Republic of the Philippines WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign
SUPREME COURT residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P.
AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F.
Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." 1 Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes
on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition
for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December
12, 1996 and reads as follows:
ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and
efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and
reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic
services and social security providing agencies and other government
intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
direct the following:
Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification
Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System
among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby
established.
Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines
and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired
by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:
Head, Presidential Management Staff
Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance System,
Administrator, Social Security System,
Administrator, National Statistics Office
Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby
designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide
administrative and technical support to the IACC.
Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number
(PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference
number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC
Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and
Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics
Technology and in computer application designs of their respective
systems.
Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of
the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office,
the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall
undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to
educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the
PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.
Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the
system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned
agencies.
Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall
submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on
the status of implementation of this undertaking.
Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect
immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner
filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE
ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. 2
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM
THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN
PRIVACY. 3
We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability
of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has
no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No.
308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople
is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of
public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. 5
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the
fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and
as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without
waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social
Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. 6 Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives
from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the
national identification system. 7 All signals from the respondents show
their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for
the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this
light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not
a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important
constitutional principle and a fundamental right.
II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is
not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power
of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life
and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and
the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one
branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a
stricter scrutiny by this Court.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them." 8 The Constitution, as the will of the people
in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power
in the Congress of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10 The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. 11 Any
power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. 12 In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President
executes the laws. 14 The executive power is vested in the
Presidents. 15 It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. 16 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. 17
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. 18 He has control over the executive department, bureaus
and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with
the discretion of its officials.19 Corollary to the power of control, the
President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties effectively. 20
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he
can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the
people." 26 The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I
deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with
the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government,
Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive
Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on
National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative
Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization,
powers and general administration of the executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government, the organization and
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the
executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the
rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for
the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal
administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel
and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the
functions performed by administrative officials on private
individuals or parties outside government. 27
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements
the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-
gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent
of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well
as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to
make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a
law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection,
and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact
business with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse
to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will
have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this
reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits
of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power
of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. As well stated
by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is
here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the
general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority
to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power
to make laws." 28
III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law,
still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is
the "right to be let alone." 29 In the 1965 case of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 30 the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to
the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional
foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found
within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments, 31 viz:
Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed
by emanations from these guarantees that help give them life and
substance . . . various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ''right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc, 32 we adopted the Griswold ruling
that there is a constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice,
later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of
married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within
the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional
right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept
of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy
is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. 33 It
is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of
the Bill of Rights, viz: 34
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The
Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. 35 It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, 36 and recognizes
the privacy of letters and other private communications. 37 The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, 38the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, 39 and trespass to
dwelling. 40 Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, 41 the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 42 and the
Intellectual Property Code. 43 The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. 44
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is
the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens
and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the applicatin of statistical
methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological
data." 45 The term "biometrics" has evolved into a broad category of
technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's identity
through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral
characteristics. 46 A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable
physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry
or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the
individual's personality and includes voice print, signature and
keystroke. 47 Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal
identificatin number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric
measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or
entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 48
A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where
technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an
individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in
computer data banks 49 and becomes a means of identifying an individual
using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned
every time service or access is provided. 50 Another method is the retinal
scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the
capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a
unique print similar to a finger print. 51 Another biometric method is known
as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique
combination of substances excreted from the skin of people. 52 The latest
on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have
found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique
heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat
and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat
signature." 53
In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate.
Some science fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no
longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new
science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological
characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O.
No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what
particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will
seek its coverage. Considering the banquest of options available to the
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to
privacy of our people is not groundless.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show
that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning." 54 This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the
avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No.
308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308
cannot be undarplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he
deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security.
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded
— whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency.
The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements
for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the
PRN, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base
through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast
reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse,
a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited
to the name, address and other basic personal infomation about the
individual. 57 Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308
from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear
and categorical terms how these information gathered shall he handled. It
does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to
safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government
agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard
against leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. 59
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access
confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the
individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the very
abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. 63
The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive
cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national
network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer
revolution. 64 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive
dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for
varied purposes. 65 It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping
the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. When
information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can
be extracted together with other data on the subject. 66Once extracted,
the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy
begins.
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting
opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative
and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture.
The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the
people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that
endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume
them.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the Natioal ID and the
use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The
reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the
case determines the reasonableness of the expectation. 68 However,
other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a
particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The
use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not
assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As
technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy
decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted. 72 The security of the computer data file depends not only on
the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in
hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely
drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy,
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
The rules and regulations to be by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal
defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or
order. On its face, A.O. No. gives the IACC virtually infettered discretion
to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.
Nor do your present laws prvide adequate safeguards for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act. No. 591 penalizes the
disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO
with imprisonment and fine. 73 Republic Act. No. 1161 prohibits public
disclosure of SSS employment records and reports. 74 These laws,
however, apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not
clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government
agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the
penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is another reason why its enactment should
be given to Congress.
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's
abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational relationship
test. 75 He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to
streamline and speed up the implementation of basic government
services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3)
generate population data for development planning. He cocludes that
these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the
means are rationally related to the end. 76
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc, 77 we upheld
the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in
compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets
and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on
the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality
in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. 78
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A.
3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself
is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited
and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. IN the case at
bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it
cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we
now hod that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this
court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation
a stricter scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it
enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a
basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the government
does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is narrowly
drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987
Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and
to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is to
lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by
the Constitutions.
The case of Whalen v. Roe 79 cited by the Solicitor General is also off-
line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized
computer record of the names and addresses of all persons who
obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York
State Controlled Substance Act of 1972 required physicians to identify
parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs
with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the
names and addresses of the patients can be recorded in a centralized
computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were
patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary
medication because of their fear that the computerized data may be
readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it
may stigmatize them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the
statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e., the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in
avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an aspect of the right to privacy,
the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the
enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous
drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly
and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a
specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the
matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained
numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid
down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and
retrieval of the informatin. It ebumerated who were authorized to access
the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing
penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of
the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police
power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital
safeguards.
Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the
Court is not per se agains the use of computers to accumulate, store,
process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.
Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency which both
government and private industry seek. Many information system in
different countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social
objective, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public
services, more efficient management of credit and insurance programs,
improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
activities. 81 Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good
administration by making accurate and comprehensive information for
those who have to frame policy and make key decisions. 82 The benefits
of the computer has revolutionized information technology. It developed
the internet, 83 introduced the concept of cyberspace 84 and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his
personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and classes of
information from libraries and databases connected to the net.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does
not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused 85 and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. 86 Intrusions
into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-
defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that
any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this
Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe
v. Mutuc, to wit:
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate
delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the
computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No.
308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier
against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded
warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a
way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have
lost its benign capacity to forget." 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the
dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to
privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

The concept of limited government has always included the idea

that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the
state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks
the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 87

IV

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources —
governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. 88 In th case at
bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT HELD:
Manila
YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General
EN BANC and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG &
violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,
present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.
vs.
Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
FACTS:

Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai

Banking Corporation (HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the
offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the
criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application
of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private
prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty
ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of
prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, HSBC.Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935,
modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6
months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of
prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng
filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new
trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought
to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November,
1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case
to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this

case.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It
is our duty, given the facts and the law, to approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals’ decision2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially
affirmed the National Labor RelationsCommission’s resolution dated
March 31, 2004,3declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal, directing
petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to New
Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the
NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00
attorney’s fees.4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment
and placement agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent,
Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in
Taiwan.6
Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear
employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. 8 She alleged
that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of
₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June
26, 1997.10 She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to
work as quality control for one year.11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter.12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a
certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that
she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office
to get her salary and passport."13 She was asked to "prepare for
immediate repatriation."14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only
earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. 16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor
Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that
she was illegally dismissed.18 She asked for the return of her placement
fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for
23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. 19 She identified
Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal. 20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's
termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her
"failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement
fee of ₱70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860
dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of ₱20,360.00.23 Petitioner
added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been
transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
(Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was
already substituted by Pacific Manpower.25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against
it.26 It alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between
them.27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract
should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations
might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for
petitioner’s illegal acts.30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting
Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was
based on mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter found that there was no
excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt
presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a
discussion on petitioner’s transfer of obligations to Pacific 34 and
considered the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondent’s
complaint.35
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations
Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. 38 It reiterated the
doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on
a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. 39 It found that Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes
for termination. 40 There was no sufficient proofto show that respondent
was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company
requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not observed in
terminating respondent.42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of
reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction. 43 It refused to
entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. 44 It did
not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule
on the matter.45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only
three (3) months worth of salaryin the amount of NT$46,080, the
reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorney’s fees of
NT$300.46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration47 dated
May 12, 2004 through a resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused
the filing of a petition49 for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing
the National Labor Relations Commission’s resolutions dated March 31,
2004 and July 2, 2004.
The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal,
Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s
fees.51 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor
Relations Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations
against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus: Although the public
respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we
should point out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months
backwages or the amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its
finding that she was dismissed without due process, a finding that we
uphold, given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in
the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s finding
in regard to the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on
the law; as well as the award of attorney’s fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public
respondent for further proceedings, for the purpose of addressing the
validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party complaint against the
transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that as far as the decision of
the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby
affirmed with finality, and we hold petitioner liable thereon, but without
prejudice to further hearings on its third party complaint against Pacific for
reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are
hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance with the foregoing discussion,
but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last sentence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition. 54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding
respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and attorney’s
fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because
there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her
work.55
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid. 56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly
transferred to Pacific at the time respondent filed her complaint, it should
be Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual
obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitioner. 57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’spetition is without merit. We find
for respondent.
I in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just
cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to
accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and
quality standards at work.58 They may also impose reasonable rules to
ensure that the employees comply with these standards. 59 Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. 60 Certainly, employers
cannot be compelled to retain the services of anemployee who is guilty of
acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. 61 While the law
acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not
"authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our
jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the
employee’s right to security of tenure." 63Workers are entitled to
substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may
not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution. 64
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to
work in a different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas
Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus.Thus, in
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate
requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi
Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country.
Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi
Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health
authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no
question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here
regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.Furthermore,
settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign
claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines,
employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The
Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special
protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security
of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. Theyshall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law.
....
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow
foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an
overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness
would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of employment
contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court
emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private respondent in writing of
the charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal
investigation to give him opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners
contend that the twin requirements ofnotice and hearing applies strictly
only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need
not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas
employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as
the Labor Code which afford protection to labor apply to Filipino
employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad. Moreover,
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract
is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed
that the Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners
and private respondent was executed here in the Philippines with the
approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. 68 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated
for a just or authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due
process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination
by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his
family or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and
negligent in her duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for
termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the
employer. "The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." 70 Failure to show
that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean
that the dismissal was illegal.71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must
be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and
workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the
standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated
tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable
time prior to the employee’s performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees,
which allow termination ofthe employee only when there is "just cause or
when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer
to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement." 72
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be
limited to probationary employment. That rule is basic to the idea of
security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed to all
employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for
determining the probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency,
and qualifications as a regular employee. Due process requires that the
probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his
or her engagement so he or she can adjusthis or her character or
workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon
which the employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s
chances of being positively assessed for regularization by his or her
employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after
regularization. The employer, on a regular basis, determines if an
employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based
on that determination, and after complying with the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its
management prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove to his or her
employer that he or she meets all the standards for employment. This
time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of
retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to
meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were
not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on
allegations of the employer’s failure to communicatework standards that
would govern one’s employment "if [these are] to discharge in good faith
[their] duty to adjudicate."73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply
with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her
work.74 No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner
did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what
efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of
the standards against which her work efficiency and performance were
judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position held by respondent showed
that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that
there is just cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was
legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her
repatriation on the same day show not onlyfailure on the partof petitioner
to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for
termination. They patently show that the employersdid not comply with
the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid
procedure of dismissal.75 The employer is required to give the charged
employee at least two written notices before termination. 76 One of the
written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may
cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must "[inform] the
employee of the employer’s decision."78 Aside from the notice
requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be
heard."79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing
requirements. Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She was
told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same day
and barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on
the same day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness
of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified and
given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process
of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to
her salary for the unexpired portion ofthe employment contract that was
violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts
withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995, states thatoverseas workers
who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less."
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency
is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution,
amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the
said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money
claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four
(4) months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate
authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
....
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the
worker and the transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is
due solely to the fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established, is
not the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS;
EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The repatriation of the worker
and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary
responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker
overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged
to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of
remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker
and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local
agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not
in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his
belongings.
....
The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of
withheld wages as attorney’s feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commission’s
decision to award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth
equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for
her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards.
The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should,
however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of
the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc.,82 this court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" 83 is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process. 84
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It
"confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all." 85
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less"was reinstated in Republic Act No.
8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage.
Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and
keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement
agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency,
as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency
is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution,
amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the
said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money
claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within thirty
(30) days from approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized
deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions
made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign
employer/principal, it shall be automatically disqualified, without further
proceedings, from participating in the Philippine Overseas Employment
Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and unless it
fully satisfies the judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case
providedunder this section shall subject the responsible officials to any or
all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision
or resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to
be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any
appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without
prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incured [sic]
under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of
violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means
that the reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet
in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in
1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act
No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises
adversarial positions in their proper context before considering a prayer
to declare it as unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed
incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional,
without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals.At minimum, the existence of
Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment in this
case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to
petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to
"[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights."87 When cases become mootand academic, we do
not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where
the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is
analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad
who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the
restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously declared as
unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office
of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent
with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All
laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent
with the Constitution,the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision
of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the
situation has so changed so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy
that attend to these cases. The new law puts our overseas workers in the
same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure to
reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold
economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to
avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further
litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages as well as add to the
indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply
because our precedents have not been followed. There is no
constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty
procedural niceties. Constitutional interpretation is complex, but it is
never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties
and the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality
of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was
constitutional.90 The legislators intended a balance between the
employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local
recruitment agency. 91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was
already declared as constitutional in Serrano. 92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid
and constitutional.93 However, since the parties never raised the issue of
the constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022,
its contention is that it is beyond judicial review. 94
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was
unconstitutional because it infringed on workers’ right to contract. 95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic
Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to
show any compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages
that should be recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to
three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms
of "privileges conferred and liabilities enforced." 97 It is a guarantee
against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality." 98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and
classifications."99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion. 100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative
power.101 A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made
arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law
applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are
reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the
class and those who do not fall within the class. 103 A law that does not
violate the equal protection clause prescribesa reasonable
classification.104
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class."105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable
classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated
clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas workers and
fixedperiod local workers.106 It also distinguished between overseas
workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas
workers with employment contracts of at least one year. 107 Within the
class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts,
there was a distinction between those with at least a year left in their
contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they
were illegally dismissed.108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In
Serrano, there is a "legislative classification which impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this
court in Serrano, "[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford
protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial
to OFWs."111
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No.
8042, the money claims of illegally terminated overseas and local
workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the same
manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired
portions of their contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed
overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of
three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation on the
money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term
employment.115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose
employment contracts had a term of less than one year were granted the
amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to
three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of their
contracts.117
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the
subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose
contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall
be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited
to their salaries for three months only."118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do
not rest on any real or substantial distinctions that would justify different
treatments in terms of the computation of money claims resulting from
illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to
security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts.
This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract
terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, the workers’
right to security of tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally
terminated are neither greater than norless than the rights violated when
a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. It is state policy to
protect the rights of workers withoutqualification as to the place of
employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their expected
salary, which they could have earned had they not been illegally
dismissed. For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic
insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the distinctions between
overseas workers with an employment contract of less than one year and
overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and
between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and
overseas workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they
were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas
workers] are contractual employeeswho can never acquire regular
employment status, unlike local workers" 121 because it already justifies
differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims. 122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’
money claims do not justify a differentiated treatment in the computation
of their money claims.123 If anything, these issues justify an equal, if not
greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who generally are
more prone to exploitation given their physical distance from our
government.
We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the
law, which is to "establish a higher standard of protection and promotion
of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in
distress, and for other purposes."124 Further, we find specious the
argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to
the benefit of the [overseas] workers." 125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not
increase the standard of protection afforded to them. On the other hand,
foreign employers are more incentivizedby the reinstated clause to enter
into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more flexibility to
violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily
terminating overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers
whose rights they violated. Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are
impressed with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the longer
contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated earlier.
They are left with claims that are less than what others in the same
situation would receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a
situation where the law meant to protect them makes violation of rights
easier and simply benign to the violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures,
and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s
liability. While intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning
agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’ recovery in
wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever
may be liable, including the principal/employer – the direct employer
primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 – read
as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps
what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability
of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to
benefit the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist,
the limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate"
incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe
the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive:
instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is
directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their
liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is
effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs,
justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage greater deployment
efforts. Thus, the incentive,from a more practical and realistic view, is
really part of a scheme to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for
purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the
OFWs — the benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and
their principals are takenfrom the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full
salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus,
the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even
profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment
contract embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW,
not only because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by
operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders
a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser
cost of dismissing a Filipino will always bea consideration a foreign
employer will take into account in termination of employment decisions. . .
.126
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same
burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less
than the Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate business interest
can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious."127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due
process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their
monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose. 128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion
of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042.
The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must
be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and
was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from
July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to
petitioner and other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an
OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision
of law."129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of
June 21, 2013, which revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance
from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation,applies in this case. The
pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read: The
Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved
the following revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of
stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2 of Circular No.
905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rateof interest, shall be six percent (6%) per
annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of
the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions are hereby
amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the
guidelines in computing legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames: 130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual
and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment
of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate
of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand
can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest
shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).
The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of
the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph
1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and
executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue
to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. 131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money,
goods, or credits, and in judgments when there is no stipulation on the
applicable interest rate. Further, it is only applicable if the judgment did
not become final and executory before July 1, 2013. 132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that
states otherwise. While the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to
set or limit interest rates,133 these interest rates do not apply when the
law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central
Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law." 134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that
unlawfully terminated overseas workers are entitled to the reimbursement
of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Since
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannotrepeal Republic Act No.
8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of
changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees
from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which
provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting
parties need not repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to.
Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been explicitly stipulated,
but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the
matter."135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between
the placement agency and the overseasworker that in case the overseas
worker is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement
fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This
implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement
of placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the unexpired portion of
the employment contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are
covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does not provide for a
specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1,
2013 and there was no stipulation in the contract providing for a different
interest rate, other money claims under Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with
Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per
annum on her money claims from the finality of this judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as principal and petitioner as the
employment agency that facilitated respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
provides that the foreign employer and the local employment agency are
jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of
an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also
provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be
answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to
the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to
labor and alleviating workers’ plight.136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign
employer is attended by practical and legal complications.1âwphi1 The
distance of the foreign employer alonemakes it difficult for an overseas
worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of the Labor Code.
There are also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and
procedural rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas
worker’sattempt to advance his or her claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be
impleaded in the complaint as an indispensable party without which no
final determination can be had of an action. 137
The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 assures overseas workers that their rights
will not be frustrated with these complications. The fundamental effect of
joint and several liability is that "each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation."138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if
only oneof the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action.
Hence, in the case of overseas employment, either the local agency or
the foreign employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign
employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers are
assured that someone — the foreign employer’s local agent — may be
made to answer for violationsthat the foreign employer may have
committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that
overseas workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their
employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be
"enforced to the full extent"139 against the local agent,the overseas
worker is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due
them.140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on
joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer from the
overseas worker to the local employment agency. However, it must be
emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas
worker’s money claims is not leftwithout remedy. The law does not
preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of
whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money
claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making localagencies jointly and severally liable
with the foreign employer is thatan additional layer of protection is
afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies, which are businesses by
nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the lookout against
foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their
reputation or finances, local agenciesmust already have mechanisms for
guarding against unscrupulous foreign employers even at the level prior
to overseas employment applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine
whether there was indeed a transfer of obligations from petitioner to
Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the respondent overseas
worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner is
possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to
enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
V
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as
they travel into the farthest and mostdifficult reaches of our planet to
provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas
workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy
hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract,
maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults
and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts
towhich they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel
they can do as they please in their own country. Whilethese workers may
indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are
abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they
return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no
reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot
be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances. 142
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all
Filipinos. We default by limiting the contractual wages that should be paid
to our workers when their contracts are breached by the foreign
employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will reward
our overseas workers with what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the
amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of
NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.

But it seems that we have not said enough.

We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be

told a million times over; each of their stories as real as any other.
Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and the heartbreak of
families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days,
months, and years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know
of the joy and sadness when they come home to see them all grown up
and, being so, they remember what their work has cost them. Twitter
accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets and online applications will
never substitute for their lost physical presence.

Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and
flow of political and economic crises. They are our true diplomats, they
who show the world the resilience, patience, and creativity of our people.
Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the provision of material
creations of this world.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2008
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential
decrees and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only
in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification that of
the RTC in Makati City,2 finding petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI)
liable to private respondent Fertiphil Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it
paid under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465.
The Facts
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations
incorporated under Philippine laws.3 They are both engaged in the
importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his
legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others,
for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. 4 The LOI provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its
fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than
₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be
applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines.5 (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid ₱10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in
the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA
then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid ₱6,689,144 to FPA
from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.6
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of
the ₱10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI
a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to
accede to the demand.7
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages 8 against FPA and
PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. 9 Fertiphil
alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation,
which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer
industry.
In its Answer,10 FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the
issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of the
State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It
also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI
because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer,
not the seller.
RTC Disposition
On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Planters
Product, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the former:
1) the sum of ₱6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of
judicial demand;
2) the sum of ₱100,000 as attorney’s fees;
 3) the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling that the imposition of the ₱10 CRC was an exercise of the State’s
inherent power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the
basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose, viz.:
It is apparent that the imposition of ₱10 per fertilizer bag sold in the
country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the exercise of the power of
taxation. It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is
plenary. Comprehensive and supreme, the principal check upon its abuse
resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their
constituents. However, there are two kinds of limitations on the power of
taxation: the inherent limitations and the constitutional limitations.
One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public
purposes:
The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public
purpose. By the same token, taxes may not be levied for purely private
purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the redress of private
wrongs. They cannot be levied for the improvement of private property, or
for the benefit, and promotion of private enterprises, except where the aid
is incident to the public benefit. It is well-settled principle of constitutional
law that no general tax can be levied except for the purpose of raising
money which is to be expended for public use. Funds cannot be exacted
under the guise of taxation to promote a purpose that is not of public
interest. Without such limitation, the power to tax could be exercised or
employed as an authority to destroy the economy of the people. A tax,
however, is not held void on the ground of want of public interest unless
the want of such interest is clear. (71 Am. Jur. pp. 371-372)
In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of ₱6,698,144.00 to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant to the ₱10 per bag of fertilizer
sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the
defendant Planters Products, Inc. thru the latter’s depository bank, Far
East Bank and Trust Co. Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the plaintiff, Fertiphil
Corporation, which is a private domestic corporation, became poorer by
the amount of ₱6,698,144.00 and the defendant, Planters Product, Inc.,
another private domestic corporation, became richer by the amount of
₱6,698,144.00.
Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-
quoted jurisprudence, it is quite evident that LOI 1465 insofar as it
imposes the amount of ₱10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and
orders that the said amount should go to the defendant Planters Product,
Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate that a tax can be levied
only for a public purpose and not to benefit, aid and promote a private
enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc.12
PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 13 PPI then filed
a notice of appeal with the RTC but it failed to pay the requisite appeal
docket fee. In a separate but related proceeding, this Court 14 allowed the
appeal of PPI and remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition.
CA Decision
On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming with
modification that of the RTC, with the following fallo:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of
attorney’s fees is hereby DELETED.15
In affirming the RTC decision, the CA ruled that the lis mota of the
complaint for collection was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465, thus:
The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise
its power to judicially determine the constitutionality of the subject statute
in the instant case.
As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the
courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law (Lim v. Pacquing, 240
SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of political
departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary.
However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when
the following requisites are obtaining in a controversy before it: First,
there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial review. Second, the question must be ripe for adjudication. Third,
the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised
at the earliest opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 [2000]).
Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and
damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals that the
instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an
unlawful and unconstitutional special assessment. Consequently, the
requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis
mota of the case is present, making it proper for the trial court to rule on
the constitutionality of LOI 1465.16
The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued
under the police power of the state, it is still unconstitutional because it
did not promote public welfare. The CA explained:
In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy
imposed under the said law was an invalid exercise of the State’s power
of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional
prescription that taxes be levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out
that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the depository
bank of PPI, which the latter used to advance its private interest.
On the other hand, appellant submits that the subject statute’s passage
was a valid exercise of police power. In addition, it disputes the court a
quo’s findings arguing that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the
benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created
by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PPI.
Of the three fundamental powers of the State, the exercise of police
power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the property sought
to be regulated has some relevance to public welfare (Constitutional Law,
by Isagani A. Cruz, p. 38, 1995 Edition).
Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set
by the Constitution, which requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to
determine the validity of a police measure as follows: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals (National Development Company v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257 [1990]).
It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial court’s
holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure, ensuring the continued
supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued
with public interest. However, the method by which LOI 1465 sought to
achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public
welfare. The government’s commitment to support the successful
rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an
unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute’s impartiality. There is
no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical
with the general interest of the country’s farmers or even the Filipino
people in general. Well to stress, substantive due process exacts fairness
and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a
statute’s public purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police
power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an
arbitrary exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant
would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes
cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of
private individuals.17
The CA did not accept PPI’s claim that the levy imposed under LOI No.
1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Inc., a foundation
created to hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI. The CA stated:
Appellant next claims that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the
benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a foundation created
by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PFI
on the strength of Letter of Undertaking (LOU) issued by then Prime
Minister Cesar Virata on April 18, 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of
Justice in an Opinion dated October 12, 1987, to wit:
"2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic
shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital
recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the
purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of
Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters
Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately ₱206
million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) (such
unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter
referred to as the ‘Unpaid Capital’), and subsequently for such capital
increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.
The capital recovery component shall be in the minimum amount of ₱10
per bag, which will be added to the price of all domestic sales of fertilizer
in the Philippines by any importer and/or fertilizer mother company. In this
connection, the Republic hereby acknowledges that the advances by
Planters to Planters Foundation which were applied to the payment of the
Planters shares now held in trust by Planters Foundation, have been
assigned to, among others, the Creditors. Accordingly, the Republic,
through FPA, hereby agrees to deposit the proceeds of the capital
recovery component in the special trust account designated in the notice
dated April 2, 1985, addressed by counsel for the Creditors to Planters
Foundation. Such proceeds shall be deposited by FPA on or before the
15th day of each month.
The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and
collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or (b) any
shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost
accruing from the date hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding
from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables
and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the
purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the ‘carrying cost’ shall be at such
rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing
its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations." (Records, pp. 42-43)
Appellant’s proposition is open to question, to say the least. The LOU
issued by then Prime Minister Virata taken together with the Justice
Secretary’s Opinion does not preponderantly demonstrate that the
collections made were held in trust in favor of millions of farmers.
Unfortunately for appellant, in the absence of sufficient evidence to
establish its claims, this Court is constrained to rely on what is explicitly
provided in LOI 1465 – that one of the primary aims in imposing the levy
is to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI. 18
PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.19 It then filed
the present petition with this Court.
Issues
Petitioner PPI raises four issues for Our consideration, viz.:
I
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE
COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT IN A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION AND DAMAGES
WHERE THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE VERY LIS
MOTA OF THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI 1465 BE CHALLENGED BY
ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH HAS NO STANDING TO DO SO.
II
LOI 1465, BEING A LAW IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ASSURING THE FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE
COUNTRY, AND FOR BENEFITING A FOUNDATION CREATED BY
LAW TO HOLD IN TRUST FOR MILLIONS OF FARMERS THEIR
STOCK OWNERSHIP IN PPI CONSTITUTES A VALID LEGISLATION
PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF TAXATION AND POLICE POWER
FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES.
III
THE AMOUNT COLLECTED UNDER THE CAPITAL RECOVERY
COMPONENT WAS REMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND
BECAME GOVERNMENT FUNDS PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE
AND VALIDLY ENACTED LAW WHICH IMPOSED DUTIES AND
CONFERRED RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
"OPERATIVE FACT" PRIOR TO ANY DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465.
IV
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST VEXATION (SHOULD BE ENRICHMENT)
FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.20 (Underscoring
supplied)
Our Ruling
We shall first tackle the procedural issues of locus standi and the
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues.
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of
standing is a mere procedural technicality which may be waived.
PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a "personal
and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result
of its enforcement."21 It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage
from the CRC imposition because "incidence of the levy fell on the
ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer
company."22
We cannot agree. The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance
in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in a
catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a
material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi
requires a litigant to be a "real party in interest," which is defined as "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit."23
In public suits, this Court recognizes the difficulty of applying the doctrine
especially when plaintiff asserts a public right on behalf of the general
public because of conflicting public policy issues. 24 On one end, there is
the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from
unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the other end,
there is the public policy precluding excessive judicial interference in
official acts, which may unnecessarily hinder the delivery of basic public
services.
In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the "direct injury test" to determine
locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera, 25 it was held that a person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result." The "direct injury test" in public suits is similar to
the "real party in interest" rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.26
Recognizing that a strict application of the "direct injury" test may hamper
public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in cases of
"transcendental importance" or with "far reaching implications." Being a
mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may
be waived in the public interest. 27
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private
or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct
injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did
pay, the ₱10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic
market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to
the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the
constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the
ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe
sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient
injury to Fertiphil.
Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI
because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy
certainly rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic
sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business consists not
only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting
alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465.
Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered all or part of the
levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the
business of Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.
Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the
liberal policy consistently adopted by this Court on locus standi must
apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance.
It involves not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly,
the use of taxes for public purpose. Former President Marcos issued LOI
No. 1465 with the intention of rehabilitating an ailing private company.
This is clear from the text of the LOI. PPI is expressly named in the LOI
as the direct beneficiary of the levy. Worse, the levy was made
dependent and conditional upon PPI becoming financially viable. The LOI
provided that "the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable."
The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of
the statute. It is Our constitutional duty to squarely resolve the issue as
the final arbiter of all justiciable controversies. The doctrine of standing,
being a mere procedural technicality, should be waived, if at all, to
adequately thresh out an important constitutional issue.
RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue was
adequately raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case.
PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality
of the LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality of the LOI cannot be
collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection. 28 Alternatively, the
resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination
of the complaint for collection.29
Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately
pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot
determine its claim without resolving the issue. 30
It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of
a statute, presidential decree or an executive order. This is clear from
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Underscoring supplied)
In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,31 this Court recognized the power of the
RTC to resolve constitutional issues, thus:
On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. 32
In the recent case of Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign
Affairs,33 this Court reiterated:
There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the
Court of Appeals or to this Court alone for even the regional trial courts
can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 34
Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be
sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by courts of
justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be
had in criminal actions, as in People v. Ferrer 35 involving the
constitutionality of the now defunct Anti-Subversion law, or in ordinary
actions, as in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds36 involving the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring public lands. The
constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented
in the case, and (b) its resolution is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.37
Contrary to PPI’s claim, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly
and adequately raised in the complaint for collection filed with the RTC.
The pertinent portions of the complaint allege:
6. The CRC of ₱10 per bag levied under LOI 1465 on domestic sales of
all grades of fertilizer in the Philippines, is unlawful, unjust, uncalled for,
unreasonable, inequitable and oppressive because:
xxxx
(c) It favors only one private domestic corporation, i.e., defendant PPPI,
and imposed at the expense and disadvantage of the other fertilizer
importers/distributors who were themselves in tight business situation
and were then exerting all efforts and maximizing management and
marketing skills to remain viable;
xxxx
(e) It was a glaring example of crony capitalism, a forced program
through which the PPI, having been presumptuously masqueraded as
"the" fertilizer industry itself, was the sole and anointed beneficiary;
7. The CRC was an unlawful; and unconstitutional special assessment
and its imposition is tantamount to illegal exaction amounting to a denial
of due process since the persons of entities which had to bear the burden
of paying the CRC derived no benefit therefrom; that on the contrary it
was used by PPI in trying to regain its former despicable monopoly of the
fertilizer industry to the detriment of other distributors and
importers.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the
complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to
refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law
imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil
had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid
pursuant to an unconstitutional law should be refunded under the civil
code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere
consequence of the law being declared unconstitutional. The RTC surely
cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI
unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI which triggers the
refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint
with the RTC.
The ₱10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation.
At any rate, the Court holds that the RTC and the CA did not err in ruling
against the constitutionality of the LOI.
PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power
or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI was implemented for the
purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country
and for benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions
of farmers their stock ownership in PPI.
Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted
to give benefit to a private company. The levy was imposed to pay the
corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is
enacted under the police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did
not promote the general welfare of the people or public interest.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State.
These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police
power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare,39 while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be
used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation.
The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the
validity of a law enacted under the police power. 40 The power of taxation,
on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional
limitations.
We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by
the State of its taxation power. While it is true that the power of taxation
can be used as an implement of police power, 41 the primary purpose of
the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the
exaction is properly called a tax.42
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu, 43 it was held that the imposition of a
vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State of its police power,
but of its taxation power, thus:
It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth Act 123
and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code that the
legislative intent and purpose behind the law requiring owners of vehicles
to pay for their registration is mainly to raise funds for the construction
and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the
operating expenses of the administering agency. x x x Fees may be
properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument
of regulation.
Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue
is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is
properly called a tax. Such is the case of motor vehicle registration fees.
The same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land Transportation
Code. It is patent therefrom that the legislators had in mind a regulatory
tax as the law refers to the imposition on the registration, operation or
ownership of a motor vehicle as a "tax or fee." x x x Simply put, if the
exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a regulatory fee, the
imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an "additional" tax. Rep. Act
4136 also speaks of other "fees" such as the special permit fees for
certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10) and additional fees for change
of registration (Sec. 11). These are not to be understood as taxes
because such fees are very minimal to be revenue-raising. Thus, they are
not mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as taxes like the motor vehicle
registration fee and chauffeurs’ license fee. Such fees are to go into the
expenditures of the Land Transportation Commission as provided for in
the last proviso of Sec. 61.44 (Underscoring supplied)
The ₱10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere
regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the seller or
the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as
much as five percent.45 A plain reading of the LOI also supports the
conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly
provided that the levy was imposed "until adequate capital is raised to
make PPI viable."
Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The ₱10 levy is
unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The levy was
imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.
An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes
are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely
private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. 46 The
reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare;
hence, implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for
a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and
use the funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States
case bluntly put it: "To lay with one hand, the power of the government on
the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored
individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is
nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is
called taxation."47
The term "public purpose" is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can
be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence states that "public
purpose" should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain
to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially
government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic
services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social
justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.
While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are
continually expanding in light of the expansion of government functions,
the inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a public
purpose still stands. Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax
law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to
give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not
satisfy the requirement of "public purpose."
The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other
secondary sources. Here, We agree with the RTC and that CA that the
levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose.
First, the LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI,
a private company. The purpose is explicit from Clause 3 of the law, thus:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its
fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less than
₱10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate
capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be
applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines.48 (Underscoring supplied)
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the text of a statute should
be given a literal meaning. In this case, the text of the LOI is plain that the
levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI. The framers of the LOI
did not even hide the insidious purpose of the law. They were cavalier
enough to name PPI as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes levied under
the LOI. We find it utterly repulsive that a tax law would expressly name a
private company as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes to be levied from
the public. This is a clear case of crony capitalism.
Second, the LOI provides that the imposition of the ₱10 levy was
conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially "viable." This
suggests that the levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. The LOI
notably does not fix a maximum amount when PPI is deemed financially
"viable." Worse, the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of
fertilizer to pay the levy is made indefinite. They are required to
continuously pay the levy until adequate capital is raised for PPI.
Third, the RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were
directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far East Bank and Trust
Company, the depositary bank of PPI.49 This proves that PPI benefited
from the LOI. It is also proves that the main purpose of the law was to
give undue benefit and advantage to PPI.
Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. A reading of
the Letter of Understanding50 dated May 18, 1985 signed by then Prime
Minister Cesar Virata reveals that PPI was in deep financial problem
because of its huge corporate debts. There were pending petitions for
rehabilitation against PPI before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The government guaranteed payment of PPI’s debts to its
foreign creditors. To fund the payment, President Marcos issued LOI No.
1465. The pertinent portions of the letter of understanding read:
Republic of the Philippines
Office of the Prime Minister
Manila
LETTER OF UNDERTAKING
May 18, 1985
TO: THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
LISTED IN ANNEX A HERETO WHICH ARE
CREDITORS (COLLECTIVELY, THE "CREDITORS")
OF PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. ("PLANTERS")
Gentlemen:
This has reference to Planters which is the principal importer and
distributor of fertilizer, pesticides and agricultural chemicals in the
Philippines. As regards Planters, the Philippine Government confirms its
awareness of the following: (1) that Planters has outstanding obligations
in foreign currency and/or pesos, to the Creditors, (2) that Planters is
currently experiencing financial difficulties, and (3) that there are
presently pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
Philippines a petition filed at Planters’ own behest for the suspension of
payment of all its obligations, and a separate petition filed by
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, Manila Offshore Branch for the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for Planters.
In connection with the foregoing, the Republic of the Philippines (the
"Republic") confirms that it considers and continues to consider Planters
as a major fertilizer distributor. Accordingly, for and in consideration of
your expressed willingness to consider and participate in the effort to
rehabilitate Planters, the Republic hereby manifests its full and
unqualified support of the successful rehabilitation and continuing viability
of Planters, and to that end, hereby binds and obligates itself to the
creditors and Planters, as follows: x x x
2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall
cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital recovery
component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of
funding the unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters
presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. ("Planters
Foundation"), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately ₱206
million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) such
unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter
referred to as the "Unpaid Capital"), and subsequently for such capital
increases as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters. x x x
The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and
collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital and/or (b) any
shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost
accruing from the date hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding
from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables,
and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the
purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the "carrying cost" shall be at such
rate as will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing
its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
By: (signed)
CESAR E. A. VIRATA
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance51
It is clear from the Letter of Understanding that the levy was imposed
precisely to pay the corporate debts of PPI. We cannot agree with PPI
that the levy was imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry
in the country. The letter of understanding and the plain text of the LOI
clearly indicate that the levy was exacted for the benefit of a private
corporation.
All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed
under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. LOI No. 1465 failed to
comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws.
The LOI is still unconstitutional even if enacted under the police power; it
did not promote public interest.
Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the
State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test of "lawful
subjects" and "lawful means." Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1)
the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 52
For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it
did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue
advantage to a private corporation. We quote with approval the CA
ratiocination on this point, thus:
It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial court’s
holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional.1awphil To be sure, ensuring the
continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an
undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the method by which
LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will
promote the public welfare. The government’s commitment to support the
successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private
corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute’s
impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity,
like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the country’s farmers or
even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress, substantive due
process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where
none is needed. When a statute’s public purpose is spoiled by private
interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be
struck down for being an arbitrary exercise of government power.To rule
in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues
derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private individuals. (Underscoring supplied)
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of
operative fact is inapplicable.
PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465
is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact,
which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being
declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI
No. 1465 even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.
We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be
entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a quo. 53 PPI
did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the
RTC and the CA. It cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to
extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law.
At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an
unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation,
inoperative as if it has not been passed. 54 Being void, Fertiphil is not
required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance
with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation
or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice
to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play. 55It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to
a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration.56
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy57 or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
creating it.58
Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the
amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from
the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted
and deposited to its bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be
inequitable and unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly
enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that "every person who, through an act of performance
by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him." We
cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity
dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26969 December 19, 1984
CARPIO PHUA, TAN SIN TEE, PUA CHING TOO and PUA SHING
SHING, the last two represented by CARPIO PHUA, petitioners-
appellees, vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the Bureau of
Immigration, respondent-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This cage is about the exclusion from this country of Tan Sin Tee and her
two minor children, Pua Ching Too and Pua Shing Shing, on the ground
that they were not properly documented.
The three arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong on November 7, 1961
documented as Filipino citizens and holders of certificates of registration
and Identity issued on November 2, 1961 by the Philippine Consulate. It
should be noted that the signature of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on
the cablegram authorizing their documentation as Filipino citizens was
a forgery.
Upon their arrival, their admission was referred to a board of special
inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration After due investigation, the board
rendered a decision admitting Tan Sin Tee and her children, as Filipino
citizens. Tan Sin Tee was alleged to be the wife of Carpio Phua, a
supposed Filipino, with the two minors as their legitimate children. The
minors were born on May 2, 1955 and January 24, 1956 or within an
interval of less than nine months.
The decision of the board of special inquiry was referred individually to
the Board of Immigration Commissioners. Commissioner Emilio Galang
wrote the word "Exclude" above his signature while Commissioners
Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis wrote the word "Noted" on the
face of the decision which means affirmance of the decision of the board
of special inquiry. The Commissioners did not meet as a body and did not
deliberate on the said decision. As a result, Tan Sin Tee and her children
were issued on December 13, 1961 Identification certificates as Filipino
citizens.
On January 24, 1962 the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum Order
No. 9, directing the Board of Commissioners to review all decisions of the
board of special inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country
particularly those where entry had been permitted on the ground that the
entrant is a Filipino citizen.
Immigration Commissioners Martiniano P. Vivo, Virgilio N. Gaston and
Marcial Rañola motu proprio rendered a decision dated November 14,
1962, excluding Tan Sin Tee and her children. The Commission said:
There is doubt as to the alleged Philippine citizenship of Carpio
Phua and his relationship therein to the applicants. Carpio's birth
certificate was not presented. There is only a certification by the
Director of the Archives Division that there is no record of his birth
without giving any reason for such lack of record. No effort was
made to secure his birth certificate from Lauan, Samar, his
birthplace.
It has also been noted that the births of the two applicant children
occurred within nine (9) months, a physical impossibility for which
no explanation was offered. There was blood test of the
applicants but such blood test is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Even assuming the validity of the marriage between Carpio and
Tan Sin Tee although performed only according to old Chinese
customs, there appears no evidence of their legal capacity to
marry.
In view of the foregoing applicants failed to establish their claim
that they are the wife and children, respectively, of a Philippine
citizen.
The Commissioners ordered that Tan Sin Tee and her alleged minor
children be ordered excluded pursuant to section 29 (a) (17) of the
Immigration Law. Before the warrant of exclusion could be carried out,
Carpio Phua and his alleged wife and children filed an action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in 1966 declared as void the
decision of the Immigration Commissioners, set aside the warrant of
exclusion and made permanent the preliminary injunction against the
execution of said warrant. The Commissioners appealed. The appellees
did not file any brief.

We hold that the trial court erred in holding that the petitioners were
denied due process of law. The Immigration Law does not require notice
and hearing for the review by the Board of Commissioners of the decision
of the board of special inquiry. The petitioners were already heard before
the board of special inquiry. That hearing was a sufficient compliance
with the requirements of due process. (Caoile vs. Vivo, L-27602, October
15, 1983, 125 SCRA 85, 98; Arocha vs. Vivo, 128 Phil. 566. See Go Yu
Tak Wai vs. Vivo, L-22257, May 25, 1977, 77 SCRA 55.)

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. The
petition is dismissed. The preliminary injunction is dissolved. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and

Cuevas, JJ., concur.
U.S. Supreme Court
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928)
Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands
Nos. 564 and 573
Argued April 10, 1928
Decided May 14, 1928
277 U.S. 189
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
Syllabus
1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank,
the stock of which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide
that the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the
one case, and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the
election of directors and managing agents of the corporations is an
executive function, and that the attempt to repose it in the legislative
officers named violates the Philippine Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199.
2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three
departments -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is
implicit, as it is in state and federal constitutions, that these three powers
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other. P. 201..
3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers
conferred upon each of the three departments of the government, is basic
and vital -- not merely a matter of governmental mechanism. Id.
4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American
constitutional system that, unless otherwise expressly provided or
incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either
executive or judicial power, the executive cannot exercise either
legislative or judicial power, and the judiciary cannot exercise either
executive or legislative power. Id.
5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the
authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or to appoint the agents
charged with the duty of enforcing them. The latter are executive
functions. P. 277 U. S. 202.
6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or
incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties
upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of
appointment by indirection. Id.
7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of
property or a business in which the government is interested is
essentially an executive act which the legislature is without capacity to
perform, directly or through its members. P. 277 U. S. 203.
8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public
officers in the strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with
executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the
legislature. Id.
9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not
executive officers the power to vote in nonstock corporations created for
governmental purposes lend no support to a construction of the
Constitution which would justify Congressional legislation like that here
involved, considering the limited number of such instances, the peculiar
character of the institutions there dealt with, and the contrary attitude of
Congress towards governmentally owned or controlled stock
corporations. P. 277 U. S. 204.
10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in
the Governor-General by the Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting
in him the supreme executive power, with general supervision and control
over all the departments and bureaus of the government; the provision
placing on him the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and
the provision that all executive functions of the government must be
directly under him or within one of the executive departments under his
supervision and control. P. 277 U. S. 205.
11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things
which may be done, and also a general grant of power which, standing
alone, would include those things and more, the general grant may be
given full effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not
intended to be exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206.
12. In § 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing
all the executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one
of the executive departments under his direction and control, and the
proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature, are
both to be construed as independent and substantive provisions. P. 277
U. S. 207.
13. An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine
Legislature reported to it under § 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn
from the failure of Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in
that section, where the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is
therefore clearly void. P. 277 U. S. 208.
Affirmed.
Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to two judgments of ouster rendered by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in proceedings in the nature
of quo warranto, which were brought in that court by the Philippine
government against the present petitioners to test their right to be
directors in certain corporations described in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, presenting substantially the same question, were argued
and will be considered and disposed of together. In each case, an action
in the nature of quo warranto was brought in the court below challenging
the right to hold office of directors of certain corporations organized under
the legislative authority of the Philippine Islands; No. 564 involving
directors of the National Coal Company, and No. 573 involving directors
of the Philippine National Bank.
The National Coal Company was created by Act 2705, approved March
10, 1917, subsequently amended by Act 2822, approved March 5, 1919.
The Governor-General, under the provisions of the amended act,
subscribed on behalf of the Philippine Islands for substantially all of the
capital stock. The act provides:
"The voting power of all such stock owned by the government of the
Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee, consisting
of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives."
The National Bank was created by Act 2612, approved February 4, 1916,
subsequently amended by Act 2747, approved February 20, 1918, and
Act 2938, approved January 30, 1921. The authorized capital of the bank,
as finally fixed, was 10,000,000 pesos, consisting of 100,000 shares, of
which, in pursuance of the legislative provisions, the Philippine
government acquired and owns 97,332 shares; the remainder being held
by private persons. By the original act, the voting power of the
government-owned stock was vested exclusively in the Governor-
General, but, by the amended acts now in force, that power was
"vested exclusively in a board, the short title of which shall be 'Board of
Control,' composed of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives."
The Governor-General was also divested of the power of appointment of
the president and vice-president of the bank, originally vested in him, and
their election was authorized to be made by the directors from among
their own number. Provision was also made for a general manager to be
appointed or removed by the board of directors with the advice and
consent of the board of control. The manager was to be chief executive of
the bank, with an annual salary to be fixed by the board of directors with
the approval of the Board of Control. Further duties were conferred upon
the Board of Control in connection with the management of the bank
which it does not seem necessary to set forth.
It is worthy of note that this voting power has been similarly devolved by
the legislature upon at least four other corporations: the National
Petroleum Company, by Act 2814; the National Development Company,
by Act 2849; the National Cement Company, by Act 2855, and the
National Iron Company, by Act 2862 -- and the suggestion of the Solicitor
General that this indicates a systematic plan on the part of the legislature
to take over, through its presiding officers, the direct control generally of
nationally organized or controlled stock corporations would seem to be
warranted.
In pursuance of the first-quoted provision, petitioners in No. 564 were
elected directors of the National Coal Company by a vote of the
government-owned shares cast by the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House, and, in pursuance of the second quoted provision,
petitioners in No. 573 were elected directors of the National Bank in the
same way. The Governor-General, challenging the validity of the
legislation, did not participate in either election. While there are some
differences between the two actions in respect of the facts, they are
differences of detail which do not affect the substantial question to be
determined.
On behalf of the Philippine government, respondent in both cases, it is
contended that the election of directors and managing agents by a vote of
the government-owned stock was an executive function intrusted by the
Organic Act of the Philippine Islands to the Governor-General, and that
the acts of the legislature divesting him of that power and vesting it, in the
one case, in a "board," and, in the other, in a "committee," the majority of
which in each instance consisted of officers and members of the
legislature, were invalid as being in conflict with the Organic Act. The
court below sustained the contention of the government and entered
judgments of ouster against the petitioners in each case.
The congressional legislation referred to as the "Organic Act" is the
enactment of August 29, 1916, c. 416, 39 Stat. 545, which constitutes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands and bears a relation to their
governmental affairs not unlike that borne by a state constitution to the
state. The act contains a Bill of Rights many of the provisions of which
are taken from the federal Constitution. It lays down fundamental rules in
respect of taxation, shipping, customs duties, etc. Section 8 of the act
provides: "That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein
provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by
this Act." And, by § 12, this legislative power is vested in a legislature, to
consist of two houses, one the Senate and the other the House of
Representatives. Provision is made (§§ 13, 14 and 17) for memberships,
terms, and qualifications of the members of each house. By § 21, it is
provided "that the supreme executive power shall be vested in an
executive officer, whose official title shall be the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands.'" He is given
"general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of
the government in the Philippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with
the provisions of this act."
He is made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the
Philippine Islands and of the United States operative within the Philippine
Islands." Other powers of an important and comprehensive character also
are conferred upon him. By § 22, the executive departments of the
Philippine government, as then authorized by law, are continued until
otherwise provided by the legislature. The legislature is authorized by
appropriate legislation to "increase the number or abolish any of the
executive departments, or make such changes in the names and duties
thereof as it may see fit," and "provide for the appointment and removal
of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General."
Then follows the proviso:
"That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the
supervision and control of the Governor-General."
Section 26 recognizes the existing Supreme Court and courts of first
instance of the Islands, and continues their jurisdiction as heretofore
provided, with such additional jurisdiction as should thereafter be
prescribed by law.
Thus, the Organic Act, following the rule established by the American
Constitutions, both state and federal, divides the government into three
separate departments -- the legislative, executive, and judicial. Some of
our state constitutions expressly provide in one form or another that the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be
forever separate and distinct from each other. Other Constitutions,
including that of the United States, do not contain such an express
provision. But it is implicit in all, as a conclusion logically following from
the separation of the several departments. See Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 103 U. S. 190-191. And this separation and
the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of
the three departments is basic and vital -- not merely a matter of
governmental mechanism. That the principle is implicit in the Philippine
Organic Act does not admit of doubt. See Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil.Rep.
612, 622, 628, et seq.
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American
constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or
incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either
executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either
legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive
or legislative power. The existence in the various Constitutions of
occasional provisions expressly giving to one of the departments powers
which by their nature otherwise would fall within the general scope of the
authority of another department emphasizes, rather than casts doubt
upon, the generally inviolate character of this basic rule.
Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority
to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with
the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. It is
unnecessary to enlarge further upon the general subject, since it has so
recently received the full consideration of this Court. Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52.
Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or
incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot ingraft executive duties
upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of
appointment by indirection, though the case might be different if the
additional duties were devolved upon an appointee of the
executive. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 147 U. S. 300-
301. Here, the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the
"board" and "committee," respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything
which is in aid of the performance of any such functions by the
legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the
Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and
still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall
within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for
concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one of the three
among which the powers of government are divided. Compare Myers v.
United States, supra, pp. 272 U. S. 117-118.
Assuming, for present purposes, that the duty of managing this property -
- namely, the government-owned shares of stock in these corporations --
is not sovereign, but proprietary, in its nature, the conclusion must be the
same. The property is owned by the government, and the government in
dealing with it, whether in its quasi-sovereign or its proprietary capacity,
nevertheless acts in its governmental capacity. There is nothing in the
Organic Act or in the nature of the legislative power conferred by it to
suggest that the legislature, in acting in respect of the proprietary rights of
the government, may disregard the limitation that it must exercise
legislative, and not executive, functions. It must deal with the property of
the government by making rules, and not by executing them. The
appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of
property or a business is essentially an executive act which the
legislature is without capacity to perform directly or through any of its
members.
Whether the members of the "board" or the "committee" are public
officers in a strict sense we do not find it necessary to determine. They
are public agents, at least, charged with the exercise of executive
functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the
legislature. Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, involved a case very much
like that now under consideration. The state legislature had created a
committee of its own members to investigate the rights of the state in the
flowing waters therein. The committee was authorized to determine what
steps were necessary to be taken to protect the rights of the state, to
employ counsel, etc. There was no claim that the investigation was for
the purpose of ascertaining facts to aid in future legislation or to assist the
legislature in its legislative capacity, but it was for the purpose of enabling
the committee itself to reach a conclusion as to what should be proper to
do in order to protect the rights of the state. The court, in holding the act
unconstitutional, said (p. 31):
"In other words, the General Assembly not only passed an act -- that is,
made a law -- but it made a joint committee of the Senate and the House
as its executive agent to carry out that law. This a clear and conspicuous
instance of an attempt by the general assembly to confer executive
power upon a collection of its own members."
And the court held that this was invalid under the provisions of the state
constitution respecting the tripartite division of governmental powers. See
also Clark v. Stanley, 66 N.C. 59; State ex rel. Howerton v. Tate,68 N.C.
546.
Petitioners seek to draw a parallel between the power of Congress to
create corporations as appropriate means of executing governmental
powers and the acts of the Philippine Legislature here under
consideration. To what extent, the powers of the two bodies in this
respect may be assimilated we need not stop not to determine, since the
power of the legislature to create the two corporations here involved is
not doubted. But it is argued further that Congress, in creating
corporations for governmental purposes, has sometimes devolved the
voting power in such corporations upon persons other than executive
officers. In the case of the Smithsonian Institution, cited as an example,
Congress provided for a governing Board of Regents composed in part of
members of the Senate and of the House. There are two or three other
instances in respect of nonstock organizations of like character. On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, in the case of
governmentally organized or controlled stock corporations, Congress has
uniformly recognized the executive authority in their management,
generally providing in express terms that the shares shall be voted by an
executive officer, and in no instance attempting to grant such power to
one or more of its members. Many instances of this kind are cited by the
Solicitor General, but it is not necessary to repeat his enumeration. It is
enough to say that, when we consider the limited number of acts of
Congress which fall within the first class spoken of above, as well as the
peculiar character of the institutions dealt with and the contrary attitude of
Congress toward corporations of a different character, such acts cannot
be regarded as lending support to a construction of the Constitution
which would justify congressional legislation like that here involved. As
this Court said in Myers v. United States, supra, pp. 272 U. S. 170-171:
"In the use of congressional legislation to support or change a particular
construction of the Constitution by acquiescence, its weight for the
purpose must depend not only upon the nature of the question, but also
upon the attitude of the executive and judicial branches of the
government, as well as upon the number of instances in the execution of
the law in which opportunity for objection in the courts or elsewhere is
afforded. When instances which actually involve the question are rare, or
have not in fact occurred, the weight of the mere presence of acts on the
statute book for a considerable time, as showing general acquiescence in
the legislative assertion of a questioned power, is minimized."
And we are further of the opinion that the powers asserted by the
Philippine Legislature are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-
General. The intent of Congress to that effect is disclosed by the
provisions of that act already set forth. Stated concisely, these provisions
are: that the supreme executive power is vested in the Governor-General,
who is given general supervision and control over all the departments
and bureaus of the Philippine government; upon him is placed the
responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine
Islands, and, by the general proviso already quoted, all executive
functions must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of
the executive departments under his supervision and control. These are
grants comprehensive enough to include the powers attempted to be
exercised by the legislature by the provisions of law now under
review. Myers v. United States, supra.
It is true that § 21 contains a specific provision that the Governor-General
shall appoint such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-
General, or such as he is authorized by this act to appoint, or whom he
may hereafter be authorized by law to appoint. And it is said that the
effect of this is to confine the Governor-General's powers of appointment
within the limits of this enumeration. The general rule that the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of others is subject to exceptions. Like other
canons of statutory construction, it is only an aid in the ascertainment of
the meaning of the law, and must yield whenever a contrary intention on
the part of the lawmaker is apparent. Where a statute contains a grant of
power enumerating certain things which may be done and also a general
grant of power which, standing alone, would include these things and
more, the general grant may be given full effect if the context shows that
the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. See, for example,
Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 273 U. S. 611; Portland v. N.E.T. &
Co., 103 Me. 240, 249; Grubbe v. Grubbe, 26 Or. 363, 370; Swick v.
Coleman, 218 Ill. 33, 40; Lexington ex rel. v. Commercial Bank, 130
Mo.App. 687, 692; McFarland v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co., 94 Mo.App. 336,
342.
Applying these principles, we are unable to accept the contention that the
enumeration here in question is exclusive in the face of the general
provisions already quoted, and particularly of that one which declares that
all executive functions are vested directly in the Governor-General or
under his supervision and control. It is true that this provision is in the
form of a proviso, and it is argued that it is therefore nothing more than a
definition by negation of the power given to the legislature in the same
section. But an analysis of the section, which is reproduced so far as
pertinent in the margin, * shows, though not wholly beyond doubt, that the
power given to the legislature is itself a proviso. In other words, both the
grant of power to the legislature and the grant of power to the Governor-
General are in form provisos to the general provisions of § 22 which
precede them. It is difficult to assign to either proviso the general purpose
of that form of legislation, which is merely to qualify the operation of the
general language which precedes it. We think, rather, that both provisos
are to be construed as independent and substantive provisions. As this
Court has more than once pointed out, it is not an uncommon practice in
legislative proceedings to include independent pieces of legislation under
the head of provisos. See Georgia Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S.
174, 128 U. S. 181; White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545, 191 U. S.
551; Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 260 U. S. 435.
Finally, it is urged that, since no action has been taken by Congress
under § 19 of the Organic Act,, requiring all laws enacted by the
Philippine Legislature to be reported to Congress, which reserves the
power to annul them, the legislation now under review has received the
implied sanction of Congress, and should not be disturbed. Clinton v.
Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 80 U. S. 446, is cited in support of this
contention. In that case, jurors were summoned into the legislative courts
of the territory of Utah under the provisions of acts of Congress
applicable only to the courts of the United States. This Court held that the
jurors were wrongly summoned, and a challenge to the array should have
been sustained. The Court, however, proceeded also to examine the jury
law enacted by the territorial legislature, and declared it to be valid. In the
course of the opinion, it was said that, since the simple disapproval by
Congress at any time would have annulled that law, it was not
unreasonable to infer that it was approved by that body. In the later case
of Clayton v. Utah Territory, 132 U. S. 632, an act of the same territory
providing for the appointment of certain officers was held to be void as in
contravention of a provision of the territorial Organic Act vesting in the
Governor the power to appoint such officers. Dealing with the same point
here made, this Court said (p. 132 U. S. 642):

"It is true that, in a case of doubtful construction, the long acquiescence

of Congress and the general government may be resorted to as some
evidence of the proper construction, or of the validity, of a law. This
principle is more applicable to questions relating to the construction of a
statute than to matters which go to the power of the legislature to enact it.
At all events, it can hardly be admitted as a general proposition that,
under the power of Congress reserved in the organic acts of the
territories to annul the acts of their legislatures, the absence of any action
by Congress is to be construed to be a recognition of the power of the
legislature to pass laws in conflict with the act of Congress under which
they were created."

The inference of an approval by Congress from its mere failure to act, at

best, rests upon a weak foundation. And we think, where the inference is
sought to be applied, as here, to a case where the legislation is clearly
void as in contravention of the Organic Act, it cannot reasonably be
indulged. To justify the conclusion that Congress has consented to the
violation of one of its own acts of such fundamental character will require
something more than such inaction upon its part as really amounts to
nothing more than a failure affirmatively to declare such violation by a
formal act.

Whether the Philippine Legislature, in view of the alternative form of the

provision vesting all executive functions directly under the Governor-
General or within one of the executive departments under his supervision
and control, might devolve the voting power upon the head of an
executive department or an appointee of such head, we do not now
decide. The legislature has not undertaken to do so, and, in the absence
of such an attempt, it necessarily results that the power must be
exercised directly by the Governor-General or by his appointee, since he
is the only executive now definitely authorized by law to act.

The judgments in both cases are

Affirmed.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.
MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010. 1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already
considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National
Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010, is
non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources
of Malolos City’s population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of
Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report2) and as of 2008
(Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July
2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084)
which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these
materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and
authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting
RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are
unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review
power,5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled
to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of
necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the
population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional
limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of
non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040
improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of
judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political
and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is
that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial
question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that
it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so
exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a
court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is
properly brought before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon
the political situation does not render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up
constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional
limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore,
there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of
representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will
opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of
the Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591
is to contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC’s theory, this
Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative
districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population
indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer
way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population
indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City’s compliance with the
constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On Miranda’s
Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%]
between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that
(a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National
Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on
intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year;
and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by
the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using
Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s
population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City’s
population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued
his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make
the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO
Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of
its fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates
declared official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of
2010. 1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration
Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31
July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August
2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population
indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 –
Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the
population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to
reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing
Malolos City’s population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City’s claim that the 2007
census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year
2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the
constitutional requirement."8 This unbecoming attack by the government’s
chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government’s
census authority has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to
know that absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO
enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the performance of its
functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District fares no better. EO
135 excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered
incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water
district’s so-called population census to the level of credibility NSO
certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will
allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone,
sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though
these private entities are not in the business of generating statistical data
and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to
handle, collate and process them.
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative
because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay
is not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-
census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct
population census are local government units (that is, province, city,
municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data
processing.9
By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely
divergent population figures,10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the
danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135’s
stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be
diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and,
in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional
mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000
constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the
constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince
the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda’s
certificate.11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in
a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express
prohibition.12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction,
statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city’s
population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes
of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component
city.13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135’s
paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance
with the population requirement in the creation and conversion of local
government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less
important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our
democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the
same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before

the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark
following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase
to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC
neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section
3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a
legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of
the geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement
in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no
argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for
Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative
District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable.
To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its
purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative
for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and
compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity
and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum
mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of

respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED
WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM,
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER
WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all
of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong,
herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held
on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall
have its own legislative district with the first representative
to be elected in the next national elections after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become
the new legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is
that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article
VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the
subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to
the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in
the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct
from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has
not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1)
and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
 accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as
aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that
the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but
is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has
been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled
that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been
further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to
the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of
R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration
by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not
required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all
relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of
the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows
that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of SO ORDERED.
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not
qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts

the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said
argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring
fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners

present further arguments against the validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made
to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since
the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San
Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing
to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has

resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that
Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong,
Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives,
and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO
Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the
Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and
thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges
pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was scheduled for
17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on
Elections, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code. As reported by the Speaker in the session of 9
February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the
Commission on Elections which states that the Honorable
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second District of Lanao del Sur
filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in Muslim
Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat,
performing an administrative act, did not include the name of the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any
elective official whether national or local running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and Phrases
as by the very act itself – by the mere act. And therefore, by the
very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of candidacy, the
Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the
House of Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been
carried in today's Roll and will not be carried in the future Rolls of
the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter
dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was
taken on this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his
bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such
relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from
the Roll, petitioner was excluded from all proceedings of the House of
Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff
was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by
other persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from
performing his duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as the
duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he
did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of
Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of
members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by
which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided
for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House
of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election." On the other hand, the grounds by
which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional
provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term
of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a
Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple
matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On
the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds
previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately
omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in
excluding him from the Roll of Members is contrary to the present
Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents acted
without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called
"administrative act" of striking out his name is ineffective in terminating
his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an interpretation
of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only
the courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said
to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another
office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of
candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of
the House of Representatives be recognized, is anchored on the negative
view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE
UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE
RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING
HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS
CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor
General contend that Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still
operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
"voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article
VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67 is not
included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds
mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes
of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among which
are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of
disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is
an act of resignation which estops him from claiming otherwise as he is
presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that their
questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not
involve any encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
 Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A.
No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an
office, other than the one for which he has been lastly elected,
shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this
wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. — Any elective provincial,
municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one
which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective
officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. — Any elective
provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his
term of office commences, or within ten days after his
proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His
failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be
considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has
been elected unless his failure is for a cause or causes beyond
his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. — Governors,
mayors, members of various sanggunians, or barangay officials,
shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be considered on
forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature
included in the enumeration of elective public officials who are to be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-
President. The advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election
Code, the provision seems to be different — I think this is
in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or
municipal district officer running for an office other than
the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the
Committee in departing or changing these provisions of
Section 24 of the old Election Code and just adopting it en
toto? Why do we have to change it? What could possibly
be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I
don't mind repeating it. The purpose is that the people must be
given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to
the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However,
because of the practice in the past where members of the
legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office,
because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials
were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have
already obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature,
and they want to run for mayor or for governor and yet when the
people give them that mandate, they do not comply with that
 latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier
mandate. So we believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest
mandate must be the one that will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman
Arturo Tolentino on the constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based
on constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on
the rationale as stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials
running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office
facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new
chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1— Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of
public officers? This only means that all elective public officials should
honor the mandate they have gotten from the people. Thus, under our
Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the Batasan shall serve for the
term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in the case of
barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as
part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold
(sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate
should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other
position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his
mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a
Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6
years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then, that
clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the mandate of the
people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the
accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is
not because of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it
is because of the Constitution itself which I said under the 1973
Constitution called and inserted this new chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run.
Now, what is it for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy,
that means that he does not want to serve, otherwise, why should he file
for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact
therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of
abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman
from Manila because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional
provision not only of the fact that Members of the Batasan and local
officials should serve the entire 6-year term for which we were elected,
but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public officers
not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily
because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the
elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their
own personal ambition. And that is the reason, Mr. Speaker, why we
opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective public officers
holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be
considered ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In
fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more
emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory
provision is no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern
that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public
office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position.
This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must
serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which
they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of
office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with
"tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the
period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of
said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not
exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the
term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby
files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his
successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of
office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to
present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the
four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure
of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the
case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution
of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature
from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution
or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the
office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect
of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of
the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our
fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts
pertaining to the validity of legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a
constitutional measure is presumed to be created. This Court has
enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative
enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with
the same rigor in construing a constitution as a statute and only those
things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly imply the
negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the
power of legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a
constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule of construction and
serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such intent is
not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section
7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation
envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by the
Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The
term 'voluntary renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it
appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the
Committee please enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary
renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the
second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is
more general than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of
filing a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt,
concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently
being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of
Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
 MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my,
shall we say, basis is that in one case the person is intending to
run for an office which is different from his own, and therefore it
should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an
intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is
otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a
person to quit an office which he is only intending to leave? A
relinquishment of office must be clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while
I do not disagree with the conclusion that the intention cannot be
enough, but I am saying that the filing of the certificate of
candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an
intention; it's already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No.
180 above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is)
automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are
considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted
official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of
filing of the certificate of candidacy should be taken into
account. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office
produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position
being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the
other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed
in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of
voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office
having been spelled out in Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no
statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name
from the Roll of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the
House of Representatives and he exercises administrative powers and
functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the
Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It
was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the
unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives
that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor
of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear
and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It
was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to
perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in
all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a
public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As
such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as
the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which
public policy may dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts
become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our
way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may
already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. 1 It is in this light that we
should address the instant case.
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In view of pressing contemporary
events, the petition begs for immediate resolution.
The Antecedents
This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC
to use an automated election system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436,
entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998
NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL
AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the size and
form of the official ballot which shall contain the titles of the positions to
be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative,
referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates
shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using
the same type size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board of
Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the
election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the
elections: - Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for president and vice president, shall be
deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided,
further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall
take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for
filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of President, Vice
President, Senators and candidates under the Party-List System as well
as petitions for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the
Party-List System shall be on February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the
filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27,
1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of
private printers under proper security measures which the Commission
shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers
upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements. Accredited political
parties and deputized citizens' arms of the Commission may assign
watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the
Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stub shall be
printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive
hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying
machine and that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and
other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registered voter with
a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct. 2
Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23,
2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS
AND IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL
EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY, CREDIBILITY,
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7166 AND OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 13 of the
amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of
the electronic display and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which
shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the propositions to
be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where
practicable, electronic displays must be constructed to present the names
of all candidates for the same position in the same page or screen,
otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the
entire ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure
that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all pages before completing
his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot
choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each
position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type
size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as
preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote
upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated using the same font and
size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors
shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be
provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official
candidates within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing a
certificate of candidacy.
With respect to a paper-based election system, the official ballots shall be
printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper
security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The Commission
may contract the services of private printers upon certification by the
National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet
the printing requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized
citizens' arms of the Commission shall assign watchers in the printing,
storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the
Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as, but not
limited to, bar codes, holograms, color shifting ink, microprinting, are
provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a
provision of additional three ballots per precinct.3
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election
laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the
Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official
Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding
a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be
considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of
candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009,
during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices
the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, 5 filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
The Petitioners' Contention
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing
of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early
printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such
advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC
a candidate at the moment of filing. In fact, the law considers him a
candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Petitioners then assert
that this being so, they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from
their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time
they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered
resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign
period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. 6
Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of
the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to
arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their
positions upon the filing of their CoCs. 7
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto
resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. 8
The Respondent's Arguments
On the procedural aspect of the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), representing respondent COMELEC, argues that
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have
not yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed
provision in the COMELEC resolution. The OSG further claims that the
petition is premature or unripe for judicial determination." Petitioners have
admitted that they are merely planning to file their CoCs for the coming
2010 elections. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely
speculative and contingent upon the filing of the same. The OSG likewise
contends that petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. They are
questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the
latter's rule-making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper
remedy.9
On the substantive aspect, the OSG maintains that the COMELEC did
not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of Resolution No.
8678 for it merely copied what is in the law. The OSG, however, agrees
with petitioners that there is a conflict in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 that
should be resolved. According to the OSG, there seems to be no basis to
consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned and to require them to
vacate their positions on the same day that they file their CoCs, because
they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Further, this -
deemed resigned- provision existed in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.
Blg.) 881, and no longer finds a place in our present election laws with
the innovations brought about by the automated system.10
Our Ruling
I.
At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect.
What petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under
Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a
remedy to question decisions, resolutions and issuances made in the
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.11 Prohibition is also an
inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from the
Court is a determination of the proper construction of a statute and a
declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously, their petition is one for
declaratory relief,12 over which this Court does not exercise original
jurisdiction.13
However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the
questioned provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law.
Given this scenario, the Court may step in and resolve the instant
petition.
The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues
raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution
the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started
and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to
lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable
damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the
government's manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety,
if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite
the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues.
In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice
or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the Rules
were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly administration of
justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts
would be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of
their judicial discretion.14
II.
To put things in their proper perspective, it is imperative that we trace the
brief history of the assailed provision. Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, which for ready reference is
quoted as follows:
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate
in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within
this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the
same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy.15
Notably, this proviso is not present in Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, the
law amended by R.A. No. 9369. The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of
B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.- Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
It may be recalled-in inverse chronology-that earlier, Presidential Decree
No. 1296, or the 1978 Election Code, contained a similar provision, thus'
SECTION 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position. - Every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso
facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they
presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy,
subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.
Much earlier, R.A. No. 6388, or the Election Code of 1971, likewise
stated in its Section 23 the following:
SECTION 23. Candidates Holding Appointive Office or Position. - Every
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and every officer or
employee in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso
facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That the filing of a certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which he may
have incurred.
Going further back in history, R.A. No. 180, or the Revised Election Code
approved on June 21, 1947, also provided that
SECTION 26. Automatic cessation of appointive officers and employees
who are candidates. - Every person holding a public appointive office or
position shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files
his certificate of candidacy.
During the Commonwealth era, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 725,
entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE NEXT ELECTION FOR
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR," approved on January 5, 1946, contained, in the
last paragraph of its Section 2, the following:
A person occupying any civil office by appointment in the government or
any of its political subdivisions or agencies or government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether such office by appointive or elective,
shall be considered to have resigned from such office from the moment of
the filing of such certificate of candidacy.
Significantly, however, C.A. No. 666, entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE
FOR THE FIRST ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATORS, AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
AMENDMENTS THEREOF," enacted without executive approval on June
22, 1941, the precursor of C.A. No. 725, only provided for automatic
resignation of elective, but not appointive, officials.
Nevertheless, C.A. No. 357, or the Election Code approved on August
22, 1938, had, in its Section 22, the same verbatim provision as Section
26 of R.A. No. 180.
The earliest recorded Philippine law on the subject is Act No. 1582, or the
Election Law enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907, the last
paragraph of Section 29 of which reads:
Sec. 29. Penalties upon officers.- x x x.
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for election, nor shall
he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to election,
at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to
the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the Court of First
Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of
the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take any part in any municipal,
provincial, or Assembly election under penalty of being deprived of his
office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatever for a term
of five years: Provided, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not
be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote
at any election.
From this brief historical excursion, it may be gleaned that the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369- that any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start
of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy- traces its roots to
the period of the American occupation.
In fact, during the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 2231, the bill later to be
consolidated with House Bill No. 5352 and enacted as R.A. No. 9369,
Senator Richard Gordon, the principal author of the bill, acknowledged
that the said proviso in the proposed legislative measure is an old
provision which was merely copied from earlier existing legislation, thus'
Senator Osmeña.- May I just opine here and perhaps obtain the opinion
of the good Sponsor.- This reads like, "ANY PERSON HOLDING [means
currently] A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE POSITION" SHALL BE
CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED- [which means that the
prohibition extends only to appointive officials] "INCLUDING ACTIVE
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES"-
This is a prohibition, Mr. President.- This means if one is chairman of
SSS or PDIC, he is deemed ipso facto resigned when he files his
certificate of candidacy.- Is that the intention
Senator Gordon.- This is really an old provision, Mr. President.
Senator Osmeña.- It is in bold letters, so I think it was a Committee
amendment.
Senator Gordon.- No, it has always been there.
Senator Osmeña.- I see.
Senator Gordon.- I guess the intention is not to give them undue
advantage, especially certain people.
Senator Osmeña.- All right.16
In that Senate deliberation, however, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
expressed her concern over the inclusion of the said provision in the new
law, given that the same would be disadvantageous and unfair to
potential candidates holding appointive positions, while it grants a
consequent preferential treatment to elective officials, thus'
Senator Santiago.- On page 15, line 31, I know that this is a losing cause,
so I make this point more as a matter of record than of any feasible hope
that it can possibly be either accepted or if we come to a division of the
House, it will be upheld by the majority.
I am referring to page 15, line 21.- The proviso begins: "PROVIDED
FINALLY, THAT ANY PERSON HOLDING A PUBLIC APPOINTIVE
OFFICE - SHALL BE CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED FROM
HIS/HER OFFICE."
The point that I made during the appropriate debate in the past in this
Hall is that there is, for me, no valid reason for exempting elective officials
from this inhibition or disqualification imposed by the law.- If we are going
to consider appointive officers of the government, including AFP
members and officers of government-owned and controlled corporations,
or any other member of the appointive sector of the civil service, why
should it not apply to the elective sector for, after all, even senators and
congressmen are members of the civil service as well
Further, it is self-serving for the Senate, or for the Congress in general, to
give an exception to itself which is not available to other similarly situated
officials of government. Of course, the answer is, the reason why we are
special is that we are elected. Since we are imposing a disqualification on
all other government officials except ourselves, I think, it is the better part
of delicadeza to inhibit ourselves as well, so that if we want to stay as
senators, we wait until our term expires. But if we want to run for some
other elective office during our term, then we have to be considered
resigned just like everybody else. That is my proposed amendment. But if
it is unacceptable to the distinguished Sponsor, because of sensitivity to
the convictions of the rest of our colleagues, I will understand.
Senator Gordon. Mr. President, I think the suggestion is well-thought of.-
It is a good policy.- However, this is something that is already in the old
law which was upheld by the Supreme court in a recent case that the
rider was not upheld and that it was valid. 17
The obvious inequality brought about by the provision on automatic
resignation of appointive civil servants must have been the reason why
Senator Recto proposed the inclusion of the following during the period of
amendments: "ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED
AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR
WHICH HE FILED HIS COC."18 The said proviso seems to mitigate the
situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering
persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the
campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding
appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
Parenthetically, it may be remembered that Section 67 of the OEC and
Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436 contained a similar provision on automatic
resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs for any office
other than that which they hold in a permanent capacity or for President
or Vice-President. However, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9006, or the
Fair Election Act,19 in 2001, this provision was repealed by Section 1420 of
the said act. There was, thus, created a situation of obvious
discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective
officials were not.
This situation was incidentally addressed by the Court in Fari᳠v. The
Executive Secretary21 when it ruled that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection
clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification.- If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court
has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this
manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate.- It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority.- Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that
under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election except to vote.- Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of
the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those
occupied by them.- Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass
upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e.,
elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material
and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same
classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 22
However, it must be remembered that the Court, in Fari᳠/i>, was intently
focused on the main issue of whether the repealing clause in the Fair
Election Act was a constitutionally proscribed rider, in that it unwittingly
failed to ascertain with stricter scrutiny the impact of the retention of the
provision on automatic resignation of persons holding appointive
positions (Section 66) in the OEC, vis-୶is the equal protection clause.-
Moreover, the Court's vision in Fari᳠/i> was shrouded by the fact that
petitioners therein, Fari᳠et al., never posed a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 66 of the OEC. Fari᳠et al. rather merely
questioned, on constitutional grounds, the repealing clause, or Section 14
of the Fair Election Act. The Court's afore-quoted declaration in Fari᳠/i>
may then very well be considered as an obiter dictum.
III.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the
constitutional challenge advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to
settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC,
which, as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the
American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause.
But before delving into the constitutional issue, we shall first address the
issues on legal standing and on the existence of an actual controversy.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of whether a
party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 23 In this case, petitioners
allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the
2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners
have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are
not yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC
resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet
candidates, they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge,
simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such
as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose
their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do
not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates
always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. 24 The
Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge, on
grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact
on voting rights.25
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.26
We have also stressed in our prior decisions that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of
actual cases and controversies.27 The Court, in this case, finds that an
actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the
COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of
all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they
would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the
provisionthey would file their CoCs and run in the 2010 elections. Given
that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the
filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or
hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy. 28
IV.
Having hurdled what the OSG posed as obstacles to judicial review, the
Court now delves into the constitutional challenge.
It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches
on two fundamental freedoms, those of expression and of association.
This premise is best explained in Mancuso v. Taft, 29 viz.:
Freedom of expression guarantees to the individual the opportunity to
write a letter to the local newspaper, speak out in a public park, distribute
handbills advocating radical reform, or picket an official building to seek
redress of grievances. All of these activities are protected by the First
Amendment if done in a manner consistent with a narrowly defined
concept of public order and safety. The choice of means will likely
depend on the amount of time and energy the individual wishes to
expend and on his perception as to the most effective method of
projecting his message to the public. But interest and commitment are
evolving phenomena. What is an effective means for protest at one point
in time may not seem so effective at a later date. The dilettante who
participates in a picket line may decide to devote additional time and
resources to his expressive activity. As his commitment increases, the
means of effective expression changes, but the expressive quality
remains constant. He may decide to lead the picket line, or to publish the
newspaper. At one point in time he may decide that the most effective
way to give expression to his views and to get the attention of an
appropriate audience is to become a candidate for public office-means
generally considered among the most appropriate for those desiring to
effect change in our governmental systems. He may seek to become a
candidate by filing in a general election as an independent or by seeking
the nomination of a political party. And in the latter instance, the
individual's expressive activity has two dimensions: besides urging that
his views be the views of the elected public official, he is also attempting
to become a spokesman for a political party whose substantive program
extends beyond the particular office in question. But Cranston has said
that a certain type of its citizenry, the public employee, may not become a
candidate and may not engage in any campaign activity that promotes
himself as a candidate for public office. Thus the city has stifled what may
be the most important expression an individual can summon, namely that
which he would be willing to effectuate, by means of concrete public
action, were he to be selected by the voters.
It is impossible to ignore the additional fact that the right to run for office
also affects the freedom to associate. In Williams v. Rhodes, supra, the
Court used strict review to invalidate an Ohio election system that made it
virtually impossible for third parties to secure a place on the ballot. The
Court found that the First Amendment protected the freedom to associate
by forming and promoting a political party and that that freedom was
infringed when the state effectively denied a party access to its electoral
machinery. The Cranston charter provision before us also affects
associational rights, albeit in a slightly different way. An individual may
decide to join or participate in an organization or political party that
shares his beliefs. He may even form a new group to forward his ideas.
And at some juncture his supporters and fellow party members may
decide that he is the ideal person to carry the group's standard into the
electoral fray. To thus restrict the options available to political
organization as the Cranston charter provision has done is to limit the (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
effectiveness of association; and the freedom to associate is intimately
related with the concept of making expression effective. Party access to (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
the ballot becomes less meaningful if some of those selected by party
machinery to carry the party's programs to the people are precluded from (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
doing so because those nominees are civil servants.
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
Whether the right to run for office is looked at from the point of view of
individual expression or associational effectiveness, wide opportunities
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial
exist for the individual who seeks public office. The fact of candidacy
differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the
alone may open previously closed doors of the media. The candidate
fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways,31 a
may be invited to discuss his views on radio talk shows; he may be able
real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
to secure equal time on television to elaborate his campaign program; the
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited
newspapers may cover his candidacy; he may be invited to debate before
from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal a
various groups that had theretofore never heard of him or his views. In
two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
short, the fact of candidacy opens up a variety of communicative
four-wheel vehicle.
possibilities that are not available to even the most diligent of picketers or
the most loyal of party followers. A view today, that running for public
office is not an interest protected by the First Amendment, seems to us Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply
an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was the with the second requirement if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold that Justice Isagani A. Cruz (Ret.), in his treatise on constitutional law,
candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental explains,
interest. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that
interest must be subjected to strict equal protection review. 30 The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be
invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. To illustrate, the
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected accepted difference in physical stamina between men and women will
by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the justify the prohibition of the latter from employment as miners or
proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the opportune time for stevedores or in other heavy and strenuous work. On the basis of this
the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal same classification, however, the law cannot provide for a lower passing
protection clause and for being overbroad. average for women in the bar examinations because physical strength is
not the test for admission to the legal profession. Imported cars may be
taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled automobiles for the
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
protection of the national economy, but their difference in origin is no
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
justification for treating them differently when it comes to punishing
considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective
violations of traffic regulations. The source of the vehicle has no relation
ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone
to the observance of these rules.32
that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not
only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory
would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.33
is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied
with, namely:
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one's candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further
aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would
be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public.34 The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the
assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of
valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification
must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented
by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any
Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post
(in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local
government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head
executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our
law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and can
still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge
of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy
would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show
his fitness for the position aspired for.
Mancuso v. Taft,35 cited above, explains that the measure on automatic
resignation, which restricts the rights of civil servants to run for officea
right inextricably linked to their freedom of expression and association, is
not reasonably necessary to the satisfaction of the state interest. Thus, in
striking down a similar measure in the United States, Mancuso succinctly
declares'
In proceeding to the second stage of active equal protection review,
however, we do see some contemporary relevance of
the Mitchell decision. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, supra. In order for
the Cranston charter provision to withstand strict scrutiny, the city must
show that the exclusion of all government employees from candidacy is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. And, as stated
in Mitchell and other cases dealing with similar statutes, see Wisconsin
State Employees, supra; Broadrick, supra, government at all levels has a
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of its civil service. It is
obviously conceivable that the impartial character of the civil service
would be seriously jeopardized if people in positions of authority used
their discretion to forward their electoral ambitions rather than the public
welfare. Similarly if a public employee pressured other fellow employees
to engage in corrupt practices in return for promises of post-election
reward, or if an employee invoked the power of the office he was seeking
to extract special favors from his superiors, the civil service would be
done irreparable injury. Conversely, members of the public, fellow-
employees, or supervisors might themselves request favors from the
candidate or might improperly adjust their own official behavior towards
him. Even if none of these abuses actually materialize, the possibility of
their occurrence might seriously erode the public's confidence in its public
employees. For the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the
impartiality itself; the knowledge that a clerk in the assessor's office who
is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files which
could provide pressure points for furthering his campaign is destructive
regardless of whether the clerk actually takes advantage of his
opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state indeed has a
compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public
work force.
We do not, however, consider the exclusionary measure taken by
Cranston-a flat prohibition on office-seeking of all kinds by all kinds of
public employees-as even reasonably necessary to satisfaction of this
state interest. As Justice Marshall pointed out in Dunn v.
Blumstein, [s]tatutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with
precision. For three sets of reasons we conclude that the Cranston
charter provision pursues its objective in a far too heavy-handed manner
and hence must fall under the equal protection clause. First, we think the
nature of the regulation-a broad prophylactic rule-may be unnecessary to
fulfillment of the city's objective. Second, even granting some sort of
prophylactic rule may be required, the provision here prohibits
candidacies for all types of public office, including many which would
pose none of the problems at which the law is aimed. Third, the provision
excludes the candidacies of all types of public employees, without any
attempt to limit exclusion to those employees whose positions make them
vulnerable to corruption and conflicts of interest.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently
from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
V.
The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being
overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in
government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also
be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010
elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he
can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political
world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public
elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in
government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone
in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and
unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the
Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know,
general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry
and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public
office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all
public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character,
whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress
has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
involved on such a sweeping scale. 36
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad
measures that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After
all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power
emanates from them.
Mancuso v. Taft,37 on this point, instructs
As to approaches less restrictive than a prophylactic rule, there exists the
device of the leave of absence. Some system of leaves of absence would
permit the public employee to take time off to pursue his candidacy while
assuring him his old job should his candidacy be unsuccessful. Moreover,
a leave of absence policy would eliminate many of the opportunities for
engaging in the questionable practices that the statute is designed to
prevent. While campaigning, the candidate would feel no conflict between
his desire for election and his publicly entrusted discretion, nor any
conflict between his efforts to persuade the public and his access to
confidential documents. But instead of adopting a reasonable leave of
absence policy, Cranston has chosen a provision that makes the public
employee cast off the security of hard-won public employment should he
desire to compete for elected office.
The city might also promote its interest in the integrity of the civil service
by enforcing, through dismissal, discipline, or criminal prosecution, rules
or statutes that treat conflict of interests, bribery, or other forms of official
corruption. By thus attacking the problem directly, instead of using a
broad prophylactic rule, the city could pursue its objective without unduly
burdening the First Amendment rights of its employees and the voting
rights of its citizens. Last term in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court
faced an analogous question when the State of Tennessee asserted that
the interest of ballot box purity justified its imposition of one year and
three month residency requirements before a citizen could vote. Justice
Marshall stated, inter alia, that Tennessee had available a number of
criminal statutes that could be used to punish voter fraud without
unnecessary infringement on the newcomer's right to vote. Similarly, it
appears from the record in this case that the Cranston charter contains
some provisions that might be used against opportunistic public
employees.
Even if some sort of prophylactic rule is necessary, we cannot say that
Cranston has put much effort into tailoring a narrow provision that
attempts to match the prohibition with the problem. The charter forbids a
Cranston public employee from running for any office, anywhere. The
prohibition is not limited to the local offices of Cranston, but rather
extends to statewide offices and even to national offices. It is difficult for
us to see that a public employee running for the United States Congress
poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same
employee if he were running for a local office where the contacts and
information provided by his job related directly to the position he was
seeking, and hence where the potential for various abuses was greater.
Nor does the Cranston charter except the public employee who works in
Cranston but aspires to office in another local jurisdiction, most probably
his town of residence. Here again the charter precludes candidacies
which can pose only a remote threat to the civil service. Finally, the
charter does not limit its prohibition to partisan office-seeking, but
sterilizes also those public employees who would seek nonpartisan
elective office. The statute reviewed in Mitchell was limited to partisan
political activity, and since that time other courts have found the partisan-
nonpartisan distinction a material one. See Kinnear, supra; Wisconsin
State Employees, supra; Gray v. Toledo, supra. While the line between
nonpartisan and partisan can often be blurred by systems whose true
characters are disguised by the names given them by their architects, it
seems clear that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the
temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved in an
office removed from regular party politics to warrant distinctive treatment
in a charter of this sort.
The third and last area of excessive and overinclusive coverage of the
Cranston charter relates not to the type of office sought, but to the type of
employee seeking the office. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his
dissent in Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 120-126, 67 S.Ct. 556, restrictions on
administrative employees who either participate in decision-making or at
least have some access to information concerning policy matters are
much more justifiable than restrictions on industrial employees, who, but
for the fact that the government owns the plant they work in, are, for
purposes of access to official information, identically situated to all other
industrial workers. Thus, a worker in the Philadelphia mint could be
distinguished from a secretary in an office of the Department of
Agriculture; so also could a janitor in the public schools of Cranston be
distinguished from an assistant comptroller of the same city. A second
line of distinction that focuses on the type of employee is illustrated by the
cases of Kinnear and Minielly, supra. In both of these cases a civil
service deputy decided to run for the elected office of sheriff. The courts
in both cases felt that the no-candidacy laws in question were much too
broad and indicated that perhaps the only situation sensitive enough to
justify a flat rule was one in which an inferior in a public office electorally
challenged his immediate superior. Given all these considerations, we
think Cranston has not given adequate attention to the problem of
narrowing the terms of its charter to deal with the specific kinds of
conflict-of-interest problems it seeks to avoid.
We also do not find convincing the arguments that after-hours
campaigning will drain the energy of the public employee to the extent
that he is incapable of performing his job effectively and that inevitable
on-the-job campaigning and discussion of his candidacy will disrupt the
work of others. Although it is indisputable that the city has a compelling
interest in the performance of official work, the exclusion is not well-
tailored to effectuate that interest. Presumably the city could fire the
individual if he clearly shirks his employment responsibilities or disrupts
the work of others. Also, the efficiency rationale common to both
arguments is significantly underinclusive. It applies equally well to a
number of non-political, extracurricular activities that are not prohibited by
the Cranston charter. Finally, the connection between after-hours
campaigning and the state interest seems tenuous; in many cases a
public employee would be able to campaign aggressively and still
continue to do his job well.38
Incidentally, Clements v. Fashing 39 sustained as constitutional a provision
on the automatic resignation of District Clerks, County Clerks, County
Judges, County Treasurers, Criminal District Attorneys, County
Surveyors, Inspectors of Hides and Animals, County Commissioners,
Justices of the Peace, Sheriffs, Assessors and Collectors of Taxes,
District Attorneys, County Attorneys, Public Weighers, and Constables if
they announce their candidacy or if they become candidates in any
general, special or primary election.
In Clements, it may be readily observed that a provision treating
differently particular officials, as distinguished from all others, under a
classification that is germane to the purposes of the law, merits the stamp
of approval from American courts. Not, however, a general and sweeping
provision, and more so one violative of the second requisite for a valid
classification, which is on its face unconstitutional.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to state that the Americans, from
whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a
similar measure for being unconstitutional. It is high-time that we, too,
should follow suit and, thus, uphold fundamental liberties over age-old,
but barren, restrictions to such freedoms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No.
9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009
MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and ARSENIO DENSING
NOBLE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition1 for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007
Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in
SPA No. 07-202, which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing
Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith
Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the position of municipal mayor
of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating
therein that he has been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.
On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification3 against
Noble docketed as SPA No. 07-202, alleging that the latter lacks the
residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local
officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed
place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and
that he does not appear to have the intention of residing therein
permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business
called OBERT Construction Supply.
In his Answer,4 Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of
Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18,
1992, he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go
of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral
activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in
the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.
In a resolution dated May 13, 2007,5 the Second Division of the
COMELEC ruled in favor of Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from
running as mayor, thus:
Respondent Noble’s claim that he is a registered voter and has actually
voted in the past three (3) elections in the said municipality does not
sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency at Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental. Neither does campaigning in previous elections
sufficiently establish residence.
Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. He failed to prove not only his bodily
presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show that he
intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon his
residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to Disqualify
Aresnio Densing Noble is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.6
Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the
meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed
the winning candidate on May 15, 2007. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent
Motion to Annul Proclamation.7
On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the
Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty
position.
The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on
January 18, 1992, the couple has since resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental; that he was a registered voter and that he participated in the last
three elections; and although he is engaged in business in Cagayan de
Oro City, the fact that he resides in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter
and owns property thereat, sufficiently meet the residency
requirement.8 Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant Motion for
Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution
promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the Commission (Second
Division).
ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is
QUALIFIED to run for the local elective position of Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.9
Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the
COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
declared Noble qualified to run; when it did not annul Noble’s
proclamation; and when it failed to proclaim the true winning candidate,
Judith Pundaodaya.
In a resolution dated November 13, 2007, the Court required the
10
respondents to comment on the petition.
Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Manifestation and Motion11 praying that it be excused from filing a
separate comment and that the said pleading be considered sufficient
compliance with the November 13, 2007 Resolution.
Meanwhile, for Noble’s failure to comply, the Court issued
Resolutions12 dated July 15, 2008 and December 9, 2008 requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt, imposing a fine of ₱1,000.00, and requiring him to file a
comment. On June 2, 2009, the Court deemed Noble to have waived the
filing of the comment.13
The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely
abused its discretion: 1) in declaring Noble qualified to run for the
mayoralty position; and 2) in failing to order the annulment of Noble’s
proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the winning
candidate.
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, requires that an elective local official must be a
resident in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he intends
to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the election. 14
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15 it was held that the term
"residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."
In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that
domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent
for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is
a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can
have but one residence or domicile at a time. 1avvphi1
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.17 Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these
three requirements, the domicile of origin continues.18
Records show that Noble’s domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City. However, he claims to have chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental as his new domicile. To substantiate this, he presented before
the COMELEC his voter registration records;19 a Certification dated April
25, 2007 from Election Officer II Clavel Z. Tabada;20 his Marriage
Certificate;21 and affidavits of residents of Kinoguitan22 attesting that he
established residence in the municipality after his marriage to Bernadith
Go. In addition, he presented receipts23 from the Provincial Treasurer for
payment of his water bills, and Certifications from the Municipal Treasurer
and Municipal Engineer that he has been a consumer of the Municipal
Water System since June 2003. To prove ownership of property, he also
presented a Deed of Sale24 over a real property dated June 3, 1996.
The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us
that Noble successfully effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled
by the COMELEC Second Division, private respondent’s claim that he is
a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has
actually elected residency in the said municipality. Indeed, while we have
ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of
residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. 25 Thus, in Perez v.
Commission on Elections,26 we held that a person’s registration as voter
in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not
sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. 27
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not
only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. 28
In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his
actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it
prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence. We are
also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water bills in the absence
of evidence showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while
Noble presented a Deed of Sale for real property, the veracity of this
document is belied by his own admission that he does not own property
in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.29
On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original
domicile as shown by the following: a) Certification dated April 12, 2007
of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City
stating that Noble is a resident of the barangay; 30 b) Affidavit31 of the
Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated
April 14, 2007, attesting that Noble has not resided in Barangay
Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c) photos32and official receipts33 showing that
Noble and his wife maintain their residence and businesses in Lapasan;
d) tax declarations34 of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under the
name of Noble; and e) the "Household Record of Barangay
Inhabitants"35 of Mayor Narciso Go, which did not include Noble or his
wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble’s claim that he resides with his
father-in-law.
From the foregoing, we find that Noble’s alleged change of domicile was
effected solely for the purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007
elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on
Elections, 36 we held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at
excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. 37 Thus, we
find Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Notwithstanding Noble’s disqualification, we find no basis for the
proclamation of Judith Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules on succession
under the Local Government Code, explicitly provides:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become
the xxx mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental occasioned by Noble’s disqualification, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07-202 declaring respondent
Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run as Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent
vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 186006 October 16, 2009
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T.
ALINGAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
Rule 64, assailing the Resolution1 dated November 23, 2007 of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the
Resolution2 of the Comelec En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No.
07-621.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
and her husband, Mohammad "Exchan" Limbona, each filed a Certificate
of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. On April 2, 2007,
private respondent Malik "Bobby" Alingan filed a disqualification case
against Mohammad before the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao
del Norte. On April 12, 2007, Alingan also filed a petition for
disqualification against petitioner.3Both disqualification cases were
premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband lacked the one-
year residency requirement and both were not registered voters of
Pantar.4
On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her
certificate of candidacy,5 which was subsequently approved by the
Comelec.6 Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss the disqualification
case against her for being moot and academic. 7
On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the
elections in Pantar because there was no final list of voters yet. A special
election was scheduled for July 23, 2007. 8
On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution
disqualifying Mohammad as candidate for mayor for failure to comply with
the one-year residency requirement.9 Petitioner then filed her Certificate
of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21, 2007. On July 23, 2007,
Alingan filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner for, among
others, lacking the one-year residency requirement (SPA No. 07-621).10
In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-62111 dated November 23, 2007, the
Comelec Second Division ruled that petitioner was disqualified from
running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held that petitioner only
became a resident of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that
petitioner’s domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her
birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident of Barangay
Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband was Barangay Chairman until
November 2006. Barangay Rapasun, the Comelec said, was petitioner’s
domicile by operation of law under the Family Code. The Comelec found
that the evidence petitioner adduced to prove that she has abandoned
her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the
elections consisted mainly of self-serving affidavits and were not
corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Comelec also
took note of its resolution in another case where it was found that
petitioner was not even a registered voter in Pantar. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.12
The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated
January 14, 2009,13 affirming the Second Division’s Resolution
disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said that the issue of whether
petitioner has complied with the one-year residency rule has been
decided by the Supreme Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v.
Commission on Elections and Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan promulgated on
June 25, 2008. The Comelec noted that, in said case, the Supreme Court
upheld the Comelec First Division’s Decision in SPA No. 07-611
disqualifying petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for failure to
comply with the residency requirement.
Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the Comelec’s November 23,
2007 and January 14, 2009 Resolutions. She posits that the Comelec
erred in disqualifying her for failure to comply with the one-year residency
requirement. She alleges that in a disqualification case against her
husband filed by Nasser Macauyag, another mayoralty candidate, the
Comelec considered her husband as a resident of Pantar and qualified to
run for any elective office there. Petitioner avers that since her husband
was qualified to run in Pantar, she is likewise qualified to run. 14
1avvphi1
Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically
present in that municipality for almost two years prior to the May 2007
elections. During the time she had been residing in Pantar, she
associated and mingled with residents there, giving her ample time to
know the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and economic potential of the
municipality. This, she said, is proof of her intention to establish
permanent residency there and her intent to abandon her domicile in
Marawi City.
She next argues that, even as her husband was Punong Barangay of
Rapasun, Marawi City, he never abandoned Pantar as his hometown and
domicile of origin. She avers that the performance of her husband’s duty
in Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having his domicile elsewhere.
Hence, it was incorrect for the Comelec to have concluded that her
husband changed his domicile only on November 11, 2006. 15 At the very
least, petitioner says, the Comelec’s conflicting resolutions on the issue
of her husband’s residence should create a doubt that should be resolved
in her and her husband’s favor.16
She further contends that to disqualify her would disenfranchise the
voters of Pantar, the overwhelming majority of whom elected her as
mayor during the July 23, 2007 special elections. 17
The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Comment, insisting that the Comelec correctly disqualified petitioner from
running as mayor for lack of the one-year residency requirement.18 The
OSG argues that there is no evidence that petitioner has abandoned her
domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City.19 Moreover, the OSG
said that this Court has ruled on the issue of petitioner’s residency in
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik "Bobby"
T. Alingan.20 Lastly, the OSG contends that the Comelec’s ruling in
Nasser A. Macauyag v. Mohammad Limbona is not binding on petitioner
because she was not a party to the case. 21
We dismiss the Petition.
The issue of petitioner’s disqualification for failure to comply with the one-
year residency requirement has been resolved by this Court in Norlainie
Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik "Bobby" T.
Alingan.22This case stemmed from the first disqualification case filed by
herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611.
Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy
subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and
found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of
Pantar.
A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September
4, 2007 Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-
611 disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for
office of the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In
view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed
Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary restraining order
issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.23
The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement. It held:
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year
residency requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law
is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in
fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not
identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a
person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first,
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that
where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third,
a man can have but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s "domicile"
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one,
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
Petitioner’s claim that she has been physically present and actually
residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-
serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists
merely of self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has
abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is
alleged that respondent "has been staying, sleeping and doing business
in her house for more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan and yet,
there is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate
such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondent’s intention to
stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate
of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she
has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact
that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a
registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification as
a candidate.
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s domicile of origin is
Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her
domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi
City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner’s husband, effected
the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on
November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live
together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the
change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse
from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity
of the family. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove
otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and
is in consonance with human experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x
x.24
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was
denied with finality on March 3, 2009.25Petitioner filed another Motion for
Reconsideration,26 which the Court treated as a Second Motion for
Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution dated June 2,
2009.27 Of late, petitioner has filed a "Manifestation" that raises yet again
the issues already resolved in the petition and which the Court has,
accordingly, merely noted without action. 28 Thus, our ruling therein has
now attained finality.
Consequently, the issue of petitioner’s compliance with the one-year
residency requirement is now settled. We are bound by this Court’s ruling
in the earlier Limbona case where the issue was squarely raised and
categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this
case, especially since the present Petition merely restates issues already
passed upon by the Comelec and affirmed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is
DISMISSED and the Resolution dated November 23, 2007 of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections and the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA No.
07-621 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of
SUPREME COURT Palawan.
Manila
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his
EN BANC Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of
Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive
G.R. No. 191938 October 19, 2010 evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents’ evidence
failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private respondents’
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City
vs. resident.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES and
ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondents. In this regard, we took note of the "incremental moves" Mitra undertook to
establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following: (1)
RESOLUTION his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa
City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in
BRION, J.:
March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya
Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by public respondent construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for he was leasing pending the completion of his house. Thus, we found that
Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments 2 filed by private under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no
respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private reason to infer that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether
respondents), dated July 19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. We also
addressing our Decision of July 2, 20103 (July 2, 2010 Decision or emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally
Decision). We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in its
4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private analysis) to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC concerning his
respondents’ petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of residence was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that the
petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra). evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra
indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan
The Assailed Ruling within the period required by law.

To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited The Motions for Reconsideration
certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not only obliged but are
constitutionally bound to intervene when the COMELEC’s action on the In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC,
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July
discretion – in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from 2, 2010 Decision on the sole ground that:
the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors
of judgment to errors of jurisdiction. Based on our evaluation of the
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REVIEWED THE
evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit
PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND
any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. We noted, too, that
SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS OVER THAT OF [THE]
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the
PUBLIC RESPONDENT.4
evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan,
Palawan. We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider
whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over its
factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and
conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given
the status of finality. The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in
taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues raised therein
are essentially factual in nature. It claims that it is elementary that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to correcting questions of law
and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.
On the merits, the COMELEC submits that there is substantial, if not
overwhelming, evidence that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.
It argues that it merely took cognizance of Mitra’s purported dwelling’s
"habitableness," or lack thereof, to determine the fact of residency; while
Mitra may have exhibited his intention to transfer his domicile, the fact of
actual residency was lacking.
For their part, the private respondents raise the following errors in support
of their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments dated
July 20, 2010, viz:
I.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN EXERCISING THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S LIMITED CERTIORARI JURISDICTION EVEN WHEN THE
PETITION, ON ITS FACE, FAILED TO SHOW HOW THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY USING
SUBJECTIVE AND NON-LEGAL STANDARDS IN ASSESSING THE
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY MITRA.
III.
GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ONE ASPECT OF
ITS RESOLUTION, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NONETHELESS
CONSIDER WHETHER THE OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED ARE
ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE RULING OF THE COMELEC.
A.
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO OVERTURN
THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COMELEC SHOULD BE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. WHEN THE EVIDENCE
OF [THE] PETITIONER ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED AND
CONTROVERTED, THE SAME FAILS TO REACH THE
QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUBSTITUTE THE
FINDINGS OF THE COMELEC.
IV.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN FOCUSING ON THE COMELEC’S
OPINION REGARDING THE PHOTOGRAPHS SUBMITTED BY MITRA
OF HIS SUPPOSED RESIDENCE, WHILE TOTALLY DISREGARDING
OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AND CONSIDERED BY THE COMELEC.
A.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE WHICH SHOWS
THAT THE SAME IS ONLY UP TO 28 FEBRUARY 2010.
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE
WHICH SHOW THAT MITRA FAILED TO ABANDON HIS
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN.
V.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MITRA HAD
TRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN
IN PUERTO PRINCESA CITY TO HIS DOMICILE OF CHOICE IN
ABORLAN, IN AN INCREMENTAL PROCESS.
VI.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MITRA DID NOT COMMIT
ANY DELIBERATE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN HIS COC.
 A.
THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN PETITIONER’S COC
RESPECTING HIS RESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE
FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSE STATEMENT, PETITIONER
DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO MISINFORM
THE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL RESIDENCE. HENCE,
HIS COC WAS CORRECTLY DENIED DUE COURSE AND
CANCELLED.
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN EXONERATING MITRA FROM THE
VIOLATION OF A MANDATORY PROVISION OF LAW WHICH
ENTAILS BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
BY INVOKING THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW WHERE SUCH
RESORT IS NOT CALLED FOR IN VIEW OF THE GIVEN
FACTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
VII.
JURISPRUDENCE RELIED ON BY THE MAJORITY IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
A.
THE CASE OF TORAYNO V. COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO THE PRESENT CASE.
B.
THE CASE OF ASISTIO V. TRINIDAD PE-AGUIRRE IS
LIKEWISE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
C.
THE CASE OF VELASCO SHOULD BE APPLIED STRICTLY TO
THE PRESENT CASE.5
Our Ruling
We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and
for oral arguments.
We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents’
arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the
same arguments addressing the issues we already considered and
passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and
private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument
meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments
proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’
original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered,
without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral
argument shall require.
Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the
case the motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts
on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.
First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the
Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize
that Mitra’s petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. They also stress
that the Court should respect and consider the COMELEC’s findings of
fact to be final and non-reviewable.
The COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that
the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a
petition for review on certiorari – is wholly erroneous. This submission
appears to have confused the standards of the Court’s power of review
under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC
to grossly misread the import of Mitra’s petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for certiorari,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review
(under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under
the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,
i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The basis for the Court’s review of COMELEC rulings under the
standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which provides that "[U]nless otherwise provided by [the]
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." For this reason, the
Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on
Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing
of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause – "except as
hereinafter provided."6
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections7 and Dario v. Mison,8 the Court
construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although with a different
reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, except as therein provided. In Ocate v.
Commission on Elections,9 we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the
challenged tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
1avvphi1
relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself,10 in
defining judicial power, pointedly states that –
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of
this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this
authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC’s
position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases
under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review
that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents’
proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari
jurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all
factual issues as the Constitution11 and the Rules of Court12 provide, we
stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional
duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention simply because
a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the factual
issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized
exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in
a certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. One such exception is when the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under
the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because
of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of
jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitra’s submissions and arguments on
grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to
appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC proceeding and that
the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material
representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitra’s petition plainly
argued that the COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion was patent when
it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false
representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the process,
analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every
step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in the appreciation of the evidence.
Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use
subjective non-legal standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in
arriving at its decision; it merely stated how it perceived Mitra’s alleged
residence. The private respondents additionally claim that the quantum of
evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC should be
clear and convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in
the present case.
The assailed COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the
standards the COMELEC used. We found that the COMELEC plainly
used a subjective non-legal standard in its analysis and thereby, the
COMELEC used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that
Mitra’s residence at the Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence
contemplated by law.
We reiterate that the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up
residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs of Mitra’s Aborlan
premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have
been a residence because of its assessment of the interior design and
furnishings of the room. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division’s
Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely
conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more
than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a
residence, for lack of the qualities of a home that the Second Division
wanted to see. To quote:
The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed "residence" are telling.
The said pictures show a small, sparsely furnished room which is
evidently unlived in and which is located on the second floor of a
structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse. These pictures
likewise show that the "residence" appears hastily set-up, cold, and
utterly devoid of any [personality] which would have imprinted Mitra’s
personality thereto such as old family photographs and memorabilia
collected through the years. In fact, an appreciation of Mitra’s supposed
"residence" raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there. Verily,
what is lacking therein are the loving attention and details inherent in
every home to make it one’s residence. Perhaps, at most, and to this
Commission’s mind, this small room could have served as Mitra’s resting
area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.
This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former
employees and customers of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitra’s
residence is located in an unsavory location, considering the noise and
pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had been
Maligaya Feed Mill’s office just a few months back, militates against
Mitra’s claim that the same has been his residence since early 2008.
These information make it clear to this Commission that this room is not a
home.13
Thus presented, the COMELEC’s requirement of what should be
considered a "residence" cannot but be a highly subjective one that finds
no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.
Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents’ theory that
the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the
COMELEC should be clear and convincing evidence, as it
misappreciates that we nullified the COMELEC’s findings because it used
the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions.
The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in
the present case relate to questions bearing on the cancellation of the
COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged
deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his
residency in Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa
City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred
by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his
transfer in early 2009. As our Decision discussed and as repeated
elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish
by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer,
while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but even
used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out
that we (1) totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which
the COMELEC, on the other hand, properly considered; (2) disregarded
the import of the effectivity of the lease contract, which showed that it was
only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the evidence
showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly
considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this point,
we only need to address some of the private respondents’ misleading
points in order to clear the air.
1. The private respondents’ reliance on the expiration date of the
lease contract, to disprove Mitra’s claim that the room at the
Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced. This argument
is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely
and fully time-barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it
was renewable at the option of the parties. That a lease is fixed
for a one-year term is a common practice. What is important is
that it is renewable at the option of the parties. In the absence of
any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply
continues and is deemed renewed.14
2. In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of
Puerto Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their
Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitra’s
alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
dated February 3, 200915 allegedly showing Mitra’s signature. To
recall, we found that based on the records before us, the
purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of
Mitra. Although the private respondents have belatedly filed this
evidence, we carefully examined the recently submitted colored
copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse
our finding; the "alleged signature" appears to us to be a mere
hazy "superimposition" that does not bear any resemblance at all
to Mitra’s signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the
February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary
value. It did it not at all carry Mitra’s signature; his secretary’s
positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the
latter’s participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3. The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a
Certification, dated July 17, 2010,16 from the Municipal
Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any
record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission was made to show that
Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan. The
Certification pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing
records/registration in our office regarding the alleged pineapple
plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. However, the
Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering
data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value
Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident
in Penida Subdivision, Puerto Princesa City for whatever legal
purposes may serve him best.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two
reasons. First, it was filed only on reconsideration stage and was
not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for
resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the
Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face,
contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there
are no existing records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay
Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also expressly
states that its records are not yet complete since it is "on the
process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged
in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan." 17 Under
what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to
prepare a list of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not
even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitra’s business
interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case. Not
only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental
pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also
corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo
Temple and other witnesses.
4. The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in
ruling that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. We likewise see no merit in this
claim. One important point in the present case is that the private
respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate material
misrepresentation in Mitra’s statement on his required residency
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our
Decision, is a glaring gap in the private respondents’ case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation
given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made
to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the
evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitra’s favor;
even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go
below the level of an equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitra’s evidence of
transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the
respondents’ evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot
conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a
deliberate one, about his residence.
The character of Mitra’s representation before the COMELEC is an
aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it
focused mainly on the character of Mitra’s feedmill residence. For this
reason, the COMELEC was led into error – one that goes beyond an
ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there
had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitra’s COC, the COMELEC
committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC
was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation. In this
case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully
considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence
within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty
approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his
stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a
three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed
mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we
condemned the COMELEC’s use of subjective non-legal standards.
Mitra’s feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately
from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his
expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa
City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling;
the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a
house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he
leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves
do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC’s highly
subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding
before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case
sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and
residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in
his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally
acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding
his residence was a misrepresentation.18
5. The private respondents submit that the Court erred in relying on
jurisprudence (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC19 and Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad
Pe-Aguirre20) not applicable to the present case. They additionally argue
that our ruling in Velasco v. COMELEC21 should be applied strictly to the
present case.
These submissions are wrong, as they do not consider the purposes and
the specific points of law for which we cited these cases. Torayno, Asistio
and Velasco, read in their proper perspective, fully support our findings
and conclusions in this case.
While Torayno does not share the exact factual situation in the present
case, we cited the case to illustrate that it is not unknown in this
jurisdiction to have a situation where a candidate, due to legal
developments (such as reclassification of a component city to a highly
urbanized city), is compelled to transfer residence to allow him to
continue his or her public service in another political unit that he or she
cannot legally access as a candidate, without a change of residence. In
the present case, as in Torayno, Mitra would not have had any legal
obstacle to his gubernatorial bid were it not for the reclassification of
Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city.
The adjustment he had to make was solely in his residence, as he
already had, as a Puerto Princesa City resident, knowledge of and
sensitivity to the needs of the Palawan electorate.
The factual antecedents of Asistio are likewise not exactly the same as
the facts of the present case, but the Court’s treatment of the COC
inaccuracies in Asistio fully supports our conclusion that Mitra has
established his Aborlan domicile. In Asistio, we held that Asistio’s mistake
in his residency statement in his COC "is not sufficient proof that he has
abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established
residence outside of Caloocan City."22In the present case, Mitra did not
commit any inaccuracies in his COC. In fact, any inaccuracy there may
have been was committed by third persons on documents (such as the
building permit, contract of sale of the Temple property, and his CTC) that
do not have any bearing on his candidacy. Under these circumstances,
we would apply a harsher rule to Mitra if we conclude that he has not
established his Aborlan domicile.
Our July 2, 2010 Decision finds commonality with our ruling in Velasco in
the recognition, in both cases, of the rule of law. But as we explained in
our Decision, the similarity ends there as the facts to which the law was
applied differed. We thus ruled:
These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v.
COMELEC where the COMELEC cancelled the COC of Velasco, a
mayoralty candidate, on the basis of his undisputed knowledge, at the
time he filed his COC, that his inclusion and registration as a voter had
been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material fact that he
had clearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his
application to register and yet concealed his non-voter status when he
filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed the COMELEC’s action in cancelling his
COC.
If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that
similarity is in the recognition in both cases of the rule of law. In Velasco,
we recognized – based on the law – that a basic defect existed prior to
his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and the vice-mayor-elect’s
assumption to the office. In the present case, we recognize the validity of
Mitra’s COC, again on the basis of substantive and procedural law, and
no occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the
gubernatorial post.23
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not
shown, through their respective motions, sufficient reasons to compel us
to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.
Other Developments,
Issues and Rulings
In the course of the Court’s consideration of this case, a dissent was
entered that contained its own arguments on why our Decision of July 2,
2010 should be reversed. For a complete treatment and presentation of
the issues raised, the arguments in the dissent and the refutation are
discussed below, separately from the arguments the COMELEC and
private respondents themselves raised.
First, the dissent asserts that our conclusion that the private respondents’
evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City
resident is "way off point" since the private respondents showed, as the
COMELEC has found, that Mitra could not have stayed and resided at
the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill located at Barangay
Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.24 In concluding that Mitra remained to be a
Puerto Princesa City resident, the dissent points to the certification of the
Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City attesting that
Mitra continued to reside in that barangay. The dissent also argues that
the certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, supported by the
sworn statement of Commodore Hernandez that Mitra resides in that
same barangay, deserves equal if not greater weight than the statement
of the Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; the latter supporting
statement should provide the "tilting element on the question of Mitra’s
continued residency in his domicile of origin."25
Second, the dissent faults us for not giving weight to the sworn
statements of Maligaya Feed Mill’s customers and former employees,
who testified that Mitra did not reside at the mezzanine portion of the
Feed Mill. It emphasizes the undisputed point that the room at the
mezzanine neither has the usual comfort room nor a kitchen area.
Additionally, it argues that we conveniently failed to cite any statutory
standard with respect to the determination of whether Mitra’s alleged
residence constitutes a "residence" as defined by law. 26
Third, the dissent submits that we gravely erred "in giving credence to
Mitra’s gratuitous claims of business interests in Aborlan Palawan" to
justify our finding that "Mitra’s transfer of residence was accomplished not
in one single move but, through an incremental process."27 It notes that
Mitra failed to submit material proofs to prove his substantial business
interests in Aborlan, Palawan, such as but not limited to - "government
issued permits or licenses, tax declarations, or real estate tax payments,
property leases and proofs of commercial transactions." 28 The dissent
concludes that the suppression of material evidence, which, could directly
prove the existence and ownership of the pineapple plantation should be
taken against Mitra who claims ownership and existence of these
businesses.29
Fourth, the dissent argues that we erred in unduly relying on the
"dubious" lease contract for being ante-dated. It stresses that the
ponencia unreasonably gave credence to the lease contract despite
"indicators" of its invalidity, which should have forewarned the Court that
the same is not what it purports to be. 30 It also adds that our justification
that the lease contract by law may be impliedly renewed from month to
month lacks factual basis, since Mitra himself, in his Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 13, 2010 before the COMELEC en banc,
stated that "he had moved to his own new house physically residing in his
newly completed home in Aborlan."31
Fifth, the dissent implores the Court to apply to the present case our June
15, 2010 Decision in G.R. No. 192127, Mario Joel T. Reyes v.
Commission on Elections and Antonio V. Gonzales, 32 where we resolved
to dismiss Reyes’ petition via a minute resolution for failure to sufficiently
show that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
Reyes’ COC for his deliberate misrepresentation on his transfer and
establishment of a new residence in Aborlan, Palawan.
Finally, the dissent submits that the mere fact that Mitra won in the May
10, 2010 gubernatorial elections cannot disregard the mandatory one-
year residency requirement to qualify as a gubernatorial candidate. It
cites our ruling in Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 33 where we ruled
that the provisions on material qualifications of elected official should
always prevail over the will of the electorate in any given locality; to rule
otherwise, would be "to slowly gnaw at the rule of law."
These arguments are addressed in the same order they are posed under
the topical headings below.
The private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing
evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully
supports our conclusion that the private respondents’ evidence failed to
show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. As discussed
now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by
substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to
Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009. Given this
proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to
establish the contrary.
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissent’s reliance on the
Certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa
City is misplaced. The ponencia cannot give full evidentiary weight to the
aforementioned Certification which simply stated -
This is to CERTIFY that ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, is a
bonafide resident of Purok El Rancho this (sic) Barangay.
CERTIFIES FURTHER, that on February 3, 2009, he secure (sic)
community tax certificate in this Barangay with CTC No. 16657723.34
To be sure, a bare certification – in a disputed situation – cannot suffice
to conclusively establish the existence of what the certification alleged.
The purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither signed nor thumb-
marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been
adopted and used by Mitra as his own. In our evaluation, we in fact
pointedly emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February
3, 2009, if at all, carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camora’s
(Mitra’s secretary) positive declaration that she was the one who
procured it, while Mitra’s Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried
Mitra’s own signature. Camora fully explained the circumstances under
which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was
never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez’ declaration on its face did
not controvert Carme E. Caspe’s sworn statement which adequately
proved that Mitra’s transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single
move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008 and
concluded in March 2009. Thus, we emphasized in our Decision:
A sworn statement that has no counterpart in the respondents’ evidence
in so far as it provides details (particularly when read with the statement
of Ricardo Temple) is Carme Caspe’s statement on how Mitra’s transfer
of residence took place. Read together, these statements attest that the
transfer was accomplished, not in one single move but, through an
incremental process that started in early 2008 and was in place by March
2009, although the house Mitra intended to be his permanent home was
not yet then completed.35
The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation
of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead it to
incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he
committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC.
Contrary to the dissent’s view, the sworn statements of Maligaya
Feedmill’s customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could
not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be
given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of
negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face
of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspe’s testimony,
cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that
was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental
process that started in early 2008. It is well-settled in the rules of
evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.36
Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion, as it failed to correctly appreciate that the
evidence clearly pointed to fact that Mitra effectively transferred his
residence to Aborlan, viz:
Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on the
Dissent) that Mitra made definite, although incremental transfer moves,
as shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in
Aborlan in 2008; by lease of a dwelling he established his base; by the
purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of registration
as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed
against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his
working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take
care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant
presence in the whole Province of Palawan. 37
The dissent’s observation that the ponencia conveniently failed to cite
any statutory standard with respect to the determination of whether
Mitra’s alleged residence constitutes a "residence" as defined by law is
simply not true.38Our July 2, 2019 Decision was particularly sensitive to
the matter of standards, as we noted that the COMELEC used personal
and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitra’s dwelling when, in
fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the dwelling must be where a
person permanently intends to return and to remain. Thus, we held:
In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused
solely on its consideration of Mitra’s residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on
the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the COMELEC’s view
(expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by the En
Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra’s
residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s
personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every
home to make it one’s residence. This was the main reason that the
COMELEC relied upon for its conclusion.
Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and
furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and examined only through
photographs, is far from reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined
the fitness of a dwelling as a person’s residence based solely on very
personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete
with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a
residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to
return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the
place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.39
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective
assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we
cited Coquilla v. COMELEC,40 which characterized the term residence as
referring to "domicile" or legal residence, that is "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi).
Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan remain undisputed and are
supported by the evidence on record.
The dissent’s view that Mitra’s business interests are not supported by
the evidence on record is not accurate. As discussed above and in our
July 2, 2010 Decision, Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan stand
undisputed in the present case. On the one hand, the private
respondents failed to present any iota of evidence to disprove Mitra’s
claims that he had significant investments in Aborlan, such as the
expiremental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm.
On the other hand, Mitra submitted photographs 41 of his experimental
pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm to prove his
business interests in Aborlan. Carme E. Caspe’s and Ricardo Temple’s
statements also corroborated Mitra’s claim that he owns the pineapple
plantation which is located in a property near the Maligaya Feedmill. In
this regard, Carme E. Caspe’s sworn statement pertinently declared:
3. Since 2001, Congressman Mitra has been frequently visiting
my farm and we often meet at the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm
located along National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya, Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan.
4. Sometime in January 2008, Congressman Mitra together with
his brother Ramon B. Mitra and his Chief of Staff, Atty. Winston T.
Gonzales and some of their friends started an experimental
pineapple growing project in a rented farmland located near the
Maligaya Feedmill and Farm.
5. At about the time that they started the pineapple project,
Congressman Mitra and Ramon Mitra would from time to time
stay overnight in the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill
located along National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya, Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan.
6. Sometime in February 2008, inasmuch as Congressman
Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra and Ramon B. Mitra would want to
permanently stay in Aborlan, as Congressman Mitra would want
to be nearer and have easier access to the entire 2st
Congressional District and as they intend to invest in a chicken
layer venture in Aborlan in addition to their pineapple project, we
ented onto a contract of lease covering the residential portion of
the Maligaya Feedmill as their residence, a chicken layer house
and a growing house for chickens. We also agreed that
Congressman Mitra has the option to purchase a portion of the
Feedmill where he can erect or contruct his own house if he so
desires later.
 7. Congressman Mitra, pursuant to our agreement, immediately
renovated and refurbished the residential part in a portion of the
Feedmill and as of March 2008 he started to occupy and reside in
the said premises bringing with him some of his personal
belongings, clothes and other personal effects.
10. That in January 2009, Congressman Mitra decided to
purchase a nearby farmland located behind the Deaf School
where he intends to contruct his residential house and farm.
However, as he needed time to consummate the sale of the
property and to construct his house thereon, we agreed to renew
the lease for another year effective February 2, 2009 to February
28, 2010 consisting of, among others, a residential portion of the
Maligaya Feedmill.
11. Sometime in May 2009, Congressman Mitra caused the
construction of a house and established a game fowl/fighting cock
farm in the lot that he purchased but he continued to reside in the
Maligaya Feedmill up to the present.42
The photographs of the experimental pineapple plantation, farm,
farmhouse and cock farm, coupled with the sworn statements of Carme
E. Caspe and Ricardo Temple, substantially prove the existence of
Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan. Thus, Mitra’s failure to submit
permits or licenses, tax declarations, real estate tax payments and other
proofs of commercial transactions does not negate the fact that he has
substantial business interests in Aborlan as he claims.
Incidentally, the dissent’s invocation of the adverse presumption of
suppression of evidence43 is erroneous, since it does not arise when the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties. 44 In the present case, the
required proofs of commercial transactions the dissent cites are public
documents which are at the disposal of both parties; they are not solely
under the custody of Mitra and can be easily obtained from the municipal
offices of Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do so. The
bottom line is that no such evidence was ever presented in this case, and
none can and should be considered at this point.
The validity or invalidity
of the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitra’s residence
in Aborlan.
Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract,
what is significant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the
issue to the present case. As we emphasized in our Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us;
what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into
an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya
Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was
under construction) and whether he indeed resided there. The notary’s
compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a
defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties’ affirmation
before a notary public of the contract’s genuineness and due execution. 45
The dissent’s thesis – that Mitra’s allegation in his Motion for
Reconsideration (dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en
banc that he had already transferred to the newly constructed house in
Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible
from month to month - is misleading. The significance of Mitra’s
statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had already
transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be read in
isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitra’s explicit
intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through an
incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the
mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the
premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitra’s
business interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
Reyes v. Commission on Elections is not applicable in the present case.
In invoking the applicability of our June 15, 2010 ruling in Reyes v.
Commission on Elections, the dissent cites the "explanatory note"
penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales recommending the dismissal
of Reyes’ petition. The explanatory note states:
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (1)
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that
the petitioner had not sufficiently established a change of his domicile
from Coron, Palawan, his domicile of origin, to Aborlan, Palawan, his
supposed domicile of choice, for failure to show, among others things, (1)
actual presence at Aborlan, Palawan, and (2) abandonment of his
residence at Coron, Palawan. It thus correctly relied on the Court’s
pronouncement in Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado that without clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of the requirements for a change of
domicile, the domicile of origin continues.
Reading Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code with the constitutional
qualifications for a Member of the House of Representatives, petitioner’s
false representation in his COC regarding his residence, which affects his
qualifications, gave cause for the COMELEC to cancel the same.46
On June 15, 2010, the Court issued a Minute Resolution dismissing
Reyes’ petition, which states:
The Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for failure thereof to
sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
Commission on Elections in rendering the challenged resolutions which,
on the contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts and applicable law
and jurisprudence.47
This Resolution found no grave abuse of discretion and upheld the March
25, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division48 and May 7,
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. 49 In this March 25, 2010
Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division found:
An evaluation, however, of the evidence presented by the parties vis-à-
vis the three requirements for a successful change of domicile would
show that the petitioner is correct.
First, the alleged residence of respondent is a mere beach house or a
lodging house with a roof made of pawid as shown in the Declaration of
Real Property of Clara Espiritu Reyes, the wife of the respondent. This
description of the property is confirmed by two photographs attached to
the Memorandum of the petitioner. By its very nature, a beach house is a
mere temporary abode, a lodging house where people stay merely as
transients. It is not meant to be a permanent place to live in. As the
Supreme Court declared in Dumpit Michelena v. Boado, a beach house is
at most a place of temporary relaxation and it can hardly be considered a
place of residence. With this kind of property, it can scarcely be said that
respondent has the intention of remaining there permanently or for an
indefinite period of time.
Second, respondent has failed to show actual presence at his domicile of
choice. Respondent himself admitted that he goes only to Aborlan
whenever he gets reprieves from work as most of the time he stays at
Puerto Princesa City, where he also resides with his wife. His witnesses
also confirm this saying that all Palaweños know that the office of the
governor is at the capitol of Puerto Princesa City, where respondent and
his wife stay if there is work at the office. However, considering that
Aborlan is only about an hour’s away from Puerto Princesa, it is odd that
respondent and his wife never go home to Aborlan after office hours if he
intended to establish his domicile of choice in the said municipality. It is
also unusual that respondent’s wife still stays at Puerto Princesa City
while she works as manager of Palawan Agricultural and Animal
Husbandy Corporation, which is based in Aborlan. This conduct is not
indicative of an intent to establish their domicile at Aborlan.
Third, respondent failed to show that he already cut his ties with Coron,
Palawan as his domicle. Although respondent declared that as early as
2008, he has already transferred his domicile at Aborlan, still he secured
his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) for the year 2009 at Coron.
Respondent tried to wiggle out from this tight spot by explaining that it
was secured by his secretary, who through force of habit inadvertently
got it for him. However, such explanation proved futile when respondent
was confronted with the fact that he still used the said CTC in
establishing his identity when he signed a Special Power of Attorney on
January 12, 2009 and when he signed a contract in behalf of the Palawan
Provincial Government on August 10, 2009 even when he has
supposedly secured another CTC from Aborlan on April 7, 2009.
Thus, even in August of 2009, less than a year prior to the May 10, 2010
election, respondent still portrayed himself as a resident of Coron. The
intention then to abandon the said place as his domicile is wanting.
Based on the foregoing discussions alone, it is at once apparent the
three-point requirements for the abandonment of a domicile and the
establishment of a new one do not concur in the case of the
respondent.50
Contrary to the dissent’s view, no parallelism can be drawn between this
ruling and the present case, so that this ruling cannot apply to the latter.
First, the dissent’s citation of Justice Carpio-Morales’ explanatory note
recommending the dismissal of Reyes’ petition cannot be considered a
precedent that should be made applicable to the present case. The
explanatory note, while reflective of the Court’s thinking, is not a decision
nor an opinion of the Court. It remains what its description connotes – an
explanatory note provided by one Justice and approved by the Court –
and nothing more; what binds the Court is its pronouncement that no
grave abuse of discretion transpired in the COMELEC’s consideration of
the case. Under this legal situation, what assumes significance are the
COMELEC Resolutions that the Court effectively upheld when it issued
the June 15, 2010 Minute Resolution dismissing Reyes’ petition.
Second, the factual circumstances in Reyes are entirely different from the
present case; no parallelism can be drawn so that the application of the
ruling in Reyes cannot be bodily lifted and applied to Mitra. In Reyes, the
COMELEC ruled that Reyes committed a material misrepresentation in
his COC when he declared that his residence is Tigman, Aborlan,
Palawan and that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to.
The COMELEC so concluded after it found that the evidence showed that
Reyes failed to prove that (1) he had the intention to remain permanently
in Aborlan since his alleged residence is a mere beach house which by
its very nature is a temporary place of residence as held by the Court in
Dumpit Michelana v. Boado;51 2) he had actual presence at his domicile
of choice; and (3) that he had already transferred from his domicile
(Coron, Palawan) to Tigman, Aborlan Palawan. The COMELEC even
found, on the matter of CTC, that Reyes consistently used his Coron CTC
in his transactions, thus negating his explanation that the CTC was
procured without his knowledge and consent.
In contrast, we found in the present case that Mitra did not deliberately
misrepresent his Aborlan residence to deceive or mislead the Palawan
electorate since he in fact adduced positive evidence of transfer of
residence which the private respondents failed to sufficiently controvert.
In this regard, we noted with emphasis that Mitra undertook "incremental
moves" to his new domicile in Aborlan as evidenced by the following: (1)
his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa
City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory
moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in
March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya
Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the
construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises
he was leasing pending the completion of his house. 52 The issue
regarding Mitra’s CTC, too, was satisfactorily explained and is far
different from the obtaining facts in the case of Reyes.
No occasion exists to apply the rule of the primacy of the will of people
since Mitra did not commit any deliberate misrepresentation; in fact, he
proved that he transferred his residence to Aborlan within the period
required by law.
The dissent contends that Mitra’s election as Governor "did not render
the present case moot and academic or lift the statutory one-year
residency requirement for him to qualify for the gubernatorial post." 53 The
dissent apparently perceives Mitra’s electoral victory as a major
consideration in our Decision of July 2, 2010. Unfortunately, the dissent is
mistaken in its appreciation of the thrust of our Decision; we in fact ruled
that no reason exists to appeal to the primacy of the electorate’s will
since Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.
We said:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in
case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to
the popular mandate. Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule
of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions,
requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified
reading and application of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous
significance to the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one,
such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that
effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the
electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a
candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office. Short of adopting a clear cut
standard, we thus made the following clarification:
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in
the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of form and
that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our
ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered
merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and
material election law requirement involves more than the will of the
people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation
under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws,
we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on
material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of
the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold
that we cannot choose the electorate will.

Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC provided the following test:

[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely
sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are
the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. [Emphasis supplied.]

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to
the primacy of the electorate’s will. We cannot deny, however, that the
people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency
qualification had been squarely raised and their voice has erased any
doubt about their verdict on Mitra’s qualifications. 54

Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with

FINALITY, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion
for oral arguments now before us. Let entry of judgment be made in due
course.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution
No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 93712 - the law that
Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino
G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for
the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan
De Oro."3This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. 4 It
increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their
place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next
national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag,
Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan,
Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while
barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an,
Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS
Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all
urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise
the second district.5
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No.
78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the
COMELEC on March 27, 2007.7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner
amended the petition to include the following as respondents: Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor
and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City; and its Board of Canvassers.8
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837
on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC
cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules,
regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is
indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit.
He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to
cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No.
7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and
Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution
No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the
Solicitor General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the
hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a
statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3)
the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place;
and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de
Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite
is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling
in Del Mar v. PAGCOR,9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro
City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator - the material change in
the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to
decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and
resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his
right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for
the other legislative district, and 6) government funds were illegally
disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan
De Oro City.10
THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can
be limited to the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so,
should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the
division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation
doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the
petition totally without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.11 It was
pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present
petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals12 and the
RTCs,13 a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an
increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of
matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule
otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally
stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important
to be exceptions to the rule, are petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our
nation's lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is
assailed.15 The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the
nature of the issues raised - among them, whether legislative
reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local
government unit - are reasons enough for considering it an exception to
the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as
well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the
legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action
against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule
65 petition for certiorari.16For these reasons, we do not see the principle
of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the
present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of
Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide
for the City's legislative apportionment. This argument essentially
proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of
apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government
units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body. 17It is the allocation of
seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of
voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among
the districts.18 Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays
down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which
provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or
reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically
and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the
Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays.20 In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been
defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation
of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof."21 The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local
Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The
Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of
legislative districts,22 and likewise acts on local government units by
setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through
legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two
provisions since they are inherently different although they interface and
relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political
representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated,
the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting
power among districts."23 Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed
among the representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of
interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous,
compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every
city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of
population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative
districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate
and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the
required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates
reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5,
Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units
may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination,
and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and
territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be
observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in
the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income,
population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability
and capacity to provide services.24 The division or merger of existing units
must comply with the same requirements (since a new local government
unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X,
Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the
Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit.26 In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case
that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering
San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this
distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered
and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan
because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section
10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district
only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone
and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San
Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of
requirement for one under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated
by a consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the
nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their
areas of application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the
American roots of our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
Fourteenth Amendment29 of the U.S. Constitution and from the
constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of
1902 created the Philippine Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower
house of the bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the
Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the members of
the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the
conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly
were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the
seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as
practicable according to population. Thus, legislative apportionment first
started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the
apportionment provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and
90 representative districts electing one delegate each to the House of
Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine
Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of
legislative apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of
apportionment; the concern was "equality of representation . . . as an
essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed in the leading
case of Macias v. COMELEC.31 The case ruled that inequality of
representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was
reiterated in Montejo v. COMELEC.32Notably, no issue regarding the
holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these cases and the others that
followed, as no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of
equal representation "in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with each
district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987
Constitution, distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of
party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite
required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of
local government units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973
Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 226433 required, in the
creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of
boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas
affected." In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278)
carried this further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a
majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the
conversion of their municipality into a city in a plebiscite." This was
followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite
as a condition for the creation and conversion of local government units
as well as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.34 In
1973, the plebiscite requirement was accorded constitutional status.
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of
a plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or
reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite
was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition
and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the
concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a
sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a
member of the House of Representatives and members of the local
legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate
unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of
the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied
by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs.
Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which
has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district
does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it
elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a
corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be
created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need
for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on
a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political
and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of
the state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of the
Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines
them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish,
merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again
established by both the Constitution and the Legislature. 36 A local
government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and
qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of
its Sanggunian.37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of
the state in carrying out the functions of government." 38 As a corporate
entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it
exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts
as "an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs"39 and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate
capacity on local concerns.40 In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it
fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government
units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local government
unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment
does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government
unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite
requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and
be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision -
Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of
the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence
in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen,
Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan,
Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan,
Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while
barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an,
 Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS
Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all
urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise
the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political
and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City
politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along
territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is
only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the
city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of
Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not
come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the
creation of another congressional district in the city by providing, as
reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang
Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional
apportionment made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod,
however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law -
R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any
other city with more than one representative district shall have
eight (8) councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof
to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that the
cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other
cities comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12)
councilors each and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors
each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of the said
cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of
councilors according to their charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories.
Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the
effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter
more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had
only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its
population of approximately 500,000.42 By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively
has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city's
population. In terms of services for city residents, this easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000
constituents as against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same
goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from
12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In
representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a
greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in
the Sanggunian; each congressman and each councilor represents both
a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are now
concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice
the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of
Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not
increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is
unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has
127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2
is composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates
the principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a
province, not the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very
same question in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision
in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the
Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting
is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality
based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas
P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual
population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of
the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows
that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total
population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
representative," while ensuring representation for every province
regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves
the local government units as they are found and does not require their
division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it imposes.
Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units
are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.

The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the

division of Cagayan de Oro City into two districts because
the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the
second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if
backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the division on the basis
of the difference in the barangays' levels of development or
developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards
for legislative apportionment or reapportionment. What the components
of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the
lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any
grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal parameters,
this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. 47

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was
SUPREME COURT estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2distributed among four (4)
Manila legislative districts in this wise:

EN BANC District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE Sipocot Pasacao
ROBREDO, Petitioners, Cabusao San Fernando
vs. 2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE Milaor Camaligan
A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, Naga Magarao
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO Pili Bombon
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO Ocampo Calabanga
LARRAZABAL, Respondents. 3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
DECISION Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
PEREZ, J.:
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
Baao Bula
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Balatan Nabua
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, Bato
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification
as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor
Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following
steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was District Municipalities/Cities Population
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 1st District Del Gallego 176,383
2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its Ragay
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In Lupi
substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Sipocot
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second Cabusao
legislative districts of the province. 2nd District Libmanan San 276,777
Minalabac Fernando
Pamplona Gainza
Pasacao Milaor
 3rd District (formerly 2nd Naga Camaligan 439,043 Article VI
District) Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon Section 5. (1) x x x x
Canaman Calabanga (2) x x x x
4th District (formerly 3rd Caramoan Sangay 372,548 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
District) Garchitorena San Jose
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
Presentacion Siruma province, shall have at least one representative.
5th District (formerly 4th Iriga Buhi 429,070 (4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
District) Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited
Bato provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress
both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order
the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be
of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand,
local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat
district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance
least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4 with the minimum population requirement.

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the
approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the
Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from
which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in
the new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither
did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the
province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act
No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as
basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision
reads:
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the
intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population
minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the
original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two
hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of
fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the
population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing
the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to
observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly
apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as
explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3)
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1),
(3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural
and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are
guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an
error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716
via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent
distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a
250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of
the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with
respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the
250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly
valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the
remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a
fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the
respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed
against a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents
maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were
not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they
engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the
same could have been ventilated through a petition for
 declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show
that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial
injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The
respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required
legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when
confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need
a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of
locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and
took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as
a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are
not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled
in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of
the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able
to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive
Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental importance,
the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the
more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to
the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it
the presumption of constitutionality. 24Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of
the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld.
To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they
perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement
of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from
the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in
cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano,
Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati
into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was
a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less
than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only
450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law
and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of
the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for
as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter
alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since
it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum
population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In
other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of
an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional
districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000
in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to
an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its
population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on
the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled
to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that
ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of
Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at
least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section
5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended
to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING
THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the
250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities
and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to
determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila
should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of
250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one
legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through
the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been
apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was
among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission
originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which
corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200
seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner:
first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and
the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and
the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide,
who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court,
explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be
appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of
legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and
cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986
projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning.
This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56
million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250,
000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative,
we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for
all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de
Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to
increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and
cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the
province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received"
which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as
already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional
Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the
northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of
Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated
that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then
queried whether population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into
account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative
Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent
and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is
the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of
75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern
towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only
186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important
towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital
of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out
that there are more potential candidates in the north and therefore if
Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped
together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose
inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto
Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the
period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said
proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was
explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of
265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District
has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto
Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the
contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is
nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the
proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First
District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second
District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa
City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF
PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being
no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of
Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It
was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually
composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further
narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval
of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City
and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the
idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio
City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could
be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide,
however, pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be
lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population would
increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of
business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that
population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the
official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba
and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet
as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He
stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that
the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but
on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of
many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved
the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and
districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting
in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment,
Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall
comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan,
Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon
and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and
districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided
into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district
having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a
vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because
such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of
compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters
discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people
in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
"accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For
Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not
be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and
population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of
the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising
stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which
does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the
Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a
constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the
1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2)
districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point. 40 In
other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not
prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as
that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population
standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment
or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264,
were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together,
with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two,
point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse
of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No.
9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the
reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of Camarines
Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but
is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional
district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution
and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional
debates on the exact issue presented by this petition. 1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716

entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and
JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our
nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect
of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court
should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to
the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective
offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's
qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the
following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR.
ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
______ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law,
rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and
that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113
and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed,
petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate
dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be
elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. 3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying
for the dismissal of the disqualification case. 4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the
COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among
others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between petitioner
and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano
dated April 28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28,
1995.8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission
(Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for
Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and
 declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in
the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en
banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where
three (3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second
District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven
(38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who
obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes. 10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending
petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election
returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain
the winning number of votes for the position of Representative of
the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have
been resolved by the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the
immediate implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the
Commission is likewise directed to inform the parties by the
fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the hearing
of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in
the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent
motion to lift order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental
Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to
Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to
raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the
qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the
COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal
portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to
proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept
the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be
heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the
Commission has to be studied with more reflection and
judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6,
1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division,
promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito
A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for
lack of the constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently,
the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should
he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this
Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of
the City of Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis
of the completed canvass of election returns, determine the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed.
 SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May
15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995
issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors
for consideration, to wit:
A IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND
ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995
ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND
LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION,
SAID JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE
ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE
PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS
THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
C BE PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
IT PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION
(ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A
THRESHOLD ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY
REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC
HAS JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT
NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE
PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND
DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM
(PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE
PEOPLE'S WILL.
D Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE
YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH
WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF
THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT
OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE
ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT
SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED
DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO
WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT
WINNER.15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that
after the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over
the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House
of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of
jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error
and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his
proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional
District of Makati City. We disagree.
candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the same.
Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when
the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who
has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution.
While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein.
Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and
(petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from
the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of
authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis,
because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by
Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case
against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not
oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest
number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the
phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the
provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification
cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A.
6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases
involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P.
881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks
election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning
in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court
held that the term "residence" has always been understood as
synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for
Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members
of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in
 the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the
day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis
ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that the provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to
the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning
as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is
that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the
usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego
vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in
a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless
defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best
met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to
inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually
was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by
the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or
whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of
Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was
a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was
a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record
up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the
1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is
an alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the
COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention
to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a
period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified
that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has
other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the
right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims
that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in
Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the
sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27 is not
to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate
for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence
of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution,
in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically
pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of
Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement
cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac
to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the
case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change
of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of
clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof,
the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to
impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not
created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing
geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people
actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by the new
Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be
allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their
genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its
assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the
Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop
around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong
with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it
Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as
winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The
answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first"
among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences.
The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our
reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the
thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they
believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner
been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have
been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended
the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer
Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results
under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung
from one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we
declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead
candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in
good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either
qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of
votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said
case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of
the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a
non-candidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which
was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the
canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of
invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no
candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a result,
this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the
disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio
v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be
proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion
is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous
ruling in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a
disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent
votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes
of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella
v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld
the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect
that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes to be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate
cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis
on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a
dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere
belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should
not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo,
Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for
the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the
electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to
serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does
not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the
recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we
held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and
was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains
that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere
belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of
governor.Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is
that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted
for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for
not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes for the same position cannot
assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost
in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously
not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029)
seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same
did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of
finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,
who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor.
He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second
highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice
of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning
rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then
(Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and
another two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on
official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should
be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136
SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That
case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. .
..
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex
rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been
disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in
effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk
of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in
the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government.
Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot
assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot
be installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated
candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast
for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for
petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo,
p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view.
We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention
that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified
is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because
this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions. 40 These
decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously
qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that
the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically,
the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is
absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters'
"choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the
second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters
preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result
among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the
disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident.
Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices
could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second
placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election
cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast
where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality
of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's

conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of
Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of
respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year
residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic
government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through
their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service
in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of
the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement
mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED. Our Order restraining respondent COMELEC from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.