Tañada V.

Tuvera:
Facts:
Due process was invoked by the Petitioners(Tañada) in demanding the disclosure of
certain presidential decrees claiming that is was not published. The government then
argued that publication was only necessary unless it was ‘Otherwise Provided’. They
also stated that when the Law states that it will be effective immediately upon approval
it would be so. The court then decided that the publication of the mentioned decrees
should be published or else have no binding force or effect. The petitioners again
returned to the court to move for reconsideration, asking, 1.) meaning of “law of public
nature” or “general applicability’?; 2.) must there be a distinction between ‘laws of
general applicability’ to those that aren’t?; 3.) meaning of publication?; 4.) where
publication is made?; 5.) when publication be made?

Petitioners suggested, 1.) there should be no distinctions; 2.) publication means

complete publication; 3.) publication must be in official gazette. Solicitor-General
claimed that the statement “Unless otherwise provided” meant that publication was not
always imperative. After the courts considered the current motion and the previous
case, they contend that the line “Unless otherwise provided” meant the date of
effectivity and not of the requirement of publication, which cannot be omitted in any
event. The reason being that the non-publication would not conform to due process.

Issue:
Whether or not the clause “Unless otherwise provided” talks about the requirement of
publication?

Ruling:
No. The courts decided that the clause talks not about the requirement of publication,
but the date of effectivity of laws. The court ordered laws to be published in full in the
official as soon as they are approved on the 15th day or on a specified date by the
legislature in accordance to art. 2 of the NCC.

De Roy V. CA
Facts:
Petitioners(de roy) set out for a Special Civil Action for Certiorari to declare 2
Resolutions of the ’Special First Division of the Court of Appeals’ null and void. The
first resolution on BERNAL V. DE ROY, Sept. 30, 1987 denied the motion for extension
to file for a motion for reconsideration on grounds that the the decision of the said case
was final. The second resolution on Oct. 27, 1987 denied motion for reconsideration
due to late submission.

 In the said case, the Firewall of a burned building collapsed unto a tailoring shop of
the private respondents(Bernal). Such event caused damages and injuries as well as
the death of Marissa Bernal(daughter). Petitioners forewarned respondents to vacate
the area but failed to do so. In light of the facts, the RTC rendered judgement ordering
petitioner as guilty or Gross Negligence and to pay for damages. on Appeal, CA
affirmed the decision of the former. Orders from the CA was promulgated on Aug. 7,
1987and was received by petitioners on Aug. 25, 1987, the last day for filing motion for
extension of time to file motion for reconsideration.

SC finds the CA to have not committed any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners. SC contends that CA correctly followed the 15-day rule on motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. SC stated that the motion for extension may only
be done so with them. Petitioners contend that the Ruling in the case of Habaluyas
should not be used in their current case since the ruling thereof was not published in
the official gazette at the time the resolutions of the CA were made.

Issue:
Whether or not the 2 Resolutions of the CA should be null and void?

Whether or not SC decisions should be published in the official gazette in order to be

binding?

Ruling:
No. The CA did not commit any abuse of discretion in ordering such resolutions
because they simply followed the 15-day rule on petition for reconsideration.

No. No law requires the publication of the rulings of the SC in the official gazette in
order to be binding and to be used in a certain case. Rulings of the court are all
published and found in the ‘Reports of Supreme Court decisions’ (G.R.s) and in the
’Supreme Court Reports Annotated’ (SCRA).

People V. Que Po Lay (1945)

Facts:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Que Po Lay
appealed from the the decision of the CFI finding him guilty for violating CBC no.20 in
connection with Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, ordering imprisonment for 6mo. and to pay fees
and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In the charges, appellant was in
possession of foreign currency(USD), U.S. checks, and U.S. money orders total of
$7,000 and failed to sell such to the Central Bank through its agent within one day
following the receipt as required by CBC no.20.

The appeal claims that the said Circular was not published in the official gazette prior
to such omission, stating that the Circular had not force and effect. it was contended
that Commonwealth Act no.638 and no. 2930 required the Circular to be so since it
one of General Application. Solicitor-General argued the opposite. CA agreed with the
SolGen. The 2 mentions C.A. acts only enumerated those which require publication.
Court states that CBC no.20 is not a law or a statute, however, it has the force and
effect of law and since such Circular provides for a penalty for its violation or non
observance, it must be published. As also stated in Art. 1 of the Spanish CC, laws shall
be binding after 20 days after promulgation. Stated that the term ‘Laws’ include
regulations and Circulars issued in accordance with the same. In the present case,
CBC no.20 was promulgated in the year 1949 but was published only on Nov. of 1951,
3mo. after the case of Que Po Lay.

Issue:
Whether or not CBC no.20 requires publication in the official gazette?

Whether or not CBC no.20 is already in force and binding upon the case of Que Po
Lay?

Ruling:
Yes. CBC no.20 being Penal in nature and of General Application, must be published in
the official gazette for it has the force and effect or Laws which was issued in
accordance with the same.

No. Due to the lack of its publication, It has no force and effect and was not binding
upon any person. Court therefore ordered the acquittal of the appellant and reverse the
decision of the judgement.

NPC V. Pinatubo Commercial

Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) questioned the decision of June 30, 2006
of the RTC Mandaluyong declaring items no.3 & 3.1 of the NPC Circular 99-79
unconstitutional. Circular nos. stating that the only allowed partnerships or
corporations to bid for the disposal of ACSR wires are those who directly use
aluminium as raw products for finished products. It is said to be in violation of
substantial due process and the equal protection clause and for restraining competitive
free trade and commerce.

On April 29, 2003 Pinatubo was informed through letter that they were denied to enter
bidding. Pinatube then sent a petition to the RTC for the annulment of the Circular
including a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC upheld
the petition thereof on the grounds that the Circular was not published. NPC however,
contends that there was no need for publication of the Circular since it was not of
General Application. They also contend that there was a distinction between
‘Manufacturers’ and ‘Traders’ of aluminium scrap.

Court held that the Circular did not need to be published since it was an internal rule or
regulation (Tañada V. Tuvera) and since it did not implement any law. The Court stated
that being a part of a bid is a Privilege and not a right in this case and that Pinatubo
cannot claim any right if they do not meet the requirements to join the bid.

Issue:
Whether or not said Circular(NPC Circular no.99-79) should be published?

Ruling:
No. The Circular need not be published since it is only the orders of the president of
the NPC to its employees organising such bid and that it was not of General
Application as well as it does not implement any laws. The Circular is simply a number
of conditions in order to join bidding and that it is an Internal rule and regulation. Court
Reversed the RTC decision and Dismissed the petition of Pinatubo.

Valeroso V. People
Facts:
On July 10, 1996 SPO2 Antonio Disuanco, received a dispatch order to serve a warrant
of arrest against Valeroso for kidnaping with ransom. The Petitioner was seen in Culiat,
QC. Arrest was conducted when they Disuanco and his team obtained a firearm from
the waist of Petitioner. The firearm was registered not to him, but to a one Raul
Salvatiera. Petitioner was then accused for violating P.D. 1866 or illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition.

Petitioner testified that at the time of arrest, he was only sleeping when 4 men in
civilian clothes entered and tied him up. He stated that Disuanco even warned him that
they had permission to shoot. Petitioner then asked for the warrant of arrest and the
search warrant, but it was denied to him by the team. Petitioner contends that the
search was illegal and that the firearm was of legal title. He further stated that he was
not allowed to his own council nor to talk to his family. Petitioner’s neighbour in the
boarding house, Adrian Yuson, testified and affirmed the statements of the accused.

The RTC and CA decided Petitioner Guilty in violation of P.D. 1866. Petitioner now
contends to the SC that the previous Courts erred in the application of the laws and
did so even without proof beyond reasonable doubt. SC however, held that proof
beyond reasonable doubt was present as the evidence was submitted by the Firearms
and Explosives Division of Camp Crame. P.D. 1866 was the governing rule at time of
the incident(July, 10, 1996) but was after amended by R.A. 8294(July 6, 1997). As a
general law, penal laws must not be given retroactive effect, however, the exception is
if it for the benefit of the accused. The amended law(R.A. 8294) was still a benefit to the
accused since it lowers the time of imprisonment.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 8294 should be given retroactive effect in the case?

Ruling:
Yes. the transition from P.D. 1866 to R.A. 8294 lowers the term of imprisonment from
Reclusion Perpetua as maximum to Prisonion correccional as maximum. As a rule,
laws may be retroactively applied if it is for the benefit of the accused, and in this case
the lowering of punishment of time of imprisonment is still considered to be a benefit to
the accused.

PNB V. Office of the President

Facts:
Private respondents(PR) were buyers on instalment of subdivision lots in Marikina
Village Inc. The developer of the village Mortgaged the lots to PNB. Not knowing about
the Mortgage, PR constructed houses on the lots. However, developer defaulted on the
mortgage and the lots were foreclosed by PNB and ownership was acquired by the
same. PR set a suit and was decided by the Office Appeals, Adjudication, and Legal
Affairs(OAALA) on Oct, 28, 1988 ruling that PNB may collect from PR only the
remaining amortizations and cannot compel PR to pay in full again.

Petitioner raised in their petition that the Office of the President erred in applying P.D.
957 because it was enacted in 1976 and that the mortgage was executed in 1975.
Court stated that P.D. 957 intended to affect mortgages executed even prior to
enactment of such decree. Law did not expressly provide for its retroactivity but it may
be inferred through the law’s intent. To protect buyers from such schemes as done by
the developer.

Issue:
Whether or not P.D. 957 should be applied retroactively in the case?

Ruling:
Yes. the reason being that the intention of the law was to protect the rights of the
buyers or citizens from certain prejudicial schemes even if the law itself does not
provide for its retroactivity. The law in question being of a Curative Nature. Court
upheld the decision of the CA and denied the petition of PNB.

D.M. Consunji Inc. V. CA

Facts:
On Nov. 2 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker for D.M. Consuji Inc. fell 14 floors
Renaissance Tower in Pasig to his death. On May 9, 1991, Widow of the deceased filed
a complaint for damages through the RTC of Pasig. Employer raised the Widow’s
availment of the benefits from State Insurance Fund. RTC then rendered judgement in
favour of the widow awarding her damages. Petitioner appealed with the CA but was
rendered a decision affirming the decision of the RTC. Petitioner now asks for the
reversal of the decision to the SC stating that the police reports were not enough to
prove the negligence of the employer stating that all evidence are only hearsay. As a
rule of court, hearsay in applicable not only to oral statements but also to those written.
However, the rules of court allows certain exceptions to the theory on hearsay such as
Sec. 44 Rule 130.

PO3 Villanueva stated in his testimony that the cause of the fall was the loosening of
the bolt from the chain block. The case is said the follow the principle of ‘Res Ipsa
Loquitur’ which assumes negligence. Petitioner contended that it exercised due care to
avoid the accident. Court holds Fabros’ statement was hearsay. Petitioner claims that
the respondents already availed of the death benefits under Art. 173 or ‘Workmen’s
compensation act’. The problem now with the court is the issue whether or not a
petitioner can claim compensation under Art. 173 of the labor code and sue in a Civil
Case? From a previous ruling(Pacaña V. Cebu) the courts ruled that the respondents
may acquire of any of the two remedies but cannot avail of both. However, some
petitioners in said case were allowed to avail of both.

CA acknowledge that the respondent in this case was unaware of the negligence of the
employer when she availed for the compensation in Art. 173. CA stated that the
respondent was ignorant of the fact as well as to her rights. the court ruled that by
acquiring one action, the other is deemed waved. However, exception to this rule it the
knowledge of the person of such waiver. In this case, respondent had no knowledge of
the fact and of her right. Therefore, the court cannot consider the waiver.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent’s choice of remedy(Art. 173) waives the remedy of a
Civil Case for higher damages?

Ruling:
No. The choice of the respondent to such action was done so without her knowledge
about the negligence of the employer of the incident. As a rule, a waiver of rights must
be done so with knowledge to such right. in this case, the respondent had no idea of
her right to sue for a Civil Case for higher damages.

Cui V. Arellano University

Ruling:
The plaintiff(Cui) appealed from a decision of the CFI Absolving Arellano. Petitioner
took up preparatory Law course in the university and after which he enrolled in the
college of law of the same. The uncle of the plaintiff ‘Francisco Capistrano’ the dean of
the college of law. as the plaintiff enrolled for the last semester but was unable to pay
his tuition fees. He then enrolled in the College of Law of Abad Santos University.
Plaintiff acquired scholarship grants and that his paid tuition was to be returned to him
at the end of the semester. For a total of 1,033.87php. In order to apply for permission
to take the Bar exam, he needed his TOR from Arellano. The latter refused to issue
such record until he paid back the refunded tuition. plaintiff paid for the sum of money
in order to obtain the records and to take the bar exam.

Petitioner beforehand signed a waiver that in light of the scholarship grants, he would
not transfer to another university and to refund the sum of money. The Lower court
Decided that the Contact between the plaintiff and defendant is valid. Court stated that
the plaintiff had no good reason to leave Arellano but only to follow his uncle. The SC
however, decided that the contract be null and void being contrary to Public Policy. The
SC now reversed the decision of the CA and ordered for defendant to pay plaintiff a
sum of 1,033.87php.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract signed by the plaintiff for his waiver is valid?

Ruling:
No. The SC decided that the stipulation to the contrary was against public policy and is
therefore null and void.

Mercano V. COA
Facts:
The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the COA denying his claim for
reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code(RAC) for a total
amount of 40,831php. Petitioner is a Director of the NBI who had Cholecystisis.
Petitioner claims reimbursement for the medical expenses under Sec. 699. NBI Chief
sent a letter stating that the illness was service-related. However, Chairman of COA
stated that the RAC was already repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner re-submitted his claim stating that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
repeal sec. 699 of the RAC. Chairman of the COA did state that the petitioner may
request compensation from the Employee’s Compensation Commission. It was stated
by the COA that the ‘whereas’ clause of the Administrative Code implied the repeal of
the RAC.

Court states that Sec. 27 of such Code is actually an implied repeal. In Review of the
two codes, it is seen that the latter code does not cover the entire subject matter of the
former code nor does it attempt to cover such. COA failed to show that the two codes
had irreconcilable conflicts. However, Sec. 699 not being mentioned in the new code
implies that it is in itself repealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repeals the RAC?

Ruling:
No. The ruling of the court suggests there be only 2 ways of implied repeal. one, if the
latter law covers the whole subject matter of the previous law. second, if the old law is
inconsistent and irreconcilable with the new law. As a general rule, implied repeals are
not favoured by the courts.

People V. Licera
Facts:
An appeal questioning a law, by accused, on a judgement of the CFI of Occidental
Mindoro. Judgement convicted the accused of illegal possession of a firearm and
imposing 5 years of imprisonment. Accused stated that the reason for such firearm
was because he was a secret agent appointed by Gov. Feliciano Leviste and as a
Peace offices, does not require him to have required permits. Accused contends that
the court erred in applying a former case of “People V. Mapa” that Sec. 879 of the RAC
which provides that Secret Agents have no exception to the rule on firearms.

The courts sustain that the jurisprudence at the time of appointment and time of act of
Licera was that of the Macarandang Rule. hence, the rule of the court it to acquit the
accused and reverse the decision of the CFI.

Issue:
Whether or not the latter court decision should be used in the decision of the case?

Ruling:
No. As a general rule, if a new decision/jurisprudence is available, it shall be the
decision to follow since the decisions of the court shall become part of the legal
system of the country. However, in the case, at the time of appointment as a secret
agent of the accused and during his apprehension, the jurisprudence followed was the
rule existing even though it being now the former.

Chua Jan V. Berna

Facts:
On June 26, 1913, a cockpit match was held in the city of Tabaco, Albay. Each of the
contenders placed therein a wager of 160php each. Defendant cock was declared the
winner. The plaintiff commenced a suit asking for his cock to be declared the winner in
the CFI. Petitioner prayed the order for defendant to pay 160php for the wager. CFI
dismissed the case. The ground of the CFI for dismissal is the reason that the judge
had no knowledge of the rules of a cockfight to render judgement. Having no
knowledge is not a reason for dismissing a case without resolving the issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case is valid?

Ruling:
No. The SC held that there is no excuse for rendering judgement. In accordance of Art.
6 paragraph 2, customs of the place shall be observed else the general principles of
the law. The ruling of the court was to revert the case back to its original court to be
rendered judgement.

People V. Purisima
Facts:
There were 26 petitions filed by the People of the Philippines, represented by the city
fiscal of Manila, Samar, and SolGen. The petition involves 3 CFI courts, CFI Manila
branch 7 & 18 and CFI Samar. Filed with the courts are complaints alleging the
accused to have violated P.D. 9 “Illegal possession of a deadly weapon”. Accused
moved to quash the complaints on the ground that in filing the complaint, no evidence
was shown to constitute the violation. Petitioners state that the accused had a carving
knife, 11’3/4in. long. The 3 courts have the same information but they differ from the
name of the accused and date of the act. Accused are Porfilio Duran; Reynaldo
Aquino; Panchito Refuncion. The courts stated that there was an important element
missing from the filed informations, which is proof that the carrying of the blade outside
of the accused’s property, caused public disorder or unlawful acts. All 3 courts ordered
the dismissal of the cases stating that P.D. 9 was used as an instrument for extortion,
that not all persons carrying a pointed blade outside his residence would use so for
unlawful acts. The issue raised is that P.D. 9 does not specify the need for such act to
be done so unlawfully.

Issue:
Whether or not P.D. 9 should be strictly enforced in the case?

Ruling:
No. The ruling of the court is that even though not specifically stated in the provision,
the essence of the law as interpreted by the court should be followed in order for
certain laws not to be used as an instrument of extortion. Proof of violation in this case
is essential to filing the information, it must be shown that the act constitutes criminal
or unlawful intent.

Martinez V. Buskirk
Facts:
On Sept. 11, 1908, the plaintiff, riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila. The driver of the
carromata saw the defendant’s waggon and stopped at the side of the road to give
way to the waggon. The wagon ran into the carromata, overturning it and causing
injuries to the plaintiff. Defendants contend that the horses were spooked by noises
which cause them to run without the control of the driver and thus causing the incident.
The court found the defendant guilty of negligence. The SC stated that there were no
general law on negligence in this country except those in the CC. Art. 1902-1903. SC
reversed the decision on ground that there was no findings that the cochero was
negligent. Res Ipsa Loquitur cannot be inferred in this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Cochero was negligent in his manner of tending to the horses?

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that the cochero was not negligent being that there was no evidence
to support the claim. leaving the horses as such does not correspond to negligence.
The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur may be applied only on a case to vase basis.

Yao Kee V. Sy-Gonzales

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a chinese national, died on Jan 17. 1977 in caloocan. He left behind real and
personal properties worth a total of around 300,000php. Sy-Gonzales and others filed a
petition to grant letters of administration to the CFI of Rizal. They stated in the petition
that they were the heirs of the deceased; that the deceased died intestate; they do not
recognise the marriage of kiat to Yao Kee; to appoint Sy-Gonzales as administratrix of
the intestate. Petition was opposed by Yao Kee and stated, She was the lawful wife of
the deceased; Sze Sook Wah, the eldest as the administratrix. CFI found that
petitioner’s marriage is legal; Sook Wah, etc. are the legitimate children; defendants are
illegitimate children. CFI judged in favour of the petitioners.

CA rendered new judgement acknowledging defendants as natural children of

deceased, and Sook Wah as administratrix. Both parties asked for partial
reconsideration which was denied. PR filed with the SC assailing the ruling of the CA
that the marriage to Yao Kee is not proven valid and in declaring defendants as natural
children. The petitioners stated that the 2 were married in fookien and that no marriage
certificate is needed in chinese customs, simply a signed document of the parents or
elders. It is also stated in a certification issued in manila by the Embassy of China.
However, these do not prove the fact of the validity of the marriage in chinese law or
custom. SC mentioned Art. 71 of the CC and held that in order to prove its validity, they
must establish the foreign law as a fact and the foreign marriage with evidence. Since
there was no written evidence on the custom being pursued, the SC finds no
judgement of the CA reversible.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage can be considered valid?

Ruling:
No. the petitioners rely on a custom from a foreign country, however, as stated in the
CC, customs must be proven as a fact according to the rules on evidence. without
such evidence, a custom cannot be considered.

CIR V. Primetown
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap the vice Chair of Primetown property group, applied for
a refund on his income tax he paid for in 1997. He alleged that though his business
was good in the first quarter of that year, it slowed down after and made him suffer a
loss of 71,879,228php. He raised that since he suffered loss for that year, he should not
pay income tax. However, he did pay for that quarter his income tax and his credible
withholding tax amounting to 26,318,398.32php and alleges that he is entitled to a tax
refund or credit. Respondent was required to present more documents to support his
claim, but was denied after. April 4, 2000, Respondent filed with the CTA, however the
case there was dismissed on grounds that it was beyond the 2yr. prescriptive period to
pass the claim as provided for in Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code(NIRC). The CTA confirmed that the Respondent the return on April 14, 1998
which was the start of the prescription period. In accordance with Art. 13 of the CC on
the computation for the prescriptive period to a total of 730 days since the year 2000
was a leap year. The submission of the respondents return was 731 days prior to the
petition. Motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CTA.

An appeal was then made to the CA Which reversed the decision of the CTA in grounds
that Art. 13 of the CC did not distinguish the difference between a leap year and a
regular year, that regardless of a leap year, it shall still be considered to be of 365 day.
The CIR moved for a reconsideration but was denied. The petitioner in the SC
contends that the tax refunds being an exception in nature, should be strictly
construed against the claimant. The CA ruled that the computation of the CTA was
accurate however, it had a wrong basis which is the E.O. 229 or the Administrative
code. The order impliedly repealed all other acts not consistent with it. CA states that
the computation in Art. 13 of the NCC is in conflict of Sec.31 Chapt. 8 Administrative
Code and since the latter is more recent, it should be the rule to be upheld. With the
ruling, it was held by the Sc that the petition was filed at the last day of the prescriptive
period. The SC ordered the petition denied and remanded the case back to the CTA.

Issue:
Whether or not the prescription period for such refund had already ended?

Ruling:
No. The SC ruled that the basis for the computation of the CTA was incorrect following
Sec.229 of the NIRC. the correct computation to be followed should be that of Sec.31
Chapter 8 of the Administrative code, it being the latter law and impliedly repealing the
former laws.

Van Dorn V. Ronillo

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn seeks to set aside the orders of the respondent judge which
denied her motion to dismiss.

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while the PR is a citizen of the US. They were
married in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the Philippines and had 2 children, and
was divorced in Nevada and was later remarried in the same place to Theodore Van
Dorn. On June 8, 1983, PR filed a suit against the petitioner in the RTC of Pasay,
stating that the petitioner’s business in Ermita is part of the conjugal property of the
parties. PR prayed to be declared with the right to manage the business. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on ground that the cause of action was barred due to the
judgement of the divorce proceedings of then evade court where the PR
acknowledged that there were no conjugal properties. The court denied such because
the property is situated in the Philippines and that the previous judgement of the
Nevada court had no bearing.

In the SC, petitioner that the PR was estopped from claiming the property due to his
statements in the divorce proceedings and that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds. PR replied that the divorce decree cannot prevail over the laws
of the Philippines and to its national policy. The issue faced by the court is the divorce
of the parties in nevada. The Nevada court was considered to have obtained the
jurisdiction over the persons. The validity of the Nevada divorce is unquestionable, the
judgement of that court is binding upon the PR as an american citizen. Court decided
that the divorce was valid and that the PR is no longer the husband of the petitioner,
therefore, has no legal standing to sue since he is bound by the decision of his court.
The SC granted the petition and for the lower courts to grant the dismissal of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgement of the Nevada Court is absolute?

Ruling:
Yes. However, it is only absolute to the PR being an American citizen. Therefore, he no
longer has any legal standing to sue in this country, and since the property in question
is situate in the Philippines.

Pilapil V Ibay-Somera
Facts:
On Sept. 7, 1979, Imelda Pilapil, a filipino citizen, and PR Erich Geiling, a german
citizen, were married before the registrar of births, marriages and deaths, in
Friedensweiler in Germany. The couple lived in Malate, Manila and had one child,
Isabella Geiling. They were separated by de facto. PR initiated a divorce proceeding in
Germany in the Shoneberg Local Court, stating that their marriage was a failure and
that they have been living separately. Petitioner also filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC of manila. The Shoneberg Court
promulgated a decree of divorce on ground of failure of marriage of the spouses with
the custody of the cild awarded to the petitioner. 5mos. after the issuance of the
divorce, PR filed 2 complaints of adultery in the office of the city fiscal of manila,
alleging that while still married to the PR, the petitioner had an affair with William Chia
and Jesus Chua. After investigation, complaint was about to be dismissed due to lack
of evidence by assistant fiscal. However, after review of the city fiscal, approved a
resolution to file the adultery complaint. The case was given to the RTC manila “People
V. Pilapil & Chia” and “People V. Pilapil & Chua”.

Petitioner filed a petition asking Secretary of Justice to set aside the resolutions of the
fiscal and the cases against her dismissed. SJ ordered the case to be forwarded to his
office for review. Petitioner filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition and prayer for
temporary restraining order and to seek the annulment of the lower court dismissing
her motion to quash the complaint. Petitioner’s ground was that the court had no
jurisdiction over the case and that the offended spouse is a foreigner who already
obtained a decree of divorce prior to filing the complaint. Court granted the restraining
order against the PR. SJ ordered the city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case,
finding the petition meritorious.

Art. 334 RPC, stated that the complaint of adultery cannot be prosecuted without a
sworn statement of the offended spouse. The SC decided that at the time of the filing
of the complaint, the legal capacity of the PR is no longer as the offended spouse since
the decree of divorce had already been passed out.

Issue:
Whether or not the PR may file a complaint against the petitioner even after decree of
divorce from the German court was already issued?

Ruling:
No. the SC ruled that In filing a criminal complaint for adultery or concubinage, there
must be a sworn statement from the offended spouse. In this case, during the filing of
the complaint, the PR was no longer the offended spouse since he was already
declared to be divorced, and that is why the SC cannot grant his complaint.

San Luis V. San luis

Facts:
Petition for review assailing the decision of the CA which reversed and set aside the
resolution of the RTC of Makati.

A case for the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former governor of
Laguna. Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages during his life. First marriage was to Virginia
Sulit with 6 children; Second was to Merry Lee Corwin with 1 son. Merry Lee, an
American citizen filed a divorce in the Family Court of Hawaii ordering an absolute
divorce. Third marriage was to the respondent, Felicidad San Luis, with then a surname
of Sagalongos, in LA California. Felicisimo spent 18yrs. with respondent. Respondent
then set for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letter of administration in the RTC of Makati.
She alleged that she was the widow of the decedent who lived in Alabang Village,
Alabang. That the only surviving heirs are the respondent herself; 6 children from 1st
marriage, 1 child from 2nd marriage; that decedent left behind real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at 30,304,178php. Petitioner prays that the properties
be liquidated and for the letter of administration be issued to her.

Feb. 4, 1994, Rodolfo San Luis(petitioner), child from 1st marriage, a motion to dismiss
on ground of improper venue to file case and failure to state cause of action; that the
letter of administration should be filed in laguna, it being the prior residence of the
decedent; and that the respondent had no legal personality to file the case since at the
time of death, decedent was still legally married to Merry Lee, making respondent only
a mistress. Court ordered the denial of the motions to dismiss. Respondent submitted
the legal documents as evidence that the decedent regularly went home to Alabang
Village. She also presented the order of absolute divorce from the court of Hawaii to
show that the divorce with Merry Lee was in effect. She stated that Art. 26 of the
Family Code, Allowed the decedent had the legal capacity to marry her.

Petitioners Rodolfo, raised that Paragraph 2 of Art. 26 cannot be given retroactive

effect to validate the bigamous marriage of the respondent because it violates their
rights. Court denied the motion for reconsideration and that presiding judge was
changed. Court denied the petition for letter of administration since the last residence
of the decedent was in laguna, hence, it should be issued in the same. Court also
stated that respondent does not have legal capacity to file petition, since her marriage
was bigamous. They also stated that the absolute divorce did not affect the decedent
since he is a filipino citizen. And that Art. 26 cannot be retroactively applied.

Respondent appealed with the Ca which reversed the prior decisions and remanded
the case back. Court stated that the place of residence is different from place of
domicile and that letter of administration is legally filed in makati. Rodolfo filed petition
for review on certiorari to the SC. They stated that Residence is synonymous with
Domicile. SC does not fin merit in the petition, sated that the term residence meant
actual residence and differ from legal residence or domicile(Sec.1 Rule73). Letter of
administration was correctly filed. Case of van dorn must be applied. SC affirmed the
ruling of the CA’s reversal and remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not place of domicile is the same as residence?

Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file petition?

Ruling:
No. The court stated that under Sec.1 of Rule 73, the term residence meant ‘actual
residence’ which is different from Legal Domicile.

Yes. The court used the decision of the case of Van Dorn in that the decree of divorce
is binding upon the party if the alien spouse filed for it and that the Philippines
recognises its validity. The marriage therefore of the respondent is not bigamous.