, the second requisite for self-defense is
not present. There should be a necessity in both the action taken as well as the means used, and
the latter depends on whether or not the aggressor himself was armed, the nature and quality of the
weapon used and the physical condition and size of both the aggressor and the person defending
himself. Primo Omangay was unarmed. Although a bit taller, Primo was of the same size as
appellant Amania. 25 The means used by appellant Amania was clearly unreasonable for, as we have
held in People vs. Montalbo, 26 "(t)hough the deceased struck him with his fists, the appellant was not justified in mortally wounding
his assailant with the penknife. This was not a reasonably necessary means of repelling the attack."
The plaint of appellant Amania could, at best, fall under the ordinary mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under paragraph 1, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, since there is also
no conclusive evidence with respect to the third requisite for self-defense. We do not believe,
however, that appellant Amania can even be granted this ordinary mitigating circumstance since,
aside from the testimonies of witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, we entertain grave doubts on
the veracity of appellant Amania's allegation that he was the victim of an unlawful aggression
considering the mercurial changes in his assertions. For, before giving the aforestated reason why
he killed Primo Omangay, said appellant had earlier given another on the witness stand, as follows:
"I killed him because when we were on the way, the son cut the banana tree of Gaudencio
Guevarra." 27 On the other hand, Noe Romero, barangay captain of Marsagomayon, Sta. Catalina,
testified that when appellant Amania surrendered to him, said appellant told him that he killed Primo
Omangay because the latter chased him. 28

With respect to appellant Guevarra, his story, as earlier narrated, is that Macario Omangay chased
him with a bolo and tried to hack him three times. Fortunately, so he claims, he was able to evade
the hacking blows, and he then hacked Macario several times. 29 Obviously, said appellant was
emboldened in spinning this tale by his awareness of the fact that there were no eyewitnesses present at
the scene of the alleged fight between him and the victim. However, there are certain physical facts and
indicia that belie his aforesaid contentions which, parenthetically, also stand completely uncorroborated.

For one, as we have earlier observed, we have the testimonies of the mother and sister of the victim,
witnesses Arsenia and Isidra Omangay, which, although we did not fully credit the same with respect
to some attendant details, we nevertheless accept with regard to the main substance thereof, that is,
that appellant Guevarra was the unprovoked assailant of said victim while the latter was walking on
the trail.

In view of the importance thereof to this particular aspect of the case, we reproduce the documented
counterstatement of the facts by the Solicitor General:

Arsenia was the first to see appellant Eduardo Amania. Appellant Amania was sitting
on a rock at the side of the trail holding an unsheathed bolo. At the opposite side of
the path stood Gaudencio Guevarra who also held a bolo. . . . (pp. 7-13, tsn, August
10, 1988).

She was, however, startled when appellant Amania suddenly lunged at her husband
who was walking behind her. Appellant Amania stabbed Primo on the left side of the
body causing him to fall (p. 13, tsn., August 10, 1988; p. 23, tsn., January 11, 1989).

Almost at the same time, Gaudencio Guevarra relentlessly hacked Macario fourteen
times on various parts of the body. Not satisfied, Guevarra decapitated the then
prostrate Macario (p. 23, tsn., January 11, 1989; p. 7, tsn., June 29, 1988).

xxx xxx xxx

Both Primo and Macario Omangay died on the spot from the wounds they
sustained. 30

That Macario Omangay was killed right along the side of the trail in Sitio Talustos is not seriously
disputed by the defense. Aside from a token argument that "(i)t is quite inconceivable to propose that
the malefactors would have dared staged (sic) such a serious felony in broad daylight in the middle
of the sitio's main path, . . . ," 31 the defense has not presented any evidence to prove that said victim
was killed elsewhere. This, therefore, completely refutes appellant Guevarra's testimony that he killed the
victim beside the river after he was chased there by the latter. By his own admission, the distance from
the side of the trail in question up to the side of the river where he supposedly killed the victim in self-
defense is about "50 arms length" or around sixty meters. 32 In fact, he even admitted that he did not tell
the barangay captain to whom he surrendered to get from the scene of the supposed fight the bolo which
the victim allegedly had, nor did he tell the police in Sta. Catalina to whom he was shortly thereafter
turned over that the victim had a bolo, much less that he killed the victim in self-defense. 33

Moreover, the number of wounds inflicted on the victim, their location on his neck, back, lap and
abdomen, as well as their depths and areas of penetration constitute ample evidence belying self-
defense. In the case at bar, Macario Omangay sustained fourteen wounds, one of which almost
completely severed his head. As we observed in People vs. Garachico, et al., 34 "(t)he wounds
inflicted upon the victim by the two accused who were not wounded at all, sufficiently disprove their
allegation that they acted in self-defense.

Now, although the burden of evidence had shifted to the defense for having invoked self-defense,
still the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Unlike the burden of evidence which shifts from
one party to the other, the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution. 35 Therefore, the elements
of the composite crime of robbery with homicide, as well as its attendant circumstances and the fact that
appellants are guilty thereof, must still be proved by the prosecution.

While the People, as earlier explained, failed to prove said special complex crime, the evidence fully
sustains the charge that appellants killed the victims Primo and Macario Omangay. With respect to
the unlawful taking of their lives, appellants miserably failed in their bid for exoneration by their
allegedly having acted in self-defense. Furthermore, appellants having admitted the homicidal acts,
the Court is left with no option but to find each of them guilty of homicide, appellant Amania for the
death of Primo Omangay and appellant Guevarra for the death of Macario Omangay, there being no
qualifying circumstance attending the killing and no evidence of conspiracy between appellants
having been proved.

Barangay captain Noe Romero testified that at around 4:30 P.M. of that fateful day, appellant
Amania surrendered to him, followed for the same purpose by appellant Guevarra some thirty
minutes later. 36 A barangay captain or chairman was and still is considered a person in
authority. 37 Hence, appellants Amania and Guevarra may be granted the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same since the allegation of
evident premeditation is without evidentiary basis, with the result that the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide shall be im posed in its minimum period.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and another is rendered finding
accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra GUILTY of the crime of homicide,
and each of them is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Said accused-appellants Eduardo Amania and Gaudencio Guevarra are hereby further ordered to
respectively INDEMNIFY the heirs of the victims Primo Omangay and Macario Omangay in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each victim, in line with our current jurisprudential policy on such civil
liability ex delicto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123817. December 17, 1999]

IBAAN RURAL BANK INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
MR. and MRS. RAMON TARNATE, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 affirming with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 534, as well as the resolution of the
Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 33206, 33207 and 33208 of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. On
March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. [herein petitioner]. On
June 11, 1976, with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner, the spouses as sellers, and Mr.
and Mrs. Ramon Tarnate [herein private respondents] as buyers, entered into a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage of the lots in question. Private respondents failed to pay the
loan and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. The Provincial Sheriff
conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole bidder. On
December 13, 1978, the Provincial Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on
October 16, 1979. The certificate stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the
registration of the sale. No notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was given to the private
respondents. On September 23, 1981, private respondents offered to redeem the foreclosed lots
and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the
redemption on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots. The Provincial Sheriff
also denied the redemption on the ground that private respondents did not appear on the title to be
the owners of the lots.
Private respondents filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the
foreclosed lots. They alleged that the extra-judicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid
notice and demand upon them. They further argued that they were entitled to redeem the foreclosed
lots because they offered to redeem and tendered the redemption price before October 16, 1981,
the deadline of the 2-year redemption period.
The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to
redeem the lots because they were not the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to
redeem on September 23, 1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had
elapsed from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979; that there was no need
of personal notice to them because under Section 3 of Act 3135, only the posting of notice of sale
at three public places of the municipality where the properties are located was required.[1]
After trial on the merits, the lower court ruled in favor of herein private respondents and
against the petitioner, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:

(a) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank Inc., and Provincial Sheriff of Batangas
for the redemption of the foreclosed properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-33206, T-33207 and T-33208 of the Registry of Deeds, Lipa City by the
plaintiffs by paying the mortgaged obligation.

(b) Ordering the Provincial Sheriff of Batangas to cancel the Transfer Certificate of
Titles issued to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successors-in-interest and to
issue the corresponding Transfer of Certificate of Titles to plaintiffs upon payment of
the required legal fees.

(c) Ordering the defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., to pay plaintiffs moral damages in
the amount of P200,000.00, and attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00.

All other claims not having been duly proved are ordered DISMISSED.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[2]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the lower
court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:

1. The register of Deeds of Lipa City is hereby ordered to cancel the Certificate of
Titles issued to defendant Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. and its successor-in-interest and to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title to plaintiffs-appellees upon
proper redemption of the properties and payment of the required legal fees.

2. Defendant Ibaan Rural bank, is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiffs the amount of
P15,000.00 as attorneys fees.

3. The moral damages awarded in favor of plaintiffs is hereby ordered deleted.

SO ORDERED.[3]

A timely Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 14, 1996. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN IT
SUSTAINED AVAILABILITY OF REDEMPTION DESPITE THE LAPSE OF
ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
SALE.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITIONER IS

ENTITLED TO A REVIEW OF ITS DECISION, WHEN THE RESPONDENT COURT
ALLOWED RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS FEES SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER
DID NOT ALLOW THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO EXERCISE BELATEDLY
REDEMPTION OF THE FORECLOSED PROPERTY.[4]

Essentially, two issues are raised for resolution. What was the period of redemption: two years
as unilaterally fixed by the sheriff in the contract, or one year as fixed by law? May respondent
court properly award attorneys fees solely on the basis of the refusal of the bank to allow
redemption?
We now resolve these issues.
When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents.[5] For two years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the
certificate. Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period
specially since it had time to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the
part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as consent.[6] By
its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents to believe that they had two years
within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years, petitioner is estopped from
asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period had already
lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own
silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another
to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.[7]
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on Lazo vs. Republic
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,[8] where the court held that the one year period of redemption
provided in Act No. 3135 is only directory and can be extended by agreement of the parties. True,
but it bears noting that in Lazo the parties voluntarily agreed to extend the redemption
period. Thus, the concept of legal redemption was converted by the parties in Lazo into
conventional redemption. This is not so in the instant case. There was no voluntary agreement. In
fact, the sheriff unilaterally and arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two (2) years in
the Certificate of Sale. The parties were not even privy to the extension made by the
sheriff. Nonetheless, as above discussed, the bank can not after the lapse of two years insist that
the redemption period was one year only.
Additionally, the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor of the original owner of
a property. The fact alone that he is allowed the right to redeem clearly demonstrates the
solicitousness of the law in giving him another opportunity, should his fortune improve, to recover
his lost property.[9]
Lastly, petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence,
meticulousness and mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate
of Sale it could have easily discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual
period for redemption. Banks, being greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise
a degree of diligence in the handling of its affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business
firm.[10]
On the second issue, the award of attorneys fees must be disallowed for lack of legal basis. The
fact that private respondents were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce
their claim does not justify the award of attorneys fees. The general rule is that attorneys fees
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the public policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate.[11] The award of attorneys fees must be deleted where the award of
moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.[12]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32984 is
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128568. April 9, 2003]

SPOUSES REYNALDO ALCARAZ and ESMERALDA

ALCARAZ, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN, MENAS R.
TANGGA-AN, VIRGINIA III YVETTE R. TANGGA-AN, CECIL T.
VILLAFLOR, HERMES R. TANGGA-AN, VENUS R. TANGGA-AN,
JUPITER R. TANGGA-AN, YVONNE T. FRI, VIVIEN R. TANGGA-AN
and HON. JUDGE P. BURGOS and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated January 10, 1997 of
[1]

the Court of Appeals affirming the decision dated June 26, 1995 of the
[2] [3]

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 17, which in turn upheld the
decision dated January 5, 1995 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cebu
[4]

City, Branch 2, ordering the ejectment of the petitioner spouses from the house
they were renting from respondents.
On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an, Menas Tangga-an,
Virginia III Yvette Tangga-an, Cecil Villaflor, Hermes Tangga-an, Venus
Tangga-an, Jupiter Tangga-an, Yvonne Fri and Vivien Tangga-an filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer, with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. R-
33928, against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz.
The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of
respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the rest of the respondents) leased
a residential building (house) located at Premier Street, Hipodromo, Cebu City
to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and
occupancy of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it
was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing
Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves
for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000 beginning November
22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent. Thus, as of
October, 1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated
demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the
possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate
the same. Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own use and
benefit.
On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993,
the ownership of the lot on which the house stood was transferred by the NHA
to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio Tangga-an is the son of the late
Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of the
other respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was consequently
issued in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses,
the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house resulted in the
cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner
spouses. Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and
Angelita) and not to respondents since the latter supposedly no longer had the
legal right to collect rentals.
On January 5, 1995, the MTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which read:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is entered by way of preponderance of evidence in favor of

plaintiffs and against the defendants, Ordering the latter to vacate the premises
immediately, including all those who are occupying the subject house in relation to
them; They are also jointly ordered to pay the sum of P48,000 representing rental
payment in arrears from November, 1993 up to October, 1994 and to update monthly
payment of P4,000 thereafter until their vacation therefrom; They are saddled to pay
attorneys fees in the sum of P5,000 and litigation costs in the amount of P1,000.

SO ORDERED. [5]

In ruling in favor of the respondents, the MTC held that the petitioner
spouses clearly violated the contract of lease due to non-payment of rent. They
failed to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio alone. On the other
hand, the respondents proved that, after the death of Virgilia, they registered
said house in the name of their trustees, co-respondents Hermes Tangga-an
and his wife. Furthermore, considering that Virgilios claim of ownership over the
lot was the subject of a pending litigation for annulment of deed of sale and
reconveyance of property involving the Tangga-ans, the MTC ruled that it
cannot usurp to pass judgment on the issues, as well as the conflicting claims
of the parties therein.
[6]

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC, and held that:
xxx [D]efendants failed to present any documentary evidence modifying or amending
the contract of lease (Annex C, complaint) to justify the transfer of payment of the
monthly rental to Virgilio Tanga-an who claims only as the registered owner of the lot
on which the leased house is located. It appears that Virgilio Tanga-an does not
possess any proof of ownership of the rented house. Clearly, defendants had violated
the lease agreement executed between them and the deceased lessor Virginia R.
Tangga-an (sic) the predecessor in interest of Hermes Tangaa-an and his wife as
shown in the Tax Declaration of the said spouses (Annex A, complaint) whose name
appears under the space for previous owner by stopping payment of rental to the
present owner despite the existence of the contract of lease which expires on
November 22, 1996. The law on contracts basically states:

Obligations arising fro contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. (Article 1159, New Civil Code of the
Philippines).

xxx xxx xxx [7]

In denying the petition for review and affirming the judgments of the courts a
quo, the Court of Appeals ruled that:

We also concur with the holding of both courts that as heirs of Virginia Tangga-an,
private respondents have the right to institute the action for ejectment, in accordance
with Article 487 of the Civil Code; and that the claim of petitioner that Virgilio
Tangga-an owns the lot where the leased residential building stands and occupied by
petitioners is still the subject of a civil action for annulment of the sale of the lot
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It does not follow as a matter of course that
whoever owns the lot owns the building in question. Ownership of the lot cannot
change the nature and ownership of the building, which belongs to the plaintiffs as
heirs of the late Virginia Tangga-an through Ernest Tangga-an and his wife.
Respondent court correctly reasoned out that xxx defendants cannot hide over the
cloak of Virgilio Tangga-an, his claim of ownership over the lot as far as the Court is
concerned being irrelevant to this case xxx. Most importantly, the action involving the
question of ownership of the lot is not a lawful ground to suspend/abate the ejectment
proceeding. The rationale of the rule being that an ejecment suit involves only the
issue of material possession or possession de facto (San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals,
235 SCRA 145, 150, and cases cited). [8]

Hence, this petition on the following assignments of error:

I
 THE LEASE CONTRACT EXECUTED BY PETITIONERS WITH VIRGINIA
TANGGA-AN, PLAINTIFFS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, COVERED NOT
ONLY THE LAND, BUT ALSO THE IMPROVEMENT THEREON, INCLUDING
THE BUILDING.

II

VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN, AS ONE OF THE HEIRS OF VIRGINIA, HAD THE

SAME RIGHTS OVER THE PROPERTY AS THOSE OF THE OTHER HEIRS,
THE PLAINTIFFS. HENCE, VIRGILIO MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED
UNILATERALLY BY THE OTHER HEIRS IN HIS ENJOYMENT OF HIS
HEREDITARY RIGHTS.

III

THE REGISTRATION OF THE LAND, INCLUDING THE IMPROVEMENTS

THEREON, IN THE NAME OF VIRGILIO TANGGA-AN UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM IS INDEFEASIBLE AND MAY NOT BE ATTACKED
COLLATERALLY IN THE PRESENT ILLEGAL DETAINER CASE. [9]

We rule in favor of the respondents.

Section 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.

The issue of ownership is precisely what the petitioner spouses raised to

justify their non-payment of rent and to resist eviction from the house they
leased from respondents. Being indispensable to the resolution of the issue of
possession, we herein render a provisional ruling on ownership.
Petitioner spouses seek a dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction
claiming that the only issue to be resolved is ownership over the house which
is improper in an ejectment case. We disagree. The issue in the case at bar is
whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent
because of the change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house
was built. The main question therefore is still the lawful possession of the
subject premises by the petitioner spouses. To resolve it, a discussion of the
ownership issue is necessary.
 The petitioner spouses insist that the courts a quo erred in not finding that
Virgilio Tangga-an became the new owner not only of the lot but also of the
residential house. They claim that, before she died, Virginia, the original owner
of the subject house, waived and ceded her rights over the land in favor of
Virgilio. The said transfer allegedly included the subject house because,
pursuant to Article 440 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the property gives
the right of accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially. They also
maintain that the NHA executed a deed of sale of both the house and the lot in
favor of Virgilio. According to the petitioner spouses, the tax declaration over
the house in the name of respondent Hermes Tangga-an, as trustee of the other
respondents, was self-serving and had no probative value compared to the
certificate of title over the lot in the name of Virgilio Tangga-an.
We find no merit in petitioners arguments.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, a petition for review before this Court should only raise questions of
law. In the absence of showing that the case falls under one of the
exceptions, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
[10]

parties and not reviewable by this Court. And they carry even more weight when
the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. As such, this
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. [11]

The courts a quo were unanimous in holding that the petitioner spouses
failed to substantiate their factual averment that Virgilio not only acquired the
lot but also the house. After examining the records, we found nothing to
disprove the facts determined by the lower courts. All the petitioner spouses
presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate of title over the
lot. No document was ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house in
Virgilios favor. Virgilios title could not be used to prove ownership over the
house built on said lot as it carried no reference at all to the house. A building
by itself is a real or immovable property distinct from the land on which it is
constructed and therefore can be a separate subject of contracts.
[12]

On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of

Virginia, they were the rightful owners of the subject house. They presented a
tax declaration in the name of their trustees, co-respondent Hermes Tangga-an
and his wife, which tax declaration sufficiently evidences their co-ownership and
acquisition of title following the death of the decedent Virginia. We have ruled
that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership. [13]

One of the factual issues raised by the petitioner spouses concerns the
alleged waiver and cession of Virginias rights over the house and lot to Virgilio.
But the petitioner spouses did not mention any consideration received by
Virginia for the waiver of the house, in effect making said waiver a donation
thereof to Virgilio. However, in order for a donation of real property like a house
to be valid, a public instrument duly signed by the donor and accepted by the
donee (which acceptance must be known to the donor while alive) must be
executed. Moreover, said donation must not impair the legitime of the forced
[14]

heirs of the donor in order for the same not to be inofficious. In the case at bar,
[15]

no such public instrument was presented. Neither was it explained why said
waiver did not impair the rights of the other compulsory heirs of Virginia.
To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios
property as a result of the acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the
petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the accessory follows the principal.
Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by the owner of the lot on
which it is built.
There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this
well-entrenched principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from
raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the
lease of the house, without including the land. The contract states: 1. That the
lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at Premier St.,
Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City. At the time of the perfection of the contract,
[16]

the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia,
the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the
same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and
performed their obligations as lessees for two years.
Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the
lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of
ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the
building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title over
the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically
canceling the contract.
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive
presumption that:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive

presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it;

xxx xxx xxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the
petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the
contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after
Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease
without judicial approval. Due to the change in ownership of the land, the
petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract because Virgilio
supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot.
They alleged that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as
lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house. But there
is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind
the same in case of violation of the terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a
contract is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect. What the
[17]

petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for
interpleader for the claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the rentals
in court.
The petitioner spouses aver that their payments to Virgilio beginning
November, 1993 were payments made in good faith to a person in possession
of the credit, in consonance with Article 1242 of the Civil Code. This therefore
[18]

released them from their obligation. They claim that Virgilio collected the rentals
in his capacity as a co-owner. Being a son of Virginia, he was also entitled to
the rent of the subject house. We disagree. Virgilio collected the rentals not as
a co-owner but as the alleged sole owner of the subject house. The petitioner
spouses themselves admitted that Virgilio claimed sole ownership of the house
and lot. It would be incongruous for them to now assert payment in good faith
to a person they believed was collecting in behalf of his co-heirs after admitting
that they paid rent to Virgilio as the sole owner thereof.
Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent,
respondents can legally demand the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000]

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assails (1) the amended decision of public respondent Court of
Appeals dated 03 July 1995 in CA-GR CV No. 33395 affirming the trial
[1]

court's judgment ordering herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Company (hereafter, METROBANK) to release/cancel the real estate
mortgage constituted over the subject property, and (2) the respondent court's
resolution dated 04 December 1995 denying petitioner METROBANK's motion
for reconsideration.

The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of

six hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by businessman
Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753 (106901) of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business
reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent
G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the
mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the
subject property.

Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in
behalf of respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo,
Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to inquire on Mr. Chia's
remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a
statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of
August ,1980.

The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and
[2] [3]

respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980

in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16 September
1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one
hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one
centavos (P116,416.71), for which METROBANK issued an official receipt
[4]

acknowledging payment.

This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real

estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty.
Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an action
for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.

In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale
in favor of respondent GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its
part justified its non-release of the real estate mortgage (1) upon the advise of
Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent GTP,
and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are
also secured by the subject property.

After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11 December
1990 granting the reliefs prayed for by respondent GTP as plaintiff, viz:

"WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record,

this Court holds that in view of the facts contained in the records,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants, ordering -

"1.....Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the

release or cancellation of the real estate mortgages executed by
the deceased defendant Tomas Chia and his wife, defendant
Vicenta Chia, over the property described in TCT No. 106901 of
the registry of deeds for Quezon City;

"2.....Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate

copy of said TCT No. 106901; and,

"3.....Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of

P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

"The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.

"IT IS SO ORDERED." [5]

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24

October 1994 reversing the trial court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling
[6]

in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos
and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to
petitioner METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch
as there are other unliquidated past due loans secured by the subject
property.

With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November

1994, filed before respondent Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration
[7]

with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of

the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the re-scheduled date of oral
arguments on 08 March 1995 where METROBANK was supposed to bring
before the respondent Court the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr.
Chia secured by the deeds of mortgage sought to be released,
METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent GTP
and Mr. Chia appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a
memorandum in lieu of oral arguments in support of its motion for
reconsideration. GTP filed its memorandum on March 17, 1995 to which a
[8] [9]

reply memorandum was filed by METROBANK on April 10, 1995. [10]

On 03 July 1995, the now assailed amended decision was rendered

[11]

reconsidering the original 24 October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11
December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court. Respondent Court of
Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously
considered METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the
subject property, in concluding anew that "the present case for specific
performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the aforesaid
amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not
suffice to pay in full the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute
Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with the late Tomas Chia. There is
therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner
METROBANK is now before us after its motion for reconsideration of the 03
July 1995 amended decision was denied by respondent Court of Appeals per
Resolution of 04 December 1995. [12]

We find no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision.

We quote with favor the following pronouncements of respondent Court of

Appeals in the Amended Decision, thus:

"x x x. In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that we erred

in reversing the appealed judgment despite the finding that
subject property covered by TCT 106901- Quezon City had been
sold, in a manner absolute and irrevocable, by the spouses,
 Tomas Chia and Vicenta Chan, to plaintiff-appellee, and on
September 16, 1980, the latter complied with its contractual
obligation thereunder by paying the total mortgage debt it
assumed, amounting according to Metrobank itself,
to P116,416.71, as of September 16, 1980.

"All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the

opinion, and so rule, that whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia
contracted with Metrobank after September 4, 1980, without the
conformity of plaintiff-appellee, could not be adjudged as part of
the mortgage debt the latter so assumed. We are persuaded that
the contrary ruling on this point in Our October 24, 1994 decision
would be unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before
buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt thereon,
the latter inquired from Metrobank about the exact amount of the
mortgage debt involved.

"The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors'

debts subsequently obtained would be covered by the same
security became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee
the mortgaged property with the knowledge of the mortgagee
bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that
whatever additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same
was not chargeable to and collectible from plaintiff-appellee. It is
then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid cause or
ground not to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite
full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by appellee." [13]

Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real

estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other
unliquidated past due loans." InManeclang vs. Baun, this Court enumerated
[14]

the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:

"1.....there must have been a representation or concealment of

material facts;

"2.....the representation must have been with knowledge of the

facts;

"3.....the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of

the truth of the matter; and
 "4.....it must have been with the intention that the other party
would act upon it.

Respondent GTP, thru Atty. Atienza, requested from METROBANK that he be

furnished a copy of the full indebtedness secured by the real estate
mortgage. In response thereto, petitioner METROBANK issued a statement
[15]

of account as of September 15, 1980 which amount was immediately settled

[16]

and paid the next day amounting to P116, 416.71. Petitioner METROBANK is
thus barred from taking a stand inconsistent with its representation upon
which respondent GTP, as an innocent third person to the real mortgage
agreement, placed exclusive reliance. Respondent GTP had the reasonable
right to rely upon such representations as true, considering that it had no
participation whatsoever in the mortgage agreement and the preparation of
the statement of account, coupled with the expectation that a reputable
banking institution such as petitioner METROBANK do conduct their business
concerns in the highest standards of efficiency and professionalism. For an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against a person relying thereon. A
party may not go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of
the other party who relied upon them. In the law of evidence, whenever a
party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such
belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or
omission, be permitted to falsify it. [17]

Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before

respondent Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims
as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March
1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner
METROBANK to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the
following pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals et. al, speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco, find
[18] [19]

rightful application, viz.-

"It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a

material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in
his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must
overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact,
and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises
that the evidence, if produced, would operate to his prejudice, and
support the case of his adversary. x x x"
 "No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his
power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit
him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the
fact does not exist."

x x x......................x x x......................x x x

"Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going

to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to
prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an
opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well
be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded.
x x x"

"The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within
his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the
court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence,
and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as
claimed by the opposing party."

Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only

created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be
heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity
to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The amended decision of respondent

Court of Appeals dated 3 July 1995 as well as its resolution of 4 December
1995 is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142932. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOEL GONZALES,

JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-
appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex
crime of robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor Suralta in the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph
Bernaldez with robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in
an information which alleged

That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in
conspiracy with one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away Seiko divers watch valued at P1,000.00, one Sanyo cassette
valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00, with a total value of FOUR
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, belonging to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs,
represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum; and on the
occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting
upon the latter wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
 When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty,
whereupon they were tried.[3]
On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for
Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to
Dismiss with respect to accused Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the
court issued an order stating

On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst.
Provl. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-
taken and in order, said motion is granted.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered
dismissed. The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to release immediately from
custody the person of Joseph Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant his
further confinement in jail.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo

Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and
Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao
Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and
Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife,
suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun had a
bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other one carrying a knife
had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held
Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in
the house were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the
sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor. Nicanor
answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to give money to the
holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was intended to be deposited in the bank,
to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the
cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school
expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the familys Sanyo cassette
recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the
guests, of his Seiko divers wristwatch and then left.[5]
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the
first one was a mere warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita
became hysterical after seeing her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor
was immediately brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first
aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital but he eventually
died.[6] The death certificate (Exh. B) states the cause of his death as

Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST

Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS]
PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE
CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL
TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID
Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA.[7]

The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita
Suralta and Arsenio Abonales gave descriptions of the holduppers and told the
responding police investigators that they would be able to recognize the suspects if they
saw them again.[8]
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus
compound in the neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao
Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the incident was able to pick up
suspects,[9] one of whom was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a
wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a
cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered from his house,
some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.[10]
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team
investigating the robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam,
Police Chief of San Isidro, about the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and
the recovery of the items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam,
Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor Generoso Police
Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man armed with a gun
who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the
knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.[11]
Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her
nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said that they were able to recognize the suspects despite
their disguises because they were only one to two meters away from each other during
the holdup, and the rooms of the house were well-lighted.[12] In addition, Carolita was
able to identify the Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their house
because of the broken antennae and the name Nick Suralta written inside the battery
compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified the Seiko divers watch
(Exh. A) as his.[13]
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-laws
farm, piling coconut palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he
had supper in his house and slept there together with his family.[14]
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he
was awakened by Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie
Tano, who took him to the Governor Generoso police station in connection with a
robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the police station, he was investigated by
Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail, people came to see
him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman companion if he was one of the
persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, I do not know
them. For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return,
the woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accused-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in the robbery.[15]
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen
Ernesto Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they
alighted from the jeep and he was made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro
with the use of an armalite and hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought to
the Mati Cemetery and there forced to confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open
tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days,
he was taken to Governor Generoso. He denied participation in the crime and stated
that the cassette recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.[16]
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30
oclock in the evening of July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in his house in Tibanban,
Governor Generoso together with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998,
he went to the Municipal Jail of Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police
that he was concealing a firearm. At the police station, he was investigated by Inspector
Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept, which he denied. He was later placed in
jail.[17] Inspector Malintad, however, testified that Bernaldez was actually arrested in his
house in Tibanban.[18]
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta,
accompanied by Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went to the jail and made the
prisoners stand up, after which they went to Malintads office. Then, the two returned to
the jail cell after a few minutes and Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in
the robbery.[19]
 Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers
from Manikling, San Isidro, where the robbery with homicide took place, and could be
reached by several means of land transportation.[20]
Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel
Gonzaless testimony. According to Bahan, at around 5 oclock in the morning of July
21, 1992, he left for Governor Generoso on official mission together with SPO3 Castro,
SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel
Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck
Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo Castro of Municipal Trial Court
of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to turn
over Joel Gonzales.The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 oclock in the
morning and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of July 21, 1992. To
support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the court page 362 of the police blotter for
July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:

SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police
Station from Governor Generoso and brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding
the request of Chief Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial
Command, Mati Dvo Or to Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of
Davao Or duly signed by [Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of accused
to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC No. 7183 for Robbery with
Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of
Police of Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided
that maximum security must be implemented and to be returned said to Governor
Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel Gonzales also
involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses
subject is hereby placed under police custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1
Fortuna to the Jailer guard BJMP SPO3 Cabillada.[21]

SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati
Cemetery. He said that when they arrived in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel
Gonzales to the Chief of Police, who then turned him over to the investigating section.[22]
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in
connection with Criminal Case No. 7183. Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been
administratively charged with maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case was later
dismissed and he was exonerated.[23]
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of
the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum of P50,000.00, to indemnify also jointly and
severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.

The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit D) is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the
wristwatch (Exhibit A) to Arsenio Abonales.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE ACCUSED
WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL ARE
INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.[25]

On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants,
assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[26]
We find accused-appellants contentions to be without merit.
After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence
establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for
robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon
things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done withanimus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim
is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public Attorneys Office
concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving the commission of the crime,
questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.[27]
 First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the
identification made by the two prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio
Abonales. They argue that the manner by which accused-appellants were identified was
suggestive and showed partiality. They argue further that, most often, the bereaved
families of victims are not concerned with the accuracy of identification because they
are overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless of whether or not the suspect is
the real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower
courts conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses identification of the
accused-appellants as the persons who robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples guest
Arsenio Abonales and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims
of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe
the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailants create a lasting impression on the victims minds which
cannot be easily erased from their memory.[28] There is no evidence to show that the
eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they mistook accused-appellants for the
men who robbed and killed the victims. On the contrary, fear for ones life may even
cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings.[29] Experience shows that
precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in
identifying criminals.[30] The desire to see that justice is done will not be served should
the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the
crime.[31]
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-
appellants as the armed men who held them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim.
There was no possibility of mistaken identification because prosecution witnesses were
able to observe their movements and their body built and height despite the fact that
accused-appellants covered their faces.[32] As Carolita Suralta testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?
A When they got inside, Your Honor.
....
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel Gonzales,
considering that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?
 A Because at the time he said, silence, I recognized his voice, Your Honor.[33]
Accused-appellants counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the
trial by using the word recognize to simultaneously mean identification of face and
knowledge of the name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree
with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when one equates knowing the person
by his movements and by his voice with knowing a person by his name. Although the
names of accused-appellants were supplied by the police, the witnesses nevertheless
recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in the Governor Generoso
jail.[34] What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the true and correct
names of the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually seen
committing the offense.[35]
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is
presumed that he was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.[36] That presumption has not been overcome in this case. Consequently, the
identification of accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is
motive for the killing important when there is no doubt as to the identity of the
perpetrators of the crime.[37] But here the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob
him of his possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
positive identification of accused-appellants. The defense of denial and alibi,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimonies of credible witnesses. [38]
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and
investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their
rights to remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12,
Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is
inadmissible in evidence against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales was picked up at around 8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora,
Governor Generoso. Accused-appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline
and was wearing a wristwatch. According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant
Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation and voluntarily
surrendered the stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
 ....
Q In his residence?
A In the vicinity of his residence.
Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?
A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.
Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
....
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police station and
interrogated him and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the crime and he told
me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
....
Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he voluntarily turned
over the loot?
A On that date.
Q The time when you went to the house?
A Yes.
....
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A I did not go inside the house.
Q How many of you went to the house?
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?
A Yes.
Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?
A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items.[39]
 To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when
they made their admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a
suspect and for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
freedom in a substantial way.[40] Hence, the admissions made by accused-appellants are
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However,
the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility of these statements
immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was presented as a
witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession were
asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right
to object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintads testimony. [41] Indeed, it was even
the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate
on the circumstances of accused-appellant Gonzales admission in the course of his
cross-examination of the said witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that
one of his companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
....
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A He was picked up later.
Q Where did you pick him up?
A At Tibanban.
Q Why did you pick him up?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his companions?
A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up.[42]

On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail
at the Police Station of Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked
them who killed the victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it
was accused-appellant Joel Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one answered  I
was not responsible in the killing  and he said, Joel Gonzales killed the victim.
 Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.[43]

Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his

co-appellant Joel Gonzales. For the constitutional provision on custodial investigation
does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted
having committed the crime.[44]
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no
warrant when the latter conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged
items taken during the robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and
wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went
to the house of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder,
chainsaw, and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a consented
search, which constitutes a waiver of the constitutional requirement for a search
warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from an unreasonable search may
be waived either expressly or impliedly.[45] And when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary rule (Art.
III, 3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken
from him. Inspector Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a
chainsaw, and spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the
latter in his house. There is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintads claim that the stolen
items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant Gonzales.These items were
definitively identified by the owners as those taken from them. Between the testimonies
of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of regularity in their duties, and the
bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the police
officers. This is true especially considering that the police officers have not been shown
to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him. Since the subject items were found in the
possession of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of
the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was unable to satisfactorily explain his
possession of the stolen items.
 All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion perpetuawas correctly
imposed by the trial court on accused-appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same being in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[46] An additional amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Such damages require no further proof other
than the death of the victim.[47] The restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their
respective owners ordered by the trial court is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial
Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor
Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the proceedings. The
cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the wristwatch
to Arsenio Abonales.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of
Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent
of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and
acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have
been derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt
of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC’s
finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100
by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and
Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated
November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by
their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1,
Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the
warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995,
thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight
(38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply
Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse,
based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if
he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private
complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the
Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3
Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito
Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police
District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in
the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14
Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which
Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which
was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant
entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from
him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the
buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the
warehouse.

After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck
tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was
already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police
station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen
(13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed
by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse.5

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February
1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he
was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware &
General Merchandise (Gold Link).6

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The
poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes
later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those
items were stolen tires.7

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in
the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612.8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional.9

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.10

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence
in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen – testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and
an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort
Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila
on 27 February 1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13)
out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession.15 Ong likewise admitted
that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was
issued Sales Invoice No. 980.16

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24)
years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for
proof of ownership of the tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of
tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as
to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and
the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of
the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include
the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of
commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No.
1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is,
according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612
1âw phi 1

requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item,
object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a
diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
1âw phi1

practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and
may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove
that Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by
the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the
prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the 25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four
(44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned
in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil
tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation
of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 75120 April 28, 1994

POLICARPIO CAYABYAB, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE, APPELLATE COURT, FAUSTINO, GABRIEL, SOLEDAD &
FRANCISCA, and all surnamed LANDINGIN and AMPARO FRANCISCO, respondents.

Villamor A. Tolete for petitioner.

Juan O. Reyes, Manuel, Jr., Nepuscua & Pimentel, Jr. Law Offices for private respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and
set aside (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 03883, reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLII, Dagupan City, in Civil Case No. D- 5101;
and (2) its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision.

We deny the petition and affirm the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Respondents Gabriel, Soledad and Francisca, all surnamed Landingin, are children of respondent
Faustino Landingin and the late Agapita Ferrer. Petitioner is the son of Agapita Ferrer by her first
husband, Ludovico Cayabyab, while respondent Amparo Francisco is petitioner's niece, being the
daughter of his sister, Nieves Cayabyab.

In their second amended complaint filed against petitioner before Branch VII of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case No. D-5101, private respondents asked for the
annulment of the deeds of sale and the recovery of possession of four parcels of land with damages.
Two of the parcels of land (Lots [a] and [d]) are situated in Dagupan City while the other two (Lots [b]
and [c]) are situated in Barrio Botao, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.

Private respondents alleged that petitioner was able to obtain the signatures of Agapita Ferrer and
respondent Faustino Landingin in the deeds of sale through fraud, undue influence and abuse of
confidence. It was only in 1980, or three years thereafter, that they learned of said sales after
respondent Gabriel Landingin received from petitioner a demand to vacate Lot (d) on which
petitioner and private respondents all reside. According to private respondents, these lots form part
of their inheritance as the compulsory heirs of Agapita Ferrer, to the exclusion of petitioner, who
already received his share during Ferrer's lifetime.

In his answer, petitioner did not claim Lot (a) but alleged that he acquired by purchase one-third
portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Faustino
Landingin and Agapita Ferrer on March 21, 1973 and notarized before Notary Public Eduardo B.
Siapno (Exh. "O"; Exh. "10"); the remaining two-thirds portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer before Notary
Public Juan S. Caguioa on April 21, 1977 (Exh. "P"; Exh. "9"); and Lot (d) by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Agapita Ferrer with the marital consent of respondent Faustino Landingin
on April 21, 1977 (Exh. "N"; Exh. "2").
On May 9, 1984, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without pronouncement
as to damages and costs.

Both parties appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, with private respondents questioning the
merits of the decision and petitioner questioning the omission of an award for damages.

On October 7, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the questioned
decision. It ordered the annulment of the deeds of sale over the subject lots and declared the heirs
of Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin the owners and rightful possessors of the
parcels of land in question. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the improper appreciation of the facts by the Court a quo,
which likewise misapplied the law involved therein, We hereby reverse and set aside
the appealed decision and render another one annulling the deeds of sale executed
on March 21, 1973 (Exh. 0 or 10) and on April 21, 1977 (Exh. P or 9 and Exh. N or
2), covering Parcels (b), (c) and (d) of the complaint, cancelling Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 37058 (Exh. 4) and reinstating Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10018
(Exh. H), declaring the four (4) lands described in the complaint as owned by the
heirs of Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer. We hereby order the defendant to
immediately surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs. No damages and costs
(Rollo, p. 71).

Hence, this recourse.

II

It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive
on this Court. However, where the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to
each other, we deem it necessary to review the records and the evidence of the instant case (Gaw v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 405 [1993]; Lauron v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 215
[1990]; Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 1 [1990]). There is no dispute that the lands
subject of this case, namely, Lots (a), (b), (c) and (d) formerly belonged to the conjugal partnership
of respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer. The ownership over Lot (a) is, however, not
being contested by petitioner and therefore respondents' claim that it is conjugal stands
uncontradicted.

Petitioner's evidence show that: the one-third portion comprising 1,806 square meters each of Lots
(b) and (c) were sold on March 21, 1973 by the spouses to petitioner for a consideration of
P1,000.00 (Exh. "O"; Exh. "10"); the remaining two-thirds portion of the same lots comprising 3,612
square meters each were sold to petitioner on April 21, 1977 for a total consideration of P3,612.00
(Exh. "P"; Exh. "9"); and, on the same date, the spouses also sold Lot (d) to petitioner for a
consideration of P5,000.00 (Exh. "N"; Exh. 2). All these transactions were evidenced by deeds of
sale signed by respondent Faustino Landingin and thumbmarked by Agapita Ferrer, which were
witnessed by two persons and acknowledged by the vendors before a notary public. The sale of Lot
(d) was recorded on April 28, 1977 with the Register of Deeds, who cancelled TCT No. 10018 in the
spouses' name and accordingly issued TCT No. 37058 in petitioner's name.

Petitioner claims that the sale of the subject lots to him is valid and binding as clearly evidenced by
the deeds of sale which are public documents. According to him, private respondents' allegation of
fraud, deceit and undue influence have not been established sufficiently and competently to rebut
the presumption of regularity and due execution of the deeds of sale.
Indeed, the general rule is that whosoever alleges fraud or mistake in any transaction must
substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care for his concerns
and that private transactions have been fair and regular. This rule is especially applied when fraud or
mistake is alleged to annul notarial documents which are clothed with the prima facie presumption of
regularity and due execution (Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 132 [B], Sec. 30).

Nevertheless, the general rule admits of exceptions, one of which is Article 1332 of the Civil Code
which provides:

When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract
must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

Under the foregoing provision, where a party to a contract is illiterate, or can not read nor understand
the language in which the contract is written, the burden is on the party interested in enforcing the
contract to prove that the terms thereof are fully explained to the former in a language understood by
him (Sales v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]; Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 897 [1983]; Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504 [1971]). In all contractual, property or
other relations, where one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his physical, mental or
other handicap, the courts must be careful and vigilant for his protection (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 24; Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 151 [1981]; Tang
v. Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA 236 [1979]).

In the case at bench, both respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer were illiterate. The
latter, in fact, could only thumbmark her signature on all the deeds of sale (Exhs. "2-B"; "9-D"; "10-
C"); and although respondent Faustino Landingin may have affixed his signature to the deeds of
sale, he could neither read nor write and actually lost the use of his right arm to paralysis in 1971
(TSN, September 10, 1981, pp. 4-5). To make matters worse, all the deeds were written in English
while the spouses could speak and understand only the Pangasinense and Ilocano dialects (TSN,
June 30, 1981, pp. 14-15; Id., Sept. 10, 1981, pp. 4-6; Id., Aug. 21, 1982, pp. 21-22).

Since fraud and undue influence in the execution of the subject deeds are alleged by respondents,
the burden, under the circumstances, shifted to petitioner to prove that the contents thereof had
been adequately explained to the vendors and that the latter fully understood the same (Heirs of
Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals, supra., at 904).

As very well found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.

The testimonies of Bartolome Ceralde and Dr. Alfredo Cerezo are not sufficient and credible enough
to tip the scale in favor of petitioner.

First, Ceralde is a "compadre" of petitioner. The fact that the respondent Faustino Landingin and
Agapita Ferrer sold a parcel of land to him in 1973, does not necessarily make the sale of the lots to
petitioner valid and binding. Dr. Cerezo, on the other hand, has been the spouses' physician since
1955 and his testimony that he never knew of Agapita Ferrer's eye operation and hospital
confinement in Manila (TSN, August 27, 1982, p. 25) raises serious doubts about his credibility.

Second, when the two contracts were executed and witnessed by Dr. Cerezo in 1977, Agapita
Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin were 81 years old. In fact, barely six months later,
Agapita actually died of senility, as stated in her death certificate (Exh. "A").
Third, both Dr. Cerezo and Ceralde testified that Atty. Tandoc, the lawyer who allegedly drew up the
deeds of sale in 1977, read and explained in Pangasinense the contents of said deeds to the
spouses. Ceralde, however, was not present when Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said act.
Surprisingly too, Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said a witness. Even Attys. Caguioa and
Siapno, who notarized respectively the same deeds of sale, as well as the 1973 contract, were never
called to testify. No explanation whatsoever was given as to the failure of petitioners to present these
two notaries public who notarized the deeds of sale in question.

The weight of the testimony of Dr. Cerezo is therefore undermined by this lapse on the part of
petitioner. Only the two notaries public could be examined and cross-examined on the accuracy of
their translation of the contents of the documents written in English into the dialect known to and
understood by the vendors.

Fourth, the couple was not assisted by any of their children in the execution of the subject contracts.
This circumstance is strange and highly suspicious. Magdalena, respondent Faustino Landingin's
daughter by his first marriage, and Soledad Landingin were then living with their parents. Like
Amparo Francisco, their step-niece, they actually assisted the couple in their correspondences and
transactions (TSN, June 22, 1981, pp. 4, 15; Id., June 30, 1981, p. 17; Id., Sept. 10, 1981, pp. 3,
14; Id., October 21, 1982, pp. 3-4). However, neither of the sisters nor Amparo was invited to act as
an instrumental witness, much less informed of the execution of the contracts at petitioner's house
which is merely one meter away from their house (TSN, Aug. 27, 1982, p. 18).

Fifth, there is no satisfactory showing that the consideration for the sale of the lots was ever paid to
Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin. Where it is claimed that the signature and
thumbmark of the vendors were procured by the vendees through fraud, undue influence and abuse
of confidence, a showing that valuable consideration passed hands and that the vendors benefitted
therefrom, may help erase any thought that such sinister designs attended the transaction.

Indeed, all these facts and circumstances lend credence to the claim that the sale of the subject lots
and the execution of the deeds of sale were done surreptitiously and in fraud of the couple and their
heirs (Aguinaldo v. Esteban, 135 SCRA 645 [1985]).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.

CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, TEODULFO DAGUING,

FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at
large), accused.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime of Kidnapping
with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna,
Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido
Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them reads:

That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one
another, with the use of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia
and take him away to a place unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim was
killed.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7) accused
remain at large.

The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and Buenaventura
Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.

CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven o'clock in the morning, he
was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao.
At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and
taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other
persons. viz: Didoc Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos
Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while
his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up
the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on his way.
With the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2

BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon. He testified

that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in barangay
Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-
five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands
tied by a rope behind his back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five
(5) other persons whom he did not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos
Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place. 3

From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from.

At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna claimed that on May 24,
1984, Danilo Noroño, a cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. They were
informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroño, his wife's grandmother, was bedridden and
seriously ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw,
Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled
these plants and regularly applied them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada
for three (3) weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in
barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his
grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroño.

Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings
against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He
claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their barangay.
Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon
but the latter got mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other. Nogalada on the
other hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982, they had an altercation during a volleyball game
held during the barangay fiesta. 5

After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. As kidnapping
(and serious illegal detention) is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and
murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, under Article 48 of
the Code, the herein accused should be punished with the maximum of the more
serious crime, hereat the supreme penalty of death. Considering that the Constitution
of 1987 does not allow the imposition of the death penalty, however, herein accused
is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of
P30,000.00. He is credited with the full period of his detention in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not sign an
agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and regulations at the inception.

SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal.

In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses
that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He submits, inter alia, that
considering that the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia's questionable and
unexplained absence and disappearance should not be blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all
probability, may still be alive.

In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the culpability of accused-
appellant were sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on the disputable
presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4) years.

Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May 27, 1984. During this
time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed men. Clearly, he
was then in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for a span of six years),
Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The People urges that these circumstances raised a
presumption that Moronia has been killed by accused-appellant and his companions.

The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the prosecution are
sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or
not accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable therefor.

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a
compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of
the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 8

Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?

Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on May 27, 1984 with
his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his life
was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia has been absent and unheard from
since that time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a presumption of death was
sufficiently raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4) years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold accused-
appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.

In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder
although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of murder
or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be found. It is
enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized that there
are cases where the death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.

However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In the Sasota
case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly take the victim from his
house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused continued ill-
treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never found.

In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of the accused,
Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of barangay
Monterico and was never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever
established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on
him. Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed
accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any
of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for abducting
Moronia was not definitively established. To be sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.

There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of
Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter.
The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it should be further
presumed that the person with whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the
subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant
for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous
facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the
prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged
liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.

It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-
appellant should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.

Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping
with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was
established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted
together in its commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the
commission of the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on
accused-appellant. 12

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.

Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is meted an
indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84672 August 5, 1991

IMPERIAL VICTORY SHIPPING AGENCY, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TOMAS FANEGA, SR., respondents.

Nestor C. Lumba and Ruben L. Cabio for petitioner.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari to nullify the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission in POEA Case No. (M) 85-12-0972 dated May 30,1988 setting aside the earlier
decision dated December 11, 1987 and ordering the petitioner Imperial Victory Shipping Agency,
Inc., together with Christiaco Compania de Navera, to pay jointly and severally, the respondent
Tomas Fanega, Sr. the sum of P130,000.00 under the POEA Standard Employment Contract as
death compensation benefit of his son who died on December 26, 1982, plus ten (10%) percent
thereof as attorney's fee.

Tomas Fanega, Jr. was hired as a seaman by a Greek company, the Christiaco Compania de
Navera through its agent, petitioner Imperial Victory Shipping Agency. He was assigned on board
M/V Rhodian Sailor, which unfortunately sank somewhere in Taiwan on December 26, 1982. As his
body was not recovered, he was presumed dead together with twenty-one other Filipino crew
members.

Tomas Fañega, Sr. immediately filed his claim for death benefits. During the hearing in the National
Seaman Board, the P & I Club, as insurer for the shipowner, offered to pay private respondent the
amount of P52,500.00 as death benefits in accordance with the POEA Standard Employment
Contract. Private respondent's lawyer, however, advised him not to accept the amount because it
was allegedly too small compared to what he can recover if the case will be filed against the
principal abroad. Accordingly, private respondent refused the offer and agreed to the filing of the
claim abroad. However, he was not able to collect the insurance benefits of his son in Greece due to
the alleged bankruptcy of the insurance company. Thus, private respondent filed this case with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on December 16,1985, well within the period of
prescription of three years from the date the cause of action accrued on December 26, 1982.

From January 20, 1986 up to March 4, 1987, hearings were conducted on the case. Atty. Joseph
Capuyan, as counsel for private respondent declared under oath during the hearing of February 18,
1987 as follows:

(1) He admits that Tan Sapalo Law Offices was handling complainant's case
immediately after the death of complainant's son;
 (2) That there was actually an offer made by respondents before to pay complainant
of his death benefits;

(3) That they actually filed a claim abroad in behalf of complainant;

(4) That complainant, about two (2) years ago, manifested to them that he intended
to withdraw his claim abroad;

(5) That as per advise of complainant, Atty. Capuyan advised the American Lawyer
to withdraw Fanega's claim;

(6) That they would be submitting copy of the complaint and other necessary papers
in due time to support the foregoing statement (POEA Decision, Rollo, p. 27)

For failure of private respondent to comply with what is incumbent upon him to do so regarding the
submission of the papers referred to above, the POEA concluded that the suit filed abroad was still
pending. It ruled that complainant cannot sue in two for a simultaneously for the same cause of
action. It also ruled that the claim is barred by laches. The pertinent portion of the POEA decision
states:

... The declarations of both the complainant and his counsel clearly established their
refusal of the offer of payment made immediately after the death of the former's son.
Likewise, it supports respondent's theory that they cannot now be liable without
extreme prejudice for the reason that long before the sinking of NW Rhodian Sailor",
respondent's manning agreement with its principal had already been terminated, The
condition now of respondent had so chanced (the foreign principal's whereabouts
now unknown both to respondents herein and the P & I Club) that it would be most
iniquitous to allow complainant after all these time and circumstances, to recover
from it. In the light of the foregoing, complainant cannot now be allowed.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, let the above-entitled case be, as it hereby ordered,

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

These findings were affirmed in NLRC's first decision dated December 11, 1987 which held as
follows:

This action of the complainant of instituting separate complaints involving the same
patties and the same cause of action is not allowed by law. The flimsy excuse of the
complainant that they were compelled to file the instant case before the POEA
almost three (3) years from its accrual considering that no positive result was
obtained in his behalf by the Tan Sapalo law firm does not alter Our finding that the
instant case is already barred by the filing of the first case abroad. As aptly pointed
out by the POEA, the complainant cannot sue in two fora simultaneously for the
same cause of action.

We affirm.

WHEREFORE, promises considered, let the appeal be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED

for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed. (NLRC Decision dated
December 11, 1987, Rollo, pp. 34-35)
On motion for reconsideration of private respondent, the NLRC reversed and set aside the aforesaid
decision on May 30, 1988. We quote from the latter decision the reason for the reversal.

The fact of complainant's failure or inability to collect the insurance benefit from the
insurer of the sunk vessel has not been denied nor rebutted. Also, there is no dispute
that complainant's son had died on December 26,1982 while on board M/V Rhodian
Sailor which sank somewhere in Taiwan. Such being the case, We believe there
would be no obstacle to complainant's recovering from the employer under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract.

What the law prohibits is recovering from two fora for the same cause of action. The
right to choose from which forum he would recover belongs to the complainant, and
having failed to recover therefrom in one forum does not bar him from proceeding
against his respondent employer under the standard provision in the employment
contract of his deceased son. Neither does the fact that he rejected the previous offer
of payment to him by (Pandiman P & I Club) affect his right to collect from herein
respondents. This is simply giving meaning and effect to the legal and constitutional
protection to labor and obedience to the call of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby set aside our decision dated

December 11, 1987, and another judgment entered, ordering the respondents to pay
jointly and severally the complainant the sum of P130,000.00 under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract as death compensation benefit of his son who died
3n December 26, 1982, plus ten (10%) percent thereof as attorney's fee. In the
absence of evidence that the deceased's body was actually recovered and buried, no
burial expense(s) is awarded. (NLRC Decision dated May 30, 1988, Rollo, pp. 37-38)

Hence, this petition by Imperial Victory Shipping Agency.

Petitioner argues that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it reversed its original decision dismissing the case for lack of merit. First, it claims
that the NLRC's decision of December 11, 1987 is final and executory as private respondent's
motion for reconsideration was filed on the 11th day. Private respondent received a copy of the
aforesaid decision on January 14, 1988 and filed his motion for reconsideration on January 25,
1985.

It appears, however, that the 10th day fell on a Sunday. Thus, the motion for reconsideration was
timely filed on the next working day. This Court has had the occasion in SM Agri and General
Machineries v. NLRC G.R. No. 74806, January 9, 1989, 169 SCRA 20, to explain the ruling in Vir-
Jen Shipping v. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 58011-12, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 347, which was cited
by petitioner in support of its argument. in said SM Agri and General Machineries case, this Court
held that the ruling in the Vir-Jen Case does not apply where the legal holiday is coincidentally the
10th or the last day to appeal for in such instances, Section 31, Article VIII of the Revised
Administrative Code must be applied and said Section 31 provides that where the day or the last day
for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next
succeeding business day.

The Court therein explained that the ruling in Vir-Jen Shipping case contemplates a situation where
one is burdened with the task of computing a ten-day period which includes a Saturday, Sunday or
Legal Holiday and not when the tenth day falls on a Sunday or Legal Holiday. To be noted is the fact
that Saturday (unless legally declared a holiday) is considered a business day and therefore if the
last day to appeal falls on a Saturday, the act is still due on that day and not on the next succeeding
business day.

Thus, while the Court upheld therein the interpretation made in Vir-Jen Shipping Case that the 10-
day period fixed by Article 223 of the Labor Code contemplates calendar days and not working days,
it recognized an exception to this general rule, i.e., where the 10th day is a Sunday or a Legal
Holiday, in which event, the appeal can be filed on the next business day. Consequently, in such
case as in this case, the supposedly last day to appeal will not be deemed the last day because it
happens to be a Sunday or Legal Holiday. Instead, the act can be done on the next business day
following that Sunday and Legal Holiday.

Secondly, petitioner claims that the principle of laches bars recovery by private respondent. While
admitting that the complaint before the POEA was filed within the three-year prescriptive period, it
argues that it cannot now be liable without extreme prejudice for the reason that long before the
sinking of M/V Rhodian Sailor, petitioner's manning agreement with its principal had already been
terminated. The condition now of petitioner had so changed as the foreign principal's whereabouts
are now unknown. It concludes that it would be most inequitous to allow respondent after all these
time and circumstances to recover from it. It cites Article 1897 of the New Civil Code which provides
that an agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts and
argues that there is much less reason for a non-agent to be so held.

We are not impressed with these arguments of petitioner. Laches is a doctrine in equity while
prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not court of equity. Thus, laches
cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66696, July 14, 1986, 143 SCRA 40 that it is a long standing
principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law
and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
36958, July 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 587, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of
procedure. We said therein:

As for equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality,' this is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be
barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time
limited for the commencement of actions at law.

In the same vein, the cause of action of private respondent not having prescribed, the liability of
petitioner as manning agent subsists notwithstanding that it is no longer the manning agent at the
time the cause of action was filed. The crucial factor is whether it was the manning agent
responsible for the employment of the seaman. In the affirmative, the liability of the agent with the
principal is solidary in accordance with Section 1, Rule II of the Rules and Regulations of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.

Petitioner next attacks the second decision of May 30, 1988 for making a finding that the foreign suit
was withdrawn on the mere assertion of private respondent that he abandoned his claim because he
failed to recover therefrom and for shifting the burden of proof upon it to refute the same.
Petitioner correctly assessed that the case is simple. To get the death benefits, all that was
necessary to show is that he was the father of the dead boy. The issues herein raised on the effects
of delay and the prohibition against double recovery are matters of defense. Thus, the petitioner,
being the party asserting those facts or issues generally has the burden of proof as to such facts or
issues. It must take the initiative to prove them or its defenses will fail. The test for determining on
whom burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to which party would be successful if
no evidence on such matters were given.

Petitioner tried to avoid the burden of proving double recovery by invoking the presumption of
pendency of foreign suit. It is true that petitioner has in its favor said presumption of pendency of the
foreign suit which is an undisputed and admitted fact. This is consistent with the Rules of Court, Rule
131, Section 3 on disputable presumptions, to wit:

Rule 131. Section 3. Disputable Presumptions.-The following presumptions are

satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

e.) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that
nature.

Thus, while the presumption relieved the petitioner of the burden of proving the fact of pendency of
the foreign suit, it cannot held in petitioner's defense. It is not the pendency of a foreign suit that bars
recovery, What the law prohibits is recovery from two fora for the same cause of action.

Likewise, petitioner explains its failure to prove double recovery by arguing that the question of
whether the foreign suit was withdrawn, peculiarly lies with the private respondent as he alone,
together with his counsel, can tell in which court in Greece the suit was filed. We are not convinced.
The mere difficulty in discharging a burden of making proof should not relieve the party having the
burden of evidence from the necessity of producing evidence as it is in its power to produce. As the
manning agent of Christiaco Compania de Navera, or even as an erstwhile agent thereof, it is not
precluded from securing the necessary proof Its inability is the result of its own lack of initiative to
secure the necessary proof. Thus, in the face of the categorical assertion of private respondent that
he has failed to collect the insurance benefit from the insurer of the sunk vessel abroad, without any
evidence to the contrary being presented by petitioner, the respondent Commission committed no
grave abuse of discretion in reversing its decision and granting private respondent compensation
benefits for the death of his son.

However, worthy of note is the Solicitor General's view that the amount of death benefits to be
awarded to private respondent should either be only P50,000.00, the amount pegged under the
POEA Standard Format at the time of the seaman's death, or the amount of P52,500. 00, the
amount offered by the P & I Club soon after the tragedy but was refused by private respondent. He
pointed out that to order petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of P130,000.00 plus ten per
cent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees would be inequitous and constitutive of unjust enrichment
because the amount of P130,000.00 as death benefits became effective only in 1984, a fact not
rebutted by private respondent.

Indeed, the material date in determining the amount of death compensation benefits is the date of
death of the seaman, not the amount provided by law at the time of payment. Accordingly, the
private respondent is entitled only to P50,000.00 which is the amount of death compensation
benefits under the POEA Standard Format in 1982. Besides, the delay in the recovery of the death
compensation benefits is attributable to private respondent, not to petitioner.

Anent the denial of funeral and burial benefits by the respondent Commission, the Solicitor General
is of the belief that private respondent should be awarded these benefits even though the body of
the deceased seaman was not found. He argues that denial of these benefits would create a
dangerous precedent as there would be no serious efforts exerted on the part of the principals or
agencies similarly situated to search for or produce the bodies of deceased overseas workers.
Noteworthy also is the private respondent's argument that despite the absence of the corpse, rituals
were performed in accordance with the Roman Catholic practice. Notwithstanding the plausability of
these arguments, We cannot award burial and death benefits to private respondent in view of latter's
failure to question timely the decision of the respondent Commission. No affirmative relief can be
awarded to a party who has not appealed.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 30,1988 of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of P130,000.00 death
compensation benefits be reduced to P50,000.00 plus ten (10%) percent thereof as attomey's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.